

On the Computational Complexity of Minimal Cumulative Cost Graph Pebbling

Graph Pebbling is Cool and
Important!...but Hard

Jeremiah Blocki

Samson Zhou



Motivation

- ❖ Users tend to pick weak passwords
- ❖ Server attacks are inevitable



Entity	Year	Records
Yahoo	2013	1,000,000,000
Yahoo	2014	500,000,000
Friend Finder Networks	2016	412,214,295
Massive American business hack including 7-Eleven and Nasdaq	2012	160,000,000
Adobe Systems	2014	152,000,000
eBay	2014	145,000,000
Heartland	2009	130,000,000
Rambler.ru	2012	98,167,935
TK / TJ Maxx	2007	94,000,000
AOL	2004	92,000,000
Anthem Inc.	2015	80,000,000
Sony PlayStation Network	2011	77,000,000
JP Morgan Chase	2014	76,000,000
National Archives and Records Administration (U.S. military veterans' records)	2009	76,000,000
Target Corporation	2014	70,000,000
Home Depot	2014	56,000,000

YAHOO!



GmailTM
by Google



 Adobe[®]



eHarmony[®]

ASHLEY
MADISON[®].COM

LastPass 

ebay



Linked 



User	Password	User	Password Hash
Stephen	auhsoJ	Stephen	39e717cd3f5c4be78d97090c69f4e655
Lisa	hsifdrowS	Lisa	f567c40623df407ba980bfad6dff5982
James	1010NO1Z	James	711f1f88006a48859616c3a5cbcc0377
Harry	sinocarD tupaC	Harry	fb74376102a049b9a7c5529784763c53
Sarah	auhsoJ	Sarah	39e717cd3f5c4be78d97090c69f4e655

User	Random Salt	Password Hash
Stephen	06917d7ed65c466fa180a6fb62313ab9	b65578786e544b6da70c3a9856cdb750
Lisa	51f2e43105164729bb46e7f20091adf8	2964e639aa7d457c8ec0358756cbffd9
James	fea659115b7541479c1f956a59f7ad2f	dd9e4cd20f134dda87f6ac771c48616f
Harry	30ebf72072134f1bb40faa8949db6e85	204767673a8d4fa9a7542ebc3eceb3a2
Sarah	711f51082ea84d949f6e3efecf29f270	e3afb27d59a34782b6b4baa0c37e2958

Motivation

- ❖ Users tend to pick weak passwords
- ❖ Server attacks are inevitable
- ❖ Try to mitigate offline attacks
- ❖ Specialized hardware (ASIC) can compute 10^{12} hashes per second.





Password Hash Function Goals


- ❖ “Moderately Expensive” to compute
- ❖ Expensive to compute on ASIC
- ❖ Fast and cheap on PC







ANTMINER




Memory Hard Functions

- ❖ Memory hard functions require comparatively more resources for adversaries to compute
- ❖ Data-dependent memory hard functions are susceptible to side-channel attacks
- ❖ Data-independent memory hard functions (iMHFs)

iMHFs


$f_{G,H}$



Hash function: H

iMHFs

$f_{G,H}$




$$h_1 = H(pwd, salt)$$



iMHFs


$f_{G,H}$



$$h_2 = H(h_1)$$

iMHFs

$f_{G,H}$




$$h_3 = H(h_1, h_2),$$

$$h_4 = H(h_2)$$

iMHFs

$f_{G,H}$




$$h_5 = H(h_3, h_4)$$

iMHFs


- ❖ Calculating an iMHF can be modeled as graph pebbling [AS15]




Graph Pebbling




Graph Pebbling




Graph Pebbling




Graph Pebbling




Graph Pebbling




Graph Pebbling



Graph Pebbling




Graph Pebbling




iMHFs

- ❖ How to quantify “memory-hardness” of iMHF?
- ❖ ST-complexity: maximum number of pebbles \times number of steps
 - ❖ 2 pebbles \times 7 steps = 14
- ❖ ST-complexity can scale badly with multiple evaluations [AS15]
- ❖ [AS15] \exists function f such that:

$$ST(\sqrt{n} \text{ instances of } f) = O(ST(f))$$




Graph Pebbling




$$|P_1| = 1$$

Graph Pebbling




$$|P_1| + |P_2| = 1 + 2 = 3$$

Graph Pebbling




$$|P_1| + |P_2| + |P_3| = 3 + 2 = 5$$

Graph Pebbling




$$\sum_{\{i=1\}}^4 |P_i| = 5 + 1 = 6$$

Graph Pebbling




$$\sum_{\{i=1\}}^5 |P_i| = 6 + 2 = 8$$

Graph Pebbling



$$\sum_{\{i=1\}}^6 |P_i| = 8 + 2 = 10$$

Graph Pebbling



$$cc(G) = \sum_{\{i=1\}}^7 |P_i| = 10 + 1 = 11$$

iMHFs



❖ [AS15] CC amortizes well:

❖ $CC(n \text{ copies of } f) = n \times CC(f)$

$cc(G)$	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Argon2i [BDK15]	$\Omega(n^{1.75})$ [BZ17]	$O(n^{1.767})$ [BZ17]
DRSample [ABH17]	$\Omega\left(\frac{n^2}{\log n}\right)$ [ABH17]	$O\left(\frac{n^2 \log \log n}{\log n}\right)$ [ABH17]



Gap of 500,000

$$7.3 \cdot 10^{-6} \cdot \frac{n^2}{\log n}$$

$$\frac{n^2}{6}$$

Review

- ❖ Data-independent memory hard functions require comparatively more resources for adversaries to compute
- ❖ Calculating an iMHF can be modeled as graph pebbling
- ❖ Cumulative complexity better model than space-time complexity



Main Result

❖ Computing $cc(G)$ is NP-hard!

❖ Implication:
Cryptanalysis of
memory-hard
functions is provably
hard



Bounded 2-Linear Covering

- ❖ Given n variables x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n , integers $m \leq k$, and k equations of the form $x_i + c = x_j$, can we find m assignments so that all equations are satisfied?
- ❖ $x_1 + 2 = x_2, \quad x_2 + 3 = x_3, \quad x_1 + 6 = x_3$
- ❖ $x_1 + 5 = x_2, \quad x_2 + 1 = x_3, \quad x_1 + 5 = x_3$
- ❖ $m = 2$ ($k = 6$)
- ❖ Assignment 1: $x_1 = 1, x_2 = 3, x_3 = 6$

Bounded 2-Linear Covering



- ❖ Given n variables x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n , integers $m \leq k$, and k equations of the form $x_i + c = x_j$, can we find m assignments so that all equations are satisfied?
- ❖ $x_1 + 2 = x_2, \quad x_2 + 3 = x_3, \quad x_1 + 6 = x_3$
- ❖ $x_1 + 5 = x_2, \quad x_2 + 1 = x_3, \quad x_1 + 5 = x_3$
- ❖ $m = 2$
- ❖ Assignment 1: $x_1 = 1, x_2 = 3, x_3 = 6$
- ❖ Assignment 2: $x_1 = 1, x_2 = 6, x_3 = 7$

Bounded 2-Linear Covering

- ❖ Given n variables x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n , integers $m \leq k$, and k equations of the form $x_i + c = x_j$, can we find m assignments so that all equations are satisfied?
- ❖ $x_1 + 2 = x_2, \quad x_2 + 3 = x_3, \quad x_1 + 6 = x_3$
- ❖ $x_1 + 5 = x_2, \quad x_2 + 1 = x_3, \quad x_1 + 5 = x_3$
- ❖ $m = 2$
- ❖ Assignment 1: $x_1 = 1, x_2 = 3, x_3 = 6$
- ❖ Assignment 2: $x_1 = 1, x_2 = 6, x_3 = 7$
- ❖ **Our Theorem:** B2LC is NP-complete (reduction from 3PARTITION)


Reductions

GOAL: If m assignments for k equations,
then Pebbling Cost is SMALL.
Otherwise, Pebbling Cost is LARGE




Reductions

GOAL: If m assignments for k equations,
then Pebbling Cost is SMALL.
Otherwise, Pebbling Cost is LARGE




Honest Pebbling

GOAL: If m assignments for k equations,
then Pebbling Cost is SMALL.
Otherwise, Pebbling Cost is LARGE




Honest Pebbling

GOAL: If m assignments for k equations,
then Pebbling Cost is SMALL.
Otherwise, Pebbling Cost is LARGE




Honest Pebbling

GOAL: If m assignments for k equations,
then Pebbling Cost is SMALL.
Otherwise, Pebbling Cost is LARGE




Honest Pebbling

GOAL: If m assignments for k equations,
then Pebbling Cost is SMALL.
Otherwise, Pebbling Cost is LARGE




Honest Pebbling

GOAL: If m assignments for k equations,
then Pebbling Cost is SMALL.
Otherwise, Pebbling Cost is LARGE




Honest Pebbling

GOAL: If m assignments for k equations,
then Pebbling Cost is SMALL.
Otherwise, Pebbling Cost is LARGE




Honest Pebbling

GOAL: If m assignments for k equations,
then Pebbling Cost is SMALL.
Otherwise, Pebbling Cost is LARGE




Cheater!

GOAL: If m assignments for k equations,
then Pebbling Cost is SMALL.
Otherwise, Pebbling Cost is LARGE




Cheater!

GOAL: If m assignments for k equations,
then Pebbling Cost is SMALL.
Otherwise, Pebbling Cost is LARGE




Cheater!

GOAL: If m assignments for k equations,
then Pebbling Cost is SMALL.
Otherwise, Pebbling Cost is LARGE



Cheater!



Lemma 4 *If the B2LC instance has a valid solution, then $\Pi_{\text{cc}}^{\parallel}(G_{\text{B2LC}}) \leq \tau c m n + 2 c m n + 2 c k m + 1$.*

Lemma 5 *If the B2LC instance does not have a valid solution, then $\Pi_{\text{cc}}^{\parallel}(G_{\text{B2LC}}) \geq \tau c m n + \tau$.*

Reductions

Figure 5 shows an example of a reduction in its entirety when $\tau = 1$.





Fig. 5. An example of a complete reduction G_{B2LC} , again $m = 3$ and $c = 3$. The green nodes represent the pebbled vertices at time step 2 while the red nodes represent the pebbled vertices at time step 10.

Graph Reducibility

- ❖ We say that a directed acyclic graph G is (e, d) -reducible if there exists a set S of e nodes such that $G - S$ has depth at most d .



Graph Reducibility


- ❖ Can deduce $cc(G)$ from (e, d) -reducible!
- ❖ Depth-robustness is a *necessary* condition for secure iMHFs (AB16)
 - ❖ There exists attack with $E_R(A) = O(en + \sqrt{n^3 d})$, which is $o(n^2)$ for $e, d = o(n)$.
- ❖ Depth-robustness is a *sufficient* condition for secure iMHFs (ABP16)
 - ❖ $cc(G) \geq ed$

Summary

- ❖ We show computing $cc(G)$ is NP-hard (as is computing $st(G)$).
- ❖ Integer Program for $cc(G)$ has $\Omega\left(\frac{n}{\log n}\right)$ integrality gap.
 - ❖ Evidence that a problem is hard to approximate
- ❖ We show that given e, d , it is NP-hard to determine whether a graph is (e, d) -reducible (even for graphs with bounded degree).
- ❖ Given d , it is hard to:
 - ❖ Approximate e to a factor of 1.3 (minimum Vertex Cover).
 - ❖ Approximate e to a factor of 2 (Unique Games Conjecture).
- ❖ An optimal cumulative cost pebbling of a graph may take more than n steps.

Open Questions

- ❖ Does there exist an algorithm to approximate $cc(G)$?
- ❖ Do there exist constants c_1, c_2 so that given an (e, d) -reducible graph, we can find a set S of $c_1 e$ nodes such that $G - S$ has depth at most $c_2 d$?



- ❖ Even $O(\log n)$ approximation helps!

[illegible]

Questions?



- (1) Variables: For $1 \leq v \leq n$ and $0 \leq t \leq n^2$,
 - (a) Integer Program: $x_v^t \in \{0, 1\}$
 - (b) Relaxed Linear Program: $0 \leq x_v^t \leq 1$
- (2) Goal (minimize cumulative pebbling cost): $\min \sum_{v \in V} \sum_{t=0}^{n^2} x_v^t$.
- (3) Constraint 1 (Must Finish): $\sum_{t=0}^{n^2} x_n^t \geq 1$.
- (4) Constraint 2 (No Pebbles At Start): $\sum_{v>0} x_v^0 \leq 0$.
- (5) Constraint 3 (Pebbling Is Valid): For all v s.t $|\text{Parents}(v)| \geq 1$ and $0 \leq t \leq n^2 - 1$ we have

$$x_v^{t+1} \leq x_v^t + \frac{\sum_{v' \in \text{Parents}(v)} x_{v'}^t}{|\text{Parents}(v)|}.$$




Fig. 5: Integer Program for Pebbling.

Theorem 9 *Let G be with constant indegree δ . Then there is a fractional solution to our LP Relaxation (of the Integer Program in Figure 5) with cost at most $3n$.*

Reductions

- ❖ Reducing 3-PARTITION to B2LC
- ❖ Reducing B2LC to $cc(G)$

Reductions

$$T = \sum_{\{i=1\}}^m s_m$$

$$x_1 + s_1 = x_2, \quad x_2 + s_2 = x_3, \quad \dots, \quad x_m + s_m = x_{m+1},$$

$$x_1 + 0 = x_2, \quad x_2 + 0 = x_3, \quad \dots, \quad x_m + 0 = x_{m+1},$$


$$x_1 + T = x_2, \quad x_2 + T = x_3, \quad \dots, \quad x_m + T = x_{m+1},$$

$$x_1 + 2T = x_2, \quad x_2 + 2T = x_3, \quad \dots, \quad x_m + 2T = x_{m+1},$$

$$x_1 + (n-2)T = x_2, \quad x_2 + (n-2)T = x_3, \quad \dots, \quad x_m + (n-2)T = x_{m+1},$$


$$x_1 + \frac{T}{n} + 3(i-1)(n-2)T = x_{m+1},$$

Reductions




$m = 3n$ integers in original 3-PARTITION instance

Reductions




$m = 3n$ integers in original 3-PARTITION instance

Reductions




$m = 3n$ integers in original 3-PARTITION instance

Reductions



$m = 3n$ integers in original 3-PARTITION instance

Reductions



$m = 3n$ integers in original 3-PARTITION instance

3-PARTITION

- ❖ Given set of $3n$ integers, can we partition them into n sets, each with the same sum?
- ❖ $\{1,2,4,5,6,7,8,11,13\}$
 - ❖ $\{2,4,13\} \rightarrow 19$ $\{1,7,11\} \rightarrow 19$ $\{5,6,8\} \rightarrow 19$
- ❖ $\{1,2,3,4,6,7,9,10,11\}$

Reductions

- ✓ Reducing 3-PARTITION to B2LC
- ✦ Reducing B2LC to $cc(G)$