# Authentication


UT CS361S
SPRING 2021
LECTURE NOTES

#### Authentication/Authorization


Validating Identity

Permissions
Assigned to a
Validated Identity

#### The Authentication Process



#### Authentication Mechanism



## The Big Three

Something you **KNOW** 

Something you **HAVE** 

Something you **ARE** 




#### KNOW: Passwords

#### **Security Requirements**

- The password is ONLY known by the party seeking authentication
- The password cannot be easily guessed by human or computer
- 3. The password will not be forgotten by the party seeking authentication

## Password Registration



#### Password Verification

COMPUTATION & ALGORITHMIC COMPONENTS

Verify
D' = HASH(Y, salt k)
Load D
Compare D == D'?

DATABASE ID X: k, D

**NETWORK** 

Identity X
Password Y


**Transport** 

Input Identity X


**TERMINAL** 

Password Y


#### Common Problems




### Challenge Response Symmetric



### Challenge Response Asymmetric



### Man-In-The-Middle (MITM)






# Something you Have


#### **Security Assumptions**


- The "token" is ONLY possessed by the party seeking authentication
- The token cannot be easily forged or duplicated
- 3. The authentication protocol is secure

## Something you Have Examples









# Problems with "Tokens"

Is it **REALLY** something you have?

Is sending a code by email 2-factor?

What about phone cloning?

What about network interception?

Is an RSA Token's seed just something you know?

"Something you can respond with"

#### **Security Assumptions**

- 1.The "characteristic" is effectively unique
- 2.Can effectively measure, record, or detect the characteristic
- 3. Characteristic cannot be forged, replicated, or otherwise "lost"
- 4. Characteristic will not change (too much) over time
- 5.Characteristic will never need to be revoked
- 6.The Authentication Protocol is Secure!

# Something you Are

# False Positives vs False Negatives



False Negative – Do not authorize party with valid characteristic



False Positive – Authorize party with invalid characteristic



# Receiver Operating Characteristic

The trade off between FP and FN

Decreasing one typically increases the other

Equal Error Rate is when FP approximately equals FN

In most biometrics, *False Negatives* are worse

#### Problems with Biometrics

- 1. Fingerprinting has been \*seriously\* misused in Courts (see Anderson at pp. 469-470)
- 2. Interpretation of results and understanding of statistics
- 3. Variable accuracy in scanning mechanism
- 4. "Freshness"
- 5. Belief in infallibility leads to security culture problems
- 6. Biometrics exclude a \*lot\* of people (e.g., differently abled)
- 7. Cvil Rights and Privacy issues
- 8. Injury that alter the characteristic (e.g., fingerprint)

#### One other "Authentication"

"SomeWHERE you Are"

Almost universally used as an ancillary form of authentication Generally used do disprove rather than prove identity