

Maré United – an External Evaluation



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April 2014

Executive Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

- *Relevance*

Luta pela Paz did take a serious approach to ensuring that the Maré United project was developed and designed in a way that was relevant to the needs of its intended beneficiaries. The project's underlying intervention logic was coherent and realistic, it met needs of the communities which it serves and was sufficient flexibility for adaptation to a changing context. Luta pela Paz did involve the relevant stakeholders actively in the design of the project and has shown that it is actively thinking about how this could be improved in the future. All stake-holders interviewed considered the project to be highly relevant to the needs of its target groups and beneficiaries.

It is recommended that Luta pela Paz continue to monitor the gender break-down of its participants and to take positive action to promote equal opportunities and remedial action to tackle inequality, while recognising the limits set by the external environment.

It is recommended that Luta pela Paz consider how to develop its activities that involve the parents of children who participate in the Academies.

- *Effectiveness*

All of the evidence provided during this evaluation shows that the project has been effectively implemented. No one interviewed suggested that similar or better results could have been achieved with a different methodology. It was repeatedly stressed that the key to Luta pela Paz's effectiveness is that it continually monitors and evaluates all aspects of the delivery of its programmes and is extremely responsive to suggestions for improvements and adaptations. It is recommended that Luta pela Paz make more use of group discussions for monitoring and evaluation purposes rather than relying so much on written questionnaires.

- *Efficiency*

No evidence was found which indicated that the project could have been delivered at a lower cost, or that any resources were wasted or used inappropriately.

Security assessments should be made mandatory as part of the project planning and this should include the provision of a realistic budget heading to cover issues such as legal protection for staff against police malpractice, witness protection for staff and staff evacuation where necessary.

- *Impact*

All of the evidence provided during this evaluation strongly suggests that the Maré United project has had a significant positive impact on young people's behaviour, self-esteem and way of thinking.

It is recommended that Luta pela Paz continues to discuss internally how to develop an outreach strategy with the city and state authorities in Rio de Janeiro and to increase the project's impact on public policy decision-making.

- *Sustainability*

The continued expansion of Luta pela Paz shows that it has been extremely adept at finding new sources of such funding. Luta pela Paz should continue to invest heavily in securing the support of

international as well as national donors. Staff salaries and other benefits should also remain competitive to encourage professional staff recruitment and retention.

The Luta pela Paz ‘model’ is now being successfully ‘exported’ to other Brazilian states and other countries, which can be regarded as an indicator of both its relevance and sustainability.

Maré United an External Evaluation

Introduction

This report summarizes the findings of an external evaluation of a three year Luta pela Paz project, Maré United, funded by Comic Relief from 2011-14. Its purpose is to assess if the outcomes described in the original project design were achieved, and the anticipated benefits realized. It should help Luta pela Paz, Comic Relief and other stakeholders to take stock of and learn from the project implementation process, gain a greater understanding of the effectiveness and appropriateness of the model, identify gaps and assess the sustainability of the activities and outputs of the project. It should also provide practical and realistic recommendations for future programme design and development.

Luta pela Paz first established an Academy in Complexo da Maré in 2000 and its activities are discussed in more detail below. The Maré United project was established in 2011 to build on the organization's work. According to the original project proposal Maré United aimed to open three different satellite projects in different communities within Maré – each of them in a region controlled by different armed criminal factions – and replicate the activities offered at the main Academy.¹ The project intended to offer young people various sporting activities alongside education, job training courses, and weekly personal development classes and support. It also specifically aimed to access, engage with and realize the potential of the most hard-to-reach and socio-economically marginalized young people.

The main Academy, which already provides similar activities, would be used as a hub for regular exchange meetings of young people from the satellite projects and Luta pela Paz would also establish integrated teams to compete in community events and city-wide tournaments. The overall objectives of the project were summarized as: to achieve a: 'Reduction of anti-social, criminal or violent behaviour of young people on the project that have a history of violent and/or criminal behaviour due to taking advantage of the sporting, education and personal development opportunities provided by the project leading to their making improved life choices.'² This has also been expressed as the: 'Prevention of violent behaviour and reduced experience of violence amongst young people via uptake of increased socio-economic inclusion opportunities and value attached to peaceful behaviour through participation in sport and personal development.'³

The specific aim of the project was to bring down the 'invisible barriers' imposed by decades of control by drug trafficking factions. By bringing young people from different communities together, Luta pela Paz aimed to break down feelings of rivalry and mistrust between them, increase their understanding of their collective and individual rights as citizens, and build a greater sense of belonging to a unified Complexo da Maré. Amongst the indicators listed that Luta pela Paz wanted to see are: increased circulation of non-involved young people between 'rival' communities; a decrease in persistent stereotypes of young people in 'rival' communities; less anti-social, criminal or violent behaviour amongst young people; an increase in safer environments within the community as the result of increased cohesion amongst young people; an increase in the number of healthier and fitter young people in the community; and the up-skilling of local organizations and staff trained and monitored by Luta pela Paz as part of the project.⁴

¹ Comic Relief Application Form, International Project Grant Application 2009-2012; and Comic Relief Project Grant, Grant Start-up Form, no date

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

This evaluation was conducted in March and April 2014 and is primarily based on interviews with a total of 48 project stakeholders and an analysis of project documents. A full list of project documents is contained in Appendix 1 of this report. Other background material is cited in the footnotes. Most of the interviews were conducted between 18 and 28 March, although some additional interviews were conducted by Skype and email exchanges before and afterwards. The evaluation also drew on three focus group discussions involving the parents of young people from the different communities where the satellite projects are established. All interviews were conducted on the basis of confidentiality, although their dates are cited in the footnotes. A draft report was produced in early April and discussed with senior staff and the report was finalized after their input and comments.

This report also draws upon two previous, much broader, external evaluations of Luta pela Paz. The first of these, carried out for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Brazilian Ministry for Health and conducted by the Latin American Centre for the Study of Violence and Health (CLAVES), was published in 2006.⁵ The second was jointly published by Luta pela Paz and the Centre for Social Justice and Change, in the University of East London in July 2013, based on research carried out the previous year.⁶ The focus of these evaluations was different to the current report, but they provide extremely comprehensive and reasonably up to date information about the project, which the current report does not seek to duplicate, given its narrower geographical focus and time-constraints.

Since the second of these external evaluation reports was published, however, there has been a significant change in the external environment in Complexo da Maré. Armed activity by criminal gangs and the police began to increase during 2012 and significantly increased during the course of 2013. At least ten people were killed during a police operation inside Maré in June 2013 and police operations have become more frequent in the opening months of 2014.⁷ While the research for this report was being carried out a high-level decision was made between Brazil's President, Dilma Rousseff, and the State Governor, Sergio Cabral, to deploy the military in Complexo da Maré during the run-up to the World Cup in June 2014.

This has impacted on both the community in Maré and this evaluation report. The focus groups were originally scheduled to take place at the end of March 2014, but had to be postponed due to a violent police operation, which is discussed further below, and so were conducted in April 2014 using a slightly different format. Instead of conducting the focus groups entirely independently the evaluator adopted a fly-on-the-wall approach while Luta pela Paz's monitoring and evaluation team led discussions on how the organization could improve its services to the community and what were the principal challenges they felt in Maré at the moment.

One discussion took place while the Luta pela Paz building was surrounded by heavily armed soldiers and some of the parents, who did attend the meeting explained that many people are too afraid to leave their homes in the current environment. One set of interviews with staff members had to be terminated early because the Academy was shut down after shots were fired near to it. The police also illegally entered and searched the homes of several staff members who live in the community, often on the same day as interviews with them were being conducted. These developments obviously had a major impact on context in which the project is being implemented and will also affect its central objective of creating greater community cohesion in Maré, so are discussed in some detail in the next section of this report.

⁵Edinilsa Ramos de Souza e Patrícia, Constantino *Avaliação do projeto Luta pela Paz Maré – Rio de Janeiro*, Fundação Oswaldo Cruz, Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública, Centro Latino Americano de Estudos de Violência e Saúde Jorge Careli, Novembro de 2006

⁶ Alice Sampson and Maria Rita Vilella, *Fight for Peace Academies in Rio and London - assessing their progress and impact*, Centre for Social Justice and Change, School of Law and Social Sciences, University of East London, July 2013

⁷*Global Voices*, 'How the police have turned Rio de Janeiro's Maré favela into a battlefield', 28 March 2014

Key Questions for the Evaluation

The two key questions for the evaluation from the Terms of Reference are:

- 1) *What difference has the project made to people's lives (what, who, where, when)?*
- 2) *How has the project made this difference?*

These questions have been expanded using the five standard evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability and each question is addressed in a separate chapter of this report.

- *Relevance*: was the project suitably designed to address the problems identified? Was it relevant to the needs of its target group and beneficiaries?
- *Effectiveness*: how far did Luta pela Paz deliver on the project's intended outputs and results? Could it achieve similar or better results with a different methodology? How could things be done better in the future?
- *Efficiency*: how did Luta pela Paz perform on the allocation of human and financial resources in implementing the project? Did it achieve value for money? Are Comic Relief satisfied with the reports they received? Could this be improved in any way?
- *Impact*: what contribution did the project make to the change Luta pela Paz and Comic relief wants to see? What were the final results of the activities and how did they fit into Luta pela Paz's overall strategy for the period?
- *Sustainability*: are the project's results sustainable? Is the support and involvement of Luta pela Paz and Comic Relief still required in order to achieve lasting results and, if so, how and where?

The evaluation also addressed the issue of equal opportunities and non-discrimination as a cross-cutting theme and specifically addressed the question of how, if at all, did the Comic Relief condition asking Luta pela Paz to review its approach to gender, disability and HIV impact on the project reach or impact?

Background

Complexo da Maré consists of 17 *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro with a total of almost 130,000 inhabitants (see map in Appendix Two). The area is located on the margins of Guanabara Bay, and used to consist of a series of beaches, small islands and mangroves. Starting in the 1940s, it was gradually transformed into a vast urban sprawl, as the city's industrial development boom brought an influx of migrants from other parts of Brazil and abroad. It is now situated between three of Rio's most important highways: *Avenida Brasil* (Brazil Avenue), *Linha Vermelha* (the Red Line) and *Linha Amarela* (the Yellow Line), linking the city with the International airport. Its position is strategically significant given the number of visitors who will soon be passing along these transport routes during the World Cup. Maré is also the last big 'unpacified *favela*' near to the city centre and has become a hold-out base in recent years for the heavily-armed criminal groups that dominate the drugs trade.

The history of Rio's *favelas*, the growing influence of the drug traffic and the attempts by the authorities to control the resulting violence have been extensively documented elsewhere.⁸ An analysis carried out in 2003 concluded that the 'extreme levels of armed violence are generating numbers of firearm-related deaths in the city of Rio de Janeiro that are comparable, if not greater, than the number of conflict-related casualties in many armed conflicts'.⁹ The gangs took over the residents' associations and began to impose certain rules of social behavior, using physical punishments that included arbitrary executions on those who transgressed. This meant that street crime became rare in some *favelas* as the 'traffic' took on many policing functions. In many cases the gang members had been born and raised in the *favelas* that they dominated, but as turf wars continued rival factions captured the territory of other gangs, which placed them in a position of 'occupation' over local communities.

During the 1990s, many children and teenagers joined the drug market, as first-generation dealers were arrested or killed. It is estimated that at its peak there were around 10,000 young people involved.¹⁰ The entrances to many *favelas* were blocked by barricades and guarded by armed *soldados*. Weapons such as assault rifles, machine guns and rocket propelled grenades were carried openly and it was not uncommon to see children armed with armaments that they were barely able to lift. Dowdney has noted that the 'utilization of high powered weapons and the types of armed violence caused by inter-faction disputes and confrontations between the police and factions' mean that 'stark similarities exist between children employed in [the city's] drug factions and "child soldiers" in almost every functional and definitive aspect'.¹¹ This has become rarer since the 'pacification' process discussed in more detail below, however, Conjunto Marcílio Dias where Luta pela Paz has one of its satellite academies remains guarded in this way and on the night of the focus group session the evaluation team had to drive past a barricade and gunmen.

The authorities responded with a range of measures from the introduction of community policing, to the granting of 'bravery awards' to officers, which gave cash payments of up to 150 per cent of their monthly

⁸ See, for example, Janice Perlman, *Favela: four decades of living on the edge in Rio de Janeiro*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010; Ludmila Mendonça Lopes Ribeiro, (coord.); Silva, Klárisa Almeida and Silva, Marcella Carvalho de Araújo. *Cronologia das políticas de segurança pública e dos modelos de policiamento: Rio de Janeiro, 1983-2010*. Projeto História do Policiamento Comunitário do Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC/FGV, n.d.; Maria Alves and Philip Evanson, *Living in the Crossfire, Favela Residents, Drug Dealers and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011

⁹ Luke Dowdney, *Children of the drug trade, a case study of children in organised armed violence in Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: 7Letras, 2003), p.117.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

salary according to how many ‘criminals’ an officer killed.¹² This so-called Wild West Bonus had a dramatic impact on the police’s killing rate, which jumped from an average of 3.2 people per month between January and May of 1995, to 20.55 per month between June 1995 and February 1996.¹³ The number of civilians killed by the police rose from 355 in 1998 to 900 in 2002, a 153 per cent increase.¹⁴ The impact of the violence also began to reach well beyond the *favelas* as the criminal gangs enforced city wide shut-downs to protest at the jailing of their leaders, attacking police stations with grenades and automatic weapons and burning buses that tried to operate, including, notoriously in 2006, a bus in which the passengers remained trapped inside.¹⁵

The authorities also launched so-called *mega-operações*, large-scale in-and-out raids on selected *favelas*, which the police entered in large numbers and with a heavily militarized presence, often killing completely uninvolved people. In 2007, for example, an operation in Complexo do Alemão resulted in 40 people being shot dead over a three month period.¹⁶ In a subsequent investigation the UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial executions stated that: ‘I received credible accounts from residents and family members of victims that victims were shot in the back whilst walking away from police, or dragged out of homes unarmed and executed, or disarmed and then shot in the head.’¹⁷ Such ‘invasions’ had little impact on the crime gangs, however, who simply resumed their activities once the police had left.

In the mid-2000s, the situation in Rio was further complicated by the rise of a new armed movement: the militias. Formed by off-duty or retired policemen and other public agents, the militias initially claimed that they wanted to liberate the *favelas* from drug trafficking. In turn, residents had to pay fees for different services and a ‘security tax’. Militias extra-judicially execute suspected criminals, intimidate residents, torture journalists and threaten and kill those who speak out. A Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) report concluded that the militias dominated 171 *favelas* and found extensive evidence of official state involvement in them.¹⁸ In August 2009 a member of the current Governor Sergio Cabral’s personal security detail was arrested on charges of alleged participation in a militia that had recently murdered four people.¹⁹ There have also been persistent allegations that the police extort money from the drug gangs and use official operations as cover to carry out private kidnappings and executions. As Cano has observed, the main motivation for the formation of the militias seems to have been that some police officers realized that they could make more money controlling territories than receiving bribes from traffickers whose profits were decreasing, due to the decline in income generated by the drugs trade.²⁰

¹² Luiz E. Soares and João T. Sento-Sé, *Estado e Segurança Pública no Rio de Janeiro: Dilemas de um Aprendizado Difícil*. Programa Maré-CAPEs-CNPQ - Reforma do Estado, 2000.

¹³ Jailson de Souza e Silva e Jorge Luiz Barbosa, *Favela: alegria e dor na Cidade, Rio de Janeiro*: Editora Senac Rio [X] Brasil e ao Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Comercial, 2005

¹⁴ Center of Criminal Research and Analysis, “Annual Crime Statistics for the Capitol of Rio De Janeiro, 1991-2002,” Office of the Rio de Janeiro state Secretary of Security.

¹⁵ Richard Penglase, ‘The shutdown of Rio de Janeiro. The poetics of drug trafficker violence’, *Anthropology Today* 21 (5): 3-7, 2005; and *Guardian*, Conor Foley ‘The grim news from Ipanema’, 1 January 2007

¹⁶ National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15(a) of the annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1, Brazil, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, First session Geneva, 7–18 April 2008, A/HRC/WG.6/1/BRA/1, 7 March 2008, para 51.

¹⁷ Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Mr Philip Alston, Mission to Brazil, A/HRC/11/2/Add.2 future, 28 August 2008, para 22

¹⁸ Assembleia legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (ALERJ), Relatório Final da Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito destinada a investigar a ação de Milícias no âmbito do estado do Rio de Janeiro (November 2008).

¹⁹ A/HRC/14/24/Add.4, 28 May 2010, para 29

²⁰ Ignacio Cano, ‘Seis por meia dúzia? Um estudo exploratório do fenômeno das chamadas “Milícias” no Rio de Janeiro’ in *Segurança, Milícias e Tráfico no Rio de Janeiro*: 48-83. Rio de Janeiro: Justiça Global, 2008.

In 2008 the state Governor unveiled a new strategy based on the permanent deployment of specially trained police pacification units (*Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora* – UPPs) which would be sent into areas to stay.²¹ The UPPs are composed of new police recruits, who are, at least in theory, supposed to receive special training in human rights and community policing strategies as well as higher pay and other benefits, which it is hoped will make them less easy to corrupt. The strategy rests on four sequential steps. First, physically retaking control of a territory (*retomada*) through a massive show of force, often using officers from the elite special operations police battalion (*Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais* – BOPE); next the *stabilization* of the territory through highly visible patrolling, again, often under responsibility of the BOPE; then a definitive occupation in which the UPP assumes the main responsibility for policing; and finally a shock of order (*choque de ordem*) against various forms of petty illegality and irregular practices in which the state begins to reassert its social control. During the latter two phases of the operation ‘pacified’ territories are supposed to be targeted for social investment, vocational training and job creation schemes as well as a coordinated delivery of social services that aims to ‘integrate’ them into the rest of the city.²²

Although initially widely seen as successful the ‘pacification’ process has become increasingly controversial.²³ The process has coincided with a big fall in some forms of violent crime – with murder rates, in particular, falling significantly. However, while some these gains are undoubtedly real, some may partly be due to the way in which the police began to record them due to financial incentives in their own bonus system.²⁴ Other crimes, including petty thefts, street robberies, rapes and domestic violence have increased, partly perhaps because of increased reporting rates, but also because the ‘traffic’ no longer enforces its own norms of social control. Residents in the ‘pacified’ *favelas* have become increasingly critical of the police’s behaviour while the police themselves are still very divided about many of the concepts surrounding human rights and community policing, which are a key component of the UPP concept.²⁵ In October 2013 ten UPP police officers were charged with the abduction and murder of Amarildo de Souza a resident of Rocinha who ‘disappeared’ after being taken into police custody a few months earlier and is believed to have been tortured to death.²⁶ The UPPs are also suffering casualties as the armed gangs reappear in many ‘pacified’ *favelas* again.²⁷ Four police officers in UPPs have been shot dead in recent month and three UPP police stations were burned to the ground in mid-March 2014 in a coordinated series of attacks. A number of attacks took place in Maré on evenings when the focus group discussions were being carried out.

Complexo da Maré is now at the epicentre of these tensions. A UPP has not yet been deployed to it at the time of writing, mainly because the authorities appear to be over-stretched in controlling *favelas* that are supposedly now ‘pacified’. However, as discussed above, a large-scale operation by BOPE was carried out in Maré in the last week of March 2014, during which the police allegedly stabbed one man to death during this and kidnapped another for ransom. On 30 March 2014 the authorities deployed more than

²¹ Conor Foley, *Pelo Telefone: Rumors, truths and myths in the ‘pacification’ of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro*, HASOW, March 2014

²² *Bringing the state back into the favelas of Rio de Janeiro: Understanding changes in community life after the UPP pacification process* World Bank, October 2012

²³ Ignacio Cano, *Os Donos do Morro: Uma avaliação exploratória do impacto das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadoras (UPPs) do Rio de Janeiro*, Rio de Janeiro: Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) Laboratório de Análise da Violência (LAV) and Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública (FBSP), 2012

²⁴ Daniel Ganem Misse, *Políticas Sociais em Territórios Pacificados*, Tese, não publicada, Universidade Federal Fluminense, Centro de Estudos Gerais, Centro de Estudos Sociais Aplicados, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Sociologia e Direito, Niterói, 2013

²⁵ Julita Lemgruber, *Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: O Que Pensam Os Policiais. Relatório de Pesquisa*. CESeC, Março 2011

²⁶ *O Globo*, ‘Imagens mostra Amarildo de Souza sendo levado pela policia no RJ’, 9 de Agosto 2013

²⁷ Interviews conducted December 2013 and January 2014

1,400 police officers marines in a massive security operation and it is expected that they will remain in occupation of the territory until after the World Cup. During the first two weeks of April, when the focus groups were conducted, Maré was flooded with heavily armed police and soldiers and, as described above, there were a number of shooting incidents.

Maré's location between two of the city's main access roads to the city and close to both the international airport and the Maracana football stadium made it virtually inconceivable that the authorities would not subject it to extra security measures in the run-up to the World Cup in June 2014. Rumours about either a 'pacification' or a military occupation had been rife for many months, raising tensions in the area. Some members of the armed gangs who were based in other favelas in the city, such as Complexo do Alemão, had relocated to Maré in recent years due to the 'pacification' process, although many of these fled during the police and military operations described above.

Violence and crime in Rio involves complex webs of political interest, economic profit and corruption in which elements of the state itself are deeply enmeshed and this is the context in which Luta pela Paz operates. Understanding this is also crucial to understanding the influences shaping public security policies and this should be borne in mind when considering the impact of Luta pela Paz's activities when measured against its project objectives.

While outsiders often think of Complexo da Maré as a single territory, its internal geography, history and politics need to be understood as these had considerable impact on the development of Maré United. While extremely poor compared to the rest of the city, Maré also contains areas of relative wealth as well as deprivation. It stretches from Conjunto Esperança in the south to Conjunto Marcílio Dias in the north. Each *favela* has different characteristics and residents draw sharp socio-economic distinctions between both the territories and their inhabitants. One interviewee compared Maré to Copacabana saying that it contained the 'essence of Rio de Janeiro in all its diversity'.²⁸ Others stressed how well serviced it was compared to other territories and also noted that the territory has benefited from socio-economic development in recent years.²⁹ This is borne out by the national census figures which show, for example, that illiteracy rates dropped from around 20 per cent to 9 per cent between 2000 and 2010, while the percentage of people graduating from University has risen from 0.5 per cent to 1.6 per cent.³⁰ Interviewees repeatedly stressed that these wider economic and political forces had a crucial impact on the project's development and needed to be understood when assessing its impact. 'If the violence stopped we could be opening hotels here', one interviewee stated, in reference to the area's economic potential, due to its location between the international airport and the city centre.³¹

Nova Holanda, where Luta pela Paz has its main Academy, contains a number of other non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including two of Rio de Janeiro's most famous NGOs: Observatorio de Favelas and Redes de Desenvolvimento da Maré. Nova Holanda is relatively 'privileged' in terms of social services and access to employment when compared to neighbouring *favelas* and this has important 'political' implications when considering Maré United's goals. It has also long been controlled by *Comando Vermelho* (Red Command), Rio's oldest drug trafficking gang. To its immediate north are Rubens Vaz and Parque Uniao, the richest areas of Complexo da Maré, sometimes referred to as 'Zona Sul' by local residents, in ironic reference to the wealthy tourist/business part of the city. Further north still is Praia de Ramos, which contains Maré's last remaining beach and is the one area controlled by the militias. Further north still is Conjunto Marcílio Dias, one of Rio's oldest favelas, which was formed in

²⁸ Interview conducted 19 March 2014

²⁹ Interviews conducted 24 and 25 March 2014

³⁰ Segundo Relatório parcial da análise da segunda fase do Censo Maré 2000. See also Centro de Estudos e Ações Solidárias da Maré – CEASM, Caderno do CENSO MARÉ 2000 – Quem somos, quantos somos, o que fazemos?

³¹ Interview conducted 25 March 2014

1948, and is itself divided into three smaller areas (Mandacaru, Terra Nostra and Kelson). This is the most remote community of Maré, connected to it by a single road and bordering the neighbourhood of Penha. The isolation of Conjunto Marcílio Dias is exacerbated by the presence of the militia in Praia de Ramos. The militia has repeatedly tried to invade the area – which is why its entrance remains guarded by *Comando Vermelho* gunmen – and residents complained that the militia had prevented one of the only bus services from reaching the *favela*, making it virtually impossible for them to ever travel to the city.

To the south of Nova Holanda are Nova Maré, Baixa do Sapateiro, Morro do Timbau, and Conjunto Bento Ribeiro Dantas, which have historically been controlled by *Terceira Comanda* (Third Command). There is literally a front-line between the two communities, in Parque Maré and Baixa do Sapateiro, a street named Rua Evanildo Alves, referred to locally as the Gaza strip. Bullet holes in the buildings here – which include one of the few public schools – attest to the ongoing battles between the two factions for territorial control. One of Luta pela Paz's satellite Academies is now located here and, as described above, it was surrounded by soldiers during the focus group discussion that took place. There were also a number of shooting incidents in this area on the night of the focus groups.

Further south, and physically divided from them by *Linha Amarela*, are Conjunto Pinheiros, Vila dos Pinheiros, Conjunto Salsa e Merengue, Conjunto Vila do Joa and Conjunto Esperanca. These were previously controlled by Rio's third drug trafficking gang, *Amigos dos Amigos* (Friends of Friends). However, in 1998 *Terceira Comanda* mounted an invasion which drove them out and brought the entire south of Maré under their control. Bento Ribeiro Dantas used to be nicknamed 'cross-fire' locally since it marked the boundaries of the disputed area between the two gangs. While the research for this report was being carried out and a week before the police operation in the complex, a local commander of *Terceira Comanda* defected to *Amigos dos Amigos*, bringing almost the whole of south Maré under the control of the rival gang. At the time of writing the only two areas under the control of *Terceira Comanda* are Vila do Joa and Conjunto Esperanca.³²

The three communities in which Maré United initially planned to establish its centres were: Vila do Pinheiro, Bento Ribeiro Dantas and Marcílio Dias. The satellite project in Vila do Pinheiro was not in fact established and the one in Bento Ribeiro Dantas had to subsequently be relocated to Baixa do Sapateiro, during 2013. The reasons for this will be discussed further below, but it is worth stressing at this point how strong a part regional identities play in shaping the consciousness of the residents of Complexo da Maré and how significant are the 'invisible barriers' that divide the community.³³

Luta pela Paz and the five pillars model

Luta pela Paz established its first Academy in Complexo da Maré in 2000, initially as part of the *Viva Rio* project and then, since 2007, as independent centre in its own right. It started in a small rented gym in which ten young members of the local community attended boxing training and citizenship classes. Participation soon quadrupled to 40 and the project has continued to grow since then. In 2005, Luta pela Paz moved to a purpose built Academy, which has a sports gymnasium with shower and toilet facilities as well as classrooms, an information technology centre and a staff room. It now trains around 1,600 children every year. The Academy is based in Nova Holanda and, as discussed above, this geographical

³² Interview carried out 9 April 2014

³³ An analogy between attempts to overcome Belfast's sectarian divisions may be appropriate, although it should be noted that more people are shot dead in Rio every single year than died during the whole of the 30 year conflict in Northern Ireland

location is important, given the contextual background described above, and was part of the motivation for the creation of the satellite centres in the MaréUnited project.³⁴

Luta pela Paz targets youth at risk, including those involved in and affected by crime and violence, and those not in school or employment. It uses sport as an entry point and also helps participants obtain access to the formal labour market and develop leadership skills. Its education classes and sports training events are free but participants must also attend citizenship classes and all of its activities are used to reinforce the same philosophy, summarized below as the five pillars model. The project provides educational and support services, and a series of personal development classes to promote alternatives to violence, gang membership and drug-trafficking, or to help people leave gangs. Its sports programmes have trained over 7,000 young people and produced two Brazilian national boxing champions, who are now candidates for its Olympic boxing team. A spin-off sports wear clothing company – LUTA – has also developed alongside the project.

Luta pela Paz's innovation revolves around using non-traditional methods, boxing and martial arts, to engage young people where traditional methods aren't working. It has also developed an integrated programme that is tailored to support the individual with options and supportive influences to deal with a multi-causal problem. This process is supported by both on-the-ground practice and widespread ethnographic research/theory. Unlike many programmes that focus on only one solution (eg, education), Luta pela Paz integrates a series of actions to respond to a number of problems young people may have. When it cannot offer a service, young people are referred to other programmes via a network of local actors. Luta pela Paz also receives young people from this network, helping to complement other services.

Gangs, street crime and the drugs trade offer excitement to many children and young people. Boxing and martial arts classes aim to offer an alternative adrenaline rush, sense of belonging and self-worth to that offered by gang membership. Participating in sports such as boxing, capoeira and wrestling, garners respect from peers. At Luta pela Paz, the adrenaline generated from physical activity is combined with discipline, responsibility, positive behavioural development, teamwork and leadership.

Luta pela Paz has developed this approach into a codified holistic and integrated programme that provides young people with the options and supportive influences they need to respond to the drivers and external influences identified as causal to youth involvement in crime, gangs and gun violence. The Five Pillars are:

1. Boxing and martial arts – provides role models, attracts young people and channels youth aggression; transforming it through building self-confidence, self-control, discipline, identity, responsibility and respect for rules. Non-violence is key to all aspects of the coaching process.
2. Formal and extra-curricular education – numeracy and literacy, information technology, formal qualifications for 16–29 year-olds who have dropped out of the education system, themed life-skills classes.
3. Employability – access to the formal work market through job skills training, partnerships with companies for internships/employment, careers advice service.
4. Youth support services – one-to-one mentoring support, profiling, case-working, targeted agency referral (eg, social, medical, legal), home visits, community outreach support.
5. Youth Leadership – accredited youth leadership course, youth council participation in all levels of programme development, staff internships.

³⁴ The description in the following paragraphs, unless otherwise cited, are taken from Luke Dowdney 'Fighting for peace in Rio's favelas and beyond', in Conor Foley (ed) *Another system is possible: reforming Brazilian justice*, Brazilian Ministry of Justice and International Bar Association, 2012

Personal development is delivered across all pillars by all staff. Five values also underpin all of Luta pela Paz's activities:

- embracing (we accept anyone with no judgment);
- solidarity (we work together);
- champion (we aim to be the best in all we do);
- inspiring (we aim to inspire and are open to being inspired); and
- fearless (we are proud to stand up for peace).

In addition to using sport as a mechanism for building self-identity and self-worth, the project gives young people opportunities to make choices and access alternative activities to joining street gangs or armed groups. It provides a 'non-involved' peer group offering support and companionship within the programme, and a constructive place to spend their free time. The classes serve to channel negative energy and aggression, and transform it into positive energy through teamwork, self-confidence, healthy competition and respect for the law. The project offers educational and professional training as well as career advice, to prepare young people who are often excluded from the formal labour market. They may be unemployed, in need of an income to help their family budget, or to start their own professional lives, or wanting to leave criminal activities.

In 2009 Luta pela Paz began a new project, *Novos Caminhos*, which focuses on attracting the most hard-to-reach and vulnerable young people between the ages of 16–29, who have dropped out of the formal education system, to return to their studies. The project provides: numeracy and literacy training and support; courses in nationally recognised education and training qualifications; individual mentoring and support; personal development classes; job training and workshops; careers guidance and advice; and boxing and martial arts coaching. On completion of Level 1 or Level 2 of the project, participants are supported by staff to secure internships and/or job interviews at companies. *Novos Caminhos* was successful from the beginning, with the number of applications far exceeding initial expectations, and there is now a considerable waiting list of people who want to part. Alongside regular activities, additional support is offered to students with learning issues, such as literacy classes for those who have been absent from the classroom setting for a long period of time. All students are granted an official valid diploma from the local education authorities after finishing the secondary level, as well as specific training on job market issues.

Luta pela Paz encourages members to help improve the community in which they live, by assuming leadership roles. Those who take on a leadership role within the group are invited to participate in youth leadership workshops. During the workshops, they develop public speaking skills, and are trained in group dynamics, and how to best represent the project and themselves in seminars, events and meetings. Members are invited to take an active participatory role in overall project coordination by joining the Luta pela Paz Youth Council, composed of ten to 15 young people. The Council has decision-making power over Luta pela Paz's projects, which includes hiring personnel, planning events, starting new projects or improving existing ones.

Luta pela Paz also provides individual mentoring for vulnerable children. For example, it carried out mentoring sessions for 147 children in 2010, while 408 home visits were completed by the social work and youth team and 532 follow-up telephone calls were made. The project also provided additional after-school tutoring to 63 children and organised four parents' meetings. The project organised 13 cultural visits outside the community, which included: Rio de Janeiro's Museum of Modern Arts (MAM); Fiocruz; CRIAM; Rio de Janeiro's Botanical Gardens; Museum of Federal Justice; Banco do Brasil Cultural Center; as well as movie screenings and plays.

Building on this work the Maré United project aimed over a three year period to open three satellite projects in other favela communities within the Complexo da Maré. These satellites were to be located in rival drug faction territories. The proposal envisaged creating satellite projects with local partner organisations already working with the target group within those locations.³⁵ The activities will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections of this report.

The underlying strategic assumption on which the project is based is that Luta pela Paz's heritage and reputation within Maré, puts it in a position to move between communities dominated by rival armed factions and operate in the context described above. This evaluation report analyses the success of the project, first of all with an overall assessment and then against the five criteria of: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. However, it is important to stress that in establishing the project Luta pela Paz subjected itself to a far more rigorous and demanding external evaluation by the community in which it works. Simply put, Maré United's success or failure puts Luta pela Paz's credibility on the line.

³⁵ Comic Relief Application Form, International Project Grant Application 2009-2012; and Comic Relief Project Grant, Grant Start Up Form, no date

Overall assessment

Both of the previous evaluations of Luta pela Paz's work were extremely positive and this was backed up by the vast majority of interviews carried out for this report. The 2006 external evaluation report concluded that: 'the biggest value of the project must surely be how it fights for human rights and social dignity, consistently challenging threats and cynicism and daily weaving a social fabric that helps to protect young people at risk.'³⁶ According to the 2013 external evaluation:

LPP has activities structured in response to the drugs factions that divide communities and compensate for failing state institutions, by offering a safe and caring place, flexible and holistic services, and activities to broaden young people's horizons. . . . LPP has a leadership role within Maré, and has an excellent reputation amongst other community-based organisations. . . . The overwhelming majority of young people were very positive about attending LPP and identified many improvements to their lives including: greater tolerance, more respectful behaviour, being fitter, and feeling better about themselves. . . . Young people particularly value talking to staff and a team of professionals offer psychological support, counselling, mentoring, and receive support from social workers and youth workers. The overwhelming majority have positive and trusting relationships with staff.³⁷

Everyone interviewed noted the personal commitment shown by its staff, working in a difficult, dangerous and challenging environment. One interviewee described Luta pela Paz's work in Maré as 'providing young people in Maré with a breath of oxygen, without which they suffocate.'³⁸ Another said that 'it is a daring project. The name was very well chosen, because it literally fights to achieve social change and a more peaceful future for our children'.³⁹ A former participant in one of its projects described its personal impact on him by saying:

It is like you were in a very dark room and then a door opens to let in the light. I was trapped in a box for ten years, going nowhere, doing nothing, without any purpose or meaning to my life. Now I am taking a University exam and mentoring on the programme for other kids. The point about the programme is that it opens doors, even if people don't necessarily decide to go through them in the end.⁴⁰

It was clear from the focus group discussions that Luta pela Paz meets an enormous need in the community for recreational and educational projects. All the parents interviewed unanimously testified to its positive impact on the lives of their lives and the lives of their children. One commented that 'it takes our kids off the streets and fills their heads with something useful.'⁴¹ Another said 'the teachers are great. They are really professional and have really helped my kid. My son was very quiet when he started and didn't participate, but the classes have really helped to bring him out.'⁴² Parents praised both the technical quality of the education and sporting activities – one noted that the trainers 'always took care

³⁶ Edinilsa Ramos de Souza e Patrícia, Constantino *Avaliação do projeto Luta pela Paz Maré – Rio de Janeiro*, Fundação Oswaldo Cruz, Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública, Centro Latino Americano de Estudos de Violência e Saúde Jorge Careli, Novembro de 2006

³⁷ Alice Sampson and Maria Rita Vilella, *Fight for Peace Academies in Rio and London - assessing their progress and impact*, Centre for Social Justice and Change, School of Law and Social Sciences, University of East London, July 2013, p.21

³⁸ Interview conducted 19 March 2014

³⁹ Interview conducted 25 March 2014

⁴⁰ Interviews conducted 24 March 2014

⁴¹ Interviews conducted 7 April 2014

⁴² Interviews conducted 7 April 2014

that no one got hurt’ – but also strongly supported both the citizenship classes and the underlying ethos of the project. One noted that:

The citizenship classes are really great. My grandson is much better at interacting with other kids as a result of them. It has really opened his mind and broadened his horizons.⁴³

Others stressed the absolute lack of other social amenities in some places, particularly Conjunto Marcílio Dias. One mother said: ‘before Luta pela Paz opened the academy here, I couldn’t leave my son alone because I was afraid for him. Now he does judo three times a week and I can leave him in total tranquillity. He is much more self-disciplined as well and doesn’t scream and shout as much.’⁴⁴ Other mothers also commented on the importance of physical exercise in making their children fitter and better socialized. One said ‘if it wasn’t for this project my son would be sitting home all day playing computer games.’⁴⁵

All of this reflects extremely well on Luta pela Paz’s staff and leadership. If it were simply a sports and education project providing young people with a safe place in which to train and study this evaluation would easily be able to conclude that its relevance, effectiveness and efficiency are beyond doubt. However, both Luta pela Paz and Maré United have set themselves more challenging goals of having a *sustainable impact* on the external environment. As discussed above, Luta pela Paz aims to ‘reduce and prevent’ anti-social, criminal or violent behaviour. Maré United shares these objectives and additionally seeks to ‘build community cohesion’ and bring down ‘barriers erected through decades of violent factional disputes.’⁴⁶

This evaluation aims to help the organization assess its own strategic direction against those goals and provide it with information and analysis that may help it more fully realize its own potential. As one interviewee noted ‘Luta pela Paz’s strengths are at the local level in the communities in which it works, and internationally where it has a deservedly high reputation with foreign donors. Its weakness, though, is to make those type of connections, consistently, at the city, state and national level’.⁴⁷ Another interviewee commented:

Luta pela Paz has the potential to leap from a local social organization which provides a very positive and enriching experience for the young people who come into contact with it into an organization that makes connections and promotes responsibility with the Brazilian authorities whose decisions, actions and inactions make the real differences to the lives – and sometimes deaths – of the young people in Maré with whom the project works.⁴⁸

As will be discussed later in this report, Luta pela Paz is developing a specific project which involves targeted work with small groups of young people that have a history of violent and/or criminal behaviour and whose progress can be measured on an individual basis. Although this was included in the original Maré United project proposal, it is now evolving into a separate project and so deserves a separate evaluation given that it raises a quite distinct set of issues under the headings of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. It is not, therefore, a central focus of this evaluation report.

⁴³ Interviews conducted 7 April 2014

⁴⁴ Interviews conducted 8 April 2014

⁴⁵ Interviews conducted 8 April 2014

⁴⁶ Comic Relief Application Form, International Project Grant Application 2009-2012; and Comic Relief Project Grant, Grant Start-up Form, no date

⁴⁷ Interview conducted 19 March 2014

⁴⁸ Interview conducted 19 March 2014

The two previous external evaluations provided an impressively comprehensive amount of detail about the *outputs* of Luta pela Paz's various projects. They also attempted to systematize and analyse the project's *outcomes* against the above goal of reducing and preventing violence by participants in the project by focusing on the influence that it has had on its individuals. This has proved problematic for the reasons discussed below.

Luta pela Paz itself administers the distribution and collection of self-assessment questionnaires to participants in the project, which include questions on changing attitudes towards social issues, including the use of violence, and their own personal self-esteem. The project also tracks the number of its participants who gain qualifications through its education projects as well as those who go on to find work or achieve greater educational success and, conversely, those who continue to experience problems at school or who have further conflicts with the law.

This provides a wealth of information which can help to establish the *relevance* and *effectiveness* of the project, but does not, in and of itself, establish the strategic *impact* of the project, nor how it contributes to the changes that Luta pela Paz wants to see in a *sustainable* manner. For example, given the project's impressive internal monitoring and evaluation of its courses, and its continuous efforts to improve these, it seems highly likely that they will have helped participants to subsequently obtain employment. However, a statistic showing the number of people who found work after participating in a Luta pela Paz project cannot allow for the infinite number of variables which help to explain why one person is successful in gaining a job and another is not. Nor can this statistic take into account macro-economic factors that explain overall employment levels rise or fall at particular times and which would skew the results in a positive or negative direction. Therefore while this information is undoubtedly valuable for internal monitoring and evaluation purposes, it does not provide an effective benchmark for a strategic external evaluation of the project's impact. As the 2013 external evaluation report notes:

There are a number of challenges evaluating multi-dimensional programmes like FFP which are multi-causal and located in complex community settings. These challenges include: Using a reliable research design which addresses contribution; that is, finding out if a programme has made a difference to the lives of young people, or if other factors account for the changes. In short, a robust evaluation finds out if the FFP programme is a cause that has an effect with the expectation that many complex causal chains exist and contribute to an overall effect. Some will be distinct logical chains, and others complex chains which are activated when they interact with other logic chains. . . . Another challenge is understanding the complex relationships between participating in sport and expected outcomes such as a reduction in criminality or attending education programmes and finding work, and there is scant evidence that sport effects these outcomes. Programmes such as FFP, affect intervening factors which are typically identified confidence and aspirations and it is these changes which, in turn, influence a young person's decision to start and complete an education course, or to stop committing violent crime, but intervening variables like self-esteem have been found to have weak links to such outcomes⁴⁹

The 2013 report argued that, for both practical and ethical reasons, it would be virtually impossible to apply the 'gold standard' evaluation technique of randomized control trials (RCTs) on another group of young people in order to identify the specific impact that Luta pela Paz has had on its participants. It therefore, focused on generating 'robust and useful evidence' about whether the theoretical basis upon which Luta pela Paz is constructed, the five pillar model described above, 'might work in principle to identify possible causal links and contextual issues'. It then took:

⁴⁹ Alice Sampson and Maria Rita Vilella, *Fight for Peace Academies in Rio and London - assessing their progress and impact*, Centre for Social Justice and Change, School of Law and Social Sciences, University of East London, July 2013, p.5

a problem-solving approach that ‘tests’ , and refutes, the theories that are embedded in the FFP programme to ascertain if the problems the programme sets out to address have been modified. Where data best fits particular hypotheses these are selected to explain how the FFP programme works.⁵⁰

This micro-level approach details how Luta pela Paz’s various stakeholders have tried to improve the functioning of the programme, but without addressing the overall questions raised above. The 2006 external evaluation report took a different approach by cross-referencing statistical information on social attitudes and experiences of participants in Luta pela Paz with the results of questionnaires administered in local schools and for Brazil as a whole.⁵¹ Although this showed some variations between the attitudes displayed by different groups, the report did not discuss any clear patterns that it saw emerging, or attempt to assert a causal relationship between them. Given the inherently subjective nature of a self-assessment questionnaire and the strong possibility that the person filling it in will give the answers that he or she thinks are expected to be provided, it is difficult to use the results as conclusive proof that the project had brought about a change in attitudes when compared to the ‘control group’. As will be discussed further below, relying on the completion of written questionnaires may also not be the best form of obtaining information in a community like Maré. The 2006 evaluation report concluded, somewhat ambiguously, that:

In summary, the effectiveness of any social preventative treatment depends upon the community, the family, the school and the context of labour market conditions. In a certain sense we can say that programmes of intervention such as those of Luta pela Paz compete for influence with the same conditions that produce the delinquency. However, it is necessary to pay attention to the institutional context in which the programmes and practices can be effective.⁵²

While this is undoubtedly true as a general statement, it would more normally be found in the introduction rather than the conclusion of an evaluation report. It does not provide much guidance about the specific impact of the project or how its design could be modified to make it more successful in reducing criminal and anti-social behaviour by participants. The report also listed a series of ‘positive’ and ‘negative points’ in its evaluation, which focussed on how participants felt the various sporting and educational activities of the project could be improved.⁵³ However, these noticeably failed to address the above central question about the impact of the project itself.

It could be argued that ‘reducing and preventing violent crime by participants’ is not a SMART objective (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and timetabled) for the overall project since it is too broad and ambitious. Apart from the difficulties of measuring the overall impact against such criteria there is also a danger that it could create perverse results: for example, Luta pela Paz’s success in recruiting those most vulnerable to gang membership could lead to a greater proportion of its ‘graduates’ re-involving themselves in crime than if it confined itself to only targeting those less likely to become criminals in the first place. Targeting those who are *more* likely to reoffend would show up as a negative in any statistical

⁵⁰ Ibid., p.8

⁵¹ Edinilsa Ramos de Souza e Patrícia, Constantino *Avaliação do projeto Luta pela Paz Maré – Rio de Janeiro*, Fundação Oswaldo Cruz, Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública, Centro Latino Americano de Estudos de Violência e Saúde Jorge Careli, Novembro de 2006, pp.80-106

⁵² Ibid., pp.146-6

⁵³ Ibid., pp.118-28. For example, it was suggested that more social trips to the city should be made for programme participants, financial support should be provided to amateur athletes, more money should be spent on maintenance of the sporting equipment, more support should be provided to job-seekers, more value should be shown to certain sports, etc.

calculation, although it would clearly be a positive result in reaching youth at risk. It was obvious from the interviews conducted that some of Luta pela Paz's senior leadership are aware of this problem and the launch of a project specifically targeted at gang members is partly a response.⁵⁴

It could also be argued that if a project is both relevant and effective then it is reasonable to *assume* that it has had a positive impact even if this cannot be measured with much precision. However, the Maré United project also contains another objective which is to bring young people from different communities within the complex together, break down feelings of rivalry and increase their understanding of their collective and individual rights as citizens. As discussed above this is an extremely challenging objective, but it is potentially a SMART one as its impact can be measured using fairly simple indicators. Amongst the questions put to the parents of young people involved in the project during the focus group discussions were: are you and your children finding it easier to move around Maré, do you feel a greater sense of community cohesion? Are you better able to assert your rights, and what are the barriers that still divide your community?⁵⁵ The answers to these questions were obviously hugely affected by decisions related to the 'pacification' process discussed in the previous section and the violence surrounding the police incursion that was being conducted while the research was taking place. This was clearly beyond Luta pela Paz's immediate ability to control, but it does highlight the importance of considering the *potential impact* of the organization on the shaping of public policy, which will be discussed further later.

Maré United has opened up a new and ambitious set of challenges for Luta pela Paz because it is now seeking to measure its *impact* not just on the individuals who participate in it but on how they and it are viewed by the outside world, at least within Maré itself. An underlying assumption in the establishment of the project was that its reputation was such that it would be able to work across the 'lines' of the three armed factions. As the 2013 external evaluation report noted this perception is shared by its participants:

Interviewees emphasized the importance of LPP's ability to bridge the gap between the communities within Maré itself, which, for the local population, sometimes represent worlds apart due to different drug faction's control. Wearing a LPP t-shirt allows young people to move back and forth between favelas within the Complexo, and participating in training sessions and competitions enables them to visit other communities without running the risk of being punished. Wearing the project's t-shirt, is described as a 'free-pass' and 'holy shirt' which, according to one young person, 'serves as bullet-proof vest.' Crossing the drug faction 'lines' wearing a LPP t-shirt results in young people reconsidering some deeply entrenched community taboos that contribute to the violence; for example, making friends with people who live in different factions. . . . According to another interviewee, since LPP's arrival community social values have started to change. Young people value studying, they encourage their friends to attend LPP and there is a 'huge' waiting list for education classes. The sport stimulates young people and attracts others and their families, and this brings the community together to participate in positive activities. The staging of competitions in public spaces in Maré, usually held on Saturdays, has particular symbolic importance and demonstrates how divided communities can unite and how they have shared interests in their children's achievements.⁵⁶

Similar expressions were used during one of the focus groups at the main Academy during the present evaluation. The strong turn-out of parents for the focus group discussions, despite the obvious physical danger that they were putting themselves in, was also a visible demonstration of the support for the

⁵⁴ Interviews conducted 25 and 26 March

⁵⁵ Focus group discussion 8 April 2014

⁵⁶ Alice Sampson and Maria Rita Vilella, *Fight for Peace Academies in Rio and London - assessing their progress and impact*, Centre for Social Justice and Change, School of Law and Social Sciences, University of East London, July 2013, p.27

project within the communities that it works. One woman noted that ‘when the kids put on a Luta T-shirt they can travel freely. Even BOPE respect the shirt and leave them alone’⁵⁷ The fact that the evaluator was also able to travel in and out of areas controlled by different armed factions visibly proves that Luta pela Paz’s work is respected by all sides. It was also difficult not to notice the contrast between the tranquil harmony and self-confidence displayed by participants inside Luta pela Paz’s academies during its various activities and the underlying sense of tension and menace where the police and military were patrolling on the streets immediately outside.

Luta pela Paz set itself ambitious objectives against which to be evaluated. It is clear that the organization has made a difference to people’s lives and both of the two previous evaluations – despite their differing methodologies – provide valuable information about the impact that this has had on the social attitudes of individual participants. The purpose of this report is to try and assess the specific contribution of Maré United against the criteria set out in its own project proposal. At the very minimum this provides a base-line from which subsequent progress can be measured. The challenges that Luta pela Paz has set itself are huge and so the main aim of the report is to help inform its internal reflections and discussions with donors about its achievements to date and the journey yet to travel.

⁵⁷ Focus group discussion 8 April 2014

Relevance

Was the project suitably designed to address the problems identified? Was it relevant to the needs of its target group and beneficiaries?

The first and most obvious test of a project's relevance is do its target group use the services that it provides and, as the next chapter on effectiveness shows, it is obvious that the project has more than delivered on its outputs and results in quantitative terms.

As discussed above Luta pela Paz's innovation revolves around using sport as an engagement mechanism and developing tailored, integrated programmes to provide individual support to those facing multi-causal problems. One point made by a number of interviewees stressed the relevance of this approach in Maré because so many house-holds are headed by single women.⁵⁸ This means that a generation of children are growing up without fathers or a strong, positive male role-model in the family. Given the overwhelming impact of the presence of armed drug trafficking gangs in the community and the violence caused by inter-gang disputes and battles with the police, it is easy to see why this should be influential in shaping images of masculinity in many young people's lives. Luta pela Paz's boxers, in particular, are seen as champions in the community and the linkage between the self-confidence, self-control and self-discipline that Luta pela Paz promotes in its sports training, combined with the wider philosophy contained in its citizenship classes has built a strong 'brand' identity that is central to Luta pela Paz's overall strategy.⁵⁹

The gender imbalance was very obvious in the focus groups where the overwhelming majority of participants were mothers and grandmothers, mainly of teenage boys who were attending the academy for its sports sessions. One woman spoke at length about how violence had increased in community since she was growing up there and about the 'lack of respect' shown by young people today and their increasing involvement in criminality. When asked why she thought things had changed she said 'there are more kids today, that's why things are more difficult to control'.⁶⁰ Other members of the same focus group said that they thought things were improving and that although things were tense at the current moment (the building was surrounded by armed soldiers as the discussion was taking place) they were more optimistic about the future. Another woman, however, said that the presence of the police and soldiers would lead to an increase in rapes in the community.⁶¹ Since it was a collective discussion, in which the evaluator was deliberately adopting a low profile, it was not possible to clarify what she meant by this, but the implication was that she regarded the presence of the police and soldiers as a direct threat to women and girls.

All participants in the focus groups said that the communities needed better services from the state – particularly in the areas of health and education – and one commented 'we don't need an army of soldiers, we need an army of teachers'.⁶² However, it was also unanimously agreed that deprivation alone was not the problem. Many people commented that levels of violence had been lower when they were younger although the community had been physically poorer. Similar views were expressed in all of the other focus groups, with many people saying that 'things were happier when we were children, even though we were poorer.' The groups unanimously and visibly asserted that the ethos and identity promoted by Luta pela Paz could play a major part in constructing a new community ethos. A number of people also commented that Luta pela Paz should organize activities specifically for parents. There was considerable

⁵⁸ Interviews conducted 25 and 26 March 2014

⁵⁹ Interviews conducted 25 and 26 March 2014

⁶⁰ Interview conducted 7 April 2014

⁶¹ Interview conducted 8 April 2014

⁶² Interview conducted 7 April 2014

discussion in the focus groups about whether Luta pela Paz should concentrate on trying to change children's attitudes or those of their parents. Most participants felt that it needed to work with both.

The overall relevance of Luta pela Paz to the community it serves was also key to ensuring that the design of the Maré United project was relevant to the objective that it is trying to achieve. The initial internal discussions that led to the development of the Maré United project proposal took place in 2010 at a time when there was considerable optimism about the success of the 'pacification' process described above, but while Complexo da Maré remained wracked by internal divisions. At the time it was assumed that Maré would soon be receiving its own UPP, although different interviewees have slightly different memories about how they assumed that this would impact on the project's implementation.⁶³ For reasons already outlined, however, there is now considerably more scepticism about this process and the project is in fact being implemented in a much more difficult and dangerous environment than could have reasonably been predicted at the time. Clearly the change in the external environment impacted on the project's development and relevance but in ways that probably could not have been better foreseen during the project's design.

One of Luta pela Paz's greatest strengths is that it is so strongly based in the community that it works in. The vast majority – 80 per cent – of its staff are from the local community. Six of the project's full time staff were previously participants on the programme. All members of the Youth Council are from the local community and they were consulted in the design of this project.⁶⁴ The fact that the main Academy is so widely used by the community also distinguishes it from other NGOs that have projects there. This has undoubtedly helped to ensure the relevance of the project design.

In preparation for the establishment of Maré United, Luta pela Paz organized to focus group discussions with two groups of young people. One group were already participating at the main Academy in Nova Holanda (Group 1 / 36 respondents), while the other were from Vila do João (Group 2 / 18 respondents), a *favela* controlled by a rival drug faction (age ranges in both groups 16-25 years). The results of these discussions are summarized below.⁶⁵

Group 1: Over a third said they would not go to a favela controlled by a 'rival' faction due to fear of what could happen to them there. All respondents said they would like to see Luta pela Paz in 'rival' communities to 'offer opportunities to others' and 'to overcome rivalries'. Thirty-two respondents said they would be prepared to visit Luta pela Paz in 'rival' territory so long as they were publicly identified as Luta pela Paz members while doing so. Seven said that they would be too scared to do this due to 'the faction war'.

Group 2: the majority said they would visit the Luta pela Paz Academy if they were invited, although they said that they had avoided doing so until now because it was in a 'rival' community and they restricted their movements due to 'fear of violence' and 'the war'. One participant commented that 'the rivalry exists and the majority won't go' but that 'it would be good to break down this invisible barrier so that young people could circulate freely'. Others said if they went to 'rival' communities but had a reason to be there because of Luta pela Paz, the traffickers would leave them alone.

⁶³ Interview conducted 26 March 2014

⁶⁴ Interviews conducted 25 and 26 March 2014

⁶⁵ Comic Relief Application Form, International Project Grant Application 2009-2012; and Comic Relief Project Grant, Grant Start Up Form, no date

Luta pela Paz also created a rigorous selection criteria for evaluating a partnership proposal, which was based on extensive analysis of the experiences of other organizations as well as. The criteria for selecting partners was:

1. Partnership may only be forged with local organizations composed of local staff members (from Maré communities);
2. Partnership may only be forged with local organizations that either form part of local networks, or with whom Luta pela Paz has already worked;
3. The organization must have a proven record of working with children and youth in the community with educational, social or sport projects;
4. The organization must have already worked in partnership or have been sponsored by Local Government or a well-known International Organization in the related fields;
5. The organization must have ongoing access to our target-group – even if not working with them at the moment;
6. The organization must have adequate infrastructure for educational and sporting activities.⁶⁶

Using the above criteria, Luta pela Paz identified three potential places to open satellite centres in: Bento Ribeiro Dantas, Conjunto Marcílio Dias and Vila do Pinheiro. However, the original goal of implementing the project had to be modified. As its December 2013 report noted: The original premise of the project was to find and train local organizations inside Complexo da Maré to help the young people affected by crime and violence, as well as the lack of provision of basic public services that serves as additional catalysts for negative behaviour and choices. However, we were unable to identify any organization that matched the necessary requirements to develop an approach aligned with Luta pela Paz's holistic "Five Pillars" methodology and our "Theory of Change" framework. Thus, we decided to establish ourselves in these communities and, starting from scratch, develop our work towards the young people involving the local young people and their parents, legitimating our approach and creating a positive and engaging environment with them – something that took time and lots of efforts to be consolidated, and that nowadays serves as a powerful platform for promoting personal development changes.⁶⁷

In its first annual narrative report on the project to Comic Relief, in June 2011, Luta pela Paz reported good progress had been made in opening the first satellite centre, which had already commenced activities, although the second had been delayed slightly due to the redeployment of a local priest who had been identified as the most suitable project partner.⁶⁸ In the third area, however, a more serious obstacle had arisen when the local armed faction had attempted to lay down conditions to Luta pela Paz regarding the establishment of the satellite centre, demanding that it be paid what amounted to 'protection money'. This was deemed not acceptable as Fight for Peace does not negotiate with illicit groups.⁶⁹ The report also warned that:

violence is still affecting the entire region, particularly in the last two months with intense clashes between rival armed groups in their occasional struggle to conquer new "territories", which has affected our progress in these areas. . . . we faced a level of resistance from local armed groups to the expansion of our activities and the satellite projects which was higher than we had expected. This challenge has greatly influenced our approach while seeking for an area to host the activities of our third satellite.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Maré United, *First Annual Report to Comic Relief*, 30 April 2012

⁶⁷ Interim Report for the Laurie Family Fund, December 2013

⁶⁸ Maré United, *First Annual Report to Comic Relief*, 30 April 2012

⁶⁹ Interviews carried out 25 and 26 March 2014

⁷⁰ Maré United, *First Annual Report to Comic Relief*, 30 April 2012

The report noted that it was proving ‘particularly difficult to find suitable facilities within Complexo da Maré that are big enough to comfortably deliver our activities’ and while it expressed the hope that a partnership could be struck with the local Residents’ Association in Conjunto Esperança this proved impossible and the project in fact only opened two satellite centres. The centre in Bento Ribeiro Dantas was also relocated to Baixa do Sapateiro during 2013.⁷¹ The report stated that:

We have also learned that it is necessary to enhance our internal staff training, particularly to help our new staff (most of them which were already employed by our local partner) adapt to our methodology and values. While the other two satellite projects are in the process of renovation and development, our efforts will be focused specifically on training the staff that will be based at them, to meet the same standards we have at our headquarters. While it took a little bit longer than anticipated to identify local partners and start the activities in our satellite projects, we are confident that the absence of similar activities in the regions we have chosen to support will help us convince young people from those communities to join our activities, prior to the desired interchange of members we want to start in the upcoming months to begin breaking the barriers that has torn apart the region for too long.⁷²

As discussed above, the five pillars methodology is central Luta pela Paz’s identity and ethos and training in this has become compulsory during the project for all staff, including those who have been employed via partner organisations. In its second annual report to Comic Relief, the project claimed ‘significant success in uniting a community that has historically been divided by fear and torn apart by the ruling of drug trafficking’.⁷³ A report published in December 2013 also stated that: ‘The change in the number of satellite projects has not had any other impact on the original objectives and goals.’⁷⁴ This will be discussed further below.

Luta pela Paz has also noted two recurring problems with the project: a high drop-out rate by some participants and violent incidents within Complexo da Maré, which forced the occasional suspension of the activities of the centres.⁷⁵ It reported that it was trying to address the former problem through individual mentoring ‘by reinforcing the importance of basic education to build a sustainable future with better career opportunities and prospects’, although the length of the courses, which usually take 14 – 18 months to complete, meant that ‘many are dropping out to address their most immediate needs’ taking informal jobs to give their families a basic income. However:

Regarding the outbreak of violence in Complexo da Maré – as an external factor, there is little we can do to address this challenge individually. During the beginning of the second semester, the region witnessed a massacre perpetrated by Rio’s Military Police Elite Squad (“BOPE”) in one of the region’s favelas, leaving ten dead and countless charges of Human Rights violations. Since that episode, conflicts between police forces and drug dealers have become increasingly intense and violent. It is important to highlight that Maré has not yet been pacified by Rio’s “UPP” programme, and is still under control of the different drug factions, facing new challenges as the dynamics of drug trade and armed violence are rapidly changing across the city. Whereas possible, Luta pela Paz has prevented exposure of young people, their parents and our own staff by temporarily suspending its activities during these violent episodes.⁷⁶

⁷¹ The decision to relocate this centre was partly taken for security reasons and partly because of suspicions that the Residents Association may have had some involvement in the traffic.

⁷² Maré United, *First Annual Report to Comic Relief*, 30 April 2012

⁷³ Maré United, *Second Annual Report to Comic Relief*, 1 May 2013

⁷⁴ Interim Report for the Laurie Family Fund, December 2013

⁷⁵ Interim Report for the Laurie Family Fund, 2012; Interim Report for the Laurie Family Fund, 2013

⁷⁶ Interim Report for the Laurie Family Fund, December 2013

Both problems are ongoing and have clearly had a negative impact on the project's relevance, in the sense that they impair young people's participation in it. Of the three satellite centres originally planned by Maré United, one could not be opened and a second had to be moved to a different location because of the violent external environment in which they were operating. This can be considered one of the occupational hazards of working in a conflict zone. However, from the above it is clear that **Luta pela Paz did take a serious approach to ensuring that the Maré United project was developed and designed in a way that was relevant to the needs of its intended beneficiaries. The project's underlying intervention logic was coherent and realistic, it met needs of the communities which it serves and was sufficient flexibility for adaptation to a changing context. Luta pela Paz did involve the relevant stakeholders actively in the design of the project and has shown that it is actively thinking about how this could be improved in the future.** The decisions not to open the third satellite centre and to move the location of the second one seem to have been a sensible and flexible adaptation of the project design given the changing external environment. **All stake-holders interviewed considered the project to be highly relevant to the needs of its target groups and beneficiaries.**

One point that came across very strongly in the focus group discussions is that many parents think of Luta pela Paz as almost an extension of their families and social networks. There was an eagerness to discuss their children's progress and also the common problems of their communities. Luta pela Paz's multi-disciplinary psycho-social team make around 1,000 home visits per year to work directly with parents and guardians. It also holds regular parents meetings and these are involved in feedback for Monitoring and Evaluation purposes. Parents are also attended at the three centers when they need support. The value of this for the communities in which it works cannot be overstated and should be developed as much as possible. **It is recommended that Luta pela Paz consider how to develop its activities that involve the parents of children who participate in the Academies.**

Equal opportunities issues

In 2013 female involvement across the whole of Luta pela Paz's activities reached 37 per cent, which should be recognized as a significant achievement. Men are generally over-represented as participants in Luta pela Paz's sporting activities, while women are over-represented in its educational activities. In its December 2013 report, for example, it noted that of 1,050 young people participating in boxing and martial training sessions (boxing, *capoeira*, wrestling, judo, *tae kwon do*, *jiujitsu*, *muaythai* and mixed martial arts [MMA]) in 2012, only 275 were girls or young women. It stated that it would be acting on the recommendations of an external consultancy on Cross-Cutting Issues, and was planning to adopt new initiatives in order to continue increasing female enrolment and attendance. These initiatives included opening female-only classes and promoting competitions for girls. All sports trainers were also receiving training on gender and equal opportunities issues, conducted by the consultant.⁷⁷ Conversely, the project found that the overall, the proportion of men participating in its educational activities was lower than expected. It stated that it will 'continue to develop new outreach strategies in order to increase the number of male students during the next year.'⁷⁸

The report also noted that: 'During the last year, Luta pela Paz excelled in delivering sports activities to its young people, as a result of heavy investment in staff which included: technical training for the coaches, workshops on cross-cutting issues (which helped us increase the number of female athletes) and the hiring of a Sports Coordinator to ensure the sports team was working towards the same goals, in accordance with our values. We have also been able, for the first time, to include young females in the

⁷⁷ Maré United, *Second Annual Report to Comic Relief*, 1 May 2013

⁷⁸ Ibid.

group of Luta pela Paz's athletes to join official competitions.⁷⁹ This issue was raised during the interviews and focus group discussions and while the staff clearly regarded it as a problem to be tackled no parents or participants mentioned it spontaneously. When asked why it would be the case a number stated that 'boys prefer certain sports and girls prefer other things.'⁸⁰

Given the over-representation of men as both perpetrators and victims of violent crime, there is a clear logic to why Luta pela Paz seeks to involve them in its sporting activities. Their under-representation in Luta pela Paz's education programs is clearly taken as significant by Luta pela Paz staff as their over-representation in its sporting activities, but it would be wrong to assume that the only 'correct' balance would be 50:50 in all activities.

These gender imbalances appear to be based more on the external environment in which Luta pela Paz is working than with specific project-related issues. Brazil is a patriarchal society in which social views of men and women's respective roles are strong. **It is recommended that Luta pela Paz continue to monitor the gender break-down of its participants and to take positive action to promote equal opportunities and remedial action to tackle inequality, while recognising the limits set by the external environment.**

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Interviews conducted 25 and 26 March and 7 and 8 April 2014

Effectiveness

How far did Luta pela Paz deliver on the project's intended outputs and results? Could it achieve similar or better results with a different methodology? How could things be done better in the future?

The outputs of the Maré United project proposal had clear quantitative and qualitative indicators for measuring its effectiveness. The project would establish three satellite project centres in different communities; recruit and train local staff teams for them. Along with the main Academy, the three centres would together provide 1,400 children and young people per year with access to boxing and martial arts training and competitions, as well as weekly personal development classes and individual mentoring support from qualified sports coaches and youth workers. They would also provide selected participants with further access to services such as formal education classes, job training, careers advice service and computer training; organise cross-community group personal development and sports training sessions will be held monthly at the Academy. The project would also establish a Complexo da Maré wide competitive boxing and martial arts teams and three community based competitive tournaments per year.⁸¹

According to Luta pela Paz's database: in 2013 a total of 1,686 people participated in Luta pela Paz's activities, compared to 1,725 in 2012 and 1,301 in 2011. A more detailed break-down of these statistics is included as an annex to this report, but it can be noted here that Luta pela Paz clearly out-performed the quantitative objectives set for the project in all but the first year.

As discussed above, the objective of opening three satellite centres had to be modified, due to a combination of logistical and security concerns. There were also some delays involved in opening the second centre. However, some of the targets that were set for the whole project were already met by the end of the first year, such as the number of young people completing literacy classes or being trained in job qualification courses.⁸² In its first annual report to Comic Relief the project reported 'good progress' on establishing its first satellite centre in Bento Ribeiro Dantas 'which is hosted in the local Residents' Association and which within less than one month had already enrolled 110 young people from the local neighbourhood. This included 33 enrolled in primary educational activities and a total of 77 active members of its sports sessions (broken down as: Boxing 26; Capoeira 28; and Wrestling 23)'.⁸³

In its second annual report to Comic Relief Luta pela Paz noted that 'we had a slightly lower number of students in the educational project because of budgetary constraints and other administrative and logistical problems. However, we have seen a growth in the number of participants of sports session. This growth was only possible because Luta pela Paz was able to create roots in the communities where the satellites were opened, improving the relationship with local people and further attracting new members to its activities.'⁸⁴ By the end of 2012, the second satellite centre had also been established and Luta pela Paz reported that the two projects between them had engaged more than 600 young people, with this figure rising to over 2,000 once the main Academy was included.⁸⁵ The project also diversified its range of sporting activities, starting new training sessions in *Muay Thai* and Mixed Martial Arts (MMA), the first of which soon became the second most popular at the Academy, after boxing. In December 2012 Luta pela Paz reported that:

⁸¹ Comic Relief Application Form, International Project Grant Application 2009-2012; and Comic Relief Project Grant, Grant Start Up Form, no date

⁸² Maré United, *Second Annual Report to Comic Relief*, 1 May 2013

⁸³ Maré United, *First Annual Report to Comic Relief*, 30 April 2012

⁸⁴ Maré United, *Second Annual Report to Comic Relief*, 1 May 2013

⁸⁵ Interim Report for the Laurie Family Fund, December 2012

We have directly reached over 2,800 young people since the beginning of Maré Unida project. During this period, we have been able to successfully engage with local communities, which have answered positively with renewed trust and engagement in our activities in the communities of Baixa do Sapateiro and Marcílio Dias – communities that were chosen to host the satellite projects due to the low provision of basic public services in terms of education, leisure and security.⁸⁶

These figures are cumulative and include the total number of participants over the three years of the project. According to the 2013 external evaluation:

During 2012, 1,725 young people attended LPP of whom 67% were young men and 33% young women, mostly aged between 15 and 17 years, but also included a wide age range; some were under 10 years old and some young adults who were over 20 years. . . . In 2012 and 2011 most young people were not in education, employment or training at the start of the New Pathways education programme (175 young people), and at the end of the courses 64% were in education, employment or training. A pass rate of 70% was achieved by students. . . . In 2012, 334 young people attended the education New Pathways programme, 131 attended literacy classes of whom 62% were young women. . . . In 2011, 50 young people found work; in 2012, 130 young people received career guidance, and 11 young people joined an apprenticeship scheme. . . . In 2012, 622 home visits were made, 334 young people were mentored and 97 young people received intensive support.⁸⁷

The break-down for 2013 was fairly similar. The majority of the 1,686 participants in Luta pela Paz activities in 2013 were involved in its sporting activities (1,330) while just over 500 were involved in its educational activities. Over 1,000 of these participated in activities in the main Academy, with just under 300 using the two satellite centres. While these numbers are higher than the goals set out in the original project proposal, it should be noted that the cumulative number is likely to be lower than would be derived from multiplying the number of participants per year by the number of years of the project.

It is expected that most participants in Luta pela Paz activities will remain involved for more than a year. The education courses that it provides are extremely intensive, but still take a year and a half to complete, with the learning outcomes in fact covering topics that it would normally take three years to teach.⁸⁸ All the sporting activities are ongoing and participants would be expected to graduate to higher levels of proficiency over time. As discussed above, one of the major preoccupations of the project is how to reduce its drop-out rates and several interviewees involved in delivering the sports and education projects stressed that a major indicator of success or failure is how long participants remain involved in their classes.⁸⁹ One commented that ‘we need to grow by keeping more people in’.⁹⁰ When asked if there was one single improvement that she could make to the project she said that ‘I would like to put an extra floor on this building to give us more space’.⁹¹

This highlights a problem which many interviewees have obviously been thinking about. When asked how the success of the project could best be evaluated, one interviewee stated ‘because more people are

⁸⁶ Interim Report for the Laurie Family Fund, December 2013

⁸⁷ Alice Sampson and Maria Rita Vilella, *Fight for Peace Academies in Rio and London - assessing their progress and impact*, Centre for Social Justice and Change, School of Law and Social Sciences, University of East London, July 2013, p.21

⁸⁸ Interviews carried out 25 and 26 March 2014

⁸⁹ Interviews carried out 25 and 26 March 2014

⁹⁰ Interview carried out 26 March 2014

⁹¹ Interview carried out 26 March 2014

participating’.⁹² However, he went on to state that this was leading to greater and greater physical constraints with the project either needing more and more resources or having to turn increasing numbers of people away.

Since Luta pela Paz prioritizes reducing drop-out rates from its programmes this means that its number of beneficiaries could eventually become static with the same resources being used to benefit participants that have spent several years participating in some activities. Another staff member commented: ‘All the programmes are built around progression and so if people were to remain in them indefinitely, they wouldn’t be working properly. Through our monitoring and evaluation we can track people’s involvement and so we know, not just how many people participate in projects each year, but how long they remain involved. At the moment we are still not operating at capacity, but as we get closer to it this could become a problem and that is part of why we needed the satellite centres.’⁹³

As discussed above the format of the focus groups had to be changed slightly, due to the security situation, and the evaluator adopted a fly-on-the-wall approach while Luta pela Paz’s monitoring and evaluation team led discussions on how the organization could improve its services to the community. This did not seem to inhibit participants in any way and some made quite forceful suggestions for things that could be improved. It was noticeable that many of the points that they raised had not previously been picked up by the questionnaires that Luta pela Paz regularly distributes and it seemed that people felt more comfortable in expressing themselves in a focus group environment than through filling out a written questionnaire. **It is recommended that Luta pela Paz make more use of group discussions for monitoring and evaluation purposes rather than relying so much on written questionnaires.**

Luta pela Paz should, however, be commended for the openness and transparency of its management processes. There are continual ongoing discussions about how projects can be developed and improved with space created for suggestions and feed-back from all project stakeholders. Every three years there are formal consultations over the design of a new organizational strategy. These take place over a period of around three months and are based on group discussions and focus groups with youth councils, staff members and boards in both Brazil and Britain. Management meetings, line-management sessions and complete staff meetings also involve open feedback.⁹⁴

Although Luta pela Paz is not the only social project operating in Maré, the popularity of its sporting and educational services make it unique and its effectiveness in implementing them are of huge strategic importance when considering the project’s potential impact in the community that it serves. The relevance of the five pillars methodology has been discussed above and the impact of the project will be discussed subsequently. Both depend on the effective implementation of the project and **all of the evidence provided during this evaluation shows that the project has been effectively implemented. No one interviewed suggested that similar or better results could have been achieved with a different methodology. On the contrary, it was repeatedly stressed that the key to Luta pela Paz’s effectiveness is that it continually monitors and evaluates all aspects of the delivery of its programmes and is extremely responsive to suggestions for improvements and adaptations.**

For the reasons discussed above, there is a danger that the more successful Luta pela Paz becomes in retaining participants the fewer places there will be for new people to participate in it, unless the organisation is able to continually expand its physical space and activities. However, the effectiveness of the project should also be understood to include how its activities touch the lives of people who do not directly participate in them. During 2012, for example, the number of athletes joining official

⁹² Interview carried out 26 March 2014

⁹³ Interview carried out 31 March 2014

⁹⁴ Interview carried out 26 April 2014

competitions for Luta pela Paz increased from 36 to 67 competitors, compared to the previous year. This also included – for the first time – seven female athletes.⁹⁵ More than 60 young people from all different sports have attended – and won – countless official competitions in their modalities locally (in Rio), nationally and internationally in 2013. This included Roberto Custódio, who won the Continental Boxing Championship. Roberto, who joined the Academy more than a decade ago, is also a member of the Brazilian Boxing Team and as role model for many young people in all communities where Luta pela Paz is present.⁹⁶

The significance of these achievements will be discussed further in the section of this report on impact, but it can simply be noted here that these achievements may be regarded as a source of pride for the whole community and not just the participants and their immediate family members. Luta pela Paz's activities in the communities in which it works can have a multiplying effect beyond the project's individual participants because people watch its competitions, cheer on its competitors and celebrate its champions. The achievements of the project in this area should also be measured by its effectiveness in showing young people who may never directly participate in its activities that another world is possible.

The Special Project

One of the objectives set out in the original Maré United project proposal was to 'reduce and prevent' anti-social, criminal or violent behaviour by young people who have a history of such behaviour. During the course of the project's implementation this evolved into a separate Special Project that Luta pela Paz is now implementing with separate funding.

In its narrative report submitted to Comic Relief in May 2013 Luta pela Paz stated that: 'During the second year of the grant, we have successfully reached 86 young people with a history of violent and/or criminal behaviour in activities offered by Luta pela Paz, both at our Headquarter and at the satellite projects. In order to reach this hard to reach target, our social workers were actively engaged in outreach activities to inform young people and the wider community of the goals of the project and the activities and opportunities offered by Luta pela Paz, such as IT courses, career guidance, and job training courses, besides boxing and martial arts sessions. After more than two years of activity in the communities of Bento Ribeiro Dantas and Marcilio Dias, Luta pela Paz has been increasingly recognised by local communities as a serious and effective of organization. As a result, we have seen an increase in the interest by hard to reach young people in our activities, enabling us to offer a better support to those engaged.'⁹⁷ However, in its end of year report, in December 2013, it was stated that:

We have been able to successfully access and engage, through outreach initiatives, young people with a history of violent and/or criminal behaviour since the beginning of the project. Young people from this particular target group have been mostly enrolled in educational classes, where the support from mentors and social workers have been fundamental to prevent at-risk behaviour or re-offending. However, as "Maré United" activities progresses, it became clear to us that *some* of these young people weren't actually responding to the positive stimulus offered by Luta pela Paz because of the **high levels of entrenchment in illicit activities**, as well as other components such as drug abuse and addiction (issues that our methodology never proposed to deal with). To address this issue, Luta pela Paz has started an innovative **pilot-project** with a small number of young people deeply involved in drug trafficking, combining intensive case working with education, individual mentoring, a monthly scholarship, and job qualification, in

⁹⁵ Maré United, *Second Annual Report to Comic Relief*, 1 May 2013

⁹⁶ Interim Report for the Laurie Family Fund, December 2013

⁹⁷ Maré United, *Second Annual Report to Comic Relief*, 1 May 2013

order to prove that it is actually possible – and less costly – to promote reintegration of these particular group than to incarcerate them.⁹⁸[emphasis in original]

Although interviews were carried out with various staff members involved in this project during the course of the current evaluation, many of the issues that it raises go beyond the scope of the current report. It does appear, however, that this targeted special project is likely to be more effective than subsuming the approach into the broader Maré United project and this will also obviously affect the way in which its relevance and impact are assessed. This report, therefore, does not seek to evaluate whether or not Maré United was or was not successful in ‘reducing and preventing’ crime and anti-social behaviour by participants in the programme.

⁹⁸ Interim Report for the Laurie Family Fund, December 2013

Efficiency

Were the outputs produced and delivered in a cost efficient manner and could this be improved in the future? Was there any need to change any of the planned project activities?

No evidence was found which indicated that the project could have been delivered at a lower cost, or that any resources were wasted or used inappropriately.

Neither of the two previous external evaluations focused on financial or administrative issues and nor was this included as a specific area in the terms of reference for this evaluation. Although this evaluation did include an examination of the project budget and interviews with those responsible for financial control, given the limited scope and time pressures involved in conducting this evaluation, this report does not consider this issue in any depth. Luta pela Paz reported that there had been no communication problems with Comic Relief regarding financial and administrative accounting and proceedings. In fact Luta pela Paz were effusive in their praise for the support provided to them by Comic Relief. The financial reporting requirements were described as:

very detailed and they involved a lot of work, but since everything was in order on our side, it did not pose a particular problem for us. We always informed them of any changes that we were making and they responded to us very quickly when we had doubts or questions. They were very good at answering our emails and the project officer came out to visit three times which meant they understood the environment that we were working in. That was very important in the discussions that we had with them about some of the initial delays we had in starting the project and the problems of opening a third satellite centre.⁹⁹

Luta pela Paz reported that they had learnt a lot from Comic Relief's reporting and monitoring systems and had modified and improved their own in the light of these experiences. They were also extremely grateful to the support that Comic Relief provided on equal opportunities issues, which included funding an external consultancy to carry out a needs-analysis and then providing training, support and strategic advice to staff about how some aspects of the programme could be modified.

As well as hiring new staff for the satellite projects Luta pela Paz re-deployed existing staff to visit the centres daily to support, train and mentor them. This included ensuring that Luta pela Paz's values were fully reflected in the work of the centres as well as doing outreach work in the local communities encouraging young people in the streets to join the project and participating in citizenship classes. This obviously had resource implications, but does not seem to have detracted from the work of the main Academy. Given that Luta pela Paz's staff, vehicles and premises are all highly visible and identifiable this cross-community work clearly contributed to one of the project's central goals. However, no one interviewed reported any problems or fears for safety in moving between different *favelas*.

Luta pela Paz considered the resources that they had been provided for the project were sufficient and that while some modifications had been made to the original budget, this reflected changes to the external environment rather than fundamental flaws in the original project design. Luta pela Paz also stated that the salaries it paid to its staff were set at a competitive level to enable it to recruit and retain experienced professionals. However, one interviewee commented that future projects may need to allocate higher costs to security-related issues, including cameras on the outside walls and more support for staff members exposed to violence. The centre has been burgled twice leading to the loss of computers and while no one has been hurt yet, she felt that more staff should be provided with greater medical cover and

⁹⁹ Interview carried out 26 March 2014

life insurance.¹⁰⁰ She also said that counselling facilities may need to be made available to staff suffering from post-traumatic stress. Almost everyone interviewed during the evaluation mentioned a particular incident in which they had either witnessed a violent incident or in which a friend or relative had been killed or injured. While this may be considered an ‘occupational hazard’ in working in Complexo da Mare, it is clear that Luta pela Paz owes a duty of care to its staff and needs to budget accordingly.

On one of the days in which the research for this evaluation was being carried out the police carried out a number of raids on people’s home, including those of two staff members, entering homes illegally, without a warrant. In a separate incident on the same day they also killed one young man, who was allegedly stabbed to death. All of those interviewed stated that these were every day occurrences and that most people would be too afraid to take legal action against the police for fear of reprisals. However, one interviewee noted that during the confrontation in June 2013 in which at least ten people died during a police operation, some of whom were also allegedly stabbed to death, residents had come out of their houses to prevent the police from taking away one of the bodies and so destroying forensic evidence and contaminating a potential crime scene.¹⁰¹ Others noted that the state Secretary for Public Security had made a promise that same day that all complaints about police misbehaviour during the operation would be investigated and witnesses provided with official protection.

As has been discussed earlier in this report Luta pela Paz is operating in a fraught, complex and violent environment and the project’s potential for having a positive impact on this environment will be discussed in the next section. This also, however, has direct implications for its operating costs and this requires a serious discussion both internally and with its principal donors. At a basic minimum the organization needs to consider how to ensure that **security assessments should be made mandatory as part of the project planning and this must include the provision of a realistic budget heading to cover issues such as legal protection for staff against police malpractice, witness protection for staff where necessary and staff evacuation.**

Finally, Luta pela Paz has grown extremely rapidly since its establishment in 2000 as a one person organization into one employing over 100 staff and with operations spread between Britain and Brazil and also increasingly engaged in international work. This also obviously has impacted on its organizational structures, administrative demands and reporting requirements involved in securing and accounting for such funds, although there do not appear to be any cause for concerns about the organisation’s financial management. Unfortunately it was not possible to interview Comic Relief during this evaluation, but Luta pela Paz’s administrative and financial systems appear to be robust and the organisation is externally audited by Deloitte.

¹⁰⁰ Interview carried out 26 March 2014

¹⁰¹ Interview carried out 26 March 2014

Impact

What contribution did the project make to the change Luta pela Paz and Comic relief wants to see? What were the final results of the activities and how did they fit into Luta pela Paz's overall strategy for the period?

As discussed above, it is extremely difficult to measure the impact of a project of this nature due to external factors, but Maré United itself included some clear SMART objectives that focussed on bringing down the 'invisible barriers' that divided the community by bringing young people together for common activities. The indicators for this were:

increased circulation of non-involved young people between 'rival' communities; a decrease in persistent stereotypes of young people in 'rival' communities; less anti-social, criminal or violent behaviour amongst young people; an increase in safer environments within the community as the result of increased cohesion amongst young people; an increase in the number of healthier and fitter young people in the community; and the up-skilling of local organizations and staff trained and monitored by Luta pela Paz as part of the project.¹⁰²

The extent to which this was achieved was one of the central discussion points in the focus groups organized in the three Luta pela Paz centres in April 2014. As described above the focus groups took place during a tense and difficult moment. It had originally been planned to organise these entirely independently of Luta pela Paz, but it proved difficult to find an independent facilitator prepared to enter Complexo da Maré during the police operations. It was instead decided to organise the sessions as Luta pela Paz internal monitoring and evaluation meetings with the external evaluator adopting a fly on the wall profile remaining as unobtrusive as possible. The three meetings, therefore, began with general discussions about the three centres and how their activities could be improved before moving into a discussion about their wider community impact once the participants were more relaxed.

It was clear from these discussions that participants greatly valued Luta pela Paz's presence in their community, felt that it provided a safe place in which they could participate in its activities and felt that it had potential to project values which could promote greater community cohesion. Many participants noted that cross-community training and competitions were a good way of bringing people together and that Luta pela Paz's reputation helped bridge that divide. One participant stated that she allowed her son to go to Luta pela Paz activities in other communities in their marked vehicles but warns him 'always to stay close to the teacher and not go out of the centre on his own'. Another said that because she lived far away from the main centre her son sometimes missed his Capoeira classes and 'he loves them so much it really breaks my heart', so the satellite centres made it easier for him to attend. A third commented that 'if you leave your kids on the streets alone they will naturally gravitate towards the gangs and think that other communities are the enemy.'¹⁰³

These views are supported both by the interviews carried out during this assessment and by Luta pela Paz's own project data. One report, for example, notes that: 'we have witnessed that the combination of positive influences and stimulus offered to the young people through our methodology has been an effective trigger to promote changes at both personal and social levels. These changes have been observed in all the target groups of "Maré Unida" project by the combination of self-completion questionnaires, quantitative and qualitative data analysis, focus groups and staff observations. Not only have the young people become more prone to make positive choices for their futures, but also their own identity have

¹⁰² Comic Relief Application Form, International Project Grant Application 2009-2012; and Comic Relief Project Grant, Grant Start-up Form, no date

¹⁰³ Interview carried out 8 April 2014

continued to change during the last years: from the collective commonsense of a “divided Maré” – because of the barriers imposed by years of dominion from drug trafficking – young people are increasingly aware that their citizenship transcends these imaginary boundaries, which has a positive influence in the way their relationships are developed and how to they react to differences – mostly, as the recent results have shown – in a positive way.¹⁰⁴ According to of Maré United’s second year narrative report:

For the second year in a row, results from the Annual Personal Development Surveys have shown an outstanding percentage of young people feeling safe enough to visit the other communities where LPP is established: 79% on average, more than three times the predicted number. It is also interesting to notice that there was an increase in the number of young people (420) taking part in joint-activities designed to improve cohesion between different communities. We expect to achieve both these targets in the next following months.¹⁰⁵

It also reported that: ‘The results from the latest Annual Personal Development Evaluation (a self-assessment questionnaire completed by all active members of the project at the end of each year) have shown that, overall, the impact of our activities in these young people’s behaviour, self-esteem and way of thinking were remarkably positive. For example: 92 per cent of the young people in this target group reported having successfully acquired life-skills (a 10 per cent increase from the previous years), 99 per cent of them reported feeling more positive towards their own future and 91 per cent feeling “fitter” and having a “healthier lifestyle”.¹⁰⁶ The fact that 97% of the young men and 99% of the young women feel more confident about their own future, and that the family members also see a difference in the attitudes of these young people, suggests that real change is happening. We would also like to note that this is a particularly highly elastic indicator, which fluctuates yearly on a 10% basis, which explains this result in Year 2.’¹⁰⁷

All of the evidence provided during this evaluation strongly suggests that the Mare United project has had a significant positive impact on young people’s behaviour, self-esteem and way of thinking.

Virtually every single person interviewed also addressed the overall impact of the project and it was clear that all stakeholders in the project have given the issue much thought. A range of views were expressed and these are summarized here. Everyone who argued that Luta pela Paz had the potential to increase the impact of its work noted that this was based on its success in building a credible, community-based organization within Complexo da Maré. One interviewee, while questioning the sustainable impact of social projects in reducing violence in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas stated that:

what these projects have done is to make people think differently about young people in the *favelas*. Prior to the 1980s when Brazilian decision-makers or opinion-formers talked about youth, they meant students. The *favelas* were invisible or treated solely as a social nuisance. What groups like Luta pela Paz and Afro-Reggae have done is alter the discourse, created a popular movement, given these young people a voice. Instead of academics, like me, opining about public policy and what would be best to tackle youth poverty and social disadvantage the young people themselves can directly address the politicians and public institutions that affect their lives. That is an enormous achievement.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Interim Report for the Laurie Family Fund, December 2013

¹⁰⁵ Maré United, *Second Annual Report to Comic Relief*, 1 May 2013

¹⁰⁶ Maré United, *Second Annual Report to Comic Relief*, 1 May 2013

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Interview conducted 19 March 2014

Another interviewee, while acknowledging the restraints that the project worked under asked rhetorically ‘how can we judge the long-term impact of the project for participants after they leave it? Most of them will have kids themselves by then. They will still be living in poverty and at the margins of society. Even though they may have got some education and citizenship skills, most will only be able to get the worst jobs so how can we say it has changed their lives’¹⁰⁹ Another stated that the danger of this approach is that we are selling them an individual dream of escape, rather than looking at the system, which is the actual problem.’¹¹⁰

One persistent theme that emerged during the discussions is that Complexo da Maré suffers from two types of violence: the violence inflicted within it due to the influence of the traffic and the violence that is inflicted upon it due to the policies of the state. It was repeatedly stressed that while the two phenomena were clearly separate, they needed to be approached holistically to have a sustainable impact. During the focus group discussions, for example, participants repeatedly complained that while the occupation of the territory by the police and military had driven out the criminal gangs, it had led to an increase in police harassment and extortion, with several participants reporting that their own children had been threatened only days after the operation had begun.¹¹¹ As discussed above, some women believe that the police and soldiers may also be involved in sexual and gender based violence. It was unanimously agreed that unless the authorities tackled the underlying social and economic problems facing the community – including the lack of social services, official corruption and police brutality – violent crime would soon return.

The 2013 external evaluation addressed this point specifically, but its conclusion could be seen by some as problematic. According to the report:

Most young people will continue to live in poverty even if they are employed and to live in violent prone areas, many out of choice. Thus, their economic and community circumstances may not significantly change, but the way in which the young people choose to live their lives does alter. Arguably, this is the greatest achievement of FFP; young people learn to listen, to respect the perspectives of others, they understand humility, learn how to make positive friendships and how to have respectful relationships, to take responsibility and to contribute by giving support and praise, and learn that achievement comes through trying and perseverance. These skills and attributes arise from the values that drive FFP and are integral to the new logic of a young person’s situation; they inform how a young person lives, their relationships with others and their community.¹¹²

Part of this argument is undoubtedly correct. Luta pela Paz does aim to change the social attitudes of its participants and through this improve individual lives. As discussed above it has had considerable success in doing so. However, the danger of this approach is that it may invert the causes and consequences of social attitudes on the one hand and violence and poverty on the other. Accepting existing social and economic conditions as a given, which must be either lived in or escaped from, quite obviously ignores the third possibility of seeking to influence public policy to change things for the better. As Dowdney has noted:

Individual involvement [in crime] is multi-causal and correspondingly programmes that seek to protect people from violence must also be holistic and integrated. As long as there is a lack of other responses (or options) for young people, or a lack of counter-influences that actively support non-involvement, for many crime, gangs and guns will remain a rational choice –

¹⁰⁹ Interview conducted 19 March 2014

¹¹⁰ Interview conducted 19 March 2014

¹¹¹ Interviews conducted 7 April 2014

¹¹² Interview conducted 19 March 2014

possibly the only realistic choice. Behavioural changes among young people that access programmes will need to take place at an underlying level (eg, decision-making based on social, moral and emotional development), and an overt progression/exit level (eg, education or employment outcomes). Policy-makers will need to increasingly accept that repressive policing tactics and the juvenile justice system cannot be the only policy focuses for this problem if it is to be successfully treated. In order to provide alternatives to the influence of armed groups in Rio de Janeiro, we also need to understand their history, motivation and structure.¹¹³

The evidence that Maré United has succeeded in breaking down divisions between different communities and building a sense of a ‘united Maré’ in which people are more able to assert their rights as citizens was mixed. One woman said that: ‘if Luta pela Paz put me on one of their buses then I will go to another territory to participate in an event with my son. But I would be too scared to go on my own.’¹¹⁴ Others expressed quite nuanced views about how easy it was to ‘cross the invisible lines’ that divide Maré. Some said they visited other communities regularly and had family members living there. Others said that they would be too scared to go into some other communities ever – and that they also would not let their children do so.

It was quite clear that Maré United had not, in and of itself, had a significant impact in breaking down the barriers that divided the community, but many believed that it had the potential to help do so as part of a transformative process. In all of the focus groups there was general agreement with statements that Luta pela Paz should be actively engaged in trying to shift public policy.

No one interviewed under-estimated the challenges involved in undertaking such work, which would require dedicated staff time and have resource implications. There are already a number of Brazilian ‘political advocacy’ groups in Rio and Luta pela Paz should neither duplicate their activities nor lose the own focus of its work, which is as a front-line service deliverer. However, a number of practical suggestions were made, which interviewees stressed could have a positive impact and could build on existing project activities. These can be summarized as outreach to the Brazilian state authorities including policy-makers and opinion-formers, the judiciary, public prosecutors and the public defenders office, as well as developing contacts with the police and deepening the existing contacts state education and social services departments. As one interviewee, who is a resident in Maré, put it

If Luta pela Paz can bring in Prince Charles and Prince Harry here from England to visit the centre and talk to the kids, why can’t they arrange for the Brazilian judge who sentences the young people of Maré to prison when they appear in front of him to pay a visit and get better acquainted with our social and economic conditions.¹¹⁵

Some of this work is already been done. Luta pela Paz has a support team, which includes a lawyer and psychosocial worker, who help people with legal problems and provide a referral service.¹¹⁶ It has a network of employers and recruitment agencies to which it refers young people looking for work. It is also planned to employ an extra person in the education team who will specifically focus on employability issues, working with employers and also helping young people to set up small businesses. The emphasis, however, is sending people from Maré into the city rather than using the Academy and its satellite centres as a bridge by which state institutions can outreach into the community.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Luke Dowdney ‘Fighting for peace in Rio’s favelas and beyond’, in Conor Foley (ed) *Another system is possible: reforming Brazilian justice*, Brazilian Ministry of Justice and International Bar Association, 2012, p.150

¹¹⁴ Interviews conducted 7 April 2014

¹¹⁵ Interview conducted 26 March 2014

¹¹⁶ Interview carried out 26 March 2014

¹¹⁷ Interview carried out 31 March 2014

The basic thrust of the suggestions was that the strategy developed by Luta pela Paz for Maré United should be adapted and expanded into a wider attempt to bring down the ‘invisible barriers’ that separates the ‘hill’ from the ‘asphalt’. Luta pela Paz should consciously seek to create links with Brazilian state institutions: schools, colleges, Universities, justice institutions, social services, planning departments and so on that are based in the city and whose members have little direct experience of the *favelas*, through exchange visits and joint activities. A range of suggestions were put forward, including working directly with the judiciary to develop alternative sentencing programmes linked to Luta pela Paz’s Special Project, to using Luta pela Paz’s training methodology as part of the induction of the officers of a future Maré UPP. Another Maré resident stated:

obviously we don’t want people coming up from Zona Sul thinking that they can ‘civilize’ us, but what we need to do is start breaking down the mental barriers that separate the city from the *favelas* and mean that people down there are literally scared of us and regard us as less than human. It is their attitudes that need changing as much as ours.¹¹⁸

Some of the ideas that interviewees offered have probably already been tried and have met with official resistance, others may prove impractical or could compromise Luta pela Paz’s independence. Given the level of official corruption in Rio’s public administration, increasing levels of engagement with Brazilian public officials is fraught with difficulty. It should also be noted that Luta pela Paz does regularly bring public officials to its centres during visits such as ones described above. The lack of engagement with the judiciary and members of Rio’s public administration is not through a lack of effort by Luta pela Paz, but because most of these officials simply do not want to engage with the people of Maré and other *favelas*.

The purpose of this report is not to provide a blue print for such activities but to suggest it as an overall approach. Luta pela Paz is in the process of expanding its Consultative Council, which is intended to increase its outreach work and advocacy. Developing such a strategy, however, has resource implications. As discussed above it could also carry political risks, and Luta pela Paz is rightly wary of undertaking any activities that could jeopardize its hard-won reputation based on integrity and independence. Violence and crime in Rio de Janeiro involves complex webs of corruption involving elements of the state and it will be vital for Luta pela Paz to maintain its independence. Nevertheless, particularly in the context of the now imminent ‘pacification’ of Complexo da Maré, **it is recommended that Luta pela Paz continues to discuss internally how to develop an outreach strategy with the city and state authorities in Rio de Janeiro and to increase the project’s impact on public policy decision-making.**

¹¹⁸ Interview conducted 25 March 2014

Sustainability

Are the project's results sustainable? Is the support and involvement of Luta pela Paz and Comic Relief still required in order to achieve lasting results and, if so, how and where?

Luta pela Paz obviously requires continued grant funding to maintain its activities. In its end of year report, in December 2013, it noted that:

After almost 30 months actively working close to the local communities, Luta pela Paz has earned their trust not only for the quality of the work developed for – and with – the young people benefited through “Maré United” project, we are coming to an end of the current grant with one of the project’s major funders. . . . As the grant’s end approaches, we are struggling to search for new funding opportunities in order to keep offering the high-quality of services to these communities that are not in the radar of local government authorities and still face the threats and dangers of armed violence and the influence of drug trafficking. During the next six months, as it has been during the last few, one of the organization’s top priorities will be to secure additional funding to continue the work of “Maré United” project in the communities where the satellites have been established and that already benefited more than 2,800 young people so far.¹¹⁹

The continued expansion of Luta pela Paz shows that it has been extremely adept at finding new sources of such funding. As discussed earlier, one spin-off from the original project was LUTA clothing, which donates half of its profits to finance the project’s activities. Another has been the development of an international training programme which allows Luta pela Paz to share its methodology with projects in other countries. A training seminar was being held while this evaluation was being conducted involving participants from all over Brazil. A third has been the focussed project developed to work with young people who have a history of violent or anti-social behaviour. All three have income generating potential and interviewees stated that the development of commissionable services, such as research and training, could provide a steady source of income in the future, which could cross-subsidize other activities.¹²⁰

These projects are not the focus of this evaluation report, but their development can be taken as evidence of the fact that Luta pela Paz continues to innovate and learn. The organization has grown from a one-person operation to a multinational employing a staff of over 100, based on two separate continents, with a spin-off commercial activities and a truly global reach. This has required a constant process of innovation, renovation and re-invention as well as charismatic and inspirational leadership. Clearly the sustainability of this as a strategy requires maintaining the faith, trust and confidence of its donors, however, Luta pela Paz’s track record to date does suggest that this would be justified. **The Luta pela Paz ‘model’ is now being successfully ‘exported’ to other Brazilian states and other countries, which can be regarded as an indicator of both its relevance and sustainability.**

There is no ‘silver bullet’ to achieve sustainability. Successful projects and organisations build up diverse sources of donor support, using public and private money and national and international support. One concern expressed by some interviewees about the project’s sustainability is its reliance on funding for international donors.¹²¹ However, Luta pela Paz are working hard to build relations with Brazilian donors in both the public and private sectors, as its success in securing support from Petrobras demonstrates. Maintaining a broad range of donors is one of the best guarantees that an organisation can maintain its independence and subjecting itself to the scrutiny of a variety of reporting requirements is also a good

¹¹⁹ Interim Report for the Laurie Family Fund, December 2013

¹²⁰ Interview carried out 31 March 2014

¹²¹ Interviews conducted 18, 19 and 25 March 2014

way of maximising its accountability. Although Luta pela Paz has succeeded in accessing Brazilian national donors, international donors are, and should in the future be, important partners in developing the organization's projects. Maintaining Luta pela Paz's independence and integrity is vital for its reputation and future activities and will be particularly important if the organization does decide to adopt a strategy of outreach to the Brazilian authorities as described above in the section of this report on impact. It is, therefore, recommended that **Luta pela Paz should continue to invest heavily in securing the support of international as well as national donors.**

As previously discussed Luta pela Paz staff members considered the resources that were provided for the project were sufficient and that the salaries it paid to its staff were set at a competitive level to enable it to recruit and retain experienced professionals.¹²² This latter point is important when considering its sustainability for the reasons discussed above and it is recommended that **Staff salaries and other benefits should remain competitive to encourage professional staff recruitment and retention.**

However, as discussed in the section of this report on effectiveness there is a clear finite problem with the sustainability of Luta pela Paz's activities. Many of Luta pela Paz's services are already heavily over-subscribed, most of them run for over a year and the organization works hard to reduce drop-out rates as part of its commitment to quality control. This means that the long-term trend will be to reduce the absolute number of beneficiaries, as the same resources will be used to benefit participants that have spent several years participating in some activities. There is no programmatic solution to this problem, but it is raised here to highlight the importance of the previous discussion on impact.

Luta pela Paz is providing services to the residents of Complexo da Maré that are actually the responsibility of the Brazilian state. The failure of the public authorities of Rio de Janeiro to provide basic social and legal protection to *favela* residents directly led to the territorial seizure of these communities by armed drug trafficking gangs described earlier in this report. While various non-governmental organizations have sought to ameliorate the consequences of the Brazilian state's abdication of its own responsibilities, through the provision of various social projects, they cannot and should not substitute themselves for it. Although Luta pela Paz is pursuing a number of strategies to increase the project's sustainability its ultimate goal in the medium and long-term should be to secure changes to Brazilian public policy to tackle the underlying causes of violence and crime.

¹²² Interview conducted 25 March 2014

Appendix One: Project Reference Documents

Comic Relief Application Form, International Project Grant Application 2009-2012

Comic Relief Project Grant, Grant Start Up Form, no date

Maré United, *First Annual Report to Comic Relief*, 2 June 2011

Maré United, *Second Annual Report to Comic Relief*, 1 May 2013

Interim Report for the Laurie Family Fund, June 2012

Interim Report for the Laurie Family Fund, June 2013

Alice Sampson and Maria Rita Vilella, *Fight for Peace Academies in Rio and London - assessing their progress and impact*, Centre for Social Justice and Change, School of Law and Social Sciences, University of East London, July 2013

Edinilsa Ramos de Souza e Patrícia, Constantino. *Avaliação do projeto Luta pela Paz Maré – Rio de Janeiro*, Fundação Oswaldo Cruz, Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública, Centro Latino Americano de Estudos de Violência e Saúde Jorge Careli, Novembro de 2006

Appendix Two: Map of Complex da Maré



Appendix Three: Annual statistics

LUTA PELA PAZ

COMPARATIVO ANUAL DE RESULTADOS

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013		
	T	T	T	T	M	F	T
TOTAL (POR PROJETO)							
Atletas da Paz	866	568	798	1260	893	437	1330
Novos Caminhos (Contagem Vagas)	70	221	235	235	74	91	165
Novos Caminhos (Real)	70	221	409	334	127	126	253
Reforço Escolar	0	63	94	131	36	67	103
SUB-TOTAL (I) (com NC Vagas)	936	852	1127	1626			1598
SUB-TOTAL (II) (com NC Real)	936	852	1301	1725			1686

TOTAL (POR LOCAL) *(com NC Vagas)							
Sede	936	852	837	1098	637	394	1031
BRD/BS	0	0	146	301	216	80	296
Marcílio Dias	0	0	144	227	150	121	271
TOTAL	936	852	1127	1626			1598

TOTAL (POR LOCAL) *(com NC real)							
Sede	936	852	1021	1144	654	424	1078
BRD/BS	0	0	144	331	242	81	323
Marcílio Dias	0	0	136	250	160	125	285
TOTAL	936	852	1301	1725			1686

ATLETAS DA PAZ (POR ESPORTE)							
Boxe	487	312	304	428	248	118	366
Capoeira	214	142	141	124	91	54	145
Luta Livre	165	114	185	261	84	22	106
Judô	0	0	86	226	120	74	194
Tae Kwon Do	0	0	64	102	66	93	159
Jiu Jitsu	0	0	18	119	127	29	156
Muay Thai	0	0	0	0	119	47	166
MMA	0	0	0	0	38	0	38
TOTAL	866	568	798	1260	893	437	1330

ATLETAS DA PAZ (SEDE)							
Boxe	487	312	210	277	144	89	233

De 1 a 3 meses			49%	69%			65%
De 3 a 6 meses			40%	21%			21%
Mais de 6 meses			12%	10%			15%
Capoeira	214	142	115	93	57	35	92
De 1 a 3 meses			27%	42%			42%
De 3 a 6 meses			50%	27%			13%
Mais de 6 meses			24%	31%			45%
Luta Livre	165	114	157	196	84	22	106
De 1 a 3 meses			31%	50%			51%
De 3 a 6 meses			55%	30%			20%
Mais de 6 meses			14%	20%			29%
Judô	0	0	86	226	120	74	194
De 1 a 3 meses			47%	34%			37%
De 3 a 6 meses			45%	24%			30%
Mais de 6 meses			0%	42%			34%
Muay Thai	0	0	0	0	118	42	160
De 1 a 3 meses							76%
De 3 a 6 meses							24%
Mais de 6 meses							0%
MMA	0	0	0	0	38	0	38
De 1 a 3 meses							74%
De 3 a 6 meses							26%
Mais de 6 meses							0%
TOTAL	866	568	568	792	561	262	823

ATLETAS DA PAZ (BRD/BS)							
Boxe	0	0	44	84	36	15	51
De 1 a 3 meses				63%			71%
De 3 a 6 meses				29%			29%
Mais de 6 meses				8%			0%
Capoeira	0	0	26	31	34	19	53
De 1 a 3 meses				54%			66%
De 3 a 6 meses				31%			34%
Mais de 6 meses				15%			0%
Luta Livre	0	0	28	37	0	0	0
De 1 a 3 meses				78%			
De 3 a 6 meses				22%			
Mais de 6 meses				0%			
Jiu Jitsu	0	0	18	119	127	29	156
De 1 a 3 meses				61%			51%
De 3 a 6 meses				39%			31%

Mais de 6 meses				0%			18%
Muay Thai	0	0	0	0	1	5	6
De 1 a 3 meses							100%
De 3 a 6 meses							0%
Mais de 6 meses							0%
TOTAL	0	0	116	271	198	68	266

ATLETAS DA PAZ (MD)							
Boxe	0	0	50	67	68	14	82
De 1 a 3 meses				58%			43%
De 3 a 6 meses				36%			33%
Mais de 6 meses				6%			24%
Luta Livre	0	0	0	28	0	0	0
De 1 a 3 meses				89%			
De 3 a 6 meses				11%			
Mais de 6 meses				0			
Tae Kwon Do	0	0	64	102	66	93	159
De 1 a 3 meses				51%			29%
De 3 a 6 meses				22%			35%
Mais de 6 meses				27%			36%
TOTAL	0	0	114	197	134	107	241

NOVOS CAMINHOS (Nº BASE PARA CÁLCULO COM VAGAS)							
Sede	70	221	175	175	40	65	105
BRD/BS			30	30	18	12	30
MD			30	30	16	14	30
TOTAL	70	221	235	235	74	91	165

**levar o ano como nº de participantes*

NOVOS CAMINHOS (Nº REAL DE PARTICIPANTES POR LOCAL)							
Sede	70	221	359	221	57	95	152
BRD/BS			28	60	44	13	57
MD			22	53	26	18	44
TOTAL	70	221	409	334	127	126	253

**levar o ano como nº de participantes*

NOVOS CAMINHOS (FORMADOS POR CICLO)							
Sede	55	101	83	12	0	0	0
BRD/BS			18	0	0	0	0
MD			10	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	55	101	111	12	0	0	0

**levar o ano como referencia do Ciclo*

Fechado

REFORÇO ESCOLAR							
Sede	n/a	63	94	131	36	67	103

EMPREGABILIDADE							
Participantes de Cursos	59	71	87	130	20	61	81
Encaminhados para Vagas	n/a	n/a	86	73	42	52	94
Contratados*	n/a	n/a	45	70	9	10	19
Aprendizagem				11	2	4	6

SUPORTE SOCIAL							
Entrevistas Sociais							492
Atendimentos Psicológicos							176
Atendimentos Jurídicos							57
Contatos Telefônicos			801	869			
Visitas Domiciliares			317	622			
Abordagens de Rua			262	1080			