

On the known - yet still pervasive - myth that sensitivity and specificity do not depend on patient covariates

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Abstract

There is a major probability error that is made in everyday medical diagnostic reasoning. The prevailing medical diagnosis framework lures users into making this error by defining sensitivity and specificity to be independent of patient covariates. This leads to the mixing and matching of risk scores for pre-test probabilities with sensitivities and specificities from studies that do not take into account the same covariates as the risk scores. That sensitivity depends on covariates is well known, and certain authors have criticized the prevailing probabilistic medical reasoning framework for misleading its users to think otherwise. However, no text has explicitly written out the probability expressions. In this work, we write out the probability calculations, and we show the precise error in reasoning that occurs.

1. Introduction

Consider a scenario in which a patient presents with unilateral swelling of the calf. After clinical evaluation, one computes the Wells' pre-test probability (Wells et al., 1998) of deep venous thrombosis (DVT). Given the pre-test probability, one chooses whether to order an ultrasound based on the sensitivity and specificity of the ultrasound. Given the sensitivity and specificity of the ultrasound, and the pre-test probability of DVT from the Wells' score, one arrives at a post-test probability of DVT. This post-test probability might be assessed mentally, or on paper. Does this sound reasonable? If so, read on.

The scenario we have just described is very common. It is a standard usage of the prevailing medical diagnostic reasoning framework. The prevailing framework, however, lures users into a trap. It leads users to assume that

sensitivity and specificity do not depend on patient covariates. For example expositions of the prevailing medical diagnostic reasoning framework, which write sensitivity and specificity so that they do not depend on patient covariates, see, e.g., Ledley and Lusted (1959); Parikh et al. (2008); Trevethan (2017)). That sensitivity and specificity do depend on patient covariates has been noted by many authors Moons et al. (1997); Harrell et al. (2001); Moons and Harrell (2003); Guggenmoos-Holzmanna and van Houwelingen (2000), but influence of the prevailing framework is very strong. The downstream consequence of the assumption that sensitivity and specificity do not depend on patient covariates is that almost all post-test probability assessments accidentally mix a pre-test probability derived from a risk score that depends on patient covariates with sensitivities and specificities from studies that do not take into account those same covariates. This mixing and matching can make the post-test probability meaningless. In this work, we write out the post-test probability expressions behind this claim.

2. Background

2.1. Diagnostic problem

In the standard diagnostic problem, we seek to obtain a post-test probability of a disease given a test result. In the prevailing medical diagnosis framework, which depends on Bayes' rule, if Dz is a binary random variable representing disease presence if it is set to 1 and disease absence if it is set to 0 and $Test$ is a binary random variable representing a positive test result if it is set to 1 and a negative test result if it is set to 0, we have that

$$\begin{aligned} p(Dz = 1|Test = 1) &= \frac{p(Test = 1, Dz = 1)}{p(Test = 1)} \\ &= \frac{p(Test = 1|Dz = 1)p(Dz = 1)}{p(Test = 1)} \\ &= \frac{(\text{sensitivity})(\text{pre-test probability})}{p(Test = 1)}, \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where sensitivity is $p(Test = 1|Dz = 1)$ and pre-test probability is $p(Dz = 1)$. Using the law of total probability, the denominator can be further written in terms of sensitivity, specificity, which is formally defined as $p(Test =$

$0|Dz = 0)$, and pre-test probability:

$$\begin{aligned}
p(\text{Test} = 1) &= p(\text{Test} = 1, Dz = 1) + p(\text{Test} = 1, Dz = 0) \\
&= p(\text{Test} = 1|Dz = 1)p(Dz = 1) \\
&\quad + p(\text{Test} = 1|Dz = 0)p(Dz = 0) \\
&= p(\text{Test} = 1|Dz = 1)p(Dz = 1) \\
&\quad + (1 - p(\text{Test} = 0|Dz = 0))(1 - p(Dz = 1)) \\
&= (\text{sensitivity})(\text{pre-test probability}) \\
&\quad + (1 - \text{specificity})(1 - (\text{pre-test probability})).
\end{aligned}$$

In this way, one can write the standard post-test probability as a function of sensitivity, specificity, and pre-test probability.

Note that (1) only conditions on the test result, like most examples from the prevailing medical diagnosis literature (see the commonly cited overviews of post-test probability, such as Parikh et al. (2008); Trevethan (2017)). Conditioning only on the test result is not unreasonable to introduce the concept of post-test probability for educational purposes, but it does not align with the true clinical objective of diagnostic reasoning. The clinician wishes to provide the most patient-specific post-test probability, and this probability is a function not only of the test result but also of the other patient covariates (i.e., other information that we have about the patient).

Unlike in the standard post-test probability examples where one conditions only on the test (shown in (1)), consider the case where one also conditions on patient covariates, X . For example, X might contain symptoms or demographic information. Conditional on $X = x$, we obtain the post-test probability

$$\begin{aligned}
p(Dz = 1|\text{Test} = 1, x) &= \frac{p(\text{Test} = 1|Dz = 1, x)p(Dz = 1|x)p(x)}{p(\text{Test} = 1|x)p(x)} \\
&= \frac{p(\text{Test} = 1|Dz = 1, x)p(Dz = 1|x)}{p(\text{Test} = 1|x)}. \tag{2}
\end{aligned}$$

Note that, as was done for the denominator of (1), the denominator of (2)

can be rewritten

$$\begin{aligned}
p(\text{Test} = 1|x) &= p(\text{Test} = 1, Dz = 1|x) + p(\text{Test} = 1, Dz = 0|x) \\
&= p(\text{Test} = 1|Dz = 1, x)p(Dz = 1|x) \\
&\quad + p(\text{Test} = 1|Dz = 0, x)p(Dz = 0|x) \\
&= p(\text{Test} = 1|Dz = 1, x)p(Dz = 1|x) \\
&\quad + (1 - p(\text{Test} = 0|Dz = 0, x))(1 - p(Dz = 1|x)) \\
&= (\text{sensitivity})(\text{pre-test probability}) \\
&\quad + (1 - \text{specificity})(1 - (\text{pre-test probability}))
\end{aligned}$$

Now, in (2), sensitivity is defined as $p(Dz = 1|\text{Test} = 1, x)$ instead of $p(Dz = 1|\text{Test} = 1)$, and likewise for specificity, $p(Dz = 0|\text{Test} = 0, x)$, and pre-test probability, $p(Dz = 1|x)$.¹ In general, in (2), the presence of the covariate, x , requires one to extend (1) to the more complex expression in (2), which has a more complex representation of sensitivity. This requirement to extend the expression, if not done properly, can lead to a particularly nefarious error in reasoning, which we will now describe.

Consider a scenario in which a patient presents with swelling in the calf. One starts with Wells' score for a deep venous thrombosis, which gives $p(DVT + | \text{cancer, swelling, etc} \dots)$. One consults the literature on ultrasound (US) to find its sensitivity, $p(US + | DVT+)$, and specificity, $p(US - | DVT-)$ (e.g., one consults (Goodacre et al., 2005)). Note that Goodacre et al. (2005) gives $p(US + | DVT+)$ instead of

$$p(US + | DVT+, \text{cancer, swelling, etc} \dots).$$

In other words, the sensitivity and specificity values are not conditional on patient covariates. Using these sensitivity and specificity values in conjunction with Wells' score implicitly assumes (this is not often written out, it is just hidden within the diagnostic reasoning) that

$$\begin{aligned}
&p(DVT + | US+, \text{cancer, swelling, etc} \dots) \\
&= \frac{p(US + | DVT+)p(DVT + | \text{cancer, swelling, etc} \dots)}{p(US + | \text{cancer, swelling, etc} \dots)}.
\end{aligned}$$

¹One could argue that this is overloading "sensitivity" to represent both $p(\text{Test} = 1|Dz = 1)$ and $p(\text{Test} = 1|Dz = 1, x)$, and we will discuss this below.

However, the last expression is usually false. It should be

$$p(DVT + |US+, cancer, swelling, etc...)$$

$$= \frac{p(\mathbf{US} + | \mathbf{DVT}+, \mathbf{cancer}, \mathbf{swelling}, \mathbf{etc...})p(DVT + |cancer, swelling, etc...)}{p(US + |cancer, swelling, etc...)}.$$

This error is rampant in the clinical world, since most post-test probability calculations are done informally (the expressions are not written out), and, even if the expressions are written out, the practices in the prevailing medical diagnostic literature tends to still lead to this error.

In general, the error occurs when one defines a post-test probability that implicitly assumes

$$p(Dz = 1|Test = 1, x) = \frac{p(\mathbf{Test} = 1|\mathbf{Dz} = 1)p(Dz = 1|x)}{p(Test = 1|x)},$$

where the denominator is assumed to be written as

$$p(Test = 1|x) = p(Test = 1|Dz = 1)p(Dz = 1|x) + p(Test = 1|Dz = 0)p(Dz = 0|x).$$

The last two displays only hold if $Test \perp X$, in which case $p(Test = 1|Dz = 1)$ truly equals $p(Test = 1|Dz = 1, x)$. Assuming $Test \perp X$, however is an error (Harrell et al., 2001; Moons and Harrell, 2003). It is unlikely that US is independent of the severity of the DVT, which is taken into account in the Wells' score based on the tenderness of the leg and extent of the swelling. That this independence between test and covariates does not hold for other medical conditions has been shown in many studies; see, for example, Moons et al. (1997); Hlatky et al. (1984); Prince-Guerra et al. (2021) or the other examples listed in (Moons and Harrell, 2003; Harrell et al., 2001; Guggenmoos-Holzmann and van Houwelingen, 2000)).

The prevailing diagnostic framework, however, lures users into assuming that $Test \perp X$ by naming the special case, $p(Test = 1|Dz = 1)$, as sensitivity.² Note, for example, that in virtually all expositions of the prevailing medical diagnosis framework see e.g. (Parikh et al., 2008; Trevethan, 2017)

²More generally, the prevailing framework causes errors by renaming probabilities, which are better left unnamed.

the authors define

$$\text{sensitivity} = \frac{\text{true positives}}{\text{true positives} + \text{false negatives}},$$

which is $p(\text{Test} = 1|Dz = 1)$.

But $p(\text{Test} = 1|Dz = 1)$ is a special case, because sensitivity can be more broadly defined as $p(\text{Test} = 1|Dz = 1, x)$. If sensitivity truly depends on patient covariates, only $p(\text{Test} = 1|Dz = 1, x)$ is useful to obtain the true clinical desirable, $p(Dz = 1|\text{Test} = 1, x)$. In a sense, it is as if the post-test probability is a vehicle and sensitivity is a wheel. The prevailing framework defines a wheel to be a stone cylinder, and this has generally led the majority of those using the framework to behave as if a wheel is a stone cylinder and nothing else. However, a wheel is a general concept, which could refer to a stone cylinder, to a bicycle wheel, or to a wheel in a modern vehicle. Sometimes, even in a more modern vehicle, using a stone cylinder might be passable; often, it is disastrous.

3. Discussion

We have given a more detailed exposition of the probability expressions behind the faulty assumption that sensitivity and specificity do not depend on patient covariates, which has been discussed in Harrell et al. (2001); Moons et al. (1997); Guggenmoos-Holzmänn and van Houwelingen (2000). We have also discussed the clinical consequences associated with the assumption. In particular, we have shown that the assumption lures well-intentioned health-care providers into mixing and matching pre-test probabilities that depend on patient covariates with sensitivities and specificities that do not. By writing the probability calculations explicitly, we hope that we have provided more clarity on how the error is made and how it might be avoided.

To avoid this error, one must conduct new, redesigned studies that estimate sensitivities and specificities that *do* depend on patient covariates; i.e., studies should estimate $p(\text{Test} = 1|Dz = 1)$ instead of $p(\text{Test} = 1|Dz = 1, x)$. Then, one could correctly compute (2). Note, however, that Harrell et al. (2001) describes (2) as taking three left turns to make a right; in fact, it would be better if one modeled the post-test probability, $p(Dz = 1|\text{test}, x)$, directly, without resorting to the use of Bayes' rule. One would then have a risk score for the pre-test probability, $p(Dz = 1|x)$, and an additional risk score for the post-test probability, $p(Dz = 1|\text{test}, x)$. Evaluating the impact

of a test would be tantamount to considering the change in post-test probability that occurs when moving from $p(Dz = 1|x)$ to $p(Dz = 1|test, x)$. In other words, if one has two tests, $test_1$ and $test_2$, and one is not sure which one to order, one could compute $p(Dz = 1|x, test_1)$ and $p(Dz = 1|x, test_2)$ and compare them both to $p(Dz = 1|x)$. The test that would change the post-test probability more in the desired direction should be chosen. This would be considerably more straightforward, more accurate, and less likely than current practices to cause the error that was identified by Harrell et al. (2001); Moons et al. (1997); Moons and Harrell (2003) and described in this work.

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