

# Hong Kong Security Watch

July 2015

#### Foreword

#### Better Security Decision with Situational Awareness

Nowadays, a lot of ?invisible??compromised computers are controlled by attackers with the owner being unaware. The data on these computers may be mined and exposed every day, and the computers may be utilized in different kinds of abuse and criminal activities. The Hong Kong Security Watch Report aims to provide the public a better ?visibility??of the situation of the compromised computers in Hong Kong so that they can make better decision in protecting their information security.

The data in this report is about the activities of compromised computers in Hong Kong which suffer from, or participate in various forms of cyber attacks, including web defacement, phishing, malware hosting, botnet command and control centres (C&C) or bots. Computers in Hong Kong are defined as those whose network geolocation is Hong Kong, or the top level domain of their host name is ??hk??or ????

#### Capitalizing on the Power of Global Intelligence

This report is the fruit of the collaboration of HKCERT and global security researchers. Many security researchers have the capability to detect attacks targeting their own or their customers??networks. Some of them provide the information of IP addresses of attack source or web links of malicious activities to other information security organizations with an aim to collaboratively improve the overall security of the cyberspace. They have good practice in sanitizing personal identifiable data before sharing information.

HKCERT collects and aggregates such valuable data about Hong Kong from multiple information sources for analysis with Information Feed Analysis System (IFAS), a system developed by HKCERT. The information sources (Appendix 1) are very distributed and reliable, providing a balanced reflection of the security status of Hong Kong. ?? We remove duplicated events reported by multiple sources and use the following metrics for measurement to assure the quality of statistics.

#### Better information better service

We will continue to enhancing this report with more valuable information sources and more in-depth analysis. We will also explore how to use the data to enhance our services. Please send us your feedback via email (hkcert@hkcert.org).

#### Limitations

The data collected in this report is from multiple different sources with different collection method, collection period, presentation format and their own limitations. The numbers from the report should be used as a reference, and should neither be compared directly nor be regarded as a full picture of the reality.

Table 1: Types of Attack			
Type of Attack	Metric used		
Defacement, Phishing,	security events on unique URLs within the		
Malware Hosting	reporting period		
Botnet (C&Cs)	security events on unique IP addresses within		
	the reporting period		
Botnet (Bots)	maximum daily count of security events on		
	unique IP addresses within the reporting period		

#### Disclaimer

Data may be subject to update and correction without notice. We shall not have any liability, duty or obligation for or relating to the content and data contained herein, any errors, inaccuracies, omissions or delays in the content and data, or for any actions taken in reliance thereon. In no event shall we be liable for any special, incidental or consequential damages, arising out of the use of the content and data.

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### Highlight of Report

This report is for May 2015. In May 2015, IFAS<sup>1</sup> collected 144,431 security events related to Hong Kong from 19 data feed sources<sup>2</sup>. After data processing to remove duplications, there were 9,057 unique security events used for analysis in this report. The number of security events decreased significantly this month. However, the number of phishing events and malware hosting events remain high.

#### Server related security events

The distribution of server related security events is summarized below.

# Server Related security events distribution




Figure 1: Distribution of Server related Security Events

The server related security events decreased significantly by 33% or 2,174 events.

Defacement events and phishing events decreased by 31% and 56% respectively while malware hosting events increased by 40%. The 2062 malware hosting events were from single compromised sites, mass compromised sites and dedicated malware hosting sites.

The most serious single case was the compromise of http://conservancy.org.hk/, which was the website of a Hong Kong NGO. Its website was compromised to host 290 malware hosting URLs. The most serious mass compromise

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>IFAS - Information Feed Analysis System is a HKCERT developed system that collects global security intelligence relating to Hong Kong to provide a picture of the security status.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Refer to Appendix 1 for the feed sources

case was from the IP 210.245.166.72, under which, 43 legitimate websites was hosted. They were compromised to host 230 malware hosting URLs. IP address 14.136.137.103 was believed to be hosting a dedicated malware hosting site, under which, all URLs are IP Only.

Botnet related security events The distribution of botnet related security events are summarized below: Botnet Command and Control Servers There were two C&C servers reported in this month, both were IRC bot C&C server.

#### Botnet related security events

The distribution of botnet related security events are summarized below:

#### Botnet (C&Cs) security event distribution




Figure 2: Distribution of Botnet (C&Cs) related security events

Total number of botnet(bots) security events showed a decrease of 7%. Conficker, Zeus and Virut were the top 3 of the chart.

This month, the positions of the top five botnets remain unchanged (Figure 14). The dropping trend of the top botnet, Conficker, was flattened. In the past three months, the number of Conficker events was roughly unchanged. The dropping trend of Zeus and ZeroAccess continued, they dropped for 8% and 4% respectively. On the other hand, the number of Virut event continued to rise. If the trend goes on, Virut will overtake Zeus as the second largest botnet next month.

#### Botnet (Bots) security event distribution




Figure 3: Distribution of Botnet (Bots) related security events

#### Top TLD and ISPs involved in security events

Among all Top Level Domains (TLDs), ??com??topped the TLD distribution of all security event types, which include defacement, phishing and malware hosting. ??hk??TLD related events contributions are: Defacement (7%); Phishing (3%); and malware hosting (1%)

AS number for New World Telephone Ltd was the top ISP in terms of total number of security events. For two consecutive months, an ISP other than PCCW Limited, which ranked 2 this month, topped the list. The number of events involving PCCW Limited kept decreasing, from over 1800 events at the beginning of 2015, to 1469 events this month.

AS number for New World Telephone Ltd was the top ISP for server related security events including malware hosting (754 events), phishing (497 events) and defacement (153 events). Sun Network (Hong Kong) Limited ranked the second ISP for server related security events of this monthwith defacement (13 events), phishing (364 events) and malware hosting (202 events) reported. ??

### 1 Defacement

### 1.1 Summary

#### **Defacement General Statistics**




Figure 4: Defacement - General Statistics

### Defacement URL/IP Ratio




Figure 5: Defacement - URL/IP ratio

### 1.2 TLD Distribution




Figure 6: DefacementTld - TLD Distribution

Table 2: DefacementTld				
Rank	Top Level Domain	$\operatorname{count}$	%	
1	com	275	71	
2	hk	27	7	
3	net	24	6	
4	cn	18	4	
5	com.hk	14	3	
6	org	8	2	
7	com.cn	4	1	
8	us	2	0	
9	org.hk	2	0	
10	tv	1	0	

# 2 Phishing

### 2.1 Summary

### Phishing General Statistics




Figure 7: Phishing - General Statistics

### Phishing URL/IP Ratio




Figure 8: Phishing - URL/IP ratio

### 2.2 TLD Distribution




Figure 9: PhishingTld - TLD Distribution

Table	3:	PhishingTld
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Rank	Tld	Count	%
1	com	1660	83
2	hk	56	2
3	IP only	53	2
4	net	50	2
5	$\operatorname{cn}$	42	2
6	$\operatorname{com.hk}$	24	1
7	org	20	1
8	$\operatorname{tk}$	12	0
9	$\operatorname{org.ph}$	12	0
10	science	9	0

# 3 Malware

### 3.1 Summary

#### Malware General Statistics




Figure 10: Malware - General Statistics

### Malware URL/IP Ratio




Figure 11: Malware - URL/IP ratio

### 3.2 TLD Distribution




Figure 12: MalwareTld - TLD Distribution

Table 4: MalwareTld				
Rank	Top Level Domain	count	%	
1	com	1218	59	
2	org.hk	293	14	
3	IP Only	245	11	
4	com.cn	75	3	
5	cn	70	3	
6	net	62	3	
7	com.hk	53	2	
8	org	15	0	
9	hk	13	0	
10	xyz	4	0	

### 4 Botnet

#### 4.1 Botnet - Bots

### 4.1.1 Major Botnet Families found on Hong Kong Network




Figure 13: Botnet Unique IP (Monthly Max Count)

Table 5: listOfBotnets

Rank	Botnet family	count	%
1	Conficker	10964	31
2	ZeroAccess	10191	28
3	Zeus	4249	12
4	Virut	2210	6
5	Non Botnet	1873	5
6	Tinba	750	2
7	Unclassified-ddos-participant-ssdp-amplifier	692	1
8	Pushdo	659	1
9	Ramnit	370	1
10	Sality	312	0

### 4.2 Botnet - Command and Control Servers (C&Cs)

### 4.2.1 Botnet - C&C Servers by communication type




Figure 14: Botnet - C&C Servers by communication type

### 5 Internet Service Providers (ISP)

### 5.1 Top 10 ISPs hosting Defacement




Figure 15: Defacement - Top ISPs

Table	6.	<b>ISPDefacement</b>
таше	0):	15F Detacement

Rank	ISP	count	%
1	AS number for New World Telephone Ltd.	153	39
2	Hong Kong San Ai Net Int'l Limited	35	9
3	Pang International Limited-AS number	32	8
4	Forewin Telecom Group Limited, ISP at	15	3
5	CommuniLink Internet Limited.	14	3
6	Sun Network (Hong Kong) Limited	13	3
7	Host Virtual, Inc	13	3
8	Enzu Inc	9	2
9	Rainbow network limited	9	2
10	REDTONE TELECOMMUNICATIONS(HK) LIMITED	8	2

### 5.2 Top 10 ISPs hosting Phishing




Figure 16: Phishing - Top ISPs

Table 7: ISPPhishing

Rank	ISP	count	%
1	AS number for New World Telephone Ltd.	497	20
2	Pang International Limited-AS number	397	16
3	Sun Network (Hong Kong) Limited	364	15
4	HongKong Virtual Internal Server Company Limited	274	11
5	Hong Kong Broadband Network Ltd.	170	7
6	Forewin Telecom Group Limited, ISP at	123	5
7	VpsQuan L.L.C.	111	4
8	Cloudie Limited	84	3
9	Wharf T&T Ltd.	60	2
10	Hutchison Global Communications	55	2

### 5.3 Top 10 ISPs hosting Malware




Figure 17: Malware Hosting - Top ISPs

Table 8: ISPMalware			
Rank	ISP	count	%
1	AS number for New World Telephone Ltd.	754	36
2	UDomain Web Hosting Company Ltd	293	14
3	Hong Kong Broadband Network Ltd.	246	11
4	Sun Network (Hong Kong) Limited	202	9
5	Pang International Limited-AS number	122	5
6	SunnyVision Limited	58	2
7	Shanghai Chenyi Network Technology Co.,Ltd	54	2
8	China Telecom Next Generation Carrier Network	53	2
9	Internet Assigned Numbers Authority	42	2
_10	NETWORK AND SECURITY SOLUTIONS LIMITED	28	1

### 5.4 Top 10 ISPs of unique botnets (Bots)

### **ISPBotnets**




Figure 18: Botnet (Bots) - Top ISPs

Table 9: ISPBotnets			
Rank	ISP	$\operatorname{count}$	%
1	PCCW Limited	1465	26
2	Hong Kong Broadband Network Ltd.	657	12
3	<b>Hutchison Global Communications</b>	518	9
4	Wharf T&T Ltd.	433	7
5	AS number for New World Telephone Ltd.	404	7
6	PCCW IMSBiz	287	5
7	Sun Network (Hong Kong) Limited	177	3
8	HK Cable TV Ltd	94	1
9	HOSTSPACE NETWORKS LLC	76	1
10	-	74	1

### **ISPAII**




Figure 19: All Events - Top ISPs

Table 10: ISPAll

Rank	ISP	Defacement Count	ole 10: ISPAll  Phishing Count		Botnet Count	Total C
1	AS	153	497	754	404	1808
	number					
	for					
	New					
	World					
	Telephone					
	Ltd.					
2	PCCW	1	1	2	1465	1469
	Limited					
3	Hong	1	170	246	657	1074
	Kong					
	Broadband					
	Network					
	Ltd.					
4	Sun	13	364	202	177	756
	Network					
	(Hong					
	Kong)					
	Limited					
5	Pang	32	397	122	35	586
	International					
	Limited-AS					
	number					
6		1	55	2	518	576
	Hutchison					
	Global					
	Communications					
7		1	60	15	433	509
	Wharf					
	T&T					
	Ltd.					
8	PCCW	5	38	1	287	331
	IMSBiz					
9		0	1	293	3	297
	UDomain					
	Web					
	Hosting					
	Company					
	Ltd					
10		1	274	5	9	289
	HongKong					
	Virtual					
	Internal					
	Server					
	Company					
	Limited					

### **ISPServerAll**




Figure 20: Server Related Events - Top ISPs

Table 11: ISPServerAll						
Rank	ISP	Defacement Count	Phishing Count	Malware Count	Total Count	%
1	AS number for	153	497	754	1404	29
	New World					
	Telephone Ltd.					
2	Sun Network	13	364	202	579	12
	(Hong Kong)					
	Limited					
3	Pang	32	397	122	551	11
	International					
	Limited-AS					
	number					
4	Hong Kong	1	170	246	417	8
	Broadband					
	Network Ltd.					
5	UDomain Web	0	1	293	294	6
	Hosting Company					
	$\operatorname{Ltd}$					
6	0 0	1	274	5	280	5
	Internal Server					
	Company Limited					
7	Forewin Telecom	15	123	5	143	2
	Group Limited,					
	ISP at					
8	VpsQuan L.L.C.	0	111	3	114	2
9	Cloudie Limited	3	84	16	103	2
10	SunnyVision	7	13	58	78	1
	Limited					

#### A Sources of information in IFAS

The following information feeds are information sources of IFAS:

Table 12: Methods of Geolocation Identification Event Type First introduced Source Defacement Zone - H 2013-04 Phishing ArborNetwork: Atlas SRF-Phishing 2013-04 Phishing CleanMX - Phishing 2013-04 Phishing Millersmiles 2013-04Phishing Phishtank 2013-04 Abuse.ch: Zeus Tracker - Binary URL Malware Hosting 2013-04 Malware Hosting Abuse.ch: SpyEye Tracker - Binary URL 2013-04 Malware Hosting CleanMX - Malware 2013-04 Malware Hosting Malc0de 2013-04 Malware Hosting Malware Domain List2013-04Malware Hosting Savour.cn 2013-04 Botnet (C&Cs) Abuse.ch: Zeus Tracker - C&Cs 2013-04 Botnet (C&Cs) Abuse.ch: SpyEye Tracker - C&Cs 2013-04 Botnet (C&Cs) Abuse.ch: Palevo Tracker - C&Cs 2013-04 Botnet (C&Cs) Shadowserver - C&Cs 2013-09Arbor Network: Atlas SRF-Conficker Botnet (Bots) 2013-08 Botnet (Bots) Shadowserver - botnet\_drone 2013-08Shadowserver - sinkhole\_http\_drone Botnet (Bots) 2013-08 Botnet (Bots) Shadowserver - microsoft\_sinkhole 2013-08

#### B Geolocation identification methods in IFAS

We use the following methods to identify if a network's geolocation is in Hong Kong:

Table 13: IFAS Sources of Information				
Method	First introduced	Last update		
Maxmind	2013-04	2015-4-20		

# C Major Botnet Families

Botnet	Alias	Nature	4: Botnet Families Infection Method	Attacks/Impacts
BankPatch	<ul><li>MultiBanker</li><li>Patcher</li><li>BankPatcher</li></ul>	Banking Trojan	<ul> <li>via adult websites</li> <li>corrupt multimedia</li> <li>codecs</li> <li>spam e-mail</li> <li>chat and messaging</li> <li>systems</li> </ul>	monitor specific banking websites and harvest user's passwords, credit card information and other sensitive financial data
BlackEnergy	Nil	DDos Trojan	<ul> <li>rootkit techniques to maintain persistence</li> <li>uses process injection technique</li> <li>strong encryption and modular architecture</li> </ul>	launch DDos attacks
Citadel	Nil	Banking Trojan	• avoid and disable security tool detection	<ul> <li>steal banking</li> <li>credentials and</li> <li>sensitive information</li> <li>keystroke logging</li> <li>screenshot capture</li> <li>video capture</li> <li>man-in-the-browser attack</li> </ul>
Conficker	<ul><li>Downadup</li><li>Kido</li></ul>	Worm	<ul> <li>domain generation algorithm (DGA) capability</li> <li>communicate via P2P network</li> <li>disable security software</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>epxloit the Windows</li> <li>Server Service</li> <li>vulnerability (MS08-067)</li> <li>brute force attacks for admin credential to</li> <li>spread across network</li> <li>spread via removable drives using "autorun"</li> <li>feature</li> </ul>