

CMSC 641, Design and Analysis of Algorithms, Spring 2010

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Homework Assignment - 10

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Rough 3-Coloring

Algorithm

Let the graph $G(V, E)$ be with $|V| = n$ vertices $v_1, \dots, v_n \in V$ and $|E| = m$ edges $e_1, \dots, e_m \in E$. Also, we have the 3-color set $C = \{c_1, c_2, c_3\}$.

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1: for  $i = 1$  to  $n$  do
2:   Randomly pick a color  $c_j \in C$  and color the vertex  $v_i$  with  $c_j$ 
3: end for
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Analysis

Let X be the random variable denoting the total number of satisfied edges and X_i be an indicator variable corresponding to the i^{th} edge $e_i \in E$ s.t.

$$X_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } e_i \text{ is satisfied} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \forall i \in 1 \dots m. \text{ Hence, } X = \sum_{i=1}^m X_i.$$

Now, $P(X_i = 1)$ = probability that the colors picked by the algorithm for two endpoints of e_i are different = $\frac{3 \times 2}{3 \times 3} = \frac{2}{3}$.

$$\text{Hence, } E[X_i] = 0 \cdot P(X_i = 0) + 1 \cdot P(X_i = 1) = P(X_i = 1) = \frac{2}{3}.$$

By linearity of expectation, we have, $E[X] = E\left[\sum_{i=1}^m X_i\right] = \sum_{i=1}^m E[X_i] = \frac{2}{3}m \Rightarrow$

$$E[X] = \frac{2}{3}c^*.$$

Contention Resolution Revisited

Part (a)

Proof: S is conflict free

Let's assume to the contrary $\Rightarrow \exists$ processes $P_i, P_j \in S$ s.t. P_j is in conflict with P_i . Also, $X_i = X_j = 1$ by construction. But then P_i must not be selected as an element of S , a contradiction.

Let Z be the random variable denoting the total number of conflict free processes in the set S (i.e., value of Z denotes the size of S) and Z_i be an indicator variable, with

$$Z_i = \begin{cases} 1 & P_i \in S \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \forall i \in 1 \dots n.$$

$$\text{Hence, } Z = \sum_{i=1}^n Z_i.$$

Now,

$$\begin{aligned} P(Z_i = 1) &= P\left((X_i = 1) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{X_j \in \text{adj}(X_i)} X_j = 0\right)\right) \\ &= P(X_i = 1) \prod_{X_j \in \text{adj}(X_i)} P(X_j = 0), \text{ since independent} \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^d, \text{ since } |\text{adj}(X_i)| = d \\ &\Rightarrow E[Z_i] = P(Z_i = 1) = \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{d+1} \\ \Rightarrow E[Z] &= \sum_{i=1}^n E[Z_i] = \frac{n}{2^{d+1}}, \text{ by linearity of expectation} \end{aligned}$$

Part (b)

As in part (a), we have

$$\begin{aligned}
P(Z_i = 1) &= P\left((X_i = 1) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{X_j \in \text{adj}(X_i)} X_j = 0\right)\right) \\
&= P(X_i = 1) \prod_{X_j \in \text{adj}(X_i)} P(X_j = 0), \text{ since independent} \\
&= p \cdot (1-p)^d, \text{ since } |\text{adj}(X_i)| = d \\
&\Rightarrow E[Z_i] = P(Z_i = 1) = p \cdot (1-p)^d \\
\Rightarrow E[Z] &= \sum_{i=1}^n E[Z_i] = np \cdot (1-p)^d, \text{ by linearity of expectation}
\end{aligned}$$

Hence, expected size of $S = f(p) = E[Z] = np \cdot (1-p)^d$. We want to maximize the size of the independent set S
 $\Rightarrow f'(p) = (1-p)^d - dp(1-p)^{d-1} = 0 \Rightarrow p = \frac{1}{1+d}$ (we have $f''(p) < 0$ at this point).

Hence, maximum expected size of the independent set $= nd \left(1 - \frac{1}{d+1}\right)^{d+1} = \frac{nd^d}{(d+1)^{d+1}}$.

One-Pass Auction

If the seller accepts the first bid, the probability of accepting the highest of the n bids $= \frac{1}{n}$ only. Hence, let's the strategy of the seller be the following: he rejects the first $k-1$ bids ($2 \leq k \leq n$) and accepts the first one which is the highest of all the bids he has seen until that point of time. We have to find k s.t. the seller accepts the highest of the n bids with probability at least $\frac{1}{4}$.

Now probability that he accepts the highest bid using this strategy,

$$\begin{aligned}
P_n(k) &= \sum_{i=k}^n \text{Probability that } i^{\text{th}} \text{ bid is highest and the seller accepts it} \\
&= \sum_{i=k}^n \frac{1}{n} \cdot \frac{k-1}{i-1}, \text{ (since to accept } b_i, \text{ the maximum bid from} \\
&\quad \text{the first } i-1 \text{ bids must be among the first } k-1 \text{ bids)} \\
&= \frac{k-1}{n} \sum_{i=k}^n \frac{1}{i-1} \cdot \frac{n}{i-1} = \frac{k}{n} \int_{\frac{k}{n}}^1 \frac{1}{x} = \frac{k}{n} \ln \frac{n}{k} \text{ for large } n, \text{ with } n \rightarrow \infty
\end{aligned}$$

Hence, as seen from the graph of $P_n(k)$, if we choose $0.2n \leq k \leq 0.7n$, the seller accepts the highest of the n bids with probability at least $\frac{1}{4} = 0.25$.

