

CMSC 641, Design and Analysis of Algorithms,  
Spring 2010

Sandipan Dey,  
Homework Assignment - 10

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Rough 3-Coloring

Algorithm

Let the graph  $G(V, E)$  be with  $|V| = n$  vertices  $v_1, \dots, v_n \in V$  and  $|E| = m$  edges  $e_1, \dots, e_m \in E$ . Also, we have the 3-color set  $C = \{c_1, c_2, c_3\}$ .

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1: for  $i = 1$  to  $n$  do
2:   Randomly pick a color  $c_j \in C$  and color the vertex  $v_i$  with  $c_j$ 
3: end for
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Analysis

Let  $X$  be the random variable denoting the total number of satisfied edges and  $X_i$  be an indicator variable corresponding to the  $i^{\text{th}}$  edge  $e_i \in E$  s.t.

$$X_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } e_i \text{ is satisfied} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \forall i \in 1 \dots m. \text{ Hence, } X = \sum_{i=1}^m X_i.$$

Now,  $P(X_i = 1)$  = probability that the colors picked by the algorithm for two endpoints of  $e_i$  are different =  $\frac{3 \times 2}{3 \times 3} = \frac{2}{3}$ .

$$\text{Hence, } E[X_i] = 0 \cdot P(X_i = 0) + 1 \cdot P(X_i = 1) = P(X_i = 1) = \frac{2}{3}.$$

By linearity of expectation, we have,  $E[X] = E\left[\sum_{i=1}^m X_i\right] = \sum_{i=1}^m E[X_i] = \frac{2}{3}m \Rightarrow$

$$E[X] = \frac{2}{3}m.$$

## Contention Resolution Revisited

### Part (a)

**Proof: S is conflict free**

Let's assume to the contrary  $\Rightarrow \exists$  processes  $P_i, P_j \in S$  s.t.  $P_j$  is in conflict with  $P_i$ . Also,  $X_i = X_j = 1$  by construction. But then  $P_i$  must not be selected as an element of  $S$ , a contradiction.

Let  $Z$  be the random variable denoting the total number of conflict free processes in the set  $S$  (i.e., value of  $Z$  denotes the size of  $S$ ) and  $Z_i$  be an indicator variable, with

$$Z_i = \begin{cases} 1 & P_i \in S \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \forall i \in 1 \dots n.$$

$$\text{Hence, } Z = \sum_{i=1}^n Z_i.$$

Now,

$$\begin{aligned} P(Z_i = 1) &= P\left((X_i = 1) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{X_j \in \text{adj}(X_i)} X_j = 0\right)\right) \\ &= P(X_i = 1) \prod_{X_j \in \text{adj}(X_i)} P(X_j = 0), \text{ since independent} \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^d, \text{ since } |X_j \in \text{adj}(X_i)| = d \\ &\Rightarrow E[Z_i] = P(Z_i = 1) = \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{d+1} \end{aligned}$$

$$\Rightarrow E[Z] = \sum_{i=1}^n E[Z_i] = \frac{n}{2^{d+1}}, \text{ by linearity of expectation}$$

## Part (b)

As in part (a), we have

$$\begin{aligned}
 P(Z_i = 1) &= P\left((X_i = 1) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{X_j \in \text{adj}(X_i)} X_j = 0\right)\right) \\
 &= P(X_i = 1) \prod_{X_j \in \text{adj}(X_i)} P(X_j = 0), \text{ since independent} \\
 &= p \cdot (1-p)^d, \text{ since } |\text{adj}(X_i)| = d \\
 &\Rightarrow E[Z_i] = P(Z_i = 1) = p \cdot (1-p)^d \\
 \Rightarrow E[Z] &= \sum_{i=1}^n E[Z_i] = np \cdot (1-p)^d, \text{ by linearity of expectation}
 \end{aligned}$$

Hence, expected size of  $S = f(p) = E[Z] = np \cdot (1-p)^d$ . We want to maximize the size of the independent set  $S$

$\Rightarrow f'(p) = n(1-p)^d - ndp(1-p)^{d-1} = 0 \Rightarrow p = \frac{1}{d+1}$  (we have  $f''(p) < 0$  at this point).

Hence, maximum expected size of the independent set  $= nd \left(1 - \frac{1}{d+1}\right)^{d+1} = \frac{nd^d}{(d+1)^{d+1}}$ .

## One-Pass Auction

If the seller accepts the first bid, the probability of accepting the highest of the  $n$  bids  $= \frac{1}{n}$  only. Hence, let's the strategy of the seller be the following: he rejects the first  $k-1$  bids ( $2 \leq k \leq n$ ) and accepts the first one which is the highest of all the bids he has seen until that point of time. We have to find  $k$  s.t. the seller accepts the highest of the  $n$  bids with probability at least  $\frac{1}{4}$ .

Now probability that he accepts the highest bid using this strategy,

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_n(k) &= \sum_{i=k}^n \text{Probability that } i^{\text{th}} \text{ bid is highest and the seller accepts it} \\
 &= \sum_{i=k}^n \frac{1}{n} \cdot \frac{k-1}{i-1}, \text{ (since to accept } b_i, \text{ the maximum bid from} \\
 &\quad \text{the first } i-1 \text{ bids must be among the first } k-1 \text{ bids)} \\
 &= \frac{k-1}{n} \sum_{i=k}^n \frac{1}{i-1} = \frac{k-1}{n} \int_{\frac{k-1}{n}}^1 \frac{1}{x} dx = \frac{k-1}{n} \ln \frac{n}{k-1} \text{ for large } n, \text{ with } n \rightarrow \infty
 \end{aligned}$$

Hence, as seen from the graph of  $P_n(k)$ , if we choose  $0.2n \leq k \leq 0.7n$ , the seller accepts the highest of the  $n$  bids with probability at least  $\frac{1}{4} = 0.25$ .

