

SANFORD DIEHL
Curriculum Vitae

EDUCATION

- 2021 Harvard University, Ph.D., Philosophy (*expected*)
- 2013 Columbia University, B.A., Philosophy, *summa cum laude*, Honors in Philosophy
Minor in German Literature and Cultural History

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

Normative Ethics, Moral Psychology, Political Philosophy, Social Philosophy

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

Post-Kantian European Philosophy, Metaethics, Applied Ethics, Epistemology

DISSERTATION: “Love, Respect, and Mutual Recognition”

My dissertation asks what we learn about respect and love by viewing them as kinds of recognition—of taking someone to matter in a way that shows that person the significance they have for you. I argue that because central forms of love and respect have the structure of recognition, the reasons these attitudes provide must be able to receive rational uptake from the person they concern. This constraint helps to make sense of various forms of intimacy in friendship, provides evidence for the distinctiveness of second-personal thought, and yields a conception of justifiability to others that fills gaps in the foundations of contractualism.

Committee: Richard Moran (chair), Matthew Boyle (Chicago), Ned Hall, T.M. Scanlon,
Kieran Setiya (MIT)

UNDER REVIEW

A paper about immanent critique (revise & resubmit at the *European Journal of Philosophy*)

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

- 2020-21 Dissertation Completion Fellowship, Harvard University
- 2020 Special Commendation for Extraordinary Teaching, Harvard University
(*Harvard-wide award by undergraduate nomination to ~10% of instructors for their teaching during the pandemic*)
- 2019 GSAS Merit/Term-Time Fellowship, Harvard University
(*Harvard-wide merit-based award for research, declined*)
- 2018-19 Graduate Fellowship, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University
- 2018 Bowen Prize, Harvard University (*for best essay in moral or political philosophy*)

- 2018 Richard M. Martin Predissertation Fellowship, Harvard University
- 2015-19 Derek Bok Center Certificate of Distinction in Teaching, Harvard University (4x)
(for receiving an average teaching evaluation score of at least 4.5/5)
- 2015 GSAS Summer Predissertation Fellowship, Harvard University
- 2013 Phi Beta Kappa, Columbia University
- 2013 James Gutman Prize in Philosophy, Columbia University

PRESENTATIONS AND COMMENTS (* = refereed)

- 2021 “Aggregation and Alienation,” LMU-Zürich Early Career Conference on Relational Normativity, Universität Zürich (*postponed due to the pandemic*)*
- 2019 “Partiality and Being Loved,” Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University
- 2017 “Why Immanent Critique?” Chicagoland Graduate Philosophy Conference, University of Illinois-Chicago*
- 2016 “Why Immanent Critique?” Workshop on European Philosophy, Harvard University
- 2014 “Hegel and Natural Teleology in Dewey’s Later Thought,” Virginia Tech Graduate Philosophy Conference, Virginia Tech*
- 2019 Comments on Julia Markovits, “The Partial Relativism of Praise and Blame,” Workshop on Rights and Supererogation, MIT
- 2019 Comments on Sungho Kimlee, “Self-Cultivation in Early Confucianism,” Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics Faculty Seminar, Harvard University
- 2018 Comments on Sean Aas, “Before Year Zero: Political Philosophy and the Prehistory of Disability,” Workshop in Social Philosophy, Princeton University*
- 2017 Comments on Max Lewis, “The Goldilocks Dilemma for Pessimists about Moral Deference,” Harvard-MIT Graduate Philosophy Conference, Harvard University

TEACHING

Primary Instructor:

- 2020 Contractualism, Spring (*undergraduate seminar*)
- 2017 Moral Epistemology, Fall (*undergraduate seminar*)
- 2019 Big Data, Ethics, and Moral Machines, Summer, Harvard Pre-College Program
(*two-week summer course for high school students*)

Teaching Assistant (* = discussion section):

- 2019 Nozick’s *Philosophical Explanations*, Selim Berker, Spring
- 2017 Marx and Marxism, Tommie Shelby, Spring*
- 2016 Self, Freedom, and Existence, Richard Moran, Fall*
- 2016 Violence and Democracy, Susanna Siegel, Spring

- 2016 Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Matthew Boyle, Spring*
- 2015 Existentialism in Literature and Film, Sean Kelly, Fall*

Guest Lectures:

- 2019 "Scanlon's Contractualism," in Modern Moral Philosophy and the History of Ethics
- 2017 "Stephen Lukes, *Marxism and Morality*," in Marx and Marxism
- 2016 "The Third Antinomy," in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*

GRADUATE-LEVEL COURSEWORK (* = audit)

- Modern Moral Philosophy and the History of Ethics (Doyle & Setiya, MIT)*
- The First Person (Doyle & Moran)*
- Topics in Political Philosophy (Stanczyk)*
- Kant's Ethical Theory (Korsgaard)*
- Partiality and Impartiality (Preston-Roedder & Setiya, MIT)*
- Normative and Meta-Normative Questions (Berker & Parfit)*
- Moral Psychology (Setiya, MIT)
- The Ethics of Belief (Rinard)
- Metaethics (Berker)
- Marx (Tuck, Harvard Government)
- Other Minds (Boyle & Moran)
- Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (Boyle)
- Epistemology (White, MIT)
- First-Year Colloquium (Richard)
- Aristotle's Ethics (Korsgaard)
- Equality and Liberty (Scanlon)
- First-Year Colloquium (Hall & Simmons)
- Knowledge and Abilities (Richard)*
- Heidegger's *Being and Time* (Carman, Columbia)
- Hegel and Dewey (Honneth, Columbia)
- Metaethics (Vogt, Columbia)
- Weber and Lukács (Honneth & Neuhauser, Columbia)
- Hegel and Durkheim (Neuhauser, Columbia)

SERVICE AND PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

- 2019 Organizer, Prospective Students Visit
- 2018-19 Philosophy Graduate Student Representative
- 2018 Member, Departmental Climate Committee
- 2018 Participant, Critical Theory Summer School, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
- 2016-18 Departmental Representative to the Graduate Student Council
- 2016-18 Research Assistant for Richard Moran

- 2016 Research Assistant for Susanna Siegel
- 2014-18 Organizer, Harvard Philosophy Talk-Shop Series
- 2013-19 Referee, MIT-Harvard Graduate Philosophy Conference
- 2011-13 Research Assistant for Samuel Moyn
- 2013-20 Organizer of or regular participant in reading groups on relational normativity, rights, analytical Marxism, neo-Aristotelian ethics, Kant, philosophy and literature, philosophy in German, the work of Joseph Raz, and the work of Vincent Descombes

LANGUAGES

English (native), German (proficient), Spanish (basic)

REFERENCES:

Richard Moran (*advisor*)
Bryan D. Young Professor of Philosophy
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Matthew Boyle
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Edward J. Hall
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Bernhard Nickel (*teaching*)
Professor of Philosophy
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T. M. Scanlon
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Dissertation Abstract

What difference does it make to the way you relate to other people that you are relating, specifically, to other *subjects*? Philosophers often write as though having a point of view makes humans a kind of object that warrants special treatment, much as being beautiful makes works of art warrant contemplation and preservation. My dissertation argues instead that the subjectivity of other people bears on the question of how to relate to them by changing why that question matters. Your deliberative conception of how other people count does not just inform what you should do; it provides others with recognition, acknowledgment to them of how they count for you.

I defend this picture by arguing that it solves two problems. First, it makes sense of the relational features of interpersonal morality that motivate contractualism but leave its foundations obscure. Second, my picture reconciles the thought that we love other people for who they are with the essentially intersubjective character of some of love's most valuable expressions.

According to contractualists, whether an action is right or wrong depends on whether it can be justified to each person it affects. Contractualism is meant to be an alternative to consequentialism: contractualists deny that the action with the best consequences is always justifiable to each person. But for that to be true, the justifiability of an action *to* a person cannot be a mere matter of its being justified, *simpliciter*, in light of how it affects everyone.

In Chapter 1, I reject two influential analyses of justification-to. The first, due to Stephen Darwall, analyzes justification-to in terms of the authority to demand something from someone. The second, recently defended by R. Jay Wallace, draws on the idea that duties are always directed, i.e., owed to a particular person. Both views locate the directionality of justification in what it is to have an obligation, rather than in how the balance of different people's interests determines which obligations one has. As a result, I argue, neither view may appeal to the requirement of justifiability to each person to explain the source of obligations not to produce the best outcome.

My own proposal has two parts. In Chapter 2, I argue that when you care about what is good for you, you are not concerned with the instantiation of some property, e.g., your welfare. Rather, you care about how what happens to you bears on your ongoing activity of living your life. And this agential conception of why it matters what happens to you is at odds with the impersonal conception of value that underlies consequentialist reasoning. Chapter 3 draws on Marx's early writings about recognition and alienation in productive activity to argue that it is alienating to be treated in accordance with a conception of how you matter that you cannot affirm in your own voice. Action must instead be justified in terms of its bearing on each party's activity of living, something it does not make sense to aggregate across people. What results is a reinterpretation and defense of Rawls's charge that consequentialism cannot respect the "separateness of persons."

In Chapter 4, I turn to actions and attitudes central to love and friendship—expressing care, sharing in action and experience, understanding one another deeply—that must be undertaken for the right reason to be undertaken at all. Consoling your distraught friend only so that she will owe you a favor, for instance, does not merely fail to merit praise: it fails to constitute real support. I argue that what separates genuine care from its alienated imitation, shared activity from strategic coordination, and being understood from being monitored is whether the other person figures in the agent's practical thought in an essentially second-personal way. To grasp a second-personal thought, one must understand it to corefer with the first-personal thoughts of its referent, congruent with the interconnection of uses of 'you' and 'I' in conversation. Love for another subject is thus shaped, like respect, partly by the conditions of its intelligibility as such to that person.