

# Discussion of Shi, Zhang, and Meinerding (2025)

“The Impact of Climate Policies on Financial Markets:  
Evidence from the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism”

Discussant: Sangmin Simon Oh (Columbia Business School)

Econometric Society Meeting 2026

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## Plan for Discussion

1. CBAM and Its Importance
2. Going Beyond CARs

## Comment 1. CBAM and Its Importance

# EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)


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- Steel production emits  $\approx$  2 tons of CO<sub>2</sub> per ton of steel,
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- EU-produced steel faces a carbon cost of  $2 \times €80 = €160$  per ton, while imported steel into the EU faces €0 per ton




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- After CBAM, for each shipment, the importer must:
  - (1) report embedded CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, and
  - (2) buy CBAM certificates equal to those emissions
- CBAM charge mirrors the EU carbon price.




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


**thyssenkrupp**

## Why Important?

- First credible attempt by a major economy to impose carbon pricing at the border
- A global policy event with exporters, foreign governments, and multinational firms all updating beliefs about future trade costs and climate regulation

# Exhibit #1: Global Reaction to CBAM



Source: GMK Center

## Exhibit #2: Foreign Policy Responses

### 1. Expanding National Carbon Pricing (China, India)

- Expanded or accelerated national ETS / carbon pricing, which allows exporters to claim a deduction for “carbon price paid” under CBAM
- Keeps carbon revenue at home rather than transferring it to the EU

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## 3. Climate Club Alignment (United States)

- Congressional proposals for CBAM-style border adjustments
- Parallel negotiations on climate-linked steel and aluminum trade

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. WHITEHOUSE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and  
referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_

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## A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to create  
a carbon border adjustment based on carbon intensity,  
and for other purposes.

## Exhibit #3: CBAM-Related Uncertainty

**Implementation Uncertainty:** Insufficient data systems and rising reporting costs

*“Around three quarters of German companies are not able or only partially able to report emissions data from their suppliers outside the EU... the pressure to set up the necessary monitoring and reporting systems in companies is increasing significantly.”* [[source](#)]

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**Price and Margin Uncertainty:** Unclear levied rates, unclear pass-through

*“Most of the companies are yet figuring out a way to deal with CBAM... about 60% of our exports go to Europe and we want to know what is the rate that will be levied and will it be company specific?”* [[source](#)]

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**Strategic Risk Perceptions:** Concerns about undermined competitiveness & investment

*“The first thing to do about CBAM is just to eradicate it, get rid of it... it may not yield real environmental benefits and could gradually drive investment out of Europe.”* [[source](#)]

# CAR Result and Its Interpretation

Paper finds -1% to -1.3% CARs for exposed EU customer firms over a few days.

Table 3: Total treatment effect

	(1) Control group	(2) Generalized control group	(3) Treatment group	(4) Difference (3) – (1)	(5) Difference (3) – (2)
	$loc.treat.ratio_i = 0 \ \&$ $ind.treat.ratio_i = 0$	$loc.treat.ratio_i < \text{median} \ \&$ $ind.treat.ratio_i < \text{median}$	$loc.treat.ratio_i > \text{median} \ \&$ $ind.treat.ratio_i > \text{median}$		
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**Suggestion 1:** Rebalance the institutional background for better interpretation of results

- Paper provides detailed political timeline to help justify the event date
- But more detail is needed on what CBAM actually implied for firms and markets at the time (e.g. connection to ETS reform, global policy reactions, firm-level uncertainty)

## Comment 2. Going Beyond CARs

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**Suggestion 2b.** Method in **Nagel and Xu (2025)** Movements in Yields, not the Equity Premium: Bernanke-Kuttner Redux

- Nagel and Xu (2025) construct a counterfactual stock price change that would occur if only discounting moved, holding the cash-flow claims fixed.
- If the authors can get dividend futures for a subset of EU customer firms, they can do:
  - Treat dividend futures prices as the “cash flow leg”
  - Treat risk-free curve as the “discounting leg”
- Then the authors can fix the “cash flow leg” at pre-event and only let the “discounting leg” move with the event

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**Suggestion 3.** Benchmark CBAM CARs against two groups of policies --

- Magnitude and persistence relative to other climate policy announcements
  - E.g. ETS reforms, carbon tax introductions, subsidy rollbacks
- Policies with similar scope but different enforcement mechanisms
  - E.g. price-based vs. quantity-based regulation, border-adjusted vs. domestic-only

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**Useful Example:** December 2017–2018 EU ETS Phase IV reform

- Tightened the emissions cap and adjusted the supply of carbon allowances over time
- Directly affects expected carbon costs and long-run regulation
- Widely viewed as a regime shift

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- **A few suggestions for future iterations:**
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  - Distinguish cash flow vs. discount rate news and benchmark against other policies
- **A few questions prompted by the paper for the future:**
  - To what extent can firms hedge or insure against policy-induced risks?
  - When do policy interventions primarily reallocate risk across firms and sectors, and when do they create new aggregate risks that financial markets must absorb?
- **Very much looking forward to the next version!**