

## More Local, More Clientelistic?

How Clientelism Tolerance Differs by Election Levels in Taiwan

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Prepared for the 5<sup>th</sup> World Congress of Taiwan Studies, May 23<sup>rd</sup> 2025

# Overview

- 1 Literature Review and Theory
- 2 Research Design
- 3 Conclusion

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→ *What else accounts for the variation of this tolerance?*

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→ *How does vote buying practice differ across levels of government/election?*

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  - *Perverse accountability*: it holds electorates instead of politicians accountable.
  - *Corruption*: it usually relies on embezzlement and power abuse to reward voters.



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- ② Do *mechanisms* of tolerance for clientelism differ across election levels?

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
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    - Clientelism taken root in the authoritarian period now still lingers at local levels
  - Theory-wise, in the scholarship on clientelism in Taiwan, the emphasis has always been local factions, and the role of voters was missed out.

# Vote Buying/Clientelism Indices (V-Dem) and GDP per Capita



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*In the experiment, I test the theories by analyzing the results of our key attribute: accusation.*


# Attributes of the Conjoint Experiment

Attribute	Level
Party Affiliation	[DPP] Democratic Progressive Party/DPP [KMT] Kuomintang [Independent]
Education	[High School] [NTU Undergrad*] Undergraduate at National Taiwan University [NTU Master's] Master's at National Taiwan University [US Master's] Master's at a US University
Gender	[Female] [Male]
Branding	[Fresh] Fresh in politics, fresh in working style [Warmth] Raised in the same village (county), the candidate promises to serve electorates as if they are family. [Competency] Praised by the ex-village chief(ex-county magistrate) when working for the village office (county government).
Platform	[Allowance transparency] Transparency of allowance usage for village (county) office [Collective public goods] Full underground power lines (Development of sewage disposal monitoring system) [Individualized public goods] Full salary donation for new ambulances and assistance of the vulnerable (Increase of pensions for the weak and elderly)
Accusation	[None] [Vote buying] Buying votes with cash through brokers [Procurement projects] Trading future procurement (construction) projects for donations [Patronage jobs] Rewarding brokers with village office (county government) jobs for their vote mobilization


\* : The level was accidentally omitted in the village chief experiment due to technical error.




# Levels of Elections Involved in the Experiment



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# Interface of the Experiment

詳細閱讀兩位候選人資料，然後選擇您支持的候選人。

請問您會投給哪一位 **無黨** 候選人？

## 望來縣 縣長選舉

	一號	二號
選舉 指控	以縣政府職位換取樁腳 因素	透過地方工程標案換取營造 商支持
性別	女	男
政黨	無黨籍	國民黨
介紹	空降政治素人，主打 『新人新作風』	在望來縣長大，曾言『把望 來縣民當成家人來服務』
學歷	公費留美碩士	公費留美碩士
政綱	針對縣內廢污水排放， 建立水污染監測機制	加碼發放敬老金；擴大弱勢 救助範圍

☐ 一號

☐ 二號

請為兩位候選人評分。(1 = 非常差, 4 = 還好, 7 = 非常不錯)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

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學歷	高中畢業	高中畢業
政黨	無黨籍	民進黨
性別	男	男
介紹	空降政治素人，主打 『新人新作風』	在慈福里長大，曾言『把慈福 里民當成家人來服務』
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
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
# Descriptive Statistics: Sample ( $n = 1853$ ) vs True Population

Categories	Sub-categories	Sample ( $N = 1853$ )		Actual %
		n	%	
Gender	Female	916	49.4	50.1
	Male	937	50.6	49.9
Age	20-39	707	38.1	33.5
	40-59	914	49.3	38.1
	60 or above	232	12.5	28.4
Education	No degree	302	16.3	50.3
	Undergrad	1138	61.4	41.1
	Postgrad	413	22.3	8.6
Locality	City	1492	80.5	74.4
	County	361	19.5	25.6
Political Spectrum	Neutral	906	48.9	/
	Pan-Blue	359	19.4	/
	Pan-Green	588	31.7	/
Self-assessed Social Status	1-3 (Low)	229	12.4	/
	4-6 (Medium)	1081	58.3	/
	7-10 (High)	543	29.3	/
Political Discussion	Never	133	7.2	/
	Seldom	872	47.1	/
	Often	727	39.2	/
	Usually	121	6.5	/
Political Knowledge	Both wrong	229	12.4	/
	One correct	1046	56.4	/
	Both correct	578	31.2	/


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## H2A (More closeness in lower elections): Supported

Categories	Sub-categories	Sample (N = 1853)	
		n	%
Closeness to Legislators	Very far	1193	64.4
	A bit far	447	24.1
	A bit close	177	9.6
	Very close	36	1.9
Closeness to Mayor	Very far	1308	70.6
	A bit far	372	20.1
	A bit close	153	8.3
	Very close	20	1.1
Closeness to Village Chief	Very far	356	19.2
	A bit far	531	28.7
	A bit close	573	30.9
	Very close	393	21.2

More than 50% in total find village chiefs a bit/very close but for higher officers, it is only around at most 12%.

## H2B (More closeness leads to more tolerance): higher elections only




Figure: Interaction Between Closeness and Clientelism Accusation in the Two Elections

## H3A (Less perceived power in lower elections): Supported

Scope	Issues	Central	City/County	District/Township	Village
National	Outdated military equipments	1299	304	104	146
	Low minimum wage	1274	426	88	65
Local	Potholes on the road	47	662	612	532
	Difficulties in benefit application	60	271	738	784
	Orphan settling	64	411	877	501
	Building summons appeal	53	1004	610	186

**Table:** Levels of Officials Respondents would Reach Out to for Different Issues

The distribution shows that lower officers are perceived to be responsible for more trivial and daily issues.

## Operationalizing “perceived power” to test H3B

To operationalize perceived power of a level of official, I count the number of issues the respondents would reach out to. And then, I categorized the sample into 3 bins (0 = none, 1-2 = moderate, 3 to 4 = strong).

Categories	Sub-categories	Sample (N = 1853)	
		n	%
Power to County/City Govt.	None	601	32.4
	Moderate	968	52.2
	Strong	284	15.3
Power to Village Office	None	767	41.4
	Moderate	829	44.7
	Strong	257	13.9

## H3B (Less perceived power leads to more tolerance): lower elections only




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# Summary of Hypothesis Tests

## Variation of Clientelism Across Election Levels

**H1:** *Clientelism tolerance is higher in lower elections.*

## Closeness Mechanism

**H2A:** *Perceived closeness to elected officer is higher in lower elections.*

**H2B:** *Clientelism tolerance is higher with higher closeness to officers.*

## Power Mechanism

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
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
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Also, here are some “for what it’s worth” additional findings which could lead to other spin-off projects in the future.

# FWIW 1: Gender and Clientelism Tolerance




## FWIW 2: Political Knowledge and Clientelism Tolerance






# FWIW 3: Partisanship and Clientelism Tolerance



## FWIW 4: Social Status and Clientelism Tolerance



# Overview

- 1 Literature Review and Theory
- 2 Research Design
- 3 Conclusion

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  - Electoral systems other than SMD?
  - More profile attributes?
  - And more...

# Thank You!

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