Failure in
ROUNAQ JAHAN
This is an extraordinarily
timely study with implications of the greatest importance not only for observers of present-day difficulties in Pakistan, but for
political scientists interested in any part of the world where gov ernments are faced with the problem of creating integrated nations.)
Pakistan: Failure in National Integration presents one scholar’s efforts to explain why the institutional innovations of.
the Ayub regime, which often > seemed so promising to. ob servers abroad, were in fact the prelude to, first, a crisis, and then the destruction of national unity in Pakistan. The author concentrates on the most formi dable problem which faced Pakistan in its quest for nation building: the integration of the geographically and _ culturally distinct Bengali subnation. She shows how Pakistan’s path under the Ayub regime, in em phasizing state-building and de emphasizing nation-building, followed the advice given many
(Continued on back flap)

Pakistan: failure in national integration
The Southern Asian Institute of Columbia Uni versity seeks a deeper knowledge of that vast and tumultuous area stretching from Pakistan in the West to Indonesia and the Philippines in the East. To understand the problems facing its leaders and diverse peoples requires sustained study and re search. Our publications are intended to contribute to that better understanding.
Rounaq Jahan examines the problem of na tional integration in Pakistan. She analyzes why former President Ayub’s constitutional innova tions, economic policies, and approaches to bureau cratic recruitment and political participation were inadequate and even contributed to the disinte gration of Pakistan.
Fakistan: failure in national mtegra tron
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TO MY MOTHER AND

TO THE MEMORY OF MY FATHER

Preface

ONE OF the traumatic events of 1971 was the disintegration of Pakistan and the emergence of the new nation state, Bangladesh. The study traces the gradual process of east-west disintegration in Pakistan that resulted in 1971 in the breakup of the country. It is a policy-oriented study, and I focus mainly on the Ayub period (1958-69) in Pakistan's history. The purpose of this study is not to frame any general theory regarding politi
cal development or national integration; rather, I try to show how diffi cult application of theories is in an empirical situation. Ayub was hailed in the sixties by many political scientists as a great "modernizer" and an "imnovator'; and, indeed, he undertook a number of development-ori ented policies. Here I analyze the actual workings of some of these policies and evaluate their impact on the problem of national integration in Pakistan.

The study originated five years ago as a Ph.D. dissertation at Har vard University. When my academic adviser, the late Professor Merle Fainsod, suggested the topic, I was at first reluctant to undertake the

necessary research. Given the Ayub regime's strict control of the press and writing in general, it would be difficult to collect materials and to write on this controversial political issue. I also knew that my objectivity would be questioned by those who disagreed with my conclusions. But because the issue was so challenging, and because no comprehensive study of it had yet been attempted, I decided to undertake this research. I collected data and conducted interviews in Pakistan during the spring and summer of 1968 and wrote the dissertation a year later in the spring and summer of 1969. I then edited the dissertation for publication, which essentially meant cutting its size by half, during 1969-70, when I spent the year at the Southern Asian Institute of Columbia University. In November 1970 I went to Dacca, and since communications between

Dacca and New York were problematic throughout 1971, publication of the book was delayed. While the manuscript was at the press, the dis integration of Pakistan became complete, and Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, emerged as a sovereign nation state. Except for the addition of an epilog, I decided not to alter any part of the manuscript which had been submitted to Columbia University Press in November 1970, since I thought the study would be more interesting for not having been written on the basis of hindsight. The epilog is an attempt not so much to update events as to analyze the birth of Bangladesh in the light of the whole study.

Many people have made this book possible. I am particularly grate ful to late Professor Merle Fainsod, who was an invaluable teacher, friend, and guide during my stay at Harvard. He read through the study at all stages and offered ready and useful criticisms. I remember espe cially the difficult spring and summer of 1969, when, though hard pressed by tremendous problems on campus, he willingly made time to read my dissertation. Most gratefully I acknowledge my all-too-obvious debts, intellectual and otherwise, to Professor Samuel P. Huntington. I owe to him my interest in comparative politics. Over the years he remained a constant source of encouragement and help. I am also in debted to Professor Rupert Emerson, who first aroused my interest in the problems of nationalism, and to Professor Francis G. Hutchins, who read my dissertation and offered valuable comments.

I am grateful to the Southern Asian Institute of Columbia University, particularly to Professors Stanley Heginbotham, Wayne A. Wilcox, and

Howard Wriggins. Professors Wilcox and Wriggins read the manuscript in its entirety and suffered through its various stages with patience and good humor. They have made possible a considerable degree of im
provement in the syntax, style, and structure of the study. Abdus Sattar made useful comments on the earlier drafts and Mohiuddin Alamgir helped in the collection of some statistical data. Gustav and Hanna Papanek helped in many ways, as did Professor James Q. Wilson. I am grateful to my professors at Dacca University and the many people | interviewed in Pakistan, whose association had helped me in gaining insight into Pakistani politics.

I am indebted to Professor Alex Inkles for giving me the permission to use his survey materials on Pakistan. I am also grateful to Michelle Kamhi and Karen Mitchell, who edited the manuscript for readability and style, Jesse Goodale, who labored hard on checking the footnote references, and Mrs. Carole Greszler, who typed the manuscript. Thanks are also due to my numerous friends in Cambridge, New York, and Dacca who helped with criticisms and suggestions at various times. Finally, I am grateful to my parents for their unstinting encouragement and emotional sustenance, and particularly to the memory of my de ceased father, without whose interest, support, and urging my career could not have taken this shape. But while I owe a great deal to many people, it is, of course, my book and hence my responsibility.
Cambridge, Massachusetts Rounaq Jahan May 1972
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Pakistan: failure in national integration

one / Introduction: the problem of national integration

MANY of the new states of Asia and Africa, as Rupert Emerson has pointed out, “are not yet nations in being but only nations in hope.””! Na tionalism in these countries came as a negative phenomenon. It was a movement more against Western colonialism than for a positive, co herent, national identity. Unlike the European countries, where national ism accompanied or followed industrial and democratic revolutions, and where common language and culture were key elements in the growth of nation states,” the new states of Asia and Africa found the mixed seeds of their nationalisms planted in essentially diverse traditional social soils. The challenges of the “integration crisis” lay in the future.°

‘Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation, p. 94.

2John H. Kautsky, ed., Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries, p. 38. For a de tailed analysis of the development of nationalism in Europe, see Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History; Carlton J. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism; Hans Kohn, Prophets and Peoples.

3Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, p. 65. According to Pye,

political de velopment in the new states involves six crises: i.e., crises of identity, legitimacy, penetra tion, participation, integration, and distribution. These six crises may appear in different sequences, but all of them must be successfully met before a society can become a modern nation state.
1

Language and cultural factors are often not supportive of the growth of a single nationalism in these new states, a great many of which have "illogical" boundaries cutting across tribes and nationality groups or which contain within themselves "subnational" groups whose leaders aspire to lead an independent nation state. The social group cleavages in multicultural states are both horizontal (i.e., ethnic, religious, linguis
tic, tribal) and vertical (i.e., class, caste, sectarian). The most immediate loyalties of the vast majority of people in these states go to units other than the nation state. The primary task faced by the leaders of the new African and Asian states, therefore, is to transform "primordial senti
ments'! into "civil sentiments," to create a national identity out of, or superior to, parochial identities, to build a nation state out of multiple subnational groups—a nation state not merely "in form and by inter national courtesy"® but also in political and governmental reality.
The term "nation-building" has both a mechanistic and a volunta ristic aspect. It suggests, in the words of Karl W. Deutsch,
. an architectural or mechanical model. As a house can be built from timber, bricks, and mortar in different patterns, quickly or slowly, through different sequences of assembly, in partial independence from its setting, and according to the choice, will and power of its builders, so a nation can be built according to different plans, from various materials, rapidly or grad
ually, by different sequences or steps, and in partial independence from its environment.°®
Though nation-building is a problem shared by both developing and developed countries, there are important differences between the two. In developed countries, where there is a preexistent, well-formed, na tional ideology, a national elite, and national institutions, the problem is essentially found in the need to integrate one or more alienated groups into the already existing system. In the developing countries, on the other hand, there is often no such preexisting "sovereign" system, and
'Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States. Geertz defines a primordial sentiment as "one that stems from the givens of —or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed givens of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connections mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social prac- tices" (p. 109).
° Pye, Political Development, p. 37.
*Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, eds., Nation-Building, p. 3.

the problem is thus twofold: first, to create a national ideology, a na tional elite, and national institutions, in short, to build a nation where there was none before; and second, to integrate the various groups into the newly created national system.
Nation-building, or national integration (the terms are used inter changeably in the current literature on political development), is a multi dimensional problem. As Myron Weiner suggests, it may involve five tasks:' the creation of a sense of territorial nationality; the establishing of a national central authority; the bridging of the elite-mass gap; the creation of a "minimum" value consensus; and the devising of integrative institutions and behavior. In this study, national integration is broadly de fined as the creation of a national political system which supersedes or incorporates all the regional subsystems. The special emphasis here is on ethno-cultural group conflicts in Pakistan's plural society and on the con sequent problem of integration.
In the newly emerging states of Africa and Asia, the problems of nation-building are compounded by the fact that the ruling elite must perform the seemingly independent and sometimes contradictory tasks of state-building and

nation-building simultaneously. In Europe, by con trast, the ruling elites generally faced the task of nation-building only after having built the state.* While state-building requires the creation and concentration of authority and an emphasis on the role of govern ment in the social process (what David Easton has called the output functions), nation-building, especially in states with several subnational groups, often calls for dispersal of power and an emphasis on responsive ness in the political process (Easton's input functions).° The prime neces sity of the state's survival as an independent international entity often pushes the governing elite to concentrate on state-building at the cost of nation-building. By overemphasizing the need for the concentration of authority, the maintenance of law and order, economic development, and the establishment of an efficient administrative apparatus, the ruling elite in the new states often underestimates the need to nourish and strengthen the political process. Most new governments find it difficult

7Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, CCCLVIII (1965), 52-64.

8 Joseph R. Strayer, "The Historical Experience of Nation-building in Europe"; and Karl J. Friedrich, "Nation-building?"; chaps. 1 and 2, respectively, in Deutsch and Foltz. ° David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life.

to share power and enter into a political dialogue with the subnational groups in order to develop a national ideology, and above all to tolerate an acceptable level of instability in the system. In the absence of ade quate policies for nation-building, however, the cohesion of the state becomes tenuous. The new states must therefore strike a rather delicate and difficult balance between nation-building and state-building efforts. The two processes are potentially complementary; but unless they are carefully balanced, they work at cross purposes and undermine each other.

Though integration is a vital problem of the new states, only a few studies have systematically measured and analyzed the nation-building efforts of these states.!° Most available studies are concerned with ex plicating indices for the analysis of modernization, social change, and political development.'! National integration is generally treated as a part of the broader problems of political development and moderniza tion. But though they are interrelated problems, the process of creating an integrated nation and the process of achieving a developed, modern polity often require different sets of policies. Hence, there is a need to examine nation-building as a separate and distinct problem.

In the case of Pakistan, as we shall see, a disequilibrium arose in the development of the country's different sectors, i.e., in economic development, modernization, state-building, and nation-building. The failure to develop adequate nation-building policies, in spite of suc

cess in other sectors, endangered the viability of the state. In Paki stan, as In many new states, especially those with numerous subna tional groups, there has been an imbalance in the distribution of power

0Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, is a path-breaking study which suggests indices for the measurement of national integration. For the analysis of the problems of integration in specific countries, see Selig S. Harrison, India: James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa; Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building; Kalman H. Silvert, ed., Expectant Peoples; Geertz, Old Societies, Howard Wriggins, Ceylon.

'Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society; Cyril E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization; David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization; Lucian W. Pye, ed., Com munications and Political Development; Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture; Joseph La Palombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development; Gabriel A. Almond and Lucian W. Pye, eds., Political Culture and Political Development; La Palom- bara and Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development; Karl W. Deutsch, "So- cial Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, LV (1961), 493-514; Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.

among those groups. One or two "subnations," because of their early exposure to modernization, have tended to monopolize administrative, economic, and political power and, thus, to become dominant as the "national" elite. This

elite, partly because it is modern in outlook and partly because of the necessities of survival, has put a premium on goals of economic development, social change, modernization, and _state building, objectives requiring both the creation and the concentration of power.'* But the concentration of power in the hands of this elite has meant concentration of power in the hands of a single subnation group, to the exclusion of others.

Politics in Pakistan, as in the new states in general, is still best char acterized as the politics of status, and there are few political links between the elite and other groups. While policy innovation for moderni zation and economic development undertaken by the elite leads to the social mobilization of others subnational groups, the elite is reluctant to share its newly concentrated political power with newly mobilized groups. There is thus a lag between "mobilization" modernization in the economic sector and "representative" modernization in the political sec tor.

Pakistan is in many ways typical of the new states. It falls into the category of what Clifford Geertz calls "old societies and new states.""* It shares with other new states many features —a long history of colonial domination, a plural society, and a so-called traditional socioeconomic political structure. Pakistan is truly a new state and a new nation. It is a state which "almost no one had foreseen and few could credit in advance as even a possibility."'* The claim of the "Pakistani nation" was first put forth, in partial form, as late as 1940, and the state was created legally when India became independent in 1947. For Pakistan, there fore, state-building and nation-building can be easily differentiated, since both the state and the nation had to be consciously and deliberately built almost from scratch after independence.

The most formidable problem of nation-building in Pakistan after the state's inception was the integration of the Bengali subnation. The urgency of this problem is underscored by the fact that the Bengalis

12 See Frederick Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, pp. 406-19.

13 Geertz, Old Societies.

14Emerson, From Empire to Nation, p. 92.

were not merely the largest ethno-cultural subgroup in Pakistan but actu ally constituted a majority (54 percent) of the country's total population. At the time of independence the Bengalis had little representation in the civil-military bureaucracy, the professions, or the entrepreneurial class. As a result, the Punjabis and the migrants from northern and western India— who "modernized" early—though ethnically and linguistically a minority, became the national elite of Pakistan from the outset. The new state, threatened by external danger and internal crisis, addressed itself primarily to state-building and economic development. Thus the "output sector," where Bengali representation was nil, was developed with little regard for the "input sector," where Bengali representation could have been substantial. Without doubt, the emphasis on state-building efforts made Pakistan a more viable political unit, but it led to the growing alien ation of the Bengalis. Neglect of nation-building policies eroded the thin veneer of Pakistani national identity, and by the end of the 1960s East and West Pakistan were on the brink of separation. In 1971 a civil war was the culmination of these trends of contradictory priorities of political development.

From the viewpoint of East and West Pakistan's integration, the second decade of Pakistan's existence, the Ayub period, was a critical time. The Ayub regime, like military regimes elsewhere, assumed power to "save the country from disintegration," and promised a fresh start at nation-building. As a proof of his intentions, Ayub Khan visited East Pakistan within ten days of the military coup, and pledged that the domi nation of East Pakistan by West Pakistan would cease.!° In subsequent years his regime undertook an unprecedented publicity campaign, em phasizing that it had done more for East Pakistan than had any previous government. And indeed the regime did adopt some policies responsive to Bengali demands. The intensity and extent of the Bengali drive for autonomy at the end of Ayub's decade therefore puzzled many casual ob servers of the Pakistani political scene. However, as an analysis of the actual workings and consequences of the Ayub regime's nation-

building policies will show, there was, as before, an imbalance in the development of different sectors, an imbalance which inevitably intensified Bengali alienation.

* Dawn (Karachi), October 22, 1958.

Unlike most military regimes, the Ayub regime pursued a deliberate policy of political institution-building. Several questions will be examined here to gauge the capabilities of these institutions for national integra tion: (1) Were these institutions structurally integrative? Was East Paki stan's numerical representation in these institutions equal to that of West Pakistan? Were there any built-in devices whereby representatives from the two wings could work out a consensus on fundamental problems within these institutions? Were the linkages created by these institutions vertical or horizontal? (2) Were these institutions functionally integra tive? That is, did they succeed in giving the Bengalis a sense of identity with the national political system? Did they provide for effective Bengali participation? Were they "responsive" to Bengali demands? Did they give the Bengalis a share in political power? (3) Finally, did these institu tions gain legitimacy in the country as a whole, and especially in East Pakistan? What was the extent of compliance with and support for—two essential attributes of legitimacy—these institutions in East Pakistan? With respect to the Ayub regime's economic and administrative poli cies, it is important to determine whether those policies succeeded in gaining Bengali support for a "national" economy and administration or, on the contrary, led to greater Bengali demands for a separate and auton omous economy and administration for East Pakistan. The analysis also assesses the effect of the lag between the regime's performance in the economic and the political sectors. This created a disequilibrium in the national system. While Ayub Khan's economic growth policies resulted in the creation of new forces, his political institutions, with their limited capacities for mobilization and participation were unable to reconcile these forces, and the regime was toppled in the resulting social turbu lence. !®

Since the regime was highly "elitist" in nature, a pertinent question is whether the power elite was representative. Was Bengali representa tion in the power structure any more equitable than in the pre-1958 peri od? Did the elite structure undergo any changes that significantly af fected east-west integration?

16 Here Huntington's differentiation between political modernization and political de velopment is closely followed. While Ayub's economic policies led to increased social mobili zation and greater complexity of the polity, the political structure he created was unable to manage the increased load of this more modern polity, which finally led to the breakdown of Ayub's political edifice.

And finally, side by side with the analysis of the Ayub regime's na tion-building policies, it is essential to examine the gradual transforma tion of Bengali ferment, from a linguistic-cultural phenomenon into a much broader, economic-political one, and to trace the increasing radi calization of Bengali politics and the changing nature of Bengali political demands—from demands for participation in the national political sys tem to demands for a totally autonomous system.

two / Background: east-west imbalance, 1947-58

Anatomy of the Pakistani nation

THE NEW STATES that have the best opportunity of success in the process of nation-building are, in the words of Joseph R. Strayer,

> . .. those which correspond closely to old political units; those where the experience of living together for many generations within a continuing political framework has given the people some sense of identity; those where the political units concide roughly with a distinct cultural area; and those where there are indigenous institutions and habits of political thinking that can be connected to forms borrowed from outside.'

In the light of these preconditions, the task of nation-building in Pakistan seems difficult indeed, for, as Rupert Emerson has pointed out, "by the

accepted criteria of nationhood there was in fact no such thing as a Pakistani nation.'?
'Joseph R. Strayer, "The Historical Experience of Nation-building in Europe," p. 25. 2 From Empire to Nation, p. 92.
9
10 / Background: east-west imbalance, 1947-58
Geography and population. Pakistan has appropriately been called a "double country."? Comprising a total area of 365,529 square miles, it is made up of two unequal regions (East Pakistan: 55,126 square miles; West Pakistan: 310,403 square miles) separated from each other by more than a thousand miles. West Pakistan is a largely arid land, with an average annual rainfall of less than twenty inches. Its western and northern parts have high mountains. While the Indus Basin in the east and south is a vast alluvial plain, huge areas to the southeast of the basin are arid desert. East Pakistan by contrast is situated in one of the largest and most heavily watered deltas of the world. It comprises allu
vial plains with marginal hills in the east and southeast. Its monsoon climate gives East Pakistan an average annual rainfall of one hundred inches. The region's vast network of rivers undergoes extensive periodic flooding: every year nearly 30-40 percent of the land of East Pakistan is inundated by flood waters.
Geographical separation makes communication between the two wings difficult and expensive, resulting in little mobility of population and resources between them.' This lack of mobility makes common patterns of social mobilization between the two wings almost impossible. Under the economic conditions now prevailing, only a small elite can af ford to have interwing contact—which means that the national elite
tends to be narrowly oligarchic. Another result of the geographical sep aration of East and West Pakistan is that investment in socioeconomic overhead in one wing does not have a significant spread effect in the other wing; thus the logic of geography dictates that there be a dual eco nomic and administrative apparatus. Given the importance of capital site and political clientele in the developing countries, geographical separation further means that the wing where the capital is not situated may be at an economic and administrative disadvantage. The disparity in geographical location of the two wings— West Pakistan being closer to the Middle East and East Pakistan being nearer to Southeast Asia— can also create different strategic interests.° Moreover, climatic and
'See Richard Weekes, Pakistan, p. 3.
"See Table 1 in the Appendix for interwing travel figures.
*See Charles Burton Marshall, "Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs," U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Review of the Mutual Security Pro- grams, Hearings, p. 5. It should be noted, though, that India is the major strategic problem for both East and West Pakistan.
11 / Background: east-west imbalance, 1947-58
topographic differences often lead to divergent economic problems. While West Pakistan's problem is scarcity of water, that of East Pakistan is flood in the monsoon season and lack of water in the months (Novem ber to April) following the monsoon. Thus, while West Pakistan requires extensive irrigation facilities, East Pakistan needs both flood control measures and irrigation. Finally, climatic and geographic differences have resulted in different crops, patterns of housing settlement, food, and dress, all of which have effected different life styles in the two wings.®
East and West Pakistan also exhibit sharp differences in demo graphy (see Table II.1). East Pakistan's population density is nearly seven
Table I.1 / Demographic differences between East and West Pakistan

	POPULATION TOTAL (MILLIONS)		DENSITY POPULATION (PERSONS/ SQ. MI.)		URBANIZATION (PERCENTAGE)		LITERACY (PERCENTAGE)	
	1951	1961	1951	1961	1951	1961	1951	1961
EAST PAKISTAN	41.9	50.8	701	922	43	On Ab	ik DL	ss
WEST PAKISTAN	83.7	42.9	109	138	17.8	DBRS)	16.4	16.3

Source: Adapted from Pakistan, Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Home Affairs Division, Population Census of Pakistan, 1961, Vol. I, pt. ii,

statements 2.3, 2.11, 2.14; pt. iv, statements 4.1, 4.4.
times that of West Pakistan.” The average density of population in the East Pakistani rural areas is 1,300 persons per square mile of cultivated land.* While the whole of East Pakistan is densely populated, there are five especially overcrowded districts—Dacca, Comilla, Chittagong, Noakhali, and Faridpur—where according to the 1961 census there were 2,700 persons per square mile of cultivated land.’ These districts, which comprise approximately 35 percent of the province’s total popu
lation, are also the food deficit areas. From 1960 to 1965 roughly 50 percent of their cereal consumption was imported from outside.'° Though East Pakistan has a higher density of population, its rate of
See O. H. K. Spate, India and Pakistan, for a detailed discussion of the geography of South Asia.
7See Table 2 in the Appendix. anak 8 Roger Revelle and Harold A. Thomas, “Population and Food in East Pakistan” (un published paper, Harvard Center for Population Studies), p. 2.
9Tbid., p. 4. 10 Thid., p. 5.

urbanization is lower (5.2 percent) than West Pakistan’s (22.5 percent). This means that only a small percentage of the population is socially mobilized; the task of mobilizing the vast “underlying population” '!—
may create still further cleavages in the nation’s society. A distinct demographic feature of Pakistan as a whole is its large refugee population (6.5 million), East Pakistan, however, has fewer refugees (0.7 million, according to the 1951 census) than West Pakistan (7.2 million). The discrepancy in refugee settlement between the two wings has been partially responsible for East-West economic disparity in Pakistan. The influx of immigrants to West Pakistan contributed to West Pakistan’s higher rate of urbanization (the rate of urbanization for the refugees alone was 39.9 percent according to the 1951 census) and economic development (the vast majority of private entrepreneurs in West Pakistan came from these immigrants). By contrast the vacuum created in the east wing by the departure of the Hindu elite was not filled by new immigrants. !”
Language. Whereas East Pakistan “very closely approximates a linguistic unit,” West Pakistan “presents a complex polyglot.” !* As Table
Table II.2 / Frequency of languages commonly spoken as mother tongue in Pakistan (percentage of population)

	EAST PAKISTAN		WEST PAKISTAN		PAKISTAN	
LANGUAGE	1951	1961	1951	1961	1951	1961
Bengali	98.16	98.42	0.02	0.11	56.40	55.48
Punjabi	0.02	0.02	67.08	66.39	28.55	29.02
Pushtu	—	0.01	8.16	8.47	8.48	8.70
Sindhi	0.01	0.01	12°35	12.59	5.47	d.ol
Urdu	0.64	0.61	7.05	7.08	3.37	8.65
English	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.04	0.02	0.02
Baluchi	—	_	3.04	2.49	1.29	1.09

Source: Adapted from Pakistan, Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Home Affairs Division, Population Census of Pakistan, 1961, Vol. I, pt. iv, statement 5.3.
Deutsch, Nationalism, p. 128.
For a detailed discussion of the migration pattern and its role in widening the economic disparity between East and West Pakistan, see Hanna Papanek, “Entrepreneurs in East Pakistan.” The departure of the Hindu elite, however, eased the process of land reform in East Pakistan and helped the rapid rise of a Bengali Muslim counterelite. ‘8 Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan, p. 71.

II.2 reveals, the linguistic differences between the two wings are very great, making the development of a lingua franca between the wings difficult indeed. None of the languages has general acceptance in both wings. Most of the tongues are regionally based. Bengali, though the language of the majority, is virtually unknown in West Pakistan. Of the principal spoken languages of West Pakistan—Urdu, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtu—all are similarly unfamiliar in East Pakistan (although a small elite know Urdu); and do not even have general applicability in West Pakistan. Differences in script add to the difficulty of learning a second language from the other wing. The linguistic traditions in the two wings also differ. Bengali claims the distinction of having been in the vanguard of the literary renaissance in modern India. The Bengali are intensely attached to and proud of their language and often reveal a sense of linguistic

nationalism. But though the Bengali language developed under the patronage of Muslim rulers and was greatly influenced by Islamic thought, albeit in the form of Sufi mysticism,!* its secular renaissance in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was very largely due to the contribution of Hindu authors. Arguing that Bengali was permeated with Hindu imagery, the Pakistani policy-makers initially rejected Bengali's claim for recognition as a national language and attempted to make Urdu—a minority language, but one closely associated with the In
dian Muslim heritage and the Pakistan movement!*—the only national language. The attempt was abandoned in 1954 after strong Bengali op position, and both Bengali and Urdu were recognized as national lan uages. But neither tongue gained a substantial acceptance in both wings. Though English is the official language, it still remains very much the
language of the elite. Table II.3 clearly reveals Pakistan's failure to develop a second language commonly understood in both wings. It is especially disturbing to note that the percentages for all the languages

4 See Qazi Din Mohammad, Bangla Sahityer Itihas [History of Bengali literature], I, 170- 79; Il, 191-325; Dr. Mohammad Shahidullah, Bangla Sahityer Katha [History of Bengali literature], Il; Mohammad Abdul Hai, Sahitya o Sanskriti [Literature and culture] pp. 1-114.

15 Urdu first developed as a lingua franca in North India after the Muslim conquest. With the Hindu revival of the early twentieth century, the Urdu-Hindi controversy started. Since the Muslims of Uttar Pradesh were most sensitive to this issue and since the leadership of the Muslim League generally came from their ranks, Urdu came to be closely associated with the Pakistan movement. Also, Urdu literary figures like Sibli Nomani and Iqbal did much to foster Muslim nationalism in India.

Table II.3 / Frequency of major languages spoken as additional tongues (percentage of population)

EAST PAKISTAN WEST PAKISTAN PAKISTAN

LANGUAGE 1951 1961 1951 1961 1951 1961 Bengali 0.29 0.55 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.32 Punjabi _ 0.01 1.98 1318 0.84 0.52 Pushtu _ — 0.96 0.47 0.41 0.21 Sindhi 0.01 0.01 IEG 1.57 0.50 0.69 Urdu 0.46 0.72 8.85 7.28 4.03 3.59 English 1.31 0.88 2.63 2.07 LST 1,38

Source: Adapted from Pakistan, Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Home Affairs Division, Population Census of Pakistan, 1961, Vol. I, pt. iv, statement 5.3.

except Bengali and Sindhi have declined over the years. Given the in creased rate of urbanization (see Table II.1) in Pakistan, the number of "mobilized but differentiated"! groups in the country has increased — a trend not conducive to national integration.

Society and culture. Pakistan was established on the premise that Indian Muslims needed a separate state, where "they could rule accord ing to their own code of life and according to their own cultural growth, tradition, and Islamic laws."!" This argument presupposed the existence of one Indian Muslim society and culture and overlooked the very real regional variations in Indian Muslim society. It is true that society and culture in both East and West Pakistan are based on Islamic principles;!® and Islam, to its followers, is not a mere set of beliefs, but a way of life which colors every aspect of the believer's daily existence. Within this broad common context of Islam, however, there are certain basic disparities between the society and culture of East and West Pakistan— disparities which are of special significance from the viewpoint of nation building.

West Pakistani society is much more segmented than East Paki stani society. Tribalism is strong in the regions of the former North-West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces. Some of the tribes are spread over

©Deutsch, Nationalism, pp. 129-30.

'"M. A. Jinnah, quoted in Sharif al-Mujahid, "National Integration," in East Pakistan, Bureau of National Reconstruction, Pakistani Nationhood, p. 148. '* See I. H. Qureshi, The Pakistani Way of Life; S. M. Ikram and P. Spear, eds., The Cultural Heritage of Pakistan.

the neighboring states of Iran and Afghanistan, and some pose a threat to

national integration. !°
The problem of subregionalism is also acute in West Pakistan. Though the four provinces (the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Prov ince, Baluchistan, and Sind) and several former native states were merged into one administrative unit in 1956, intraregional conflict did not diminish. Rather the group identities of the various ethnic minori ties—Pathans, Baluchis, and Sindhis—were heightened, and_anti Punjabi feeling spread among these groups.”°
Feudal landlordism is widespread in West Pakistan. Especially in Sind, landownership is concentrated in a few hands (see Table II.4). A
Table II.4 / Distribution of landownership in West Pakistan
SIZE OF HOLDING
(ACRES) PERCENTAGE OF OWNERS PERCENTAGE OF LAND OWNED 5 or less 64.5 15.0 5 to 25 28.5 81.7 25 to 100 ul 22.4 100 to 500 inl 15.9 500 or above 0.1 15.0
Source: Adapted from West Pakistan, Land Reforms Commission Report, 1959, Appendix if
castelike system is prevalent, particularly in the Punjab; often endogamy is practiced and children follow the caste occupation. Some of the Muslim castes are synonymous with Hindu castes such as the Rajputs, Jats, and Arains. Because of a paucity of information, however, it is dif
ficult to judge the extent and stability of the Muslim caste system.*! East Pakistani society, by comparison, is less stratified and more homogeneous. The overwhelming majority of the people belong to one
19 For a detailed analysis of West Pakistan’s tribes and tribal problems, see Sir Olaf Caroe, The Pathans; Khalid B. Sayeed, “Pathan Regionalism,” South Atlantic Quarterly, LXIII (1964) 478-506; James W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland; The People of the Khybar; Wayne A. Wilcox, Pakistan; Robert N. Pehrson, The Social Organization of the Marri Baluch; Sylvia A. Matheson, The Tigers of Baluchistan.
20 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “Crises in Political Development and the Collapse of the Ayub Regime in Pakistan,” The Journal of Developing Areas V (1971), 221-38.
21For a detailed discussion of the caste system among Muslims in West Pakistan, see Stanley Maron, ed., Pakistan; Zekiye Eglar, A Punjabi Village in Pakistan.
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ethnic group, the Bengalis.22 There are some tribal peoples in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Sylhet, Mymensingh, and Comilla; but since the total tribal population is only about 496,000, it does not pose any serious problem of integration. *°

Interregional differences in East Pakistan are dependent mainly on socioeconomic factors, rather than on ethnic or cultural differences. East Pakistan is divided into four regions: north, south, center, and east.” The popularly held view in East Pakistan generally casts the north and south as underdeveloped; and indeed certain disparities between the north and south and the center and east can be discerned (see Table II.5). The center-east has most of the big urban centers. The capital, Dacca; the major port town, Chittagong; and the major industrial center, Narayanganj; all lie in this region.» The center and east have higher rates of urbanization (8.2 percent and 4.7 percent) than the north and south (4.2 percent and 3.8 percent). They have more people in nonagri
cultural labor (center, 18.1 percent; east, 13.8 percent; north, 11.1 percent; south, 16.5 percent), and a higher literacy rate (center, 16.3 percent; east, 19.3 percent; north, 16.7 percent; south, 17.7 percent).

While the center-east is more “modern,” it also comprises most of the crowded districts and contains nearly half of the province’s total population. There is more migration out of this region to the less crowded north and south. This internal migration creates some resentment of migrants in the north and south. The interregional conflicts in East Pakistan are still in a rudimentary stage, however.

Landownership is more dispersed in East Pakistan (see Table II.6) than in the west wing. Before independence, nearly 75 percent of the land, including all the biggest zamindari holdings, belonged to Hindu landlords. But after

partition most of the landlords fled the country, or
* Racially, however, the Bengalis are a mixed group, comprising proto-Australoid, Mongoloid, and Caucasoid strains. *® This is generally true, though the Communist-led peasant movements in the early years after partition drew heavy support from some of the tribal population. **The northern region consists of Dinajpur, Rangpur, Bogra, Rajshahi, and Pabna; the southern region, of Kushtia, Jessore, Faridpur, Khulna, and Barisal; the central region, of Dacca, and Mymensingh; and the eastern region consists of Sylhet, Comilla, Noakhali, Chittagong, and Chittagong Hill Tracts. *°For an elaboration of the thesis that early centers of modernization determine later eae oa see Peter Gould, "Tanzania, 1920-63," World Politics, XXII, (1970), 149-

Table II.6 / Distribution of landownership in East Pakistan PERCENTAGE OF PERCENTAGE OF SIZE OF HOLDING (ACRES) OWNERS LAND OWNED 0 to 0.4 18 1 0.5 to 0.9 ii 2 1.0 to 2.4 Dil 18 ZOMtOMn9 26 26 5.0 to 7.4 1, 19 Uno) tops: it 19 2S tosZ429 3) 14 25.0 to 39.9 — 8 40.0 or over _ , 2
Source: Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Agricultural Census Organization, Pakistan Census of Agriculture, East Pakistan, Vol. 1, Table 8, p. 33.
were eased out of their holdings when feudal landlordism was abolished by the East Bengal Estates Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1950, which fixed the ceiling of landholding at 33 acres per head. Moreover, since the economy is one of scarcity, landownership frequently changes hands.
The Muslim society of East Pakistan is relatively fluid. Some scholars attribute this to the former presence of a dominant agricultural caste and to the high population pressure on the deltaic land that resulted in little differentiation in occupational structure."° The traditional Muslim caste differences between the ashraf and the azlaf exist, as do the four common Muslim castes—Syed, Shaikh, Pathan, and Mughal— but it is the class differences based on economic status that have the greatest impact.?' Since economic status depends on landholding, and landownership is highly mutable, class differences are not rigid.
Differences in social stratification in the two wings lead to differ ences in social and political organization. In rural West Pakistan the power structure and leadership patterns are relatively stable, whereas in rural East Pakistan society is loosely structured, with no permanent local leadership or institutions. Only when there is intravillage or multi
26 Peter J. Bertocci, "Patterns of Social Organizations in Rural East Bengal."
27For a detailed discussion of the caste system among Muslims in East Pakistan, see Nazmul Karim, Changing Society in India and Pakistan; Pierre Bessaignet, Social Research in East Pakistan; John Owen, ed., Sociology in East Pakistan.

village conflict do the local leaders (the sardars)"° and the local council (the samaj)2®. meet to settle the dispute. Local leadership and institutions thus work only in crisis situations and not on a day-to-day basis. Power is highly localized, fragmented, and diffused. Historically, East Pakistan had been one of the areas least penetrated by governmental action. Its ecology made transportation and communication difficult. The relative isolation of rural areas gave rise to localized bases of power; and the absence of a well-knit social organization kept political power fragmented.
According to one observer of the Pakistani political scene, West Pakistan is "governmental," whereas East Pakistan is "political."°° West Pakistan, especially the Punjab, has traditionally contributed heavily to the civil-military administration. The British called them the "martial races," and a tradition of military service grew there. The Bengalis, in contrast, have long been known as the most political people of the sub continent. Bengalis gave the initial leadership to the Indian nationalist movement; and later, in the twenties and thirties, they eagerly took to the politics of violence. The terrorist movement, as well as the leftist movement, became popular in Bengal. With independence, Bengal was partitioned, but the three major traditions of Bengali politics—a demand
for Bengali autonomy (or special treatment for Bengal), tactics of vio lence, and a leftist ideology—continued to flourish in both Bengals.*! In the two decades following independence, the politics of both East and West Bengal

remained volatile and turbulent.
History and tradition. Islamic history, especially the Muslim period of Indian history, is a common source of tradition for East and West Pakistan. This bond was emphasized by leaders of the Pakistan move ment prior to the achievement of Pakistan; following independence
** Every village has a few influentials known as sardars, who belong to the dominant lineage. Sardars are not elected. Their power generally depends on their landholdings or family.
** A samaj is an intervillage organization of sardars. It works more or less like a council of elders. Recruitment to the samaj is generally by inheritance. That is, the eldest son of a sardar becomes a member of the samaj, though there are some exceptions. For a detailed discussion of rural social organization patterns in East Pakistan, see Bertocci.
°° Charles Burton Marshall, "Reflections on a Revolution in Pakistan," Foreign Affairs, XXXVII (1959), 258. *! Though the three traditions appear in both Bengals, autonomy has been a more dom- inant issue in East Pakistan than in West Bengal, where leftist ideology is more important.

it was often used by Pakistani policy-makers to cement relations between the two wings.*?
But there are differences between the historical traditions of East and West Pakistan. The region of West Pakistan, especially the Punjab, has been the gateway to India and passed through centuries of foreign domination by various races. It has truly been a melting pot of races and cultures. While East Pakistan too has been a melting pot, its historical tradition remained essentially separate from that of the central Gangetic plains. Only during the Mughal period were the regions now comprised by East Pakistan brought under central control for any extended length of
time. The supporters of East Pakistani autonomy thus cite a long tradi tion of autonomy in their regions. '
As for the recent past, the Pakistan movement was by no means a perfect bond between the two wings, for some prominent Muslim Leaguers from Bengal did not agree with Muslim Leaguers of the central and western provinces about the nature of Pakistan—whether there should be one, two, or more than two Pakistans —until 1946.°° The
5? Pakistani policy-makers from Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan to Ayub Khan have emphasized this common Islamic history and tradition. To emphasize the long tradition common to East and West Pakistan, Pakistani historians trace the origin of the Pakistan movement back to eighteenth-century Muslim resistance movements. See Hafeez Malik, Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan; Ishtiaq H. Qureshi, The Muslim Com
munity of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent.
38 When the concept of a separate Muslim nation was first put forward, there was no unanimous agreement as to the geographical composition of the new state. The first terri torial demand was made on regions which at present correspond roughly to West Pakistan. Iqbal's famous 1930 Muslim League presidential address referred to only that territory; and Choudhury Rahmat Ali and his associates, who coined the name "Pakistan," thought of regions in northwestern India: P for the Punjab, A for Afghanistan (i.e., the North-West Frontier Province), K for Kashmir, S for Sind, and TAN for Baluchistan. Later demands were put forward for two more separate Muslim states—one in the northeast, comprising Bengal and Assam, to be called Bangastan; and one in the south, comprising Hyderabad, to be called Osmanistan. There were also demands for seven Muslim states in India. During the Lahore Conference of the Muslim League in 1940, where the Pakistan Resolution was adopted, several proposals were put before the drafting committee. The resolution which was finally adopted dropped the idea of a Muslim state in the south but called for "inde pendent states" in the north-west and east. The idea of one Muslim state gained ground when it became evident that Bengal would be partitioned and that the eastern region would be territorially vulnerable as an independent state. Only in 1946 was the Lahore Resolution amended in favor of one Muslim state. For details on the development of the concept of a separate Muslim state, see Choudhury Rahmat Ali, Pakistan; S. Sharifuddin Pirzada, The Pakistan Resolution and the Historic Lahore Session; Choudhury Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan.

Lahore Resolution of March 28, 1940, which formalized the Pakistan demand, stated the following:
.. . Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic princi ples, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a ma jority as in the North Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which constituent units shall be auton omous and sovereign.
Many prominent Bengali Muslim Leaguers emphasized the term "independent states," and interpreted the Lahore Resolution as a de mand for two states. The subsequent attempt by the Muslim League central hierarchy to modify the Lahore Resolution in favor of one state met with opposition from some Bengali Muslim Leaguers, and although the resolution was finally amended in the Muslim League Council session in 1946, the amendment's validity has been questioned by many since then on the ground that the council had no power to amend a resolution passed in an open conference.**° Thus the nationalist movement does not serve as a firm integrative bond between East and West Pakistan. The East Pakistani autonomists refer to the original Lahore Resolution in support of their demand for independence, while the "centrists" refer
to the modified 1946 version to challenge this demand. Religion. Though Islam is most often cited as the main basis of Pakistani nationhood, its validity as an integrating force is limited. The distribution of religious groups in the two wings is actually quite dis proportionate. East Pakistan has a large percentage of Hindus, while West Pakistan's Hindu population is minimal (see Table II.7). Many Bengalis are reluctant to put too much emphasis on Islam, because that would immediately alienate nearly 20 percent of East Pakistan's popu lation. Moreover, emphasis on Islam is no sure guarantee for uniting all the Muslims.
54 Cited in G. Allana, Pakistan Movement Historic Documents, p. 172. ** For conflicting views on the amendment controversy, see Khaliquzzaman, Pathway; Kamruddin Ahmad, A Social History of East Pakistan; M. A. H. Ispahani, Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah; Pirzada, The Pakistan Resolution.

Table II.7 / Religious distribution in Pakistan (percentage of total population)
EAST PAKISTAN WEST PAKISTAN PAKISTAN
1951 1961 1951 1961 1951 1961 Moslem 76.8 80.4 Whol 97.2 85.9 88.1 Hindu 22.0 18.4 1.6 L5 12.9 107 Christian 0.3 0.3 1.3 1.3 0.7 0.8 Other 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4
Source: Adapted from Pakistan, Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Home Affairs Division, Population Census of Pakistan, 1961, Vol. 1, pt. i, statement 2.18, Table 5.
The two provinces of Pakistan have a somewhat different way of looking at Islam. Some West Pakistanis . . . have a patronizing way of looking at East Pakistanis in this respect. They sometimes ... air the idea that Bengali Muslims are . . . members of the faith who came into it to escape the rigors of being the low men on the totem pole under the caste system prevailing among the Hindus—whereas, in contrast, such West Pakistanis will point out that their own Muslim heritage dates back to the Arabian antecedents who brought the faith in from the area of its origin—so their common faith may set them apart in relation to India, but it does not necessarily pull them together as Pakistanis. **
Finally, too great an emphasis on Islam can aggravate sectarian conflicts, as happened during the Punjab riots of 1953, and it can inhibit the pro cess of modernization by strengthening the hands of orthodox "ulema" or fundamentalist parties.
State-building vs. Nation-building, 1947-58
The inherent disparities between East and West Pakistan were un doubtedly deepened by the policies pursued by the ruling elite in the first decade of

Pakistan's independence. In the early years of Pakistan's existence, the viability of the new state was so much in doubt that the na tion's policy-makers were compelled to pursue policies maximizing the state's cohesion. However, emphasis on the development of governmen tal capabilities not only meant an unbalanced growth of the political sys

86 Charles Burton Marshall, "Testimony," pp. 4-5.

tem (i.e., the growth of output functions at the cost of input functions) but also led to an imbalance in the distribution of power among the vari ous subnational groups. Emphasis on the output sector, the civil-military bureaucracy —which was dominated by West Pakistanis, especially the Punjabis, who had a long tradition of bureaucratic participation—auto matically "limited the immediate Bengali participation in the govern ment."°' A demand for autonomy arose in the east wing in the early fif ties when the Bengalis found that their representation in the power center of the state was virtually nil.

The power elite: The elite that came to power in Pakistan after inde pendence was a small group of people having a narrow base of support in the society. The oligarchic nature of this elite was due partly to the rapid decline in support of the more popular "national" political elite which emerged before independence. The latter generally came from regions that were not part of Pakistan and lost their political constitu encies after partition. They were reluctant either to broaden their ranks by including the regional leaders from within Pakistan or to risk an election, for fear of losing power. As the "national" political elite con tinued to avoid elections, their mandate grew stale and the ranks of the opposition (mainly regional leaders) swelled. In their bid to stay in power, the "national" political elite found an ally in the civil-military bureau cracy, whom they often used (or were used by) for political purposes. ** The civil-military bureaucracy came to the aid of the political elite, partly because they were trained to carry out their political superiors' orders and partly because they also believed in the policy of centralization and "nationalization" that the elite was following. Thus, during the first dec ade, a close working alliance developed between the "national" political elite and the civil-military bureaucracy —an alliance that in later years, especially after 1954, was dominated by the latter.*®

In the first decade following independence, Bengali participation in the national power elite was limited. Although the Bengalis had nearly 50 percent representation in the central political elite (Table II.8), they

*7Wayne A. Wilcox, "Problems and Process of National Integration in Pakistan," The Pakistan Student, March-April 1967, p. 12.

** See Henry F. Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan, pp. 51-103. 5° Here, however, it should be remembered that the alliance was not so much an institu tional one as a personal one among a few top civil servants and military personnel who were participants in key decision-making.

Table II.8 / Central political elite in Pakistan, 1947-58

EAST WEST

Heads of state 2 2 Prime ministers 8 4 Ministers, deputy ministers, state ministers* PH Oy Members of Constituent and National Assemblies 84 75 Sources: Compiled from data in Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), Appendix II; and Pakistan, Constituent Assembly, List of Members of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 1952.

* The number of ministers, deputy ministers, and state ministers includes those up to 1957 and omits those in the two short-lived ministries from 1957 to 1958.

Table 1.9 / Military elite in Pakistan, July 1955 (no. of officers) SERVICE EAST WEST Army 14 894 Navy ¥f 593 Air Force 60 640 Source: Dawn (Karachi), January 8, 1955.

had a bare 5 percent in the military elite (Table II.9), only about 30 percent in the civil bureaucratic elite (Tables II.10 and II.11) and 10 percent in the entrepreneurial class (Table II.12). This imbalance was due largely to historical factors. Before partition East Bengal was an un derdeveloped hinterland of West Bengal. Bengali Muslims were gener ally poor peasants. At the time of partition, only one of the 133 Muslim Indian Civil Service/Indian Political Service (ICS/IPS) officers who opted for Pakistan was

a Bengali Muslim.*® Though postindependence recruit ment policy was geared toward increasing Bengali representation in the higher Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP),*' the initial lag resulted in a con tinuing gap between the participation of the two wings. (Table II.10). The British policy of army recruitment from the “martial races” of West Pakistan had the effect of almost completely excluding Bengalis from

40 Ralph T. Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, p. 49. 41 After partition, the recruitment policy in the CSP included a quota system to increase the number of Bengalis. Thus, only 20 percent were selected purely on merit, while 40 percent had to be chosen from East and West Pakistan, respectively.

Table II.10 / East-West representation in CSP, 1948-58*

YEAR	TOTAL NO. OF OFFICERS	EAST PAKISTAN NO.	EAST PAKISTAN % OF TOTAL	WEST PAKISTAN NO.	WEST PAKISTAN % OF TOTAL
1948	18	2	a 16	88.9	
1949	20	9)	45.0	AD 55.0	
1950	20	6	30.0	14	70.0
1951	WIL 4	36.4	i 63.6		
1952	LZ 5	29.4	12	70.6	
1953	13)	23.1	10	77.9	
1954	25	7	28.0	18	72.0
1955	ie 3)	29.4	12	70.6	
1956	21	TA 52.4	10	47.6	
1957	20	a 35.0	13	65.0	
1958	24	10	41.7	14	58.3

Sources: Compiled from Pakistan, Establishment Division, Civil List of Class I Officers Serving under the Government of Pakistan, 1st January, 1966; and Gradation List of the Civil Service of Pakistan, January 1, 1968.

* Note: Figures are for the beginning of each year.

Table II.11 / East-West representation in the higher ranks of the Central Secretariat, 1955

RANK	EAST	WEST	% OF TOTAL
Secretary	_	19	—
Joint secretary	8	38	7.3
Deputy secretary	10	123	eo
Undersecretary	38	510	7.0

Source: Pakistan, Constituent Assembly, Debates, Vol. 1, January 17, 1956, p. 1844.

the army. After independence, the military, unlike the civil service, did not adopt any conscious policy to counteract this imbalance. Similarly, the Bengali Muslims, by tradition, were not represented in the landed or entrepreneurial classes. In East Bengal, Hindus were generally the big landlords, and whatever private enterprise there was, was in Hindu and Marwari hands.

Even in the political elite, where the Bengalis had near parity of representation, real power always seemed to elude them:

Table II.12 / Industrial assets by “community” in Pakistan, 1959

COMMUNITY	PERCENTAGE OF PRIVATE MUSLIM ENTERPRISES	PERCENTAGE — PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS	PERCENTAGE OF ALL ASSETS	PERCENTAGE OF ASSETS
Halali Memon	100.0	67.0	88.0	26.5
Chinioti	18.0	0.16	9.0	6.0
Dawoodi Bohra	0.03	5.0	3.5	0.02
Khoja Isnashari	5.0	4.0	0.02	5.0
Khoja Ismaili	3.5	0.06		
Other Muslim trading communities				
Syed and Shaikh				
Pathan				
Bengali Muslim				
Other Muslim (including unknown)				
PRIVATE HINDU AND FOREIGN ENTERPRISES				
Bengali Hindu				
Marwari				
Other Hindu and Sikh				
Parsi				
British				
American, other foreigners				
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES				
Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation				
Government				

3.0 4.0 0.08 18.0 12.0 _ 8.0 5.9 7.00 3.5 2.5 43.00
14.0 8.5 37.50
21.5 12.5
8.5 10.00
2.0 =
1.5 2.50
1.0 0.01
7.5 =
LO =
12.0
7.0 =
5.0 =
Source: Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 42.
Note: Percentages are approximate.
Nazimuddin [Bengali] became Prime Minister, but lacked force of will, and was ultimately dismissed by the (Punjabi) Governor General. Mohammed Ali (Bogra) was brought in as Prime Minister but, although a Bengali, he remained the captive of the West Pakistan group that provided the main strength of his government. The Bengali members attempted to use their majority to diminish the power of the Governor-General, but as a result they

found themselves out of their own jobs. The electorate of East Bengal had repudiated the Muslim League, but the outcome was a rule for more than a year by West Pakistan bureaucrats. *?
Thus the power structure that Pakistan inherited had little effective Bengali participation, and the policy pursued by the "national elite" in the early years —a policy of one state, one government, one economy, one language, one culture—tended to perpetuate this imbalance; and was a significant factor in the growth of Bengali alienation in the first decade of Pakistan's existence.
Administrative and political centralization: "the viceregal system" and East Pakistan. The administrative-political policies pursued during the first decade were characterized by extreme centralization. They led to the establishment of an administrative-political system which has been termed "viceregal."*? The Act of 1935, under which Pakistan was ad
ministered until 1956, provided for a strong central government; and the_ constitution of 1956 perpetuated the essentially strong position of the center vis-a-vis the provinces.
The office of the governor of each wing was often used as an instru ment of centralization. Though under a parliamentary system of govern ment the governor is supposed to be a figurehead, in Pakistan during the 1947-58 period the governor (like the governor-general at the cen ter) was generally the effective head of the province; and, being the center's appointee, he always protected the center's interests in the province. Furthermore the governors were often powerful men who had close party contacts. '4
Another often used instrument of centralization was governor's rule. Article 92A of the Government of India Act of 1935 (article 193 in the 1956 constitution) enabled the central government to dismiss the provincial government and impose direct central rule on the provinces.
" Keith Callard, Pakistan, p. 178.
'8 Khalid B. Sayeed, Pakistan, chap. 10.
"The five governors who succeeded the first English governor in East Bengal all re mained active in politics. Firoz Khan Noon after his East Bengal governorship (1950-53) went on to become chief minister of the Punjab (1953-55) and prime minister (1958). Choudhury Khaliquzzaman (1953-54) later became president of the Muslim League. Is- kandar Mirza (1954-55) was an IPS officer, and a secretary of defense, and went on to become interior minister (1954-55) and president (1955-58). Fazlul Huq (1956-57) was a former chief minister of Bengal and was still the unofficial head of his political party during his tenure of governorship.

The article was used to thwart any challenge to the position of the "na tional" political elite. Its more blatant imposition was in East Bengal in 1954, when the newly elected United Front was forced from office." The center could also control individual provincial politicians through the

Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act (PRODA). Though there were Muslim League governments in both the center and East Pakistan during the 1947-54 period, the party channel of con trol was seldom used and the East Bengal Muslim League only occasion ally took stands differing from those of the central Muslim League. *® But the most effective instrument of centralization was the central services, especially the Civil Service of Pakistan, which manned most of the key decision-making posts in both the center and the provinces. And even when the CSP worked in the provinces, its ultimate coordination lay with the center. As was the case in preindependence India, the central services were the single stable bond between the center and the prov inces.

The Bengali elite, especially the growing vernacular elite of East Bengal (see below), was unhappy with this policy of political-administra tive centralization, for they found that not only were they not partici pants in the strong center that was being developed but they were not even masters of their own house, since centralization invariably dimin ished provincial autonomy. The demand for full provincial autonomy was put forth as early as 1950, when the first draft of the constitution was submitted. As the centralization process continued, the demand for au tonomy drew growing public support. Autonomy became the main issue which swept the United Front to power in 1954. The summary dismissal of the United Front ministry and the continued imposition of governor's rule was interpreted by the Bengali counterelite as yet another illustra

4° Though the Adamjee industrial riots were given as the reason for the center's imposi tion of governor's rule, continuation of the rule for over a year, along with the national elite's attempt to portray the United Front leaders as traitors, secessionists, communists, etc., made it evident that the elite was unwilling to tolerate even legal opposition to its policies and position. vis

46 Bengali Muslim League members fought for provincial autonomy in the subcommittee drafting the Basic Principles Committee (BPC) Report. After publication, the report was opposed by many Bengali Muslim Leaguers. Also, in 1952, the predominantly Muslim League provincial assembly passed a resolution urging the center to adopt Bengali as one of the state languages. See Callard, Pakistan, pp. 172-82; and G. W. Choudhury, Constitu tional Development in Pakistan, pp. 108-9.

tion of the "national elite's" intolerance of any political opposition.*" The demand for autonomy therefore intensified after 1954. But while the policy of administrative-political centralization 'first prompted the Bengalis to demand autonomy, it was the economic policies of the central government that lent material support to the demand.

Economic Policy: disparity between East and West Pakistan. As in the political-administrative sphere, so in the economic, the early policy was one of centralization and expediency. Bengalis attacked the econom ic policy of the ruling elite as a significant factor in the perpetuation and widening of economic disparity between East and West Pakistan. While the causes for this economic disparity are complex and debatable,** there is little question that during the first decade East Pakistan's economy was relatively stagnant compared to West Pakistan's. All the available data indicate a widening economic gap between East and West Pakistan in the first decade (see Tables II.18, II.14, and II.15). The economic gap which existed between the two wings in 1947-48 increased substantially by 1958. Per capita income increased in West Pakistan from Rs. 330 in 1949-50 to Rs. 878 in 1959-60; whereas in East Pakistan it declined from Rs. 305 to Rs. 288. Agriculture's contribution to regional income dropped in West Pakistan from 50 percent in 1951-52 to 46 percent in 1959-60, and that of industry rose from 8 percent to 15 percent; whereas in East Pakistan agriculture dropped from 68 percent to 65 percent and industry rose from 7 percent to 10 percent.*® Infrastructure also devel oped more rapidly in the West. During the period 1947-58, enrollment in primary schools increased by 163 percent in West Pakistan and by 38 percent in the east; enrollment in secondary schools increased by 64 percent in the west but dropped by 6.6 percent in the east; university

*7See Abul Mansur Ahmad, Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchasa Bachara [Fifty years of

poli tics as I saw it]; Ataur Rahman Khan, Ojaratir Dui Bachar [Two years of chief ministership]. These memoirs by two former Awami League ministers show that they looked upon the im position of the center's rule as an attempt to keep them out of power.

*' The economic disparity between East and West Pakistan has been a matter of contro versy among Pakistani economists. Generally, West Pakistani economists attribute it to the east wing's low level of development in 1947, while Bengali economists attribute it to the central government's policies. For a detailed discussion of the question, see Md. Anisur Rahman, East and West Pakistan; Mahbub ul Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning; Nurul Islam, "Some Aspects of Interwing Trade and Terms of Trade in Pakistan," The Pakistan Development Review, III (1963), Joseph J. Stern and Walter P. Falcon, Growth and Development in Pakistan, 1955-1969.

*°Mahbub ul Haq, Economic Planning, p. 105.

31 / Background: east-west imbalance, 1947-58

Table II.13 / Gross domestic product, population, and rates of growth (rupees in crores: 1959-60 prices) a eS ee a ee 1949-1950 1954-1955 1959-1960

SECTOR EAST WEST EAST WEST EAST WEST Agriculture 850 589 887 649 938 701 Manufacturing 12) 18 81 79 50 142 Other 451 576 514 7038 567 836 Total 1,318 1,188 1,482 1,431 1,555 1,679 Population (millions) 43.1 35.8 48.1 40.2 53.9 45.0 Per capita (rupees) 805 330 298 356 288 873 Annual rates of growth (percent)

1949-50 To 1954-55 1954-55 To 1959-60

EAST WEST EAST WEST

Agriculture 0.9 1.9 ile! 1.6 Manufacturing 21.0 34.0 10.0 12.4 Other 2.6 4.1 2.0 3.5 Total Levi 3.9 nee 8.2 Population Dee, 2.8 2.3 Pe) Per capita ONS 1.5 —0.6 0.9

Source: Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 20.

enrollment increased by 38 percent in West Pakistan and by 11.2 per cent in East Pakistan. Similarly, the transport system (measured in road and railway mileage and number of motor vehicles) and communications facilities developed more quickly in the west wing."°

A number of complex economic and noneconomic factors led to the widening interwing economic disparity in the first decade. No attempt will be made here to discuss these factors in detail.°! Following indepen dence two factors were important in helping West Pakistan widen its initial advantage. First, West Pakistan got the bulk of the migrant entre preneurs, who played the principal role in West Pakistan's rapid industri

50 Tbid., p. 104.

51For a more detailed analysis of the problem see chap. IV.

32 / Background: easi-west imbalance, 1947-58

Table IL. 14 / Average annual per capita consumption of selected commodities, 1951-52 to 1959-60

INDICES FOR WEST PAKISTAN

COMMODITY EAST WEST (cAsT =100)

FOODS

Food grains (lbs.) 389.0 899.0 103 Raw sugar (lbs.) 16.1 46.9 291 Refined sugar (Ibs.) Bo 6.8 252 Tea (lbs.) 0.1 0.8 800 Fish (lbs.) 8.3 ee 389 Salt (lbs.) 11.4 16.7 146 ESSENTIAL CONSUMER GOODS

Cloth (yds.) DO 7.8 855 Matches (no.) 7.0 AO 159 Cigarettes (no.) OND) 121.0 576 Kerosene oil (gals.) Ons 0.4 80 Paper (lbs.) 0.4 1.0 250 SELECTED PRODUCTION GOODS

Coal (lbs.) 82.0 66.0 206 Electricity (kwt.) 1.0 18.8 1,880 Petrol (gals.) 0.1 0.8 800 LUXURIES

Motor cars (no. per 10,000 persons) 1.0 9.8 980 Radios (no. per 10,000 persons) 6.4 46.5 727

Source: Mahbub ul Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning: A Case Study of Pakistan (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 95.

al development.*? The second factor, and this was the result of public policy, was the decision to set up the capital in Karachi.®** The influx of migrant entrepreneurs and the location of the capital meant rapid indus trial and infrastructure development in West Pakistan—which led to a higher absorption

capacity and higher demand on the government for
52 Gustav Papanek, Pakistan’s Development, pp. 32-36. Papanek argues that West Pakistan’s development was due largely to the “response” of private entrepreneurs to the early “economic” incentives.
88 Ibid., pp. 21-24.
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186 F9 3L3 OF LI8‘08 ISS FS
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9ST'S Ors866'TS8°3
PIOT
130° GLb
SSo'T 881
1Z0°TZ LESH L661 306'S
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saja1yaa 4ojout fo
fo s4oqo0p fo sasinu spaq pidsoy fo
on on on
panssi sasuacy opps fo ‘oN
advapiu povoy
“98-OLT
“S9-ZOT
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poydepy
“LST
“FS-6FT
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resources. During the first decade, the central government allocated nearly two-thirds of its developmental and nondevelopmental funds to West Pakistan. There was a similar disparity in the allocation of foreign aid (see Tables II.16, II.17, and II.18). The central government also

Table II.16 / Distribution of central government's revenue expenditure, 1947-48 to 1960-61

	EAST PAKISTAN		WEST PAKISTAN		UNALLOCABLE	
	RS. IN CRORE	% OF TOTAL	RS. IN CRORE	% OF TOTAL	RS. IN CRORE	% OF TOTAL
Revenue expen diture including working expenses of commercial departments	269 2;	995 45	952 43			
Revenue expen diture excluding working expenses of commercial departments	86 5	616 34	1,138 61			

Source: Adapted from East Pakistan, Planning Department, Economic Disparities Between East and West Pakistan (1963), p. 17.

Table II.17 / Central government development outlay, 1947-48 to 1960-61

	EAST PAKISTAN		WEST PAKISTAN	
	TOTAL (RS. IN CRORE)	PER CAPITA (RS.)	TOTAL (RS. IN CRORE)	PER CAPITA (RS.)
Investment Neri,	88	430	I bey	
Loans	184	40	224	61
Grants-in-aid	76	15	101	28

Source: Adapted from East Pakistan, Planning Department, Economic Disparities Between East and West Pakistan (1963), p. 18.

did much to develop the private sector through its economic and fiscal policies and its control of foreign exchange, import licensing, and capi tal issues. Here again there was interwing disparity in allocation (see Table II.19). Disparity in the allocation of resources was defended by the central government on the

economic grounds that there were greater

Table IL.18 / Foreign aid and loans 1947-48 to June 30, 1960 EAST PAKISTAN WEST PAKISTAN CENTER TOTAL
RS. IN % OF RS. IN % OF RS. IN % OF RS. IN
CRORE TOTAL CRORE TOTAL CRORE TOTAL CRORE
Foreign
development
aid 93.89 17 335.22 62 118.03 21 542.14 U.S. commodity
aid 129.00 30 262.00 64 18.00 6 409.00 Source: Adapted from East Pakistan, Planning Department, Economic Disparities Between East and West Pakistan (1963), p. 21.
demands in the western wing.*‘ But governmental allocations were open for all to see; and the disparity, whatever its economic rationale, led to the charge of discrimination against the Bengalis and created a sense of distrust among the Bengalis toward the central government.* The Bengalis were particularly dissatisfied with the “one-economy” policy of the government, which failed to take into consideration the es sential differences in economic patterns and the geographical separation between the two wings. The east wing’s low starting point, lack of private entrepreneurs in industry, and high labor and political unrest,°® which was one reason for the smaller influx of foreign private capital, meant that a deliberate and sustained effort on the part of the government was necessary for East Pakistan’s development. In the absence of such an
effort, resources tended to gravitate to the more developed region.*” But what irked the Bengalis most and gave special impetus to their demands for autonomy was the transfer of resources from East to West Pakistan. Through a surplus in international trade and a deficit in inter wing trade, a sizable amount of East Pakistan’s foreign exchange earning was diverted to the west wing (see Table II.20). Though interwing economic disparity dates from 1947, it was not a
54 Mahbub ul Haq, Economic Planning, p. 113.
55 Many Bengali politicians, economists, and administrators look upon the central govern ment’s policies as the main reason for economic disparity. See the East Pakistan Planning Department’s publication Economic Disparities Between East and West Pakistan, as an il lustration of this.
56 See Tables 3 and 4 in the Appendix for an east-west comparison of labor and political unrest.
57 See Gunnar Myrdal, Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to World Prosperity, for an elabo ration of this point.

Table IL19 / Value of import licenses allocated for raw materials and spare parts, 1951-58 (Rs. 1000)
EAST WEST EAST WEST 1951 52,400 88,981 1955 51,072 144,201 1952 42,579 137,468 1956 84,782 84,178 1953 45,525 82,242 1957 94,123 94,854 1954 43,227 104,608 1958 84,832 87,266
Source: Adapted from East Pakistan, Planning Department, Economic Disparities Between East and West Pakistan (1963), p. 20.
Table 11.20 / Trade balances for East and West Pakistan, 1948-58 (rupees in crores)
FOREIGN BALANCE INTERWING BALANCE OVERALL BALANCE EAST WEST EAST (—) WEST (-4-) EAST WEST 1948-49 14.68 —64.83 12.05 2.63 | —52.78 1949-50 24.41 —34.70 18.51 5.90 —16.19 1950-51 75.82 +17.54 20.85 74.97 +38.39 1951-52 82.81 —55.20 13.77 13.54 —36.43 1952-53 27.61 — 14:99 6.92 20.69 =8.07 1953-54 85.19 —18.338 23.50 11.69 Oke
1954-55 41.14 —29.16 10.68 30.46 —18.48 1955-56 68.06 AA 9.55 58.51 —12.66 1956-57 9.09 old 19.77 —10.68 —52.01 1957-58 25.25 —88.07 43.29 —18.04 —44.78
Source: Muhammad Anisur Rahman, East and West Pakistan: A Problem in the Political Economy of Regional Planning (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1968), p. 12.
significant factor in Bengali alienation in the first years of independence. Economics did not become a full-blown controversy until 1955. It did not figure prominently in either the 21-Points election manifesto of the United Front or the pre-1954 Constituent Assembly debates. But after 1954, especially after the Awami League became the opposition party in the National Assembly in the Do

Oeee session, economic disparity be came the focal point of controversy between the center and East Paki-

stan.°* The East Pakistan Awami League published a pamphlet called Why Autonomy? which focused on economic reasons for provincial autonomy. Studies by Bengali economists were also published, for the first time giving a sophisticated economic analysis of the interwing eco
nomic disparity.°° Even after the Awami League came to power at the center, economic issues remained the main point of controversy between the center and East Pakistan and constituted one of the major reasons for the Awami League's loss of governmental power.

Cultural policy. While economic disparity was an issue that pri marily affected the middle class in East Pakistan, the cultural policy of the "national" elite gave a wider emotional appeal to the demand for autonomy and helped to develop a linguistic nationalism among the other classes of Bengalis. The cultural policy of the ruling elite during the early years was assimilationist. It was thought that the two wings could be held together only if there were one language and one culture between them. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah's famous Dacca speech of 1948 defending Urdu as the state language typifies this view:

.. . let me make it very clear to you that the State Language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan. Without one State Language, no Nation can remain tied up solidly together and function.®!

But from the beginning such assimilation was opposed by the Bengalis. Even before the Quaid-i-Azam's speech, which triggered demonstrations in Dacca University, Bengali members of the Constituent Assembly had demanded due recognition of Bengali. The policy-makers stuck to
their assimilationist approach, however, and efforts were made to Islam icize Bengali. The first Basic Principles Committee Report (1950) recommended Urdu as the only state language. The BPC report was widely rejected by the Bengalis. By 1952, the controversy led to open

58 See Pakistan, Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, Second Assembly, Vol. 1, January 9, 17 (speech by Abul Mansur Ahmad); January 27 (Ataur Rahman Khan); January 28 (Professor Muzaffar Ahmad).

59See A. Sadeque, The Economic Emergence of Pakistan.

6 See Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Group Interests in Pakistan Politics 1947-58," Pacific Affairs, XXXIX (1966), 83-98; and Abul Mansur Ahmad, Rajnitir Pamachasa Bachara, pp. 376-98 on the Awami League's conflict with the entrepreneurial elite. 61 Jamilud Din Ahmad, ed., Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Il, 490.

confrontation, when Dacca University students engaged in violent dem onstrations on behalf of Bengali. Not only did the opposition political parties and the intelligentsia continue to demand recognition of Bengali, but now even the party in power in the East Bengal Legislative Assembly
passed a unanimous resolution urging recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages. The central government persisted in its policy until 1956, however, when the consititution recognized both Urdu and Bengali as national languages. The center's assimilationist cultural policy, therefore, rather than uniting the two wings, drove a wedge between them. It alienated the Bengali intelligentsia, the professionals, the students—in other words, the newly mobilized groups in the east wing. Yet more critical, the policy stimulated rapid development of vernacular elite in East Pakistan who supported policies and priorities very different from those pursued by the "national" elite.

The rise of a vernacular elite in East Pakistan

From the viewpoint of east-west integration, the most crucial develop ment during the first decade was the rise of a vernacular elite in East Pakistan. Unlike the ruling elite at the center or in West Pakistan, which changed little over the years, the Bengali elite changed a great deal during this period. At the time of independence, the ruling elite in East Bengal, like the central ruling elite, was "national" and "nonvernacular," or bilingual. The Bengali Muslims entered the modern age at a relatively late stage. Before independence their leaders generally were landlords or Calcutta-based urban cosmopolitans

who were either nonvernacular or bilingual. But in the years following independence, preexisting factional groups and new social forces gave rise to a Bengali counter elite which was mostly “vernacular” and regional*®? During its struggle

* The difference between the vernacular and the nonvernacular elite is not merely in the languages they speak; it also lies in their socioeconomic backgrounds, socialization processes, and their philosophies and policy priorities. The vernacular elite generally come from poor or lower-middle-class families in rural areas or small towns; while the nonvernac- ular elite come from economically well-off urban families (though their income might come from rural zamindari sources) who could afford to send their children to English-language

for supremacy (1947-54), the vernacular elite developed its own sep arate political party and platform and a distinct linguistic nationalism. The election of 1954 marked the loss of power of the old ruling elite.*° The ascent of the vernacular elite to power within the relatively short period of seven years was due partly to preexisting factional opposition to the “national” elite and partly to the inept policies followed by that elite and its allies in the center.

Origins of the vernacular elite. The vernacular elite drew its strength from various groups and organizations. At the initial stage, Muslim League factions opposed to the ruling faction played a key role. Prior to independence, the Muslim League was divided into three major factions: the Dacca, or Nazimuddin, faction; the Fazlul Huq faction; and the Suhrawardy faction. The Dacca faction, led by men like Khawaja Nazimuddin and Akram Khan, was an essentially traditional, conserva

tive faction that represented the landed interests. Its leadership was nonvernacular and had little popular support in the countryside. The Suhrawardy faction was mostly modernist and urban-based, primarily in Calcutta. Many of the members, including Suhrawardy himself, were nonvernacular. Their main strength lay in their organizational capability and in their hold over the mobilized urban literati groups, especially the students. The Fazlul Huq faction was vernacular and rural-based. It was organizationally weak but had mass support because it champi

oned popular socioeconomic causes like the abolition of landlordism and the settlement of rural debt, as well as specifically Muslim causes. Both the Huq and Suhrawardy factions fell out with the central Mus lim League hierarchy, one of the reasons being their disagreement over the issue of Bengal’s political autonomy.** After partition, the Nazimud

schools and universities. After independence, with the introduction of universal adult franchise and the sudden increase in political participation, the vernacular elite found themselves in a position of strength because of their numerical superiority, and they suc cessfully challenged the nonvernacular elite. For similar developments in other South Asian countries after independence, see Selig S. Harrison, India, Chap. II]; Howard Wriggins, Ceylon, Chaps. VI and IX.

6 Jn the 1954 East Bengal provincial election the ruling Muslim League party could secure only 10 seats in a house of 309.

6 When Fazlul Hug broke with Jinnah on the question of membership in the Imperial Defense Council, he complained bitterly of Jinnah’s interference in Bengal politics. See the Hug-Jinnah correspondence in S. Sharifuddin Pirzada, ed., Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah’s Cor respondence, pp. 55-84; and Fazlul Huq’s letter of resignation, quoted in Ispahani, pp. 48-49. Similarly, one of the reasons for Suhrawardy’s disagreement with the central Mus-

din faction came to power in East Pakistan with the help of the central Muslim League hierarchy.®* Thus the early power elite in the east wing was essentially nonvernacular, organizationally weak, and opposed by the Huq and Suhrawardy factions. A few of the prominent supporters of these factions were accommodated by the ruling elite; but the majority, including Fazlul Huq and Suhrawardy themselves, remained outside the government. The inability of the ruling elite to incorporate these dissatisfied factions spurred the quick rise of the vernacular counter

elite. The opposition factions, coupled with Maulana Bhasani's group, which had its main strength in Assam and Sylhet, laid the foundation of a separate political party and platform.** Unlike the other leaders, Bhasani believed in nonconstitutional methods and civil disobedience, and he was the only Pakistani leader who sought a rural base. His belief in socialism and anti-imperialism made him a catalyst for leftist forces in East Pakistan.

In addition to these Muslim League factions, the Congress and Com munist parties helped shape the ideology and organization of the Bengali counterelite. At the time of partition, Congress was the only official opposition party in East Bengal and hence bore the main burden of criticizing the policies of the ruling elite. Congress, for example, under took the championship of the Bengali language and principles of secular ism.°' The Communists also had considerable impact.** After indepen

lim League was his support of the cause of greater Bengal. For a detailed analysis of the shifting fortunes of the Suhrawardy and Nazimuddin factions, and the central Muslim League hierarchy's role in these fortunes, see Abdul Mansur Ahmad, Rajintir Panachasa Bachara, pp. 210-11; Kamruddin Ahmad, East Pakistan, pp. 86-96; Ispahani, pp. 114-17, 216-17.

°° Interestingly enough, top Bengali leaders, both Congress and Muslim League, often had open conflict with the central hierarchies of their parties. After partition the factions that came to power in both West and East Bengal were the ones backed by the central hierarchies. For a detailed analysis of this phenomenon, see Leonard Gordon, "Bengal and the Indian National Movement."

°° While in the more developed countries, where parties are well organized, factional disputes are usually settled within the party, in East Bengal politics, where party organi zation is weak, factional disputes often lead to party splits and the establishment of separate parties.

*' See Pakistan, Constituent Assembly, Debates, February 25, 1948 (speeches by D. N. Dutta, Prem Hari Barma, B. K. Datt, Sris Chandra Chattopadhaya).

*°On the role of the Communists in East Bengal politics, see Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "The Leftist Movement in East Pakistan —Leadership, Factionalism, Doctrinal and Tactical Dilemmas" (unpublished paper available from author).

dence, the Communists at first adopted the policy of working for an immediate revolution, and organized a peasant movement.*®? The quick suppression of the revolutionary movement, and a change in the policy of Cominform, led the Communists to work in other, non-Communist front organizations. They worked in the Youth League," East Pakistan Students Union (EPSU),"! Ganatantri Dal,7? and the Awami League — organizations from which the vernacular elite drew substantial support. The Communists also aided the vernacular elite in the 1952 language movement and the election of 1954.

It was, however, the student organizations that proved to be the vernacular elite's major source of strength. Students continued their pre independence tradition of political activism,'' and provided leadership and support for the various political movements undertaken by the vernacular elite. After independence, the enrollment of Muslim students increased steadily. The majority of them went to vernacular language schools, and they were an ever-expanding base of support for the vernacular elite.

Foundation of the Awami League (1949). The foundation of the Awami League, the first Muslim opposition party in East Bengal, brought many dissatisfied factions under one platform. Soon the Awami League became the chief spokesman of the budding vernacular elite. An exami

nation of the Awami League's leadership reveals some of the characteris tics of the Bengali counterelite. The party president, Maulana Abdul

88 Y. V. Gankovsky and L. R. Gordon Polonskaya, A History of Pakistan, pp. 148-45. 77The Youth League was established in 1951. It was the first noncommunal student organization and aimed at mobilizing popular support on a program of secularism, anti imperialism, antifeudalism, world peace, unfettered democracy, and employment op portunities for all people. The Youth Leaguers provided leadership to the various political parties that were later established. Ten top-ranking leaders of different underground Com munist party factions are former Youth Leaguers. See Maniruzzaman, "The Leftist Move ment."

71The East Pakistan Students Union was established in 1952, on the initiative of the leftists, to be a noncommunal student organization with an antiimperialist

plank. Since 1952, the EPSU has become the major leftist student organization.
72 Ganatantri Dal was established in January 1953 by the Youth Leaguers and other leftists to facilitate the left's participation in the 1954 election as members of a separate
73 Like students in many other developing countries, East Pakistani students are highly politicized. According to one recent survey of university students, 77 percent can be clas sified as politicized and 80 percent appear to have medium to high political competence. See Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Political Activism of the University Students in Pakistan" (unpublished).

Hamid Khan Bhasani, was a peasant leader, a former president of the Assam Muslim League, a maulana (religious leader) with little formal education, who had a long record of political imprisonment.'* The three vice-presidents — Abul Mansur Ahmad, Ataur Rahman Khan, and Abdus Salam Khan—were all small-town lawyers with little active political ex
perience. The general secretary, Shamsul Huq, was a young student leader who came to prominence during the 1948 language demonstra tions. The assistant general secretary, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was an other young student leader who came to light during the 1948 move ment. Thus the Awami League's leadership was dominated by mofussil (small town) lawyers and students—vernacular professionals or poten tial professionals.

The Awami League provided a political organization for the rising vernacular elite, but they still lacked a coherent political platform. Early Awami League demands and demonstrations dealt with issues such as food shortages and the restoration of civil liberties. But the vernacular elite needed a political issue that would clearly set them apart from the ruling elite and would mobilize mass support behind them.

Anti-BPC Movement (1950). The anti-Basic Principles Committee Report (anti-BPC) movement supplied the vernacular elite with their major political dogma—full regional autonomy for East Bengal. The Ba sic Principles Committee Report, which was the first draft of the Paki stani constitution, drew sharp criticism from East Bengal. Bengalis feared that the BPC draft, if implemented, would reduce East Bengal's majority to a minority and would turn "East Bengal into a colony of Pakistan@

A committee of action formed at a mass convention of opposition political workers in Dacca was entrusted with drafting an alternative pro posal for the constitution. The conveners of the committee of action, Ataur Rahman Khan and Kamruddin Ahmad, were both Awami Leaguers. The committee toured East Bengal and agitated mass opposition to the BPC Report. Finally, in February 1950, a "Grand National Convention" was held which adopted alternative constitutional proposals. These proposals,
"4 As pointed out above, Maulana Bhasani is the only political leader in Pakistan who has attempted, though with limited success, to build a rural base of support. Pakistan, Constituent Assembly, Debates, Sess. 8, November 21, 1950 (speech by Nur Ahmad).

especially those dealing with East Bengal's autonomy, remained the sheet anchor of all subsequent demands for autonomy in East Pakistan. The proposals assign only defense and foreign affairs to the central government; and even this jurisdiction was subject to the limitations that there would be two regional foreign offices and two regional defense forces, manned by the people of the regions.'° The federal government was entitled to levy taxes only on certain specified items and could add new items of taxation only with the consent of the region. The draft constitution also called for the establishment of "a sovereign socialist re
public" and for the recognition of Bengali as a state language. Language movement. While the anti-BPC movement gave the ver nacular elite its political program, its mass appeal and group coherence was supplied by the language movement. The language movement was, in fact, crucial to the development of the vernacular elite. It helped fos ter a kind of linguistic nationalism in East Pakistan. It made the students a potent political force and set the pattern of student-literati-professional alliance which was used successfully in all subsequent movements. Above all, it supplied the vernacular elite with a universally popular is sue, a cause under which all Bengalis could unite, a

cause which helped bridge the elite-mass gap.”
The language movement started soon after independence. The Con gress members of the Constituent Assembly had demanded equal recog nition of Bengali and Urdu as early as February 1948. In that month Dacca University students went on strike, demanding that Bengali be recognized as one of the state languages of Pakistan. Though the move ment was short-lived, it showed for the first time the strength of the stu dents, the main spokesmen for the vernacular elite. In 1952 a second language movement occurred which was by far the most remembered. The events of February 21, 1952, left a deep imprint on East Pakistan’s political development. Massive student demonstrations in Dacca in de liberate violation of a government ban on public meetings, the death of student demonstrators under police fire, the subsequent province
76 For a full text of the proposed constitution see Kamruddin Ahmad, East Pakistan, Ap pendix C. atte Ss 77 For an interesting analysis of the impact of the language movement in giving Bengali Muslims a sense of identity, see Badruddin Umar, “Mussalmanera Sawadesh Pratyabartana [The Muslim’s return home],” in Badruddin Umar, Sanskritik Sampradayikata [Communal ism in culture], pp. 8-11.

wide strike and protest, all changed the political complexion of East Pakistan. The 1952 language movement created myths, symbols, and slogans that consolidated the vernacular elite. It gave them not only a popular common cause but also their first martyrs. A whole new literary and cul tural tradition grew out of the events of February 21.’* The day is now celebrated every year as a memorial day when mass meetings are held with renewed pledges to support the vernacular elite’s ideals and causes. In fact, the celebration of February 21 often serves as a political barom eter of the vernacular elite’s moods. The bigger the processions and mass meetings and the more violent the clashes with police, the more frus trated and dissatisfied the vernacular elite.
The main driving force of the 1952 movement was the students, working in close cooperation with political party members. The students took the crucial step of breaking section 144 on February 21, and in so doing they courted arrest and some of them died.’ They organized not only the massive strike and demonstrations in Dacca but also the later province-wide strike, and thus demonstrated the coherence and effec
tiveness of student organizations.
The language movement drew widespread sympathy and support from the rural areas, in part because the large majority of Bengali stu dents came from these areas.*® Though the peasants did not actively par ticipate in the movement, their tacit support became manifest in the elec tion returns of 1954, when the Muslim League government in East Bengal was defeated by a massive rural vote. The students’ campaign on the language issue had greatly influenced the vote. And the language is sue was the first point in the 21-Point Manifesto of the United Front (see below). Representative of the language movement’s importance in the
See Hasan Hafizur Rahman, ed., Ekushe February [21 February], for a collection of writings commemorating the day.
7° On the eve of 21 February, when section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Paki stan was imposed banning public meetings and processions, the All-Parties Action Commit tee favored obeying the government order. The students, however, favored confrontation by breaking section 144. Of the four persons known dead by police fire, three were students and one was a clerk of the East Bengal Secretariat.
6° Alex Inkeles’ data on East Pakistani students, based on interviews with 357 students from Dacca University and the Dacca Polytechnic Institute in the early sixties, show that the fathers of 55 percent of students are engaged in full- or part-time agriculture, and nearly 73.8 percent of the students come from villages, small towns, or small cities. Alex Inkeles, Mimeograph, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

overthrow of the ruling elite was the defeat of the Muslim League chief minister by a young student leader of the language movement who had no past political experience.
The 1954 election: overthrow of the “national” political elite in East Bengal.

The 1954 election marked the rejection of the "national" elite by the Bengali electorate. The election strategy of the vernacular elite was to maximize popular support by closing their divided ranks and drawing up a program upon which there was general consensus. Before the election campaign the Bengali counterelite was fragmented into sep arate political parties. In addition to the Awami League, the major politi cal party of the counterelite, there were several other parties to the left and right. There was the Nizam-i-Islam, founded in 1950, which stood for the establishment of an Islamic polity based on Quranic principles. The Nizam consisted mainly of orthodox religious leaders, and its socioeco nomic program was to the right of the Awami League. To the left of the Awami League stood the Ganatantri Dal. In addition, there was the Krishak Sramik Party (KSP), founded in 1953, composed mainly of Fazlul Huq's personal followers and allies, and similar to the Awami League in its ideology and program. To strengthen their position vis-a vis the ruling political elite, the opposition parties decided to form an electoral alliance. A united front comprising the Awami League, the KSP, the Nizam-i-Islam, and the Ganatantri Dal was formed in 1958; and a common election manifesto, the 21-Point formula, was drawn up.

The United Front and its 21-Point Manifesto foreshadowed later political trends in East Pakistan. The United Front was the first of a series of coalitions. United more against the Muslim League than for any posi tive policy, it consisted of various antagonistic forces, among whom fac tionalism was rife from the start.*! The coalition manifesto comprised a number of conflicting goals. Still it was a significant document, insofar as it was accepted by all the opposition groups and it contained the sa lient points on which a consensus was reached by the Bengali counter elite. The major thrust of the 21-Point manifesto is the accommodation of the vernacular elite's interests.*2 Twelve of the points expressed their

81 East Pakistani politics has been dominated by political movements which aim more at getting into power than at achieving specific policies. In a traditional society, where party organization and penetration is weak, political movements stressing opposition to the ruling elite can mobilize the masses more readily than can other issues.

82 According to S. F. Levin, "The People's League Party," in A. M. D yakov, ed., Paki-

demands. Thus point nineteen called for establishment of full regional autonomy for East Bengal on the basis of the Lahore Resolution, giving to the central government power over only three subjects: defense, for eign affairs, and currency. Even in these matters, regional safeguards were included. In defense, the headquarters of the navy would be in the east wing, and an armament factory would be established there in order to make East Bengal self-sufficient in defense. Other demands in cluded recognition of Bengali as one of the national languages (point one); introduction of the vernacular as a medium of instruction (point ten); abolition of "reactionary" Dacca and Rajshahi University acts, to make the universities autonomous (point eleven); repeal of security acts for political imprisonments (point fourteen); separation of executive and judiciary functions (point fifteen); assurance of regular and free elections (points twenty and twenty-one); declaration of February 21 as an official memorial day (point eighteen); and erection of a memorial for the martyrs of the language movement (point seventeen). While the 21 Points were essentially a program of the vernacular elite, they also included demands directed toward mobilizing support from workers and peasants. Thus it called for the introduction of econom ic and social rights for industrial workers, according to the principles of the International Labour Organisation. To the peasants, it pledged "na tionalization of jute" and securing of fair prices (point two), support of cooperatives and cottage industry (point four), and construction of irriga tion facilities for flood and famine control (point seven). To the urban white-collar workers, it promised reduction of income disparity between high- and low-salaried employees (point twelve). Thus a very broadly based program and alliance was formed to fight the incumbent Muslim League government.** The strategy proved a success. The Muslim League was swept out of office, and the vernacular elite came to power. The vernacular elite in East Bengal vs. the "national" elite at the

stan, p. 86, the manifesto was “primarily the program of the Bengal nationalist move ment.” In addition to expressing “the interests of the Bengal nationalist bourgeoisie,” the program was designed “to receive the support of the other strata of the population of East Pakistan.” (Levin gives a Marxist interpretation of the rise of Awami League.)

**In this respect the United Front and its 21-Point manifesto were similar to the preinde pendence Muslim League and its program. Before independence, the Muslim League prom ised policies designed to get the support of divergent groups. But some of these policies were mutually conflicting and could not be implemented—which led to the defection of

center, 1954-58. With the coming to power of the vernacular elite in East Bengal, the east wing’s relationship with the center underwent se vere strain. Even prior to 1954, there had been conflicts between the central government and the province; but these had generally been solved within committees and the Muslim League organization, beyond the public gaze.** The center always managed to impose its will upon the East Bengal government without resorting to direct intervention by the governor-general’s rule, which had been used in other provinces. Thus there was a stable Muslim League government in East Bengal from 1947 to 1954. The 21 Points, however, especially the demands for full regional autonomy for East Bengal, were anathema to the “national” elite. Within six weeks of its assumption of power, the United Front ministry was dismissed by the center, on the grounds that it was bringing about disintegration of the country.*®

But the vernacular elite and the “national” elite were soon forced to work with each other, out of mutual need rather than any shared objec tives. The “national” elite needed the vernacular elite’s support to pro vide their rule in the east wing with a semblance of legitimacy. And the vernacular elite, after waiting in a political wilderness for more than a year, found they needed the center’s support to return to power. A working relationship thus grew between them. The new spirit of com promise and cooperation was revealed in the signing of the Murree Pact.*® The vernacular elite conceded that West Pakistan be considered as one administrative unit, thus submerging West Pakistan’s ethnic dif

various groups and factions from the Muslim League. The United Front in its 21 Points, also, formulated a broadly based program to incorporate different groups. But some of these groups and proposed policies were also mutually conflicting, and the United Front broke up within two years.

§4The Muslim League government in East Bengal fought for greater power for their province in the subcommittee entrusted with drafting the BPC Report. But they were over whelmingly outnumbered. See Callard, Pakistan, pp. 172-75. Also see the editorials in the East Bengal Muslim League’s mouthpiece, Azad (Dacca), September 29, 30, October 2, 4, and 16, 1950, for the East Bengal Muslim League’s opposition to the center.

85 When he imposed the center’s rule, the central prime minister accused the provincial chief minister Fazlul Huq of treason and of conspiring to bring about the secession of East Bengal. See Mohammad Ali (Bogra’s) speech, Dawn (Karachi), May 31, 1954.

86 The Murree Pact, signed by members of the Muslim League, the Awami League, and the United Front, was an attempt to bring about an east-west agreement on some contro versial issues. See Dawn (Karachi) July 8, 1955. For a detailed description of the bar gaining that preceded the signing of the Murree Pact, see Abul Mansur Ahmad, Rajnitir Panachasa Bachara, pp. 286-99.

ferences under one administrative and political structure, limiting Ben gali ability to form coalitions with anti-Punjabi elements in the west wing and giving parity of representation with East Pakistan. For its part, the “national” elite recognized Bengali as a national language along with Urdu, and accepted the principles of a joint electorate, regional autono my for East Bengal, and parity of the two wings in all spheres. This al liance, however, based as it was on a mutual quid pro quo, was at best tenuous and was likely to break down whenever either partner felt it could make a better bargain. The fragility of the alliance is well illus trated by the extreme instability in both the center and East Pakistan: between 1954 and 1958, there

were five governments at the center and three in East Pakistan (there was governor’s rule for nearly two years in East Pakistan).
Though the vernacular elite advocated regional autonomy for East Bengal, it was quite eager to participate in the center and was willing to cultivate an alliance with the West Pakistani political forces. When the United Front was formed, it was understood that, of its three leaders, Bhasani would remain with the party organization, Hug would be in East Pakistan, and Suhrawardy would go to the center. Suhrawardy consis
tently tried to make the Awami League a national party and himself a national leader. His first attempt to do so had been made in 1952 by joining the East Bengal Awami League with several West Pakistani
parties— Mamdot’s Jinnah Muslim League in Punjab, Pir of Manki Sha rif's Awami League in the North-West Frontier Province, and Awami Mahaz in Sind. Conflict soon arose between the East Bengal Awami League and the largest component of the West Pakistan Awami League, the Mamdot group, which consisted mostly of feudal landlords who did not share the East Bengal stand on land reforms, provincial autonomy, and foreign policy. The Mamdot group’s departure in 1953 weakened the West Pakistan Awami League numerically, but left it ideologically more cohesive. Between 1953 and 1955, the Awami League gained the
support of regional autonomists in both East and West Pakistan. Suhrawardy’s efforts to build himself up as a national leader re quired the delicate balancing of conflicting forces. While he was himself a member of the nonvernacular “national” elite, his constituency was the vernacular elite in East Pakistan. He had become a maior political figure by cultivating this constituency, but he could not come to power at the

center unless he played up his “national” image and toned down some of the demands of the Bengali vernacular elite. After coming to power he was thus caught in a dilemma. By softening his stand on regional autono my (especially on autonomy for West Pakistan’s provinces) and on foreign policy he lost the support of regional autonomists (especially those from West Pakistan) and leftists;*? while his support of Bengali business in terests alienated West Pakistani entrepreneurs.** These irreconcilable forces led to a new split in the Awami League and to the fall of Suhra wardy’s ministry within thirteen months of its accession to power.
Despite Suhrawardy’s fall from power and the split in the Awami League, the fragmented Bengali counterelite still tried to form all-Paki stan parties and alliances. As long as there was hope of a free political process, the vernacular elite was willing, indeed eager, to participate in national politics. They believed that their numerical superiority would give them an edge in the political process and would enable them to use their political power to redress the administrative-economic disparity from which the east wing had suffered in the past. The Awami League tried to pick up some right-wing industrial and business support in West Pakistan to fill the vacuum created by the departure of regional autono mists. Similarly, the East Pakistani leftists who had left the Awami League joined with other leftist parties and the West Pakistani regional autonomists to form the National Awami Party (NAP) in 1957. But the hopes of the Bengali counterelite for effective participation at the center were dashed when, within a few months of the long-awaited national elections, martial law was declared, the established political institutions were swept aside, and the civil-military bureaucracy, in which Bengali representation was minimal, assumed power in the country.
87 Thus after Suhrawardy became prime minister he declared that 98 percent autonomy was granted to East Pakistan by the 1956 constitution, though the Awami League had pre viously refused to sign the constitution on the grounds that it did not grant enough autono my. Suhrawardy also defended the SEATO and CENTO security alliances, though the Awami League had campaigned against the signing of these pacts. In addition, he defended one unit for West Pakistan, though the West Pakistan Awami League wanted repeal of one unit.
88 The Suhrawardy ministry came under fire from West Pakistani businessmen, who al leged that the government was using import licensing as a means of political patronage. For a detailed discussion of the conflict, see Maniruzzaman, “Group Interest,” pp. 89-91; Abul Mansur Ahmad, Rajnitir Panachasa Bachara, pp. 429-32.

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three / The decade of Ayub
(1958-68): an overview

WHEN martial law was declared in Pakistan on October 7, 1958,abro gating the constitution and the established political process, the coup was hailed by its supporters as a revolution, a break with the past and the beginning of a new era. The Karachi daily Dawn welcomed the "peace ful revolution" as an "answer from heaven"! and marveled at a "sane revolution" that brought forth "a complete change of both system and re gime. . . . without any strife or bitterness."* Ayub himself always called the military coup a "revolution."®

The military takeover in Pakistan was neither a revolution nor a revolutionary coup, however. Instead it was a classic case of a "reform coup" as defined by Samuel P. Huntington.* It was brought about by

1 Editorial, Dawn (Karachi), October 7, 1958.

2 Editorial, ibid., October 12, 1958.

3 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, chap. 6.

4S. P. Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," in Changing Patterns of Military Politics, pp. 32-40. According to Huntington (p. 33), in a reform coup "a com bination of military and civilian groups seizes power intending to make reforms in the political, economic or social structure. They usually do make some reforms, though they do not instigate a convulsive revolutionary process."

men who were already participants in the existing political system and who had institutional bases of power within that system. Long before the coup, the military had been working as a silent partner in the civil-mili tary bureaucratic coalition that held the key decision-making power in the country. Though the civil-military bureaucracy Pakistan inherited from the British had been trained in a tradition of neutrality, it was also law-and order oriented and was accustomed to viewing politicians as rabble rousers. In postindependence India, political control over the civil military bureaucracy was made possible by strong political organization and leadership. But in Pakistan, in the absence of such organization, the civil-military bureaucracy assumed de facto political power and dismissed the politicians as superfluous and as impediments to moderni zation.» The military's disillusionment with political leadership dated from Liaquat's affixing his signature to the cease fire of the Kashmir campaigns of 1948 —a blunder, in the eyes of the army, which cost them victory.© Some top military men long nursed a grudge against the politicians' handling of the war. The seriousness of the rift became evi dent with the Rawalpindi Conspiracy of 1951, when a few military leaders allegedly tried to overthrow the government.'

The military bureaucracy developed a close working alliance with the civil bureaucracy,® not merely out of institutional interests—the military's needs were always quickly met by the civil service? — but also because their views on the country's problems and solutions were similar. Like the civil bureaucracy, the military gave priority to state-building and government-building tasks and believed in a policy of centralization.

° On the civil servants' attitude toward the politicians, see Henry F. Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan, pp. 91-96.

° Fazal Mugeem Khan, The Story of thé Pakistan Army, pp. 117-18.

'Though a precise reason for the Rawalpindi Conspiracy was never made public, it was widely believed that the generals involved were those dissatisfied with the government's Kashmir policy.

*See J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension, pp. 179-86; and Wayne Wilcox, "The Pakistan Coup d'Etat of 1958," Pacific Affairs, XXXVIII (1965), 27-30, for a detailed discussion of this point.

* The military's cultivation of the civil bureaucracy was partly due to the latter's capacity to deliver the goods. Thus, both Ayub in his autobiography and Colonel Mohammad Ahmed in My Chief, pp. 38-55, mention that it was difficult to establish a modern army because resources were scarce and because it was hard for Ayub to get a decision from the poli- ticians. Ayub also mentions that Iskander Mirza, then defense secretary, was able to make decisions quickly (Friends Not Masters, pp. 75-76)

Both looked with suspicion on the political elite, especially on the rising vernacular elite in East Pakistan, whom they considered to be a disrup tive force.'° After 1954, when the vernacular elite gained ascendancy, the civil-military bureaucratic elite began to express doubts about the capability of the parliamentary system to provide for political stability and national integration. Iskander Mirza, spokesman for the civil bureau cracy, publicly advocated a controlled democracy.!! Ayub Khan, spokes man for the military elite, in 1954 circulated his draft constitution urging the adoption of a "controlled form of democracy with checks and coun terchecks."'* He suggested that "certain preliminary steps will have to be taken" before such a constitution is adopted, and that the "taking of such preliminary steps . . . is the immediate aim of Pakistan."!

There was no immediate attempt to take direct control, however, even though the 1956 constitution did not satisfy the military. Ayub referred to it as a "document of despair."'* But so long as Iskander Mirza was president, the civil-military bureaucratic elite was satisfied to remain in the background. Their decision to intervene directly came only after it became apparent that Mirza had exhausted all possible political alliances, and that the national elections scheduled for February 1959 would bring the vernacular political elite to power, not only in East Pakistan but also at the center. The civil-military bureaucratic elite looked upon the forthcoming election, and the prospect of the vernacular elite's coming to power, as a prelude to chaos and national disintegration.'!° The military seized power five months before the scheduled election, on the plea of saving the country from "complete disruption." *®

The events surrounding the actual decision to seize power have not

10 Thid., pp. 55-58.

11 Dawn (Karachi), October 31, 1954.

12 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 188.

13 Thid., p. 187. He does not elaborate on what these preliminary steps should be, how ever.

14 Thid., p. 54.

15 The military coup of 1958 may be termed what Morris Janowitz calls "reactive mili tarism." The military was apprehensive about the worsening socioeconomic and political condition of the country under the civilian regime, and the coup came essentially as a reaction to it. See Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 51-59; and Mohammad Ahmed, My Chief, pp. 77-82, on the military's growing impatience with the civilian regime and their apprehension about the forthcoming election.

16 Dawn (Karachi), October 8, 1958.

yet been made wholly public, but all accounts point to the fact that the military took the initiative in planning the coup. Ayub in his autobi ography refers to the constant pressure put on him to intervene by his civilian and military friends.!' And a Pakistani military historian reported that when the commander-in-chief asked for an operations plan, "a broad tactical outline was ready."!* Rushbrook Williams, who interviewed the major participants in the coup, alludes to a preexisting plan;'* and Ayub himself refers to the politicians' attempt to make contact with certain members of the armed forces and thus isolate the senior offi cers. *°

In spite of the military's initiative in preparing the October 7 coup, they at first used President Iskander Mirza as a figurehead, thereby giving their takeover the appearance of a palace coup.*! Mirza talked of an early withdrawal of martial law, and said that a committee of ex perts would be established to frame a new consitution."? But, following a brief and futile struggle for power, Mirza was forced to leave,"> and Ayub took power on October 27, 1958, pledging that there would be no premature lifting of martial law until. the all-around confusion was cleared up.

The new regime. But who were the people entrusted with the task of overcoming the political ineffectiveness? A look at the composition of the new power elite and dominant interest groups is instructive in understanding the policies pursued by the new regime. Additionally, since the regime was highly elitist in nature, and the crisis of Bengali participation was essentially a crisis of

elite participation, an analysis of the national representativeness of the new power elite is useful to under score one significant factor of Bengali alienation from the regime.

The military coup did not bring about any fundamental change in the elite structure, as it was a defensive maneuver on the part of the

7 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 58-68.

8 Fazal Mugeem Khan, p. 194.

'°L. F. Rushbrook Williams, The State of Pakistan, p. 182.

°° Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 57.

* Ibid., pp. 70-71. Ayub relates in some detail that he went to great lengths to get letters of authority from Mirza, so that the latter "assumes full responsibility for his decisions." Mirza was used as a figurehead because the military probably hoped thereby to hasten foreign recognition of the regime.

** Dawn (Karachi), October 16, 1958.

** Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 70-76.

ruling elite to thwart the challenge of the vernacular elite.' Still the change of regime did somewhat alter the fortunes of the various interest groups. One obvious change—and this was of critical importance from the viewpoint of Bengali participation—was the virtual removal of the political elite from power. With the coup the constitution was abrogated, political parties were abolished, and the established political process was completely halted. For politicians the regime had only contempt and scorn. In his first broadcast to the nation as chief administrator of martial law, on October 8, 1958, Ayub had the following to say of poli

ticians:

Ever since the death of the Quaid-i-Azam and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, poli ticians started a free-for-all type of fighting in which no holds were barred. They waged a ceaseless and bitter war against each other regardless of the ill effects on the country, just to whet their appetites and satisfy their base motives. There has been no limit to the depth of their baseness, chicanery, deceit, and degradation. Having nothing constructive to offer, they used provincial feelings, sectarian, religious, and racial differences to set a Pakistani against a Pakistani. They could see no good in anybody else. All that mattered was self-interest. In this mad rush for power and acquisition, the country and people could go to the dogs as far as they were concerned."*

With such a dim view of politicians' motivations and capabilities, the new regime could hardly be expected to share power with the political elite. Indeed, some of the early measures of the regime were directed specifi cally against prominent political leaders, who were either arrested or politically disqualified under EBDO.**° Freedom of the press, association, and assembly was curtailed. Noting the general ineffectiveness of the politicians, Ayub boasted: "The biggest weapon of a politician is his tongue, which we have controlled. I think things are going to be quiet for a while."?'

The first cabinet of the Ayub regime did not include any prominent politicians,"* nor did the subsequent cabinets during the martial law

24 For a detailed discussion of the elite structure before the coup, see chap. II. 25 Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, 1958-1964. I, 2.

26 The Elective Bodies Disqualification Ordinance (EBDO) was promulgated shortly after martial law, and was used to disqualify politicians from participating in politics for a period of eight years.

27 The New York Times, October 19, 1958.

28 Abul Kasem Khan of East Pakistan was the only politician. But he had not been active in politics since 1954 and was mostly known not for his political exploits but rather as the leading Bengali industrialist.

period (1958-62). With the introduction of the 1962 constitution, the regime was obliged to come to terms with the political elite and to in clude politicians in the cabinet. But even after 1962, none of the im portant cabinet portfolios—defense, planning, finance, home—were given to politicians. Ayub's key advisers throughout his rule remained nonpolitical: Manzur Qadir, Shoaib, Q. A. Shahab, Altaf Gauhar, and Fida Hasan.2° Even when the regime reluctantly allowed the renewal of limited political activity, it formed an alliance with the old nonvernac ular "national" political elite. The vernacular political

elite was still anathema to the regime. In its failure to come to an understanding with
the vernacular elite the new political system was weakened, for it thereby lost the support of a significant proportion of newly mobilized groups. One of the dichotomies of the regime's political experiment was
that the politicians with mass support and strong organizational back ing — who, given participation in the system, could have been effective — were not allowed a share in the power, while those politicians who had a share in the power were without party or mass support and hence were ineffective vis-a-vis the bureaucracy and the entrepreneurial elite. Even for achieving such obviously political objectives as maintaining the
stability of the political system the regime depended upon the civil military bureaucracy rather than upon its political supporters.*° The politicians' weight in the new power elite was therefore understandably minimal.
The other group that lost some of its power under the regime was the landed aristocracy. Before 1958, it was a dominant interest group. The big landlords of West Pakistan owned not only the villages but also the votes within them. They dominated the assemblies*! and blocked the adoption of any land reform measures in West Pakistan before 1958. But after the military coup, with the abolition of the old electoral process, the landlords' control of the rural vote lessened in value and their in
fluence waned. In addition, some early measures of the new regime were directed against the landed interest. A land reform commission was set up on October 31, 1958, and the regime made explicit that one rationale behind land reform was curtailment of the landed elite's political in-

® Of Ayub's close advisers, only Z. A. Bhutto later turned to politics seriously. Manzur Qadir was a lawyer; Shoaib, Shahab, Gauhar, and Fida Hasan were all civil servants. *' Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakisan, pp. 225-27.

31 See chap. VII, n. 7

fluence.*? The measures suggested by the land reform commission and adopted by the regime could hardly be called radical.*° There was no attempt at thorough land redistribution. Measures were directed ex clusively at very large landowners. Furthermore, there were enough loopholes to permit landholdings above the fixed ceiling,° and enforce ment was lax. One estimate put the redistribution of land as not more than 2 percent of all cultivated land.** Still the 1959 land reform was the first serious attempt at land reform in West Pakistan; and according to at least one source the landlords may have surrendered as much as a third of the land they owned.** The first Basic Democracies election of 1959 indicated the declining influence of landlords in rural politics. The "average" West Pakistani Basic Democrat of 1959 was thirty-eight years of age, had had eight years of schooling, and claimed an annual income of Rs. 2,320, 59 percent of which was obtained from nonagri cultural sources.*' The declining influence of the landed elite was also
visible in the 1962 national and provincial assemblies.** As the Ayub regime politicized itself, it fell back to some extent upon the support of landlords. This was partly because the regime en tered into a political alliance with the old "national" political elite, whose major source of support was the landed aristocracy. Also, the landed elite's ready acquiescence to mild land reforms and its accommodation of the civil-military bureaucracy as a middle landed interest*® helped cement an alliance with the regime. On the whole, however, compared to the civil-military bureaucracy or the entrepreneurial elite, the old landed elite suffered a setback during the Ayub regime. Rather than the old landed aristocracy it was the rising kulaks who became the

382 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 88.

38 The ceiling on landholding was put at 500 acres of irrigated land or 1,000 acres of nonirrigated land, plus whatever additional area might be needed to give the equivalent of 36,000 produce index units.

34 Since there was an option for making gifts or voluntary surrender, many landlords redistributed land among relatives and friends, and thus avoided exceeding the ceiling while effectively retaining control of the land. See Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, p. 829.

35 Joe R. Motheral, "The Effect of Government Policy and Programs on

Agricultural Production in Pakistan."
86S. J. Burki, "Interest Group Involvement in West Pakistan's Rural Works Program." 37 Thid.
38 See Table VII. 3.
39 Most of the land that was redistributed went to retired civil-military personnel. These new landowners showed great initiative in mechanized farming and were partly responsi ble for West Pakistan's agricultural surplus in the 1960s.

dominant interest group during the decade.' The "green revolution" had created a new group of rich farmers who became the chief base of political support for the regime.
The coup brought the civil-military bureaucracy to the forefront. The military decided to remain in the background, however, while the civil bureaucracy was very visible. The civil servants were initially shaken up by Iskander Mirza's ouster and the accompanying screening of some higher civil servants. Ayub testified to early reservations on the part of the civil servants.*! But the regime soon took care to restore the civil bureaucracy's confidence. Within a few weeks the army was sent back to the barracks; and, following the initial shock, the screening procedure was substantially relaxed. Barely 5 percent of the 2,800 class I officers charged with corruption were found guilty, and of these less than half were actually punished.*? The civil servants' quick rehabili
tation is indicated by the influential positions soon assigned to them by the Ayub regime. Of the 280 members of the thirty-three major com missions formed by the regime for the purpose of suggesting substantive policy changes, nearly 60 percent were members of the civil bureau cracy; only 6.4 percent were military; and 5 percent each were lawyers, judges, and scholars. Politicians comprised barely 1.4 percent of the commissions' membership.** The civil servants not only monopolized all the policy-making jobs in the central and provincial governments but also gradually took over the different corporations and autonomous bodies that had been established, ironically enough, to circumvent the slow bureaucratic procedures of government departments. **
Soon after his assumption of power, Ayub realized the futility of his attempt to "make the country pure by whacking it with the flat of his
"The term "kulak" in the Pakistani context refers to the owners of large farms who became politically powerful through the Basic Democracies system. For a detailed descrip tion of the process, see chap. VI.
*! Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 72.
* Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, pp. 77-79. The percentage punished among class Il and class III officials was even lower. Of 5,500 class II officials charged with cor- ruption, 4 percent were found guilty, of whom fewer than 1 percent were punished, while of the 87,000 class III officials charged only 1.5 percent were punished, Diwite * Ralph Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, pp. 311-14. **In 1968, members of the elite Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) held not only most of the secretaryships at the center but also the following diverse and powerful posts: chief justice- ship of the Pakistan Supreme Court, chairmanships of the East and the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, the East and the West Pakistan Industrial De- velopment Corporation, the Central Public Service Commission, the Tariff Commission,

broad sword."** The military's initial involvement in economic and administrative decision-making led to chaos,'® and the military was more than ever frustrated by the slow rate of progress.'7 As the need to disengage the military from political decision-making became evident, Ayub turned to the civil bureaucracy.
The civil servants, on their part, followed a shrewd policy of self preservation. First, the elitist CSP opened its ranks to the military by allowing a select group of army men to join. Of the fourteen military officers who joined the CSP between 1960 and 1968, eight had close connections with the top echelon of the military hierarchy.'® Second, the whole civil service, especially the CSP, modernized its training pro gram in order to compete effectively in the changed sociopolitical milieu. Realizing the regime's

commitment to modernization and development, the CSP sent its younger members abroad for advanced training in such fields as economics, public administration, accounting, finance, and community development. By 1968, 67 officers of the CSP had spent a total of 79 man-years in seventeen American and British universities. *® This expertise enabled the CSP to head the numerous corporations set up by the government.*’ Third, the civil service changed its former law and-order outlook to an orientation favoring development, especially rural development. The quick rise of the entrepreneurial elite under the regime eroded the civil servants’ hold on urban areas. Through the con trol of the Basic Democracies and the works program, the civil servants found a new base of power, the rural gentry.*! Fourth, the civil service continued, and even improved, its policy of regional and ethnic repre
the Atomic Energy Commission, the Export Promotion Bureau, the East and the West Pakistan Agricultural Development Bank; managing directorships of the Pakistan Insur ance Corporation and Trading Corporation; directorships of Radio Pakistan and the Na tional Institute of Public Administration; office of chief economist, the East Pakistan Plan ning Department, and chief controller, Imports and Exports. (Pakistan, Establishment Division, Gradation List of the Civil Service of Pakistan, 1968.)
45 The New York Times, October 20, 1958. 46 Feldman, Revolution, pp. 44-46. 47 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 78-79.
48S. J. Burki, “Twenty Years of the Civil Service in Pakistan,” Asian Survey, IX (1969), 248.
49 Thid., p. 249.
50In 1964, the CSP held 63 posts in the corporations. By 1967, the number had risen to 85. Ibid., p. 254.
51 According to Albert Gorvine, “The Civil Service Under the Revolutionary Government in Pakistan,” Middle East Journal, XIX (1965), 332, in Baluchistan “the C.S.P. has been able to use the Basic Democracy system to replace the sardari system with the Deputy Commissioner as the new Sardar.” See also S. J. Burki, “Civil Service,” p. 250.

sentation; whereas East Pakistani representation in the CSP was 24.3 percent in 1957, by 1967 it had risen to 34.1 percent.”* Thus the CSP, by becoming the only national institution with substantial Bengali partici pation, ensured its indispensability and permanence and bettered its position in the new power elite.

The entrepreneurial elite, who were emerging as a powerful inter est group even before 1958,°° also made significant gains under the Ayub regime. The regime’s policy of economic development through pri vate enterprise helped consolidate the power of this “new, able, ruthless group of industrial entrepreneurs.”** The concentration of economic power became so great that by 1968, “66% of all industrial profits, 97% of the insurance funds, and 80% of the banks in the country were con trolled by some twenty families.”*> While the participation and influence of these “robber barons” in the policy-making process was more informal than formal, and the methods they used were more covert than overt,°® they did achieve economic and fiscal policies advantageous to their in terests. They assiduously cultivated informal channels of influence.*’ Leading industrialists such as the Dawoods became active supporters of the regime and major donors to the Muslim League party fund.** They also welcomed to their fold ex-military personnel—men like General Habibullah and Captain Gauhar Ayub—who had close contact with the top echelon of the regime, and thus strengthened their ties with the mili tary.°° The growing ascendancy of the entrepreneurial elite was reflected

°? Pakistan, Establishment Division, Gradation List of the Civil Service of Pakistan, 1957, 1967.
°8 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “Group Interest in Pakistan Politics 1947-58,” Pacific Af fairs, XXXIX, (1966), 88-91.
4 Thid., p. 89.
°° Mahbub ul Haq, chief economist, Pakistan Planning Commission, quoted in editorial, The Pakistan Observer (Dacca), May 8, 1968.
°® A. Lee Fritschler, “Business Participation in Administration,” in Guthrie S. Birkhead, ed., Administrative Problems in Pakistan, pp. 77-88.
*’ The formal channels open to them were advisory councils in the ministries of

finance, industries, and commerce, where industry and business had representatives. But the coun cils met infrequently and had limited say on overall commercial and industrial policies. See Fritschler, pp. 78-81.
°*’ The Dawoods, who increased their wealth many fold in the sixties and were the main beneficiaries of the PIDC’s disinvestment policy in East Pakistan, were loyal supporters of the regime. Siddiq Dawood became the treasurer of the Muslim League and was one of the staunch supporters of the regime in the National Assembly.
°° Retired military men went into business and became industrial magnates almost over- night. The most prominent of the ex-military men turned industrialist was Ayub’s own son Captain Gauhar Ayub, who was reportedly worth $2-$3 million. See The New York Times, March 9, 1969.

in their increased representation in the national and provincial assem blies during the decade of Ayub. Nearly 32 percent of the East Pakistani members and 19 percent of the West Pakistani members of the national and provincial assemblies of 1962 and 1965 were businessmen, indus trialists, or contractors,®° whereas in the constituent and national assem blies of 1947-58 only 4 percent of the East Pakistani members and 3 percent of the West Pakistani members had been from business or in dustry.*!
It was the military that remained the main power base of the Ayub regime, however. When Ayub first came to power he did not hesitate to acknowledge that his authority lay ultimately in the power of the sword.*? Even when the military was relegated to the background and other sources of legitimacy were established through the Basic Democ
racies and the constitution, Ayub repeatedly used the threat of “a bloody revolution” to counter serious challenges to his rule.** During periods of crisis, military men were brought into key positions to demonstrate their continued support of the regime. Ayub on his part continually shifted and balanced his potential rivals in the military.*4 Civilian control over the armed forces was abolished.®* But the military was more the support base of the regime than an actual participant in public policy
making, which was left mainly to the civil bureaucracy. The change in power structure brought about by the coup—espe cially the loss of power of the political elite— meant that the Bengalis had little representation. As discussed in Chapter II, it was only in the politi cal elite that Bengali representation was substantial.°® Even after years of a quota system Bengali representation in the higher civil services re
60 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “‘Crisis in Political Development’ and the Collapse of the Ayub Regime in Pakistan,” The Journal of Developing Areas, V (1971), 227.
61 [bid.
62 See the regime’s arguments and their ultimate acceptance by the Supreme Court in the Pakistan v Dosso case. The full judgement is reported in Dawn (Karachi), October 28, 1958.
63 Before the presidential election of 1964-65, Ayub often threatened a military takeover less benign than his if he lost. Also, during the height of the Six-Point controversy, Ayub threatened to use the language of weapons. See The Pakistan Observer (Dacca), March 21, 1966.
64 The cases of generals Sheikh and Azam Khan are illustrations of Ayub’s policy of self preservation.
6 The constitution of 1962 stipulated that the minister of defense for the next twenty years had to be a general in the military.
86 See Table IL8.

mained less than 40 percent. As late as 1966, Bengalis constituted less than 30 percent of the class I officers of the Central Secretariat.*’ In the military elite, in the absence of a quota system, Bengali representation was nearly as poor during the Ayub decade as during the fifties (see Ta
ble Ill.1).
Table IlI.1 / East Pakistani representation in the military establishment, 1963 (percentage of total)

	COMMISSIONED OFFICERS	JUNIOR COMMIS- SIONED OFFICERS	WARRANT OFFICERS	OTHER RANKS
Army	5%	74%	74%	
Air Force	17%	13.2%	28.0%	

BRANCH CHIEE PELE Y PETTY LEADING SEAMEN OFFICERS OFFICERS OFFICERS AND BELOW Navy 5% 10.4% 17.8% 28.8% Source: Pakistan, National Assembly, Debates, March 8, 1968, pp. 30-31.

While Bengali representation in the entrepreneurial class increased during the decade, none of the top twenty or thirty families who probably benefited most from Ayub's economic policies were Bengali.** Table III.2 shows the relative weight of the two wings in the power structure in the first two decades of Pakistan's history. Clearly, the Bengalis were marginally represented in the policy-making and political support groups during the Ayub period. This nonrepresentation in the elite in a highly elitist system naturally deepened the Bengalis' sense of alienation. It meant that the regime needed to devise policies and institutions which would give the Bengalis a sense of participation in and identification with the system, to counterbalance their nonrepresentation in the policy and administrative elite.

The new nation-building policies. Like military regimes elsewhere, the Ayub regime cited national disintegration as the major rationale for its coup. Nation-building therefore was expected to have top priority under the new adminstration. Within two weeks of assuming, power,

67 See Table V.1.

** According to Hanna Papanek, "Entrepreneurs in East Pakistan," p. 6: among the twenty-nine largest 'Houses' [of family-controlled enterprise groups] ranked in terms of net worth, there are two Bengalis near the bottom of the list."