

FRENCH RECORDS

RELATING TO THE HISTORY OF THE MARATHAS

VOLUME VII



Translated & Edited

By

Dr. V. G. Hatakhar

FRENCH RECORDS

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(RELATING TO THE HISTORY OF THE MARATHAS)

VOLUME V & VI

CORRESPONDENCE OF M. DE MONTIGNY, FRENCH
RESIDENT AT THE MARATHA COURT (1781-88)
MONTIGNY'S ROLE DURING THE ANGLO-MARATHA WAR

Translated

By

Dr. V. G. Hatalkar



STATE BOARD FOR LITERATURE AND CULTURE
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FOREWORD

To publish source material which will have a direct or indirect bearing on the history and Culture of Maharashtra, forms part of the programme of the State Board for Literature and Culture. It has, therefore, undertaken the work of translation and publication of French Records on the history of the Marathas, under the able stewardship of Dr. V. G. Hataalkar, retired Professor of French, Bombay University, and has already brought out the 1st and the IInd Volumes of “The French Records” on the 6th March, 1978 and the IIIrd and the IVth Volumes on the 20th March, 1982. The Board has now pleasure in releasing Volumes V and VI of “The French Records” entitled Correspondence of M.de Montigny, French Resident at the Maratha Court 1781-1788. This was the period when the French were struggling for their political existence in India with the help of the Indian powers.

Publication of the most important documents, those for the period 1751-1761 when the French were thinking of founding an Empire in India, could not be taken first, as they were not available at the time because of the difficulties of Foreign Exchange. The translation of these documents will now be brought out in 3 Volumes in the course of the next two years.

On behalf of the State Board for Literature and Culture, I am grateful to Dr. Hataalkar for undertaking the translation of the Volumes V and VI of the French Records for the State Board.

S. S. BARLINGAY

Chairman

*State Board for Literature
and Culture*

Bombay,
30th January 1983

INTRODUCTION

M. de Montigny was neither a stranger to India nor to the Maratha Court. The French Minister had sent him to the Court of the Emperor in 1776 (he actually arrived at the camp of Najaf Khan, the Emperor's general, at Agra in August 1778) to establish contact with the Emperor and prepare the ground for co-operation with the French in case the latter decided to attack the English in India. While he was at Delhi he received an urgent call from M. de Bellecombe, then Governor of Pondicherry, to proceed to Poona immediately and make a personal effort to persuade the Maratha Government to create a diversion for the English on the side of Bombay. Unfortunately, Montigny, due to no fault of his, arrived too late at Poona (July 1779). By that time, Pondicherry, the French capital in India had surrendered to the English after a gallant resistance of six weeks (October 18, 1778), and the English, who had the imprudence to march on Poona, the Maratha capital, had suffered one of the most ignominious defeats at the hands of the Marathas at Wadgaon (January 13, 1779). The Marathas were naturally elated by this success, won by their own efforts. Moreover, it was futile to expect them to make any movement in favour of the French unless the latter's forces appeared in India and especially on the Malabar Coast in a sufficiently large number. Moreover, Nana Fadnis firmly refused to enter into any fresh arrangements with the French until he had received a reply from the French Government to the proposals which he had previously made to that government. After waiting in vain for the appearance of the French squadron on the Indian coasts, Montigny, in despair, left Poona in November 1779 and arrived in Paris in September 1780.

On his arrival at the French capital, Montigny submitted a memorial to M. le Marquis de Castries, French Minister for the Navy, in which he pointed out the advantages of an alliance with the Marathas as well as of a French landing on the west coast of India. The Minister at once decided to send Montigny back to India. His mission was obviously to prepare the ground for the co-operation of the Indian princes with the French troops which Castries was planning to dispatch to India in the near future. Montigny was to establish himself at the Maratha Court in preference to other Indian powers. He was entrusted with two letters by Castries, one addressed to Nana Fadnis and another to Mahadji Shinde. The Minister informed them that the letters and the presents sent by the Peshwa to His Majesty and his ministers were duly received, but that the vessel, which carried the replies and the presents from the King of France to the Peshwa and his ministers, had perished on the coast of Madagascar in July 1777. The unjust war which England had declared against France further prevented him from maintaining a regular correspondence with the Maratha Court. Finally, Castries recommended Montigny to Nana and Mahadji and requested them to have full confidence in him.

As M. le Yicomte de Souillac, French Governor-General at the Isle of France, had decided to send the largest possible number of troops to the Coromandel Coast, the English had the greatest interest in strengthening their position on that coast by placating the Indian powers and concluding treaties with them. The principal object of Montigny's mission was to prevent the conclusion of these treaties. According to the latest news, the Marathas, to whose court he was to proceed at first, were being pressed by the English to conclude a treaty with them. There was every possibility that the latter would go to the extent of abandoning Raghoba and making all other sacrifices to achieve their objective. Montigny, who knew all the principal Maratha chiefs, was to impress upon them that every treaty signed with this ambitious nation would be a fictitious one, that this was the moment to deal it deadly blows and that if this opportunity was missed, they would never find it again. Montigny was also to explain to them that it was more advantageous for them that the French should operate on the Coromandel Coast at this moment, that by dividing themselves into small detachments, they would split their forces, which might afterwards proceed to the Malabar Coast in a fair number. If, on the arrival of Montigny at Poona, no treaty was concluded with the English, he was to maintain the Marathas in their hostile attitude against the English, and also persuade them to carry out an offensive by undertaking some expedition on the side of Bombay. Finally, Montigny was to carry on a close correspondence with M. Piveron de Morlat, who was appointed as French Resident at the Court of Haider.

By a queer coincidence, at the very moment the French Minister was planning to send back Montigny to Poona, the Marathas were thinking of sending an envoy to M. de Souillac at the Isle of France with proposals for an alliance with the French, with instructions to proceed to France if Souillac had not the power to conclude such a treaty of alliance. It will be remembered that while Montigny was at the Maratha Court in 1779, Nana Fadnis had firmly refused to enter into any fresh arrangement with the French until he had received a reply to the proposals which the Maratha Government had previously made to the French Government. But since then the situation had changed. Nana Fadnis had then hoped that after the disaster at Wadgaon, the English would make overtures for peace. He was, however, greatly mistaken in his calculations. Contrary to his expectations, the English now planned a fresh campaign against the Marathas in Gujrat and North Konkan. They captured Ahmedabad (February 1780), Kalyan, an important trade centre (May), and Bassein (December). The next step would be the invasion of the Maratha capital itself. Nana Fadnis therefore came to the conclusion that a greater effort was necessary to put an effective check on the aggressive activities of the English. But he was fully aware that he could not carry out his objective without French assistance. As contact could not be established with them in India, all their possessions in this country having been captured by the English long since, he decided to send the Maratha proposals to Souillac at the Isle of France. The Marathas demanded 2,000 French troops with officers to command them. They would pay Rs. 50,000 per month as salary to the soldiers, the officers not included. As soon as the vessels carrying the troops appeared on the Konkan Coast, the Marathas would put the French in possession of a suitable port which would later be ceded to them. As regards the places which would be captured from the English, the French would get Bombay, while the Marathas would keep all other places, irrespective of whether they belonged to the English or were usurped by them. However, the French would have the liberty to establish their factories in all these places. Souillac was requested to select a general of repute to command the French troops. After the capture of the English settlements on the west coast, the combined forces would march to reduce the English possessions in Bengal. The Marathas would also help the French to recover their possessions in India, which they had lost to the English. The troops were to be immediately dispatched. In case, Souillac could not send them or had to wait for orders from France, he was requested to write promptly to the French Minister and inform the Poona Darbar of the same. These were, no doubt, very reasonable terms. Sayyad Zain-ul Abedin Khan, who was entrusted with these proposals, had full powers to negotiate with Souillac (February 1781).

Montigny arrived at Goa on September 9, 1781, and immediately established contact with the Poona Darbar. While at Goa, he met Zain-ul Abedin Khan. The Maratha plenipotentiary was waiting for transport to take him to the Isle of France. Since Montigny was entrusted with a special mission at the Poona Darbar, he dissuaded Zain-ul from continuing his journey to the Isle of France. However, he dispatched copies of all the documents to Souillac for his information. The latter forwarded them to the French Minister with his comments. He regretted that France could not at this juncture send any assistance to the Marathas in their present need. In his opinion, it was more advantageous to attack the English first on the Coromandel Coast. Souillac therefore advised Montigny to impress upon the Poona Darbar the advantages of the French plan and induce them to make an all-out effort to attack the English on the western coast. Souillac supported Montigny's action in dissuading Zain-ul from proceeding to the Isle of France, for the latter's presence there would have been embarrassing to the French Governor-General who was at this time engaged in equipping the expedition to the Coromandel Coast to act in concert with Haider Ali against the English.

Montigny arrived at Poona on November 5, 1781. Alas! once again a little too late. The situation at this Court, so far as the French were concerned, was very critical. After the failure of General Goddard's expedition to Poona (April 1781), the English, finding that their very existence in India was at stake, were most anxious to close the Maratha war and concentrate all their efforts on the Coromandel Coast against Haider Ali. Truce had already been signed between Mahadji Shinde and Colonel Muir (October 13, 1781), and a reference was made to Nana Fadnis. The Maratha Regent was by now tired of waiting for the appearance of the French squadron on the Malabar Coast. The English were willing to offer terms which were most advantageous to the Maratha Government, viz., the restoration of all the places captured during the war.

Added to that was the jealousy which existed between the two Indian allies, the Marathas and Haider Ali. Souillac had dispatched M. Piveron de Morlat, who later became Resident, to Haider's Court to negotiate a treaty with the prince. Piveron's immediate task was to explain to the ruler of Mysore the expediency of Montigny's appointment at the Maratha Court, the aim of which was not only to aid his (Haider's) plans and operations by prevailing upon the Marathas not to come to any terms with the English, but also to continue and augment the diversion for them on the western coast of India; moreover, it was essential to avoid the union of the Marathas with the English, for, if it took place, it would considerably hamper the chances of success of the Franco-Haider coalition. This was not an easy task. Haider had already expressed much anxiety on the dispatch of Montigny to the Maratha Court. According to him, it was impossible to rely on the promises of the Marathas who had always sold themselves to the highest bidder. He was therefore afraid that they might make peace with the English at any moment. He asked Piveron to warn Montigny to be on his guard and not to rely much on the words of Nana Fadnis.

On the other hand, the French were fully aware that the dispatch of French troops to the Coromandel Coast to co-operate with Haider Ali was bound to give umbrage to the Marathas.

It was in these circumstances that Montigny arrived at Poona. He first of all laid emphasis on the advantage which resulted from the alliance of the Poona Darbar with Haider Ali, an alliance which would immensely favour the French plan of operations in India. He next explained to them the motive behind the preference given to Haider Ali Khan, which was to recover the town of Pondicherry as quickly as possible and carry succour to a colony which was always dear to the French. He assured the Darbar that after the subjugation of the English on the Coromandel Coast, the French would appear on the Malabar Coast with a fair number to co-operate with the Marathas against the English. In order to give weight to his statements, he added that he had orders neither to demand nor to accept anything from the Regency until the arrival of the French squadron on the Malabar Coast. To prove to the Marathas the desire of the French to operate on this coast, Montigny even proposed to form a unit of 300 gunners for the service of their artillery. This offer and the disinterestedness shown by Montigny in all his proposals created a good impression on the Darbar in favour of the French.

Shortly after Montigny's arrival, General Goddard dispatched Capt. Watherstone, his trusted agent, to Poona to negotiate directly with Nana Fadnavis. The Maratha Minister had agreed with Haider Ali not to conclude a separate treaty with the English. He, therefore, insisted that no separate treaty could be made without reference to Haider Ali. He was fully alive to the weakness of the situation of the English and was not so anxious to conclude peace with them, especially after the Marathas had forced General Goddard to retreat. Moreover, he was not sure that this nation would not repeat its aggression against the Marathas if a favourable occasion presented itself. It was quite natural that he should wish to have his revenge on the enemy who had thrice broken his promises. Nor could he easily forget the immense losses in men and money, and the worries and anxieties caused by the English during the last seven years. Therefore, if the French forces arrived on the west coast, as Montigny gave him to understand, he would not lose the opportunity to drive away the English once for all from this part of the country, and thus remove forever a thorn in the side of the Maratha nation. Capt. Watherstone therefore returned to Bombay empty handed. The failure of Watherstone's mission to Poona could to a large extent be attributed to Montigny's arrival at the Maratha capital and to his efforts to create confidence among the Darbar about French co-operation with the Marathas. Nana promised to place at his disposal 5,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry accompanied by a Maratha general to march into Gujarat as soon as the French squadron appeared on the Maratha Coast.

With the arrival of Montigny at Poona, the question of making a treaty of alliance with the French Government for sending troops to India to assist the Marathas against the English, was once again taken up for consideration. Montigny informed Souillac that after the offers of the English for peace, the Maratha Government's attitude towards the French was likely to stiffen. They were bound to take advantage of the rivalry between the two European nations who were both seeking their alliance, and put forth conditions which would be difficult to fulfil.

The negotiations with Montigny regarding the terms of the projected treaty were completed towards the end of June 1782. The Marathas proposed that the French should land 10,000 men at Chaul for a joint campaign against the English at Bombay and other places on the western coast. The Marathas would advance two lakhs of rupees per month for four months for the maintenance of the French army. Bombay and Surat, after their capture from the English, would be ceded to the French. The French would have the liberty to open factories in Bhadoch and Cambay. The spoils of war were to be shared equally between the two allies. After the reduction of all the places on the western coast, including that of Danda-Rajapuri from the Siddi, the combined armies would proceed to Bengal for the expulsion of the English from that province, where, in return for these services, the Marathas would cede some territory to the French. Finally, it was stipulated that the French should not conclude peace with the English, either in India or in Europe, without the consent of the Marathas. Although Montigny had objection to some of the proposals, especially the last one, he strongly advised their acceptance, for, in his opinion, an alliance with the Marathas, more than with any other power, was absolutely necessary for the success of the French enterprise in India.

Chauvigny and Warnet were entrusted with the mission of carrying the Maratha proposals to Duchemin and Suffren, who were in charge of the French land and naval forces in India respectively. As anticipated by Montigny, the Maratha proposals did not satisfy the French authorities who wanted to make certain modifications. But this step would have proved most undiplomatic under the circumstances. A suggestion was made by Suffren that the Marathas should march on Bombay so as to create a diversion for the English who were planning to invade Haider's possessions on the Malabar Coast. The French were also anxious to obtain a loan from the Maratha Government. But Montigny rightly pointed out that the Marathas would neither make any move against the English nor advance any money to the French, unless the mass of French troops appeared on the Konkan Coast. As regards the size of the French detachment, if it were at all possible to send one to assist the Marathas (Suffren had made such an inquiry), Montigny stated that the English had 400 Europeans and 4,000 sipahees in the field and another 300 Europeans in Bombay, so that a detachment smaller than 500 to 600 men would not fulfil the object. Montigny further suggested that the salary of the French soldiers should be paid from His Majesty's treasure, while the Marathas would bear the cost of the sipahees. If this was not feasible, it would be better, in the opinion of Montigny, to wait till the arrival of Bussy's forces when the French would be in a position to undertake a major operation against Bombay. Montigny added a warning that Nana Fadnavis could not long resist the English pressure to make peace, when all the other Maratha chieftains, including Mahadji Shinde, urged upon him to ratify the treaty.

In the meantime, the treaty, known as the Treaty of Salbai, was concluded between the Marathas and the English on May 17, 1782. Warren Hastings signed the treaty on June 6, but Nana Fadnavis affixed his signature eight and a half months later. The Maratha Minister's hesitation in ratifying the agreement was, in the first instance, due to the fact that, by the treaty of February 26, 1780, he and Haider Ali had agreed not to conclude peace with the English separately. To sign the treaty without the knowledge of Haider Ali would not only offend that prince, but it would also mitigate against public opinion. Secondly, Montigny had informed the Maratha Regent that Bussy, who had built for himself a great reputation in India, had been given the command of the French expedition to India and was soon expected to arrive in this country accompanied by large forces. Nana Fadnavis would therefore certainly wait and join the side which would have a definite superiority. He therefore scrupulously tried to conceal from Montigny the fact that the treaty had already been signed between the Marathas and the English by Mahadji Shinde, for, he knew its consequence. Montigny would have immediately asked to be relieved of his post as French Resident to the Maratha Court, and Nana wanted to avoid this situation. He was really sincere when he repeatedly assured the Frenchman that he was resolved to take his revenge upon the English who had thrice broken their word given to him and who, in his opinion, would not fail to do so again in future if a suitable opportunity presented itself. Nana's intention was therefore definitely not to deceive Montigny in hiding from him the fact of the treaty, as he had nothing to gain from it. On the other hand, he would lose for ever the chance of achieving his plan to punish the English in cooperation with the French if Montigny had withdrawn

from the Poona Darbar. Bussy was therefore obviously wrong in complaining to the French Minister that Montigny had allowed himself to be deceived by the Maratha Regent on this occasion.

The delay in the arrival of French troops to India under the command of Bussy made Montigny's position very embarrassing. The Poona Darbar, pressed as they were by the English and the Maratha chieftains to ratify the treaty, was growing impatient. Fortunately, a letter from Suffren, which arrived at this time, helped a little to restore the confidence of Nana Fadnavis. In the interview which he gave to Montigny on December 6, he expressed his willingness to wait a little longer. Thus, the presence of Montigny at Poona had served its purpose of delaying first the signing and next the ratification of the treaty between the Marathas

Haider Ali died on December 7, 1782, and the French assistance, which the Marathas had been soliciting since 1775, had not come even till February 1783. The Maratha Minister was therefore left with no other alternative but to ratify the Treaty of Salbai, which he did on the 24th of that month. But for the reasons stated already, he concealed from Montigny even the news of the ratification of that treaty.

At last, Bussy arrived at Porto-Novo on March 16, 1783. After taking stock of the situation, he turned his attention to establishing personal contacts with the Indian princes. On March 28, he dispatched a long letter to Nana Fadnavis. After expressing his great joy at this opportunity to renew his old connections with the family of Balajirao, Bussy proceeded to repeat the intentions of the King of France in sending the expedition to India, viz., the expulsion of the English from India and the restoration of the territories conquered by them to the legitimate rulers. The success of the enterprise, Bussy observed, would naturally depend upon the close co-operation of the Maratha nation with the French forces that had recently arrived in India. With regard to the proposals made by the Poona Government to Montigny, he expressed a doubt whether all of them would be acceptable to his nation, as he had previously endeavoured to point out, but that very soon he proposed to take steps which would go a long way in cementing a durable and indissoluble friendship between the French nation and the Marathas. Bussy urged upon Nana Fadnavis to confide fully in Montigny who would regularly communicate to him all the various measures which the French would take from time to time in connection with the campaign against the common enemy. He expressed his regret that circumstances should have compelled him to abandon his plan of starting the operations in India by landing his forces on the Malabar Coast. However, he hoped to fulfil his engagement soon after the rains stopped. In the meantime, he suggested that the Marathas should utilise the interval for making preparations for a fight to the bitter end against the English.

At the same time, Bussy posted Montigny with detailed instructions regarding the line of conduct which he should adopt at the Maratha Court. He should point out to Nana Fadnavis all the advantages which his nation would derive from an alliance with the French. He should impress upon the Maratha Minister the urgency of making intensive preparations for a war with the English, which would be fought to their complete extermination from India. He should exert his utmost to persuade the Darbar to accept certain modifications in the articles of the treaty which they had proposed to the French. He should endeavour to dispel any suspicious which the Maratha ministers might harbour in their mind about French relations with Tipu Sultan. He should also impress upon Nana Fadnavis the difference between the French and the English characters, emphasising the contrast between the French spirit of moderation, their sincerity in their negotiations, their superiority in the strength of their forces, on land as well as on the sea, as against the ambitious nature of the English and their treachery. He should also convince the Regent of the certain destruction of the English power in India if only the Marathas allied themselves with the French. But what was of the utmost importance was that Montigny should employ every device at his disposal to gain time, until circumstances permitted him (Bussy) to move with his forces to the Maratha Coast to start combined operations against the English at Bombay. Montigny was also asked to make a proposal to the Poona Government for the formation of an alliance between the French, the Marathas and Nizam Ali, without, however, committing himself to anything.

On hearing a rumour that peace had been signed between the Marathas and the English, Montigny, in an interview with Nana Fadnavis on May 8, 1783, sought clarification on this point. He informed Nana that he had received letters from several quarters which announced the conclusion of a treaty between the Marathas and the English. If this news was true, his continuation at Poona had lost its purpose and he sought permission to retire. He was at a loss to understand why after waiting for 18 months, the Poona Government should have taken such a step at the very moment of Bussy's arrival in India, when the situation in the country was going to assume an entirely different aspect. Interrupting him, Nana expressed his surprise that Montigny should have allowed mere rumours to influence him to such an extent, in spite of his repeated assurances that he would not sign a treaty with the English without informing him. He referred to the recent capture of an English flotilla by a Maratha fleet, when several officers and soldiers were made prisoners. This convoy from Bombay was destined for Nagar, capital of Bednur district, which belonged to Tipu Sultan. Its seizure, while creating a happy diversion for Tipu, had caused great consternation at Bombay. This event, Nana argued, which had become public knowledge (and of which Montigny himself had heard), could not have taken place, if the Marathas had concluded a treaty with the English. However, he admitted that Mahadji had drawn up articles of a treaty to which the English had given much publicity. Then, in a very confidential tone, he added that he had pretended to give his assent to those proposals, which, he repeated, he had not signed, because of his anxiety to get possession of Raghoba. Once this object was achieved, he would not hesitate to break openly with the English, provided, of course, the French appeared in large numbers on the Maratha Coast. Finally, he declared that he had no confidence in the English who had successively deceived him on three occasions.

On June 18, Bussy wrote another letter to Nana Fadnavis to acquaint him with his proposed plan of action. After reducing Madras in conjunction with Tipu's forces, he intended to march upon Bombay by land, while Suffren would attack the place from the sea. Bussy assured the Maratha Minister that the places captured by the English from the Marathas would be restored to them. The arrival of the French forces in India, he added, had greatly upset the English who were now trying to create division among the Indian Princes and win their support on their side. Bussy urged upon Nana not to fall a victim to English tactics, but on the other hand, make intensive preparations so as to give the English of Bombay not a moment's respite. He expressed the hope that with the joint efforts of the Marathas and the French, the English flag would soon disappear from India.

Unfortunately, all Bussy's efforts to maintain an anti-English front in India came to nothing. In the month of July, the news of peace signed between France and England arrived in India and put a stop to all the hostilities between the two European nations in this country.

It is a great tragedy that the French failed to take advantage of the best and the last opportunity to destroy the power of the English in India. They took too long a time to come to a decision to send an expedition to this country. Even after the decision was made, they mismanaged the affair to such an extent that the troops were not even adequately equipped. No wonder that 1032 out of 1400 men entered the hospital when they arrived at the Isle of France. Bussy's illness added further to the delay. The timely arrival of the French troops in India, it might be said with confidence, would have materially affected the fortunes of the war.

Be that as it may, the presence of Montigny at Poona had served its purpose of delaying the signing of the peace between the Marathas and the English. It was no fault of his, if the French forces did not arrive in time to participate in the Maratha-English conflict.

We have already stated the reason why Nana Fadnavis had concealed the news of the signing of the treaty of Salbai by Mahadji Shinde on May 17, 1782, as also its ratification by himself on February 24, 1783, from Montigny. There appears to be another reason also why Nana was anxious to retain Montigny at Poona. He was afraid that the immediate consequence of the departure of the Frenchman from Poona would be the formation of an alliance between the French and the ruler of Mysore. The French had already landed their forces in India and established contact with that prince. The France-Mysore alliance would no doubt aim at the destruction of the English power in India, but

which, as Nana feared, would subsequently constitute a potential danger to the Maratha State. Therefore, although by one of the terms of the Treaty of Salbai, the Marathas had agreed to 'hold no intercourse of friendship with any other European nation', Nana was reluctant to break off relations with the French. Not only did he retain Montigny at Poona, but he also decided to post a Maratha Vakil, Gopalrao, with the French at Pondicherry.

After the conclusion of peace between France and England, both Bussy and Montigny made best efforts to impress upon the minds of the Indian Princes, especially the Marathas and Tipu Sultan, the great necessity to compose their differences and act in concert, to destroy the common enemy, the English, with the active assistance and support of the French. Unfortunately for the French, this fond dream of theirs was not to be realised. In a special interview with Montigny towards the end of December 1783, Nana Fadnavis, while concurring with the French laudable desire, pointed out the impracticability of uniting all the Indian Princes. He cited as an example the confederation formed in 1780 between the Marathas, Nizam Ali and Haider Ali. It was, first dissolved by the defection of Nizam Ali. So far as Haider Ali was concerned, he had scrupulously avoided the fulfilment of his engagements, in accordance with the terms of the alliance. Tipu was following his father's tactics. Any alliance between the ruler of Mysore and the Marathas was, therefore, unthinkable. In his opinion, the Marathas and Nizam Ali could alone unite to operate a general revolution in the country with the assistance of French troops. It appears that Nana Fadnavis had deliberately arranged this meeting with the French Resident in order to declare his subsequent attitude towards Tipu Sultan. He had very cleverly suggested to Montigny that the French could gain nothing from their connections with that prince and should drop them.

In the Memorial submitted by him to Marechal de Castries on March 3, 1784, Bussy opines that Montigny should have allowed Zain-ul-abedin Khan, entrusted with the Maratha proposals to Souillac, to continue his route and even supported his mission. But what would have been the outcome of this step? Souillac, who was in overall command of the operations till the arrival of Bussy at the Isle of France, was definitely in favour of Haider Ali and fully determined to send the French expedition to the Coromandel Coast. If Zain-ul had been allowed to proceed to the Isle of France, he would have noticed all these preparations and reported them to the Regency. The result would have been the immediate signing of the treaty between the Marathas and the English. Ajiid how were 1,500 French soldiers going to help Haider Ali to defend his two frontiers? Montigny, who was fully aware of the situation at the Isle of France, did the right thing in dissuading Zain-ul from proceeding to Mauritius, and his conduct in this respect has been fully vindicated by Souillac himself. There was also the greatest likelihood of the Marathas joining the English against Haider Ali, and with the Marathas in the opposite camp, what would be the chances of success for the Franco- Haider alliance against a confederation of the Marathas, Nizam Ali, Bhonsle of Nagpur and the English? It is very strange that an experienced man like Bussy should have overlooked this fact. On the other hand, he should have paid compliments to Montigny for having saved the situation for the French till February 24, 1783, the date on which the Treaty of Salbai was ratified by Nana Fadnavis.

Bussy is definitely showing signs of senility, for, he says that the Regency suspected, that the letter which Montigny delivered to it on behalf of the king was forged at Goa, and that, from that time, the French Resident lost all credit. Fortunately, the letter written by Castries to Nana Fadnavis is available (p. 15). It is shocking that such a high ranking officer should make such derogatory statement about one of his subordinates, for whom everyone, including the Minister, has nothing but praise.

Another shocking statement he makes is that out of the 24 articles proposed by the Marathas, not a single one was acceptable. Assuredly, Bussy has lost his balance.

We have included here correspondence from the Court of Delhi with Montigny, firstly because of the desire not to omit anything from the volume and secondly because it helps the scholar to realise the injustice of Bussy's cynical remarks about Montigny. In fact, it is the height of cynicism to say that (note on Montigny in the Memorial of March 3, 1784) Montigny never went beyond Agra

because of the bad roads and that he never met Najaf Khan. The roads, of course, must have been bad because of the rains when Montigny reached Agra in August 1778 but they were certainly not so after November, and the Frenchman was in the Emperor's camp till January 1779. As for Montigny's not meeting Najaf Khan, this Mughal General was then at Agra; and Montigny was introduced to him by M. Visage a Frenchman who was negotiating with Mughal nobleman on behalf of M. Bellecombe, then Governor General of Pondicherry. This correspondence makes it quite clear that not only had Montigny personally met all the Mughal noblemen mentioned, including the Emperor himself, but that they all had a great esteem for him, and that is because of his sincerity and candour.

VLNAYAK GAJANAN HATALKAR

REFLEXIONS OF BUSSY ON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN INDIA

[This document, published in the *Journal de Bussy*, by A. Martineau, is included here to enable the student of history to have a glimpse into the French thinking before sending an expedition to India.]

PERSONS who were entrusted with sufficiently important operations in India and who conducted them quite successfully, but whom discretion and diffidence in their own knowledge induced to keep silent, are extremely grieved to see that the majority of the memorials and projects which are presented to the Ministry concerning our establishments in Asia, are dictated by ignorance, cupidity or extreme need to seek an employment, it did not matter at what price. The advantages of a plan or expedition are presented without speaking of the disadvantages of which they are ignorant and which they hide purposely, for lack of sufficient knowledge of the real politics of the Indians, of their various interests, their manners, and their customs. They are almost always put on the same footing as ours and on this illusory basis, they construct a purely ideal system. They represent the advantage of an enterprise, they minimise its dangers and its expenses, and they thereby set out the glory of the Minister, his honour and that of the Nation. This fatal manner of thinking has become only too common.

The zeal which I always had for the King's service has not at all diminished; my Nation's honour is dear to me; but the personal glory of the Minister who is kind enough to consult me and my reputation are also immensely precious to me. I would be very sorry to compromise both in an enterprise the means of which did not offer, if not physically, at least morally, a fair success.

We must not have any illusion. The re-establishment of our affairs in India is very difficult, very expensive, and its success doubtful, if we hav'nt sufficient means. To represent this enterprise under a different aspects is to cheat the King and the Minister. It is not sufficient to know the situation of a country, to know that the domains of such and such princes are bound to the east, to the west, etc., by those of such and such others; it is a simple knowledge, purely geographical, which any ordinary traveller can acquire, and is the least essential to our operations. But what is more important to know, are the diverse interests of the princes of Asia, the intrigues of their Darbars or Councils, their secret dissensions, their inconstancy, their views, their projects which change ceaselessly, their ostentatious but equivocal promises, their continuous wars, their short-lived treaties, the interests which divide them or which unite them, the possibility or the impossibility of making them act together or separately; finally, to know those whom we have to give preference for sustained operations, distinguish those who can contribute to our successes by succours in men and money, those who by joining us with some ill-paid troops would become a drag on us for their salary, so that we cannot expect any real advantage from them. This is the knowledge which ought to guide the Minister, and that is what I am going to try to place before his eyes in a clear and precise manner.

It is true that the princes of Asia, the Emperor himself, impatiently bear the yoke of the English; they are waiting for an event which would break their chains and which would put them back in possession of their property and their authority; they will certainly make efforts to recover both; but it will only be when they see another European Nation with forces equal in number to that of their oppressors.

Since our misfortunes in India, the English have absolutely changed their conduct in their operations. They recognised that the system of keeping their possessions under the name of some Nawab would oblige them to be always at war with the Mughal (Emperor), his Subhedars or Viceroys, that the competitors would multiply and that as a result of the process of acquiring and spending, they would be unable to preserve anything. They followed the plan which I had myself proposed in 1751; they first of all demanded and obtained from the Court of Delhi the Diwany for Bengal or an annual fee. From that time all the competitors disappeared because the Court of Delhi ceased to give parvanas.

Their successes in this part, the death of Shuja-ud-daulah and the advantageous agreements which they have made with the son of this Nawab have considerably augmented their power. These

events give sufficient grounds to fear that, in addition to a considerable increase of domains and wealth which they have acquired by these fresh successes, pushing their conquests as far as Delhi itself, they might reduce the Emperor, who is nothing but a phantom of a sovereign, to the point to which they have reduced Muhamad Ali, and that they might do in the north of Hindustan, under the name of the Mughal (Emperor) what they are doing in the south under the name of the Nawab of Arcot. This eventuality would necessarily bring about either our complete expulsion from India or reduce us to a state so object that the King's dignity would be offended by it, and that he could only allow his subjects to endure so much humiliation in this country, to continue a trade which they would indeed carry on only at the sweet pleasure of our rivals.

The treaty which the English concluded some years ago with Nizam Ali, Subhedar of the Deccan (the only Mughal prince from whom we could have expected sustained operations if he had not fallen into an almost total impotence to act, for want of men and money), renders their position in the province of Arcot still more advantageous than it was before. This prince was forced to accept the offers, which the English had been making him since a long time, to furnish him in case of need, a corps of troops in return for the cession of the four provinces which we possessed previously on the Orissa Coast. The English have secured possession of these provinces and yet have not so far furnished any troops to Nizam Ali.

This Subhedar, absolutely lacking everything, too much occupied and too often retained in the Deccan by the Marathas, by the intrigues of his own Darbar or Council, and by those of his brother Bassalat Jang, cannot be of great help to us. It is because of a token of consideration for the name of Nizam-ul-Mulk, it is because of an old national precedent in favour of the Emperor of Delhi whom the Marathas recognise as their sovereign, although they have often taken up arms against him, that they have not yet completely destroyed this Mughal power in the Deccan. Their own interest and the well-founded fear of interminable divisions and quarrels between themselves still restrain them on this point; their only politics being to continuously lower the Mughal power, not annihilate it. The result is that the Europeans will always be sought by the two parties, and will draw from it an advantage whenever they can cleverly do so. Such is today the position of the Viceroy or the Subhedar of the Deccan, whom it would not be impossible to put in our interests if we were in a position to advance him some money and to assure him the reunion of the province of Arcot with the domains of the Deccan of which it had always formed part. But could we make him these advances?

Bassalat Jang, for whom I formerly obtained in Jahagir or apanage the domains of Adoni or Raichur, depending on the Deccan and situated to the south of the Krishna, always appears to be in our interests. He has kept with him with the Nation's flag a corps of three to four hundred Europeans which has been serving him since the (last) peace. He has been soliciting the succours of the Nation, but in spite of his offers and his promises, he is in such a dearth of money that he is still more than Nizam Ali, his brother, in need of our succour of this kind instead of procuring it for us. This is the truth, in spite of the assertion of the author of one of the memorials which have been communicated to me and which claims that the resources of these two provinces in men and money are inexhaustible. His plans are to maintain himself in his mediocre possessions against the Marathas and against his own brother whom he dreads. The offer he is making of the circar of Condavir is only in view of a very small interest which is purely selfish.

This small district which has always formed part of the Deccan, and not of Adoni, situated on the southern bank of the Krishna, very near Machhalipatam, to the north-east of the actual possessions of Bassalat Jang, formerly belonged to the French Nation for which I had obtained its cession. The distance which separates it from the domains of this Nawab is nearly 600 kms, and it is occupied by a party of Pathans of whom we shall speak hereafter, and by several Rajas or Palegars.

The cession, which this Nawab would make to us of this Circar for the maintenance of the troops which he demands from us, would be more onerous to us than useful, because of its position which adjoins the English of Machhalipatam, masters of the whole Orissa Coast, as well as because of its great distance from Adoni where our troops would reside, and still more because of the multiple

dangers and the expenses which would necessarily be occasioned for the protection and the collection of revenues which could only be done with arms in hand, and for keeping ourselves continuously on the defensive against the incursions and depredations of the intermediary zamindars.

In spite of this exposition, we must not not only reject the offer made to us by this Nawab, but on the contrary, we must cultivate the friendship of this prince, sustain the hopes he founds on our succour, give him all those which could maintain him in his post, in short, consider him as an ally from whom we can at least obtain bazzars, camels, cart-bullocks, etc. But we must not give such small succour to several princes at the same time. Bound in friendship today, they can be enemies tomorrow. We would thus, expose these different corps to fight against one another; we would incite and nourish the natural mistrust of these princes, even render the Nation suspicious in their eyes; finally we would lose the King's subjects fruitlessly, for, we cannot nor should found any hopes on the national troupes which these Asiatics, whether Muslim or Maratha, have in their pay. Their union with the army corps, instead of being useful, would be infinitely harmful for numerous reasons of which the least would be that it would introduce indiscipline and desertion. The Governments of Asia are subject to such sudden revolutions that Bassalat Jang, who has been longing for a long time to be recognised as Nawab of Arcot, could be in a position to help us effectively when he is assured of prevailing, through our medium, over Nizam Ali and the contral Marathas not to attack his domains during the course of any expedition. Bassalat Jang keeps with him Mir Mogal, his younger brother from among the children of Nizam-ul-Mulk, fearing that Nizam Ali might seize him. These two brothers are perhaps, among the Mughals, the only neighbours of the Coromandel Coast whom we can hope to induce to join us, even in conjunction with the Marathas. This plan of negotiations, as well as of all others, ought as much to contribute to our success as the force of arms, and will essentially depend on the skill and knowledge of the person who will be entrusted with the expedition.

The Pathans, of whom I have promised to speak, are established at Cuddapah, Savnur-Bankapur, and Kurnool, to the south of the Krishna, between Hyderabad and the Carnatic. These are the colonies of the Nation of the same name which inhabit the North of Delhi. I had a long series of connections and negotiations with the chiefs of these Colonies. These are certainly the best troops in India, but they are not so numerous and lack money, because Nizam Ali and the Marathas of Poona often lay them under contribution. We could obtain from this Nation a few thousand cavalry by paying them; they are worth a host of others.

Haider Ali Khan could have become our principal resource because of his riches and the position of his domains if we could rely on this Mahomedan who more than all the others loves money and thinks only of his interests to which he sacrifices everything. He has formed to the West and South of the Carnatic, and in the Kadattanad territory on the Malabar Coast, a sufficiently large kingdom. This man of fortune forms only a precarious power which can be destroyed at any moment. In spite of that and besides, the little confidence he deserves, it is important to placate him. As it will be dangerous to have him against us, and as he wants to aggrandise himself in the North of the kingdom of Travancore, it is advisable to give him hope to support his designs in this respect, as well as to help him against his enemies who are in great number, —the Marathas will destroy him sooner or later to avenge the King of Mysore, prince of their caste or tribe, whom he has deprived of his kingdom and life—and to assure him the tranquil possession of his conquests in return for succour of men and money which he would give us. This negotiation must be initiated and followed in advance by the Governor of Pondicherry and the Commandant of Mahé which most closely adjoin the domains of Haider Ali Khan.

With respect to Muhammad Ali Khan, to whom the English furnish an agreed sum for his expense and his entertainment, and in whose name they govern the whole Carnatic, it would not perhaps be impossible to detach him secretly from his masters, without, however, hoping to induce him to act for us openly. He feels the harshness of the yoke which the English have imposed upon him. In fact, he is held in such slavery that he cannot have a single servant in his service without the consent of the English. He and his family are at Madras as hostages. The bait to be offered to Muhammad Ali Khan ought to be likewise the hope to give him the full and entire sovereignty of the

province of Arcot and to assure its succession to his son. But this overture should be made only on the arrival of our forces in India, whilst, on the contrary, we must begin from now onwards and without losing any time to send intelligent persons to initiate and follow these negotiations, and negotiate with the other Muslim princes of whom mention has been made above.

It must be observed that the different powers with which it is important to form an alliance, having all of them claims on the province of Arcot which can be procured only for one of them, it would neither be honest nor reasoned politics to promise to all of them the possession of the same object. It is therefore necessary to know the other grounds of ambition which the other competitors can have, for example, Bassalat Jang desires to expand towards Shira to the West and the South of Adoni; Nizam Ali Khan would like to recover the Orissa Coast which the English possess. It will therefore depend on the skill of the negotiator to reconcile the diverse interests without failing to execute his promises.

If it is possible to hope (which should perhaps be not so difficult as it appears) to re-establish confidence and friendship between Nizam Ali and his brother Bassalat Jang—their own interest demands their union—by appointing Bassalat Jang as Divan of his brother and granting jaghirs to Mir Mogal, these forces combined with ours, even if only to assure our provisions, would procure us a complete success in the North of the peninsula. When these princes get back the immense possessions of which the English have deprived them, Muhammad Ali Khan, Haider Ali Khan and the different Rajas would very amply compensate us for the expenses of our expedition. But these arrangements demand a deep knowledge of the Asiatic genius and politics, much skill and talent to inspire confidence and much time. In the present state of affairs, as no steps have been taken to achieve this end, the Maratha power alone can procure us success, as I propose to make it clear after giving a little idea of the Pallegars, Zamindars and the King of Tanjaour.

We have nothing to expect from the first in the province of Arcot, because they never come out of their territory. Their troops, fairly good in their mountains and their woods, are so bad on the plains that they embarrass more than they serve. Moreover, the crowd of these petty, idolatrous princes who are at the same time cultivators and warriors, ceaselessly pass from one party to the other in accordance with the momentary interest. What we could expect from them would only be provisions, and a refusal on their part to pay the tribute to the English if, however, they see us sufficiently in force to support them.

With regard to the King of Tanjaour it is known in that this prince was (some years back) driven from his Kingdom by the English, who, since, afraid of inviting the invasion of the Maratha power of whom the King of Tanjaour is not only an ally but of the same caste or tribe, have put him back in possession of his capital under a strong European garrison which holds this prince in a sort of slavery. This little indulgence, far from satisfying the Maratha nation, has only whetted its desire to avenge itself, a desire all the stronger because Tanjaour is one of the principal seats of heathendom and of their cult.

This is the faithful picture of the state of affairs in the south of the peninsula, according to which we can estimate the alliances, more or less useful and more or less certain, which we can form there with the Muslim princes.

As we have no base of operations, since Pondicherry is entirely divested of all the means necessary to put an army in the field, it is essential for the success of an expedition to be in a position to ally itself with a power which procure well furnished bazars or markets, and with which we can find all the resources of this kind, bullocks, horses, camels, etc. The Maratha nation is today preponderant in the whole Mughal Empire. As far back as 1753, I had predicted this preponderance as well as the decadence of the Mughals in the South of the peninsula, a fact which can be ascertained from my correspondence with M. Dupleix. At that time my advice was to prefer the alliance of the Marathas to that of the Muslims; it deserves our attention all the more as one of its principal chief is seeking our alliance [\[This is a reference to the proposals for a treaty of alliance with the French made by the Maratha Government in](#)

April 1775 to Colonel Repentigny, French commandant at Mahé, who passed them on to M. Law, Governor of Pondicherry. These proposals were personally carried by M. Belié, a French officer, who was proceeding on leave to France, to the Court of Versailles.] and as its own interests seem to fit in with ours. It is all the more important for us to attach the Marathas to us, as, if they were against us, it would be difficult to procure all the things essentially necessary to the success of our operations.

As regards a commercial treaty with this nation [This is a reference to the Commercial Treaty in Four Articles submitted by M. de St. Lubin to the Maratha Government in June 1777 on behalf of the King of France.], it is a pure chimera. Without entering into any other detail, I confine myself to observe that the Marathas are mainly a martial race and cultivators.

The Marathas have a King who has his residence at Satara in the mountains, to the West of Aurangabad. [Satara is not to the west of Aurangabad, but about 300 km to the south-west of that place.] This sovereign,.....does not participate in any manner in the government.

The principal chiefs of this Nation, who have formed private domains for themselves, have also divided the Empire to collect from it every year the Chauthai or the right to levy one-fourth of the revenues in the whole of Hindustan, which has been granted to them by Aurangzeb [The right to collect the chauth of all the six Mughal Subhas of the south was not granted to the Marathas by Aurangzeb but by his descendant Muhammad Shah in 1720.], after thirty years of war. Five other chiefs of the same nation possess in the Deccan apanages in the capacity of jahagirdars of the Empire. They are on this score obliged to serve the Emperor in the armies of the Subhedar of the Deccan against their own nation. They still fulfil today this engagement faithfully and form the principal force of the armies of this Subhedar, especially since he is in a state of oppression. That is also perhaps the principal reason which prevents the entire destruction of the Mughals in this part. The five chiefs who are in some sort separated from all common stream of the Marathas are Sultanjirao, Janojirao, Khandathe Gopalsing [Gopalsing Kandharkar.] and the Raja of Balgay [Does Bussy mean Raja Ramchandra Jadhav?].

The general interest of the Marathas and specially that of the chief who resides at Poona is firstly to restore the King of Tanjoaur to his kingdom for the reasons mentioned above, to protect this prince from the yoke of the English and to recover the right of Chauthai from the Carnatic, the Orissa Coast and generally from all the possessions of the English in India. Our interests, thus, appear to fit in perfectly with theirs on this point, and by assuring them what they desire in this respect, we have reason to hope that they will effectively support us in our operations, if they see us in force and if the (French) Chief knows sufficiently well how to seize the spirit of these nations and to conform to their usages to inspire complete confidence in them.

We call Central Marathas those who inhabit Poona and adjoin the Malabar Coast. It is with them that we must initiate and follow a negotiation, reply to letters which we have received from them—it is essential to know the difference in style which we must employ while writing to the different Asiatic powers. This observation is of the greater consequence than it appears,—send presents and announce to them the impending arrival of a powerful succour, and promise them to restore to them their right of Chauthai on all the conquests that will be made. This is the means to bind their interests with ours so as to safeguard ourselves against their usual fickleness. They could be offered other advantages to which circumstances will certainly give rise and which a clever (French) Chief will know how to seize opportunely.

Either to procure us a base of operations, as Pondicherry cannot supply it to us, or it would perhaps even be more advantageous if we commence the operations on the Malabar Coast, by landing in the neighbourhood of Bombay within reach of being promptly joined by the Marathas of this part. Of course, we would have taken at Mahé the precaution to collect the number of pirogues and boats in use on this coast, and necessary for the landing, and made all the other preparations not less indispensable. We might seize Bombay from the English, even before the union with the Marathas. This success, which would be achieved only by a surprise attack, would bring all the powers to our side, would give us, as I have said it, an excellent base of operations for our troops and for our fleet.

Some years back the English have dug there basins where their bigger ships enter and are repaired, which dispenses them from going, as they formerly used to do, to spend the monsoon in the bay of Trincomalee in the Island of Ceylon. The army would set out with the Marathas as allies for the Coromandel Coast while collecting several small chiefs, Muslim or Maratha, and especially Bassalat Jang on the way, which would form a formidable army with which we would march on Madras, where, for combined operations, our fleet, in its turn, would simultaneously arrive. When this town is thus invested on all sides, we could in all likelihood set our hopes on its conquest; even supposing that on the report of our march, the English captured Pondicherry which, in fact, has no defenses, either they would abandon it, or a small detachment could as easily retake it as they would have captured it. Moreover, the circumstances and the state of affairs will decide the place where we should begin the operations and the measures which we should take to assure their success.

The Marathas of Cuttack, who adjoin Bengal in the North of the Orissa Coast and who possess to the west the province of Berar of which the capital is Nagpur, could be of the greatest utility in this part. They have the ground, common to all the powers of Hindustan, to shake off the yoke of the English who slowly invade everything.

Three brothers are disputing the control of this territory. It is very important to promptly negotiate with them, either to facilitate their agreement (which will put all the three in our interest), or to turn the scale in favour of him who would appear to have the superiority, which would definitely attach him to us.

This alliance would become extremely useful to us in case France accepted the offer which the Emperor of Delhi is making to her of the establishment of Tatta situated to the North of the Gulf of Cambay (and not in the middle of the Persian Gulf as the author of the memorial says,) from where it would be easy for us (if, however, the road is passable) to combine with the forces of the Emperor, and in conjunction with him, drive back the English and put ourselves between our joint forces and those of the Marathas of whom we have just spoken.

But it is important to communicate to the Minister the difficulties which appear to oppose the execution of the latter project, and of which the person himself, who has proposed it, drops a hint.

The Emperor offers us an establishment of which he is not completely the master.

By transferring the proprietorship of this establishment, he is only (says the memorial) subrogating his rights to us without undertaking to handover its immediate possession to us. This Monarch is today not absolute master of this part of his empire for which the King of Kandahar and the nation of the Sikhs are contending with him, etc.

Thus, it is clear that it is a territory to be conquered and that we must for a long time employ for this operation the forces which we would send there. We shall be obliged to pay for our troops from our own funds, because we cannot collect anything from this concession until we have succeeded in vanquishing the competitors; this operation would require heavy expenses and would consume lot of time.

Out of the 3,000 men which are proposed to be sent to establish ourselves at Tatta, we must place one third of them at the disposal of the Emperor who would join to them 4,000 sipahees, undoubtedly at our expense. Could one thousand Europeans and a few thousand sipahees united with the Emperor reasonably assure the successes and advantages over the English which ought to be the object of the proposed expedition and of operating a revolution capable of repairing our disasters in India? Certainly not. It therefore appears to us preferable, if the Minister wishes and can spare men and money, to unite with powers which can effectively and promptly contribute to the execution of a project whose success ought to be nearer at hand and would amply compensate us for the expenses incurred.

We could still make some observations on the advantages relating to commerce which are supposed to result from the concession of Tatta; this is a point foreign to this memorial.

We, therefore, confine ourselves to say in general that the position of this territory could facilitate the union of our forces with those of the Emperor, but that there could also be grounds to fear that after the union, it would serve first and perhaps solely to establish ourselves in the domains, which the Pathans and the Rajputs and others have seized from him, in the illusive hope that he would act for us against the English in Bengal when his affairs are terminated elsewhere. I know the Court of Delhi. I was invested with the title of Amir of the Empire and the general command of the whole Mughal cavalry in the Deccan. I have made war and peace; I have negotiated with all the powers. I have studied their politics and I know how to appraise their offers.

Whatever it be, the Minister (by bestowing on those, who have presented this project and whose private views can be easily penetrated, only such degree of confidence as their person deserves), ought nevertheless hasten to reply favourably to them, charge them to assure the Emperor of Delhi of the intention of the Emperor of the French to unite with him for expelling their common enemies, to give him an early hope of a powerful succour and persuade him to make the necessary preparations for this purpose (Note : the majority of the French who are scattered in India under the pretext of negotiating with the native powers are more capable of harming and not contributing to the success of our operations because of infinite reasons which it would be too long and little advisable to explain here : Some of these negotiators are corrupt and known for acts which ought to render them very suspect and unworthy of the least confidence. Besides, the true and only manner of negotiating in this country is to employ native agents known under the name of Waquils.)

The commandant who will be entrusted with the expedition (if it takes place) will follow this negotiation, and according to the more perfect information on the spot and the circumstances, he will negotiate with the Emperor for this concession if it appears advantageous, either for commerce during peace or for facilitating our operations of war.

It follows from what has just been submitted to the Minister that the negotiations must contribute to the success of our operations, that the means in men and money, in munitions of all kinds, must be in conformity with the importance of the expedition, and must be sent successively to the Isle of France where ought to be established the depot of all and sundry things generally (See my first memorial).

It is essential that we must act alone in the first moments, in view of the distance and the dilatoriness of the allies whom we can have; this will promptly and completely decide them in our favour.

The more we have been humiliated in this part of the world, the more it is indispensable, if we decide to reappear there with the intention of re-establishing ourselves, that we should be in such a position that our alliance is sought instead of our seeking any succours, that we protect instead of being protected, and that in the latter case, we shall be surely despised by the powers which regulate their conduct, their confidence and their esteem by what they have to fear or to hope. It would be better not to attempt anything than to do it by halves.

As we must have in India troops known as sipahees who are local men, it is absolutely necessary for our early operations to give an order to the Governor of Pondicherry and to the Commandant of Mahé to take precautions in this respect (this can be done under the pretext of strengthening our establishments), as also to make provisions of nesly, fodder, mantecca [\[Cooking fat?\]](#), arrack, a drink necessary for the soldier (this last article is obtained from Batavia and from Goa.).

I have now to reply to the question whether the proposed expedition would occasion a war. But an individual cannot, without an inexcusable rashness, give a positive reply to it, for want of information which the, Ministers alone can procure and which is reserved for them. It is, thus solely to

obey and satisfy this demand that I hazard my conjectures which I am very far from considering as certain. I think that war would be unavoidable if the English had not on their hands the problem of America, but in spite of their present embarrassment, it may happen that at the news of our preparations, they might begin by seizing Pondicherry and our other places in India from us. It is for the Ministry to appraise the harm which war (in the present circumstances) could occasion to France. With regard to India, the loss of our establishments, divested as they are of all that could be necessary for our operations, is not of such a great consequence as it could appear, and it would be easy to find means to make up for it elsewhere. Nevertheless, it would be preferable, and even essential to do our best, to preserve Pondicherry for us, by sending there troops, successively and very promptly, to form a garrison of 1,500 to 2,000 Europeans and by levying 3,000 to 4,000 sipahees, to stop the enemy in case of attack and give us the time to arrive with all our forces. The main advantage, which would result from it, is to facilitate the landing on the Coromandel Coast without obstacles.

It is quite on the cards that the English, sufficiently occupied with the civil war, might not try to invite another one with France, and that leaving aside the despotic tone which they have assumed since our disasters, they might not oppose our establishment at Tatta, when it will be pointed out to them that in this action there is nothing more contrary to the conditions of the last treaty of peace relating to India than our idea to establish ourselves in the southern territories. This is very true, if they are satisfied with this reason, in fact, very good and very just, but which they would not condescend to listen to if they were not embarrassed. Before entering into a little known territory in which we could advance only with arms in hand against the powers which are contending with the Mughal (Emperor) for the possession of Tatta we must land at Pondicherry all the troops and all the munitions assembled in advance at the Isle of France which are said to be destined for the new establishment and which would really be meant against the English who can be attacked, according to me, with some likelihood of success only on the Coasts of Malabar and Coromandel. If the obstacles, unexpected or raised by the English, rendered the landing on either of the coasts impracticable or very difficult, we must decide to do it in the Ganges. At any rate, it would be necessary that the Commandant of Chandernagore should prepare the ground from a distance to favour this operation; he should find great facilities there, as the heavy weight of the yoke of the English has alienated the people from them in this region as well as in all the parts of India in which they exercise a tyrannical despotism. These early preparations would indeed appear to me indispensable if we wished first to confine ourselves to the establishment of Tatta, and negotiate it with the Emperor with a suitable dignity in the name of the King. The plan proposed by M. Madeo would derogate from it; especially this corps of Europeans and sipahees in the train of the Mughal Emperor would appear in Asia as the contingent of the King of France as jahgirdar of Tatta and would not procure for us any real advantage.

It would be useless to give here longer details, or wish to lay stress on a fixed plan. The scene is so mobile and so changing in Asia that the interests of the powers and the state of affairs in every respect vary from day to day. We must therefore regulate all the operations according to the circumstances.

I shall only add this reflexion : either the English will subdue their colonies of America or they will fail in this enterprise. In both the cases, they will very likely turn their attention on India and will send there superior forces to strengthen their position and to compensate either for the loss of their establishments in America or for the expenses which they will have incurred for subduing them. In that case, we have no hope of our ever being able to establish ourselves there.

If we are quite determined to make a revolution in India, this is the moment or never to act effectively or at least to occupy ourselves, seriously and without delay, with all the preparations to be made to act as soon as circumstances permit it.

C² 162, f. 126-127.

Project of a letter to be written in Persian language to Nana Fadnis, Prime Minister of Maratha Court.

The Marquis de Castries, Vazir of the Emperor of the French to Nana Fadnis, great warrior among the warriors, let the report of his exploits resound in the whole univers.

Colonel Montigny gave me an account of the favourable intentions which you have for the (French) nation.

Preserve them; a time will come when our common enemies will feel all the weight of the power of the Emperor, my august master.

You wrote some years back and sent presents to His Imperial Majesty and to M. de Sartine, then his Vazir. M. Beylie was entrusted by M. Law, Governor of Pondicherry, to carry the letters and presents which he faithfully delivered.

My very gracious master and M. de Sartine replied to you and sent presents immediately. But the ship, which carried them, perished on the coasts of Madagaskar in the month of July 1777 [\[It is difficult to believe this statement. These letters and presents could have been entrusted to M. de St. Lubin whom the French Minister had specially deputed to Poona to establish contact with the Maratha Government.\]](#).

The unjust war which the English nation has declared against us, prevented us from maintaining a close correspondence. That is what we shall do when the circumstances permit it.

I recommend Colonel Montigny to you. The Emperor, my master, will be pleased if you procure facilities to this officer to proceed to his destination.

Rest assured that this destination has a direct connection with the interests common between you and us.

The Emperor my master will never give orders which might displease his faithful friend the King of the Marathas.

What more can I say?

Let God favour all your enterprises and give you victory over your enemies.

Versailles, February 15, 1781.

C²163, f. 55-58v⁰.

Substance of the letter from the King of the Marathas to M. Le Vicomte de Souillac, dated February 1781, in his camp under Dapodi. Translated from the Persian.

Long back I wrote a letter to the Minister of France on the subject of the alliance which I desired to form with this Court. At that time, I communicated my proposals to him in all details and I was surprised not to receive any reply. But let us no more speak of what I then said and let us come to the present letter to which I request you to give a positive reply which I await most impatiently.

Twelve years ago I had received a letter from M. Chevalier [\[French chief at Chandernagore.\]](#) who announced to me the desire of the French to be allied with me. Zain-ul Abedin Khan, bearer of this letter, had also assured me about it.

M. Chevalier proposed to me to give him 15 lakhs of rupees to bring a French army with which he would subdue the Deccan, would deliver it to me and would return to Bengal where, after putting himself into possession of the old French establishments with our two combined armies, he would return to me these fifteen lakhs. He added that when this double operation takes place, he would write about it to the King of France and that he gave his word of honour that His Majesty would approve of it.

He also said that the English, who had received intimation of this negotiation, might make other proposals to me, but that I should be on my guard against them, that I should not listen to them and that they would deceive me, which Zain-ul Abedin Khan orally repeated to me.

I was all the more disposed to believe both as the English never kept their engagements which they had made either with my ancestors or with me. And that thrice I made war with them for having broken their word. They have pushed their perfidy even to breaking the treaties which they had ratified with the seal of the King and with that of their Company, and which Mr. Hastings, Governor of Calcutta, had himself confirmed through an envoy [\[Col. John Upton.\]](#) whom he had dispatched to me expressly for this purpose.

After being so often deceived by this perfidious nation, my most ardent desire is to expel them entirely from the whole of Hindustan.

I shall expel them with the forces of Nizam Ali, Haider Ali, combined with mine and those of Mudhoji Bhonsle; by this means we shall surround them on all sides.

When we have subdued these territories, we shall give you an advantageous share. That is why we must have a good General to recapture all the places which you have lost in India and which are now in the hands of the English.

In order to confirm the arrangements I propose to you, I shall affix the real seal of the Court of Poona. I have given this seal to Zain-ul Abedin Khan on the letters which I am sending you and he will assure you of my word of honour.

We continue to ask from you a good General for the execution of the projects which we propose to you; this General should carry out the arrangements which will be decided upon. You can count on everything that I say to you in this letter, as well as on what Zain-ul Abedin Khan will tell you. I shall abide by the decisions he will take with you.

As soon as you have given your consent to these arrangements, inform me about it at once. I shall be very exact in replying to your letters.

Instructions of the King of the Marathas to Zain-ul Abedin Khan, for which the Prince gives him power to negotiate with M. Le Vicomte de Souillac, to whom he deposes him, the articles mentioned hereinafter.

The King hereby swears that he will exactly carry out all the proposals which he will make.

Art. 1

Zain-ul Abedin Khan will promptly proceed to Goa from where he will go as quickly as possible to Mauritius to meet M. Le Souillac, and get from him his replies to the articles which follow.

Art. 2

He will demand on my behalf 2000 French soldiers, and not from other nation, without including the officers who will command them. For the 2000 soldiers I shall give Rs. 50,000 per month and shall separately make special arrangements for the salary of the officers.

Art. 3

When the ships, which will transport these 2000 soldiers, appear on my coasts, I shall immediately put the French in possession of one of my ports which I shall give them in proprietorship for all purposes.

Art. 4

My troops will never abandon the 2,000 men; it is to make war conjointly against the English that I demand them. We shall capture Bombay on which you will hoist your flag and of which the French will remain masters. The other English factories, of which we shall make the conquest, will belong to me but you can set up factories there. After recapturing the territories which belong to the Peshwa and which the English have usurped, you will return them to me. You will only have the right to set up factories there.

Art. 5

The discipline of your troops will be entirely in the hands of the General whom you will choose to command them, just as the discipline of mine will exclusively be the concern of their different chiefs, while reciprocally respecting the manners and customs of each other.

Art. 6

Besides the salary of your 2,000 men and of their officers, I shall separately pay for all the munitions of war which you will use in my service.

Art. 7

I shall commence to pay for your troops from the moment they land and shall give them in addition one and a half month's pay in order to buy the necessary provisions and articles for coming to join me.

Art. 8

When your troops join me and when I ask them to proceed to such and such other point to make war with the English, they will proceed there ungrudgingly.

Art. 9

My word is as sure as my writing. I likewise demand yours.

Art. 10

You will have no intercourse with any other Indian prince without my knowledge.

Art. 11

As soon as you give your consent to my proposals, inform me about it without any delay.

Art. 12

If M. de Souillac is satisfied with these proposals and if, nevertheless, he is not in a position to send me at this moment the number of troops which I demand from him and is obliged to write about it to the King of France, I request him to do so promptly and to inform me about it.

Art. 13

If M. de Souillac decides to send me these troops, let him immediately call to arms and send them to me without losing any time. I request him to take care to send me as their commander a great General who can, moreover, live on good terms with me.

When we have destroyed the English in this part, we shall next proceed to Bengal where we shall also subdue them and shall put ourselves in possession of this territory.

Copy of the instructions of M. le Vicomte de Suillac given to M. de Montigny. (1781) [The pages are not numbered.]

Isle of France, August 10, 1781.

Although M. de Montigny has left India only a short while ago, he will find that such a considerable change has taken place there that the political aspect, which then was the outcome of the respective position of the principal powers among themselves, of the interest which they were supposed show in our favour and of the means which they possessed to prevent the aggrandisement of the power of the English, this political aspect, I assert, must have been replaced by a new way of thinking.

In any case, our principal object is to acquire and possess securely in this part of the world establishments through which we can carry on our trade there in as advantageous a manner as possible.

Our state of rivalry with England, the possessions she has acquired in India, the preponderance which has been its consequence, had reduced us to the most precarious position when, anticipating the declaration of war, she unawares attacked our establishments which were left without any assistance. This epoch, which at first appeared to have dealt us the final blow, will perhaps bring about a revolution most favourable to our interests. It has already begun, and the only question is to promote it either by political manoeuvres or by actual forces.

Hardly had Pondicherry, Chandernagore and Mahé fallen in the hands of the English than a general agitation was noticed among the Indian princes. For a long time anxious about the progress and the dominating spirit of this power, they felt that, free from its rivals, they would soon be the victims of its ambition. Such was the state of affairs when M. de Montigny passed through India. He found Najaf Khan in arms in the upper Ganges and the Marathas still more indignant at the pretentiousness of the English in dictating to them a Chief. Several other princes are either in arms or ready to participate in the common cause, and pressing demand the assistance of the French.

At this time Haider Ali Khan had not yet made any movement. At war with the Marathas, his natural enemies, one could hardly expect the treaty which has been concluded between these two powers, or the project of the expedition on the Coromandel Coast which Haider has so fortunately undertaken.

In this state of affairs, it was natural to consider the Marathas and Najaf Khan as the two powers on whom we could most definitely rely, and from this point of view the Malabar Coast and Bengal were to be the points on which we had to fix our attention.

But the expedition of Haider Ali Khan, his successes, the strength of his troops, the advantageous proposals he is ceaselessly making to us, all that calls us to the Coromandel Coast. It is from there that ought to commence the real revolution which, by slow degrees, can lead to the exclusion of the English from India.

I have communicated to M. de Montigny, my plan and it is useless to repeat its details. If the circumstances do not interrupt it, I propose to dispatch, the largest possible number of troops to the Coromandel Coast in the month of January. After carrying out the landing, our squadron will assist the naval expeditions as best as possible, and especially try to fight and disperse the naval forces of the English. But as the latter have the greatest interest in strengthening their position on the Coromandel Coast, they must naturally employ all the means to placate the powers of which I have spoken above and they will do their level best to succeed in concluding treaties with them. It is

important to prevent the execution of these treaties and that is the principal object to which M. de Montigny must pay his attention.

The Marathas of Poona, to whose court he must proceed at first, was pressed by the English who, according to the latest news, had crossed the Ghats. Their object was to induce them to conclude a treaty with them (the English), and this plan was outlined by the Government of Calcutta. There is every possibility that they will abandon Raghoba and make all possible sacrifices. M. de Montigny, who knows the principal Maratha Chiefs, does not need to be indicated the means to impress upon them that every treaty with this ambitious nation would be a fictitious one, that this was the moment to deal it deadly blows and that if this opportunity was missed, they would never find it again. He will also give them to understand that it is more advantageous for them that the French should operate on the Coromandel Coast at this moment, that by dividing themselves into small detachments, they would split their forces, which might afterwards proceed to the Malabar Coast in a fair number.

If, on the arrival of M. de Montigny at Poona, no treaty is concluded with the English, I feel confident that he will succeed in maintaining the Marathas in these hostile dispositions against the English, perhaps persuade them to carry out an offensive by undertaking some expedition.

If the diversion undertaken by the Marathas on the Malabar Coast is helpful to us, that which Najafkhan will execute in the upper Ganges will be equally so. It is all the more important to operate at the court of this prince as, by the latest news that has arrived from India, there is some talk of a corps of 7000 men which the English are trying to dispatch from Bengal to the Coromandel Coast which gives reason to think that they are tranquil in this part and that Najaf Khan does not bother them. In this case, it would be very essential to promptly rally this prince. Perhaps, M. de Montigny would even be more useful at this early stage at his court than at the court of the Marathas. Everything depends upon their real situation, which is only a matter of conjectures and which could be cleared up at Goa. However, I think that it would be unfortunate and perhaps detrimental if he did not start with Poona where he could make only a short stay if circumstances called him elsewhere.

In any case, it will be of immense advantage if M. de Montigny could make arrangements to maintain a close correspondence with M. de Piveron. When he sends his dispatches to Goa either for the (French) Government or for me, he will inform M. de Beaubrun of the absolute necessity to send them promptly, because there might occur cases when, regardless of the expense, it would be necessary to dispatch an advice boat immediately.

These observations are according to me, sufficient to give M. de Montigny an idea of the scope within which his mission ought to adjust itself to our present designs and to the operations which are being prepared.

(Signed) LE VICOMTE DE SUILLAC.

Isle of France, October 13, 1781

My Lord,

I had the honour to inform you, in my letter of the 16th of the last month No. 193, of the dispatch of the corvette la Subtile to Goa commanded by M. de Salvert and on which sailed Messrs. de Montigny, de Piveron and de Beaubrun. M. de Salvert arrived yesterday, to my great surprise, after fulfilling his mission and making this voyage with incredible promptness.

M. Frederic de Souza, Governor of Goa, gave a very good reception to these gentlemen and among others to M. Beaubrun, entrusted with the duties of a Resident at Goa. He said that it was quite proper that we should have a Resident there to watch over our interests, as the English had theirs since a long time.

This Governor appears to have very friendly dispositions towards us and these favourable dispositions might be very helpful to us in the course of this war.

M. de Montigny found at Goa a Mughal by name Sayyad Yamoul Abedin Khan, dispatched by the Marathas, with orders to proceed to the Isle of France with a letter for His Majesty and one for me, and with instructions to negotiate. He rightly judged that this envoy would be an embarrassment and involve expenditure, and he dissuaded him from proceeding here. It was first of all agreed that this Mughal should deliver to M. de Salvert his packets, but afterwards as he was reluctant to part with the originals, M. de Montigny sent me a translation of the letter which was addressed to me and of his instructions. Both are from Nana Fadnavis, Chief of the Regency of the Marathas of Poona. I attach a copy of these documents with this letter. They will communicate to you, my Lord, the desire of the leaders of this power for assistance from us. But you will certainly think that it is not possible for us to comply with their request at present. M. de Montigny, who informed me on September 17, that he would shortly proceed to Poona, will impress upon them that it is more advantageous to attack the English on the Coromandel Coast and persuade them at the same time to make, in their turn, all the efforts to harass them. Moreover, the Marathas and Haider Ali Khan are very closely allied. They have their agents at each other's courts and that of the latter is urging Nana Fadnavis to create a diversion.

I am, however, grieved to see that the situation of the Marathas is critical. The English, allied with Raghoba whom they wish to place on the throne, have captured the whole of Gujarat and there was a strong report that they would march on Poona from which place they were hardly 18 Koss away.

This very warlike and very numerous nation is quite ignorant of field warfare and is very deficient in handling the artillery. M. de Montigny writes to me that if there were some men to spare for this part, they would have been very useful. I am sorry not to have foreseen that; I would have tried to procure some. If it is possible, I shall send him some subsequently.

Nizam Ali, Subhedar of the Deccan, has not joined the Confederation of Haider Ali Khan and the Marathas. He even received an English agent but he offered an explanation to Haider for it by saying that it was only out of politics and that he was far from trusting the English. He is a prince on whom we can hardly rely. He is entirely given up to pleasures, has no energy and is incapable of any decision.

Towards the end of July, the English army, commanded by Gen. Coote, had emerged from the post of Cuddalore. Haider Ali Khan, fearing a union of this corps with eight battalions which had marched from Tanjaour, had made a movement towards this region which gave Gen. Coote the opportunity to open for himself a passage to the north, a part which was defended only by 25 thousand

men. It is said that the Nawab lost 8,000 men and the English about a thousand. It appears that Mr. Coote will fall back upon Madras.

Haider Ali Khan did not pursue him. The main body of his army occupied the neighbourhood of Cuddalore where it was believed that he would make no movement until the arrival of the French.

The English of Madras awaited a reinforcement from Bengal. It would be desirable that Najaf Khan, Vazir and General of the Emperor, should harass them in this part. One of the objects of M. de Montigny's mission is to urge him to get on the move. He must have sent some one to meet this prince to whose court he could proceed from Poona.

My Lord, such is the present situation in India. There is no news of M. de Brue. In course of time, I shall have more exact details from the Coromandel Coast by the return of the corvette dispatched to Ceylon.

M. de Piveron had dispatched a messenger to Haider Ali Khan to ask for an escort and must have immediately set out to proceed to the court of this prince.

I am respectfully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

Le Vicomte de Souillac.

Isle of France, November 28, 1781.

To M. de Montigny,

I received, Sir, your letter from M. de Salvert whose corvette was very prompt, and I was happy to learn that you reached Goa safe and in good health.

It is very fortunate that you met the Mughal Zain-ul Abedin Khan, and prevented him from continuing his mission to this island. He would have been a great embarrassment and would have involved us into unnecessary expenses.

I attach herewith a letter for Nana Fadnavis in which I inform him that you have sent me, Sir, a precis of his letters and instructions, and I am trying to impress upon him that it is more advantageous at this moment to direct our forces to the Coromandel Coast in order to crush the English there and next move on the side of Bombay and unite ourselves with the Marathas. I am also speaking to him of the importance of maintaining the closest union between his nation, Haider Ali Khan and us. Nevertheless I am afraid that our dispatch to the Nawab might excite the jealousy of the Marathas, and my fears would have been much greater if you were not with them, Sir. If I had foreseen that a small number of men could have been of some help to handle their artillery, I would have dispatched some with you, but at this moment, that cannot be done.

Here is at last the moment when the plan of an expedition to India is being put into effect. In spite of the considerable damage to several ships of M. le Commandur de Suffren, to the small quantity of cordage and other nautical material brought from France by the convoy, and the inadequate means in general which a remote and small colony can procure, we have succeeded in putting the whole squadron in a state when it is ready to set sail. It is carrying my letter. I am delivering it to M. Duchemin who will utilize the quickest means to send it to you, Sir. I have requested this General to correspond punctually with you, and I have explained to him how you would be helpful to him at the courts of the different Indian princes, either to impress upon them that if we are operating at this moment only with Haider Ali Khan, it is for the greatest advantage of the common cause, or also to rouse them up to create a diversion. You, Sir, in your turn, can address to him demands which you would deem necessary and with which it will be possible for him to comply. At this early moment, he can hardly reduce his forces, but subsequently perhaps he will find more facilities.

News from Ceylon and which is a month old, leads us to believe that our troops will arrive at the appropriate time, and nothing will obstruct their landing on the Coromandel Coast. But if unexpected events supervene, and if Haider Ali Khan were no longer master of the coast and if it was impossible to effect a union with him, then we would think of proceeding to the Malabar Coast where, united with the Marathas, we would attempt an attack on Bombay. I have delivered to Messrs. Duchemin and Comte D'Orves a copy of the letter from the King of the Marathas and of the proposals which he has made to me. I have put beside the articles of this treaty notes which would serve to regulate what would have to be accepted, refused and changed.

In case Messrs. Duchemin and Comte D'Orves proposed to proceed to the Malabar Coast, they would not lose time in informing you about it, Sir, so that you should be ready with the preliminary arrangements to be made.

There is indication that fresh troops will be dispatched here from France, and I hope that they will be here in April and that I shall be able to send to M. Duchemin reinforcements in May. Then it could be possible to spare some men for the Marathas, especially to handle their artillery. You will kindly inform M. Duchemin, Sir, if you think that that might be of great use, and of the quantity that will be required.

I am grieved to find that Najaf Khan is lying idle and that the English have profited by it in order to deplete themselves in Bengal and send reinforcements to the Coromandel Coast. It is very desirable that you should be in a position to proceed to the camp of this General of the Emperor and that you should rouse him up a little.

The arrival of our land and naval forces must necessarily produce a great sensation among the Indian princes; but we must direct it in our favour and destroy the jealousy which our special connection with Haider Ali Khan may excite. That is your charge, Sir; it is not easy but it is in such good hands that I am as tranquil as I could be in this respect.

I am impatiently awaiting news from you, Sir. Take care of your health, and do justice to the very sincere attachment with which I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

(Signed) LE VICOMTE DE SOUILLAC

P.S.—I am delivering to M. Duchemin the two blank commissions which you had left with me, Sir, one for M. de Grand-Champ, officer in the Regiment of Austrasie, the other for M. Ritier, a Volunteer on Board Le Berillant. Both are proceeding to India, and according to your request to M. Duchemin, he could deliver these two commissions to these two persons or to others.

Copied at Poona, July 3, 1782.

C² 163, f. 66-71 and 111-113.

Extract of a letter from M. de Montigny to M. Le Vicomte de Souillac from Poona dated December 20, 1782 [A mistake for 1781.]

I had the honour to inform you by the return of La Subtile that the confederation between the preponderant powers of the Deccan had not materialised, I mean between Nizam Ali, the Marathas and Haider Ali Khan, but that it still exists between the last two powers and that it is the most exact truth, since the Regency of Poona confirmed it to me on November 5, at the time of my arrival at this court where I was received with all the external marks of good will. M. de Chauvigny will give you all the details of our reception.

This is, M. le Vicomte, the state of affairs when I arrived at Goa, at a time when it was indispensable to make our appearance at the courts of these princes, as it will be easy for you to see it by the subsequent details which I am communicating to you.

The English, afraid of having too many enemies on their hands, had wisely resolved to restore to the Marathas all the territory which they had seized from them with a view to concluding peace with them, and this offer, unparalleled on their part, had shaken the Regency in such a manner that I saw the moment when it was going to conclude a treaty of peace with our enemies, an event, which would have undoubtedly dealt the most fatal blow in this continent, because the English at the same time wanted that the Marathas should attack Haider Ali Khan, along with them, and this plan would have perhaps destroyed for ever all our hopes in this part of the world at least during the whole war.

On the other hand, Nizam Ali, frightened by the successes of Haider, his deadly enemy, was openly occupied, and is still secretly occupied, in placating the English to check the ambition of this Prince who, he knows, was sooner or later going to be supported by our forces. This step on our part absolutely banishes any kind of liaison with the Subhedar of the Deccan and consequently makes our liaison with the Court of Poona more necessary for us than ever.

From these considerations and according to your special instructions, this is, M. Le Vicomte, the plan of conduct which I thought it my duty to adopt with respect to the Marathas. I paid my particular attention to point out to them the advantage resulting from their alliance with Haider Ali Khan to favour the scheme of operation which you are meditating on India and that any peace with the English would only be fictitious. Finally, I tried to allay their fears on the preference we have given to Haider to commence our operations. That was the most delicate part of my mission, they repeatedly said to me : “But why did you not come to the Malabar Coast? It was the monsoon and Bombay would soon have been captured; there were at the time of your arrival only two or three small frigates which were cruising the coast and 800 Europeans, both in the fortress of Bombay and in the army of General Goddard, of which 300 Frenchmen, 200 Dutch and the rest English.” I must confess that these were very strong reasons. But I replied to them that you had preferred to await the union of M. Le Commandur de Suffren with M. D’Orves in order to operate more effectively and that your very resolute intention was to direct the mass of your forces to Haider’s camp and next appear in a respectable manner on the Malabar Coast, that the motive of this preference was to recover as quickly as possible the town of Pondicherry and carry succour to a colony which was always dear to us and that, moreover, the King would never abandon his subjects. They felt the soundness of these arguments and proposed to me that I should come to terms with them. I replied that I was not authorised to do so, but that I would undertake to communicate their proposals to you and even send them to Europe at the King’s expense if it was necessary.

In order to give more weight to my statement, I added that I had orders neither to demand nor to personally accept anything from the Regency until it had seen the results of what I was advancing. To prove to them our desire to operate on this coast, I have since even proposed to them to form a unit of 300 gunners for the service of their artillery. I also stated that I did not want salary either for me or for my officers between now and the arrival of the French squadron. These offers inspired lot of

confidence in them and gave me here all the necessary standing to harm our enemies and maintain the Marathas in their hostile dispositions against them. They have promised to give me 300 men for the artillery, 4 guns and a mortar to train them. I do not know if they will keep their word.

In short, I showed the greatest disinterestedness in all my proposals, and that is what opened their eyes, for, the letters with which I was entrusted, stated only in very vague terms the desire of uniting ourselves with them. Mere demonstrations will not suffice in the case of a nation which is afraid of falling under the yoke of an ambitious and tyrannical power.

The Marathas do realise that the English are trying to conclude a treaty of peace only because of the fear of the approach of our forces. They are equally convinced that they can hope to recover their territory only by the favour of a European nation or by negotiations with the English. That is what serves as a basis for them; and it is on that basis that we must start to drag them in our interests, and that is also what serves me as datum to deal with them.

I have probed their dispositions on several occasions concerning small succours which could be given to them. I offered them up to 200 to 300 men. I did more. As I knew that M. Deschiens was at Goa and that he could be blocked in this port because of the presence of the English squadron which was expected every day at Bombay, I proposed to offer them his services with all his men at a salary that would compensate him for such an expedition. They held several sessions on this subject and finally told me that the 500 men, which he could furnish, would not fulfil their object.

This is a warning: they will accept nothing before the arrival of the squadron, and they will make up their mind only when they see our ships appear in India. All that we could attempt between now and this epoch will lead to nothing. You see all the means I am employing to prevent this Court from allying itself with the English. I consider this as the principal object of my mission at this Court at the present juncture, for, we must not doubt for a moment that as soon as they have negotiated with them (the English), they will join them to crush Haider. I leave it to you to judge the result which such a treaty would produce. Thus, to sum up the situation: complete disinterestedness on my part and the offer of some immediate forces which could inspire confidence and prevent or at least suspend the treaty of peace which was about to be concluded between the English and the Marathas at the time of my arrival in India.

I was fortunate enough to fulfil this important object and be in a position to assure you on behalf of the Regency that this Court will come to terms with our enemies only in case Haider himself took this decision. But I would like to point out to you that the Marathas are in some way convinced that Haider will negotiate with the English if our squadron delays too long in making its appearance. This is what has induced me to dispatch M. de Chauvigny to you because the object (of his mission) appears to me of the greatest importance, for, if the present circumstances happened to change, we must not depend on anything except on a formidable squadron capable of achieving every thing by itself.

M. de Chauvigny is bearer of a letter which Nana Fadnavis has written to you on behalf of the Regency in reply to the one you had entrusted to me for being delivered to him. It expresses, like yours, only most sincere wishes of friendship that ought to exist between the two nations and the desire to form alliances.

The Regency awaits, as I had the honour to tell you, the arrival of the squadron to inform you about the terms of a treaty which it desires to conclude with the French nation. It expressed great pleasure when I decided to dispatch M. de Chauvigny to you and strongly recommended to him to narrate to you all what he saw and heard on this subject in the Darbar which he has always visited with me, and in case he is obliged to throw his packets into the sea, he would be in a position to convey to you all their details.

I venture to believe that I was able to probe the intentions of the Marathas from the questions which they put to me and from their replies to the demands which the circumstances authorized me to make to them. These are the fatal words : if the landing of our army takes place to co-operate with Haider, the Marathas will remain bound with a friendship for this prince; if, on the contrary, it does not appear, they will conclude peace with the English and attack Haider Ali Khan in concert. Nizam Ali, who has been for a long time wanting to humble this ambitious Prince, formerly his slave, will join the party, and he (Haider) will necessarily be the victim of these powers united with each other for his destruction. I shall not conceal from you that we must employ the greatest celerity to prevent the execution of this project which our enemies are zealously pursuing and for which they appear determined to spare nothing.

If the situation takes a favourable turn, I shall not forget to send you an intelligent and trustworthy man who can speak and write Persian, the only language in which political affairs are negotiated in India.

I cannot help, M. Le Vicomte, telling you that I was in the greatest embarrassment for funds. Immediately on my arrival here, I felt that the only means to establish confidence at this Court was to prove to them that I did not need any help from them, and that it was indispensable that myself, as well as the officers who accompany me, should appear at least in a decent manner. In addition, the presents which were necessary and on which I did not count, soon exhausted the funds which I had brought from the Isle of France and it would have been impossible for me to fulfil my object if I had not found resources with M. Warnet [Warnet was a supercargo on the French ship Le Sartine which had brought M. de St. Lubin to Chaul. He had been left behind by Couronnat, Captain of Le Sartine, to recover the money for the goods mortgaged in return for a loan of Rs. 300,000 from a Maratha Sahukar at Chaul.]. I was obliged to borrow Rs. 4,000 from M. de Beaubrun by writing to him the letter of which I attach herewith a copy. I shall not dilate more on this subject. You are aware of the customs and the antiquated notions of the courts of India and you will easily judge that with 8000 francs as salary which the King awards me and which amounts to only Rs. 266 per month, it is impossible, for me and my officers, not only to appear in a manner which the position I occupy requires but even to subsist. Besides, there might arise an occasion when it would be necessary to make a greater sacrifice in order to probe the secrets of the Darbar etc. I hope to receive your letters before this eventuality or, in the alternative, my credentials from the Minister should reach me; then all the obstacles will be ceased.

I have already spoken to you, M. le Vicomte, about the affairs of M. Warnet at this Court and the unjust reasons for which he had been detained there after the ruin of his shipping business. I found him more free on my return and more respected than he was before my departure, but he had not made any progress in the termination of his affairs which he solicits in vain. He serves me as an interpreter with Nana Fadnavis with great zeal and intelligence. I would very much wish that you should put in a word for him in your letters to the Regency and authorise me to support the reasonable and just demands of this merchant of whose misfortunes you are already aware.

The English squadron under the command of Admiral Hiousses [Admiral Hughes.] left the Coromandel Coast in August, some say, on an expedition to Ceylon, while others say to proceed to the Cape of Good Hope. Recently I was assured at the Darbar that it was cruising to the south of Ceylon. What is certain is that it has not yet arrived at Bombay, and that according to the usual sailing it ought to be there latest at the end of November.

The brigade which had marched to the Malabar Coast and which Shinde held in check to the north of Narmada, has come to an agreement with him and returned to Bengal after dearly buying its passage; the one, about which you know and which marched to the Coromandel Coast, passed and has joined General Coote.

I dispatched the officer of Sombre's camp to Delhi on December 11 (1781) with letters which would fulfil atleast a part of the project which is known to you. I did not think it advisable to go there myself at a time when it is of the greatest importance to remain at this Court to maintain the Marathas

in the hostile attitude against the English and cement, if it is possible, the union of this Court with Haider.

The Regency has recalled the Mughal who was bearer of letters from the Court of Poona for you, concerning the terms which it then wanted to negotiate. But the sacrifices which the English are prepared to make in favour of the Marathas and the dispatch of our forces to Haider Ali Khan have altered their early attitude and they will wait to communicate their latest resolutions till the arrival of our squadron in India.

I am waiting for the return of the harkaras which I sent to Delhi 40 days ago. The Emperor's army is now camped between Sirhind and Lahore, occupied in repulsing the Sikhs.

I have the honour to be etc.

(Signed) MONTIGNY

P. S.—Since the letter written to M. de Suillac, I have agreed with Nana Fadnavis about the signals of recognition which I have sent to the Isle of France by the corvette *La Subtile* so that all the Maratha ports should be open to our ships and to the dispatch boats which might be sent to the Malabar Coast.

Copy of the letter from M. le Vicomte de Souillac to M. Duchemin, Commander of the French army in India, from the Isle of France, dated January 18, 1782. [The pages are not numbered.]

M. Dorves, Sir, will forward to you these dispatches which I am sending him and which have been jointly addressed to us by the Minister. You will find that His Majesty has decided to dispatch large forces to India and to co-operate effectively with Haider Ali Khan to destroy our common enemies. But as these orders are to be executed only with succours of all kinds which must have left France in November, it will only be towards the months of August and September that they will reach India. And the intentions of His Majesty are that before this date we should not commit ourselves and that we should restrict ourselves to defending Ceylon and keeping the troops ready to take the field as soon as fresh orders arrive. If these instructions had been communicated to us before your departure, Sir, I would have been guided by them and I would have restricted myself to the dispatch of 1500 men for the defence of Ceylon alone. Therefore, since we have made different arrangements, we must take a mixed decision which, conforms, as much as possible, to the intentions of His Majesty and to what the circumstances require.

The Minister has been repeatedly insisting on the necessity to recall the squadron under the command of M. Dorves to the Isles in March or April, and as there is reason to presume that the English, in their turn, will dispatch large forces to India, it is certain that our squadron might find itself confronted by ships much larger in number. Whereas, united here with those which are announced, the whole fleet will leave in sufficient strength.

The Island of Ceylon is an important post which is essential to preserve carefully. But, on the other hand, it would neither be appropriate nor prudent to withdraw all our troops from the continent. The Nawab would take umbrage at it. Consequently, these are my instructions : You will remain, Sir, in the continent with the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment of the Isle of France, the Volunteers of Bourbon and the artillery with the exception of a detachment formed with the auxiliary Company.

M. le Comte D'Hoffelize will proceed to Ceylon with the Regiment of Austrasie, the Foreign Naval Volunteers and the auxiliary Company of artillery as Commander-in-chief of this corps of troops. I attach herewith instructions relating to this plan. You will kindly give, Sir, to M. le Comte D'Hoffelize those which concern him.

Your corps, Sir, will be so considerably reduced that it will be hardly possible to hazard any big operations, and in this respect you will conform to the intentions of His Majesty who wants that we should not commit ourselves before the date when all the forces, which he has decided to dispatch, arrive.

The Minister, by leaving me the choice of the officer who would command the corps of troops destined for Ceylon, excluded you, Sir, since you were necessary at the Isles. Consequently, I had at first thought that I should recall you here but I judged afterwards that there might result from it some disadvantage from the side of Haider Ali Khan. (In my opinion, it would be more advantageous if you remained with him, Sir.) And that before concluding a treaty with him you would naturally inspire in him more confidence than any one else. Besides, the cautious and delicate conduct to be followed until we receive His Majesty's fresh orders, demands all your talents and your prudence, and to recall you at this moment would amount to misinterpreting his intentions.

It will be certainly easy for you, Sir, to impress upon Haider Ali Khan how these new arrangements, which at first might annoy him, are none-the-less, advantageous to him, he will certainly be flattered with the assurance which His Majesty gives him *that he has fully resolved to co-operate with him to destroy the common enemy and to assure him as well as his descendants of the peaceful possession of his kingdom, whatever efforts any other power in India might make against him.*

I think, Sir, it will be necessary to put much display and importance in the audience which you will demand in order to declare the King's intentions to Haider Ali Khan. If M. Dorves can accompany you, I think he will do so, and that will add more weight to this declaration, about which I am informing the Nawab in a letter I am writing to him.

The Minister has sent instructions to communicate to the Poona Regency the efforts the King is making against the common enemy. I had already written to Nana Fadnavis on the occasion of the present expedition and I am addressing him a second letter.

I am sure that you have already started a correspondence with M. de Montigny; it is important to inform him about everything.

You have already seen, Sir, the King's Ordinance for the incorporation of the 3rd Legion of Foreign Naval Volunteers with the Regiment of Pondicherry as well as with the Auxiliary Company of Artillery. I received it after your departure with the order to implement it. But since circumstances have removed the two corps so far from each other, we must necessarily await their reunion to execute it. And while awaiting for M. Dagout who commands the Legion, it would be appropriate, I think, that M. de Mars should follow this corps to Ceylon.

I have also received an ordinance for some changes in the Regiment of the Isle of France of which M. de Chenneville is Colonel. I attach herewith these two ordinances.

You will kindly, Sir, give an order to M. de Chenneville to proceed here on the squadron to take command of his Regiment. I am writing to him on this subject. It is necessary that he should return here as early as possible, not only because of his Regiment, but also to have here an officer of high rank worthy of replacing you.

I have the honour to be sincerely, Sir, your very humble and very obedient servant,

(Signed) LE VICOMTE DE SOUILLAC

True copy :
Le Vicomte de Souillac.

Correspondence between M. de Montigny and M. Piveron de Morelat—28 December 1781—12 April 1782.

M. de Montigny to M. Piveron

Poona, December 28, 1781

I would have had the honour to write to you long ago, Sir, if I had something definite to communicate to you. But you are aware of the state of indecision of the Darbar and know how it takes a long time to be enlightened on the ultimate facts, especially with the Brahmins. Anyhow I can assure you that the Poona Regency will not negotiate with our rivals as long as Haider himself would take this decision, and that I came here just in time to prevent, or at least suspend the agreements which might have dealt the severest blow to our operations with Haider and which they were on the point of concluding.

The Marathas are convinced that if our squadron does not arrive, Haider will finally negotiate with English. You will realize how vital it is for the ultimate success of our affairs that our forces should arrive here and that they should arrive immediately without which we shall soon see the object of our hopes vanish.

You know the terms which the Court of Poona wanted to conclude with us, but the basic situation has changed. The English have offered to restore to them all the territory, and this offer, unparalleled on their part, has so greatly shaken them that I saw the moment when they were going to conclude a treaty of peace with them. I am doing my utmost to see that they do not come to any terms with our enemies, and am fortunate enough to have succeeded in it. The Regency has entrusted M. de Chauvigny with a letter for M. de Souillac, and I am sending him to Mauritius to personally convey to him their primary intentions. To day he is at Goa.

The Regency has recalled the Mughal [\[Zain-ul-Abidin Khan.\]](#) to Poona. They have not yet received here the news of your arrival at Haider's Court. You had a very long route to cover to reach your destination, and it will be a great pleasure for me to learn that you have arrived there in good health.

I am expecting at any moment interesting news from you, Sir, who are at the source. Let me know how you stand with regard to Haider, and whether you feel optimistic about his attitude towards us.

Nothing could be more advantageous for us than the fact that the two most warlike nations of India should be united with the same interest against the common enemy. Our task, Sir, is to do our best to cement this union, and for our Government to send forces here, for nothing can be done without the arrival of our forces.

(Signed) MONTIGNY.

M. Piveron to M. de Montigny.

At the army of the Bahaddar, January, 26, 1782

Sir,

Yesterday morning the Nawab sent for me and himself delivered to me your letter of 29th December last. In order to satisfy his desire to know about the present attitude of the Court of Poona towards the English, I returned to the Darbar in the evening and communicated to him that part of your letter wherein you assure that the Regency is absolutely resolved not to negotiate with the English as long as the Prince himself would follow this decision.

Would to God the Regency persist in this decision, for, Haider Ali Khan is very far from entering into any arrangements with our enemies. “Write to M. de Montigny”, (he himself replied to me) “that he should not rely too much on the assurances the Regency gives him; that it is necessary for our common interests that he should often see Nana Fadnavis, that he should announce to him the impending arrival of our ships (we have at least received news of it), that he should not cease to dissuade him from listening to any proposal of peace, that to make sure of this essential point he should manage to obtain from him the dismissal of the English Waquil [[Capt. Watherstone.](#)] (for Haider Ali Khan knows that a new one has come from Bombay to reiterate the proposals of peace to the Regency), that finally he should visit the Darbar as often as possible to know what is daily taking place there on this subject, and that he should inform you about it as frequently as possible to enable you to communicate it to me”. He added to me that you should deliver your letters to his Waquil who would forward them to me immediately.

I arrived here, Sir, on 18th December, after suffering on my way from a sickness which lasted 25 days during which the Abbot Perrin was twice ready to administer me his benediction. But I arrived sufficiently in time. Everything is in a good state, and my only desire is to see that our squadron appears.

From letters which I received from Colombo, it must have left the Isle of France, at the latest, on November 15. I am expecting them any moment from M. le Vicomte de Souillac, I shall inform you about it as soon as I receive them. These letters came to me from M. Monneron whom the government of our Isles has sent to Colombo as Resident.

Sir, our correspondence is now established with the approval of the two courts to which we are dispatched. Rest assured that I am not going to miss any occasion to inform you of anything that you ought to know. Moreover, for the sake of our interests, let me know what you desire on this subject.

M. de Lallée is doing well; he is camped at a Koss from here. I am going to see him today and shall carry out your wishes with respect to him and his officers. I did not have the time to do it before sending you this reply, for, the Nawab asked me to send it this very evening.

M. de Puimorin died in December from a bullet which had hit him in the leg.

The Nawab is in a very good position *vis-a-vis* the English. I was indeed present during three encounters he had with them, in which his artillery destroyed many of their men. This Prince shows me all sorts of kindnesses. His good dispositions for the nation are not at all to be doubted. He only aspires after the arrival of the French to whom he refers every now and then.

(Signed) PIVERON DE MORLAT

f. 80-81

M. Piveron to M. de Montigny.

At the army of Bahaddar, February 1, 1782

Sir,

At last yesterday I received the packet from M. le Vicomte de Souillac which I was awaiting. I hasten to communicate to you the very words he has used in his letter with regard to the squadron.

“After the action of St. Jago, M. le Commandeur de Suffren reached the Cape of Good Hope with all his division and the convoy. He forestalled the English who did not dare attack this colony, defended by our troops and the squadron. You knew, Sir, before your departure that L’Annibal, one of the ships of M. de Suffren had lost her mast at St. Jago. This news was absolutely true, but that did not prevent her from following the squadron. Today, I do not see anything which can thwart the execution of my plans. Very far from that, I am much more assured of my means than at the time of your departure. The division of M. de Suffren, when it joins that of M D’Orves, will form a formidable squadron.”

“Sir, you can assure the Nawab that our forces will be superior to those of the English and that, if the season had not been so advanced, we would have immediately attacked them on the Coromandel Coast, but that we shall surely forestall them there in January. You must also inform him of the designs they had on the Cape of Good Hope, of the succours which we have given to this allied colony, of the disgraceful flight of Johnson who did not dare attack it”.

“The transport troops of the English do not exceed 1200 men, and they lost heavily in the action of St. Jago, with the result that the succour which they are bringing to India is very insignificant”.

The letter from M. le Vicomte de Souillac to the Nawab expresses itself in the same terms. Thus, Sir, you see that every hour, every moment we should expect to see our squadron appear on this coast. You can assure Nana Fadnavis of it when you bring pressure to bear upon him. The Nawab once again instructs me to persuade you on his behalf to leave no stone unturned to dissuade the Court of Poona from concluding any arrangement with the English and to keep me continuously posted with information on this subject to enable me to communicate it to him.

I suspend all reflection on the advantages which ought to result from the success of this important operation. You are too fully aware of them. Our enemies, when they are engaged in this part, will be much more quickly destroyed in it and next will soon be so everywhere.

(Signed) PIVERON DE MORLAT

M. de Montigny to M. Piveron.

Poona, January 25, 1782

Sir, I learnt about your arrival at Haider's camp from this Prince's Waquil who is Resident at Poona and from Nana Fadnavis himself. I also learnt that the fatigues of the long journey, which you had made, had stopped you on the way for reasons of health, and I was happy to learn afterwards that you were in good health and engaged with the preparations necessary for the reception of the squadron. Would to God, that you may soon announce this news! The English impose on all the Indian princes. I have a word from Delhi that two Waquils have just announced the very impending arrival of M. Anderson at the camp of Najaf Khan and the Emperor.

Nana Fadnavis sent for me on the 9th of this month to inform me about the arrival of an English agent from Bombay but assured me at the same time not to worry giving me his promise. This agent is here since ten days, camped at a koss from the city in front of the Maratha army. He will not come to Poona. Chowkies have been placed at intervals around his tent in order to prevent any one of these men from communicating with the interior.

Nana sent for me again day before yesterday to assure me once again that he will keep his word if our forces arrive and that his conduct will be wholly measured by that of Haider whose faithful ally he was. The frankness with which he spoke to me has augmented my confidence, and I can assure you that everything on the whole is well disposed here. The arrival of our forces at this moment would produce the greatest effect, and would greatly disturb the plan which our rivals ceaselessly propose to carry out.

The insidious proposals of the English agent do not seem to produce entirely the success which he expected. They are too well known here to inspire respect. It is simply the non-arrival of our forces which might lead the Marathas to come to terms with them.

I must warn you that they are proposing here to restore almost all the territory which they have captured from the Marathas, to conclude a solid peace and next march against Haider. You see the spirit of conquest side by side with the spirit of apparent moderation. On the other hand, I have no doubt they will tempt Haider also to conclude peace.

Nana Fadnavis is so far behaving all right and continues to solicit me to send M. de Chauvigny to the Isle of France. The latter, as I had the honour to inform you, is bearer of a letter from the Regency to M. de Souillac.

It is very important for the success of Haider and of our army that we are allied with the Court of Poona. I repeat very important. You must have seen, what I have several times said to you, that by allying ourselves with Haider, we were permanently alienating the Subhedar of the Deccan. Nizam Ali appears to be quite entirely on the side of the English. We have, indeed, Haider and the Court of Poona left for us. It is for us to leave no stone unturned to preserve them for us.

I have already written to you and communicated to you, in the past, the situation of this Court and what I had done to win it over to our side. All is well. But if we failed to keep our promise to it, we shall soon see the attitude favourable for us vanish, especially the Maratha Court to which we are not sending forces at the moment. The means which political propaganda can furnish would not suffice to prevent it from coming to terms with our enemies, and I shall be grieved to see a power so essential for our interests, become useless to the success of our operations, and perhaps even harmful. I stop.

I request you, Sir, to send me a prompt reply. The place you are occupying is so interesting for news which one is most anxious to receive. You must have already received the squadron or will receive it soon. In the meanwhile, I shall do my utmost here to upset the negotiations of the English agent. But I repeat it : every thing depends on the arrival of our squadron.

Nana Fadnavis has given me the permission to correspond with Haider's Court through the intermediary of this Prince's Waquil. Letters are delivered in 12 days from Poona to Haider's camp. It is a quicker way than that of Goa, and I shall always utilise it.

(Signed) MONTIGNY.

M. Piveron to M. de Montigny.

At the Camp of Bahaddar,
February 20, 1782.

I received your letter of 25th January on the 17th instant and on the same day I received different advices that our squadron had been sighted off Paliacotte. [Pulicat.] I wanted to have these advices confirmed before communicating them to you. You will find them in the two letters of which I attach herewith a copy.

Sir, here are thus, at long last our naval and land forces on this coast. I am leaving to-night with a strong escort of cavalry to meet the generals and then return to the Nawab's camp. The English army is divided into two corps, of which the larger composed of about 10,000 sipahees and 1,000 Europeans, is commanded by M. Coote and camped near Pondamale [Poonamallee.]. The Prince proceeded to a distance of 4 koss from Wandiwash so as to hold M. Coote in check and regulate his movements on his (Coote's), in case this General wanted to go and oppose the landing of our troops. The second division of the English army, commanded by M. BradWil, [Col. Braithwaite.] composed of six battalions of sipahees with about 300 Europeans, was posted towards the south bank of the Colroon river when Tipu Saheb, the Nawab's son, who had been sent against it to do what his father is doing *vis-a-vis* M. Coote, destroyed it killing a large part of this division, of which, moreover, he made 600 sipahees and 12 officers prisoners along with some European soldiers.

Six Dutch ships of war, two frigates and ten transport ships have reached Colombo. Their union will soon be made with our fleet, which, as you will see from the letter of the 17th, written to me from Pondicherry, had a severe action with the English squadron. I have still not received news of this interesting action. But judging by the superior number of our ships and the intrepidity of M. de Suffren, I think it cannot but be very advantageous to us. As soon as I get news about it, I shall communicate it to you.

There is a report of a dispatch of M. de Bellecombe to India at the head of 6000 landing troops with six warships and four French frigates and the same number of Dutch ships together with 12 transport ships. This news is recorded in the public papers.

But without speaking of any thing else except the actual situation in which we are on this coast : superior to the English on the sea, much stronger than they on land by our union with Haider Ali Khan, I have no doubt that the policy of the Indian Courts, to whom the English have proposed treaties, will suddenly change, and I am convinced that they will not be tempted to conclude an alliance with them.

On the other hand, in the brilliant situation in which Haider Ali Khan finds himself, master to day of almost all the Kingdom of the Carnatic and at the head of a formidable army in this territory in which we have come to destroy our enemies and establish ourselves advantageously, I do not see any Indian prince whose alliance could suit us better than that of this one. The only thing that we desire on this subject is to see the Court of Poona continue the war with the English.

Sir, your position at this court is very important. To succeed in dissuading it from concluding peace with our enemies, is to prevent a diversion which would be very injurious to us. To succeed in it you can advantageously make use of definite news which I am supplying you. But.....you know too well what is necessary to be done on this subject so that I can think of other things.

(Signed) PIVERON DE MORLAT

f. 82v⁰

Letter from Pondicherry to M. Piveron.

February 16, at 6 a.m.

It makes me wild, Sir, as I saw from 3 a.m. to 6 a.m. fifteen ships coming from the north, of which 3 small frigates, 2 snows, the pal of Bahaddar and 9 big transport ships. They all flew the white flag, except the pal which flew the gingham flag. We cannot doubt that these are our transport ships, as we saw on one, which came a little too near, a large number of men, a few in blue dress and the rest in white. We conjecture that the war ships and the big frigates are fighting the English squadron and that they will appear tomorrow. The fifteen we saw appeared at night to be wanting to keep up abreast of Pondicherry, but none of the fifteen even fired a shot under its true colours. No boat was aboard because of that. Some one wanted to send a pattamar who will return only at ten o'clock and who will surely confirm what I am telling you or not confirm anything.

Till tomorrow for better information. Entirely yours.

February 17, at 4-15 p.m.

It is quite certain, my dear Sir, that the fifteen ships which we saw yesterday are our transport ships. At the present moment, we do not see the war-ships, but we hear a continuous firing to the north-east, and we are certain from the report of the muleteer, who is aboard the Danish snow, that ours are on the look-out to the south-east, that M. de Suffren is fighting with M. Hughes, with 12 warships. Thirteen sailors, who are here, having jumped into the sea at high tide with a small pariah capture, confirm all that. We have 12 warships, including an English one of fifty guns captured at Nicobar, six frigates and eleven transport ships with about 4000 men; that is certain, very certain. We shall have them all here probably to-morrow.

M. D'Orves died eight days ago; they left the Isle on December 7. As soon as I see them; I shall go aboard. Our transport ships are a little to the south-east. We do not see them, but the muleteer sees them; it is certain.

f. 75v⁰-76v⁰.

M. de Montigny to M. Piveron.

Poona, February 24, 1782.

Sir, I received your letters of January 26 and February 1. I did not want to reply to them until I had partly fulfilled the great object of my resident-ship here. I have at last succeeded in it as much as the circumstances permitted it.

The assurance with which I announced the impending arrival of our squadron, combined with my repeated solicitations, finally obtained for me the promise from the Regency to dismiss the English Waquil immediately after the Holi festivities. Therefore, Sir, kindly assure the Nawab Haider Ali Khan on my behalf that I have the firm promise of Nana Fadnavis that he will dismiss the English Waquil at this date. If I presently receive the news of the arrival of our squadron, as you announce it to me, I imagine that he will have his leave before that date.

Sir, you can, therefore, assure the Nawab that I am continuously on my guard and that I seize every occasion to preserve for us allies whose full value I know since a long time. It is only because of that that I have resolved to remain here and suspend my earlier destination with a view to cementing this alliance so important for our interests. You must have seen from my zeal in establishing our reciprocal correspondence via the Darbars how I am possessed of this object which could be brought to a successful issue only by inspiring here the greatest confidence by the refusal of any salary whatsoever on the part of the Regency. It was the only way to fulfil the views of our government, and I have done it.

I was happy to learn about the arrival of M. Louis Monneron in Ceylon. But I do not conceal from you that what you relate to me from the letter of M. le Vicomte de Souillac is not clear. This letter is not dated; we cannot know whether M. de Suffren has joined M. D'Orves, or whether it is expected. There is no mention either of the time when this squadron would leave for India. Finally, Sir, all these questions were put to me by the Prince in the Darbar, and I could reply to them only by presumptions which prudence then dictated to me.

These people are very clever and very subtle, and I request you, when you communicate to me news to take this into consideration in order to enable me to reply to them in a satisfactory manner.

You inform me that you are expecting the squadron any moment. It is very important that it should appear, for, it is quite certain that the most favourable period will soon pass. M. Johnson, who left Bombay on January 25, will shortly join Admiral Hiousses. When this union takes place, it will considerably augment the difficulties of the landing. If there is still longer delay in the appearance (of the squadron), the Regency will deem itself authorized no longer to believe what I could tell it, and I cannot answer for the negotiations it might enter into, for, our enemies have here a powerful party which is every day increasing its strength through promises, gold and presents which they shower.

I consider myself lucky that with so scanty means I have so far been able to maintain Nana Fadnavis in an attitude favourable to us; this Prince is continuously pressed by the most influential chiefs and by the unconditional offer the English are making to restore all the territory which they have captured from them (the Marathas). I must also add to these pressing reasons that Nizam Ali and the Bhonsle are coming together for concluding treaties of peace which the arrival of our squadron can alone prevent.

I am touched by the death of M. de Puimorin. M. de Bellecombe and M. Chevrean often spoke to me about him with commendation.

When you write to me, I would request you, Sir, not to give me the rank of an ambassador. I have not the ridiculous vanity to appropriate a title which I do not possess. The grades which I hold from the King and the confidence with which the Minister honours me are quite sufficient for my self-esteem.

I forgot to tell you that I have just received a letter, dated February 10, from M. de Beaubrun, who announces to me the arrival of a Dutch ship at Goa under a Danish flag, which confirms the arrival of M. L. Monneron in Ceylon on November 4. I am very much surprised not to have received by this channel, as well as by yours, letters from M. le Vicomte de Souillac after an absence of more than six months.

(Signed) MONTIGNY.

Poona, March 17, 1782

M. de Montigny to M. Piveron

Sir, I received your letters of 16th, 17th and 20th February.

I have been in bed for the last four days due to a bout of gout which has caused such a lot of pain in the feet and in the right hand that I can neither write to you nor sign. I am requesting M. Warnet, who serves me as an interpreter at the Darbar, to do it for me and write under my dictation. I shall be very brief this time as I am suffering too much to enter into long details.

The news which you have communicated to me has given me great pleasure. I immediately conveyed it to the Darbar, while reminding Nana Fadnavis of the promise he had given me to dismiss the English Waquil after the festivities of Holi. I did not want to write to you before he had carried out his promise; he has punctually done so. Thus, Sir, you can assure the Nawab that the English Waquil has left for Bombay; this affair is over. I am now busy persuading the Regency to march against the English, but I doubt very much whether I shall succeed in it unless we send them forces.

Keep me informed, Sir, of the successes of our squadron and those of our army. That is quite necessary to add weight to my proceedings with the Darbar. The long time you have taken to write to me since your last letter makes me think that the landing has not yet taken place and that M. de Suffren hotly pursued Admiral Hiousses [A mistake for 1781.] before disembarking our troops. Now I think he must have returned and that you have the whole squadron on the Coromandel Coast.

I would like to know if the six warships, which you said had arrived in Ceylon, have joined our squadron.

I am waiting to hear the definite news of the landing of the General in order to give him an account of the situation of affairs here. I request you to assure him of my respect, and convey my very sincere compliments to Messrs le Marquis de Fleury, le Vicomte d'Houdelot, de Espinassy, de Chenneville, de Savournin, de Mars, in short, to all these gentlemen. If M. de Boistel is with you, kindly remember me to him.

I received a letter from M. L. Monneron from Colombo via Goa, by which he informs me that he has sent the duplicate of this letter along with yours through the channel of Haider. If you have received it, kindly send it to me.

(Signed) J. Warnet
FOR M. DE MONTIGNY

P. S. of 26th March.

Nana Fadnavis has just returned this letter after nine days, along with the packet of M. le Vicomte de Souillac and the letters of Messrs. Duchemin and de Suffren so that I should reply to them at the same time. But that is impossible for me today. The gout, which I thought I had in the hand, has developed into a big abscess which, after unbearable pains, opened this morning. I can hardly dictate these few words to M. Warnet. Please convey my respects to the Generals and assure them that I shall shortly reply to them.

I also profit by this delay to send you a letter from M. de Beaubrun which relates to provisions for the squadron. He has strongly recommended it (the letter) to me.

Poona, April 12, 1782

M. de Montigny to M. Piveron.

Sir, I am addressing you two letters, one for M. Duchemin and the other for M. le Commandur de Suffren. They are written in a very small hand and in a size suitable for being inserted in the envelope of letters of Haider's Waquil. It is a means I am readily utilizing to dispatch the duplicates of important letters which I shall henceforth send to the Generals, for, I have regretfully noticed the delays of the Sarkar in delivering to me your letters and in sending you mine. I would point out to you that this is done without the knowledge of the Sarkar and in concert with Nurmahomed Khan, the Nawab's Waquil. In view of this private arrangement, you will realise that it is essential that the Maratha Waquil at Haider's Court should not know about this step.

In the dispatch which I received from M. le Vicomte de Souillac, he has instructed me to correspond frequently with Messrs Duchemin and de Suffren in order to give them an account of the situation of this Court. The letters which I am sending them contain details on this subject. You can assure them that I shall be very exact in communicating these to them.

They are very anxious here not to receive any news from Haider's side since the last letters from this Prince. This silence leads to conjectures not so favourable on the situation of affairs on your side. All the time I tell the Prince that the Generals are occupied at this time with their plan of campaign and that he will soon receive satisfactory news. But the only way to reassure him is to often send him news. In my own mind, I am very anxious about the fate of le Maurepas and les Trois Amis carrying the artillery-men and Messrs d'Espinassy and de Froyes. I shall be very happy to hear about their reunion with M. Duchemin.

The English agent at Goa has spread the report in this place that our squadron was entirely destroyed and that a major portion of our warships and transport-ships were carried to Madras. I have received a letter from M. de Beaubrun of 3rd April in which he was greatly alarmed by this preposterous news. I have written to him so as to assure him on this point, putting this news on the lines of all those which the English choose to spread in the Darbars to impose upon the princes of the country. This is not the first arrant lie which they have spread since my arrival here.

(Signed) MONTIGNY

My Lord, Vicomte de Souillac, Governor-General of the Isles of France and Bourbon.

Poona, April 18, 1782

Dear Viscount,

I had the honour to write to you on 20th December through M. de Chauvigny, hoping that he would still find M. Deschiens at Goa waiting to proceed to the Isle of France. But on his arrival he learnt about the departure of this Captain who had set sail five days before. Having missed him, he remained in this port without being able to find another occasion to proceed to your presence and as the arrival of our squadron in India has changed my plans and those of the Regency so far as this voyage was concerned, we now consider it useless.

You will certainly hear with great pleasure, dear Viscount, about the arrival of the squadron on the coast. You could have never dispatched it more opportunely. It was indeed time to display our ships in India to destroy the influence of the English on the local princes who have begun to breathe. You will have the priviledge of having begun the revolution in India with means which our enemies believed to be insufficient to achieve this goal.

The Regency delivered to me your letter of November 28, which you had sent me by the squadron. I regret very much my inability to reply to it personally. I am so severely suffering for more than a month from an attack of gout in the right hand that I can hardly sign my name. M. Warnet, who serves me as an interpreter with the Regency, writes under my dictation.

I expected that the last Portuguese ship for Mauritius would not set sail before the commencement of the next month. But the letters from Goa which I received day before yesterday announce to me its departure on 25th of this month, which hardly gives me time to finish my dispatch and makes me take decision to send you my correspondence to lay my conduct before you and enable you to give me orders concerning the situation of affairs. I would have joined to it that of M. de Beaubrun if I had more time to myself.

I delivered to Nana Fadnavis your letter and since this moment I have been pressing him to give me a reply which he promises me any minute. But the Brahmins take such a long time to come to a decision that I fear that I shall not be in a position to send it to you on this occasion. If it is given to me by this evening, I shall include it in my packet.

You are quite right, dear Viscount, in thinking that the dispatch of our forces to the aid of Haider ought to excite the jealousy, not only of the Maratha Court but also that of Nizam Ali. These powers always consider this ambitious and bellicose prince as an old slave of the Subhedar of the Deccan, and in this respect the English ceaselessly represent to them what they have to fear from the elevation of this prince supported by our forces. Finally, our enemies are using every means to try to unite these two courts and fall along with them on our ally. That is the aim of the politics of the English, and that serves me as basis to thwart their projects the execution of which cannot fail to put perhaps an invincible obstacle in the way of the success of our operations.

It is because of these urgent considerations that I have decided to remain at the Court of the Marathas, so often shaken by the promises of the English, in order to be in a position to avert any kind of arrangement whatsoever with them. I am lucky enough to have succeeded in it. That is also the reason which induced me to avail myself of the sojourn of M. Aumont at Hyderabad to sound Nizam Ali on his secret intentions concerning us, and according to the reply he has conveyed to me, and which you will find in my letter to M. Duchemin, he appears decided to ally himself with our nation. The object which constantly occupies me is to unite, if it is possible, these three powers without whose alliance we cannot set up our hopes on a solid establishment in India. The intention of this prince being known to me, I have suspended all demarche on this subject until I have communicated it

to M. Duchemin who knows your political intentions and whose orders will determine my subsequent conduct.

Some time after my arrival, the Council of Bombay sent here an English Waquil with the greatest pomp and large presents to negotiate peace and restore to the Marathas all the territory which they had seized from them. My representations impressed upon Nana Fadnavis, how little he ought to rely on the faith of the oaths of a nation which had so often done something harmful to their position. Finally, after two months of solicitations, I obtained the dismissal of this Waquil.

Since this epoch, I have been busy in inducing the Regency to get ready for an expedition to the north of Bombay and in Gujarat. They have promised me to march at the end of the monsoon when our squadron appears on the coast, and place me at the head of 5000 infantry, accompanied by their general with 10,000 cavalry. I am impatiently waiting for them to carry out their promises, and when they decide upon it, I shall demand according to your wishes mentioned in your letter, some light succour from M. Duchemin. That will be the occasion to employ the officers whose commissions you have sent me.

At the present moment, the Regency is occupied in drawing up the articles concerning the agreements they wish to make with our nation. I must warn you, dear Viscount, that the offers of the English have partly changed the attitude of the Marathas which is known to you. They know all the advantage which they can derive from the rivalry of the two European powers which are seeking their alliance. From this position, we ought to expect that they will be more stiff while making their proposals. When they communicate them to me, I shall submit them to you and send them to the Generals in conformity with the orders you have given me. They will decide upon the best course to be followed.

I cannot help, dear Viscount, pointing out to you that it is impossible for me to stay at this court with such scanty means as I have at my disposal. My position here is most delicate. Without troops, without arms, without funds and without succours from the Regency; possessing only letters and promises to advance; three officers to maintain; harakaras, court expenses and those for espionage, and finally, a decent position to be maintained at this court; it is easy to see that it is impossible for me to maintain myself here with Rs. 266. I am compelled to spend about a thousand rupees per month, besides the horses, the palanquins and some furniture which I have been obliged to employ on my arrival here. At present I owe to M. Warnet Rs. 5,100 which he has advanced to me and Rs. 4,500 to M. de Beaubrun including the exchange at Goa which has cost me Rs. 400 and the journey and sojourn of M. de Chauvigny in this port which amount to more than Rs. 800; I have in hand only Rs. 2,300 which as you know, dear Viscount, cannot suffice me until I receive your reply. I earnestly request you to kindly give orders so that M. de Beaubrun pays for the loans which I have been obliged to take for the King's service and furnishes me the means to subsist here decently. Half would suffice me if I were not particular about a kind of display for our interests at this court. If, in consideration of your views, you have special reasons to think that this expense is useless, kindly let me know and tell me the course I should adopt.

I have received letters from the north by which they desire my presence there. Najaf Khan is very ill; he continues to embrace our interests and I continue to maintain him in these dispositions. I have done my utmost in this respect.

I assure you, dear Viscount, I shall always be eager to justify the opinion which you have been kind enough to form about my zeal for the King's service. I solicit you to believe that nothing flatters me more than to earn your approbation.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) MONTINGY.

Poona, June 30, 1782.

My General,

The Court of Poona has just terminated the agreements which it desires to negotiate with the French nation. It is so hard pressed by the English that it wants to know what succours and what advantages it can derive from our alliance.

Nana Fadnavis, Regent of this Court, showed me three weeks ago the draft of these agreements on which I thought it my duty to make my observations which you will find in the margin of their proposals. The Regency held several sessions on this subject and the result of its latest dispositions appears to me more likely to fulfil the views we may have on the Malabar Coast. We need not, however, acquiesce in all their demands of which some cannot be fully granted to them, but which it was impossible for me to make them reconsider. These are their proposals, they say, without the stipulation of which they cannot make solid agreements with us. Finally, they are so very anxious to know how they stand in this respect that a clear indication was given to me that it was the only means at the present moment to prevent them from coming to terms with our enemies by gaining time. However, I think that the presence of our squadron could make them more reasonable on some articles of the agreements which they propose.

In their earlier proposals, they indeed gave us the Port and Island of Bombay; but they wanted to reserve for themselves the administration of the fortress and the town of Surat, by giving us a simple factory in this town, as the English had formerly before they seized it. It would have been absurd to consent to such agreements. The town of Surat belongs to the Emperor of Delhi. It would have, therefore, meant not only losing the town most happily situated for commerce, which ought to be always kept in view, but also giving ourselves a semblance of injustice and usurpation vis-a-vis the Emperor and other powers, arrangements which the English would not have failed to turn to account against us. The Maratha Court leaves us the Government and the possession of the town and fortress of Surat for fees which are due to them.

I demanded from the Regency the right to establish factories in the towns of Bhadoch and Cambay. After several discussions, it granted it; it is leaving in our hands the major part of the productions and manufactures of Gujarat and giving us at the same time the advantage of having our factories very close to one another on this coast in a space of about 100 kilometers, which is a very important point. Needless to speak about the commercial relations which it will enable us to establish with the Persian Gulf, the Indus, and the Red Sea, the advantages of which are sufficiently known so as not to mention them here. I unsuccessfully demanded the right to establish factories in all their other ports; they steadfastly set their face against it.

M. le Vicomte de Souillac orders me by his letter of November 23 to correspond with you, my General, and with M. le Commandeur de Suffren on the subject of the affairs of the Maratha Court. He also informs me that he has delivered to you notes relating to the proposals of agreement which this court desires to negotiate with the French nation.

Since the arrival of our forces in India, the proposals of the English have completely changed the complexion of affairs of this court. It is aware of the advantage it can derive from the rivalry of the two powers which are seeking its alliance. It wants to profit by this advantageous circumstance to recover its old possessions.

The Regency wants to know how it stands at the end of this monsoon. Time presses. It is for you, my General, to pronounce on what you think it most proper to do concerning this important object.

M. de Chauvigny, who is carrying the proposals of the Maratha Court is entrusted with delivering you a letter from Nana Fadnis which will communicate to you his dispositions.

M. Warnet, who enjoys the confidence of the leaders of the Regency, is also bearer of a letter from Nana Fadnis for you. This Prince desired that M. de Chauvigny should be accompanied by this French merchant, who, for the last five years that he has been at this Court, knows well its interests. He is, moreover, very much in a position to give you the information which you could desire on this subject.

Let me, my General, enter with you into details without which it would be difficult for me to unfold before you my ideas on India and to explain to you at the same time the indispensable necessity to be allied with the Maratha Court, without which it appears to me impossible to form here solid and durable establishments. This power has a port accessible in all the seasons and in which we can construct (ships) and spend the monsoon, a unique advantage in these regions which will always give preponderance to the European power which would be its master.

By my letter of April 12, I have laid before you the political situation of this Court, and the advantage which we might derive from its alliance and from its dispositions for us. The moment has come when it is advisable to take a stand consistent with the conduct which we ought to adopt with this power and the decision which you will take will determine the Regency to ally itself with us against the English or enter into the plan of a confederation already drawn long back and the result of which is only too easy to foresee.

The advantages which the Malabar Coast offers us, the possession of the port and the Island of Bombay, of the town and fortress of Surat, of factories in Bhadoch and Cambay which the Marathas offer us, are sure to fix your attention and lead you certainly to come to terms with a Court whose alliance and support are so necessary for our interests in this part of the world.

The English are so convinced of the truth of what I am advancing that they are making utmost efforts to keep on their side this power to which they are promising every thing. They have also recently proposed to them to send the agreements to Europe and have them concluded for hundred years before the King and the Parliament of England. They know that they are lost if this power escapes them and rightly consider the capture of Bombay as the most fatal blow that can be dealt to their establishments in India.

It would be futile to try to labour under a dillusion on the forces of Haider and his bellicose genius. The other powers of the Deccan cannot but see in him a usurper whose elevation is intolerable to them. Their jealousy and their resentment have assumed a new force when they saw that this ambitious belligerent was supported and sustained by a French army. The English have cleverly profited by this line of conduct on our part to excite them still further by demonstrating to them what they have to fear from his successes, and on the other hand the advantage which these very powers would derive from their union with them to crush with the weight of their combined forces, a Prince who knows no end to his ambition. This important consideration has not at all escaped the attention of M. le Vicomte de Souillac. He has communicated to me his ideas on this subject in his letter of November 28 which you were kind enough to dispatch to me.

My General, this is the point of view from which the legitimate powers of the Deccan consider Haider, our ally, and the foundation on which the English take their stand to direct their political and military operations in India.

I am advancing nothing which is not known to all those who are conversant with the politics of the Darbars.

In my opinion, the only means to prevent such a powerful confederation, the result of which would be so harmful to our interests, is to turn in our favour the princes whom the English wish to

have on their side and I do not see any who should be better disposed and more important to preserve for us than the Maratha power. With it we shall stop Nizam Ali and balance the English forces by an effective and powerful diversion to our plans on the Coromandel Coast, without speaking of the advantages which this alliance would procure for us on the Malabar Coast by giving us Bombay, the best port in India, and the major part of the trade of Gujarat by the possession of the town of Surat and the factories which are offered to us in Bhadoch and Cambay.

Once this alliance is concluded, what resource would the English have for themselves? That of throwing themselves in the arms of Nizam Ali. This Prince will certainly reject their alliance, when he will see the Court of Poona making common cause with us. We would only have to assure the Subhedar of the Deccan that he would never be disturbed in his possessions and that we desire to have him as a friend.

The Court of Poona is allied with Nizam Ali. This liaison offers us an additional means to bring this Prince to reason. Since his only fear arises from the elevation of Haider, it would be, I think, a sane politics to assure him on this subject by really not undertaking any operation in his kingdom. Then, the English will have on their hands the powers of the Deccan united with the French. Once this step is taken, I no longer visualise any major obstacles which can oppose the execution of our projects on the Coromandel and Malabar Coasts.

Our enemies will be forced to yield before the number and the force, and abandon to us the major part of the possessions which they have in the Deccan and on the costs of the Peninsula.

Once this object is fulfilled, the only decision they have to take is to fall back with all their troops on Bengal and move the powers of the upper and lower Ganges in their favour. But these powers tired of the tyrannical yoke of the English will raise their head from the very moment they see this unexpected and precipitate retreat. Besides, it will be easy for you to see, my General, by the article 19 of the proposals of the Maratha Court, what the strategy of this power is. Bhonsle, the Raja of Nagpur and Shinde, great Maratha Chiefs, are waiting only for the favourable moment to unite with the Court of Poona, to which they owe allegiance, to pounce upon Bengal.

I do not mention the Emperor; he is too enlightened on his interests not to seize eagerly the opportunity to recover a part of his kingdom, dismembered by the English Company. Then, the North on the move and the Malabar and the Coromandel Coasts partly under the subjection of the French forces offer the spectacle of a complete revolution.

I do not proceed further. I am not at all seeking to make a suggestion to follow a project, the long and uncertain execution of which would definitely throw us in the same embarrassments in which the English find themselves today.

I too fully realise the necessity to have possessions near one another to propose a plan of operation which would only tend to give us establishments too far from one another. The wisdom of our administration can only have for its aim to bring them near one another in the shortest possible space to be in a better position to defend them and vivify them.

It is from this point of view that I envisage things, and to sum up, nothing appears to me more urgent and more important for our interests than to eagerly seize the dispositions of the Maratha Court to be closely allied with it. It is the most crushing blow that we can deal to the English, and I dare think that it is also the surest course to follow for the success of our operations, without which, I repeat it, we must be prepared to have on our hands all the Maratha forces united with those of Nizam Ali.

It is thus absolutely necessary for own interests to be allied with the Marathas and to send them forces with the squadron at the next monsoon. This is, my General, the only means to keep this power on our side and turn it against the English.

I had proposed to the Regency to carry its proposals of agreement to you myself so as to be in a better position to argue with you on them at full length. I would have very much desired it. But Nana Fadnavis would never agree that I should go myself. He wants that I should remain with him until he knows how he stands with respect to the agreements which he sends you.

I have the positive promise to raise troops as soon as I receive your reply.

Whenever I go to the Darbar, I am besieged by questions concerning our operations on the Coromandel Coast. You can imagine the embarrassment in which I find myself, because I have no news from you for more than four months. It is very urgent that I should receive it. I also request you to give me your orders regarding Nizam Ali's dispositions which I thought it my duty to sound through M. Aumont and of which I have given you an account by my letter of April 12.

I have been lucky enough, since the eight months that I have been residing at the Court of the Marathas, to be in a position to lead them to reject the proposals of the English and induce the Regency to come to terms with us. I would be very much grieved to day if I saw the best occasion vanish, by losing a power so essential for the success of our projects in India.

I am waiting, my General, for your news with the greatest impatience and for your orders concerning what I should say and do here.

I have the honour to be respectfully,

My General, your very humble and very obedient servant,

(Signed) MONTIGNY.

M. de Montigny to M. le Commandeur de Suffren.

Poona, June 30, 1782.

Sir,

I have replied in triplicate to the letter which you were kind enough to write to me from Portoe-Novo on February 25. The uncertainty in which I am that these letters may not have reached you, leads me to attach herewith a copy of it. You will see therein the situation of affairs at this epoch.

Since the arrival of our forces in India the English have made the utmost efforts to win over the Maratha Court by offering to restore to it all the territory which they had seized from this power and conclude with it the most solid agreements.

My representations to the Regency have had their effect. I succeeded in pointing out to it how little it ought to rely on a nation which had so often deceived it. The situation of this Court did not permit it to break completely with our enemies. But at least it has rejected their proposals. I had the good fortune to bring the Regency round to this point and induce it to come to terms with us.

Consequently, the Maratha Court has recently finalised the proposals of agreement which it wanted to conclude with the French nation. I am dispatching them to you with M. de Chauvigny, an Infantry Captain, and the Regency insisted that M. Warnet should accompany him. These gentlemen, bearers of letters from the Maratha Court, will convey to you the details concerning this mission.

There are in this agreement articles which it was impossible for me to induce them to reconsider. I know that we cannot reasonably acquiesce in all their demands; but it was a question of gaining time and moreover, the ultimate aim is to fix the attention of our Government on the advantages which will result therefrom.

I am, Sir, addressing you a copy of these agreements with my observations in the margin as well as the copy of a very detailed letter which I am writing to M. Duchemin on this subject. It will put you in a better position to understand the situation of affairs on this coast and the urgent necessity to appear there with a squadron and forces at the next monsoon, without which I shall continue to repeat it, we must be prepared to have all the powers of the Deccan, united with the English forces against us. It is a plan of a confederation drawn long back and can take effect if we concentrate all our forces and all our means with Haider Ali Khan.

M. le Vicomte de Souillac, by his letter dated 28th (November 1781) has indeed foreseen that the dispatch of our forces to the succour of this Prince must necessarily excite the jealousy of the other powers. That is only too true. He orders me by this letter to utilize every means to win over the Maratha Court to our side. I have done everything that lay in my power and I have been lucky to succeed in it. But I venture to declare to you, Sir, that if you do not appear on this coast with forces and your squadron, all that I could do here would become useless. I no longer see the means to prevent the Marathas from concluding agreements with the English. All the fruit of my negotiation at this Court would then be reduced to the advantage of having suspended for a year the agreements of peace which it was about to conclude with our enemies at the time of my arrival in Poona.

Everything at the present moment depends on you, Sir. your presence and that of your squadron can alone prevent the Marathas from forming an alliance with the English. This is the moment to deal the most fatal blow to our enemies and put a seal on the reputation you have acquired.

I know well, Monsieur le Commandeur, that M. Duchemin cannot easily divide his forces which the Marathas would need on this coast, but the Court of Poona is so essential to our interests

that I am convinced that he will do all that he can to keep it on our side by giving you the largest possible number of troops.

The English have about 500 Europeans and 8000 sipahees on this coast and these forces are scattered in more than twenty important points which have to be defended and of which the principal ones are : Cambay, Bhadoch, Surat, Bassein, Kalyan, Bombay and Tellicherry. The others are small posts situated between these different places. Their army corps included in the forces mentioned above constitutes today only 4000 sipahees and 300 Europeans. This army diminishes every day through the desertion of these sipahees; we have during the last two months about 1000 at Poona who give no other reason for their desertion than lack of pay. For the last seven months the English have not paid their troops on this coast. Actually there is not a single ship of the line on the Malabar Coast. From that, Sir, you will be in a position to judge the English land and naval forces. I am quite confident that you will create a total revolution by coming here with your squadron and some landing troops.

Monsieur le Comandeur, I cannot end my letter without repeating to you how urgent it is that you should appear on this coast as promptly as possible. It would be very unfortunate if some major circumstances prevent you from coming here.

I have the honour to be very sincerely, etc.

(Signed) MONTIGNY.

M. de Montigny to M. Le Commandeur de Suffren.

Poona, July 23, 1782.

Sir,

I have just received your letter of April 15.¹ I read it with all the attention it deserved and I communicated to the Regency of Poona the items most likely to infuse confidence in it. Everything is tremendously well disposed here, and the appearance of your squadron on the Malabar Coast will entirely determine the Marathas in our favour.

Haider Ali Khan has charged M. Piveron to tell me that I must mistrust the Marathas, that the Regency has concluded peace with the English, that, in short, I am deceived. This is the reply which I request him to convey to the Nawab on my part : that if it was true that the Regency of Poona had concluded peace with our enemies, I would not be and I should no longer be at this Court, that he has not been correctly informed about what has taken place here, that the dispositions of the Regency continue to be the same, that it has not at all concluded peace and that I hope it will not do so.

Messrs de Chauvigny and Warnet are bearers of dispatches which will prove to you how Haider himself is deceived. I shall not enter into any details in this letter. You will shortly know all that, I believe, ought to interest you on this coast. As I have not received any news from the Coromandel Coast for the last four months, I am entitled to use the greatest caution in my correspondence. You will be, as I have told you, Sir, shortly informed of everything.

Your successes on the Coromandel Coast have created the greatest effect on the mind of the Marathas. They speak of you, Sir, with respect, with enthusiasm, and would like to see you already on their coast. You can judge, M. Le Commandeur, if, as a good citizen, I ought to share their views.

I am just coming out of the Darbar at which Nana Fadnavis repeated to me all that he has already said to me about his dispositions for us. We can count on him; he is one of the greatest enemies the English have in India.

I have the honour to be most affectionately, etc.

(Signed) MONTIGNY.

M. de Montigny to M. de Launay.

Poona, August, 26, 1782

I was extremely delighted, Sir, to receive your letter of August 5, from Cuddalore, and I reply to it with the eagerness inspired in me by the desire to make the acquaintance of some one who is a friend of M. Beaudouin [\[Brigadier, and in charge of the correspondence with the Continent of India.\]](#) whom I love and honour from the bottom of my heart. I am most sensitive to the polite things you are kind enough to say to me and to the desire you express to form a close friendship with me. Rest assured, Sir, that I indeed wish that circumstances place me in a position to effect all that I desire in this respect, and that I will certainly seek all the means to achieve that end. You have the confidence of the Minister, that of M. Le Marquis de Bussy, the friendship of M. Beaudouin. What claims for me, Sir, to desire to develop acquaintance with you and open up my heart to you!

You have given me fresh life, Sir, by announcing to me the arrival of M. Le Marquis de Bussy at the Isle of France, accompanied by large land and naval forces over which he has absolute command. It is indeed the wisest thing our Ministry could do for the glory of our arms and the prosperity of our nation in India. The respect and veneration, which is still shown to the name of M. de Bussy in all the courts of India, will enhance the means which the King has placed at his disposal, and promise us happiest successes.

I delivered to Nana Fadnavis, Regent of this Court, the letter which M. Le Marquis de Bussy had addressed to him and I was a witness to the extreme pleasure which the reading of this letter impressed on all the minds and especially on that of Nana Fadnavis. This Prince immediately said with transports of delight : “The complexion of affairs is going to be altered. This French General knows India well. He was a friend of the Great Nana Balagirao! Why isn’t he already on the coast?” This is the effect, Sir, which the name of M. de Bussy has produced; his appearance in India will do the rest.

I communicated to Nana Fadnavis the details of the forces announced by your letter and of the absolute command which M. Le Marquis de Bussy had on all our land and naval forces. I applied myself to explain to him the advantages which were going to result from the success of his operations. He rightly felt all the importance. Everything here, Sir, is disposed in a manner to operate most complete revolution. The presence of M. de Bussy is going to move all the princes in our favour.

I shall not speak to you anything about the work I have done here. You must have been already informed about it by Messrs. de Chauvigny and Warnet, entrusted with letters from the Regency and from me for the Generals; they now ought to deliver these letters to M. Le Marquis de Bussy. I think that they must now be on the Coromandel Coast. I am writing to them by this courier so that they should talk freely to you, Sir, who has the confidence of the General, and follow scrupulously what you will advise them. I recommend them both to your good offices with M. Le Marquis de Bussy. They are in a position to tell you everything that has taken place here, all what I have done and all that could be done here.

You will see, Sir, from the contents of my letters to the Generals my ideas on the situation of affairs in general and specially what I think about the alliance of the Marathas for the success of our operations in India. Now that M. Le Marquis de Bussy has arrived, I shall be very happy to submit my work to his insight and I shall wait for his orders like an oracle.

I am addressing you, Sir, the reply of Nana Fadnavis to the letter which M. Le Marquis de Bussy wrote to him, along with mine. I request you to kindly dispatch them to him as early as possible.

I have the honour to be with a very sincere attachment, etc.

(Signed) MONTIGNY.

P.S.—I am just now dispatching harkaras to the courts of all the Indian princes, with whom I am in communication, to announce to them the happy news of the arrival of M. Le Marquis de Bussy at the Isle of France and his impending departure from this island to India at the head of large land and naval forces. This news will create the greatest sensation. More than four years ago the English said that this General was no more living! The Indian princes are going to believe in Resurrection.

Extracts of the Letters of M. de Montigny to M. Warnet

December 7, 1782

I am writing to you only in a general way on questions which you had put to me by your last packets which I received only too late. My first courier will carry you details which will put you in a position to answer the questions which might be put to you by M. Le Marquis de Bussy. Here is anyhow in substance something on which you can compose your replies.

The letters of M. Le Commandeur de Suffren have created a good impression on the Marathas. They have somewhat set at rest the anxiety of Nana Fadnavis and have enabled me to support with greater confidence and success my observations and solicitations with the Prince to dissuade him from concluding any agreements of peace with our enemies. After a long conference I had with him yesterday, he promised me that he would wait a little longer. He asked me at what epoch the squadron would appear on the Malabar Coast. This question embarrassed me very much. I thought it appropriate to tell him that though the monsoon was a little advanced, I still hope to see it arrive any moment, that I did not know where and when union would take place and that it was impossible for me to give him any precise epoch, but that M. De Suffren could appear at the earliest moment. This reply leaves him in a state of uncertainty, and my job is to keep him in suspense till the end of this month. During this time I hope to receive news from your side which will then balance that which I shall have to announce to him and which will not please him, but I shall have fulfilled my object by gaining time. To enlighten him would have rather been to lose the fruit of my negotiation since my stay at this court.

From what I have just said to you, you can well imagine that it would have been awkward and quite out of place (1) to press the Prince on the demands you are addressing to me to seek modifications and changes in the proposals of the Regency, (2) to find out if the Maratha Government would make advances, (3) if the Marathas would march against the English. All these questions would have destroyed the confidence which I had so much pain in inspiring up to this moment. They would have surely attributed all these questions to the paucity of our means and to the uncertainty in which we are about coming to the Malabar Coast with the mass of our forces. All that I can do here is to employ all the springs, which I shall judge most suitable, to inspire confidence in them and dissuade them from coming to terms with the English, and this task is not trifling in the position in which the Prince finds himself today. For, rest assured that he alone resists the solicitations of the English. All the chiefs of the Regency, as well as Shinde, Bhonsle, etc. are of the contrary opinion. I would consider myself lucky if I can fulfil the object to which I have just referred until the arrival of the General.

When M. Le Marquis de Bussy lands and begins his campaign by a brilliant action, which is sure to happen, it will then be easy to successfully negotiate with the Regency what the General will judge necessary for our interests. At present, it is a question of gaining time, and that is to what I am applying myself solely as the most essential service that I can render to my nation.

M. Le Commandeur de Suffren asks me to persuade the Marathas to make a movement on Bombay and create a diversion for the attack which the English are making on Mysore. I feel, like M. Le Commandeur, the advantage that would result for Haider and consequently for us as his allies. But these people are not at all inclined to favour him by attacking the English, especially when they are not supported by our forces. They will march only when we attack them (the English). They will remain on the defensive until the English are vigorously attacked on one of the two coasts. This is their line of conduct and nothing can make them change it unless they are powerfully aided.

In any case, if the General decides to send here a French detachment with a field-artillery, it is essential that this detachment should be in the King's pay. The Prince would pay for the salary of the

English sipahees about whom you already know and would join to them others from the Sarkar. Any other arrangement appears to me out of the question, and I think that it would be better to wait till the next monsoon to operate on a large scale. This is my opinion which I submit to that of the General. You ought to know these people so far as funds are concerned. We must not count on them at all unless the mass of our forces appears on their coast. If it is decided to send a detachment here, it will be essential to have at least 8 field guns, 2 mortars, one Howitzer and 50 artillerymen, who are professionals. I cannot state anything definite about the number of soldiers. That will depend on the views of the General. He is too enlightened not to know what is necessary when he is seized of the State of affairs here. I am still seeking information and I shall shortly write to him as well as to M. De Suffren. The English have about 400 Europeans in their army of 4,000 sipahees and 300 others in Bombay. You see, my friend, that any detachment less than 500 to 600 men will not fulfil any object unless we be reduced to form troops to join the landing troops at the next monsoon.

2,000 rifles are absolutely necessary; you know that they (the Marathas) are badly equipped in everything, especially in munitions of war. The object of a diversion is so important that it will be at once grasped by the General, and if he can divert some troops, he will certainly do it. You know all that I have said to you on this subject.

There is no news from Mauritius, nor any reply to my packets as regards funds. I have been obliged to have recourse to you, my friend. M. Amiot paid me Rs. 2,000 day before yesterday. I have written to M. Beaubrun. We shall see what his reply will be. Do you understand anything about this silence? Whatever may happen, my friend, you can count on me. But truly all that I see afflicts me and urges me to return to the mother country where I would like be.

Copy of the letter from M. de Montigny to M. Piveron, from Poona

December 9, 1782.

I received, Sir, your letter of October 31. I am very sorry that the measures of M. Abbestée did not produce any effect on the Madras Committee concerning the Cutter le Hérard, a seizure made against the law of nations under the flag of its sovereign. I have therefore no more hope of seeing M. de Chauvigny set at liberty except when we shall exchange prisoners, which will certainly take a long time according to all appearances.

I have conveyed to the Darbar the news which you communicated to me from the Coromandel Coast and from that of the Malabar. We were in the know of the news from the latter one, but we did know about the death of Gen. Coote and the squall which so badly damaged the English squadron and their merchant fleet. That is very fortunate for us and will cause them lot of trouble to put themselves in a state of making their appearance again before M. Le Commandeur de Suffren; this circumstance will certainly favour our landing on your side.

Nana Fadnavis appeared to me satisfied with this event and very much impressed with the news of the frigate which, you announce, has arrived at Galle. It is surprising that you should not have already got the news which it has brought. I am worried on this account. You know all that I learnt concerning the 2nd division. Is the mishap likely to be confirmed?

I have received news about our squadron in America; it is very bad. I am waiting for the details which I should receive shortly. I shall communicate them to you by my first courier very soon.

Nana has just sent me word that M. Bikerton had arrived at Bombay day before yesterday with only seven ships in very bad condition. Others will follow, the majority without masts because of the gale which they encountered. We have not yet received news of Admiral Hughes. He is said to be before Calicut. I shall shortly get the information and shall immediately pass it on to you. There is no news from Mauritius.

You can assure the Nawab on my behalf that Nana Fadnavis continues to be unchanged with respect to the English, that is to say, inflexible and not inclined to listen to any proposal of peace. This is, Sir, the state of affairs here. I had lately a long conference with him and I have reason to be satisfied with his dispositions for us.

I have the honour to be etc.

(Signed) MONTIGNY.

To M. Warnet

Poona, February 17, 1783

I received, my dear Warnet, your letters of November 22 and January 8 and 16. I already knew the good and the bad news which you have given me, but my friend, what I shall always be grieved at, is the absolute silence from the Isles for this coast. No orders, no funds, no reply to my letters. I am overwhelmed with grief and pain. The fever is already preying on me and I am not without anxiety about the consequences it may have.

I have neither received all your letters nor all your harkaras. Some of my letters have been opened. The correspondence established via the Darbars is a very hazardous one. It is to deliver one's secret to the prince of the country and one's projects to everyone. I hope that M. Le Marquis de Bussy will establish daks at the expense of the nation and then everything will go on well. Just imagine, my friend, I have not received a word from your coast during the last three months. It is the same by the sea. No advice-boat to Goa for the last 16 months that I am here. Finally, it is only 20 days back that one of my duplicate copies containing letters from Nana Fadnavis to M. de Bussy left from Goa for Colombo and yet I had dispatched it 7 months back. That is sufficient time to go to Europe. How can you carry on with this manner of going? I shall stop speaking to you about this. The great General will remedy everything. There is great need for it. I shall confine myself to most essential things.

1. If we wish to be allied with the Marathas, there is not a moment to be lost. It is advisable to come to solid terms with them immediately on the arrival of the General and to promise to support them powerfully at the next monsoon. I am convinced that by taking this decision, we shall keep them on our side at the arrival of M. de Bussy and make them more reasonable on the terms of the agreement.

2. If we wish to undertake an operation on this coast at the next monsoon, shall we raise sipahees in advance? Shall we, at least, send troops to fulfil this object or else shall we only resolve upon a treaty with the Regency? If it was only a question of raising sipahees, we must only have good sergeants and some intelligent officers of acknowledged merit as well as some good artillerymen to help me in this task. If we conclude an agreement with the Sarkar, it promises me the command of 2,000 sipahees. If, on the contrary, we confine ourselves purely to negotiate with the Regency, should I remain here after the treaty, should I go to Hyderabad, to Delhi? What would become of me? This is, my friend, the substance of my observations. You will find out the dispositions of the General so far as this coast is concerned and you will consequently act for me. I am only trying to be useful either one way or the other, but remember well that I detest inactivity.

3. I am dispatching to the General the copy of the letters which I have received from Nizam Ali and from the Nawab Tedgenk [\[Tahawwar Jang.\]](#). I am not leaving him in the dark about anything that is taking place on this side or at Delhi. I shall only say to you a word concerning this last place : it is that everything there is in a horrible confusion. Pauly had his head cut off on December 8, and another chief had his eyes pulled out after a revolution in which he had taken part. Pauly played for six weeks the role of the Commander-in-Chief of the Emperor, but his dreadful fall has been the result of his ambition. This is a very interesting and very critical moment for this country. The English are at a distance of three days from Delhi with an army of 15 battalions and 5,000 cavalry. Pendejjiale Amdamy [\[Muhammad Beg Hamadani? There is no corroboration for this event.\]](#), one of the generals, went to meet the English. I am everyday waiting for the result of the battle which must have taken place. I have still two harkaras at Sombré's camp who ought to leave immediately after the battle is fought.

Since the death of Haider, the English have been increasing their efforts with the Regency, but Nana continues to be inflexible. I fear the arrival of the Nawab Jahauwar Jang; he accompanies the son of Nizam Ali who is coming to offer his compliments to the King of the Marathas on his

marriage which was celebrated on the 10th of this month. I was obliged to make the customary presents.

I am informed from Hyderabad that the journey of the son of Nizam Ali has a double object : that of offering compliments to the Prince on the marriage referred to above and that of holding political conferences with the Regency on the death of Haider and the arrival of M. de Bussy. The Nawab Taherjang is a partisan of the English and I fear his meeting with Krishnarao Ballal whose way of thinking in favour of our enemies you are aware of. Here is fresh work for me. I shall not lose sight of his conferences and I shall be very exact in rendering an account to the General of everything that will reach my ears.

M. de Beaubrun informs me from Goa that he has been told that Admiral Hughes was planning to seize Mangalore and Cochin while proceeding from Bombay to the Coromandel Coast where he ought to be in March.

You are thus, my friend, conversant with everything that I know. Let me know likewise what is taking place on your side

To M. Warnet at Cuddalore.

Poona, March 11, and April 5.

My friend, I am just now writing to Messrs Le Commandeur de Suffren and De Launay to inform them about the departure of the English squadron from Bombay which must have weighed anchor yesterday to proceed to the Coromandel Coast. An English letter found in a small boat of this nation captured by the Marathas was seized and the Regency informed me about it.

As I have hardly any time at my disposal, I shall write to you very little this time but which could serve you as basis for your conduct.

1. Inform me if things are disposed favourably and if we can undertake an operation at the next monsoon.

2. Let me know whether we wish to have an agreement with the Court of Poona or not.

3. Let me know also if things are disposed in such a manner that we cannot promise anything to the Marathas. For, in the end, I must take a decision. I cannot remain in the uncertainty in which I am left here : no news, no money, no orders. Send me the information which you possess so that I can arrive at a decision. Send me a word in reply; it does not matter how, it does not matter by which route. I must have one absolutely, my friend. I am dying with grief.

My friend, I shall just add a word more Do your utmost with M. De Bussy to see that he writes to the Regency of Poona and he draws up an agreement which he judges fit to be concluded with it. Otherwise everything will turn out very badly here.

M. Dufreneau escaped from Bombay; he has just arrived at Poona. He has given me most exact information on the English squadron and on the garrison of this place, which consists only of 300 Europeans and 400 sipahees.

The English squadron is effectively composed of 18 ships of the line. They have succeeded by dint of work in repairing the hulls of all the ships of the squadron. But there is just half the number of the crews which they need. It left Goa on March 27 in the morning.

M. Dufreneau gives an important information. It is the very impending arrival of a convoy coming from Europe under the escort of a warship. I am sending all the details to the Generals.

C² 163, f. 150–151.

To M. Baudouin [Brigadier, and in charge of the correspondence with the Continent of India.]

My dear General,

Poona, April 15, 1783.

I do not know if you have received all the letters which I had written to you. I availed myself of the foreign channel, for, I had no direct and sure occasion since the 18 months that I have been residing at the Court of Poona.....on the Malabar Coast since I have been with the Marathas.....with whom I am in contact. There is a report that M. de Bussy has arrived at Cuddalore on March 18. There is reason to hope that everything is going to change and there is urgent need for it.

You have certainly been apprised of the outcome of my residentship at the Court of the Marathas. This power was on the point of concluding a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with the English at the time of my arrival in India. Consequently, the Council of Bombay had dispatched Woidrechten [Warnet was a supercargo on the French ship Le Sartine which had brought M. de St. Lubin to Chaul. He had been left behind by Couronnat, Captain of Le Sartine, to recover the money for the goods mortgaged in return for a loan of Rs. 300,000 from a Maratha Sahukar at Chaul.] to negotiate this treaty. I had the good luck to prevent its execution, and I obtained the dismissal of this English negotiator from the Regency. Since then I induced the Regency to negotiate with us and make the first overtures for it. It has drawn articles of an agreement to which I have added my reflexions in the margin of their proposals. I sent them to the Generals. You must have by now seen both. My principal object at this Court was always to gain time, to prevent the English from negotiating with it and give time to the General to arrive with all his forces. I was convinced that afterwards I could turn it to account with the greatest advantages for us and against the enemy. (You will see) how my plan has succeeded. Well, the General has arrived; it is for him now to adjudicate on this matter. I sent (the outcome of) my work and the Maratha proposals to the Generals more than nine months ago. I have still to receive a reply from them. It produces the worst effect here. The English continue to pester Nana Fadnavis to conclude a treaty with them, and I am using every endeavour with this Prince to dissuade him from it, and I hope to succeed. If we had..... [The blanks are either blanks in the original, or in cipher or illegible.] at the time of my arrival in India.....

Messrs de Chauvigny and Warnet, who were dispatched by the Court of Poona to carry the proposals of the Regency, proceeded to the Coromandel Coast and arrived there a few days after the death of M. Duchemin. Fresh obstacles, fresh loss of time and other unfortunate events, which it would take a long time to detail here, prevented M. de Bussy from arriving in India as soon as he should have done, and everything has suffered immensely from it. He is here now and we shall come out of the lethargy in which we were.

You know that Messrs De Chauvigny and Warnet had embarked on the King's cutter Le Cesar [The copyist uses three names : le César, le Herard and le Lezard.] in the roadstead of Tranquebar to proceed aboard the ship of M. le Commandeur de Suffren, when on October 2, at 9 a.m., Le Sultan, an English ship with 7 guns, coming from Negapatam where it had deposited ammunition for Tanjavour, came in the roadstead of Tranquebar, passed between the shore and the cutter, approached it so closely that it cut its cable and then detached its boats armed with 100 men who went aboard the cutter, seized it and took it to Madras. There was along side the cutter a Chelingue in which M. Warnet quickly threw himself and came on the shore with his packets and all those addressed to M. Le Commandeur de Suffren. M. de Chauvigny, ill and certainly more confidant than M. Warnet, remained and was taken to Madras, from where he was transported to Bombay; he is detained there as a prisoner. I cannot express to you, my dear General, howmuch this incident has afflicted me. I have written about it to the General in the most pressing manner and I hope that he (Chauvigny) will be exchanged. I solicit you to announce this news to M. le Marquis de Castries.

On the 1st of April, M. Dufrenean, Captain of the cutter le César, arrived at Poona. This officer found the means to escape from Bombay. I introduced him to Nana Fadnavis who gave him a very good reception and gave him a 'Sarpech', a dastak and two sipahees from the Sarkar for his safety in the route he is going to take. He left yesterday. I gave him Rs. 400 for his journey from here to the Coromandel Coast by land. This officer had not at all given his word of honour to the English and was captured from under the protection of Danish forts and consequently against the law of nations.

M. de Chauvigny, watched more closely, could not escape.....

I shall not close my letter without telling you that since my arrival in India, I have not ceased maintaining the Emperor and Nizam Ali in the dispositions most favourable for us and that I have succeeded in it. I have received letters from these princes who express the desire, in which they ferrist today, to be allied with us against the common enemy. I have sent copies of these letters to M. Le Marquis de Bussy, and I am awaiting his reply any moment.

The Emperor summons me to his Court with most earnest entreaties, but I can go there only after we have concluded agreements with the Court of Poona which will not allow me to leave without that.

Pauly had his head chopped off on December 8, 1783 in a revolution that took place at Delhi. Ambition turned his head; he abandoned his own chief and sided with the Padshah, which conduct was considered as a treachery by Mirzafikhan [Mirza Shafi Khan.] in whose service he was. Sombre's camp is today on his parganas. The Begum often writes to me and solicits me to proceed to Delhi. This Court is a prey to the ambition of three princes who are disputing among themselves for the post of the Commander-in-Chief of the Emperor's army. If I were not in such a hurry to close my letter, I would have given you all the details of the latest revolution that has taken place at Delhi. I shall do so by my earliest courier.

I am in close correspondence with M. de Cannaples. He has just written to me and informs me that he has sent you the copy of my letter.

M. Bradin has dispatched to me your letter of June 20, 1781 and announces to me two more of your letters which I would have been very happy to receive but which I have not yet received. You will judge by that.....Every one assures me that M. Bradin is a gentleman. It is a very pressing reason to be bound in friendship with him, for, such a species is rare here.

I have the honour to be with the tenderest and most inviolable attachment,

My dear General,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,
MONTIGNY.

P.S.—Allow me, my dear General, to offer the assurances of my respect to Madame de Mainat and my respectful homage to Madame la Comtesse de Blot.

Please give my love to my dear cousin; I owe him only one word. Herewith is attached the copy of two letters, one from M. de Bussy and another from M. le Vicomte de Souillac. A fortnight ago I sent a big packet to the Minister.

C² 163, f. 88–93

Copy of a Treaty of peace between the State of the Marathas and the English East India Company, May 17, 1782. [\[This treaty of salbai has already been published and has therefore not been. Reproduced here.\]](#)

Treaty of friendship and perpetual alliance between the Honourable English East India Company and the Peshwa Madhavrao, Pant Pradhan, concluded by Mr. David Anderson on behalf of the Honourable Company in virtue of the powers given to him for this purpose by the Honourable Governor-General and Council appointed by the King and the Parliament of Great Britain to govern and direct all the political affairs of the Honourable East India Company in India, and by Maharaja Subhedar Madhavrao Shinde as plenipotentiary on behalf of the Peshwa Madhavrao, Pant Pradhan, Balaji Pant, Nana Fadnavis and all the chiefs of the Maratha nation.

(Copy was sent to M. de Bussy and attached to the letter of April 24, 1783 to this General Officer).

To M. Warnet.

Poona, May 22, 1783.

I am suffering too much for more than a fortnight, my friend, to be able to write to you in detail. My right leg is very much swollen and I am afraid I shall again have an attack this year like the last one. Thank God, it has taken today a turn which is not at all alarming. With a strict and constant diet, I hope to be soon all right. M. Amiot comes and dresses the wound twice a day with an attention worthy of his good heart.

The forced silence which has been guarded with the Marathas is the cause of my illness, outcome of the grief which it has caused me. It was time M. Le Marquis de Bussy arrived to soothe me on the subject of my anxiety. I did my utmost to go to the Darbar. I was there on the 20th with the letters of the General which have given the greatest pleasure to Nana and Haripant. I am most impatiently awaiting others. But my friend, all this will arrive too late. I foresee the future only too well and I am more than ever driven to despair for being forced to miss my journey to the north by fixing myself at this Court. However, I shall be consoled for it if the authorities think that I have been useful here.

All that you inform me by your letter of March 26, which reached me here only on the 15th of this month, has given me great pleasure. So I have with me friend Malavoy; its a favour from the General of which I am very sensible. I solicit you to thank him for it on my behalf. I do not say anything about it to M. Le Marquis de Bussy because he does not speak to me about it in his dispatch and because I am writing to him a letter of 12 pages containing so many details about the situation of affairs here. I shall only say a word to you about it, my friend, because I have not the time to write to you at length on this subject. You will know everything from the dispatch I am sending to the General.

I am sending you a letter from the Sarkar and you ought to proceed here immediately which is the right course for you to take. The two harkaras of M. Dufreneau have orders to return with you. Thus, this is what you were asking from me.

Nana has sworn to me by giving me his hand that he will not sign peace with the English before the month of October next and if the French arrived in force on the Malabar Coast, he would openly break with them and join us to attack our enemies in concert. This is, to be brief, the position : if the French do not arrive at this epoch, all is over, at least to all appearances.

Shinde has drawn up the articles of the treaty and has already signed it. Nana alone will stand firm until the epoch in question. They believe here that they will shortly get possession of Raghoba. That is creating many difficulties. But Nana has sworn to me that if he could get possession of Raghoba today, tomorrow he would march upon the English, if we joined his forces.

On the report spread all over India that peace was concluded between the English and the Marathas, in spite of all that Nana had said to me to the contrary, I thought it my duty to ask for a special audience with this Prince and I obtained it on the 8th of this month. I utilised every means to dissuade him from negotiating at least finally with them. He replied to me all what I have just said above and which I have not the time to write to you. I do not omit anything for the General. I am writing to him in the greatest detail on this subject. I shall often make use of our cipher since he should know it and use it.

All these letters are signed by Montigny.

Copy of a letter from M. de Montigny to M. Le Marquis de Bussy

Poona, May 25, 1783

My General,

I received only on the 15th of this month your letter of 31st March. You will be in a position to judge, from the two dates, about the time that your packet has taken to reach me and about the obstacles I experience in my correspondence via the darbars of Tipu Sultan, I have several times received letters at Poona from Cuddalore and Pondicherry in 10 and 12 days. I have also experienced delays of 2, 3 and 4 months. You will appreciate better than anyone the disadvantages which ought to result from such a correspondence especially in this continent in which political scenes succeed each other with such rapidity and the knowledge of which is so essential for the benefit of affairs. Allow me, my General, to add a word more on this subject. It is that without the establishment of a Dak of which you should be the absolute master, the uneasy, mistrustful and jealous character of the Nawab will be the cause of very frequent inconveniences, because of lack of correspondence and secrecy in your distant operations, either political or military. I have been laying emphasis on this point since eighteen months that I have been residing at the Court of the Marathas, I gradually notice the evil effects produced in all the Darbars by this interruption of correspondence. I find that it is impossible to successfully negotiate affairs by this means. Very anxious for not having received news from you since June 15, 1782, moreover, pressed by the English and by the Waquils of Shinde and the Raja of Nagpur to conclude peace with them, Nana appeared to me shaker by that and several times said to me at the Darbar : Why don't we receive any more letters from M. Le Marquis de Bussy; would his plan be to concentrate all his forces with Haider Ali Khan; would he not wish to be allied with us; it is now nearly a year, that I sent my proposals of agreement to which I have not received any replies; you promised me that you would come to the Malabar Coast; I have not seen any forces appear, not even an advice-boat; M. Le Commandeur de Suffren had also given me hopes of it; in pursuance of all what you said and promised to me, I firmly resisted the proposals of the English; I even dismissed Col. Audriehaten [Capt. Watherstone.], their Waquil whom the Council of Bombay had dispatched to me; to day you know all these facts. What have you to say to me?

I replied to all these embarrassing questions in such a manner that he could be reassured and could take patience. I was happy to see that the Prince still showed confidence in what I said to him and that he continued to resist firmly the proposals of the English. Finally, on the report spread in the whole of India that peace was concluded between the Marathas and the English, in spite of what Nana Fadnavis had said to me to the contrary on this subject, I thought it my duty to ask for a special audience from the Prince and I obtained it on the 8th of this month. I told him that I was receiving letters from all sides which announced to me that peace was signed between the English and the Marathas, that if that was true I could no longer remain at Poona, that he should give me leave at the earliest. I added that it was surprising that the Regency should have taken a decision like that after 18 months of waiting for the French at the very moment of your arrival when all the affairs were going to assume a new aspect, that moreover, this was the most favourable moment to act in concert and to fall on the common enemy on all sides, that, in short, I knew your attitude with respect to all the Indian princes and very particularly towards the Marathas and that your very resolute intention was to form an alliance with them, that the Regency ought not to forget, without indignation, the infringement on the part of the English of the treaties they had several times made with them, that all the agreements they proposed to them today were only dictated by their fear about the arrival of our forces in India, led by a General of whom they knew the great capacity and the high reputation he enjoyed with the princes of the country, that finally, all peace with them and at this moment would only be a sham peace and broken on the first occasion, that then the Regency ought to expect to face the onslaught of the power of the English. The Regent interrupted me at this moment and said to me : M. de Montigny, I have heard all you have said to me, but I am surprised that after assuring you several times that I would not make peace with the English, without informing you about it, you appear to me so affected

by these public reports which are running on this subject. You knew, he continued, that the Marathas have captured an English ship a month back, and 4 big boats laden with many munitions of war, bombs, etc.; Col. Mayelan [Col. Macleod. He was not killed but captured.] was killed, along with several officers and soldiers of whom 50 were made prisoners, as also 400 sipahees. Is it thus that you treat your friends? This is a fact; this convoy, leaving from Bombay, was proceeding to Nagar; this capture produced a happy diversion for Tipu Sultan; they are in consternation at Bombay.

I replied to the Prince that it was of the greatest consequence for me to know the truth about such an important event and that if peace was made, my residentship at this Court would be quite out of place, and my silence on this matter would become very reprehensible to my nation and to the General, that finally, I must have the word and oath of the Prince that he had not at all made and signed peace with our enemies, that it was on this condition that I could remain at the Court of the Regency and that I was immediately going to inform the General about the reply that would be given to me. Nana at once gave me his hand saying to me, rest assured that I have not at all made peace with the English, that it was true that Shinde had drawn up articles of a treaty with them and that the latter had ostentatiously published it throughout India, but that he had not signed it. I asked him about his future intentions on this subject while representing to him that the Malabar Coast was not at all negotiable for a squadron before the month of October and even the month of November, that they had nothing to fear from the English till this epoch, that besides as they were vigorously attacked on the Coromandel Coast, they would make no attempt on this one. He replied to me by giving me his hand for the second time, I give you my word not to make peace with the English if the French came in force on the Malabar Coast at the next monsoon, that is to say in the month of October. Then he spoke to me in the most confidential tone. "All my plan, he added, was to get possession of Raghoba, the agreements in which I appear to acquiesce but which I have not at all signed only tend to this goal. The English have already deceived me thrice consecutively. I have no more confidence in them. I sincerely wish to be allied with the French and you can count on my word and my oath; keep as a secret what I have said to you from the bottom of my heart; transmit it only to your General. If today, I have Raghoba in my hands, he said, tomorrow I would break openly with the English provided you appeared in force on the Malabar Coast".

This is, my General, the result of the audience I had with Nana Fadnavis on the 8th of this month. This Prince has always appeared to me in the same dispositions for us. But as I have already said to you in my previous letters, we must effect a brilliant operation, make solid agreements with the Regency and appear with our forces on this Coast without which it is only easy to foresee the decision which this power will take.

Your letters for the Regent came very happily in support of the conferences which I had with Nana Fadnavis and I was delighted to notice the effect they produced on the mind of the princes who are today convinced of your arrival in India and of the desire you have of allying yourself with the Marathas. I announced to Nana Fadnavis the early arrival of special letters relating to the agreements which you wish to conclude with the Regency. He impatiently awaits them and has promised to reply to your letters during the next few days. I could not go to the palace of Sawai Madhavrao to compliment him on his marriage on your behalf, as you had charged me to do by your letter of March 31. The state of suffering in which I have been for the last week because of a large swelling in my right leg absolutely obliges me to keep to the bed, but I was so delighted to receive your dispatch, my General, that I collected all my strength to go to the Darbar and confer once again with Nana on the general state of affairs and inform him at the same time of what I had just heard from Nizam Ali concerning the reports of peace between the English and the Marathas. Nana Fadnavis gave me on the 20th of this month fresh assurances that he had not at all signed the treaty and that I should refer to what he had already said to me. Since this time I am in my bed and suffer very much.

I await the reply of Nana and Haripant Phadke any day to attach them to my packet and send it immediately.

I lately received a letter from the Nawab Tahawwar Jang who informs me that Nizam Ali has finally decided to dispatch M. Haumont with an instruction and special letters to communicate to you his dispositions for the French nation and to know at the same time yours for this Prince. He (Nizam Ali) sends you the copy of letters I have written to him as well as to Tahawwar Jang. It is the text the Prince has used to write to you. Herewith is attached the copy of the letter from the Nawab Tedjenk.

M. Aumont has written me two letters, one on the 25th April and the other on 5th May, of which I attach a copy. By the first he informs me that the Prince wants to send him to Poona to have a talk with me, that the Raja of Nagpur has promised the English to keep at Cuttack a corps of troops, 4000 strong, which have presently arrived there, that he has also promised them that he would construct there a fort on which they are working night and day, that four lakhs of rupees distributed among the scribes of the Raja have lifted all the difficulties. In short, this prince is absolutely allied with the English. In that of the 5th May, M. Aumont informs me that the Prince is sending him to you. He announces that Nizam Ali or rather the Nawab Tedjenk told him that the English have concluded peace with the Marathas and that this Prince hoped to detach the Raja of Nagpur from the side of the English and reduce the Marathas to inaction; that Shinde had come to spend the monsoon at Barhanpur with 40,000 cavalry and a corps of 20,000 sipahees under the command of Colonel Anderson. Although I was not convinced of the truth of all this news as well as of several others, which fact it will be easy for you to see from the persusal of his letters, I thought it my duty to speak about it in strong terms to Nana Fadnavis. This Prince said to me all what I have written above, that he had not at all signed the treaty, that Shinde would not come to spend the monsoon at Barhanpur unless he was called by the Regency, that it was not true that there was a corps of 20,000 English sipahees with him, that M. Anderson, the English Waquil, sent by the Council of Calcutta to the camp of Shinde, had about a hundred sipahees for his guard. The Prince added that since the last five years the Court of Poona and Haider Ali Khan alone have fought the war with the English, that Nizam Ali never wanted to march against them in spite of all their solicitations; that it is certain that if he had set himself in motion, the English would not be where they are today.

My General, the truth of the fact is that at the time of my arrival here, Nizam Ali was entirely in favour of the English and urged the Marathas to conclude their peace with them. It is only after your arrival at Mauritius and the negotiation which I started with this prince that he seems to seek the alliance of the French, of which, moreover, you know better than me, the advantages which can be derived from it for the possessions we can have on the Coromandel Coast and especially in Orissa. I shall not repeat myself on this subject. You can cast a glance on my previous letters. I have always considered this power as one which should be very essential to us for our plans of establishments. It is the motive which persuaded me to open a correspondence with the Darbar of this Prince, shortly after my arrival at Poona. I have always been of the opinion that it was a principle of sound politics to be attached preferably to the legitimate powers of the continent without, however, being subservient to any of them in such a manner that.....we are not forced to exclusively embrace his interests and follow the movements of those whom we would have preferred. It is in pursuance of this principle that I conducted myself in my negotiations with the princes of the country.

I am overwhelmed with joy, my General, since you are pleased with my zeal. I have considered your approbation as a most flattering reward of my services. Guided today by your judgment, I don't have to fear making a mistake in the route which I have to follow relating to the plan of operations which you are going to fix. I await your orders with the greatest impatience in order to give you proof of my activity in putting them into execution. Those which you have given me to remain at the Maratha Court to maintain the Regency in our interests are of an urgent necessity, and even if you had been an ocular witness of the movements which agitate this Court and of the troubles which envelope that of Delhi, it would have been impossible for you to realise their importance and their necessity better. Rest assured, my General, I shall avail myself of everything that politics permits in a moment of crisis to fulfil your views.

My principal object here comes down to two essential points : (1) To remind Nana of his oaths not to finally conclude peace with the English between now and the month of October as well as

to unite with his (Bussy's) forces at the next monsoon to fall on the common enemy in concert. (2) To see that the Regency does not set into motion 40,000 cavalry troops against Tipu Sultan, which the English solicit with the greatest earnestness. As soon as I was informed of it, I obtained from the Prince the promise not to make the slightest move on this side by warning him that he would thereby surely lose the friendship of the French as he (Tipu) was their ally. He appeared to me to feel the soundness of my proposition and replied to me in a manner which reassured me. I strongly insisted on this point, for, everything would be lost by such a diversion in the present situation. In short, I shall do everything that will depend on me to gain time to at least favour your operations on the Coromandel Coast, if we had the misfortune not to be in a position to successively oppose the enemy on the two coasts..... Thirty-four sailors, soldiers and non-commissioned officers have just arrived here from the Marlborough and the cutter le Lezard who escaped from Bombay with the intention of rejoining their flag. They were without clothes and dying with hunger. I dressed them and fed them here for some days to enable them to undertake the journey to Goa where I am dispatching them. They left this place on the 20th of this month under the conduct of M. Geslin, an officer with me here. I thought it advisable to take this precaution for fear that they may get scattered on the way and take service inland as several of them had already expressed the desire to do so. I have directed them to M. De Beaubrun and informed Dom Frederik, Governor of Goa, about it. There are still left with me here 4 sailors very indisposed, of whom one very seriously, including the master-at-arms of the cutter le Lezard. As soon as they recover, I shall send them to Goa. In this port they will be in a position to seize the earliest safe opportunity to rejoin the squadron.

I thank you, my General, for the order you have sent me to draw funds at Goa on M. De Beaubrun. You can rest assured of my discretion in the matter of finance. I shall avail myself of it only when I need it for the King's service.

I have written to M. De Beaubrun, while sending him your packet, not to be in a hurry to send me funds until further notice. I had received from this agent a bill of exchange of Rs. 4,000 at the end of April. M. De Beaubrun had several times written to me about the difficulties which he experienced at Goa for funds and advised me to ask from him only small amounts which I needed. By his letter of November 20, 1782, he positively informed me about his absolute inability to send me money. I had then recourse to M. Warnet from whom I have borrowed on different occasions in the course of 1781 and 1782 the sum of Rs. 12,590 which I owe to this merchant who has been of the greatest service to me here.

Since then M. De Beaubrun found means to procure funds, via Cochin and through the arrival of M. M. Monneron's agent at Goa. He availed himself of these means to send me some money at Poona. I then stopped making use of the funds which M. Warnet had the kindness to leave here with his confidential agent for me when needed.

I have received from M. De Beaubrun on different occasions the sum of Rs. 15,000 at a rate of exchange of 9 per cent from Goa to Poona; I have actually received the sum of Rs. 13,650 in cash from which I have paid on different occasions for the journeys and special expenses of M. de Chauvigny the sum of Rs. 3,719 without including in it, besides, what he has borrowed from M. Warnet for his last journey to the Coromandel Coast.

If I were not in a state of suffering in which I am, I would have given you, my General, an exact detail of the expenses which I was obliged to incur here for the King's service. You will be in a position to judge of the indispensable necessity to use these funds. I venture to say that I owe to the disinterested conduct I have shown at this Court the confidence with which the Regency honours me today.

He (Nana Fadnavis?) sends tomorrow (harkaras?) for the Court of Delhi and I am going to send to the Emperor the letter you have addressed to him. Today, it is Mirza Shafi Khan who is at the head of the Imperial army. This young prince is a nephew of Najaf Khan; he has all the titles of his late uncle but he is much less powerful.

I have received a letter from Himmat Bahaddur by which he communicates to me the situation of affairs and announces to me at the same time couriers from the Padshah which I am expecting any day. Herewith is attached the copy of the letter from the Raja Himmat Bahaddur. I often dispatch letters to this Court, as you have ordered me, to study its movements. It is to day in a state of convulsion, but at the news of the first success we shall have on the coast, the clouds which are enveloping it will scatter. We can then base our judgment on the situation of this Court and find out the advantage we can derive from it.

On this side, Shinde, entirely given up to the English, is at the head of 100,000 cavalry and imposes to day on the Emperor and the princes of Hindustan to whom our enemies are trying to persuade that they have made peace with all the powers of the Deccan. Their conduct in this matter is extraordinary; they write in all the languages of the country of the successes which they have not had and announce them with the report of guns in all the places under their control. They say here that the King of France has signed peace with England on December 4, 1782. Although the princes are aware of their atrocious lies, sometimes that creates doubts in the minds of the Darbars which are very harmful to the success of negotiations. The necessity of an active and continuous correspondence is of the greatest importance not only to the success of our affairs but also to destroy the reports which they continuously spread to our disadvantage.

M. Aumont announced to me by his letter of April 25, that M. Belié had come to Adoni at the court of the son of the late Bassalat Jang with letters from you, my General, for this Nawab and for Nizam Ali, that this Prince had written to M. Belié that it was not still the right moment and that the Prince had sent him the khilat of leave. If that is true, I hardly understand the conduct of Nizam Ali. Is this is not a sentiment of misplaced jealousy? Whatever it may be, I have dispatched two harkaras to Adoni with the order to find out where M. Belié could be, persuaded that if he had come as far as that place, he could have letters for me. The road from this place to Poona is so clear that it appears extraordinary that M. Belié should not have written me a word. I would have certainly extricated him from the embarrassment in which he appears to be.

I am writing to the Nawab Tahawwar Jang to know if it would not be possible to dispatch letters to you through his territory to the Coromandel Coast without any obstacles. I shall soon receive my harkaras.

A short time after my arrival at Poona, M. Aumont wrote to me from Hyderabad that he was in the service of the Nawab Manoir [\[Munawwar Khan.\]](#) Khan who paid him very badly and that he was very much embarrassed. He even wanted to come to me, but unable to get him enlisted in the service of the Marathas, I profited by his residence at Hyderabad to urge him in his turn to sound the dispositions of Nizam Ali. He did so with zeal and intelligence. I gave an account of it at that time to Messrs de Souillac and Chevreau, whose special friend he is, to induce the administrators to grant him a subsistence because of his utility at Hyderabad. I have not yet received a reply from these gentlemen, although it will soon be a year now. M. Aumont should now be with you, my General. You know him better than I and for a long time. I shall, therefore, dispense with speaking to you about him any more, convinced that those who render service to the nation in whatever manner it may be, have a claim on your kindness.

I have the honour to be with the most absolute and most respectful attachment,

My General,

(Signed) MONTIGNY.

P.S.—

Today the 27th May, I received letters from Nana Fadnavis and Haripant Phadke in reply to those which you wrote to them. From that of Nana, you will see that this Prince requests you to refer

yourself to all that I shall say to you concerning his dispositions and the situation of affairs here, the result of which and the oath he has given me by giving his hand that he will wait till the month of October before finally concluding peace with the English, and that if you appeared on the Malabar Coast at this epoch with your forces, he would join his to yours to march against the English.

To M. Warnet

Poona, July 19, 1783.

My friend,

I shall confine myself to inform you by this courier about the most important events that have just taken place here. You will thus know that the English made utmost efforts with the Regency to persuade it to sign peace by the complete surrender of Raghoba, and to induce it to sign this treaty finally, in which the majority of the Maratha chiefs had already acquiesced except Nana who alone stood firm against the general opinion, the English had not only made the sacrifice of Raghoba, but they have even restored all the places and all the territory which they had seized from the Marathas.

It was decided on June 23 to go and receive Raghoba. Haripant Phadke, Holkar, Raste and Visajipant Bapu left at the head of 20,000 cavalry to meet this unfortunate Prince; this event took place on the 10th of this month near Chandor, [Chandwad.] 100 koss from Poona. In spite of all the dexterity displayed by Nana Fadnavis in this negotiation, as I am communicating it to the General, the English never wanted to deliver Raghoba unless Nana finally signed the treaty. The chiefs of the Regency dispatched courier after courier to persuade the Prince, and the English, by covering themselves with shame in the eyes of all the princes of the country by the complete surrender of the person of Raghoba, succeeded in concluding a peace for which they had been longing for more than two years and the signing of which I had the good luck to delay till this moment.

Whilst all this was going on at 100 koss from Poona, I received a letter from M. de Malavois who was at a distance of 20 koss from here. I informed the Prince of the arrival of this officer entrusted with letters and presents from the General for the Regency. Nana Fadnavis immediately gave orders to go and receive M. de Malavois at a distance of one koss from the town. Ganeshpant was commissioned to go there with a detachment of 300 men. He came to seek me at my residence, and we went there together. I was at the height of my joy at this apparent turn of events, when two days later, I learnt the result of the English negotiations, the surrender of Raghoba and the restitution of all the places and of all the territory which the English had seized from the Regency. It would be difficult to express to you my surprise at this news.

I demanded audience of Nana Fadnavis before introducing M. de Malavois. I was furnished with the letter of June 18 from the General. I went to the Darbar with the very resolute intention to get an explanation from this Prince on all that had just taken place. Nana, as I am communicating it to M. Le Marquis de Bussy, confirmed all that I had heard. He fell back on the urgent necessity which forced him to give way to all the considerations to first of all obtain the possession of the person of Raghoba, which he would never have got, he said, without signing the treaty of peace which the English had been soliciting for more than two years, and always unsuccessfully till this epoch, and when he saw that the chiefs of the Regency were tired of waiting for the arrival of the French on the Malabar Coast, etc. I expressed to him my surprise in the strongest terms. Nur Mohammad Khan, Nawab Tipu Sultan's Waquil, was informed about it two hours after the conference which I had with Nana Fadnavis. He must have written about it to his master.

I told Nana, how much the General would be displeased with the agreement of peace which he had just concluded with our enemies who would always be his secretly, that finally, he must give me my audience of leave. The Prince tried to soothe me by all protestations of friendship and attachment for the French nation; he added that the peace he had made.....

I thought I ought to appear convinced of all that he said to me not to break openly and give me time to send news to M. Le Marquis de Bussy of the situation of affairs.....This is, my friend,

with what we may abide..... (in cipher) it will eagerly join its.....if not it.....only when it can do it with certainty. This is the expression of Nana Fadnavis.

I am writing to the General that I presume that it is necessary in the case when circumstances will not permit us.....that he will certainly think of negotiating more directly without, however,.....

I have just dispatched to Hyderabad the General's letters for the Subhedar and for Tedjenk. I have joined to them mine according to the orders of M. Le Marquis de Bussy. I have written them in a manner suitable to the actual situation. I am going to write often to this Court.

I confess to you, my friend, that the surprise in which the news of the agreement of peace first threw me, made me hesitate for some time over the decision whether I should deliver or retain the presents meant for the Regency, but the fresh assurances of friendship and the promise made to me.....led me to follow the earlier intentions of M. Le Marquis de Bussy. I am any day expecting audience of Nana Fadnis.

You will add to all this the blunder committed by M. Rousseau, French Consul at Basra in sending two express messengers to India charged with news most likely to make.....The Consul is a very good man, but he is ignorant of the fundamentals of Indian politics. He addresses letters in Persian.....to M. Le Marquis de Bussy and to all the individual commandants, which contain the news.....He adds that he obtained the news from our ambussador at Constantinople. He also announces the impending dissolution of the English Company which the King of England wants to reduce to a simple privilege of commerce. It is reported that it is Lord Cornwallis who is charged with this operation.

Messrs de Cotinal and Martin de Moncamp, bearers of this news, arrived on 27th May at Bombay and publicly pronounced.....These two gentlemen escaped from Bombay and arrived here on the 15th of this month, announcing the same news and saying that they had.....Fortunately, Ganeshpant sent them to me if I was surprised by all this unconvincing news.....I have made a packet of all these letters which I am dispatching to M. Le Marquis de Bussy with M. de Cotinal and I am keeping here his travelling companion until I receive orders from the General.....M. de Malavois undertakes to give you many details which I have not the time to send you and which it is advisable that you should transmit to the General.

Good-bye, my friend, I embrace you from the bottom of my heart.

MONTIGNY.

Poona, August 23, 1783.

My General,

I beg to inform you that I have just received the news of the death of M. de Beaubrun, the French Nation's Agent at Goa, deceased on July 30. I learn at the same time that during his sickness which turned out to be short and violent, he had set up M. D'houstan as his executor and tutor of his son, by handing over to him the official papers to follow the affair of the nation till the time you give orders to fill up this post. I have also received a letter from M. D'houstan whom I do not know at all. I do not know whether he is suitable or not to fulfil your objectives in this part. While awaiting your orders on this matter, I have written to him and have recommended to him to use the greatest caution while handling the official papers, those of M. de Beaubrun, and to do his best in getting information about the movements of the English in this part, communicate it to me and give you an account of it at once.

The Regency has just appointed Gopalrao, a trustworthy Brahmin, to reside with you in the capacity of a Waquil. But the reports of peace between France and England have so widely spread here that everything is in a state of inertia. It might as well happen that the Regency would still suspend the departure of the Waquil by a few days. I am doing my utmost to dispatch him to you as early as possible. He will bear out all that Nana Fadnavis has promised me and which I have already conveyed to you by my letter of July 19, and which it is useless to repeat here. The Regency continues to assure me that if the French appear in strength on the Malabar Coast, it will join its forces to ours and it will march against the English.

I have not received any news from Hyderabad or from Delhi. Everything is in a state of confusion in the Darbars. The English declare that peace is made in Europe and the princes believe in it. M. Asting [\[Warren Hastings.\]](#) has written to Nizam Ali that nothing is more true and this Prince has communicated it to Nana Fadnavis who spoke to me about it and I have lot of trouble in persuading him to the contrary.

I have always my eyes open on the events relating to Tipu Sultan, but nothing is moving and will not move to all appearances before the Regency knows how it stands vis-a-vis the French.

I have several letters here from the late M. de Beaubrun which I did not think it advisable to dispatch to you except through a sure channel lest they might be opened. M. de Beaubrun was interested in the release of Col. Mathews, who was made prisoner at Nagar, as a result of the requests made to him by this officer's wife. He also announces in them news about peace. I thought that if these letters happened to be opened, that would create a very bad effect on the mind of Tipu Sultan. I shall deliver them to Gopalrao when he leaves. My fears are founded on a letter from M. Piveron of June 26 by which he informs me that he is experiencing the greatest obstacles to correspond with the Coromandel Coast and that he is convinced that the Prince is intercepting the major part of his letters, etc. That is the motive which has prevented me from sending you those of M. de Beaubrun by this route. I am, however, thinking of sending this little packet through the Waquil of Tipu Sultan in the hope that it might pass.

I am, my General, most impatient to receive your orders on the conduct I should adopt here. In the meanwhile, I am occupied in putting the Regency in our interests and pointing out to it that it would be laying itself open to break with us if it ordered its forces to march against the Nawab Tipu Sultan who is our ally. I have the strongest assurances and I have reason to believe, from what I see here, that it will not make any move on this side.

On July 29, I delivered the letters and the presents which you had meant for Sawai Madhavrao and Nana Fadnavis. I offered compliments to the young prince on his marriage on your

behalf as you had charged me to do. He was very sensible of the tokens of remembrance and friendship which you had shown him. He added that he would very sincerely desire to be bound by a friendship with the French nation about whose good faith and military virtues Nana Fadnavis often spoke to him. They were extremely happy to read your letters and they will shortly reply to them and deliver the reply to the Waquil who will carry it to you and who had instructions to tell you all that the Regency has asked me to write to you. Immediately on the return of Haripant Phadke, I shall go to meet him and deliver to him the letter and the presents which you had meant for him.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) MONTIGNY

(True Copy)

P.S.—I had an occasion to intercept a packet coming from Bombay for Goa addressed to M. Gromelin, agent of the English nation in this colony. I found in a special letter that this agent was being informed of the arrival of General Elliot to Bombay on July 24; he was coming from Europe by the order of the Court of London and had spent only 4 months and 5 days for his voyage. He was bringing, it is reported, the confirmation of peace between France, England and Spain. The other letters contained in the packet referred only to commercial operations.

To M. Baudouin, Brigadier of the King's armies.

Pondicherry, October 8, 1783

My General,

On my arrival here in October 1782 and during the following months, I had the honour to give you an account in triplicate of the mission with which I was entrusted by M. de Montigny and the Regency of Poona to the Generals of the army and the navy. I have complied with the express orders which M. de Montigny had given me, to enclose in the same packet, the letter which he was writing to you, my General, as well as his correspondence since his residentship at Poona by order of M. De Souillac, and a copy of the proposals which the Maratha Court was dispatching to M. Duchemin and De Suffren, so that you might, by these combined details, judge the conduct which he was obliged to adopt and see at a glance what was the situation of affairs then. I have also had the honour to give you a detailed account of the capture of M. Le Comte de Chauvigny from the culter le Léopard, of the happy circumstances which helped me to save the packets with which we were entrusted, of the events which followed our arrival here, of the reception which M. Le Commandeur de Suffren gave me and generally of everything that came to my knowledge up to the month of January of this year. This latest packet, my General, ought to reach you with those of M. De Launay.

When I delivered the packets of the Regency to M. De Suffren, he greatly appreciated the plans of M. De Montigny and he would have very much wished that circumstances had permitted him to proceed to the other coast to put them into execution, but the news which he had just received from M. Le Marquis de Bussy who announced to him his arrival in India in December, did not permit him to form new plans. M. De Suffren could only reply to the Regency that he was pleased with its proposals, that M. de Bussy was ready to arrive with large forces, that he was obliged to go to meet this General, that probably he could operate on their Coast at the next monsoon.

By the letter which M. De Suffren wrote to M. De Montigny, he supplied him with the means to maintain the Regency in its good dispositions for us, but unable to decide anything under these circumstances, everything was deferred to the arrival of M. De Bussy which, as you know, my General, could take place only in March last.

M. Le Commandeur de Suffren, whom I had followed to Trinkomalee. introduced me to M. Le Marquis de Bussy at the time of his arrival, I had an excellent reception from him. He highly praised the conduct of M. De Montigny at the Court of the Marathas, and as soon as he had landed at Cuddalore, he dispatched a letter to the Regency of Poona to inform it of his arrival. M. De Bussy also sent to M. De Montigny a letter most satisfying for this officer. A few days later he sent him with M. de Malavois presents for Sawai Madhavrao, Nana Fadnavis and Haripant Phadke along with letters to assure them that he would send forces to their coasts as soon as the circumstances and the monsoon permitted it. He would communicate to them his plans with M. Warnet, whom he would send back to their presence, when they would become practicable. I was granted a subsistence until the circumstances permitted M. De Bussy to occupy himself with this matter. He also dispatched some funds to M. De Montigny for the most urgent expenses, and he ordered M. De Malavois to stay with him and help him in his operations.

Since this time, M. De Montigny had spent most anxious days at the Court of the Marathas. The absence of Tipu Sultan and the preoccupations of M. De Bussy on the Coromandel Coast prevented him from writing to the Regency and to M. De Montigny, and it was impossible for me to give to this officer any news of the situation of affairs on this coast for nearly three months.

Nana Fadnavis and the other chiefs of the Regency, anxious, or feigning to be so, about such a long silence, expressed to M. De Montigny great dissatisfaction at not having received any replies to

their proposals at a time when the English were pressing them to come to terms and were making them most advantageous offers for concluding peace. It was difficult for M. De Montigny to give them proper reasons to maintain them in their earlier good dispositions. However, having heard that something was being hatched with the English, he went to the Darbar and after a very long session, he obtained the oath and the word of Nana Fadnavis that he would neither conclude nor sign any peace with the English before the month of November, but that if the French did not appear by that time, he was resolved to accept the proposals of the English. M. De Montigny at once informed M. De Bussy about the latest resolutions of the Regency. But when they arrived, there were already reports that the preliminaries of peace were signed in Europe and a short time afterwards, M. De Bussy also learnt that the treaty of peace made since a long time between the Marathas and the English had just been signed. It would be very difficult for me to render you an exact account of all the unpleasant situations in which M. De Montigny found himself, especially for the past year. Without powers for himself, not receiving any orders, lacking money to probe the secrets of the Darbar and counterbalance the intrigues of the English. Having exhausted all the resources of a politics of words, he saw all his plans vanish with a mortal grief as a result of which he suffered an illness for three or four months; he has hardly recovered from it. You would feel very acutely, my General, the worries of this officer whose activity and zeal for the King's service is known to you. On reading the following extract of the letters of M. De Montigny to M. De Bussy and to me, I have no doubt, my General, but that, after the countless kindnesses about which M. De Montigny has spoken to me and which you have always had for him, you would be sensible of the anxieties he has gone through in this mission as unpleasant as ticklish. It was not possible for him to foresee them when you sent him to India.

M. De Bussy has not received any news from M. de Montigny since 19th July. As there was no longer anything for me to be done on this coast, I requested M. De Bussy to send me back with the replies, which he would judge proper, for the Regency and his orders for M. De Montigny. I presented to him an account of the advances which I had made to M. De Montigny from which he had already paid me Rs. 4,000 and promised to pay the rest. But times having changed, he did not think that this payment should be made by him. He referred me to M. De Montigny with the promise to send him funds necessary to pay me. I confess to you, my General, that it is not at all encouraging for a merchant, who, for the welfare of the King's service, lends money without interest for two years, to run the risk of waiting for four years and of being paid only in France.

M. De Bussy has delivered to me letters for the Regency in keeping with the circumstances. M. De Montigny should remain at Poona until fresh orders which will be dispatched to him after the receipt of ministerial packets; these are shortly expected. The unexampled attachment which M. De Montigny has for you, my General, whom he always considers as his benefactor has led him to authorise me to write to you with much greater liberty than I should have taken in any other case. The capacity of a sincere friend of M. De Montigny encouraged me to set forth before you, in my letter of the months of October 1782 and January 1783. the situation of his affairs, the inevitable failure of his plans at Delhi because of the order he received to remain at Poona, the little hope that remains for him to secure not a fortune, but means to live according to his position. I have, therefore, taken the liberty to point out to you that the only means to console this worthy officer was to appoint him as a head of a colony in India at the signing of peace, rightly convinced as you are of the zeal and the exactness with which he would acquit himself of it. I would sincerely wish that my letter reaches you in time. I intend, my General, to leave tomorrow for Poona, to give account there of my mission to M. De Montigny, terminate there as quickly as possible my affairs and return to France at the earliest opportunity, filled with sentiments which M. De Montigny has awakened in my heart. Immediately on my arrival, I shall hasten to come and pay you my respects and request you to grant me your favours.

I am sending you, my General, the latest letter which M. De Montigny has dispatched to this coast to your address. It was delivered to M. Burdin, but this gentleman whom M. De Montigny had very strongly recommended me to meet, did not come to this coast and I took possession of it. I am also sending you, my General, all that I could collect of the correspondence of M. De Montigny, very much convinced that his intention is to submit all his work to you.

I am respectfully,

My General,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

J. WARNET.

Poona, October 20, 1783.

My General,

I had the honour to inform you by my letter of August 23, while giving you an account of other matters, that the Regency had just appointed Gopalrao, a trustworthy Brahmin, to reside with you in the capacity of a Waquil. On September 17, he was introduced in a public audience to Sawai Madhavrao by Nana Fadnavis. I was invited to this audience with M. de Malavois whom I have always taken to the Darbar since he has been here. He was a witness of the conference I had with Nana Fadnavis. This Prince once again repeated to me that whether war continues or peace is made, the Regency had the most sincere desire to preserve the friendship of the French and form an alliance with our nation, that he knew the perfidy of the English, that he did not rely on the faith of their treaty, that they had already broken it thrice and that he would willingly break with them if he could do it with safety, that is to say, by joining his forces to ours, and that he would inviolably keep his word if the French appeared in force on the Malabar Coast and that in case peace was made, as every one assured him it is, it was always good to be bound in friendship against an ambitious and perfidious nation which would not fail to commit hostilities at the earliest opportunity. Nana Fadnavis manifested the greatest desire that M. de Malavois should accompany the Waquil to give you a direct account of his desire to form the friendship and the alliance with our nation. M. de Malavois, about whom I can give you only the best testimony, felt like me the necessity to accompany this Waquil to inspire the greatest confidence in the Regency which gave an indication that it strongly desired it. When I found that my hands were forced on this departure and moreover, convinced that it was your desire to placate this Court, I finally acquiesced in the demand of Nana Fadnavis. Thus, M. de Malavois returns to you, my General, with the Maratha Waquil. He has seen and heard everything; he will give an exact account of it.

I would have very much liked to send this trustworthy officer to Hyderabad to know in greater detail the present situation at the Court of Nizam Ali about which I have not received any news since nearly three months when I sent your dispatches to the Princes accompanied by my letters. But I could not send M. de Malavois to Hyderabad without producing the worst effect here.

In view of the situation of affairs and the special desire of Nana Fadnavis, I took the decision which, I thought, could reconcile everything. M. de Malavois therefore leaves with the Waquil and the Prince is happy. On the other hand, I have dispatched on the 12th of this month M. Geslin to Hyderabad with the duplicate of your first dispatch and an instruction based on the present situation of affairs. This officer, who has been with me for the last two years and to whom I have already entrusted several missions inland, left Poona without causing any sensation to the Sarkar. For this purpose, I sent him without the dastak of the Prince to better achieve my object. I know that there were troubles at Hyderabad caused by the jealousy among the big chiefs of this Court, but I do not know the particular details as well as the true motive. As soon as I receive news from that quarter, I shall communicate it to you as well as that from the Court of Delhi from which I am expecting replies any moment.

Day before yesterday I received an harkara from the Emperor's army camped under the walls of Dig. I am informed by a letter from a Frenchman dated August 15, that the harkaras whom I had dispatched to the Padshah and who were entrusted with the replies from this Prince, from Mirza Shafi Khan and the Raja Himmat Bahaddur, were robbed at a distance of 30 Koss from the Emperor's army by a detachment of the Ruhellas. The letters, which they were carrying, were seized, and they returned to the army empty handed and very ill-treated.

Shinde, after taking possession of Gwalior, is now occupied in laying a siege to Gohad. This Maratha Chief, at the head of an army, 80,000 strong, is absolutely allied with the English. He has with him the Counsellor Anderson and several English officers.

M. de Malavois, whom I have posted with the latest details that I have received from the Court of Delhi, will communicate them to you.

The English have spread the news of their peace with the French in Europe so widely that all the Darbars of India are now convinced of it and testify to the fact indeed by their lack of enthusiasm and their coolness today. That is what delayed so far the departure of Gopalrao whom the Regency is now finally dispatching to you.

Raghoba is still at Commburry [\[Kopargaon.\]](#) on the Ganga, 60 Koss from Poona and under the direct guard of the Maratha Government.

I have not been able to know as yet about the plan of campaign of the Regency for this year. All the information that I could obtain on this subject goes to convince me more than ever that the Marathas are most anxious to march against Nizam Ali and Tipu Sultan. The subsequent circumstances will decide them. In the meantime, they are making preparations to send their cavalry to Gujarat in order to secure the fidelity of Fattah Sing who is known in Poona to be secretly in favour of the English, of whom the Marathas continue to be secret enemies; they are only waiting as I have already told you, for the favourable moment to declare themselves openly against them. In xis weeks' time I shall know their final resolutions. I shall be very prompt, my General, in communicating them to you.

I attach to this letter a general account of the expenses that I have incurred here for the King's service in the course of the years 1781, 1782 and up to November 1, 1783. I request you to kindly cast a glance on the statement of these expenses and you will see from it what the balance is with me. I am sending you a copy of a letter of October 28, which M. D'hougan has written to me. You will notice the embarrassment in which he appears to be, with respect to me as well as to the officers and sailors, formerly prisoners at Bombay, and whom the English want to send to Goa. I thought it my duty to write to M. D'hougan and to Messrs. Camotins to co-operate in providing for the needs of the officers and sailors who are already at Goa as well as of those who may still come there.

I request you, my General, to kindly give me most positive orders on the conduct which I must adopt here henceforward.

I have the honour to be etc.

(Signed) MONTIGNY

(True Copy)

P.S.—I have just received the news of the death of M. de Chauvigny which has certainly been premature because of the shameful treatment which the English meted out to him. That is what you could see from the extract of a letter from M. Clerget, which is attached herewith.

I am profiting by the return of M. de Malavois to send you all the old and recent letters of the late M. de Beaubrun and of M. D'hougan which I did not think it advisable to send via the Darbar of Tipu Sultan on whom I cannot depend.

Poona, November 10, 1783.

My General,

I have at last received my harkaras from Delhi for whom I have been waiting for a long time. They have brought me letters from the Emperor, from the Nawab Mirza Shafi Khan and the Raja Himmat Bahaddur, of which I attach herewith a copy. I have also received a letter from the Emperor for you, my General, as well as from his Commander-in-Chief Mirza Shafi Khan, which will testify to you the pleasure the Padshah has felt at your presence in the continent at the head of the French, the hope which he conceives from it and his particular desire to be bound by a friendship with our nation. You will see from the letters written to me by the Raja Himmat Bahaddur and the Nawab Mirza Shafi Khan the present situation of the Court of Delhi. These princes recall to me the promises I had given four years ago and the agreements I had made with the late Najaf Khan, then the Generalissimo of the Empire, and would indeed like to see them put into execution. They nevertheless realise that there have been obstacles so far in their execution. They declare that they have up to this moment rejected all the proposals of the English in the hope of our success and in the hope that the French would make agreements with the Court of Delhi as I had announced it. They even add that they are waiting for a final reply on this point to decide their stand vis-a-vis the English who are today 40 Koss from Delhi with two brigades to support their negotiations with the Emperor and who are, moreover, showering most flattering promises and presents of all kinds to induce this Prince to form a solid alliance with them.

The present situation of affairs did not permit me to reply to these princes in a satisfactory manner. I have given them, although in a vague manner, hopes and have informed them that I was any day awaiting news and orders from you, my General, that I shall then communicate to them your decision with respect to this continent in pursuance of the orders the King whose absolute confidence you enjoy for all the political and military affairs of India. I think, my General, that you will approve the caution in my reply in view of our actual situation. As I have not yet received your orders since the publication of the peace which, as it is reported, is made, I continue to believe that I am authorized not to confirm this news until I receive your orders on this point. I am adopting this course for fear that I may not conduct myself according to the plan, which the circumstances of peace, of which I do not know the terms, could have led you to decide.

I, very impatiently, desire to receive your final orders on the conduct I should adopt today with respect to the princes, with whom I am in contact, in order to be in a position to give them a reply, precise and which justifies in their eyes the frankness of my negotiations with them and our present position in the continent. What some Frenchmen have written to me about the Raja Himmat Bahaddur, who was, they say, in favour of the English, and of which I have informed you, does not appear to me to be true from the letters which I have just received. The persons who are not at all initiated into the Darbars judge only from the outward appearance, and it is a sure means of deceiving oneself.

So the worst has happened, my General, peace destroys all our hopes. The revolution, which they were justified in expecting from your presence in India and which was already prepared, will not take place. The English will thus continue to be the tyrants of a people who had placed their hope in our support and your guidance. I shall not pursue my reflexions any further. Certainly, major considerations have decided this peace. The wisdom of our Minister, always occupied with the glory and interest of the Nation, must have weighed the advantages and the disadvantages. But one cannot help regretting that circumstances should not have allowed you time to operate a revolution which would have added lustre to the French name in India.

After numerous delays the Regency is finally dispatching Gopalrao. He leaves with M. de Malavois as I have informed you by my letter of October 20. I would wish that they were indeed both

in a position to communicate to you the situation of affairs, since correspondence via the Darbar of Tipu Sultan is so precarious and uncertain.

I have not yet received any news from Tahawwar Jang or from Nizam Ali. I hope to receive it soon through the officer whom I have dispatched to Hyderabad on October 12.

I have received a letter from M. Rivière who informs me about the arrival of M. Aumont at Mondepely on September 17. I am very much surprised not to have still received letters from him. It is to be presumed, my General, that if he had any important matters from you to be conveyed to me, I should have received them more than 15 or 20 days ago.

Herewith is attached a copy of the letter addressed to me by Dom Frederic, Governor of Goa, with regard to the opposition which the late M. de Beaubrun had offered to the sale of guns belonging to M. de la Lei. This opposition had been offered because of the intimation which I had received from Hyderabad through M. Aumont that an Englishman was charged with acquiring them. Actually this Englishman was at that time in Goa for buying them. I gave information about it to M. de Beaubrun who laid the necessary embargo so that these arms did not pass into the hands of our enemies. Today that peace is made, I thought, my General, that you would not disapprove if we allowed the sale of the arms which belong to M. de la Lei and which have cost him big interest as a result of the loans which this officer was obliged to take. Consequently, I thought I could write to M. Dom Frederic the letter of which I attach herewith a copy to give you an account of everything that I have done in this matter. The late M. de Beaubrun must have then written about it to M. Duchemin.

M. D'houstan has just sent me a packet, addressed to you, which I am handing over to M. de Malavois. This agent is in the greatest embarrassment about funds. He tells me that the Nation owes Rs. 30,000 without interest and that M. L. Monneron informed him by a letter of June 19, that he had allowed a bill of exchange for 13,000 piastres to be protested. He earnestly solicits to be either confirmed in the post he is occupying by a formal Patent, or relieved if you are appointing another one. I have written to Messrs Camotins to advise them to help M. D'houstan in obtaining funds necessary for him to meet the expenses caused by the sailors, soldiers and naval officers to whom he gives a subsistence while assuring them that I would give you an account of their zeal and of their work in this matter.

I have the honour to be etc.

(Signed) MONTIGNY

(True Copy)

P.S.—M. de Malavois and the Waquil are taking the route to Kurnool instead of passing through Badami, where I expected that they would proceed. But we had reflected much on the slowness of the journey through the Kingdom of Tipu Sultan as well as on the other disadvantages and we decided upon that of Kurnool to avoid, if it is possible, passing through the Kingdom of this Prince. M. de Malavois expects to avoid the obstacles on the route with discretion.

The report is spread here more than 25 days back that the French Consul had taken possession of the Lodge which we have at Surat. I have no definite news about it. I have dispatched harkaras to find out the truth.

Poona, November 21, 1783.

My General,

I beg to inform that I have just received a letter from M. Warnet and a packet from M. Aumont which is addressed to you and which I am immediately dispatching to M. de Malavois who is on his way to your headquarters along with the Maratha Waquil.

I learn from M. Warnet's letter that M.le Marquis de Castries has sent you a copy of the treaty of peace which the Marathas have made with the English and that this treaty is previous to the proposals of agreement which the Regency has sent you. Unable to meet Nana Fadnavis till day before yesterday because of the secret conferences which are being held for some days past here, I sent for the confidential Brahmin, entrusted with our affairs with the Marathas, and told him that I was informed that the Minister had sent you a copy of the treaty which the Regency had made with the English. I questioned him a lot on this point. At the end, he confessed that it was quite true that pestered by the leaders of the Regency to conclude the peace with the English, Nana had made proposals to them, but that to gain time, he had insisted that the proposals should be passed on to, and be signed by, the King of England before he could conclude peace with them, in order to give the French time to appear on the Malabar Coast before the treaty was returned, and that then his object was to break with them openly, because he could then do so with safety, and that by adopting this conduct he kept the principal chiefs of the Regency in the hope of concurring with their views : this was his motive; but that these were only proposals not then signed. I asked him why this agreement was concealed from me, for, this conduct on their part manifested their dishonesty. Ganeshpant replied to me that Nana, Haripant Phadke and two other big chiefs of the Regency were alone in the know of it and that all this was done in a most secret manner. In fact, my General, in spite of all that I could then do to probe the shroud that surrounded this Darbar, it was impossible for me to know what every one was ignorant of here except the Prince, the General and some principal chiefs of the Regency.

I am due to meet Nana Fadnavis shortly and I shall let him know what you have communicated me on this subject. But it is easy to foresee his reply from that of his confidential man, of which I have just given you an account. The fact is that the Chief of the Regency detests the English and that he would willingly break with them if he could do so with safety, and that he had the greatest desire to see the French appear on the Malabar Coast during the last two years that I am here. The unfortunate and successive events we have met with prevented us from making our appearance there. These people will never make a move without that, Nana Fadnavis had repeatedly said to me : The English have deceived me thrice consecutively and I shall not show any scruple to deceive them in my turn. I shall join my forces to those of the French against the common enemy. Without that I shall not undertake anything against them, because I am not sure of all the chiefs of the Court. This is what he has constantly said to me and which the Waquil, whom the Regency has dispatched to you, will repeat to you.

M. Warnet has also communicated to me that your intention was not to leave any one at the courts of the Indian princes, that it involved expenses and that information could never be had in time. I am more than convinced of that because of the lack of established Daks and the obligation to send the dispatches *via* the Darbars, especially that of Tipu Sultan. I can produce more than one instance of it, since it is true that several times during 4 to 5 months, I did not receive orders and letters from the Coromandel Coast. Everything changes here so rapidly that without the most regular correspondence, one is never informed in time about matters essential to be known, but that was not my fault. It is the Darbar of Tipu Sultan which intercepted dispatches. As for expenses, it will be easy for you, my General, to see by my account that I have incurred only those which were indispensable, and I know that you have had the kindness to do me justice on this point as well as on my zeal for the King's service.

M. Aumont also informs me that your intention was to withdraw the officers who are in the service of the princes for fear of offending the English, that you are any day expecting the arrival of a frigate from Europe which would bring you final orders and that you would then pass on yours to me. I am very impatiently awaiting them, and I assure you that I shall be very prompt in executing them. M. Aumont appeared to me surprised and hurt at the fact that I had written to the Prince at Hyderabad that you intended to send some confidential person to Nizam Ali. In this proceeding I only followed the orders which you had given me and which are recorded in your letter of March 28 written from Cuddalore.

The officer whom I had dispatched to Hyderabad to get the replies to your letters, will return and join me. M. Aumont who is now charged with carrying out your intentions at the Court of Nizam Ali will exclusively occupy himself with the job, and I shall frequently correspond with him to communicate to you the position of affairs according to your intentions. Since the certainty of peace, I have reduced as much as it was possible for me the items of expenditure here. I am going to dispatch to the Coast the officer I have with me. I shall then be alone.

Raghoba is very ill. Haripant Phadke has gone to see him. The Marathas are camping to the north and at half a koss from the town. I still do not know any of their plans.

The English have spread a report at Bombay, which has found its way to the Darbar of Poona and which Nana has just communicated to me, that they have already received reinforcements in men and arms at Madras and that they are still expecting fresh ones at Bombay which they will unite with other forces and that afterwards they would break with us. All that I know is that they are filling their stores at Bombay with munitions of war and provisions, as if they were preparing for some important expedition; they have already transport ships filled with these items, but I am ignorant of their destination.

I have this very moment received a letter from M. D'houan by which he informs me that a Councillor of Bombay coming from Mangalore had assured him that M. de Cossigny had been unable to proceed to Mahé as you had ordered him to do; that Tipu Sultan had secretly raised for him some obstacles in his way, that several of his soldiers had enlisted themselves in the Nawab's service and that he had been obliged to have one of them hanged to set an example. I do not know whether this news is true. You must have been informed of it.

A French ship has arrived at Cochin straight from Europe. It is laden with merchandise for Surat and ought to pass at Goa.

M. D'houan informs me that he has at Goa 50 men both sailors, soldiers and naval officers who are bothering him to make arrangements for their departure. Some are dying almost every week from bad climate. It is very important that some one goes to seek them in order not to lose them all.

I have the honour to be etc.

(True Copy)

(Signed) MONTIGNY.

Poona, December 14, 1783

My General,

Raghoba has died. The news of his death, which took place on the 11th of this month, reached Nana Fadnavis yesterday evening, he communicated it to me this morning. This event upsets the political designs of the English to a great extent, but frees the Regent from all anxiety on this score, and gives him more stability than ever in the important post that he occupies. The big Maratha chiefs like Shinde and Bhonsle are a little disconcerted in their ambitious plans, and the English who are courting them so hard are none the less upset, as they can no more find in these powerful chiefs the succour and the support which they expected from them to turn Raghoba's claims to account in due course. The death has confounded their politics and deprives them of all hope on this side.

I met Nana Fadnavis and spoke to him about the copy of the treaty which he had made with the English and which the Minister sent you. He said to me word for word what I have written to you by my letter of 21st November last : that it was quite true that pressed by the chiefs of the Regency and especially by the English, he had acquiesced in their proposals of peace, but that these proposals had not then been signed finally, that he had been constrained to make these agreements to gain time and give the French the interval to appear on the Malabar Coast and that he even insisted that these proposals should be signed by the King and the Parliament of England, convinced that before the treaty was returned the French would have already joined their forces to those of the Regency and that then his object was to break openly with the English, being at this time in a position to do so with safety. This Prince charged me with telling you, my General, that his intention had not changed, that he would be constant, and that if the French came in force on the Malabar Coast, he would unite all the forces of the Regency with ours to destroy and expel the English from that coast; he mortally detested them. He several times repeated to me that we had made our peace with the English in Europe and that the latter had informed him of the news before the month of July, and that not seeing any likelihood of our coming to the Malabar Coast in spite of all that I had said to him on this point, he had finally concluded peace with them. And then the episode of Raghoba; you know the rest, he added. At the bottom of his heart he would always be enemy of a nation which had so often deceived him; in short, we could always count on his word. As he appeared to me very uneasy about the fact that we had made peace in Europe, I thought it advisable to give him an indication that it could not be a solid and long-lived peace, that it was in his interest as well as in that of all the Indian princes to be allied with the French; and that it was the only naval power capable of helping them powerfully against a perfidious and ambitious nation, an enemy of all the others, and which sacrifices everything to the interests of its commerce. This Prince appeared to me very much convinced of the advantage which the Marathas can derive by winning the friendship of the French, and has charged me to inform you once again that he has nothing so much at heart as to form a close alliance with our nation. The arrival of Krishnarao Ballal ended the conference which I had with the Regent. Such was the result of the audience which Nana gave me on December 13.

The transport ships, about which I spoke to you in my letter of November 21, left Bombay for the south of the Malabar Coast with the intention of carrying men and munitions of war to subdue the places and the ports which belong to Tipu Sultan along this coast.

General Elliot every day trains sipahees at Bombay. They have at present five battalions of fresh recruits ready to take the field, and nearly a thousand Europeans. Everything gives an indication of their hostile views for the coming campaign. However, they have not yet received troops from Europe as they had announced it. Some one assured me that they were not really expecting any, but that it was a rumour which they had spread to impose on the Marathas.

I am always waiting to receive your orders to know the conduct I should adopt here. In the meanwhile, I continue to keep the people in dispositions favourable to our interests and views which I suppose the French preserve on this country.

I have the honour to be etc.

(Signed) MONTIGNY

(True Copy)

Poona, December 28, 1783.

My Lord,

I had the honour to inform you by my dispatch of 14th May of the capture of the cutter le Lézard on which travelled M. de Chauvigny who underwent the same fate. This seizure was made against the law of nations on October 2, 1782 in the roadstead of Tranquebar under the protection of the Danish forts. Since then the English have transferred M. de Chauvigny to the fort of Bombay where he fell ill a short time after his arrival. The harsh treatment which he suffered at the hands of the officers of the Company, have no doubt brought about his premature death which took place on 14th September. The letter which I received from the French surgeon who attended on him till the last moment, has confirmed all what I already knew on this subject. I cannot, express to you, my Lord, how much I am grieved at the loss of this officer. The interest you took in him, the persons to whom he had the advantage to be related and whom I respect, my well founded hope to see him deserve your kindness, are as many considerations which augment my grief and my personal feelings for this officer who had for me a real attachment.

I had also informed you, my Lord, that I had conferred on May 5, the Captain's commission on M. de Malavois on the demand made to me by M. de Bussy, who had sent him to Poona with letters and presents for the Regency. Since then I have sent back this officer to M. de Bussy to give him an account of the situation of affairs. He accompanied the Waquil whom the Maratha Court has dispatched to the General to communicate to him its dispositions for the French nation.

M. de Malavois, formerly Lieutenant in the Engineering Corps of the Colonies, has talents which can be very well utilized for the benefit of the (King's) service.

Yesterday, the 27th, I conferred the commission of the Lieutenant on M. Geslin de Chateaufur who has been with me at Poona for two years and whom I had occasion to employ usefully for the King's service. I shall take advantage of the ships of the squadron, which M. de Bussy is dispatching to the Malabar Coast, to send this officer to the Coromandel Coast with my latest packets for the General. I shall then be alone here, awaiting the orders concerning the situation of affairs.

I learn at this very moment that there are French ships on the Malabar Coast which are going to set sail for France at the end of March. I shall very eagerly profit by them, my Lord, to give you an account of the political situation in the interior of India and of the result of my work during my residentship at the Court of Poona, where I would have very much desired that circumstances had put me in a position to be of greater utility.

I am respectfully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

MONTIGNY.

Poona, January 3, 1784.

My General,

I had the honour to inform you by my letter of 14th December about the result of the conference which I had with Nana Fadnavis on the dispositions of the Prince for our nation and about his particular intention to be allied with it. To day he sent for me at the Darbar to speak again on the general situation of affairs. He first of all repeated to me what he had already said to me during the last audience about the alliance which he desires to form with us, and which fact I communicated to you by my latest dispatch. He next expatiated much on the success of the English in the south of the Malabar Coast, and said to me that their plan appeared to have for its sole aim to seize all the ports and fortresses which belong to Tipu Sultan along this coast, that they had seized Palicachery some days back and that thereby opened the way to (Sriranga) patan, his capital that they had laid seige to Cannanore the principal fortress of which is already in their hands, that they are spreading the report at Goa that Calicut is actually seized. The English are apparently going to give a finishing touch to their plans, and everything gives an indication of the project, which they had formed long back to conquer the Peninsula.

I availed myself of all these movements of the English to impress upon the Prince how much it would be essential for all the preponderent powers of the Continent to come to an agreement with each other and act in concert against the common enemy by securing the help and support of the French for the future, etc., that, in short, that was the only way to get rid of a nation whose dishonesty, ambition and cupidity had for its aim only to bring all the princes of the country under their domination and next seize all the trade of India. Nana Fadnavis appeared to me convinced of my proposition as well as of the impossibility to unite all the powers at the same time against the English. He recalled to me on this point the confederation which had taken place in 1780 between the Marathas, Nizam Ali and Haideralikhan; this confederation was first of all dissolved by the defection of Nizam Ali; next Haider had seized from us, he continued, territory fetching a revenue of 60 lakhs which he had promised to restore to us. Nothing of it has been executed; he had sent us every year a few lakhs and elephants trying to avoid the promise he had given us by means of small presents. Tipu Sultan has followed the conduct of his father, and matters are today in such a state that only the French united with the Marathas and the subhedar (of the Deccan) with sufficient forces to lay a siege to Bombay and Madras, can operate the general revolution. I noticed during the whole conference with the Prince the hatred which he has vowed to the English as well as the opinion which he has at the same time formed of the superior forces which they can deploy at any moment on the coasts of the Peninsula; and this consideration impresses him much, him as well as all the princes of India whom the English hold to day in a kind of consternation, especially since they know that our peace is made with them in Europe. Nana Fadnavis terminated his audience by telling me that he would gladly see the union of our forces with those of the Marathas to expel the English from the Malabar Coast and from Bengal. This Prince appears to me in the dispositions he has always manifested, but he will not make a move without the certainty of a solid and permanent liaison supported by our forces and by the presence of our squadron on the Malabar Coast. It will be the same with Nizam Ali. These princes will break with the English only when they can do it with safety.

Today, peace is made; all the combinations on the actual politics of the princes of the country necessarily cease. I think that the question now is to instil in them the desire to secure our friendship and our support for the future events of war I, therefore, confine myself now to make them envisage their interest and ours from this point of view.

I earnestly request you, my General, to kindly give me definite orders on what I should say at present to Nana Fadnavis and to the Emperor concerning the situation of affairs and how I should terminate with the Regency of Poona.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) MONIIGNY

(True Copy)

P.S.—My General,

M. Geslin whom, I had dispatched to Hyderabad to carry the duplicate of your letters, met Nizam Ali, Tahawwar Jang and Sourrabenk [[Sohrab Jang.](#)] along with M. Aumont who had then returned from the Coromandel Coast. These princes, informed of our peace with the English, said only polite and vague things on the desire the Subhedar of the Deccan had to be allied with the French nation. This officer has brought me back letters from Nizam Ali, Tahawwar Jang and Sohrab Jang which, when properly appraised signify nothing. Nizam Ali gives me to understand that it is very surprising that we should have left Tipu fighting with the English after making peace with them. He also speaks of the huge expenses which this Prince had incurred in favour of the French, etc. It is to be presumed that Tipu Sultan must not have failed to give an unfavourable twist to all that has taken place to dissuade this Prince from reseeking our alliance. That is what I think on this subject and which is easy to believe from the uneasy, jealous and (ambitious?) character of the Nawab.

To day I presume that Gopalrao and M. de Malavois have reached their destination.

M. Warnet has not yet arrived at Goa; at least I have no news of it.

Poona, February 12, 1784

My General,

I have just now received a letter from M. le Chevalier de Peinier of January 19, with a packet addressed to you, which I am dispatching to you by the land route with a duplicate of the dispatches which I have sent since the departure of M. de Malavois. My harkara, charged with the packet of M. le Chevalier de Peinier, fell ill on the way and causes a delay of 12 days.

M. le Chevalier de Peinier has informed me of the orders which he has received from you, my General, to pay me Rs. 20,000 at Goa. He has delivered them to M. D'Houdan de Villeneuve with instructions to send them to me here. According to your intentions, which have been communicated to me by M. de Moneron, Comptroller of the army, I shall settle with this sum of Rs. 20,000 my accounts with M. Warnet. The surplus will serve me for the current expenses of which I shall give you the account.

M. Warnet has arrived at Goa on the ships of the squadron on January 2, and will shortly proceed to Poona where I hope to have his affairs terminated in accordance with the favourable dispositions of the Sarkar.

Haripant Phadke is at 60 koss from here on the road to Hyderabad with 15,000 cavalry. I am still in the dark about the plans of the Regency. Nana Fadnavis is camping at half a koss from the town and will shortly proceed to join Haripant Phadke with 20,000 cavalry, whose number will go on augmenting till his departure from here [These movements were directed against Tipu Sultan.]. I am just returning from the camp where I met the Prince who knows that I am writing to you. He has charged me again to assure you of his high consideration, of his friendship and of his attachment for you as well as of his special desire to be allied with the French nation.

I have received one of my harkaras from Hyderabad who has brought me a letter from M. Aumont; it informs me that the peace between the French and the English has changed the dispositions of the Prince who appears to be in a state of uncertainty on the conduct he ought to adopt. Nizam Ali has learnt the news of the death of Raghoba with grief and concern, for, it makes Nana Fadnavis more stable than ever in the important place which he occupies by delivering him from such a dangerous rival.

I have not received any news from the Court of Delhi.

The English are employing more than ever in the Darbars the means they have used so far with such advantage, I mean that they stir up secret manoeuvres of intrigue and seduction to try to dissuade the princes of the country as much as they can from a solid liaison with the French; they (the English) indeed feel that it can only become fatal to them.

I shall no longer send my dispatches through the Kingdom of Tipu Sultan, still less *via* his Darbar. You will see its motives from the copy, attached herewith, of a letter from M. Piveron of December 14, which I am addressing you.

Poona, February 22, 1784

My General,

I beg to inform you that I have received a packet from Goa containing two of your letters which you had entrusted to M. Warnet. One is for Nana Fadnavis and the other for Haripant Phadke. I have just returned from the army after delivering to Nana Fadnavis that which you have addressed to him and by which you inform him that peace is signed to day between France and England and by which you also express to him the sincere desire of the King of France to live on good terms with the Maratha Court and be bound by a friendship with it. I can assure you, my General, that the Prince was so satisfied with this latest disposition of His Majesty that he expressed his happiness about it in the least equivocal manner in the presence of several Maratha chiefs who were then at the Darbar. He was even pleased to relate to them the details and the success of the battle which you gave to the English on June 13, and of the glorious day of the 20th of the same month [This is a reference to the action that took place between the French and the English at Cuddalore, in which Suffren dealt a crippling blow to the English fleet under Admiral Hughes who was forced to fall back upon Madras.]. These are his very words : “If General Bussy had not had a decided advantage over the English, I am certain that they (the English) would not have been in such a haste to show the signing of the preliminaries, for, such is the dishonesty of this nation that we can rest assured that if the French had suffered reverses on this day, the English would have followed their advantage without uttering a word about the news of peace which they had just received”. This is how, my General, Nana Fadnavis has expressed himself; his hatred for the English could not but burst out against them at this moment. I explained to the Regent all the circumstances of the peace in the sense and manner which you could desire. He charged me to assure you that nothing was more agreeable to him than the proposals of alliance and friendship which, as you advise him, ought to exist between the French and the Marathas. Nana is going to reply to you, but I am afraid M. le Chevalier de Peinier might quit the Malabar Coast before my harkaras reach Goa. I am dispatching them this very moment. I shall dispatch the Prince’s letter as soon as he delivers it to me.

M. Warnet could be at Poona, from what he informs me, only on the 15th of April at the earliest. This merchant has gone to Cochin for some commercial transactions. Nana Fadnis has promised me to terminate his affairs as soon as he comes here. I am sending him two harkaras of the Sarkar and one dastak of the Prince which he has just himself handed over to me. I hope, from the favourable dispositions which he has testified to me, that M. Warnet will obtain justice which is due to him. Your urgent recommendation in his favour has produced on the mind of Nana Fadnavis the desired effect.

I have the honour to inform you that I shall follow the army of Nana Fadnavis until I receive your orders. He would start in 15 or 20 days time at the latest. Moreover, he has obtained a promise from me to accompany him.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) MONTIGNY

(True Copy)

P.S.—Nana Fadnavis is every day awaiting news from Gopalrao who must have long back presented himself before you along with M. de Malavois.

Poona, February 28, 1784.

My Lord,

I beg to address you a copy of my correspondence with the Generals. I also attach to it that of the agreements which the Maratha Court proposed to the nation a short time after my arrival at Poona and the reflections I thought it advisable to make on the same agreements.

It will be easy for you, my Lord to adjudge from this correspondence, my work at the Court of the Regency of Poona, as well as that at the Court of Delhi and that at the Court of the Subhedar of the Deccan, and to conclude from it that it did not depend on me if things have taken the course which you know and which we could hardly expect. Unfortunate circumstances have certainly got the better of the events, but I am more than ever convinced of what I had the honour to say to you, my Lord, that the surest means to operate the revolution in India will always be to begin on the Malabar Coast by the siege of Bombay as the most important capture to be made and the most fatal blow to be dealt to the English, which they rightly consider as the only point d'appui which a naval power can have in these regions.

I am certain that if M. de Bussy could have come in time with his combined forces and if he were not obliged to follow the first operation on the Coromandel Coast, he would not have hesitated for a moment to open the campaign by the siege of Bombay, of which he undoubtedly knows all the advantages for the success of a revolution. Peace is made today; other considerations occupy the Ministry. I pass on to the conduct of the English with the Regency of Poona.

The chiefs of the Councils of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay spread the report that peace was made between their nation and the Marathas since nearly two years ago. They have only followed in this proceeding their usual tactics to impose upon the public. What proves the falsity of their statement on this question is the last battle which the Marathas had with them in the beginning of April 1783. The English had dispatched a a convoy from Bombay for Mangalore, charged with munitions of war and provisions, carrying 400 sipahees, 20 officers, 50 Europeans, several field guns, 6,000 muskets, and colonels Makland and Amistine [\[Colonels Macleod and Humberstone. Neither of them was killed but both were captured.\]](#) on six transport ships. The last one was killed in the fight. Finally, after a brisk and bloody battle, the Marathas carried off the convoy. The Council of Bombay was disconcerted by this seizure which might have been of great help for the English, without this event, for their expedition on Mysore, the object of which was to create a diversion to favour their operations on the Coromandel Coast. At this time, the English redoubled their entreaties with the Maratha Court to induce it to negotiate with them. A short time afterwards arrived the news of the peace from Europe *via* Basra. They hastened to inform the Regency of it, which fact destroyed the hopes which Nana Fadnavis had conceived to see us appear on the Malabar Coast, as I had given him to understand. This Prince had promised me the command of a Corps of troops to join to the landing troops whilst it would deploy the mass of its forces along the Coast and surround the English possessions. Such was the plan of Nana Fadnavis which circumstances prevented from materialising.

I know, my Lord, that you came to know about the treaty of peace which the English had proposed to the Marathas. Nana Fadnavis indeed acquiesced in their proposals, but he insisted that the treaty be sent to Europe and signed by the King and the Parliament of England before it would be effective. His design was to gain time and give to the French the opportunity to come on the Malabar Coast before the treaty was returned, so that he could break with the English as he would then be in a position to do so with safety. The Prince had several times said to me : “The English are a perfidious nation, which has deceived me thrice. I need not have any scruple in deceiving it once.”

Seeing any how a strong reluctance on the part of the Regency to finally conclude a treaty with them, the English restored to them not only all the territory which they had seized from them in

the Konkan and Gujarat, but they also did not scruple to cover themselves with shame in the eyes of the princes of the country by delivering and abandoning the very person of Raghoba to the Regency. Several Maratha chiefs went to take charge of this unfortunate prince at Chandwad on July 10, 1783.

In spite of the establishment of peace, the Marathas took possession of the territory and the places, which have been restored to them, only at the end of December in the hope that our peace was not yet very solid with the English. This conduct on the part of the Regency gave much anxiety to the Council of Bombay.

I often meet the Regent of this Court and I notice with satisfaction that he continues to preserve a strong hatred for this nation and that he is only waiting for the moment to break and declare himself against it when circumstances permit him to do so.

The death of Raghoba which took place on 11th December last makes Nana Fadnavis more stable than ever in the important post which he occupies, and delivers this Regent of a dangerous rival in the person of Raghoba who served the English as a pretext and an instrument to their ambitious plans.

I shall remain with the Marathas until I receive final orders from M. de Bussy to know how I should terminate with the Regency of Poona which on November 11, dispatched Gopalrao, a trustworthy Brahmin, to reside in the capacity of a Waquil with M. de Bussy.

As for the Court of Delhi, it has continued to maintain the best dispositions with respect to us. The letters which I received in October from the Emperor, from the Nawab Mirza Shafikhan and from the Raja Himmat Bahaddur manifest all the satisfaction which the Padshah had on the arrival of M. de Bussy in India and the special desire of the Prince to be allied with the French nation. I am reminded of the promises which I made four years ago and the agreements I had entered into with the late Nawab Najaf Khan, then the Generalissimo of the Empire, agreements which peace alone could prevent from being effective.

The Raja Himmat Bahadur assures me that the Emperor has so far rejected the proposals made to him by the English in the hope of seeing us enter into agreements with the Court of Delhi. He adds that they are awaiting a final reply to take a decision with respect to the English who are today at 40 koss from the capital with an army, 20,000 strong, to support their negotiation with the Emperor. They are showering most flattering promises on this Prince to induce him to form a solid alliance with them. I have dispatched to M. de Bussy, along with the letters which the Emperor had charged me to send him, the copy of those which were addressed to me on this subject.

Yesterday, I received two couriers from Delhi which confirm the assassination of the Nawab Mirza Shafi Khan. The Court is in the grip of troubles and the English advantageously profit by the anarchy which reigns there to induce this Prince to come to terms with them. Major Brown, dispatched since a long time by the Council of Calcutta, has at last succeeded in penetrating the Darbar of the Prince and it is believed that he will definitely have an audience with him.

Nizam Ali, who sincerely manifested the desire to form an alliance with the nation only since the arrival of M. de Bussy, to day appears to remain in a state of indifference which is undoubtedly to be partly attributed to the publication of the peace which deprives the powers of the peninsula of the hope to shake off the yoke of the English. Such is today, my Lord, the situation of affairs in India.

The present state, to which peace has reduced us here, ought to induce us to desire for the possession of the port of Trincomalee, as being the only one to day which can serve as a protection for the precarious state of our colonies. I have no doubt that M. le Bailly de Suffron will not lose any time to unfold its importance and utility.

If I had been in a position, my Lord, to give you an account of the political situation of affairs, you would have gradually known all that has taken place in the interior of the peninsula, but for nearly two whole years French vessels did not appear on the Malabar Coast and consequently, I had no sure occasion to send you my dispatches. There occurs one today and I eagerly seize it to lay the substance of my work before you until I myself shall have the honour to give you the account in its greatest details of all the matters relating to the mission which you had entrusted to me. I would wish, for the benefit of the service, that circumstances did not leave me to regret any thing on this point and that they soon put me in a position to tell you, my Lord, how painful and distressing my position was here.

M. Marlin de Moncamp, dispatched to India by M. Rousseau, Consul at Basra, with a packet for M.de Bussy, has undertaken to deliver you mine. Eight months passed with me have enabled me to know him and to make sure of his fidelity and prudence. He leaves Poona today 29th February to proceed to Goa where he will find a French ship going directly to Marseille. This is the only occasion I had since I have been with the Marathas. Allow me, my Lord, to recommend to your kindness M. Martin de Moncamp. He will convey to you a part of the obstacles which I have experienced in my correspondence as well as on some other matters.

I am respectfully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,
MONTIGNY.

Reflexions of M. de Montigny on the proposals of the Maratha Court

Article 1

The word of honour of the French and that of the Marathas must be given simultaneously when they draw up the respective arrangements.

The French generals will indeed promise not to make peace in India without including in it the allies of the French, but as for the arrangements in Europe, it is for the French Ministry to adjudicate on this point.

Article 2

The port which will be given for receiving the landing troops must be named, as also the place appropriate for setting up a hospital and stores.

Article 3

The French have incurred heavy expenses for coming to India and in allying themselves with the Marathas. It is just that the Regency furnishes at its expense all the requirements of the landing troops to attack the places which will remain with the French as well as those which will be restored to the Marathas.

Article 4

The squadron and the landing troops together may go up to nearly 10,000 men. They will need three lakhs of rupees per month to obtain the necessary provisions. This amount which you propose to advance through a sahukar will be returned to him only at the end of the war.

Article 5

The French demand the government of the town and fortress of Surat as well as one fourth of a Koss of the land on each bank of the river Tapti in all its course from Surat to the sea.

Proposals of agreement of the Maratha Court to the King of France.

Article 1

When the land and naval forces of the French arrive on the Malabar Coast, they will join the Maratha forces. Before that, they will give their word of honour that even if the English give them their riches, they will not make their peace with them. And when the Marathas have the word of honour of the French, they will also give theirs that whatever promises the English would make to them, they will not make their peace with them, and that they will remain faithfully allied with the French. But if circumstances urged one of the two nations to make peace with the English, they will not do it without including their ally in it.

Article 2

When your army arrives here, you will be given a port near Bombay to land your troops and set up your artillery stores, hospital, etc. And when the French have captured a place from the English, they will return this port to us without either leaving troops or ships there, and will no more return to it.

Article 3

When the French forces arrive, the Maratha Government will furnish them for their landing boats, men, waggons, oxen, horses, camels and elephants, and the expenses will be put to the account of the French, and the Marathas will furnish what is necessary for the service of the Sarkar.

Article 4

When the French army arrives here, the Sarkar or the Maratha Government will place at their disposal a sahukar who will furnish to the French all the provisions they will need, like wheat, rice, flour, butter, vegetables, goats, fowls, in short, all that they will require; and accounts will be kept which will be paid by the French from time to time. And if the French require a trustworthy scribe from the Sarkar, he will be given to them.

Article 5

When the French forces arrive and join those of the Marathas, they must capture all the territory of the English and destroy them completely on this coast. When their territory and their fortresses are captured, the French will be given Bombay and its dependencies, and in Surat

The French also demand the permission to set up their flags and factories in all the Maratha ports to the exclusion of the English.

Article 6

It is in order.

Article 7

Nothing more just and more reasonable.

Article 8

In any case, this operation can take effect only after expelling the English from the Malabar Coast.

It is necessary to know what the Marathas will offer to the French for putting them in possession of the territory and the fortress of the Siddi of Rajapuri.

Article 9

The Regency will pay for the munitions of war which the French will use for attacking the places which are to be delivered to the Marathas.

Article 10

The French could inform the Marathas of the friendly relations which they would like to form with the Indian Princes, but the French will not be allied with the Indian Princes who would like to seize the territory which belongs to the Marathas, and the Marathas will likewise inform the French of the friendly relations which they would like to form with the local princes.

Article 11

After the peace, the French propose to keep only troops and ammunition necessary for the defence of their places and the protection of their commerce. Consequently they cannot

the French will have a factory just as the English had one, and the Marathas will keep the government of the town and fortress. All the other territories and fortresses which will be captured from the English, will be immediately handed over to the Marathas.

Article 6

When the French arrive, join the Maratha forces and conjointly capture whatever places from the English, all material that will be found in the said places, like money, jewels, goods, horses, camels, elephants and any other goods, the whole will be shared equally between the French and the Marathas, and both sides will swear to fulfil these arrangements.

Article 7

In all the Maratha territory and in that which they will have, as also in that the French will have, the two nations will have free exercise of their religion, and if the French or some of their servants happened to disturb the exercise of the Hindu religion, the Sarkar will lodge its complaints to the generals who will render prompt justice, and if the Marathas wish to construct some new temples, they will be given permission to do so.

Article 8

The French will capture the territory and the fortress of the Siddi of Rajapuri and will hand over the whole to the Marathas.

Article 9

The French will furnish what they will need in munitions of war, and the Marathas will do likewise for their army.

Article 10

As the French and the Marathas have common interests, the French must not therefore be allied with other Indian Princes without informing the Sarkar, and will give their word to this effect.

Article 11

If the Marathas have enemies in Hindustan or in other European territories, the French will give succour in men and ammunition; and they must not give succour to any one who is

furnish special succours to the Marathas without the King's orders.

Article 12

It is not habitual with the French to seize ships which perish on their shores.

We would demand that all the ships which will be thrown on the coasts which belong to the Marathas should be returned to them in all their entirety, and that the Marathas should grant protection to the crews.

We would also demand that all French ships could freely sail on the Malabar Coast without being disturbed by the Maratha ships.

Article 13

I think that this article can be drawn up only by the Minister when these agreements will come to the knowledge of the King.

Article 14

It is for M. Le Vicomte de Souillac to adjudicate on this article in pursuance of the plan which he will have drawn up on India.

not a friend of the Sarkar.

Article 12

The ships which will be thrown by squall or other accidents on the coast, if it is on your coasts, you will seize them; if it is on ours, we shall seize them according to our custom at all times.

Article 13

The French will not make peace with the English in Europe or in India without informing the Marathas about it, and they will give their word of honour for that purpose.

Article 14

The Sarkar desires to send forces to destroy the English in Bengal. They demand forces from the French for that purpose; they will give them a jahagir.

In response to these observations, the Regency made several changes and granted a part of the demands made to it. But on the other hand, it has added ten other articles and declared that it would not like to make any changes in its latest proposals of agreement.

C² 166, f. 63–66 & f. 67–72. (Attached to the letter of February 28, 1784)

Literal translation of the agreements proposed by Shrimant Raje Shri Madhavrao Narayan, Pant Pradhan, King of the Marathas, to Louis XVI, King of France and Navarre.

These agreements were made in the presence of M. de Montigny, French Colonel, dispatched to the Maratha Court, who, in pursuance of his instructions, submits them to Messrs Duchemin and du Suffren, Generals of the French land and naval forces in India, so that they should adjudge the said agreements.

Article 1

The land and naval forces of the French will arrive here, join the forces of Shrimant Pant Pradhan, and will fight without respite against the English, and destroy them. Before that the French will give assurances to the Peshwa that they will not make peace with the English whatever proposals may be made to them. Having given this assurance to the Peshwa, he will also give assurances to the French not to make peace with the English on the same conditions. But if circumstances urged one of the two nations to make peace with the English, it will not do so without including its ally in it.

Article 2

When the French army arrives, it must have a port near Bombay to land its troops. For that purpose, the Sarkar will place at the disposal of the French the port of Chaul called Revdanda and they will land there.

In the fortress of Chaul the Sarkar has a subhedar or governor; it will retain its subhedar who will govern there, and when the French seize a place from the English, they will transfer their men and their depots to that place, and they will not remain at Chaul.

Article 3

When the French arrive, the Sarkar will furnish them boats, camatis and labourers which they will need, and all the things which will be necessary for the camp of the French. The Sarkar will also furnish things necessary for the transport, like horses, camels, oxen, waggons, elephants or other things. The French will also furnish what they have. For laying the siege of Bombay, the Sarkar will furnish 400 oxen for the artillery, etc., and 1000 camatis for the works.

Article 4

When the French forces arrive, they will require provisions like wheat, rice and all other things like pepper, hens, goats, vegetables and other victuals. The Sarkar will give them a Sahukar who will furnish them all these articles. Since the French forces will be 10,000 strong, for this number they will require provisions worth two lakhs of rupees per month; and at that rate, if more or less arrive, the amount will be counted in the proportion of two lakhs for 10,000 men. For that the Sarkar will be answerable to the Sahukar who will make this advance for 4 months, and after that the French will make up their accounts and pay the Sahukar.

Article 5

The town of Surat and the fortress will remain in the hands of the French. There will be a thana [\[Customs officer's residence.\]](#) there and amal [\[Duty.\]](#) of the Sarkar, that is what is known as Chauthai; but in this place, from the proceeds from the duties, the Sarkar will collect one third part, to wit : in the town the pourja [\[Customs.\]](#), le gueramale [\[Includes mint duties, weighing of grains and oils, sale of herbs, Kotwal or justice and other inland duties.\]](#) and the Naki [\[Octroi. These are the meanings given by M. de Montigny.\]](#). For that purpose, there will be a scribe from the Sarkar and one on behalf of the French; and in the presence of the two, duties will

be levied, from which the Sarkar will receive one-third and the French two-thirds; and in the absence of the scribe of the Sarkar, duties will not be collected.

Outside the town of Surat, all the territory will belong to the Sarkar; that is why if some jamadar, patil or rayat or haramkhor or some offender, or any one of the subjects of the Marathas escape to Surat or Bombay, the French Government will arrest them, and when the Sarkar or the representatives of the Maratha Sarkar demand them, the French must return them without giving them protection in any case.

Article 6

When the French forces arrive here and join those of the Sarkar, all the territory, fortresses, towns, lands, etc. which are in the hands of the English must be captured; and all the military stores like guns, canons, powder, bullets and any other objects, cash money and goods and any important provisions, elephants, camels, horses, oxen, etc. etc., found in these places, will be shared equally between the French and the Sarkar. And for that purpose the two nations will take oath.

Article 7

The forces of the Sarkar and those of the French when united will capture all the fortresses, towns, lands, etc. from the English. Out of all these places, Bombay and its dependencies, the town and fortress of Surat will remain in the hands of the French who will keep them. All the rest of the territory, fortresses, towns, lands etc. will be captured and immediately delivered to the Sarkar. And the two nations will take reciprocal oaths to ensure these conditions.

Article 8

The French will have factories at Bhadoch and Cambay to carry on their trade; they will keep there the necessary soldiers or arms only in proportion to the size of the factory.

Article 9

The French and the Marathas will capture the territory and the fortress of the Siddi of Rajapuri. This conquest will be immediately handed over to the Maratha Sarkar.

Article 10

The French will furnish the necessary ammunition, powder, bullets, etc., and the Marathas will also provide themselves with the necessary munitions.

Article 11

If the Sarkar has enemies in Hindustan and other territories which belong to the Europeans, the French will help the Marathas with all the materials they have; if that is not in sufficient quantity, they will write to Mauritius for additional supplies and send them here. The French will not help all these who will not be friends of the Sarkar.

Article 12

All ships which will really belong to the French, having a Captian, supercargo and a French flag will neither be harassed nor stopped by the Maratha ships, and the French ships will also not insult Maratha ships or all those which will have their passports.

Article 13

The ships thrown by squalls or other accidents on your shores, you will seize them; if they are thrown on ours, we shall seize them; that is our custom. But if they are really French ships, we shall not seize them, and likewise if the ships of the Sarkar are thrown on the territory of the French, they will also not seize them.

Article 14

When the French forces arrive, preparations must be made for provisions and military stores. As it will require some time, the Sarkar must be informed of it three months before their arrival and a note of the requirements dispatched.

Article 15

The King of the French has sent a Waquil to the Sarkar to make agreements of friendship and peace. In pursuance of that, the King of France will make peace with the English only in concert with the Marathas. The Waquil of the French says that the agreements made between the French and the Sarkar have not yet reached the King. That is why if, before the King receives them, he comes to terms with the English, the French will not abandon the Marathas, and if the English do not make agreements which the Sarkar desires, the King of France will support the Marathas against the English.

Article 16

The Sarkar and the French are allies; their descendants will also be so, and for that purpose both sides will give assurance and oath.

Article 17

In the territories which the Marathas have and will have, and in the territory which the French will have, there will be freedom of the practice of the religion of the Hindus, and if the French and servants of the French or others oppose or disturb the practice of the religion of the Hindus, the French General will be informed of it, and will render prompt justice and not give protection to the disturbers.

Article 18

In order to capture all the fortresses and the territory of the English, the French must bring a large number of forces, munitions and war materials in the course of the month of October. That is the proper time for this expedition.

Article 19

The Sarkar desires to send forces into Bengal; French forces must be joined to them; and when they have captured the whole of Bengal, the Sarkar will give the French a jahagir in proportion to the forces they have lent.

Article 20

If the French want to make peace with the English in Europe, they must not make it without the consent of the Marathas. But as the arrangements for going and coming take a lot of time, the Sarkar will send a Waquil to Europe with instructions to make peace.

But the agreements which the English will make with the French in Europe must have their execution here; that is why the French must make agreements with the English with due care. And if the latter do not observe the agreements which they have made in Europe, the King of France will force them to do so.

Article 21

When the French and the Marathas have made peace with the English the latter will demand a piece of ground for their factory; they must not be given any. However, if circumstances require it and if the French and the Marathas agree to it, it will be given to them, but never at Bhadoch or at Cambay, but in some other plot of land of the Sarkar.

Article 22

If some relative from the family of the Sarkar, including Raghunathrao Dada, or others, come to meet the French, they must not absolutely be given shelter and must immediately be sent to the Sarkar.

Article 23

When the agreements are made in this manner, the French will carry a Waquil of the Sarkar to Europe so that the King of France puts on them his seal and his signature and sends them here to the Sarkar.

Article 24

When all these articles are written and signed with the hand and seal of Messrs Duchemin and de Suffren, M.de Montigny must send them to the Sarkar three months in advance.

Note.—Although the Regency has given these proposals of agreement on condition not to make any changes in them, there is reason to believe that if we wanted to come to terms with it finally, we would induce it to make several changes in certain articles which are unacceptable and on which it was not deemed advisable to insist because of the state of affairs when the principal object was to gain time to dissuade the Regency from accepting the most advantageous proposals which the English were making to the Maratha Court with utmost entreaties.

M. de Montigny sends his correspondence with M. Duchemin, Le Bailh de Suffren and M. Le Marquis de Bussy.

His last dispatches are dated February 28 (1784).

He speaks of the death of Raghoba who had been handed over by the English to the Regency of Poona. This death puts an end to all the civil wars between the Maratha powers and makes Nana Fadnavis absolute master of his actions.

M.de Montigny declares that the latter continues to bear an implacable hatred to the English. M.de Montigny points out that it will always be in the interest of the nation to begin by the siege of Bombay when it wishes to operate some revolutions in India.

He urges that we should use every endeavour to retain the port of Trinkomalee.

He speaks of the embassy of the English to the emperor of Delhi.

All the accounts which M.de Montigny renders might have been very interesting if the manner in which peace had been concluded had not made us loose all respect in India, and had not deprived us of all hope in future of being in a position to form some alliance with the princes of India.

It is equally true that M.de Montigny is the person who has served his nation beyond the Cape of Good Hope with the greatest zeal, capacity, intelligence and disinterestedness. We must at present forget the expression “Indian Politics” and think of it only when we reappear in India with superior forces and have carried away some victories over the English.

By a letter from M.de Montigny dated December 28th 1783, he speaks of the death of M.de Chauvigny. He sends a copy of the two treaties made with the Marathas. These two documents are without date, but they were written previously to the arrival of M.de Bussy in India.

Memorial on the present state of the Mughal Empire, of the Indian Princes and of the Marathas. [I shall soon submit to the Minister the map of the whole country described in my memorial. The territorial limits of each power will be marked in it.]

I do not think that I need announce while beginning this memorial that nothing will make me conceal the truth, that all what I am going to write is subject to more or less frequent revolutions and is true only for the moment, that it is necessary to follow these revolutions with some exactness, and be informed of them in time, if we wish to form alliances, prevent those which might be harmful, to know the forces, the resources, the interests of the different princes, in short, apply to Indian politics the same rules, the same principles on which we study it or found it in Europe. I begin with the Mughal Empire.

Ali Gohar, Shah Alam, Emperor of Delhi or Padshah, about 35 years old; [Shah Alam was 55 years old at this time.] resides in his capital around which he possesses only territory of small size. He has really under his orders but 1200 men of which 700 cavalry and 500 sipahees who constitute his guard. Abdulla Khan, his Vazir has only 500 men.

Mirza Shafi Khan, [Mirza Muhammad Shafi was Najaf Khan's nephew's son, and was murdered by Muhammad Beg Hamadani on September 1783.] nephew of Najaf Khan, has the title of the General of the armies of the Emperor, of whom, in fact, he is very independent. He resides at Agra and can collect up to 20,000 men. The party (A) [Note. —M. Pauly, who commanded the party of the late M. Sombre, had stupidly got mixed with the intrigues of the Court, was beheaded. M. Marchand has been commanding it since. M. de Montigny had formed the plan to marry the widow of M. Sombre, who is a Kashmirian, thinking her to be rich, and to command his party. M. Pauly's adventure and the confiscation made of the riches of the widow, made him renounce the plan.] of the late M. Sambre, now commanded by M. Marchand, is also at his disposal. This corps is composed of 4,000 men of which nearly eighty are Europeans. There has been a report that Mirza Shafi had been murdered by the General Hamadani and that the troops of the former were scattered; this news requires confirmation. The party of the widow Sombre is reduced the greatest misery. This woman, by name Paraganna Begum, resides at Akbarabad near Agra and has the direction of the party of her late husband.

Afrasiyab Khan, another General of the Emperor, also independent, has his residence at Hassy-erra and can raise 40,000 men. He possesses a large territory between the Yamuna and the Ganges.

Mahamet Ben Hamadanny, [Muhammad Beg Hamadani? There is no corroboration for this event.] of whom I have already spoken, is also a General of the Emperor and independent like the first two. He possesses the territory of the d'hezab and can raise 30,000 men.

Najaf Quli Khan possesses the territory of the Jats. His capital is Sabit Gad. He can hardly put into the field 8,000 men. All these leaders, jealous of one another, are occupied with making war with the Sikhs and often fighting with each other.

The Emperor has also other chiefs under his domination, but they are hardly known, if we except Imet-bahadour [Himmat Bahadur.] who was formerly in the service of Shuja-ud-daulah and who had passed into that of Najaf Khan. This Himmat Bahadur appears to be entirely devoted to the English. I think it my duty to observe on the point of these hatreds and friendships of the native princes who are so much vaunted in Europe as much against us and the English, that they exist only by reason of the particular interest of these princes, and that as soon as their projects of fortune and ambition are satisfied, the French and the English are equally stranger to them. The proceeding details, quite precise as they are, also serve to prove the state of weakness in which the Emperor finds himself.

The Sikhs, almost always at war with the Emperor of Delhi or rather with his generals, are masters of the whole territory between Persia and Delhi. They form a kind of republic whose

constitution is little known. They, however, recognise two principal chiefs, Jassa Sing and Tchav-Shahsing.

The first possesses the districts which are between Multan and Delhi, and not long ago, was making war with Taimur Shah. The number of his troops is said to consist of 100,000 men.

Tchav-Shahsing rules over all the territory situated between Panipat and Lahore. He was on several occasions at grips with the generals of the Emperor. He is said to possess from 60,000 to 80,000 troops. The Sikhs are credited with being very brave, and it is a sufficiently general opinion among the Mughals that only the Sikhs and the Marathas can expel the English from Bengal, the former by attacking the territories on the left bank of the Ganges, and the Marathas those of the right bank. It is said that the Sikhs have no friendly relations with the English.

Among the principal princes and rajas who are situated between the Mughal Empire and the territory of the Marathas, we can count :

Jaising Sawai, [[Not Sawai Jaising but Sawai Pratap Sing.](#)] Raja of Jaipur and of the Rajputs, who is a Hindu and very powerful. He has the best sipahees in Hindustan. His riches are immense and his principal care is to live at peace with his neighbours. The jahagir of Shinde, one of the principal chiefs of the Marathas, adjoins his territory. Himmat Bahadur, of whom there was a mention above, is one of his vassals. It is believed that Sawai Jaising can easily maintain an army of 40,000 men.

Gumman Sing, Raja of Jaisalmir, possesses a vast territory to the west of Ajmer; he is a friend of the former Raja, and can raise 20,000 men.

Vijaysing, Raja of Jodhpur and Mirta has his kingdom between Ajmer and Gohad. He is an ally of the Raja of Jaipur and of Ajmer. It is said that he can have an army 30,000 men.

The Rana of Ajmer is master of a very vast and very populated territory between Jaipur and Jaisalmir. He can put into the field about 40,000 men.

The Raja of Gohad, vassal of the Marathas, and who so openly favoured the passage of the English brigade which was coming from Lucknow to Surat, lost almost all his Kingdom since the English made their peace with the Marathas. He had hardly 7000 to 8000 men of whom he lost a large part at the capture of Gwalior.

Fateh Sing, Raja of Baroda in Gujarat, also a vassal of the Marathas, had favoured the English during their war against the Court of Poona. The Regency wanted to punish him and divest him entirely; but Shinde obtained grace for him, through a large sum. Fateh Sing can raise 25,000 men of whom 18,000 cavalry.

Mommen Khan, a Persian by origin, Nawab of Cambay, has about 1500 men which he can raise up to 8000. He is not known to have any connection with the English or with the Marathas. He is dependent on the Court of Delhi. His territory is small but rich and populated; it is a remnant of the conquests of Aurangzeb.

Modadgy boncela, [[Mudhoji Bhonsle.](#)] Raja of Cuttack and Nagpur, Rana of Berar, etc., is independent of the Court of Poona, and descends from the old kings of Satara. The subjects of this prince are known as lesser Marathas. His kingdom is immense and is bounded to the north by several individual rajas who depend upon Bengal, to the south by the domains of Nizam Ali, to the west by the great Marathas and to the east by the sea. He has, however, in the interior of his territory, several petty princes who are so to say independent. The number of his troops is far from proportional to the size of the provinces which they have to defend. It is said that he cannot maintain more than 80,000 men. It is certain that this prince, intimidated first by the threats of the English, won over next by the presents and the flattering words of Mr. Anderson, allowed the troops from Bengal to enter his

kingdom and from there to proceed to the Malabar Coast. He also gave a passage through Cuttack to the sipahees whom the Council of Calcutta was dispatching to Madras. However, Mudhoji Bhonsle enjoys great consideration at the Court of Poona. He is also considered to be just and enlightened, and the Marathas had chosen him perhaps as mediator of their peace with the English. The latter, in their turn, proposed to place him on the throne of Poona, which he had the moderation or rather the wisdom to refuse. He does not conceal that his kingdom of Cuttack would have already become the prey of the ambition of the English Company, if it was not afraid of incurring the hostility of too powerful an enemy. It will placate him probably as long as he could be useful to it. It is also probable that if we had been informed in time about the mediation with which he was entrusted and if we could have executed a landing of our troops in Cuttack, he would not have dared to fall in with the views of the English.

To make this tableau of the actual situation of India complete, I must not forget the princes who occupy a part of the Malabar Coast from Goa to Bombay. If, in case of a fresh war, we proposed to make a landing on the Malabar Coast to send succour to the Marathas, it would be dangerous not to know that a great part of this coast depends absolutely on some individual chiefs who have often interests contrary to those of the Court of Poona. They are really speaking not so powerful, but they are indeed masters of several passes of the big Ghats and they could so far resist the efforts which the Marathas have made to reduce them.

Ragou-angria [\[Raghuji Angre.\]](#), ruler of Kolaba, a tributary of the Court of Poona and bound by trade with the English, possesses a stretch of the Coast which is between Chaul and Bombay. He extends towards the foot of the Ghats only to a distance of about 25 to 30 km. He has 3000 troops.

The Raja of Apsy [\[Habshi. The ruler could be called a Nawab but not a Rajah.\]](#) or Siddy, an Abissinian by origin, is master of the coast from Chaul to Bankote to an extent of about 48 km. His army consists of 4000 men. A squadron could take in a supply of cows from this Prince, for, it cannot think of procuring it from the Marathas who are obstinate on this point.

The Queen of Kolhapur [\[Rani Jijabai of Kolhapur died on February 17, 1773, and it was the adopted son Shivaji who was ruling at this time.\]](#) is a Maratha and independent. She possesses only seven to eight koss of territory on the coast. But she extends considerably inland and even beyond the great chain of the Ghats. She was bound with a close friendship with Haider Ali Khan and continues to be so with Tipu Saheb. She has 10,000 troops.

Bhonsle, Maratha Raja of Wadi, is master of the coast from Tamana [\[Malwan?\]](#) to near Goa. His kingdom terminates to the east by the great Ghats. [\[The Sahyadri Range.\]](#) He has 5000 to 6000 troops and is frequently at war with the Portuguese whom he constantly beats. He descends from the old rajas of Satara and is independent of the Court of Poona for which, however, he has lot of deference.

I now pass on to the Marathas whose forces are really considerable and whom it is very important to know in detail.

Under the simple name of Marathas or central Marathas is included all the people who recognise the authority of the Court of Poona which is also called Peshwa. The King, who is at Satara, possesses only the title of the sovereign and if the Peshwa maintains for him a sufficiently brilliant court, it is out of regard for the people who would not tolerate that there was lack of respect for the posterity of their old kings whose picture they are happy to see. It is only by slow and imperceptible degrees that the Peshwa has usurped all the authority and left to the king of Satara only empty honours without any power.

People are quite aware that the old kings of the Marathas were Hindus and brave but little fit for public affairs and especially for politics, which has today become as necessary for the Indian powers as courage. After the conquests of Aurangzeb and the aggrandisement of the power of Nizam-ul-mulk, some ambitious Brahmins formed the project of depriving the Hindu Kings of the knowledge

of public affairs and of the collection of revenues [This is not a correct statement. Tarabai, wife of Rajaram and daughter-in-law of the great Shivaji was mainly responsible for this sorry state of affairs.]; they succeeded. The Marathas were content with their administration which was soon invested with royal authority. It is from these usurpers that descends the ruling house at Poona. The race of the old kings still subsists in the persons of Mudhoji Bhonsle, Sacroddy, Maloji, of whom mention has already been made.

The two Brahmins who can be considered as the origin of the ruling house or of the Peshwa were Chimnaji Appa and Balajirao [This is again a mistake. It was Balaji Vishwanath, father of these two brothers who was the founder of this house. Balajirao is a mistake for Bajirao.]; they were brothers.

Chimnaji Appa had a son Bhau, deceased General of the Marathas.

Balajirao left two children, the great Nana and Raghoba, who was surrendered by the English in the last treaty which they made with the Marathas and who is at present at Combarry [Col. Macleod. He was not killed but captured.] on the Ganga, closely watched by the troops of the Peshwa. This Raghoba, also known by the name of Raghunathrao and Dada, has several children; his eldest son is Bajirao. He is 22 years old. [Bajirao was nine years old at this time.]

The great Nana was succeeded by Madhavrao, who died in 1769 [Strange mistakes for 1772 and 1773 respectively.], and the latter by Narainrao assassinated in 1770 [Strange mistakes for 1772 and 1773 respectively.], in the hands of Raghoba who took refuge with the English.

Narainrao left a posthumous son who is the present king; his name is Pant Pradhan Sawai Madhavrao; he is about eleven years old.

The interregnum and the minority of the King obliged the chiefs to set up a Council of Regency, composed of twelve members. Raghoba, suspected of having caused the assassination of his nephew, was unanimously proscribed.

This Council of Regency has passed through several changes. Today almost all the authority resides in Nana Fadnavis, entrusted with the person of the young king, and Haripant Phadke, Chief of the armies.

Nana Fadnavis always had the affection of a father for the orphan king. It is this sentiment and the fear of losing his authority which have instilled in him the hatred which he has sworn for Raghoba and consequently for the English for granting a shelter and their protection to this murderer for long time. Raghoba has just been delivered to the Court of Poona but with several conditions for the safety of his person, conditions which Nana Fadnavis is not so anxious to fulfil. They will probably serve as a pretext to renew the war.

Nana Fadnavis was formerly only a simple scribe of the Sarkar. His name is Balaji Janardan Nana; Fadnavis, which is commonly pronounced as Fadnis, is the name of his office. He has jahagirs of Menavli, Khandesh, Nagar, etc.

Haripant Phadke, whom the Marathas also call Tatya, is General of the armies and second member of the Regency. He is very much attached to Nana Fadnavis. Nothing is concluded in the Darbar without his advice. He is animated by the same resentment as Nana against Raghoba and his protectors. He is neither so frank nor so expansive as the Regent. That is the reason why some persons believed that this General favoured the English. But nothing is further from truth. Phadke has several times beaten Haider who did justice to his military talents. He commands the Poona camp which at this moment consists only of 20,000 cavalry. He has jahagirs of Visapur, Pandharpur, Sholapur, etc.

I must also speak here of some other chiefs who are also members of the Regency and who, on account of their forces and the influence they can have in the state affairs, deserve to be known. Of

this number are : Krishnarao Ballal, Waquil of the Marathas at the Court of Nizam Ali. He is consulted on all affairs of some importance. He is even so by the Subhedar of the Deccan for his own. He has the skill to preserve the friendship between the Courts of Poona and Hyderabad, in delicate circumstances in which the English employed all sorts of means in order to cause misunderstanding between them. He is, however, accused of favouring this nation a little. But this statement appears to me a little refuted by the friendship and the confidence which Nana and Phadke show in him. He has 2000 to 3000 men in the service of the Peshwa and 400 in that of Nizam Ali who has bestowed on him a jahagir of two lakhs of rupees. With the Marathas he has the jahagir of Baramati.

Mahadji Shinde Patil, known in Hindustan by the name of Shinde, was originally a slave of the Sarkar [\[A strange statement.\]](#), he owes his great fortune to his talents for war and intrigue. He is the man whom the English succeeded in seducing and setting against Nana's power. Although this General is subject to the Court of Poona, it is not without anxiety because of the close connection which he has with the Council of Calcutta through Mr. Anderson, negotiator of the last treaty of the English with the Marathas, who resides at the camp of Shinde with several English officers. His army consists of 100,000 men and he has about 50 guns. We are still not aware of the plans of Shinde, but it is known that Suleman, second son of the Padshah had come to seek his protection and that this army was going to camp to the north of Gwalior towards Dig. M. de Montigny has no one with Shinde who can give me an account of his movements. The jahagir of this General is very vast and includes Barhanpur, Ujjain, Assaye, the region of Malwa, the spoils of the Raja of Gohad, Jambgaon, etc.

Chemnanrao-Rastia [\[Chimanrao Raste.\]](#), a member of the Regency, is chief of 12,000 cavalry.

Parissurambao [\[Parsharam Bhau Patwardhan.\]](#), commands 25,000 men of whom 20,000 cavalry. He has the jahgir of Meritche [\[Miraj.\]](#) and is a neighbour of Tipu Saheb against whom he has several times marched.

Tocodgy Holcar, a chief of great reputation whom the Peshwa had humbled and ruined because of his too great power, today commands only 8,000 men; he is entrusted with up to 30,000 in times of war. The Court of Poona is actually trying to put him in a position to balance the power of Shinde. He has the jahgir of Indore near Narbada.

Gowenbot Nitchoure [\[Govind Bhat Nitsure.\]](#), a member of the Regency, is one of the richest and most powerful Brahmin of Poona.

Apa Balvantrao [\[Appa Balwant Mehendale.\]](#), a relative of Nana Fadnavis, commands 4,000 men. He has the jahgir of Sassor [\[Saswad.\]](#).

Bawa Nitchouram [\[?\]](#), one of the members of the Council of Regency has 2,000 cavalry.

Ganissipondet Bara [\[Ganeshpant Behere.\]](#) commands 5,000.

Sacrodgy, Malodgy, brothers known under the name of Rajas. Corperas [\[Ghorpade.\]](#) have 5,000 cavalry. Their jahgir is at Akelcotta on the frontiers of the Deccan.

Bapou Pandchett, [\[Bapu Panse.\]](#) Daroga or chief of the artillery, has 2,500 men and 12,000 in times of war. There are in the Topkhana or the assenal only 25 guns in condition to serve.

Dorop [\[Dhulap.\]](#), Maratha Admiral at Vizendrouk [\[Vijaydurg.\]](#) has 1,500 sipahees, 3,000 sailors and 42 warships, pals and galivats.

I do not think I am deviating from truth by stating that the Marathas can, within the space of a fortnight, raise 250,000 men of which 120,000 excellent cavalry, 1,500 sipahees armed and disciplined in the European fashion, 500 Arabs and Abyssinians who possess unflinching courage; the rest is composed of pindharis, foot-soldiers and sipahees armed in the native fashion.

The Maratha armies take the field at their festival of Divaly which takes place at the beginning of November and they remain camped until the rainy season obliges them to retire.

The revenues of the Sarkar formerly amounted to nearly ten crores of rupees. But Haider Ali, the English, Shinde and the troubles of the Regency have diminished them much; they hardly amount at present to three crores. I have not included in this evaluation the right of Chauthai, which the Marathas have great difficulty in collecting.

The actual limits of the empire of the Marathas are to the west the sea, the kingdom of the Raja of (Sawant) wadi, of the Queen of Kolhapur, of the Siddi, of the ruler of Kolaba, the territories of Bombay, Surat, Cambay and the coasts of Gujrat; to the east the kingdom of the Raja of Nagpur and that of Nizam Ali from Barhanpur, which belongs to the Marathas to near Bagalkot; to the south the territory which Haider conquered from the Peshwa, from Badami to the north of Hukeri and from there to towards the territory of Goa; finally, to the north, the territory of the Kolis, those of Ajmer and Jaipur and the territory of the Jats which actually depends on Najaf-Quli Khan.

It would have been desirable that the persons who, with a special mission or without express mission, obtained their passage to India to fulfil the important role of a negotiator, should have paid special attention to acquiring the foregoing local knowledge, that less occupied with ambition and interest, they should have supported the views and the projects of the Minister in a more real, more useful manner.

I can cite more than one example of this sacrifice of public purpose to private ambition and interest, in spite of the finest protestations of zeal and disinterestedness. But this subject has already been presented in such a clear manner that I think fresh details on this point as absolutely useless. However, before terminating this memorial meant chiefly to reveal the resources and the power of the Marathas, I cannot help giving an idea of the manner in which the first negotiations were conducted with the Regency. I shall recall the proposals which they then made to France and which never reached the Ministry, and the reasons of her treaty with England; and without the slightest hesitation, it will be seen that if one could profit by the circumstances and forget for some time the man in favour of the State, the complexion of our affairs would perhaps have entirely changed in India.

The Regency of Poona, having decided in 1781 to demand succour from France against the English, wanted the Mughal Zain-ul Abedin Khan, a very intelligent man who knows French well and who speaks it a little, to proceed to the Isle of France in the capacity of a Maratha Vakil to M. Le Vicomte de Souillac and to communicate to him the proposals of the Court of Poona. He was authorized to proceed to France if M. Le Vicomte de Souillac did not have the necessary powers to negotiate the treaty with which the Vakil was entrusted.

The proposals of the Regency consisted in the following thirteen articles : [For the proposals, see pp 17-19. Although the language in this memorial is different the contents are the same, with the exception that in article 2, there is a note and that articles 12 and 13 differ. These are therefore produced here.]

Article (2) note : Zain-ul Abedin Khan was authorised to raise this sum from fifty thousand rupees to eighty thousand.

Article 12

If the Governor of the Isles pleads that he must have orders from his Court to consent to the said proposals, you will tell him that M. de St. Lubin, entrusted with letters from the Court of France, informed us of the desire of the King to form an alliance with us and make some conquests in this part, that it is in pursuance of these suggestions that the Court of Poona has decided to send a person of high rank like you to the Governor of the Isles, convinced that the Court of France will neither

disapprove any of the said proposals nor the dispatch which will be the outcome of it. But if the Governor persists, you will urge him to send a copy of these proposals to the Court, and you will communicate this fact to us.

Article 13

You will solicit the Governor of the Isles to make the best efforts to obtain for us, without any delay, the troops and munitions which are demanded, and to place at their head an experienced General, full of talents and capable of anticipating things and giving advice to the Sarkar in administrative matters as well as political, who is prudent and clever not only in maintaining the friendship which has been existing between the two Courts, but in making it more solid and durable by applying himself solely to destroy our common enemy.

Zain-ul Abedin Khan, furnished with his powers and bearer of the foregoing proposals, in fact, left Poona to proceed to Goa. He arrived there at the same time as M. de Montigny, who, when he learnt of the mission of the Mughal, told him that it was unnecessary, since he, M. de Montigny, was sent by the King of France to the Court of Poona with, all the necessary powers to negotiate (A).
[I think that it would have been wise to allow Zain-ul-Abedin Khan to continue his route and even support his mission to M. le Vicomte de Souillac, etc.]

I think that I can add to this note that the French Resident, mentioned in this paragraph, never passed Agra, as the roads to proceed to Delhi were not free and all that he could say of this capital and, among other things, of the late Najaf Khan was founded only on hearsay.] According to this advice Zain-ul Abedin Khan retraced his steps. But he was obliged to make use of the authority of the Governor of Goa to withdraw his papers from the hands of M. de Beaubrun, the nation's agent, who did not want to return them without an order from M. de Montigny.

The Regency, as it had with it a Resident from France, then waited for proposals instead of making them. M. de Montigny only made promises. Moreover, the Regency had suspicious about a letter from the King which M. de Montigny delivered to it, as it had information that this letter had been forged at Goa. Henceforth, our Resident lost all credit. It was then that the Court of Poona listened to an arrangement with the English, and that, deceiving M. de Montigny, it delivered to him this treaty which has been referred to in several dispatches and of which not a single article was acceptable.

I shall terminate this memorial by observing that Nana Fadnavis has formed the project of avoiding war especially with the English until the young king is old enough to govern. At this epoch, the Regent, who is rightly convinced that he will continue to be Prime Minister, will no more need the approbation of the other members of the Regency to execute his projects; and in this case, he would have effectively more power than what he has actually. It is said that he defers the burst of his vengeance against Raghoba, Shinde and the English to this time. But it is be feared that between now and this epoch which is still distant, Nana Fadnavis may succumb under the blows of his enemies whose number has not diminished.

Pondicherry, March 3, 1784.

BUSSY.

C² 160, f. 185-187.

Extract of the dispatches of M. Le Marquis de Bussy, dated the 13th and 16th February and 3rd March 1784.

(February 13, No. 23)

The Marathas wanted to attack Tipu Sultan in order to recover several districts which Haider Ali Khan had captured from the Maratha nation. M. de Bussy tried to dissuade them from this move by impressing upon them the danger of promoting the ambition of the English by uniting with them to attack Tipu Sultan.

In view of these reflections, the Maratha envoy proposed to M. de Bussy to unite with the Marathas to attack the English. He (Bussy) concludes [It will be observed that this envoy could have made this second proposal only on his own authority and that he could not get orders from this court, 1200 km away from the coast, on the reflections of M. de Bussy.] from it that little reliance can be placed on a nation which, at the same time, makes two overtures so contrary. M. de Bussy wrote to the Marathas on this subject a vague letter which does not bind him to anything.

Tipu Sultan's peace with the English is not yet concluded, but it is believed that it will be shortly completed.

Shinde, a Maratha Chief, is near Agra with 100,000 men, one does not know why. He has the second son of the Emperor in his army as also Mr. Anderson, negotiator of the last treaty of peace between the English and the Marathas.

M. de Bussy speaks of the futility of stationing Residents at the courts of the Indian Princes. M. Piveron de Morlat, Resident at the Court of Tipu Sultan, has unnecessarily incurred heavy expenditure. His letters contained nothing but vague things. But he suits Tipu Sultan whose whims he obeys and who has deceived him.

M. de Montigny, Resident at the Court of Poona, is disinterested; he has really incurred heavy expenses but he has produced accounts for the same.

In spite of our precarious state in India, we can still preserve ourselves there with dignity, because of the idea which the Asiatics have formed of French valour, an idea confirmed by the action of June 13. The Indians conclude that the French are good only for fighting and the English for politics.

The majority of the Governors of our establishments have been, during peace time, occupied only with commercial considerations, fictions and falsehoods on politics. It is because of their conduct, that of our residents and of so many adventures that our nation has been discredited in India.

M. de Bussy also reproaches M. de Piveron de Morlat for drawing bills of exchange on him, and compromising the subsistence of the troops and the credit of the nation with the greatest lavity.

He reproaches M. de Montigny for sending, without informing him and at great expense, an officer to Delhi and another to the Subhedar of the Deccan.

He reproaches M. Rousseau, Consul at Basra, for writing [Note.— M. Rousseau had orders to send to India, by all possible means, the advice that the English Crown had taken possession of the English establishments in India; he has, moreover, given an account of the dispatch of Messrs Cotinal and Montcamp for carrying the news of peace and his conduct has been approved in the right manner.] to all the powers of Asia that he was in the secret of the Minister, and for sending him two adventurers M. Cotinal and M. Montcamp, a doctor.

M. de Bussy finally speaks of his zeal to which he has sacrificed everything.

Sequence of the extract of the dispatches of M. de Bussy of February and March 1784.

M. de Moracin has arrived in India and he will shortly be at Pondichery. February 16, No. 25.

He is informed that peace between the English and Tipu Sultan is on the point of being concluded, which fact is very fortunate for the political operations.

Peace of Tipu Sultan is not yet concluded but it is on the point of being so. It is from this point [\[Note. — That is to say that March 3, M. de Bussy had not yet broached the negotiation for a concession on the Malabar Coast.\]](#) that we must begin to form some connection with this Prince.

He sends a memorial on the actual situation of the Mughal Empire, the Indian Princes and the Marathas.

C² 163, f. 116–126.

Copies of letters from the Mughal Emperor and his Ministers to Montigny relating to the friendship to be established between Hindustan and France.

Translation of two Persian letters addressed to M. de Montigny by the Mughal Emperor and of which this Colonel has sent copies to the Minister.

No. 1
(In French)

The first bearing the date November 16, 1782, from the hands of M. de Montigny.

(Persian Text)

Copy of a letter from the Emperor, always victorious, Shah Alam Bahadur, to Colonel Montigny, representing the French Emperor.

Distinguished commandant, illustrious victim devoted to battles, zealous and well intentioned servant, know that you are judged worthy of royal favours.

We have received your two dispatches, of which one announced the arrival of the invincible hero, M. de Bussy, at Mauritius, and his landing in this port, the first days of the moon of Dgemaziussani, with a large army. The other gave account of the letter which you had received from this General, dated 13th of the moon of Redgeb. This letter conveyed in substance that the sublime, very glorious and very august Emperor of the French had dispatched M. de Bussy, with the rank of Commandant General of his land and naval forces to govern his possessions in the Isles and on the Continent; and that the intentions of the said Emperor were that his General should form a league with the sound party of the Commandants, Generals and Rajas of Hindustan and of the Deccan to destroy the very name of the enemies of the Imperial Crown, and to put its good servants in possession of dominions and fortresses, of which they are the true proprietors, or which had been entrusted to them by the descendants of the Khaliph, their legitimate sovereign; the operation which M. de Bussy was bent on commencing and which he would undertake on his arrival, which would probably take place in a month.

These two dispatches were carefully read by Maharaja Anupgir, Himmat Bahaddur, and were placed before the eyes of the august Emperor, along with your offers of service, your declaration of zeal, and all the confidence which you personally deserve.

The Universe and its inhabitants know that whosoever has shown attachment to our Imperial Court and has generously fought for it, has been happy in this world and in the other; and that showered with favours and honours, he has raised his proud head to the sky and has become an object of emulation, he has been applauded by all the mortals. The valiant Bussy ought, therefore, to know that in conformity with the friendship and perfect understanding which exist between the two Empires, he will be received in our kingdoms with all kindness and that our boundless favours will fly before him, and will place him in possession of all his projects founded on our alliance, and invested with our approval. As for you, brave Colonel, be convinced of our fidelity to the treaties and of our eagerness to recognise your services on all occasions. You ought to correspond with our Sublime Porte, and dispatch to it promptly the intimation about the arrival of the French General as well as about the particulars of the subsequent events.

(In French)

The second bearing the date of 6th October 1783 in the handwriting of M. de Montigny.

(In Persian)

Copy of the special letter from the always Victorious Emperor, Shah Alam, to Col. Montigny, representative of the Emperor of France.

Illustrious Commandant, Victim devoted to military service, elite of the most considered servants, and most worthy of being so by the purity of their intentions, know that you are esteemed and honoured as you deserve it.

Your dispatch has been received and heard. It was placed before the very formidable and very sublime Emperor, who was pleased to read with interest your assurances of fidelity, zeal and constancy for the improvements of relations which exist between the two Empires. This reading has resulted in your being judged worthy of the Imperial protection. You can count on it as well as on the most favourable dispositions, which you inspired in the very august Emperor to crown you with bounties and favours, of which he is the perennial source. In this hope, you should continuously send petitions and intimations to his Highness, sanctuary of the world.

(Translated from the Persian text by order of the Minister by me the undersigned, Interpreter-cum-Secretary of the king for Oriental Languages, Versailles, October 21, 1785.)

Translation of a Persian letter addressed to M. de Montigny by the Nawab Mirza Shafi Khan, and of which this Colonel dispatches a copy to the Minister.

(In French)

It bears the date of October 6, 1783; in the hand-writing of M. de Montigny.

No. 3

(Persian Text)

Copy of the letter from the Nawab, Dispenser of favours, Amir-ul- Umra, Nassir ul doula, Mirza Muhammad Shaff Khan Bahaddur, dazzling sword of the Empire, to colonel Montigny, representing the Emperor of the French.

Greetings to our friend.

After fulfilling the duties of friendship and informing you of the inexpressible desire which we have to see you, we notify to you that your letter reached us and that its reading gave us the greatest satisfaction. We indeed felt a very lively one on hearing that your Court was disposed to draw closer and closer the bonds of friendship which formerly united it to us, and which was so inspirited under the glorious reign of the late Nawab.

Maharaja Anupgir Himmat Bahaddur Khan has further improved upon your expressions; and you can rest assured that, after his officious comments, our respective sentiments have assumed a fresh vigour. We intend to carry them to their highest point. God alone could create an occasion for it.

Your dispatch to His Highness has been submitted to his supreme observations and he has been pleased to give a special reply. Grasp well its sublime purport. Convey him your very humble thanks for it, and believe us solely occupied in putting our sincere friendship into full activity. As for other details, we refer to the letter which the Maharaja is writing to you.

We await fresh news from you, and we hope that it will reach us in time for the first audience which the Emperor would kindly grant us. We would wish that it was of a nature to interest our august master. What could we add to all that we have just pointed out to you?

Contents

(Post script)

Our friend,

Since the engagements which you had entered into with the late Nawab, four years back, nothing has been put into execution. It's not because there has been on our part or on the part of your sublime Emperor the slightest infidelity or the slightest negligence. If you wish to keep your promises and put your hand to the plough, we are quite ready; but if you still judged it proper to defer, you ought to inform us about it clearly, because in the expectation of your reply and in the hope of the execution of your engagements, we are in a position to support you. Have neither any doubt, nor any anxiety about our dispositions in this respect. It is for you to give the first signal, it will be understood and followed. Rest assured about it. To say to you something more would be vain obtrusiveness.

Translated by order of the Minister
from the Persian text by me,
Secretary and Interpreter to the
King for Oriental languages,
Versailles, October 20, 1785.
RUFFIN.

(Translation of three Persian letters addressed to M. de Montigny by the Raja Himmat Bahaddur and of which this Colonel sends the copies to the Minister).

No. 4

The first without date

Copy of the letter from Maharaja Anupgir Himmat Bahaddur to Colonel Montigny.

Greetings to our friend and guest!

After expressing to you the desire to see you and enjoy your loving presence, be it known to you that all your personal correspondence with us and your respectful dispatch to the Emperor have reached us and have given us great pleasure. We have perfectly understood all the contents of your letters which relate to the close union which you are trying to establish more solidly between the two Empires.

As, at the moment when we received these pledges of your friendship, Amir ul Umra, Nassir ud daulah Bahaddur was, as it happened, with us, as well as Mir Syndia, to confer on the most important matters of the Government, we seized this occasion to place before the eyes of this powerful Nawab all what you had written to me, your petition to the Emperor and a precis which we had ourselves drawn of it. This supreme Minister very well understood your language, full of friendship and solid views, and you will soon receive a reply, such as you desire, to your dispatch to the Emperor, and answers suitable to his sentiments for the Emperor of the French.

This nation is very much loved in this part of the world, and you should, not doubt but that there is being formed a powerful league in its favour, when the Amirul Umra will be united with M. Pauly who is expected here. When all the chiefs and commandants of Hindustan are once assembled in congress, all the affairs will be discussed in it; we shall establish in it solid bases and new foundations on each item. General good order, punishment of the rebels, of the offenders and of the traitors, will naturally form the subject matter of the first sessions; but immediately after we shall fix our attention on the alliance to be renewed with the august Emperor of the French.

It is at this opportune moment that we shall exhibit our zeal and our personal devotion for this Prince. We hope that all the noblemen of the Empire and the Mussalman chiefs, when united, will seriously occupy themselves with the internal and external problems of the Empire, and that they will resolve on the destruction of all those who will oppose it. There will result from this assembly many other advantages which will be made public only at the predistined time, but when the conferences will be over, we shall have nothing more urgent than to send the replies to your letters and give you an account of the result of our deliberations. The whole will be dispatched to you by the couriers of the Sarkar.

Have no doubts about our constancy which has never failed to support your affairs and give them stability by fulfilling the intentions of your august Emperor. This is the assurance which I request you to repeat to him often, by choosing the moments which you will judge most favourable.

The confidence, which you have personally inspired in us, has brought about the union of all hearts in favour of your Court. We presume that you will justify it by your attention to keep us exactly informed of the intentions of your Emperor, of the events which will concern him and of the good or bad successes of his arms. Beyond that what is it that remains for me to write to you?

No. 5

(In French, in the hand of M. de Montigny).

(Persian text)

The second letter from the same person bearing the date of November 16, 1782.

Copy of a letter from Maharaja, Himmat Bahaddur to Col. Montigny, representing the Emperor of France.

Greatings to Mr. Colonel, our guest and intimate friend.

We continue to eagerly desire the happiness to see you; and we inform you that we have received the letter which you have written to us, and your petition to the Emperor, the most powerful and most glorious of the monarchs. All the contents of your correspondence have been communicated to him. He was very much pleased with them.

As for your petition addressed to His Highness, he wanted to read it himself; and he felt so much joy at its contents that he was pleased to give it a personal reply, which as well as ours will reach you at the same time. We imagine that by the time you receive them, the succours which are announced will have already arrived. You will know all the eagerness of the Emperor from the expressions full of kindness, spread in his noble reply. Rest assured that we shall not lose any occasion to demonstrate to his Highness the sincerity of the sentiments and the perserverance of the efforts of your Court for the welfare of this Empire.

You must inform us fully of all that concerns the arrival, which you announce as very impending, of the French troops in the continents of India. This information is absolutely necessary for us. You know how much we are disposed to give them a good reception.

We would also very much desire that what was formerly decided between us on the subject of a flying French camp, which would remain in the service of the Emperor, was realised at this moment. His Highness would have this arrangement so much at heart that he does not hesitate to think that, if it took place, all that is still in favour of the English, would soon disappear. This would indeed be the promptest way to achieve the object.

Inform us of everything that is taking place. May you be eternally happy!

(In French. In the handwriting of M. de Montigny)

(Persian Text)

The third letter from the same person bearing the date of October 6, 1783.

Copy of a letter from Maharaja Anupgir Himmat Bahaddur to Colonel Montigny, Chevalier of the Order of St. Louis, representing the Emperor of France at the Sublime Court of our master, Emperor of the World.

The desire which we have to enjoy your presence is unlimited, and after giving you the greatest testimony of it, we hasten to announce to you the receipt of your letter for us, of your dispatch to His Highness, and of that which you have addressed to the Nawab Amir ul Umrao, Nassir ul daulah, Mirza Shafi Khan Bahaddur. The petition of the General M. de Bussy, Lieutenant General of the armies of the Emperor of France, holder of the Grand Cross of St. Louis, to our victorious Emperor, was also delivered to us by the same special courier, in original as well as with the Persian translation.

All these important documents were first read and placed under the eyes of this powerful Nawab, prime minister of the Emperor. He was so satisfied with them that without losing time, he drew up a favourable report of it for His Highness, and he dispatched it with all the original letters to the feet of the Imperial throne, the true centre of Khalifat. This special trust entrusted to trustworthy servants of His Highness, was, through their agency, placed before the noble eyes of this glorious monarch. We cannot add anything to the agreeable form under which the Nawab Amir ul Umra presented all your correspondence to our master. This minister recalled in his report all that was said *viva voce* concerning the measures to be taken to tighten the bonds of friendship and good harmony, which unite the two Empires; and he concluded with very earnest representations to His Highness to obtain from him a precise reply to your petitions.

As for us, you should not doubt our special efforts to see that the Nawab Amir ul Umra and His Highness himself are favourably disposed to them. You will have a proof of it from the following incident. The English generals, at the head of two flying camps and furnished with their military funds, arrived on the shore of the sea of Cuttack to a post to the west of Jehangirabad, which is only 30 or 40 Kerdés (a local measure of distance which I cannot estimate), and offered their very humble services to His Highness; and they made the greatest entreaties to persuade him to accept their offers; but we alone, out of consideration for the Court of France, and always with the intention of preserving for it the means of uniting more intimately with us, we opposed the English proposals and we raised so many obstacles in them that these Generals retired in despair. Mir Sindia and others yielding before the circumstances, joined the English. What can my friendship do more than what it has done?

Four years ago, you promised us an effective succour at the time of your departure for Europe. We have, during this long interval, eagerly fulfilled all the obligations which most intimate friendship could impose upon us, and we have further just prevented the success of an eventuality which was to our advantage, and which had the approval of the principal chiefs of the Empire, and even that of the Nawab Amirul Umra, and that simply to gratify you. However, you are aware of the situation of the impire, and of the effect of its confidence in the promises of your Court.

We continue to expect its execution, if not entire, at least partial. We shall content ourselves with one point, out of thousand, which have been promised to us. We shall retain hope till we receive your reply. If, by that time, there appears something, more or less, of what had been agreed between your Coart and ours, that would lead us to resume our conferences and renew the negotiation. If, however, it was still necessary to defer renouncing it, we shall take this decision. But you understand that the arrangements to be made to re-establish order and tranquillity among the peoples of our Kingdom, cannot be conveniently put off to future times. We know that you are in force on the

Continent; and if you take into consideration the necessity to hold on there, you must give me a prompt reply so that I can, on hearing from you, revive the confidence of the Amirul Umra. But if there is delay in replying to me, remember that it will be no fault of ours. Don't forget that your letters ought to be written in the Persian idiom, for, to succeed in understanding your languages we cannot help divulging your secret. You ought also to inform us about the battles and victories of the French, spread and assembled in corps of troops in the Continent, as well as about all that takes place there. We send you copies of the dispatches, which we receive so that you could take note of them.

May you be eternally happy.

Translated by order of the
Minister
from the Persian text by me,
Secretary and Interpreter of the King
for Oriental Languages, October
22, 1785.

Translation of a Persian letter addressed to M. de Montigny by Nizam Ali, Subhedar of the Deccan, and of which this Colonel sends the copy to the Minister.

No. 7

(Text Persian)

Your letter, which announced to us the desire, which the Emperor of the French has of allying himself and making common cause with us, and the departure of M. de Suffren, Commander of the naval forces of France, to meet M. de Bussy, with a promise to inform us about the union of these two Generals; this letter reached us and we read it with the closest attention.

The contents of your dispatch gave us all the more pleasure as they were confirmed to us by M. de Suffren himself. This great Admiral, whose dignity, courage and reputation efface the brilliance of the sun.

We are also animated with the desire to revive the friendship and good harmony which unites us to your redoubtable Emperor. As for measures taken in this respect, they will be related to you in greater detail in the letter of this hero.

You ought to be convinced of our eagerness to co-operate with the common project, accelerate its success, and give you personally and on every occasion proofs of our good-will. And we hope that you will occupy yourself, on your side, to see that we are kept informed of the correct position of affairs, and of the interesting particulars of the events.

It would be superfluous to expatiate more.

Translated by order of the Minister
from the Persian text by me Secretary and Interpreter of the King
for the Oriental Languages in
attendance upon the Court.
Versailles, October 20, 1785.

Translation of Persian letter addressed to M. de Montigny by the Nawab Teghidjenk Bahaddur, and of which this Colonel sends the copy to the Minister.

No. 8

Copy of the letter from the Nawab Teghi djenk to Colonel Montigny representing the Emperor of the French.

Model of bravery and morality.

We have received your letter by which you inform us of the dispatch, which you had made, in conformity with what was agreed, of the Imperial document, of the letter of Nizam Ali and of mine to the General M. de Bussy; and you point out to us next that during the interval, you had learnt of the arrival of this hero under the walls of Cuddalore of the movements made by M. de Suffren towards Bengal, and of the flight of the English, whom he had met and beaten.

M. Aumont, to whom you had written at the same time, has further given us more details on the march of M. de Bussy, and on the defeat of the English. This happy narration, joined to the desire which you have expressed to get a reply from me, has given me great pleasure; but I have nothing more to communicate to you, having already written to you to give us news of the land and naval forces. Your letter, which has crossed mine, has fully satisfied me so far as its contents are concerned. The communication of what you had previously made to M. Aumont, had given rise to my curiosity; and as I knew that he was in correspondance with you, I rightly thought he enjoyed your confidence and I charged him to send you my letter by a special courier. I hope that on his arrival, you will have hastened to join to the earlier information, which you had sent us, all the particulars which you may have learnt since this epoch on the activities of your Generals, to put me in a position to render a satisfactory and proper account to His Highness to augment the friendship and good harmony, which exist between the two Courts. That is what M. Aumont will explain to you still better. Of what use would be a longer discourse here?

Translated by the order of the
Minister from the Persian text by
me, Secretary and Interpreter to
the King for the Oriental Languages,
Versailles, October 20, 1785.

RUFFIN

Translation of a Persian letter addressed to M. de Montigny by the Begum Sombre, and of which the Colonel sends the copy to the Minister.

No. 9

Copy of the letter from the Begum, wife of M. Sombre, to Colonel Montigny, representing the Emperor of France.

Very illustrious, very honourable and very powerful Noble.

May the Supreme Being take you under its holy protection, and may it confer on you the favour to attain higher ranks!

After the usual compliments, I have the honour to inform you that since the fatal accident, of which M. Pauly has been the victim, through the perfidy of Muhammad Beg Khan Hamdani, changes have taken place, which I cannot relate to you by a letter. The bearer of this letter will give you, *viva voce*, the details. We had indeed to submit to the decrees of Providence, whose will is unalterable.

The Nawab, distributor of favours, Nassir ud daulah, Mirza Muhammad Shafi Khan Bahaddur, who is the central point of all the State affairs, and who disposes movable and immovable properties of the crown, out of consideration for my situation, has kindly retained me in the possession of all that belonged to my husband, under the title of mother. In this same capacity, I keep possession of the quarters of Djiaidar in *statusquo*. Such is the important service which this benevolent Nawab has rendered me. I accompanied him, in gratitude, with the troops up to Akbarabad. I am still here.

As for the honours, titles and dignities which M. Pauly enjoyed, we can find their trace in the Imperial Protocol. My arrival at Akbarabad rightly puts me in a position to take a complete extract of the same. I have stopped here expressly for some days, and I have sent to Delhi, the genuine source of this information by special courier, with a request that an exact and authentic notice of all the titles, honours and dignities with which M. Pauli was invested, should be taken out from the Registers of the Imperial Chancellery. As soon as this document reaches me, I shall dispatch it to you by the same special courier, as a greater precaution.

We hope that you will continue to honour us with your correspondence and your commissions. We very earnestly solicit you for it.

Offices and Titles conferred upon M. Pauli by the Emperor.

The command of 14,000 men, of 7,000 infantry and an equal number of cavalry.

Ceremonial Palanquin.

Military Music with Kettledrums.

The queue, the flag and the club of the Command.

As for qualifications and the ceremonial, they are stated, in the extract.

Besides, may you live happy and content!

Translated by order of the Minister
from the Persian text by Secretary
and Interpreter to the King for
oriental Languages, Versailles,
October 21, 1785.

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DECCAN,

Delhi,

De Souza, Dom Frederic (Governor of Goa),

D'Houdan, M.,

D'Orves, Comte,

Duchemin,

Dufreneau, M.,

ENGLAND,

FRANCE,

France, Isle of (now Mauritius),

GANESHPANT BEHERE,

Ganges,

Geslin, M.,

Goa,

Gohad,

Good Hope, Cape of,
Gopalrao,
Gujarat,
Gwalior,
HAIDER ALI,
Hamadani, Muhammad Beg,
Himmat Bahaddar (Raja Anupgir)
Holkar, Tukoji,
Hughes, Admiral,
Hyderabad,
KRISNARAO KALE,
Kurnool,
LAUNAY, M. de,
MADRAS,
Mahé,
Malabar Coast,
Malavois, M. de,
Monneron, M. L.,
Montcamp, Martin de,
Montigny, M. de,
Muhammad Ali,
NAGPUR,
Najaf Khan,
Nana Fadnavis,
Nizam Ali,
Nizam-ul-Mulk,
ORISSA COAST,
PAULY,
Peshwa (Sawai Madhavrao),
Phadke, Haripant,
Piveron de Morlat,
Pondicherry,
Poona,
RAGHOBHA (RAGHUNATHRAO DADA),
Rousseau, M. (French Consul at Basra),
SATARA,
Shafi Khan, Mirza,
Shaha Alam (Ali Gohar),
Siddi (of Rajapuri),
Sombre,
Souillac, Vicomte de,

Suffren, M. Le Commandeur de,
Surat,
TAHAWWAR JANG (Tedjenk),
Tanjaour,
Tatta,
Tipu Sultan,
Trincomalee,
VERSAILLES,
WARNET, M.,
ZAINUL ABEDIN KHAN,

FRENCH RECORDS
(RELATING TO THE HISTORY OF THE MARATHAS)

VOLUME VI

CORRESPONDENCE OF M. DE MONTIGNY, FRENCH RESIDENT AT THE MARATHA
COURT (1781–88)

MONTIGNY'S ROLE DURING THE MARATHA-MYSORE WAR

Translated & Edited

by

Dr. V. G. Hatalkar

Contents

INTRODUCTION

[Although we have reproduced the documents in full, in the Introduction, we have dealt only with that part of the documents which concerns the history of the Marathas.]

Although the Anglo-Maratha War and the Anglo-French War had ended, the French Minister thought it advisable to keep Montigny at Poona for some time longer; perhaps he expected a fresh rupture with England in the near future and in that case, Montigny's presence at Poona would be of great service in forming an alliance with the Maratha nation against the English.

Hardly had the Anglo-Maratha War ended than warclouds had begun to appear, though deemly, on the Maratha-Mysore frontier. Now, the only chance for the French to realise their dream of one day destroying the power of the English in India lay solely on the close unity among the Indian powers so that in concert with them, they (the French) would fight the common enemy. They were therefore rightly grieved to see these Indian powers wasting their precious energies and resources by fighting among themselves and thus clipping their own wings to the great advantage of their real enemy, the English. Montigny's role, therefore, at Poona was to impress upon the Maratha Regency this vital truth and persuade them to give up their hostile stand against the ruler of Mysore, even at the cost of some personal sacrifice. This was an unenviable task in view of the complicated political situation.

In the meantime, Vicomte de Souillac, Governor-General of the Isle of France and Bourbon, was now appointed Governor-General of all the French possessions beyond the Cape of Good Hope. He arrived in India in May 1785 to take stock of the situation in this country and adopt measures, including that of the appointment of the Governor of Pondicherry, for the efficient administration of the French settlements in India. While announcing his arrival at Pondicherry to Nana Fadnawis, he wrote : "The King has instructed me to inform all the powers in India that ever since the termination of the great war against the English in America, in which they were compelled to surrender all their possessions in that country, his sole desire has been to restore to the Indian Princes all the territories that have been conquered from them by the English and to protect all those whom the European nations would try to subjugate. I have communicated to you the intentions of the King of France, so that you might be prepared to act in concert with the French when the occasion arises."

As soon as he had taken stock of the political situation in India, Souillac thought of starting negotiations with the Chief Indian powers, especially the Marathas and Tipu Sultan. He disapproved of Bussy's style in his correspondence with the Indian Princes, as it comprised only in words of compliments, vague expressions and dangerous promises which, though they could never be fulfilled, must have created a most unfavourable and false impression about the French nation in the minds of these princes. Therefore, Souillac wished to give a new turn to French politics in India, and for this purpose, dispatched detailed instructions to Montigny. The French Resident was first of all to explain to the Maratha Government the motives which had led to the last war between France and England, as also those which had led to its termination, viz., that as the English had attained a certain degree of power and influence in European politics, mainly because of their possessions in America and India which were a perennial source of wealth to them, the object of the French in declaring the war was to deprive the English of their possessions in America; that the French could send very few vessels and troops to India because they had to assemble the mass of their forces in America; that the object of compelling the English to abandon their possessions in that country being fulfilled, peace had to follow, all the more necessarily because not only had the war lasted for a long time but had also involved France in huge expenditure; that the minor war in India, being only accessory to the major object, could not therefore in any way influence considerations of peace in Europe. Such frank avowal, in the opinion of Souillac, could help to correct the false notion cherished by the Indian Princes that the French had concentrated all their efforts on India and planned to dispatch a large number of troops and ships to expel the English from this country. As a result of the encouragement of such notions, Souillac said, the Indian Princes must have formed a very poor opinion of the resources and power of the French nation. Souillac continued : "After having dealt the English a very severe blow in America, the French would now aim at the total expulsion of that nation from India;

for this purpose, they would assemble the mass of their forces in the Indian Ocean; in fact, the French Government had already started putting this plan into operation; two ships, carrying troops, had already arrived at Pondicherry, to be followed by four or five more in a month's time; moreover, reinforcements would be available at the Isle of France where troops would be gradually and regularly dispatched from Europe, so as to constantly increase the mass of French troops in this part of the world; the French would thus be in a position to act with great vigour and promptness as soon as the King of France declared war against the English; the French had an advantage in that, since the English had to defend their possessions in different parts of India, their forces would be scattered all over the country; on the other hand, the French would concentrate their troops on the two coasts of Malabar and Coromandel; as regards French ambitions in India, these were to build up commerce which could be equally advantageous both to the French nation as well as to the different powers in India; the King of France did not wish to secure any vast possessions in India but would only confine himself to the establishments on the two coasts with a surrounding territory sufficient to maintain and protect their commerce; in return for the alliance with the Marathas for expelling the English from the west coast, he would only demand Bombay with a sizable rounding off; the rest of the English possessions would be returned to the Marathas; if the Marathas wished to conclude a treaty with the French immediately, they were free to make proposals which he would dispatch to France for the King's consideration; but the conquest of Bombay should be the first object to be fulfilled and the Marathas should guarantee its cession to the French along with a suitable rounding off; secondly, the treaty should not involve the French in any action before an actual declaration of war by the King of France; since it would take time to send the proposals to France and receive a reply before the treaty was finally ratified and since it was also essential to expedite the matter, the Marathas should send their proposals without any loss of time; as regards the complaint of Nana Fadnavis that the French had shown a preference for Haider Ali in their alliance, Montigny could reply that this prince was the first to make overtures to the French, that from the moment he had heard that Pondicherry was attacked, he had given orders to send all sorts of provisions to the French from his port of Mangalore, that afterwards he had twice sent to the Isle of France one of his vessels making the most advantageous offers and that he had marched with a powerful army into the province of Arcot where the English had seized all the possessions of the French; that the latter, with a small number of troops and ships destined for India, could not afford to divide their forces; that it was thus as much natural for the French to unite their troops with Haider as they should land in that part of India where stood their old possessions; that as for the Maratha proposals, these unfortunately reached the French authorities very late when there was no time for their acceptance; that, however, the French had replied that, as it was in their interest to help the Marathas against a common enemy, they would do so, in the first instance, by carrying the war into the Carnatic and that the Marathas, in their turn, should raise a powerful army to create a diversion for the English on the Malabar Coast and that the French would send them assistance as soon as possible, that the French would certainly have fulfilled their promise, if the Marathas had played their part, for, in that case, the English would have been compelled to divide their forces and consequently weaken themselves; that supposing that the Maratha Government were willing to make proposals for a treaty with the French immediately, Montigny should impress upon them that during the interval, it was harmful for the Indian Princes to waste their resources by internecine wars among themselves; that the English would not fail to provoke them to wage such wars, since it was in their interest to see to it that the Indian Princes exhausted each other so that they could afterwards be easily subjugated; that, on the other hand, the latter should form a close union among themselves and take advantage of the moment when there was a dispute going on between the East India Company and the Royal Government. These arguments, Souillac believed, should convince the Maratha Government of the correct position of the French.

On receiving these instructions, Montigny had several interviews with Nana Fadnavis. The Maratha Minister seemed to be specially satisfied with the French plans to send troops and munitions to Pondicherry and to the Isle of France in the immediate future. Referring to the last war, Nana agreed that the French had succeeded in achieving their goal of depriving the English of their precious possessions in America, but wondered how French success in that quarter was going to help the Marathas who were anxious to see the French in full strength in India. As regards the desire of the King of France to restrict himself only to establishments on the Indian Coasts, the Minister wanted to

know whether the intentions of His Majesty were to have possessions on the Maratha Coast besides Bombay. He pointed out that the English, since the last war, had not an inch of territory on this coast other than Bombay, Salsette, Surat and Bankot. As for the treaty to be concluded with the French for the future, Nana said that it required reflection, that it would be necessary to summon a meeting of the Council of the Regency and that he would give his reply only after mature deliberations. Souillac's argument about sending French troops to co-operate with Haider Ali in preference to the Marathas, had not at all convinced the Minister. With regard to war with Tipu, Nana Fadnavis declared that the conduct of the ruler of Mysore towards the Maratha Government and its allies forced them to take up arms against that prince.

A suggestion was, however, made to Montigny that the Marathas sincerely desired to remain at peace with Tipu Sultan if the latter would fulfil promises made to the Maratha Government by his father and that the French Governor-General could mediate on this issue. In the opinion of Montigny, not only would this arbitration be a sure way of arresting the fire which threatened to spread all over the Indian Peninsula, but it would also give a certain prestige to French name among the Indian Princes. He was, therefore, eagerly looking forward to Souillac's visit to the Malabar Coast at the end of the monsoon in order to moot the proposal.

As the time of the departure of Souillac for the Isle of France was approaching (he had planned to leave in the beginning of October), Montigny was anxious to get the Poona Government's reply to the Governor-General's suggestion for a treaty to be concluded between the Marathas and the French for the future. He had therefore a long conference with Nana Fadnavis and Haripant Phadke on September 16, when the issue was thoroughly discussed. The Maratha Minister firmly stated that his government would not conclude any treaty with the French unless it had received a reply from the King of France to the proposals which it had made in 1782 and which the French Resident had transmitted to Duchemin and Suffren. The late Bussy had written to him that the proposals were sent to France and had promised to inform him as soon as he would receive the King's reply. He (Nana) would like to wait for the reply. However, he assured Montigny that his attitude towards the French had not changed. The reason for this uncompromising attitude of the Marathas is not far to seek. They had on five occasions made proposals to the French for a treaty of alliance, viz., in 1772, 1775, 1778, 1781 and 1782, but the latter had not bothered to send a reply even on a single occasion. The Marathas had, therefore, every reason to feel slighted. Montigny failed to understand this simple reasoning. He drew the conclusion, and accordingly cautioned Souillac, that the Maratha Government were acting on the definite assumption that the principal interests of the French lay on the side of Tipu Sultan and the Coromandel Coast and that they used the Marathas as an object of diversion against the English of Bombay. This prejudice, he added, stood as a great obstacle in his dealings with that government and all his efforts to remove it had not proved of much avail.

With regard to the war with Tipu Sultan, Montigny expatiated in the Council on the advantages of amicably adjusting the differences that had arisen between the two parties. He pointedly drew attention to the fact that this war was going to involve the Marathas and Nizam Ali in a very heavy loss of men, material and money, and that these could be much better utilized against the common enemy when the rupture between France and England took place. Nana Fadnavis reiterated the sincere desire of his government and that of Nizam Ali to make peace with the ruler of Mysore, if the latter would stop his aggressive tactics against them, and either pay for or return the territory which his father had seized from the Marathas. Moreover, negotiations were still going on with that prince. Montigny noticed with some satisfaction that the feelings at the Maratha Court did not run so high as before and that the replies left room for hope. Since it was in the interest of the French to see that this war was avoided at all costs, Montigny promised Souillac to collect all information on this subject and promptly communicate it to him. At the same time, he hoped that Souillac's own efforts with Tipu Sultan would bear fruit and win that prince round to the desired end.

Nana Fadnavis showed great interest in Montigny's projected interview with Souillac and even encouraged it. He gladly gave him permission to go and meet his master whether it be at Goa or Daman or Surat. Evidently, he wanted the French Governor-General to play the role of mediator in

the dispute between the Marathas and the ruler of Mysore. Nana gave Montigny an undertaking not to make any movement against Tipu Sultan till his return to Poona. The French Resident was entrusted with letters from Nana Fadnavis and Haripant Phadke for Souillac. Montigny's mission obviously was to explain to the French Governor-General the motives which guided the Marathas and Nizam Ali in taking up arms against Tipu Sultan who persisted in his belligerent activities against them, and at the same time, give Souillac marked proof of their moderation as well as their ardent desire to maintain harmony among the Indian Princes. But Montigny was not destined to meet Souillac. The latter, at the last moment, gave up the idea of visiting the Malabar Coast. Tipu had sought an interview with the French Governor-General and the latter suspected that Tipu's aim in asking for this interview was to justify his conduct towards the Marathas and give an impression to the latter that the French had special relations with him and against them. On the other hand, the Marathas already suspected that the French were espousing the cause of Tipu. Souillac feared that his interview with the ruler of Mysore would confirm the Marathas in their belief that the French wished to support him, whereas, if he went to Goa to have talks with Montigny, Tipu Sultan would take umbrage. He therefore thought it wise to cancel his visit to the Malabar Coast in order not to give any cause for complaint to either party. The extent of Montigny's disappointment can be easily imagined.

At Goa, Montigny received Souillac's letter. The French Governor-General expressed his ardent desire to bring about an end of all the differences between the Marathas and Tipu Sultan. He informed Nana Fadnavis that as his own contribution towards this end, he had made pressing appeals to the ruler of Mysore to unite with the Marathas in a solid alliance which would be beneficial to both the sides. He gave an assurance that the French had no intention to give any assistance to Tipu.

The French persisted in their efforts to persuade the Marathas, Nizam Ali and Tipu Sultan to compose their differences and unite against their common enemy, the English. In his letter to Nana Fadnavis (March 8 1786), Cossigny, now Governor of Pondicherry, expressed his concern over the irreconcilable behaviour of the Indian Princes from which, as he warned, the English alone would profit.

Nana had received reports from his agents that Tipu had agreed to pay forty lakhs of rupees for an alliance with the French and that 4000 French soldiers and 10,000 sipahees were ready to march to his assistance. In spite of French assurances that they had no intentions to assist Tipu Sultan. Nana was anxious to counteract this supposed coalition between the French and the ruler of Mysore by seeking the help of the English. The latter, however, appeared less solicitous at this moment to co-operate with the Marathas.

The long contemplated hostilities between Tipu and the Marathas broke out in the beginning of the year 1786. There was a strong rumour that Tipu had entered into a treaty with the French and Nana himself seems to have given credence to it. The French Governor, however, denied the existence of such a treaty. In his letter to Nana Fadnavis, dated March 8, 1786, he gave an assurance to the Maratha Minister that the French would never undertake anything that was likely to harm Maratha interests. In his interview on June 17, Montigny made a strong appeal to Nana to adjust his differences with Tipu, if only to foil the ambitious designs of the English in this country. The Minister replied that he was fully conscious of the soundness of this argument and referred to the efforts he had made, including his proposal for French mediation in this dispute, to come to a peaceful understanding with the ruler of Mysore. But finding that negotiations had failed to achieve the desired end, he had taken the only course open to him to induce that prince to restore to the Marathas the territory wrested from them by his father and pay the tribute which had accumulated for some years.

The real object of Montigny in seeking this interview was, however, quite different. The English Resident, Mr. Charles Mallet, had just arrived in Poona. Montigny naturally conjectured that the Englishman's arrival was the result of the Maratha endeavour to seek English aid in their war against Tipu Sultan. Montigny had also received information that Mallet was prevailing upon Nana Fadnavis to engage a body of English troops in the service of the Maratha Government. The French Resident persistently asked Nana about Anglo-Maratha alliance against Tipu Sultan, declaring that the

French had reliable information that the Maratha Government had made overtures to the English who had not accepted them. Nana's reply was that this might just be an attempt on the part of the English to deceive the French so that the latter should give up any idea of forming an alliance with the Marathas or it might as well be a report deliberately spread by Tipu to win French support on his side. He categorically denied that he had ever solicited the English for assistance against Tipu Sultan, but that, on the contrary, the English themselves were anxious to furnish him sipahees led by Europeans, but that he had as yet not taken any decision on this matter. To defeat the designs of the English Resident to establish a body of English troops in the service of the Marathas as well as any attempt on the part of the latter to seek English aid against the ruler of Mysore, Montigny thought it necessary to warn Nana Fadnavis in clearest possible terms that, in case of a union of English troops with the Marathas against Tipu Sultan, the French would not hesitate to support the ruler of Mysore and that the troops assembled at Pondicherry and at the Isle of France would be utilized for this purpose. Montigny had reasons to feel satisfied with his demarche, for, as he believed, his threat had the desired effect.

In his turn, Cossigny decided to send M. Godard to Poona to get first-hand information about the activities of the English at this Court, and especially about the English proposal to post a brigade commanded by Europeans in the service of the Maratha Government. While presenting him to Nana Fadnavis, Montigny explained to the Minister the purpose of Godard's visit, viz., to find out the truth about the English intrigues at the Maratha Court. Thinking that the presence of Mallet at Poona had given rise to French suspicions, Nana declared that the Marathas had political interests in the whole of Hindustan and that it was, therefore, as much natural to see an English ambassador at the Maratha Court as that of any other nation. He assured the French agent that, barring Mallet, there was not a single Englishman present at Poona. Nana's inquiry of the position of the French in general and of the troops at Pondicherry in particular led Montigny to conclude that the Marathas would have willingly accepted the English proposals but for their fear of a French movement in favour of Tipu Sultan.

Fearing that the two parties would continue the war to their extirpation, Cossigny thought of using his good offices to bring about reconciliation between them. He, therefore, asked Montigny to find out the inclinations of the Maratha Government in this respect. No one could be more delighted at this idea than the French Resident, for, in his opinion, it would be a red-letter day in the history of the French in India if this war were terminated by French efforts. In his letter, dated December 27, to Nana Fadnavis, Cossigny expressed his deep concern at the intensive preparations the Marathas and Nizam Ali were making to continue the war against Tipu Sultan who, in his turn, was determined to fight to the bitter end. He felt that, under the circumstances, if God did not intervene, they would continue shedding blood until they were completely ruined. He wished with all sincerity that the Marathas made peace with Tipu Sultan, even if it be at a little sacrifice. He felt sure that Tipu Sultan would not reject proposals of peace if they were reasonable. He assured Nana that he would consider it a great privilege if he could contribute in some measure to a settlement which, however, in no way, would bring discredit to the Marathas, for, he desired nothing so much as the prosperity and glory of that brave and powerful nation. To Montigny, he made it quite clear that unless the Maratha proposals were reasonable, he would not undertake to open negotiations with Tipu Sultan. He asked Montigny to impress upon Nana Fadnavis that the ruler of Mysore, far from thinking of concluding peace, was anxious to continue the war. Cossigny likewise wrote letters to Nizam Ali and Tipu Sultan.

The war, to the surprise of the French, came to an abrupt end (early February 1787). The terms of the treaty that was signed were not less puzzling. Although the fortunes of the war were definitely in favour of the ruler of Mysore, yet he agreed to cede to the Marathas Badami, Nargund and Kittur (places which had been the bone of contention), and Adoni to Nizam Ali. In addition, he agreed to pay to the Marathas the arrears of tribute amounting to 65 lakhs but now reduced to 48, of which 32 lakhs in cash were to be paid immediately and the remaining sixteen in six months. He also agreed to pay regularly in future twelve lakhs of rupees annually as laid down in the treaty of 1780. No wonder that Cossigny, when informed about the terms of the treaty by Montigny, refused to believe them until he had heard on the subject from Tipu himself. The latter continuously avoided to communicate the terms of the treaty to the French Governor. When pressed on this point, he wrote

(letter, dated May 3, 1787) : “When I defeated the Marathas several times, they finally threw themselves at my feet and solicited me to make peace with them. I was pleased to grant it to them.” Till the end, he refused to divulge the truth. Prior to the signing of the treaty, Tipu had kept Cossigny posted with all the details of his various battles with the enemy, describing them in glowing terms, and the French Governor accepted them without reserve. While, on the other hand, when he found any variation in the reports supplied to him by Montigny, he thought that the latter was misinformed or deliberately deceived, because he did not enjoy the confidence of the Maratha Court. And yet Montigny had all along given him a true picture of all the events, including the defeats of 2nd October and 2nd December.

Whatever it may be, when Cossigny’s letter of December 27, 1786, arrived in Poona, negotiations for peace had so far advanced that it was not possible to disturb them. However, the French Governor’s offer of mediation had created a good impression upon Nana’s mind and the latter expressed his gratitude for the generous offer of Cossigny. He appreciated the laudable motive behind this act which bespoke well of the French character. He once again showed his hatred for the English by declaring that, if ever the French appeared in force on the Malabar Coast, he would have his vengeance upon the English.

Ironically enough, though the hostilities between the two Indian potentates terminated to the great relief of the French, the latter’s relations with the Marathas were destined to suffer a set-back. Tipu Sultan had decided to send his ambassadors to the King of France with a view to concluding a solid alliance with the French. This alliance was aimed at the English, but Nana Fadnavis believed that the invasion of the Maratha territories was Tipu’s chief object in seeking the friendship of the King of France by sending him a special embassy, and towards the end of the year (1787) proposed to Lord Cornwallis, the English Governor-General, to form a defensive alliance with the English in order to check the ambitious designs of the ruler of Mysore. Though he realised the great importance of this offer of alliance, which was essential to the safety of British India, Cornwallis was prevented by Act of Parliament from accepting it, until Tipu should break the treaty by some unequivocal act or declaration of hostility.

Montigny communicated the news of the departure of Tipu’s ambassadors for France to Nana Fadnavis about the middle of April. In fact, the Maratha Minister had known about this event from Bombay two months earlier. His reaction was obvious. Montigny wrote to Cossigny that the intimate connections of the French with the ruler of Mysore were a great cause of concern to the Marathas as well as to Nizam Ali and, according to him, if the latter were soliciting the English, it was only to oppose force by force in case of necessity. All his efforts to remove the misunderstanding in this respect had proved in vain.

Montigny soon began to feel that the attitude of the Maratha Government towards the French was stiffening. The French Resident had been negotiating for some time a delicate matter with the Maratha Government. The latter had granted a passport to English merchant vessels so that they could navigate on the Malabar Coast with the greatest security, whilst others, for want of such a privilege, were exposed to the tyranny of the Maratha pirates. Montigny, therefore, approached Nana Fadnavis with a view to securing a similar passport for all French merchant vessels. The Maratha Minister had promised that the matter would be treated to the satisfaction of the French Resident. Strangely enough, Nana later avoided the issue on the plea that there was no necessity for a passport for French vessels which had nothing to fear on the Malabar Coast. Montigny attributed this change in the attitude of the Regent to the intrigues of the English, but it appears that Nana, by his refusal to comply with Montigny’s request, expressed his displeasure at the intimate relations of the French with the ruler of Mysore. Hurt by this rebuff, the French Resident decided to make this an issue of prestige and insisted that either a passport for all French merchant vessels to navigate freely on the Malabar Coast be granted or he be given formal permission to retire from the Maratha Court. The threat, according to Montigny, had the desired effect and the Minister promised to reconsider the matter. However, till the time of his retirement from Poona (May 13, 1788), Montigny had not succeeded in achieving his objective.

Another affair in which Nana Fadnavis showed his indifference towards the French was the capture of a French vessel 'L' Adélaëdi' and the detention of Capt. Dayot and his officers for ransom by a Maratha flotilla (February 16, 1787). As soon as he heard about the incident, Montigny took up the matter with the Regent who promised to do justice to the aggrieved party. Not satisfied with the progress in the matter, Cossigny addressed a strong-worded letter to Nana Fadnavis, threatening that if the vessel was not released and full satisfaction given for the damages, the French navy would start for the Maratha Coast in October to seek reparation for the damage and avenge the insult to the French flag. It took a pretty long time to finally settle the matter but not to the satisfaction of either Montigny or Capt. Dayot.

In the beginning of the year 1787, the French Government came to the conclusion that it was futile as well as expensive to maintain French Residents with the Indian Princes; the Residents always found it difficult to secure information about the various activities, political or otherwise, at these Courts. It therefore resolved to replace the French Residents by Indians (Brahmins) who, because of their knowledge of the Indian languages, were better qualified for such roles. Moreover, the practice would be more conforming to the usage of the country. Montigny's stay of seven years at the Maratha capital thus came to an end. He left Poona on May 13, 1788.

Speaking about Montigny's role as French Resident at the Maratha Court, it must be said that he discharged his duties with great zeal and disinterestedness. Not knowing the Maratha language and not possessing the means i.e. money, whereby he could unravel the mysteries at the Maratha Court, he was outwitted on more than one occasion by Nana Fadnavis. But he was largely responsible for the delay in signing the Treaty of Salbai by the Maratha Regent and had thus succeeded in the main object of his mission. It was no fault of his that the French authorities could not send troops to help the Marathas in their war with the English. Montigny also played very useful role during the Maratha-Mysore War. His prediction that the dispute about Dharwar would be the cause of a future conflict between the Marathas and Tipu Sultan came true within three years and bears testimony to his keen power of perception. Inspired as he was with a noble patriotism, he strove to the best of his ability to serve the cause of his nation.

Memorial, dated September 15, 1785 by Vicomte de Souillac is of the same type as the one submitted by Law de Lauriston, Vol. III, and Marquis de Bussy, Vol. V. In these memorials, the authors describe the political situation of the whole of India. This is the biggest of the memorials. In fact, it could be styled as the history of India for the period 1783-85. It is surprising how the author could collect such details in such a short time. The information supplied is as exact as it could be. It deals with the political situation of the Indian Princes, the situation, political, military and financial, of the English, of the Dutch in India and of the French establishments in India, and finally, the plan of future French establishment in India.

This is a memorial submitted by Montigny about 1799 to the Executive Directory, which ruled over France from September 21, 1795 to November 9, 1799, on a French expedition to India. He first of all points out the defects of the expedition of 1782. Taking into consideration the situation of the English in India, the contiguity of their territorial possessions as well as the distribution of their forces, it was, according to him, against all principles of war and politics to attack the English on the Coromandel Coast. Montigny then proceeds to enter into the details of his plan. Since the Maratha territory in the west extended as far as the sea, where they have ports, and surrounded the English settlements on this coast on all sides, it is absolutely necessary to form an alliance with the Marathas. Montigny proposes that the French troops, 12,000 strong, with field and siege-artillery in proportion to the vastness of the enterprise, should effect a landing at the lower end of the left bank of the river Tapti. From there the French should march straight to Surat which was incapable of offering any resistance to such a strong army. This place would serve as a base for all the operations in the interior of the country. From Surat, the French should send a strong detachment for the capture of Bhadoch which should immediately be handed over to the Marathas as proof of the honest intentions of the French and their role as liberators. This act of generosity would create a most favourable impression about the French in all the Darbars of India. The French then should march along the coast as far

down as Bassein and then joined by the Marathas should advance straight on Bombay and besiege it. Simultaneously, the French squadron would block the place from the sea. Bombay, thus, cannot hold long and its surrender would make the French absolute masters of the west coast. Thereafter, the French, with the help of the Marathas and other Indian Princes, can march against the other English Establishments. In conjunction with the Marathas, they could march towards the upper Ganges and drive the English out of the richest provinces they had so far occupied. The Marathas would be compensated for the expenses of this expedition by the payment of the Chauthai. It was understood that the various places, after their conquest, would be restored to their legitimate masters. The French were, under no circumstances, to deviate from their role as liberators. This plan was very sound from all points of view but it had lost all its significance, since Tipu died in May 1799 and the Marathas were on the verge of decadence. Hence forward, any plan to destroy the power of the English in India with the help of the Indian Princes was a castle in the air. The French had lost the best and the last opportunity to do so during the War of American Independence.

A few letters exchanged between Tipu Sultan and Cossigny have also been included here. They are grouped together. They reveal the efforts which Cossigny made to bring about reconciliation between the two contesting parties. It is unfortunate that Cossigny in his letters has stooped to flattery. But there was an ulterior motive behind it. He wanted Tipu to write to the French Minister to retain him in the post of the Governor of Pondicherry and give him the rank of a Lieutenant-General. The Nawab obliged him, but the French Minister disapproved of this outside interference in the internal affairs of the French. In recognition of Cossigny's services, the Minister has conferred on him the rank of a Brigadier.

Montigny has been very unlucky in respect of funds. During his first visit to India, the French Minister somehow forgot to make fixed arrangements for his salary, and even if he had done so, after the declaration of war between France and England (March 1778), Montigny was bound to be stranded. On occasions, he had to pawn his linen. One does not know how he managed to leave Delhi to proceed to the Maratha Court, at the instructions of Bellecombe. Perhaps, M. de Lal  e, who had just been dismissed by Bassalat Jang, sent him money because Montigny went to his camp first before proceeding to Poona. At the Maratha capital, M. Warnet, a French merchant and a patriot, lent him enough money. During his second visit to this country, he refused to accept a salary from the Poona Darbar to impress his disinterestedness on that Court and win its goodwill. He could expect funds from Goa but the French expedition and Bussy's arrival in India were so long delayed that Montigny was without salary for several months. He could, of course, borrow money from M. Warnet, but since the latter's departure for France in 1785, Montigny was compelled to borrow money from the Maratha sahukars of Poona. On the last occasion, he had not received his salary for 15 months. What a pitiable state for a French Resident at an Indian Court! Next, the French Minister had fixed his salary at 16,000 frs. (Rs. 6,400) per year, i.e., about Rs. 525 per month. Montigny was continuously asked to reduce his expenses, and to comply with these orders, he had to think of selling the elephant which had been presented to him by the Maratha Court. What a disgrace for the French! And Bussy and Cossigny had no right to complain that Montigny did not enjoy the confidence of the Maratha Court! Nana Fadnavis must have certainly come to know of the financial embarrassments of the French Resident and what confidence could he place in the greatness and the power of the French nation which could not even pay the meagre salary of its agent at one of the most diplomatically important Indian Court! What a contrast with the pomp and display exhibited by all the English diplomats in all the Indian Courts! Whatever respect the Regent showed to the French Resident must have been due to the fact that the former found that the latter was a perfect gentleman and was convinced of the Frenchman's sincerity.

Another fact which requires clarification is the constant reference by the French to English intrigues at the Maratha Court to provoke discord between the Marathas and the ruler of Mysore and to foil the French attempts to bring about reconciliation between the contesting parties. There is no evidence to prove this fact. The English had strict instructions not to interfere in the quarrels of the Indian Princes unless one of the two sides was assisted by the French. In that case, they would support

the opposite side. At this time, the English made no overtures to the Marathas for any assistance in troops. It was in their interests to watch these internecine quarrels as silent spectators!

Montigny was appointed Commandant of Chandernagare on October 28, 1788.

VINAYAK GAJANAN HATALKAR

Poona, January 8, 1785

M. Le Maréchal, [[Maréchal de Castries was the Minister for the Navy.](#)]

This is the moment when you can be confirmed in all that I had the honour to relate you in 1781 before my departure from France, and since my arrival in India, concerning the Maratha power as well as the advantages which would result from a solid connection with it.

This nation is soon going to play the great role to which it is destined by its political and military constitution, and its aggrandisement ought to be considered as the epoch and the beginning of the decadence of the English in this part of the world.

The revolution which has burst out quite recently at the Court of Delhi is the clearest proof of it.

The state of break-down and anarchy which reigned at this Court, the preponderant influence, which the English had secured there, fired the ambition of the great chiefs, discouraged the small, and did not permit the Emperor, in the midst of this state of confusion, to establish an absolute authority. Today the whole complexion of affairs has altered.

Immediately after the assassination of the Nawab Afrasiab khan, generalissimo of the Emperor (which took place in November), Mahadji Shinde, powerful chief of the Maratha Court, appeared before the Padshah at the head of an army of hundred thousand men, and offered him his succour and his support. The negotiation was short; he obtained all that he desired, and the Emperor has given him the widest powers by appointing him Mouktiar. The news of the elevation of Shinde to the office of the generalissimo of the Empire, has just reached the Regency of Poona which immediately communicated it to me.

I am at the very moment dispatching a courier to M. de Bussy to inform him of this fortunate revolution which he will undoubtedly be delighted to learn.

I had the honour, Monsieur le Maréchal, to give you an account, by my dispatch of 22nd November, of the motives of the visit of the Governor-General Hastings to Lucknow and of the springs he employed to persuade the eldest son of the Emperor to seek the protection of the English Government.

Shinde has already manifested the powers with which he is invested by forcing them to return the Emperor's son, and to restore to the Padshah the immense sums they have collected since their invasion of the upper Ganges.

Shinde also persists in re-establishing the Raja of Benares in all his possessions of which he had been deprived by the Council of Calcutta. Asaf-ud-daulah and Sayyad Ali, sons of Shuja-ud-daulah, are already making movements to shake off the yoke of the English.

I am impatiently awaiting news from the Court of Delhi to know the result of this great revolution. I shall be very exact, Monsieur le Maréchal, in communicating to you all the details relating to it, as well as in giving you an account of the influence which it necessarily ought to have on all the powers of India.

I am respectfully,

Monsieur le Maréchal,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,
Montigny.

Colonies

M. de Montigny, by a letter of June 9, 1785 (it is January 8) which reached the Department only on the 8th of this month, gives an account of the principal events that took place in India.

He foresaw that the Maratha power was going to play the premier role in India and that this epoch would see the decadence of the English, and he concluded from it that it was useful to form an alliance with it.

Mahadji Shinde, a powerful chief of this nation, appeared, after the assassination of the Nawab Afrasiab Khan, generalissimo of the Padeshah or Mughal Emperor, at the Court of Delhi at the head of an army 100,000 strong and was made Muktiar or Grand Vazir.

Shinde had utilised his new office to oblige the English to return the eldest son of the Emperor to whom they had given shelter and to demand from them the repayment of the huge sums which they had collected in the Upper Ganges. He also insisted on the re-establishment of the Raja of Benares who had been dethroned by the Council of Calcutta. Asaf-ud-sdaulah and Sayyad Ali, sons of Shuja-ud-daulah, were already making movements to shake off the yoke of the English.

Pondicherry, June 6, 1785

M. de Montigny,

You must have learnt about my arrival here, Sir, from the Waquil of the Regency of Poona, who assured me that he had sent a harakara to inform the Regency about it. I had charged him to send another one to say that I was obliged to study things at the present moment and that I would soon myself write and in detail. But I have just learnt that he had not sent any one, and fearing that this delay might be misinterpreted, I am writing a few lines to Nana Fadnavis as well as to you, Sir, postponing to send you very shortly very considerable details.

Occupied with several pressing matters, I could only cast a superficial glance over your correspondence, Sir. M. Coutanceau delivered to me your latest letter of April 23. I was grieved to see in it that the Marathas were advancing to attack Tipu Sultan. I hope that the negotiations which have begun will restore peace between these two powers.

I spoke to M. Monneron about your need of funds, Sir, and he is going to send them to you by the next dispatch some time during the week.

I am extremely happy, Sir, to renew with you a correspondence which the arrival of M. Le Marquis de Bussy had suspended. I forgot to point out to you, thinking that you were informed of it by the Waquil, that inspite of my intense desire and my repeated solicitations to return to Europe, I was charged to replace M. de Bussy in the Government of all the French possessions on this side of the Cape of Good Hope.

M. Geslin will leave with the next harkaras.

Sir,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

Le Vicomte de Souillac.

(True Copy)

P.S.—The Waquil of the Regency had asked permission to return, which event was about to take place, but I persuaded him to stay. I tried to satisfy him and I think I have succeeded in it.

Vicomte de Souillac announces his arrival in India to the Minister and informs him about the halts made at Trincomalee Karikal.

Pondicherry, June 8, 1785.

My Lord,

Although very much convinced that this letter will reach you only very late, as also the subsequent ones by which I shall have the honour to give you accounts with details, I am, however, risking it so that in case ships left the Isle of France, where I am dispatching it, out of season, you should be informed of my arrival in India.

My passage was longer than I had expected it. The monsoon was belated, and very weak winds conducted us slowly. The corvette La Subtile on which I travelled dropped anchor here on the 20th of the last month. It is true that I had made a short halt at Trincomalee to inquire into the surplus stores which we were supposed to possess there and which, in fact, were there. I even asked M. Fontaine, Artillery Captain, to suspend the dispatch of 11 heavy guns which had remained there and of other artillery material which I saw that the Dutch badly needed. It will even be necessary to send back to them those which belong to them because of their inability to defend this post, important but which is in a very bad condition. M. de Vansenden, who commands it, had made demands on this subject to M. Van de Graff, Governor of Ceylon, following the death of M. Falk. I received letters from this Governor making demands for artillery which I shall satisfy quite in accordance with our means. There were only a few troops at Trincomalee; others were expected and M. de Vansenden assured me that he would be furnished a garrison of 1500 men. I desire it and it is necessary if at all an attack is feared there.

I made a second halt at Karikal and it was quite opportunely. The authorities were anxious to re-establish old rights immediately on resumption, although M. Law had judged it proper to suspend them on the occasion of the last peace. Moreover, they had set up a betel and tobacco farm which had never been at Karikal. This strict procedure had led the inhabitants to retire to the neighbouring English and Danish territory from where they lodged their complaints. I sent for the leaders who pointed out to me that having abandoned them as soon as hostilities began and having been devastated by our very allies, they had expected less strictness on our part. I pacified them and in concert with M. Monneron, I am occupied in formulating a decision which, without harming the King's interests, should satisfy the people who must be coaxed and who would emigrate, as they have threatened to do, if they were not handled factfully.

I spent four days at Karikal occupied with this matter and in visiting the outskirts of the town which can easily become important but which needed at least an earthen wall. I am going to send there an engineer to prepare a plan calculated to reassure the inhabitants against parties who devastate and plunder all that is open, but whom the smallest impediment stops.

The four Mangans form a large district which can yield production immediately and which is open to a considerable increase.

I found at Pondicherry things which had to be done indispensably and immediately whatever decision His Majesty takes. A large train of siege and field artillery is exposed to the effects of air and scorching sun. It is essential to put these precious objects under cover and construct hangars. This matter is the one which struck me most. I shall not presently enter into details of others which I have not yet studied fully. As for the condition of the place, it is known to you, my Lord. In my opinion, orders to dig again the ditches would have been necessary. This simple work would take a long time if it became urgent.

I went through the correspondence of M. Le Marquis de Bussy with Tipu Sultan, the Court of Poona, Nizam Ali and other Indian powers, and I was surprised to see that he had written only simple letters of compliments, that he had not made any overtures even to Tipu Sultan and that finally the one concerning a concession on the Malabar Coast, which you had so strongly recommended, my Lord, was still to be made. I have announced my arrival to the latter and I am going to sound him on this subject and on all those which can bind this Prince with friendship for the French nation. I have also written to M. de Montigny who has just informed M. de Coutenceau that the Marathas have made some movements which are directed against Tipu Sultan and that there have even been some skirmishes. He, however, hopes that negotiations, which are initiated, will re-establish peace between them.

An advice-boat, which recently arrived at Madras, has brought an order to Mr. Macartney and to the committee to restore to Muhammad Ali Khan his kingdom with the onus, however, for the latter to pay annually 12 lakhs of pagodas towards the payment of his debts to the Company as well as to various individuals. Lord Macartney, adhering to principles which had led him to no longer consider this prince as the sovereign of Arcot did not wish to undertake this restoration. Three days ago he left for Bengal from where he will return to Europe. The Committee is inclined to execute the orders of the Directors of the Company.

The situation of the English in Bengal is very embarrassing and even alarming. The draining of their treasury and the difficulty of feeding it necessitated a considerable reduction in the expenses. Mr. Hastings has left to the Supreme Council the responsibility to carry out this delicate operation which took place after his departure. It fell chiefly on the troops whose annual salary is reduced for Bengal alone by 60 lakhs of rupees. It resulted in much ill-temper and this frame of mind is not calculated to allay the fears caused by Shinde, the Maratha Chief, Grand Vazir of the Mughal and who is at the head of 1,50,000 men. This Shinde has given shelter to the Mughal Emperor's son on whom Mr. Hastings had previously laid his hands.

M. de Coutenceau is leaving for the Isle of France from where he intends to proceed to Europe. M. Bellier, formerly artillery commandant, has some work which retains him here. His salary has ceased from the first of this month as also that of all the officers specially employed.

The formation of the battalion of sipahees is also supposed to date from the first of this month. My Lord, I shall have the honour to inform you in detail about all these matters.

I am respectfully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

Le Vicomte de Souillac.

Pondicherry, June 19, 1785.

M. de Montigny.

You must have received, Sir, a very small letter which I wrote to you on the 6th of this month and to which was attached one for Nana Fadnavis. The object of this letter was simply to inform him of my arrival here in the capacity of Commandant-General of the French possessions on this side of the Cape of Good Hope, His Majesty having added India to the government which was already entrusted to me.

Gopalrao Ballal, Waquil of the Regency of Poona with the French nation at Pondicherry, must have informed it of my arrival immediately, and I had charged him to do so by adding that I would write as soon as I was well acquainted with the state of affairs and with the correspondence of my predecessor and with you, Sir. That is what I tried to do by employing all the time which a multitude of matters of different kind permitted me.

From this correspondence and from all the others I saw that the political means which were employed consisted in compliments or vague expressions, and in risky promises, which, as they could never be executed, must have created the most unfavourable impression about the French nation in all the Darbars of India, and at the same time the most erroneous, that of bad faith which would deter them from placing the least confidence in us.

From a letter of 4th November No. 11, I saw that you were informed that French forces would arrive on the Malabar Coast, that this fact was known since a long time and that Nana Fadnavis was well informed in this respect. Was it not evident that Nana Fadnavis would find in a month or two that he had been badly deceived? Indeed, he made it a point to bring it to your notice, Sir, in a conversation which you report in your dispatch of 10th September. All his talk which you could look over again was most judicious. I do not think that we can say a word in reply and I pity you for the very great embarrassment in which you were put. Ah! why lead into an error a power in which we have common interests? Let us explain well these interests to it, that is the first point, let us define to it our real intentions and our means, that is the second.

I shall not enter at all into the discussions which have taken place between us and the Regency of Poona on the subject of their peace and of ours. But it is necessary that it should be informed of the motives of the last war between us and the English, and of those which brought about peace. Without trying to unfold the political system of Europe, can we not give them to understand that the English nation, our rival, had attained a certain degree of power only by the possessions they had invaded in America as well as in India, that it was on this first very important part (America) that war had taken place, that our object was to deprive it of it and that we completely succeeded in it; that as for India, we dispatched there only a very few ships and troops because it was absolutely necessary to carry the mass of our forces to America where we had more than hundred ships and (troops, in proportion during the course of the war. From this knowledge, it ought to be easy to explain that the object which had caused the war being fulfilled since our enemies have abandoned all their possessions in America, peace had to follow all the more necessarily as the war had lasted for a long time and as it was pursued with the greatest vigour, it had involved us in a huge expense.

This knowledge appears to me adequate to impress upon the Regency of Poona that the small war of India being only subordinate to the major object, peace had to depend only on the latter. The same knowledge will destroy the erroneous ideas, which the Indian princes had formed and which were unfortunately encouraged, that we were occupied only with India and with sending ships and troops here. They must have concluded from it that we had only feeble means and consequently formed a very poor opinion of the French nation. These same erroneous ideas have been encouraged even after the peace, by deluding them into believing that we were going to receive armies and that we were

going to recommence war. On the contrary, it is necessary that they should know that peace always leaves an interval and that a fresh war requires preliminary formalities.

As for the complaints of Nana Fadnavis on the question that we had formed an alliance with Haider Ali Khan in preference, it appeared to me easy to reply to him that this Prince had made all advances, that from the moment he had known that Pondicherry was attacked, he had given orders to send us ships and succours from Mangalore, that afterwards he had dispatched one of his ships to the Isle of France on two occasions and made the greatest offers, that finally he had marched with a formidable army into the Carnatic with the object of recapturing the possessions which the English had invaded, that as the French had only a single unit of ships and troops destined for India, as I had already said it, we could not oppose everywhere, and that it was more natural to unite ourselves with Haider Ali Khan who had already taken action in our favour, more especially as our troops had at the same time proceeded to the part where our old possessions were situated.

The Regency of Poona says that it had made us proposals, but they had reached us only very late and when there was no more time to accept them. [\[Souillac is ignorant of the fact that the Marathas had made proposals for a treaty of alliance with the French as early as 1775, and then again in 1778. St. Lubin, French Envoy at the Maratha Court \(1777-1778\), was bearer of the latter proposals.\]](#) Our first response had tended to bring home to it that as our common interest was to join our forces against a nation against which we also had complaints, we were acting in favour of the Marathas by carrying the war in the Carnatic, that they should, in their turn, raise a powerful army to create a diversion on the Malabar Coast and that as soon as we could do so, we would give them succours, and we would have really done so if they had acted vigourously, because then the English would have been forced to divide themselves and consequently weaken themselves.

All that I have just said to you, Sir, when clearly explained to Nana Fadnavis and to the Darbar of Poona ought to convince them that it was not possible for us to behave differently from what we had done and that we would have committed greatest injustice if, called and preceded by Haider Ali Khan on the Coromandel Coast where our possessions are situated, we had abandoned him to proceed to the Malabar Coast.

After explaining to the Regency the true motive of the last war, and the very great success it had brought for us, we have only to explain to it our plans for the future and not at all for the present, for, we must indeed destroy the idea in which they are that any moment we shall be ready to recommence the war. We must, therefore, tell them that after dealing a very severe blow to the English nation, we have only to deal a second one, that of reducing them in India as they have just been in America, because then this nation, very weak by itself, will no more be in a position to arouse our jealousy. Our views tend and can now tend only to this single object, so that it is on this side that the mass of our forces will be directed. But since they have to come from a very long distance, we must have time to prepare everything in advance. That is what we are beginning to put into execution. You will say, Sir, that I am expecting several ships which will successively transport troops here, that two have arrived since my arrival here [\[It is a fact that 1000 French troops arrived at Pondicherry shortly after the arrival of Le Vicomte de Souillac in India.\]](#) and that I am expecting four or five in the course of a month; that this fact can be ascertained by his Waquil and that he will never receive news from me which is not very exact, that these troops could be reinforced quickly by those which are assembled at the Isle of France, and that finally more will flow constantly and by slow degrees from Europe to the Isle of France so as to always increase our mass, that this way we shall be in a position to act vigourously and with great advantage as soon as the King will send his orders, that they must expect (a point to be well impressed on them) that our advantage will be all the greater as having then no other object but India, all the efforts will be directed there and that as, on the other hand, the English have to defend their possessions in so many different parts of India, they could not be in force anywhere, that as for us, we shall divide ours on the two coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, that we shall inform the Marathas in advance about the war as well as about our arrangements, that even now I am thinking of informing them about the King's intentions on the manner in which he wants that the French nation should be maintained in India, that in general he only wants to establish a secure trade and equally advantageous

for the nation and for the different powers of India, that he will protect them against all those of Europe who would intend to invade the territories and make war with the said powers, that he does not wish to acquire any vast possessions, but limit himself to establishments on the two coasts with a reasonable rounding off which might defray the expenses of the said establishments and protect the trade, that by allying himself with the Marathas to capture what the English possess in the neighbourhood, he will only demand Bombay with a suitable rounding and that the rest will be returned to the Marathas; that the whole plan will be explained more exactly and with greater details in the treaty which will be concluded with them.

If they appear inclined to conclude a treaty even now, provided they do not oblige us to operate before the war is notified by the King, you might, Sir, ask for proposals which I would send to the Minister and which, after the King's sanction, would be concluded with them. But the conquest of Bombay must be the first object to be fulfilled and that its possession must be assured to us with a suitable rounding. Explain well, Sir, for, you see that it is my principle that we must have time to send their proposals to Europe and receive a reply for the finishing touch to the treaty, and tell them that as it is essential to terminate it as early as possible, they must send me their proposals immediately. It would be better if before sending them they communicated them to you so as to enable you to draft them to a certain point and remove all the items that would be contrary to the views expressed above. If they proposed, for example, to cede to us even now either Chaul or any other place which would require a garrison and division of our actual mass in India, we must rule out this proposal or decide that it would take effect only at the commencement of the war. They should also know that I must return to the Isle of France in September, where I am charged to give an account of the situation of affairs in India and where I shall await fresh orders from the King, after which I shall inform them of what His Majesty will have decided in respect of their proposals.

Supposing that the Regency of Poona acquiesces in making proposals, such as I have just mentioned, we must more than ever try to persuade it that during the interval, it would be harmful for it to waste its strength by different wars with the princes of the country, and that they must mistrust the English who will incite them to it, because it is in their interest to see them become weaker and destroy each other to take advantage of it consequently and seize their possessions; that that is what they (the English) are aiming at present more than ever having no other resources than those which they derive from this country, that on the contrary, the princess of India ought to closely unite with each other, and take advantage of this moment when there is a division between the English Company and the Royal Government of England. The former heavily encumbered with debt has just made a huge reduction in the salaries of the troops. This reduction for Bengal alone amounts to sixty lakhs of rupees annually which leads them to raise murmur, and can only render them ill-disposed. On the other hand, the Royal Government aims at seizing the territories of the Company. A Bill, which has just been passed, deprives the latter of the greatest part of its rights and very soon it will be reduced to a simple trading company, whilst the King, master of the territories, will try to aggrandise them and draw the largest possible quantity of gold and silver from India to enable him to pay off the national debt which is huge. It follows from this state of affairs that the English have a plan of conquest in India, formed and unavoidable in view of their liabilities and moreover, because of their lack of means, while the French have no other views than to deprive them of this resource and re-establish the legitimate masters in all their rights.

In the letter attached herewith, which I am writing to Nana Fadnavis and to Haripant Phadke, I do not enter into any details, but I refer them to those contained in this dispatch to which, Sir, you will kindly give all the extension which you will deem necessary, but by strictly confining yourself to the principles which I have enunciated, and which certainly are yours; no engagements which cannot be fulfilled, no announcements lacking foundations, no vague and involved promises which reduce correspondence, which ought to be interesting, to a sequence of words without substance, the result of which, if it is nil, is the most favourable that can be anticipated.

I am impatiently awaiting your reply, Sir, and you will easily understand that I should receive it urgently, as my plan is to return to the Isle at the end of September. M. de Cossigny, appointed

commandant of the establishments in India, will be indeed here and can follow the correspondence and send it to me, but it must have some basis before my departure.

I have the honour to be with a very sincere attachment,

Sir,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

(Signed) Le Vicomte de Souillac.

(True Copy)

Pondicherry, June 20, 1785.

M. de Montigny

(No. 2)

The letter attached herewith, Sir, which I have the honour to write to you under No. 1 concerns the Regency of Poona alone, and if you indeed thought that it was necessary to communicate it in full to Nana Fadnavis, I would see no objection to it. This one will deal with the general political situation.

I am grieved to see that the Marathas and Tipu Sultan cannot make up their mind to remain quiet, at least for some time. You announce, Sir, in your letter of 29th April to M. de Coutanceau that hostilities have been committed between them and that the former are speedily dispatching troops to the Krishna. However, you seem to hope that the negotiations which have begun could restore the spirit of conciliation between these two powers. If we are to credit the piece of news which has come from Hyderabad dated 25th May, we can hardly count on this hope. It announces that Nizam Ali is also sending troops to the same part and there have been big movements in this capital. It is true, it adds, that Nizam Ali cannot make big efforts, and they even fear that the outcome of this war may not be in his favour. The author of this news (M. Aumont) believes that M. Johnson left this court to solicit the government of Madras to send succour to the combined powers. But supposing (which I do not believe) that Mr. Johnson is entrusted with this mission, I am very much convinced that he will not succeed and that the English will not make any movements which tend to hasten a fresh war with France which they dread. It is much more advantageous for them to pit the Asiatic powers against one another without committing themselves. That is a matter against which they ought indeed to be on their guard, and which you, Sir, must constantly point out to them.

If, inspite of all your observations to the Darbar of Poona, he (Nana) persisted in the confederation against Tipu Sultan, and if he especially spoke about the union of the English, you could give him to understand that in case it took place, we would be obliged to support Tipu Sultan, for the King's intention is to protect the weak against the strong, and especially if the English were associated with the latter. You could add that the troops which we are assembling here are intended to act in such cases. On the whole, do not lose the occasion, Sir, to lay emphasis on this assemblage of troops, which, from what I have known, intrigues the English. Do not forget to add that it is only an advance-guard of those assembled at the Isle of France, but while explaining rightly that the whole assemblage, ready to act if we were forced to do so, is, however, only a reserve for the epoch of the war, which can be fixed only in Europe and by the orders of His Majesty. Speak also about the ships which move to and fro between the Isles and this place and which would indeed be reinforced if it became necessary. In my opinion, this démarche can provide material for reflections and fears. Let us inspire confidence on the one hand, but let us assume, on the other, an imposing tone which befits the nation and let its dignity, too often compromised, not be so any longer. Let the English pour out gold in the Darbars; they can do so because this gold has been snatched from the hands of the Indians, and they must do so to procure the means to snatch some more. But for us, who only intend to maintain the natural preponderance of the French power, we only employ means worthy of it.

I am awaiting more certain news of the state of affairs in the Deccan to enable me to decide to send a Waquil to Nizam Ali to inform him about my arrival. I know that M. Aumont had been charged with some correspondence and that you had, Sir, quite a regular one with him. But without entering into other motives, a national Resident with a foreign power must have a character and a state worthy of the nation which employs him, and here an ordinary Waquil is more suitable. I, therefore, request you, Sir, to ask from M. Aumont only news which he could communicate to you as an individual, but not charge him with anything officially.

M. Geslin [Geslin was a French officer attached to Montigny's staff.] has delivered to me a packet coming from Delhi and containing the letters from Messrs Evin and Saleur with the copies of the dispatches from the Nawabs Afrasiabkhan and Najaf Quli Khan as well as from the Emperor. All these dispatches are previous to the last revolution which has placed Shinde at the head of affairs, because of which I am not in a position to reply to the said dispatches. As for M. Evin, I request you, Sir, to give me particulars about him and about his party, and to inform me up to what point he can be useful to us in this party, whether he can have influence with Shinde and contribute to movements which can be advantageous to us. He has asked from me many commissions and among others one for him of a Lieutenant-Colonel. These sorts of commissions cannot be given lightly, and they ought to be the reward of very great services rendered.

While writing to M. Evin, I request you, Sir, to inform him about the general dispositions of His Majesty for India, to speak to him about the troops which he is sending here, etc. etc. You will also speak about the embarrassing situation of the English in India as well as in Europe, especially about the Bill, about the huge national debt, about the plan of the English Government, etc., so that all the news is circulated and is known.

I am writing to Shinde, and I am attaching herewith my letter which I request you, Sir, to dispatch to him, supposing that he continues to enjoy the same position. It is a simple letter of compliments. You could perhaps add one with some details. I do not quite know if you have to use circumspection *vis-à-vis* the Regency; in that case you must not compromise yourself and even keep my letter in your possession. If, on the contrary, you are not embarrassed by any considerations, you could write to the different persons in position in keeping with the general spirit of my dispatches.

If you deem, Sir, that it would be advantageous for us to announce that Pondicherry is being fortified, you can say that we are in the process of undertaking the work. In short, help me to change the opinion of the Indians, and let us present the French nation only such as it is : magnanimous, generous and of course, powerful.

I have the honour to be very sincerely,

Sir,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

(Signed) Le Vicomte de Souillac.

(True Copy)

Pondicherry, June 20, 1785.

M. de Montigny,

(No. 3)

M. Warnet, Sir, who has been here since some days, delivered to me the letter of 8th January which you had the honour to write to me and which you did not think that I would receive at Pondicherry.

The matters which you desired to discuss with me frankly, Sir, were actually becoming quite irrelevant to me, before the orders which I had received and which I was very far from expecting. But what is personal to you, could never be in that category. The short time you had passed at the Isle of France had sufficed to interest me infinitely in your success, because of the knowledge I had both of your pure and disinterested zeal and of your means. I was therefore grieved to see that unfortunate circumstances have prevented you from employing both. You have been embarrassed and upset in several ways. I knew it roughly and I have now seen it in detail. I shall do what depends upon me so that you should be embarrassed as little as possible. But because of the state of affairs, it is possible that you may be so often. I am sorry that too long a stay at Poona hardly allows you to proceed to some other part without ill consequence and without arousing the jealousy and the suspicions of the Regency. If you could have executed, Sir, the plan which and which I had very much adopted, to pass successively from Poona to Delhi, Hyderabad, etc., you would have been more useful, and at the present moment I think that it is Delhi where you should have been to direct the movements of Shinde and profit by the circumstance which has placed him in a position to do great things. But I know that there would be great inexpedience in your going to him, unless the Regency did not respond properly to my proposals and persisted in crushing Tipu Sultan, and national dignity demanded that you should quit Poona. However, in case you are justified in doing so, you must seek my orders and await letters for the Emperor and Shinde, of which you would be the bearer and which would accredit your mission to him. That would also depend upon Shinde's relations with the Regency and on the reliance we can put on him. It is on this point that I request you to enlighten me.

An item which must have very much embarrassed you, Sir, is the lack of funds. But in this respect the position of M. de Bussy and Monneron was not less unfortunate, and with the best will in the world, they could not help you. Although we are not still very much well off, you will, however, receive fifteen thousand rupees which M. Monneron sends you through a bill of exchange on Goa or Surat. I know how you have reduced your expenses, but it is as necessary as unfortunate, since the Minister could not be convinced that the necessary expenses should be so large.

By a letter dated August 29, 1784, M. le Marquis de Castries informs me that although the Court of Poona is far away from our establishments, he thinks that it is advisable to leave you there for sometime longer, may be in the capacity of an observer but he recommends to you to give him news about you more often than you have done, since he has not received any since April 16, 1783.

You see, Sir, that the Minister feels that it is necessary that your residentship should prolong. However, it would perhaps be necessary and possible, that you should, without ill consequence, quit Poona. But you must have a pretext which neither alarmed nor cooled the Regency. We could post there, I think, a Waquil. The one it has here does not appear to be an intelligent person, but at the present moment he is perhaps as good as another. He was a little displeased at the time of my arrival, but I satisfied him in all manner and especially in money. I hope he has written about it. I do not know if the Regency is aware that we pay its Waquil; it is fit and proper that it should know that he is paid Rs. 220 per month.

I have given money to M. Geslin who is leaving this place with these dispatches. You must send him back only in case of a very important mission, as he is very happy with these travels. Moreover, I must confess to you that this officer does not appear to be very active. He took it into his fancy not to deliver to M. Coutanceau [\[Interim commandant of Pondicherry after the death of Bussy.\]](#) the dispatches from the camp of M. Sombre, and he gave them to me only several days after my arrival and by chance. I do not know if it is because of forgetfulness, but he claims that this packet was useless. It is not for him to judge that, and in any case, he should execute the orders which he has received.

These six hundred rupees which I have given to M. Geslin as travelling expenses, you can, Sir, include them in your accounts as the salary of his grade on the footing of a Lieutenant of the troops in India.

I have already pointed out to you that I am to return to the Isles at the end of September, which ought to hasten the dispatch of your letters and those of the Regency. As regards the future correspondence, you will address yourself, Sir, to M. de Cossigny, appointed by the King as Commandant of Pondicherry, and of the French establishments in India under my orders. But on important matters you will at the same time address to me directly.

Receive the assurance of a sincere attachment with which I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

(Signed) Le Vicomte de Souillac

(True Copy)

P.S.—I attach herewith letters for M. De Souza, Governor of Goa and for the brothers Venkatesha and Narayana Camotins. You will send these to them, Sir. We charge them to pay you fifteen thousand rupees and we request M. De Souza to advise them to do so.

(Signed) Le Vicomte de Souillac

Copy of the letter written to Nana Fadnavis, Maratha Regent, dated June 20, 1785.

Nana Fadnavis.

After the compliments,

I hope that you have received the letter which I had the honour to write to you to inform you about my arrival here, and to hear from you news which I am very impatiently awaiting. Gopalrao Ballal, your Waquil, assured me that he had promptly dispatched harakaras to you. This same Gopalrao Ballal told me, on my arrival, that he wanted to return to Poona, but I persuaded him to stay with me in order to maintain the correspondence and the sincere friendship which unites the French nation with the Sarkar of Poona. He has promised to stay while waiting for your orders, and I am sure that your intention is in conformity with the sentiments of union and friendship which have always bound the two nations.

I was sorry to find that you were left in the dark about the reasons which compelled us to make peace with the English. You must have been informed that the war we fought with them was for the large possessions they had in America, that we succeeded in depriving them of all, with the result that they have met with a huge loss in that country, and that as they have abandoned everything, we derived immense advantage by making peace.

As for the ships and troops which we brought into India, it formed a very small part of our forces, because it was necessary for us to keep during the whole war, more than hundred ships and a large number of troops in America. But at the next war, it will be quite different. All our efforts will be directed to India with the intention of restoring to the legitimate rulers all the territories the English have snatched away from them. That is what the Emperor of the French has charged me to announce in order that we should unite together. When all the precautions are taken, I shall keep you informed about them. In the meantime, we are assembling at Pondicherry troops which are daily arriving, and I am expecting more on several ships which are coming, either from Mauritius or from Europe. These troops will be promptly reinforced, when needed, by a larger number stationed at Mauritius. But we must wait for the favourable moment and for the Emperor, my master, to decide everything. I shall not fail to inform you about it.

I have many other important matters to communicate to you, but I charge M. de Montigny to explain them to you. I am writing to him on this subject a very detailed letter which will inform him of the situation of all the affairs, and he will communicate them to you.

Rest assured that you will always find truth in all the matters of which I shall speak to you and that is what I recommend most strongly to M. de Montigny. Moreover, your Waquil, who is here, can give you an account of all that passes here.

I request you to send me your news very promptly, and to receive my good wishes so that all your reign should be glorious and that your steps should always be crowned with victory,

(Signed) Le Vicomte de Souillac.

Poona, July 18, 1785.

(No. 1)

M. le Vicomte,

I received only on July 16, your letter of June 6, and at once I announced your arrival to the Regency, which expressed its great pleasure at this news, convinced that it must bring about a favourable change in the new situation of affairs, a conviction on which I laid very much stress, especially as I felt the necessity in which we are today to act on a new plan.

The Regency is impatiently awaiting the interesting details which you have announced to me in your letter of June 6, and Nana Fadnis has deferred to this date his plan to communicate to me his dispositions with respect to us and his intentions concerning Tipu Sultan.

You have learnt, M. le Vicomte, by my letter of 29th April about the hostile dispositions of the Marathas towards Tipu and about the object of the conferences which were being held on this subject as well as about the futility of my efforts to bring the Regency round to a reconciliation with the Nawab. The matters are still in the same position here. The negotiations commenced three months ago are still going on between these powers. However, Tipu continues to besiege Nargund. This place, situated at about 25 koss from the right bank of the Krishna, belongs to a Brahmin family, a friend and an ally of the Marathas whom the latter think it as their duty to support against the unjust venture of the Nawab. This is the cause of the rupture which is preparing and which, there is every indication of it at the present moment, might lead to an open war if Tipu does not want to desist from his claims. To this motive are also attached private considerations which I shall have the honour to communicate to you when I am enlightened on this point in the Council of the Regency itself. I am very much worried about the consequences of all these happenings; the agitation among the people is at its highest point. I lay much hope on the effect of the courier which you announce to me. Pending this date, rest assured, M. le Vicomte, I shall not lose a single moment here to try, if it is possible, to bring round the people. In this connection, I am meeting the Brahmins (the officers) who enjoy the greatest confidence of the Regent. Your arrival in India could never have been more opportune, as everything is on the brink of a general revolution among the princes of the country. The news which you are going to give will perhaps suspend their hostile dispositions and their reciprocal jealousy which the English have been kindling in all the Darbars of India to rise afterwards on the ruins of all. That is the aim of their detestable politics and of the conduct they have been adopting since they have seized the finest part of the continent. I leave here the English and their hateful conduct to talk about more interesting things.

Allow me, M. le Vicomte, to congratulate you on the fresh mark of confidence which the King has just shown to you, by adding to your old office that of our establishments on this side of the Cape of Good Hope. The advantages which must result from it are the natural and necessary consequence of the relationship which you had formerly established between the Isles and this continent, and every Frenchman, who has the common weal at heart, ought to rejoice in it. Personally it would be difficult for me to express to you my joy when I learnt this happy news.

I never thought that I would have the honour to see you in India, which fact you might have learnt by the letter of the month of January which I wrote to you and which was to be delivered to you at the Isle of France by M. Warnet. This merchant might have told you how much I wished to have a frank talk with you, Sir, on an infinity of matters which oppress me since my residentship here and which have finally led me to solicit my return to France, by, however, observing an absolute silence on the secret motive of my discouragement. I feel happy today, Monsieur le Vicomte, to be immediately under your orders. My respect, my devotion are already known to you. My work will be laid before you, and I hope, by my zeal, to co-operate with your plans and deserve your confidence, a

favour which I consider as the most precious that I can desire in India, and which is so necessary to me for the benefit of the (national) service.

The funds which you propose to send me shortly are all the more essential to me as for the last ten months I have been reduced to have recourse to loans to defray the expenses which my residentship with the Marathas requires, and as I found myself on the point of being completely destitute, unable to find any more resources.

I attach herewith the copy of a letter of March 11, which I wrote to M. Coutanceau, because I presume that you have had no knowledge of it. This letter will prove to you that the Waquil of the Regency has not been shown a very decent conduct, as he was given to understand that his stay at Pondicherry was useless. This Waquil has written about it to Nana Fadnis and his letter has produced the worst effect on the mind of the Prince who at once wanted to recall his Waquil. You will see, Monsieur le Vicomte, what I thought it my duty to do in this respect in order not to break entirely with the Regency of Poona before knowing the intentions of the Minister. The manner in which you have spoken to the Waquil could not fail to produce a good effect and Nana Fadnis is satisfied today that he is staying at Pondicherry.

I am very impatiently awaiting, Monsieur le Vicomte, your orders and your instructions to know the conduct I must adopt at present *vis-a-vis* the Regency of Poona and the Court of Delhi.

I have the honour to be with the most absolute and most respectful attachment,

Monsieur le Vicomte,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

(Signed) Montigny

(True Copy)

P.S.— At the moment of closing my letter, my harkaras have arrived from Pondicherry with the dispatches of June 20, which you had announced to me by your letter. I suspend the departure of these harkaras to obtain, if it is possible, some result which I can communicate to you by this courier. I am asking for a fresh audience with Nana.

(Signed) Montigny.

Poona, July 29, 1785.

(No. 2)

Monsieur le Vicomte,

I did not expect the unforeseen circumstances which led M. Warnet to proceed to Pondicherry. I am all the more happy about it, as this merchant recently left the Regency of Poona, of which he knew the situation. He must have given you a very exact picture of it as well as of my personal position. Accordingly, it must have been easy for you, Monsieur le Vicomte, to appreciate the extreme embarrassment in which I was with respect to the essential matters which I was charged to negotiate as well as because of the kind of correspondence carried on with me for more than 18 months. It was such that it needed nothing less than my zeal for the King's service and my respect for the orders of the Minister not to quit my residentship at the court of the Marathas. In spite of all the deference I owe to the memory of M. de Bussy, I cannot help telling you, Monsieur le Vicomte, how much I am affected by the memorandum which this General submitted to M. Le Maréchal de Castries on my account, after explaining my conduct in a very different manner to the Minister, before he had listened to the reports of an officer whom he had sent to me and about whom I had a lot to complain, if it could ever be in my nature to harm anyone. This unjust prejudice on the part of M. de Bussy and the manner in which he communicated to me his orders since this date have extremely grieved me. At last! you have arrived, Monsieur le Vicomte, and I forget that anything untoward has taken place concerning me. I am happy to know that you are at the head of the general Government and I envisage only the pursuit of a useful and serious work. I now pass on to the most interesting items of your dispatches Nos. 2 and 3, holding back to reply to No. 1 until I have had several other meetings with Nana Fadnis and until I know how I stand with the Regency.

You were indeed right, Monsieur le Vicomte, during my transit at the Isle of France, in adopting the plan which I had the honour to communicate to you and which was to pass successively from Poona to Delhi and Hyderabad. It was a very sure means of rendering myself useful to the State in general. I sought the approval of M. de Bussy especially to proceed to Delhi where I was called by the Emperor. I had then dispatched a copy of this Prince's letter to M. de Bussy, but he communicated to me by his letter of May 28, his orders to remain at Poona where he then thought my presence was more necessary.

The political situation today between the Marathas and Tipu hardly allows me to leave this Court without arousing suspicion and jealousy in the Regency. But in case the Marathas did not respond favourably to your proposals and persisted in declaring war on Tipu in spite of all my representations in this respect, I think absolutely like you, Monsieur le Vicomte, that it would not befit the national dignity if I stayed at Poona, unless the Minister had plans to operate on the Malabar Coast.

In this supposition, I think I must not quit the Regency to proceed to the Court of Delhi, where, however, it would be very essential to have someone.

I know, Monsieur le Vicomte, how it would be advantageous if I were with the Emperor. But I think that can be done only if the Regency takes a final decision against us, or by giving it to understand that you have charged me to go round the different courts of India during the period of peace to get an exact picture of the political situation and that in any case, you have given me the order to return to Poona as the place where I must preferably reside, when the King sends his orders to operate on the Malabar Coast. By this means, I presume that Nana Fadnis would not take any umbrage, and I shall then be in a position to proceed everywhere where you would deem it necessary, and examine things better than through correspondence.

In any case I shall not take any decision without receiving your orders and shall conform to those of the Minister by continuing to reside with the Regency. Until you prescribe to me the subsequent conduct I should adopt, whether to remain at Poona, or to go to Delhi or to Hyderabad, I am ready, Monsieur le Vicomte, to fully abide by the instructions which you will think it advisable to prescribe to me concerning my mission in India.

In order to reply in detail to your inquiries concerning the relations of Shinde with the Regency and the reliance which we can put on him, we must go back to the epoch of the battle of Talegaon, that is to say to 1778. The Marathas defeated the English in a pitched battle. I shall be very brief.

The object of this war was to place Raghoba on the throne or at the head of the Maratha Government and remove Nana Fadnis for ever from the Regency of Poona. The English had Raghoba in their army, and this Prince marched against the Marathas reckoning on complete success. Nana Fadnis, his rival, accompanied the forces of the Regency, that is to say, the troops of the Sarkar, those of Shinde, and those of Tukoji Holkar. The battle took place and the troops of Nana Fadnis carried the day. The Marathas made sure that not a single person should escape, but for the manoeuvre of Shinde, who, either to favour the retreat of the English out of consideration for the person of Raghoba, or rather to make himself more indispensable and redoubtable to the Regency, always behaved in a manner which displeased Nana Fadnavis. However, Raghoba fell into the hands of the victors, and Shinde did his best to have him under his guard. Some time afterwards the Marathas learnt about the escape of Raghoba to the English. They had retained two Councillors of Bombay as prisoners, who also, under the guard of Shinde, escaped. All this occasioned much coolness between the Regent and Shinde. But the large forces of the latter imposed upon the Court of Poona, and it was necessary to conceal. I can assure you, Monsieur le Vicomte, that I have been more than once a witness of the resentment of Nana Fadnavis towards Shinde whom he dreads since this time. I shall add to all this narration that Shinde and the Raja of Nagpur were ceaselessly pressing Nana Fadnavis to conclude the latest peace with the English, and I even think that they are sureties for it : this is the very great prejudice against Shinde, but since the latest revolution that has taken place at Delhi in 1784 and of which I rendered an account to M. de Bussy, the complexion of affairs has much altered.

Every one is aware at Delhi—I mean, those who are versed in the secret of affairs—that the ambition of M. Hastings tended at nothing less than to seize the general command of the Emperor's troops by placing the eldest son of the Padshah on the throne of Delhi. The escape of this young prince to the English has been the result of the intrigue of Major Brow [\[Major Brown.\]](#), a Waquil whom the Company had dispatched to the court of the Emperor. But the elevation of Shinde to the post of the General of the Empire has ruined all the plans of Mr. Hastings in this respect; from this fact it is easy to conclude that Shinde can no longer be looked upon with the same eye by the English.

The example of a French partisan, M. Pauly [\[Pauly commanded the late Sombre's corps.\]](#), who, during the revolution, had succeeded to the general command of the armies of the Emperor, had turned the head of the English Company which, over-intoxicated by the unexpected successes which it has had in Bengal, thought, quite confidently, that it would be able to establish itself at Delhi in a formidable way, but the fine chimera vanished like a dream since this period, that is to say, since November. Shinde is absolute master of the armies of the Empire under the name of the Padshah. This powerful chief has an army of 100,000 Marathas with him and several strong posts in proprietorship in the Mughal Empire as well as in the Deccan with more than 150 koss of territory. He is since long the possessor of the town of Ajmer where the crowning of the Emperor of Delhi takes place; he has besides, the Key of Hindustan and the Deccan with the towns of Prampur [\[Barhanpur.\]](#) Asser [\[Assayee.\]](#), Burotche [\[Bhadoch?\]](#) and Ugene [\[Ujjain.\]](#) which he has also in proprietorship. God [\[Gohad.\]](#), Gouiallierre [\[Gwalior.\]](#), and Mattra [\[Mathura.\]](#) have been granted to him by the Emperor as a Jahagir with a continuous stretch of territory.

From these considerations it is easy to see, Monsieur le Vicomte, that Shinde, although dependent on the Regency of Poona, plays and will play for a long time a very great role in

Hindustan. At least his preponderance today is greatest in the Mughal Empire and at the Maratha Court. It is a fact which cannot be called in question, because he has destroyed the plan of the English at the Court of Delhi, and since no resolution is taken at that of Poona without previously consulting him. I even think today that the Regency will not give any positive reply before it has received the assent of Shinde to whom the copy of your letter to Nana and Haripant has been already dispatched.

This is the state of affairs in this part, Monsieur le Vicomte, and on which I thought it advisable to enter into the greatest detail, as in my opinion, it would serve as a basis for the subsequent conduct which we should adopt with the Regency and the Emperor of Delhi.

From the moment I noticed the influence which Shinde had in the (the political) affairs, I opened a correspondence with him while observing due decorum which I owe to the Regency. I attach herewith a copy of the two letters from this Raja. You could notice in it, Monsieur le Vicomte, his desire to enter into friendly relations with us. But it is a matter which can never be negotiated through correspondence. It will be the same with all the powers with whom we will prefer to form friendship. I am sure, Monsieur le Vicomte, that you are also of the same opinion. It is thus essential to proceed to the principal courts to examine their politics more closely.

The excess of travelling expenses over that of residentsip would not be a considerable amount considering the advantage that would result from it. Rs. 200 per month, more or less, could fulfil this object, excluding the purchase of animals for transport which could amount to Rs. 1,400 to Rs. 1,500.

It is quite true, Monsieur le Vicomte, that the item which extremely embarrassed me was the paucity of funds. My embarrassment in this respect would be difficult to describe to you, as I was several times, even recently, on the verge of being absolutely without money, as the French brokers at Goa could no longer, they said, advance me any, and without the sum which I got restored to them by the Sarkar of Poona from a seizure, made during the war, of an English ship on which they had goods, I could not have stayed here for want of funds. This restoration by the Sarkar extricated me from an extreme embarrassment in which I was, as the brokers Camotins, who did not receive any order from the administration of Pondicherry, had cooled off to the point of not sending me funds for three months. But succour of Rs. 15,000, which you are sending me, will serve to repay them for the loans which I have taken from them for 18 months and to inspire confidence in them.

I am very much convinced that Messrs de Bussy and Monneron were in a very trying position in respect of funds and that it was impossible for them to send me any, but the period of more than nine months when I did not receive replies to my letters to the Comptroller had put me in an anxiety which it would be difficult for me to describe to you, and without your arrival, most probably I would have been in the most trying position, that is to say, forced to quit my residentsip with the Marathas because of want of funds.

In spite of the reduction which I have made in all the items of my expenditure, it is impossible for me, to fulfil the duties of my mission, to spend less than Rs. 750 to 800 per month; I mean all the expenses included namely harakaras, interpreter, Persian and Marathi scribe, palanquin, sipahees for my security, horses, domestic expenses and the maintenance of an elephant which the Regency has presented to me, a single item which costs me Rs. 150 per month, but which I did not think it advisable to cut out for fear of the bad effect which it would have surely produced here. However, because of the necessity in which we are, to retrench on all the items, I tried to dispense with it, but it fell ill some time ago, and now it is not in a condition to be sold. I am sorry for this mishap, for, I would have overlooked all consideration and parted with it.

I would assure you, Monsieur le Vicomte, that there is not a single rupee spent which is not necessitated by the most indispensable particulars of my mission, which fact will be easily seen from the details in which I have entered with the Comptroller. I would very much wish that M. Le Maréchal de Castries was as convinced as you are of the fact that the necessary expenses are

obligatore. The Minister appears to have fixed at 16,000 frs. per year all the expenses in respect of my mission. You see, Monsieur le Vicomte, whatever reduction I make (even after the disposal of my elephant) the impossibility of fulfilling the domestic objectives with this modest salary. I am sure that when you have made your representations to M. Le Maréchal de Castries on the necessity of a higher salary, the Minister will give fresh orders on this point.

My earlier mission in India has almost cost nothing to the King in relation to this one, because I was not obliged to treat matters at a fixed post and compelled to a sort of forced representation absolutely indispensable to open up the Darbars and to the expenses of the harkaras which correspondence entails.

I can assure you, M. Le Vicomte, that I seized all sure occasions I could find to render an account to M. Le Maréchal de Castries of the objects concerning my mission. But I was not favoured by circumstances as much as I would have desired it. I have reason to think that the Minister is informed of it today.

In March 1784, I entrusted M. Martin with my packets for the Court. This French surgeon, sent to India by M. Rousseau, our Consul at Basra, decided, after a stay of 7 or 8 months at Poona, to return to Europe on a Portuguese ship which was to sail straight to Lisbon. I have learnt since then that as this ship missed the monsoon, it was forced to make a halt at the Isle of France. I am sorry for this delay which must have prevented M. Martin from reaching Europe as early as I should have wished it. Five months ago I dispatched fresh letters and am again going to prepare my mail for M. Le Maréchal de Castries.

I have informed the Regency that we were paying a salary of Rs. 220 per month to the Maratha Waquil. It appeared to me that the Darbar were not informed of it. The silence which it has observed on it is quite unwarranted, and I am acquainting it with the fact in a letter which I am writing to it on this subject.

I am sorry, M. le Vicomte, that M. Geslin was not very prompt in delivering you the dispatches from the camp of Sombre. I had, however, properly instructed him to deliver them to the General who was to replace M. de Bussy. But at the same time, I ought to vindicate this officer for not delivering this packet to M. Coutanceau, since he was only interim commandant and could not have taken any decision concerning the party of Sombre which, however, deserves to be encouraged because of its utility at Delhi in case of a diversion in the north of Hindustan. This party is composed of 3,000 infantry, 500 cavalry and 30 guns, well mounted and well served. Commanded by Europeans it has acquired great reputation in the service of the Emperor. M. Evin, who commands it today, is a very good subject, he has under his command several brave and intelligent Frenchmen who deserve to be encouraged by the hope of receiving military favours, such as M. le Vassoult, a very clever artillery-officer, very well educated and with an excellent conduct; M. Saleur [\[M. Saleur was the Frenchman who had accompanied Montigny to France in 1779, entrusted with proposals from Najaf Khan to the French Minister.\]](#), infantry Lieutenant, a very brave officer with wounds several of which were received in the service of the nation; M. de la Geinctey, Major in the old party, now Second Lieutenant, worthy of commendation because of the order and discipline he has introduced in this party. There are still other Frenchmen who deserve to be encouraged, as many in this corps as those who are in the service of the Emperor and of Shinde. As many changes are taking place in this part, it is advisable to make a fresh assessment of the situation of affairs. I am consequently going to send letters and as soon as I receive a reply on this point, I shall communicate to you all the details which you could desire in this respect.

Nothing is more just than the remark which you make, M. le Vicomte, concerning the number of commissions which M. Evin demands from me and especially the commission of a Major for himself and that of Lieut-Colonel for the son of Sombre, Captain for five years. These favours ought indeed to be only the reward for very great services rendered. I wrote to them more than six months back on this point, and I am sure that today they feel the justice of this observation and that with some commissions of lower rank, they would be very happy. I am going to write to M. Evin and inform him

as well as several Frenchmen in service of the new political situation here, of the straits of the English in Europe and in India, of the Bill which has just appeared concerning the Company, of the forces which we are going to receive, etc. etc., and all the while in the spirit of your dispatches so that the news should circulate everywhere. At the same time I shall apprise them of your dispositions to recommend those who can render useful services. That can indeed be a very great motive for emulation for them.

According to your instructions, I shall include in my accounts Rs. 600 which you have given to M. Geslin as the salary of his rank of a Lieutenant and shall send him back to Pondicherry only in a very urgent case.

I have at this very moment dispatched to Goa the letters which you addressed to me for M. Dom Frédéric and for the Camotins Brokers concerning Rs. 15,000 which you have ordered to be paid to me in this colony.

I now come to your letter No. 2 regarding the basis of my correspondence with M. Aumont and the dispatch of your letter to Shinde.

The correspondence which I have opened with this Maratha Chief cannot compromise my position with the Regency, as, in this respect, I have shown considerations which I ought to observe in my behaviour with it. Consequently, I shall dispatch your letters to this Raja which cannot fail to produce the best effect. I shall join to it mine with all the proper details. I shall also write to the Emperor to announce to him your arrival in India and the change in the political situation.

It is quite true, M. le Vicomte, that I have been in correspondence with M. Aumont concerning the affairs of the nation at the Court of Nizam Ali. But this is how it happened. On my arrival in Poona, I received a letter from M. Aumont who informed me of the awkward situation in which he then was and of his desire to join me. Absolutely unable to employ him at Poona, and as I knew that there was then no one at Hyderabad to study the transactions of the Darbar, I thought of persuading M. Aumont to collect information directly about the situation of this Court and communicate it to me; I promised him that I would recommend his services to the authorities of the nation. Consequently, I wrote to him and entrusted him with my letters for the Subhedar and his ministers. He had thus admission to the Darbar of Nizam Ali and he has since entered his service. He had just left the service of the Nawab Manoir [\[Nawab Munawwar Khan.\]](#) Khan by whom he was very ill-treated, from what he then wrote to me. Some time afterwards Nizam Ali received a letter from M. de Bussy from the Isle of France informing him that he was sending M. de Launay to the camp of Haider Ali Khan. At the same epoch, M. de Bussy wrote to me also and charged me to convey on his behalf the contents of his dispatch to all the princes of India with whom I was in contact. I immediately executed the orders of this General and informed the Subhedar of the impending arrival of M. de Bussy. Nizam Ali and the Nawab Ted Jang wrote to me letters by which they communicated to me the desire of uniting with the French. I then sent the copy of these letters to M. de Bussy.

As soon as Nizam Ali had received news about the arrival of this General, he wrote to him directly and made overtures to him which tended to arrangements the basis of which I do not know. M. Aumont then informed me that the Prince wished to send him to me to collect the best information so as to adjust things before proceeding to Pondicherry. But a few days later, Nizam Ali, from what M. Aumont wrote to me, changed his mind and decided to send him to the General with dispatches. Since this time, M. de Bussy charged me to correspond with M. Aumont and address him his letters for Hyderabad without, however, ceasing my correspondence with Nizam Ali, a correspondence which soon ceased because of the nature of the situation, since peace upset all the projects announced to the Subhedar. This is the basis of my correspondence with M. Aumont which will now cease following the orders which you have given me on this subject.

I am as convinced as you are, Monsieur le Vicomte, that it is essential that a national Resident at the court of a foreign power must have a character and a state worthy of the nation which employs

him, and that is especially absolutely necessary to probe the secrets of the Darbars of the Asiatic princes. Everything here is in the greatest commotion because of the war with Tipu Sultan, who, from the violence of his conduct, does not appear to be willing to come to any agreement, and the Marathas are occupied with the necessary preparations to take the field after the rainy season. I have no doubt at all that war will take place if Tipu pursues his enterprise on Nargund. The commandant of this place is defending himself vigorously and Tipu's army is very much embarrassed because of provisions. We are impatiently awaiting the issue of this siege.

As the Regency was informed that I was going to dispatch harkaras to you, Nana Fadnavis requested me to postpone the departure of my courier and at the same time sent a message that he will give me a final reply very soon. I thought it advisable to comply with his request. The discussions among the great chiefs of this Court are so continuous during the last fortnight that I have great difficulty in negotiating the matter with which you have entrusted me. I shall give you an account of all the discussions which I have had and which I shall have on this subject in my dispatch No. 3.

I shall most exactly comply, Monsieur le Vicomte, with the orders you have given me to correspond with M. de Cossigny on matters relating to my mission and in any case, I shall have the honour to address you all the important dispatches and the Princes' letters as well as the copies of those which they will write to me.

I have the honour to be with most the absolute and most respectful attachment,

Monsieur le Vicomte,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

(Signed) MONTIGNY.

(True Copy)

Poona, August 24, 1785

Monsieur le Vicomte,

I received almost simultaneously your packet of June 19 containing the dispatches No. 1, 2, 3 and your letter of the 6th of the same month. After reading them and grasping their contents, I asked for a fresh audience with Nana Fadnavis which took place on the 22nd of this month. The audience was followed by several other interviews till August 23 but I did not obtain any final reply.

I went to the Darbar furnished with your dispatch No. 1, the main content of which concern the Regency. My first care was to deliver your letter in Marathi to Nana Fadnavis and Haripant Phadke. The impression which they made on the mind of the Regent does not leave any doubt about the effect which ought to result from it : I mean the necessity for the Marathas today to explain their attitude towards us and their preparations of war against Tipu Sultan, the burning topic today of the Darbar of Poona.

I communicated to Nana Fadnavis all that you have prescribed to me by your letter of the 19th. I did it in the most striking manner and in a tone of dignity and candour which it is advisable to adopt with this power, too long beguiled by promises, vague and still unimplemented. I conducted myself according to your instructions and your principles which, I venture to assure you, are indeed mine. Your plan, recommended in this respect, Monsieur le Vicomte, is perhaps the only means to induce the Indian princes to abjure the false idea they have formed of our forces and of the greatness of our nation, calculating its strength only from the results they have seen of it in India.

The Darbar, on the whole, appeared to me very much satisfied with what I conveyed to it on your behalf, especially with the plans which occupy us to day to send troops and munitions to the Isles and to Pondicherry in order to be in a position (when orders from the King are received) to carry the mass of our forces on the Coromandel and Malabar Coasts and destroy the English there as we did in America. To comply fully with your orders, I have well impressed upon them that after the great expenses which we had incurred in America to expel the English from the possessions which they had invaded, which object had been achieved with the greatest success, we made peace with England, and that a fresh war required an interval and great preparations, that, consequently, our Ministry was occupied in advance with collecting all the means necessary to operate in India in a formidable and sure manner (as soon as the King sends his orders), that the advantage resulting from this plan will be all the greater as with India as our only objective, we shall carry all our forces against the common enemy which, being spread in all the parts of the continent, is sure to succumb before the vigorous and continuous attack which we propose to launch as soon as war starts.

The Regent asked me whether I knew approximately the epoch when war would take place. I replied to him that it was impossible to say anything definite to him on this subject, that it depended absolutely on the King whose orders we had to await, but that the ambition of the English to invade everything and the dishonesty which they were almost continuously displaying in the execution of their treaty, would not permit the French to remain long at peace with them, and that it was in pursuance of considerations so important for the tranquillity of our nation as well as that of our allies that we were continuously putting ourselves in a position to contain and curb their ambition, that we were simultaneously employing means so sure and so formidable that we have ground to hope that our coming war in India will be crowned with success as complete as that which we had recently achieved in America. This was, Monsieur le Vicomte, my reply to the Regent which he appeared to appreciate to a certain point, all the while expressing grief at the interval announced between now and the earliest war. However, it is the only means not to delude them and at the same time the one to impress upon them the candour and the truth which the French Minister employs in his negotiations. It

is according to these principles, which are yours, that I shall conduct myself in all the Darbars of India and bring home to them the contrast in the conduct which the English have been adopting.

I paid particular attention to point out to the leaders of the Council that the small war of India was accessory to that of America, in order to destroy the false impression they could have formed of our means by thinking that we had in the last war only India as our objective. However, I must inform you, Monsieur le Vicomte, that I have always told the Marathas that we had carried the major part of our forces to America, not only to expel the English from it but also to support the possessions of the Spanish and the Dutch, our allies there, and that we succeeded in fulfilling all these objects with the greatest success. But the Marathas persistently said to me : “We do not doubt at all the advantages which you had obtained in that country, but how does that concern us? We are not in America, we are in India, and it is here that we desire to see you.” This is how all the native princes think and speak; they see only through their physical eyes, and all that is not direct to their interest, touches them very little. It is the same with distant projects, even if they are the finest and the best concerted. Whatever may be their mode of thinking, I feel that the essential object is to enlighten them, if it is possible, on their own interests, and that is to what I ceaselessly apply myself here. You can rest assured, Monsieur le Vicomte, that I have seized the spirit of your dispatches and that they will serve as a basis to the conduct which I am going to adopt in all the Darbars of India.

I have impressed upon the Council of the Regency the state of distress in which is at present the English Company which has just been stripped of the largest part of its privileges, that the King was shortly going to seize the territories of this Company and that as the English had no other resources to pay off the national debt which is huge, the princes could expect to see the greatest efforts on the part of the Royal Government to extend the possessions of the Company and carry away from India whatever gold it can, that from this state of affairs ought to shortly arise a division between the Company and the Royalists, that it was the favourable moment when it would be desirable that the native princes should unite to profit by such a precious predicament, that at least they ought to keep themselves in a state of harmony until the French appeared in India to act in concert and pounce all at the same time on the English who are sure to be destroyed according to this plan of conduct, that besides they could rest assured that the intention of the King of France was to re-establish the legitimate rulers in all their rights and to protect them not only against the English but also against all the powers of Europe who would wish to make war on them and invade their possessions, that, in short, His Majesty had no other object than that of establishing in India a sure and at the same time advantageous commerce between the nation and the princes of this continent, that consequently, the King wanted to confine himself to establishments of small size on the Coromandel and Malabar Coasts with a rounding off which could defray the expenses of this establishment and protect the trade.

The Regent interrupted me on this point and asked me if the intentions of the King were to have possessions on the Malabar Coast other than Bombay. He pointed out to me that I should know that since the last war the English had not an inch of territory (that is his expression) on this continent, that their possessions on the Malabar Coast were confined to day to Bombay, Salcette, Surat and Bankot, that the Marathas were masters of the country to the foot of the walls of Surat. And that is exact truth. I did not think it advisable to insist on that point, because I have already been probing the minds for a year on this subject of territory. It would be very difficult to establish relations with the Marathas by asking from them more than what the English have on this coast where they haven't, as I have just said to you, any territorial possessions since the last war.

Allow me, Monsieur le Vicomte, to make an observation on this point. I think it is very difficult, not to say impossible, to obtain from the Marathas a territory around Bombay. They would not easily allow a European nation today in the continent, lest it might consequently extend its establishments in the interior of the country as the English have done, and nothing can re-assure them in this respect on our plan of moderation. At least I have good ground to think so from the overtures I have been making for it for a year to the Brahmins [Montigny means Maratha officers, all of whom may not be Brahmins; there may be Saraswats or Kayastha Prabhus among them.] who enjoy the greatest confidence of Nana Fadnis.

This is only an objection which I take the liberty to place before you. Perhaps you could induce them to make this cession of territory. But I doubt the success of this negotiation. If we cannot succeed in obtaining the desired territory, could we not ask of them Bombay, its dependences and the town of Surat? The Marathas would surely not refuse this demand; at least I have reason to think so, since they had granted it in 1782. In the agreements I had made with the Regency of Poona, I had even obtained a lodge in Bhadoch and Cambay to the exclusion of the English. As for the town of Surat, it belongs to the Emperor but the Marathas are masters of all the surrounding territory. What does it matter? This town, which belongs to the Padshah, will it not be a means to enter into a close relation with this Prince, so necessary to operate a revolution in the north? Moreover, Surat offers other advantages. It handles almost entirely the trade of Gujarat. This rich part of India is full of manufacture the produce of which is poured into Egypt, Arabia and Persia by way of the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indus. The advantages of the port of Bombay are too well known to you, Monsieur le Vicomte, to recall them to you here. I submit these reflexions to your superior judgement and come back to the discussion with Nana. I, therefore, confined myself to say to the Regent that if he wanted to enter into agreements with the French, we would try to find means to conciliate the respective interests of the two nations, that it was indeed necessary to come to a decision so desirable, and that to fulfil this object, there was not a moment to be lost, because you were to proceed to the Isle of France in September to give an account to the King of the general situation in India, and that, as every treaty had to have previously the sanction of His Majesty, time was necessary to send it to France and get it back here so that it can have its complete execution, that, in short, a subject-matter of such importance must not be dragged on. Nana Fadnis once again interrupted me and said to me : “That this affair demanded much reflexion, that it was necessary to summon the Council of the Regency and that after mature deliberation, they will give me a reply on this subject.” As I noticed that it demanded much discussion, I passed on to our old connections with Haider Ali Khan and to the pressing reasons which induced us to join this Nawab. I repeated in this respect everything that I have been saying all this time to the Regency since my arrival at Poona, but it would be difficult to convince the Marathas on the motives of preference which we gave to Haider Ali Khan, and they will never accept anything except what concerns them directly. It will be the same with Nizam Ali. These two powers cannot tolerate the rise of Tipu Sultan whose unbridled ambition (these are the words of the Darbar) must be lowered for the sake of the general tranquillity. They bear such deeply rooted hatred against this Nawab. The haughtiness of Tipu towards Nizam Ali and his violent conduct with the Marathas are hardly calculated to conciliate matters. The result is the war which is preparing today.

I had the honour, M. le Vicomte, to inform you, by my letter of the 18th of this month, of the motives which led the Marathas to declare this war, if this Nawab did not desist from his claims. In spite of the negotiations which have begun, he continues the siege of Nargund and does not pay to the Marathas the tribute which he owes to them. He has forced an infinite number of Brahmins [\[Hindus in general.\]](#) to embrace the Muslim religion. This act of tyranny has roused the whole caste of Brahmins so that to the personal hatred against this Nawab is added all the violence of his fanaticism. This conduct of Tipu Sultan is not likely to reconcile the minds already too much agitated. In spite of this situation I am doing my best to point out to the Regency how it would be advantageous to terminate through negotiation a war which can only become disastrous to the two parties and which the English were sure to turn to account. They have been replying to me that the Regency was quite willing to make peace, but that the conduct of the Nawab towards them and their allies will force them to take up arms against him, that he is indeed directly attacking the Regency by trying to seize by open force Nargund which belongs to a powerful Brahmin, a friend and an ally of the Court of Poona. These reasons appear to me to carry great weight and cause me to fear the consequences.

I strongly insisted in the Council of the Regency to find out if the Marathas intended to take the field against Tipu Sultan during the rainy season, but I could not get a clear reply to this day. That is my principal object today, for, if it is true that the Marathas have taken the field, their friendship with the Subhedar of the Deccan will also involve this power and is sure to operate the greatest revolution, I do not say, only in the Deccan but also in the whole of India.

Shinde, who is playing the biggest role in Hindustan and whose influence is preponderant at this Court, has been all the while pressing the Regency to declare this war. His politics is to keep the Marathas of the Court of Poona occupied to make himself more formidable without any opposition and the only master of Hindustan. This is, Monsieur le Vicomte, the state of affairs and in accordance with which I conduct myself here.

My hopes on the negotiations which had started between the Regency and Tipu Sultan have absolutely vanished. Harkaras coming from Chanour [[Savnur.](#)] assure me that this Nawab has consummated his enterprise on Nargund and that the governor of this place has been transferred to Dharwar. Although the Sarkar does not confess it still publicly, all the preparations of war which the Regency is making tend only to confirm this news, and I have no doubt today that the intention of the Marathas is to take the field after Dasara. Nizam Ali makes a common cause with the Regency and the Raja of Nagpur furnishes 20,000 cavalry and more, if necessary. The agreements were completed yesterday.

So far there is no question of the English furnishing troops to the allied powers. The information I have received on this subject leads me to presume that the Marathas will have recourse to the English only in case the French declared themselves openly in favour of Tipu.

The Maratha Waquil has written to me as well as to the Regency that a report had spread at Pondicherry that we were going to send troops to the Nawab. I have already noticed the bad effect this news has produced on the Sarkar. I have not yet found the opportunity to have a direct talk with Nana Fadnavis. On the whole, I notice that this matter will be very delicate to handle and requires greatest caution. Therefore, I shall not announce anything positive until I have received your orders in this respect. I shall confine myself to say that this news appears to me to be false, since you don't say a word about it to me in your dispatches, that this event could take place only in case the English joined the allied powers, since the intention of the King is to protect the weak against the strong, as you have said it to me in your dispatch of 20th June, No. 2.

I had the honour, M. le Vicomte, to inform you by my letter of 27th July, that I presumed that the Regency would give its opinion on your dispatches only after receiving replies to the copies of your letters which have been dispatched to Shinde, and all the dilatoriness and postponements which I experience confirm me more than ever in this supposition.

In spite of all my efforts up to the present, it was impossible for me, Monsieur le Vicomte, to send you my harkaras earlier. Nana Fadnavis constantly stood in the way as he wished to join his letters to mine, but after repeated representations which I made to him on the impossibility of delaying any longer the departure of my courier, he sent for me to the Darbar and has just confirmed to me the capture of Nargund, the grievances against Tipu Sultan, about which I had the honour to speak to you in this dispatch, and finally the necessity for the Marathas to take the field against this Nawab after the rainy season. He added to me that he could not reply to your letters at this moment, that I was a witness to the numerous matters with which he was occupied but that he would send for me in five or six days' time in connection with the subject-matter of these letters and that he would then give his replies. His Waquil has been instructed to inform you about it.

I must not forget to tell you, Monsieur le Vicomte, that the Regent has suggested to me through Sixtamen Dikchitt [[Chintaman Dixit.](#)] and Gameipondeth [[Ganeshpant Behere.](#)], in charge of French affairs *vis-a-vis* the Council of the Regency, that the Marathas were quite willing to make peace with Tipu Sultan, if he would be just towards them and that you could play the role of the mediator in this important negotiation. This is absolutely only a matter of insinuation, but I noticed that they desired it. It would indeed be a sure means to stop the conflagration which is preparing and to lend glamour to French name among the native princes. I replied that you would do in this respect all that depended on you, having nothing so much at heart as to see peace solidly established among the powers of India, that we had only one object which was the common enemy; it alone fixed all our attention.

I shall only add one word more, M. le Vicomte, it is that I would very much desire that you should think of visiting the Malabar Coast at the next monsoon. In my opinion it would be the best opportunity to negotiate with the Regency and convey to you at the same time *viva voce* an infinite number of matters which cannot be as well explained through correspondence.

I have the honour to be with the most absolute and most respectful attachment,

Monsieur le Vicomte,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

(Signed) Montigny.

(True Copy)

P.S.—I beg, Monsieur le Vicomte, to request you to kindly send with your earliest dispatches for the (French) Court the packet which I am addressing to the Minister. It contains a copy of my accounts from September 10, 1781 to November 1, 1784, with some details relating to my mission. I have the honour to inform M. Le Maréchal de Castries about it.

Four days back I received the duplicate of your dispatches which M. Geslin has sent to me from Hyderabad where he is ill with dysentery.

(Signed) M.

Poona, August 25, 1785

Monsieur le Maréchal,

I have the honour to address you a copy of my correspondence with M. le Vicomte de Souillac. It will post you with full information about the actual situation of the powers in India.

By my courier of January, I had, Monsieur le Maréchal, given you an account of the revolution effected by Shinde in Hindustan, which has raised the powerful Maratha chief to the post of the General of the Empire and destroyed the projects of the English Company in this part.

Now another one is preparing in the Deccan which tends to a general conflagration.

The haughtiness of Tipu Sultan towards Nizam Ali and his violent and tyrannical conduct *vis-a-vis* the Regency of Poona have led these powers to unite against this Nawab whose unbridled ambition alarms the Darbars of India. The Raja of Nagpur also joins this plan of alliance and everything today appears to confirm me in the opinion that war is sure to take place after the rainy season.

The negotiations which had begun three months ago between the Regency and Tipu had led me to hope that the spirit of conciliation would be restored between these powers, but as Tipu Sultan has just consummated his enterprise on Nargund which belongs to a friend and ally of the Court of Poona, I no more see any likelihood of peace unless the Nawab pays to the Marathas the revenue which is due to them or returns to the Regency the territory which Haider Ali Khan had invaded. Tipu has just forced an infinite number of Brahmins to embrace the Muslim religion. This act of tyranny has roused the whole caste of the Brahmins so that to the personal hatred against this Nawab is added all the violence of his fanaticism. This is, Monsieur le Maréchal, the state of affairs and according to which I conduct myself here. I have all the while been occupied with pointing out to the Regency the advantage which would result from terminating by way of negotiation a war which must become disastrous to all the parties and that it would be immensely wiser to cement a perfect union between the native powers so as to unite with the French at the next war and pounce in concert on the common enemy. They reply to me on that point that the Regency is only quite willing to make peace, but that Tipu openly attacks the Marathas in the friend and ally of the Court of Poona by seizing the fortress and territory of Nargund against all justice. To this motive are added the strongest considerations which I have just expressed to you, Monsieur le Maréchal. Nana Fadnavis, the Regent of this Court, said to me several times : “We espouse the defence of our ally, we claim our rights, in short, we are fighting for justice against tyranny, and war has never been more just.”

The Darbar of Nizam Ali also adopts this way of thinking. From this disposition of the Regency, I think the storm that is preparing. However, the arrival of M. le Vicomte de Souillac, the wisdom, the candour and the imposing tone which he proposes to display in these negotiations *vis-a-vis* the native princes, the attitude of the (French) court which he has charged me to announce in the Darbars, all these considerations combined might perhaps effect a change in the minds and appease the general agitation.

I shall have the honour, Monsieur le Maréchal, to convey to you the result of all these happenings by my courier of October or November. Then, a momentum will be given to all the Darbars and their resolutions revealed.

I request you, Monsieur le Maréchal, to kindly cast a glance on my dispatches Nos. 2 and 3 to M. le Vicomte de Souillac. You will see in them the totality and the details of the political situation, and the physical impossibility in which I am to fulfil the object of my mission with the salary which you have fixed for this purpose.

I could not, my Lord, give you more often an account of the mission which you have entrusted to me. It is because I did not have a sure occasion at my disposal. I hope, Monsieur le Maréchal, that you know today the obstacles which I had to surmount on this point as well as on several other points. It will no longer be so. I address this dispatch directly to M. le Vicomte de Souillac and I am sure that it will reach you with his first courier.

I am respectfully and with the most absolute devotion,

Monsieur le Maréchal,

Your very humble and very obedient servant

(Signed) Montigny.

Written about 10th September 1785

Translation of a letter in Persian addressed to M. Le Vicomte de Souillac, Governor-General of the Isles of France and Bourbon and of all the French establishments on this side of the Cape of Good Hope, by the Nawab Tipu Sultan Bahaddar, which letter was brought to the General and delivered to him on September 21, 1785, by Ramrao, French Waquil at the Court of the Prince who had sent him expressly for this purpose.

After the compliments usual and expressed among equals.

When you dispatched Ramrao to me, you had entrusted him with a letter which he delivered to me and by which you announced to me your arrival at Pondicherry where you have come to establish order, etc., etc. I have no doubt that you have received my reply to this letter and the sarpech which I sent with it. I very ardently desire to affirm and consolidate the union which has been reigning since so long between France and our Sarcar and to see the glory of the French nation sparkle. It is certain that the enemies of the Nation will seek the occasion to attack it, but your genius and your superior talents, which I know, make me feel confident that you must have already taken all the precautions and the necessary measures to repulse it and even command respect.

Some time ago, the English had attacked the Marathas and had scored over them such successes that they had penetrated their territory to a distance of 8 koss from Poona, their capital, and forced their sardars, who could not resist them, to abandon their territory which the latter themselves burnt before retiring elsewhere. The Marathas had then recourse to our Sarcar and demanded help from it. We made a treaty with them on this subject, in consequence of which, relying on their good faith, we descended into the province of Arcot where we made war with the English for four years. This diversion was so advantageous to the Marathas that it protected them from the loss of their kingdom, etc. etc.

This fact is true and clear like daylight. However, the Marathas, far from recognising the important service which we have rendered them on this occasion, today repay us with ingratitude, to the point of taking up arms against us and marching on a detachment which we had dispatched to reduce the Pallegar of Nargund who, although in our dependence, had revolted against us and had pushed arrogance even so far as to plunder and ravage the territory of the Sarkar. I have reason to think that the Marathas will even do more and are thinking of openly making a war with me. But you will hear about the lessons which I shall teach them. I hope to succeed in it with the help of Divine Providence. It is in consideration of our union and our old friendship that I am communicating to you this event. You will, moreover, be informed of the rest by the Waquil Ramrao.

I am sending you on this occasion another sarpech as a token of our mutual friendship.

I conclude by requesting you to do me the pleasure of often giving me news about you.

Copy of the letter of M. Le Vicomte de Souillac, written to the Nawab Tipu Sultan, dated September 30, 1785.

After the compliments,

I received from the Waquil Ramrao your letter as well as the sarpech which you kindly sent me as a token of the friendship which attaches you to the French nation and of that in particular of which you give me frequent proofs. Kindly accept my most sincere thanks for it.

I am extremely delighted with the assurance which you give me of your real desire to maintain and consolidate the friendship which has been reigning since times immemorial between France and your Sarkar. You can indeed rest assured of similar dispositions from the Emperor, my master, and you cannot doubt them after all that I have told you on his behalf. You will get the real proofs of it on all occasions.

I have no doubt that our common enemies are watching the opportunities to harm us. But remember that all their projects will be destroyed and that from the precautions we are taking and those which I am sure you are taking on your part, our combined forces, when the time comes, will startle and crush all those who will oppose to us.

You have the kindness to communicate to me all that your Sarkar has formerly done in favour of the Marathas, of whom you have reason to be dissatisfied at present. This nation ought to be in fact grateful for the decision which the Great Bahaddar took to descend into the province of Arcot and remain there for four years to deliver them from the English who were attacking them vigorously in their own kingdom. I am now writing to Nana Fadnavis and to M. de Montigny to urge them to admit their injustice towards your Sarkar and on the other hand, unite with you by a serious and solid friendship. It is the true means to thwart the project of the English who are seeking nothing else divide the Indian powers to profit afterwards by their weakness as they have been continuously doing it and to the great disadvantage of the princes whom they have subjugated.

I am sure that on your part you are disposed to terminate amicably with the Marathas, if they give you proper satisfaction. Rest assured that it is our common enemy who incites all these quarrels.

Ramrao told me that he had spoken to you about the feeble remnants of the French detachment which had always been set up in your Sarkar and commanded by officers of merit. Your observation is just that by sending at present men and officers, it would be a means to arouse the mistrust of the English, that it is better to wait for another occasion and that, moreover, in pursuance of the solid union which exists between us, the forces of both will always unite when the common enemy provokes us.

I have just received fresh orders from the Emperor, my master, by a ship which arrived from Europe and which brought troops, and I am obliged to proceed immediately to Mauritius where I earnestly request you to send me your news which I shall always receive with as much eagerness as pleasure.

I am sending a frigate to Mahé which will afterwards join me at Mauritius and by which I could receive news from you, if you would address it at Mahé itself where M. Marin administers as chief.

I am sending on this frigate a chief for the lodge of Calicat and I request you to give your orders so that he is established there as comfortably as with a prince who is a friend of the French nation. The name of this chief is M. Cornet.

I am dispatching M. de Piveron to France and I entrust him with my dispatches to the Emperor. If the letters, which you would send me for him (the Emperor), arrive soon, he will be their bearer and as you know his attachment for your person, they will be delivered punctually. The interests of your Sarkar will be properly known and well presented.

You were kind enough to write to M. de Piveron about your desire to meet me. Nothing would have been more flattering and more satisfying for me, and if, on my return to India, I can procure for myself this advantage, I shall seek it with the greatest eagerness. I am very sorry that the orders of the Emperor and the state of affairs do not permit me to do so at present.

I am leaving here M. de Cossigny who will command in my absence, and give me account of everything. He will send me the letters which you will do me the honour to write to me, and if you need anything, I leave him orders to do all that will please you and could be done. He will be, moreover, inclined to do so by the desire to prove to you that, if he was forced to separate himself from you, it was against his will and by the orders of M. de Bussy whom he had to obey.

Kindly allow me to offer you, as a token of friendship, a watch and some small articles which I charge Ramrao to deliver to you. I intend that he should remain at your court in the capacity of a Waquil in order to always maintain a close correspondence between us.

No one can express more ardent wishes than I for your glory and your prosperity.

Copy of the letter of M. de Montigny to M. le Vicomte de Souillac

Poona, September 16, 1785

M. le Vicomte,

I am just coming out of the Darbar where I had a very long conference with Nana Fadnavis and Haripant Phadke with a view to finding out finally how we stand with the Regency of Poona. The critical political situation and your prompt departure for the Isle of France led me to get an explanation from the Regent on the points which interest us most at this Court. Here is the result :

1^o. Nana Fadnavis will not make any eventual treaty with the nation until he has received the reply from the King to the proposals which the Regency made in 1782 and which I sent at this time to the Generals.

When I insisted in the Council on the necessity to make fresh agreements, the Regent replied to me : “M. de Bussy then wrote to me that he had sent to the Court the proposals which the Marathas had made to your nation and that as soon as he received the reply, he would communicate it to me; he assured me that it would not take a long time. I shall therefore await this reply. My attitude will always be the same. You can accordingly assure M. de Vicomte de Souillac to whom I request you to make my apologies for having delayed so long my reply to his letters. You know and you have seen all the incidents which occupied me and which passed before your eyes. It was impossible for me to do so earlier as I especially wished to reply to the explanations which you ask of me and which concern the two nations.”

This is, Monsieur le Vicomte, the reply of Nana Fadnavis and in which it was impossible for me to make any modifications.

I know that there are articles in the proposals of the Regency which are not at all admissible. The reflexions and the letter which accompanies them sufficiently show my way of thinking in this respect. But the basis perhaps is not to be rejected. Moreover, the great object at that time was to prevent the Marathas from marching against Haider Ali Khan, an object which could be achieved only by binding these very Marathas by proposals of agreements and which has not a little contributed to break up this alliance which had been formed between Nizam Ali and the Regency of Poona against this Nawab. Another consideration which could be added to this one, and which cannot escape your superior judgement, is that the Marathas were, in 1781 and even in 1782, in a situation very different from the one in which they are today. The English had invaded (as I have informed you by my dispatch of 26th August) the major part of Gujarat and Konkan; besides they had at their disposal, Raghoba, the most formidable competitor to Nana Fadnavis. The restoration of both to the Regency of Poona makes Nana Fadnavis more stable than ever in the place he occupies. From this state of affairs, it is easy to conclude that to induce the Marathas to a cession of territory around Bombay and an establishment on the Malabar Coast is a new obstacle to be vanquished; in my opinion, it is impossible to obtain this concession. It would, moreover, be very difficult to imagine that the Marathas would give more advantages to the French than have on this Coast the English, whose possessions today are confined to the port of Bombay, Thana, Bankot and Surat. I exclude Tellichery and Anjango because they do not border on the Maratha territory.

From the attitude of the Regency, and which I have studied very carefully, I am sure that no agreement can be made with it between now and the reply of the (French) Court to the old proposals, and I even presume that in the situation in which the Marathas are *vis-a-vis* the English, it would be difficult to turn it to a decisive and advantageous account before having forces to put into evidence and capable of imposing on the common enemy.

What confirms me in this opinion is that the English, who know the importance of having the Marathas on their side or at least keeping them in a state of neutrality, to try, if it is possible for them, to achieve their objective ceaselessly tell them that the intentions of the King of England are to form an indissoluble alliance with the Court of Poona and that under whatever pretext, they are expressly forbidden from disturbing this power. As a guarantee of this promise, the English cite the restitution of Gujarat and Konkan as well as the surrender of the person of Raghoba of which I have spoken above. This is the English politics at this Court. The Regency has another. It does not believe a word of what the Councils of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay say and write. But it fears the proximity of the English on this coast and the interval between now and a fresh war between France and England. This is what reduces it at the moment to a state of the greatest circumspection *vis-a-vis* the common enemy, and what leads me to presume that it will change its conduct only when it will no longer have to dread the English. This epoch will be that of the appearance of the French on the Malabar Coast.

I ought to warn you, Monsieur le Vicomte, that the Regency has a strong presumption that our main object is centred round Tipu Sultan and the Coromandel Coast and that the French envisage the Marathas as an object of diversion. All that I thought it my duty to say in this regard has not yet entirely removed it. It is a prejudice which I have to fight here and which does not put a small obstacle in the matters which I have to negotiate here.

Whatever may be the views of the (French) Court on this country, it appears to me certain that if it proposes to operate there a general revolution, it will be possible only with the succour and support of the Marathas, especially since the elevation of Shinde to the post of the Generalship of the Mughal Empire. On the other hand, our Ministry should confine itself to obtain solid establishments and with a certain size on the Orissa and Coromandel Coasts. I consider it indispensable to form a close alliance with the Subhedar of the Deccan. Nizam Ali, closer to the English than the Marathas in this country, and who has, besides, other interests to discuss, would perhaps be more easily induced to make agreements. Since the Marathas make a common cause with the Subhedar, they would be unconcerned about our alliance with this prince. It cannot be the same with regard to Tipu Sultan.

In any case, I think that we will always have to placate the Maratha power as well as the Court of Delhi, even if it was only to favour our operations on the Coasts of Orissa and Coromandel, because of the diversions which these powers can create, one in the north of Hindustan and the other in the west of this continent.

I venture this observation, Monsieur le Vicomte, only to discharge, honourably and conscientiously, my duty by exposing the truth which I owe to national interest and to the confidence with which the Minister has kindly honoured me. Seven consecutive years of observations on the politics of this country give me some sort of right to have my opinion and I proclaim it with the candour of a soldier who cannot displease a General who seeks only to effect the good of the state.

I pass on to the second explanation which I thought it necessary to have with Nana Fadnavis, concerning the war that is preparing against Tipu Sultan. I insisted again in the Council of the Regency on the advantages which would result from making peace with this Nawab by making agreements calculated to conciliate the respective interests. I laid stress on the huge expenses into which this war was going to entail the Marathas and Nizam Ali, because of the forces which these powers were obliged to put in opposition to those of Tipu, which were indeed redoubtable. Finally, I said that they would make a better use of both against the common enemy, when the rupture between France and England takes place. Nana Fadnavis replied to me that the Regency of Poona and Nizam Ali were quite willing to make peace, if Tipu wished to be just, cease his ventures, pay for or return the territory which his father, Haider Ali Khan, had seized from the Court of Poona, that, moreover, negotiations were going on with this Nawab and that nothing positive could still be said to me on this subject. It was impossible for me to get other explanations, but I noticed with a sort of satisfaction that the minds were less agitated than usual and the replies, although vague, which were given to me, make me feel optimistic about the result. I shall know more about it in a few days' time, and I shall be very eager, Monsieur le Vicomte, to convey to you all that I shall learn concerning this subject-matter.

That is the essential point today, and I have no doubt that your negotiations with Tipu Sultan will produce the best effect and perhaps lead this Nawab to the desired end. It is a great service which you will render to the nation, for, it is the surest means to thwart the machiavellian views of the English by maintaining peace among the native powers.

Herewith are attached the letters of the Regency which it was impossible for me to procure earlier, whatever I could say and do. It would be difficult for you to imagine, Monsieur le Vicomte, the dilatoriness and difficulties which are experienced in the Darbar of Poona. The Brahmins are, unquestionably, the most difficult caste to deal with, and I am beginning to get very much fed up of them. I close this dispatch only on the 19th evening, for, I awaited letters from Nana Fadnavis and Haripant Phadke.

I have the honour to be with the most inviolable and most respectful attachment, etc.

(Signed) Montigny.

P.S.—Monsieur le Vicomte,

I have just learnt that you have written to the Governor of Goa that it would be possible for you to see him before your return to the Isle of France. According to this news, I propose to send to Goa in time, an harkara who will have instructions to return in five days to Poona to bring me orders which you would very much like to give me. It is so essential that I should render an account *viva voce*. There is nothing which I will not do to proceed to some port on the Malabar Coast which you will deem suitable, either to Goa, Daman or Surat. I would give preference to the last, if you thought of going up the coast to this point, because I would fulfil the objects there which would be difficult for me to do anywhere else and of which I shall render you an account at the time. I have the approval of Nana Fadnavis to go anywhere where your orders will call me on the Malabar Coast, and I have taken all the necessary measures to proceed there with the greatest possible celerity.

M. Don Frédéric has been very ill from gout. That is what prevented him from replying to your letters.

Translation of a letter in Marathi addressed to the General Le Vicomte de Souillac by Nana Fadnavis, dated September 17, 1785 and received on November 6.

(After the usual compliments.)

I am in perfect health till today and I request you to honour me with news about you. The letter with which you honoured me reached me in time. It speaks first of all about the one which you kindly wrote to me to announce to me your arrival at Pondicherry, next about the reasons which led the Emperor, your master, to accept the proposals of the English who were forced to demand peace, because they were unable to hold their own in America after several battles given by the Emperor of France, and that the French became masters of the whole of America; that as all the land and naval forces were occupied with the attack of America, those of India were not so numerous, but that at present a large force has assembled at Mauritius, in troops as well as in ships, and that they are arriving daily at Pondicherry. You also informed me about the orders which you have received from the Emperor of the French to have restored to the old rulers the territories which are seized from them in India, and you tell me at the same time that I shall be better informed about the rest by Col. Montigny, to whom you have written in great detail : that is what he did very exactly.

I am very happy to hear from you about the orders which you have received from Europe to fight those who have seized the territories of others and liberate these invaded territories and return them to the legitimate masters, and also about your intentions to put these orders into execution. Such is the conduct of the Princes whose government has high traditions. As this project is very just, I hope that by God's grace it will be executed; and I am quite tranquil on this point, as I depend much on the prudence of a person as enlightened and as far-sighted as you are and who seeks only to execute the orders of the Emperor of France. I am confident about the success of the said project.

I have only to request you to honour me often with news about yourself.

Note.—A letter from Haripant Phadke, Maratha General and Deputy Regent, was received at the same time, addressed also to M. Le Vicomte de Souillac. This letter literally contains the same thing.

C² 169, f. 15-50.

No. 15 (India)

Pondicherry, September 15, 1785

My Lord,

By one of my dispatches dated July 8, with the stamp India No. 4, I had the honour to announce to you that I would presently give you a general account of the state of affairs in India and that I would submit to you the plan according to which, in my opinion, we ought to be established there till the next war, or, to be more exact, until circumstances bring about some change in our position *vis-a-vis* the European and Indian powers. I fondly hoped that I would be in a position to announce to you something positive on the attitude of Tipu Sultan and of the Marathas. But the distance of places and the excessive dilatoriness with which everything is discussed in the Darbars, greatly frustrated me in my desire to give you, my Lord, promptly all the information which you would like to expect from me. The approaching wintering season forces me to leave this coast in the early part of October, otherwise I may be detained here for several months. But when I visit the Malabar Coast, I shall receive there subsequent replies from the two Darbars mentioned above and I shall dispatch a corvette to Europe simultaneously with my departure for the Isle of France. But while waiting for this latest piece of information, I thought this one too urgent not to address it immediately to you, my Lord. I even think that it can be sufficient to decide His Majesty to adopt a plan.

I shall begin by an exposition of the political and actual situation of the Indian princes, a situation which may accidentally change, but in the details alone, due to unstable, isolated causes, subordinate to the general course which prompts them.

I shall speak afterwards of the English, the only European power which ought to fix our attention in India.

I shall also make a mention of the Dutch and try to explain how a firm and intimate friendship between this nation and ourselves would be advantageous to both.

Finally, I shall indicate the means to re-establish the reputation which we cannot conceal that we have lost in India since the treaty of peace of 1763; at the same time they will protect us against all surprise on the part of a rival and neighbouring nation.

POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE INDIAN POWERS

The Great Mughal is a nonentity, almost a fictitious being, without forces, without money and who has a standing only when a prince or a powerful chief uses his name to augment his. Such is at the present time Shinde, a Maratha chief, who, at the head of more than hundred thousand men, has assumed the title of the General of the Great Mughal. His possessions, which are very large, adjoin those of the English in the upper Ganges and he could give them lot of anxiety, if he wished or dared to act. He has with him at present the son of Shah Alam decorated with the title of the Great Mughal; he is the same person who was previously a protégé of the English.

(Shinde is aged. His possessions are indefinite and this power will vanish with him.)

The great distance of this part of India and the lack of communication make it difficult to obtain definite news about it. I am expecting it any moment from M. de Montigny.

I shall not make a mention here about the subhedars and Nawabs of Bengal, as I do not consider them at all as Indian powers, since they are, as a matter of fact and really, only the foremost subjects of the English, with titles and an absolutely vain pretence.

The Raja of Nagpur

The Raja of Nagpur and Cuttack, a Maratha, is independent. His kingdom, vast as it is, confronts Bengal in the north, the domains of Nizam Ali in the south and the central Marathas to the west. United with the latter by all conventions, we could derive from it a support all the more advantageous, because by landing at Ganjam, in agreement with both, we would be in a position to cause the greatest anxieties to the English so far as Bengal is concerned. The central and the subsidiary Marathas are bound by friendship with Nizam Ali, Subhedar of the Deccan, and while negotiating with the one it would be advisable to negotiate with the others. In view of the affinity of interests, Shinde will necessarily join this confederation; but as I have said it, the power of the latter is precarious and we can count on it only for the time being.

Nizam Ali

Although the possessions of the Subhedar of the Deccan are very large, his standing is more due to his dignity and to the glamour of his ancestors than to his real strength. Shut up in his seraglio where intrigue rules everything, he asserts his authority now and then only to display a vain ostentation. M. de Bussy wrote him two letters of compliment but it required months to deliver them and months to receive replies which signify nothing. M. de Coutenceau wrote to him after the death of M. de Bussy and the reply is yet to come. I have also written to him and surely he will not reply before my departure. Moreover, all this isolated correspondence does not absolutely signify anything. The assurance that the prince is doing well, some vague and exactly the same expressions of friendship and a request for reciprocal news sum up all their contents.

We never had a Waquil or an Envoy at this Court since the peace of 1763. One M. Aumont has been residing there on his own for several years, and Nizam Ali even gives him a salary. But without passing any judgement on M. Aumont about whom some persons have spoken well to me and the largest number ill, he would rather be harmful than useful to us because of the tack of consideration which he enjoys there. For this reason, I even preferred to dispatch my letter to Nizam Ali through one M. Rivière who commands a corps of topas to which are joined some Frenchmen picked up from the interior. The consideration which the latter enjoys is hardly better than that of the other, but I do not think that he has roamed so much and that he has practised so many professions.

However apathetic may be the character of Nizam Ali, he, however, feels the risk he is running in seeing the largest part of his kingdom invaded by the English, who possess, by way of a Jahagir, or mortgage, the provinces known as the Four Sarkars, have a door open on the Deccan and are likely to penetrate it. They have just made an attempt to obtain from this Prince the province of Guntur or Condavir, also as a mortgage; he resisted it, but the English will renew the attempt and obtain it. This province has been ceded to Nizam Ali by his nephew, the Nawab of Adoni, after some agreements made between them. It will end in encircling Nizam Ali if the English obtained it, and he will no longer have any opening to the sea.

We can cast a glance on the province of Guntur which produces 10 to 12 lakhs of rupees. I would even think that Nizam Ali would find, in the cession he would make of it to us, the means to upset the plans of the English; but we must post and maintain there a corps of white troops and sipahees, incur there expenses in fortifications and divide our mass of troops and means which, as I shall say subsequently, ought to form all our force in India and assure our success in future.

If we wanted to enter into a sustained and useful negotiation with the Subhedar of the Deccan, we must maintain there a Waquil or an Indian Envoy, or perhaps confine ourselves at first to a simple emissary who, especially in the beginning, would better promote our affairs than a known and acknowledged Resident. The Brahmin Rajappa, who is here, would be fit for either mission.

Marathas of Poona

The central Marathas, or the Marathas of Poona, ought to be considered as an Indian power most solid, most well-established and the one of which the independence is most assured. The right of Chauthai or that of the fourth part of the tribute of India which has been granted to them since the older days, gives them all the greater preponderance, because by means of their numerous cavalry, they proceed rapidly and in force in the most distant parts, the only means of collecting this right. The princes, the nawabs, the Rajas who see them swoop down on them, hasten to negotiate. It costs them more or less according to the circumstances and it is to be recommenced some time afterwards.

The correspondence of M. de Bussy with the Regency of Poona, instead of promoting our interests with this power, has rather harmed us. I have seen letters of this General, posterior to our peace with the English, by which he announced land and naval forces ready to appear on the Malabar Coast. Thus, they have not the slightest confidence in our promises and they emphatically say that they will believe in them only when they will see us land on their coasts and in sufficient strength to operate successfully. Their treaty with the English is only temporary, and we can believe them when they say that we have only to appear to render it null and void. His Majesty has deemed it advisable to leave M. de Montigny at Poona for some time longer, and I think that if we intended to form a real friendship with this Regency, we must not recall him, that as, in any case, it is advisable to placate it, we must, if we recall M. de Montigny, suppose that it is to submit an account or give him fresh instructions, and it would be proper to replace him immediately by a Waquil. This latter way of maintaining correspondence is much less costly, although in reality it is not so. You had fixed, my Lord, the salary of Messrs de Montigny and de Piveron at sixteen thousand francs per year, but it is necessary to point out to you that even the double is insufficient. If an European envoy were not on a footing which requires at least 2,000 rupees per month, he would not obtain the least consideration and it would be much better not to have any at all. We can rely on the integrity and even on the moderation of M. de Montigny; he was aware of the desire we had that his expenses should be reduced as much as possible; he has certainly done his best to comply with it, and yet, I have seen on my arrival here that he had been forced to borrow large sums and that a dispatch of fifteen thousand rupees which I requested M. Monneron to make to him was absolutely indispensable to meet his liabilities and put him in a very restricted position.

It is regrettable that you have not been given sufficiently detailed and sufficiently positive accounts to enable you, my Lord, to take orders from His Majesty and give your final opinion on some particular matters on which it is not possible to take half measures and which we must abandon if we judge the expense, which they inevitably entail, too heavy. The expenses of European Residents at the Courts of the Indian princes cannot be fixed; peace, war, some other particular circumstance augment them or reduce them. Here is an example : M. de Montigny has been given a present of an elephant, he is obliged to keep it unless he is prepared to do great harm to the nation he represents, while lowering himself, in his turn, in the eyes of the Indians. He is thus forced for this single item to incur extra expense which is all the same very considerable. I think that, as a rule and in ordinary times, we must not have European Residents with the native princes, that a simple Waquil is sufficient and that if he is properly chosen, he can be more useful; but the same does not hold good when it is a question of giving the finishing touches to a treaty or discussing important points on which there is already a rough agreement.

In this case, we shall require Envoys extraordinary and the passing expenses which they entail are compensated by the result of their negotiation.

If, however, His Majesty deems that M. de Montigny should continue to reside at Poona, I think that we must fix for him a special salary and independent of all extraordinary expenses of which he will furnish an annual or half-yearly statement to the administration of Pondicherry. This special salary could be ten to twelve thousand francs. The same holds good for any other European Resident at the courts of Indian princes.

On my arrival here, I found a Waquil of the Marathas, but who, dissatisfied with the manner in which M. de Bussy had treated him, had demanded his recall and his request was granted. Although this man by himself is not very useful, I thought that it would be advisable to retain him by satisfying him. That is what I did and he is still here. Early on my arrival I wrote to the Regency of Poona and to M. de Montigny, but provisionally, and I soon sent more detailed dispatches. It takes a very long time to go to Poona and return. The result is that I have not yet been able to receive replies to any of these dispatches. I am awaiting them any moment and if I receive them before this submission of account is finished, I shall attach them to this dispatch. As for the present, I confine myself to insert in it copies of my second dispatch to Nana Fadnavis, Regent of Poona, and to M. de Montigny. This latter (copy of my second dispatch) will put you, my Lord, in a position to judge if I have caught the spirit of your instructions, and if, while expressing the dispositions of His Majesty, I have not deviated from them.

I have also written to the other chiefs of the Regency and to Shinde, and I have recommended to M. de Montigny to dispatch my letter to the latter.

If, before my departure, I have no reply from M. de Montigny, I shall ask him to write to me at Goa, where I shall proceed and where he could even come and have an interview with me.

Tipu Sultan

I pass on to Tipu Sultan; it appears difficult to make him forget the grievances he claims to have against us on the occasion of the peace and about the abrupt manner in which we abandoned him. On my arrival here, I found one of his Waquils of a very inferior class, whom M. de Bussy had very much neglected and who was dissatisfied with the treatment. I deemed it advisable to treat him better; I talked to him much about his master and I magnified the opinion His Majesty had of him and His desire to cement the union which had always existed between France and his Darbar. I hastened to write to this Nawab and announce to him that I was going to send him a Waquil. His reply was honest and he attached to it a passport for the Waquil whom I had announced to him.

The departure of the latter had preceded the reply of Tipu Sultan and consequently he hadn't any passport. I wrote to this Prince a sufficiently detailed letter of which I attach herewith a copy. I charged M. de Piveron, whom I found here and whom I retained here, to write to him in his turn, and I delivered to the Waquil instructions of which I also attach herewith a copy. This Waquil, by name Ramrao, a Brahmin, was known to the Nawab and had already resided at his Court under M. de Piveron, in whom Haider Ali Khan had the greatest confidence and who had also deserved that of the son. On the other hand, my relations with the late Nawab were known to the latter. It seemed thus that everything would concur to dispel his prejudices and revive his confidence; and I was very much surprised to learn from the Waquil who wrote to me secretly that he had been arrested for several days a few kilometres from Srirangapattan, Residence of this Prince, that he had been searched and an inventory had been made of all his belongings, and that a close watch was kept on him. The letter which informed me of these strange circumstances preceded only by a day the Nawab's reply which I attach herewith. He had sent it directly by a courier, while that of our Waquil was carried secretly by a man who had been obliged to make several deviations.

In the meantime, the Nawab had sent for the Waquil and had received my letter. That is what I learnt by a letter from the latter who, in spite of such strange antecedents, had a very good reception. But through an unaccountable sequence of inconsistency, he (Tipu) had not at all informed him that he was dispatching to me a courier although, according to the usage, the Waquils are always informed about it so that they should write in their turn.

You will see, my Lord, from this reply of Tipu Sultan that he eludes all my proposals, that he employs vague expressions and that finally he communicates to me his plan to write directly to the King and to you, my Lord, and to send ambassadors to France. Although I doubt whether he will execute this latest plan, I hastened to give him information which he demanded from me by a letter of which I attach herewith a copy, and in which I tried to bring home to him that he was losing precious

time and that it was important for him, as much as for us, to agree from now on the main points which would form the basis of our friendship. I am waiting for his reply which I ought to receive before my departure from the coast. If it is satisfactory and if he expresses the desire to bind himself seriously by a friendship with us, I shall send him M. de Piveron who will afterwards come and join me at Mahé and whom I shall entrust with my last dispatches.

Since we are speaking of M. de Piveron, allow me, my Lord, to render him before you all the justice which is due to him. He has had many enemies and he has still some. The remarks which were first made secretly and afterwards more openly, produced the desired effect. The crowd repeated them, and at the slightest cause of discontent, founded or unfounded in the army corps of M. Duchemin, its source was attributed to M. de Piveron. It is, however, to him alone, I dare assert it, that this army corps owed its subsistence and the abundant succour furnished by Haider Ali Khan. The conduct of M. Duchemin, his talks more than rash, which many persons took the liberty to repeat following his example, had wearied and alienated this Prince to such an extent that even after the arrival of troops, without M. de Piveron, he would have abandoned us and made his peace with the English. Therefore, as finally the truth was out, justice has been rendered to him, and although an attempt was at first made to prejudice you against him, my Lord, you had pointed out to me that you were disposed to present his services to His Majesty and solicit his graces in his favour. I solicit them once again from you, my Lord, and with all the earnestness demanded by justice which I owe, more than any other person, to M. de Piveron.

I would not have found him here, if M. le Marquis de Bussy had not continuously deferred to settle his accounts which I was obliged to terminate. You have found, my Lord, that his expenses were excessive; but as I had an occasion to say it in the case of M. de Montigny, the necessary expenses of envoys at the courts of the Indian princes cannot be appreciated, and much more when you must follow an army, fulfill special missions, etc. This is the position in which M. de Piveron was several times; and it is a fact that he has spent about fifty thousand francs beyond the allowance which had been fixed for him and allocated to him.

I come back to Tipu Sultan. His strange conduct towards our Waquil, the vague manner in which he has replied to me, and more than all that, his imperious, distrustful and inconsequential character hardly permit us to place confidence in him. Messrs de Cossigny and de Piveron who knew him intimately, have formed the same opinion of it. This Prince, elated by his power and the good luck which follows him since he succeeded his father, is convinced that he needs no one and that he can support himself by his own effort. It is true that in the slightest reverses, all this confidence vanishes and gives place to irresolution and even to discouragement. Several times, after M. de Cossigny had retired from his army and when he was negotiating with the English, he would send for M. de Piveron at midnight, at one and two o'clock in the morning, to seek his advice on different movements of the latter, provoked by his infringements of the truce concluded with them. Then he put up with all that he was told, and M. de Piveron had been on several occasions to the English camp on his behalf to negotiate with the General. But as soon as nothing worries him, his character reappears, and he no longer recognises any one and does not listen to any advice.

Independently of the defects about which I have just spoken, Tipu Sultan is vindictive and cruel. I know from our Waquil with him, from M. de Lallée and from others that he still does not cease complaining bitterly about the fact that we abandoned him; he calls us dishonest perfidious, etc. He also does not cease making an enumeration of the sums which his connections with us have cost him, or his father. He speaks about it to M. de Piveron in a letter which he has just written to him, and he appears to have a plan to repeat what he has spent for us. I must observe in this respect that we have made a great mistake in giving him pure and simple receipts, while it had been stipulated that these sums would be repaid from the revenues of the territories ceded by Haider Ali Khan.

Although Tipu Sultan and the Marathas have respectively Waquils at each other's court, they are anything but friends. On several occasions there have been skirmishes between the detachments of the two nations, and recently one of the detachments of Tipu has beaten a Maratha detachment, has

forced it to recross the river Krishna and has captured a post called Nalgund. There is a report at present that the latter have returned in force, that they have beaten Tipu's detachment and recaptured this post. It is also stated that the chief of this detachment, first cousin of Tipu and Nawab of Carpey [Cudappa.], fearing the consequence of the discontent of this Prince, has gone over to Nizam Ali with 25,000 men. I have not received any positive information about it, but I am inclined all the more to believe it because the example of Karim Saheb, brother of Tipu, whom he got arrested and put into fetters, and who is believed to be dead, ought to frighten his cousin. (Tipu Sultan's brother is not dead and the news spread about the Nawab of Cudappa is false.)

Tipu Sultan was at Srirangapattan, his usual place of residence, at the time of the last letter he wrote to me, dated August 3. An army of 100,000 men, which he always leads, surrounded the town. He had announced that he was going to strike camp at the earliest, and it is reported that he had actually proceeded to Banglaore, a place 120 km away from Srirangapattan and nearer to the Carnatic. As he already spoke much of attacking Nizam Ali, it is very possible that his plan is to approach his kingdom, especially if the defection of the Nawab of Cudappa is true. His plan in general is to aggrandise himself at the cost of the possessions of Nizam Ali and of the Marathas who are to the north of the Krishna, and to limit his in this part by this river.

I think that it would be good if Tipu Sultan suffers some reverses. It is the only means to bring him back to us. He will then feel how we can be useful to him. Actually, if only he reflects, he cannot conceal from himself the fears which the Marathas and Nizam Ali, when united, ought to instill in him. Feared and little loved by his chiefs, there is not a single one whom he does not mistrust and whom he has no reason to mistrust. The English will foment divisions among the latter and instigate others to form a league and he must necessarily succumb if he is not aided.

I thought it advisable to expatiate on the subject of this Prince so that you could judge, my Lord, what reliance we could put on him. You wished that we should be in a position to induce him to cede to us a place on the Malabar Coast with a suitable rounding off where we could fix our principal establishment in India. To be sure of this Prince we must have a sufficiently extensive hypothecation in order that there should not remain any doubt about his real and firm intention; but I doubt very much whether we can induce him to do so. Mahé, whatever extension we may give to its district, would never be but a very mediocre possession and the expenses of which in fortifications and civilian buildings would be vast. Onor [Honavar.] would be better and we can ask for a large territory around it, but everything would have to be done there also. As for Mangalore, we must not imagine that Tipu would cede it to us. He has naval designs and wishes to carry on the extraction and trade of the produce of his kingdom through his marine. These plans are chimeric but he really has them none the less.

Moreover, I intend to treat later the question which you have discussed, my Lord, in your correspondence with M. de Bussy on the pros and cons of the principal establishment on the Malabar Coast or on that of Coromandel.

The Indian powers of which I have just spoken, are the only ones who deserve some attention. The others are either nonentities or under their dependence or under that of the English.

SITUATION OF THE ENGLISH IN INDIA

Situation of the English in Bengal

I have not been able to procure the exact statement of their actual forces in Bengal; but I know that the base consists of three regiments or brigades of the Company which each should be of thousand men; half a battalion of riflemen; four companies of pensioners of 100 men each; twelve artillery companies raised to 60 men each by their formation. The whole would come to 4,600 men at full strength; but we must assume a large reduction in the full strength, and this reduction may carry the actual number to 3,000 men.

Forty battalions of sipahees which, in ordinary times, are at 700 men and raised to 1,000 in times of war. I do not know if they are at full strength of peace times. Supposing it to be so, the total number of black troops amounts to 28,000 men.

Approximate estimate of the total strength of the troops of the English in Bengal—31,000 men.

The vast extent of their possessions in this part, the necessity to protect them from invasion, that of summoning the troops in their different provinces to levy the contributions which can be collected only by this means, requires at least this number in ordinary times. Those of war ought necessarily to augment their anxieties with regard to the neighbouring princes, and consequently require larger forces for this single object.

It is only towards the end of the war that the English dared to reduce the number of their troops in Bengal and dispatch some troops to the Coromandel Coast and to that of Malabar. Necessity, on the one hand, and some fortunate circumstances, on the other, required and permitted this transmigration; but if only we succeed in setting the neighbouring powers into movement, or even if these manifest the slightest semblance of being disposed to it, we ought to be assured that the English will take good care not to lose sight of such a vast and important part of their possessions, which they can preserve only by the constant use of force. The old princes, or if you like, those who preserve their empty title, are ready to offer a helping hand to the first liberator; those, who are not subjugated, fear to play that role and the only question is of an early prompting.

The English are fully aware of the danger of their situation and how precarious it is, and this conviction ought to lead them all the more not to reduce their troops in Bengal as the public revenues have just been increased considerably. Before his departure for Europe, Mr. Hastings had spent several months at Laknour [[Lucknow](#)], residence of the Nawab of Audh, under the denomination of Vazir, a pure and simple denomination and a hereditary title, and made a very advantageous transaction, if, however, it is free from anxiety. The revenues collected by the English from the dependencies of this prince rose to 108 lakhs of rupees and the expenses to 134 lakhs. This monstrous abuse has been suppressed. M. Hastings took it upon himself to restore to the Nawab of Audh his territory and to withdraw the English troops from it, on condition that he would annually pay to the treasury of Calcutta 118 lakhs of rupees, and he bound himself to do so on the surety of the leading sahukars or bankers. There results from this transaction the benefit hereinafter.

The yield from the Court of the Vazir	118 lakhs
Suppression of the excess of expenditure at the said court.	26 lakhs
I can add the two following items of improvement :—	
Net yield from salt by the prohibition of its import	40 lakhs
Reforms made by Mr. Macpherson since the departure of Mr. Hastings in the civil and military expenditure.	40 lakhs
	<hr/>
Total	224 lakhs
Receipts known in 1778 were at	330 lakhs
Total of the revenues from Bengal	<hr/> 554 lakhs <hr/>

From this yield, at least three hundred will be absorbed by the cargo of the Company and the civil and military expenditure, which, however, we can hardly appraise and in which there will be lot of abuse. The balance will serve to pay off the debts of India which can be carried to eight hundred lakhs.

The Nawab of Audh certainly believed that he could easily pay the sum for the sort of independence which he has recovered; but he will soon feel how harsh is the condition by which he has obtained it. Even the difficulty of fulfilling it will awaken the idea to shake off the yoke entirely.

The absence of English troops points to its possibility, and the succour of a neighbouring power can easily realise it. Shinde would actually be of great help to the Nawab of Audh, if they could come to an understanding.

Such is the situation of the English in Bengal, a brilliant situation apparently, but precarious. Lord Macartney, who had resigned the governorship of Madras, was at Calcutta when he learnt of his appointment to the office of the Governor-General of the English possessions in India, an office which he firmly refused. He must have even actually left for Europe.

Situation of the English on the Coromandel Coast

The English, not so opulent on the Coromandel Coast, have perhaps a more solid stability there. Masters of almost the whole coast from Ganjam to Cape Comorin, they have less to fear an attack there by the Asiatic powers. In this vast stretch of the coast, the only two princes who had formerly some stability are the Nawab of Arcot and the King of Tanjaour. The others are petty rajas and pallegars who can only be considered as the farmers of the English, each one in his district. There is not, however, a single one from among them who was not inclined to shake off the yoke, but the circumstances must be such as they could hope not to re-enter it. Muhammad Ali Khan, Nawab of Arcot, feels more than any other how harsh and humiliating is his position, in spite of even the restoration which has just been made to him of his kingdom. The imposition of twelve lakhs of pagodas, which he is forced to pay annually, is too high in view of the state of devastation of the province of Arcot; and it is only by contracting fresh debts that he can fulfil this engagement.

M. de Coutenceau wrote to Muhammad Ali Khan at the time of recovering Pondicherry. He even spoke to him about the jonkans or rights which were at issue with the Committee of Madras. From the says reply of this prince, which reached me after the departure of M. de Coutenceau, he gives us to understand how he has little powers; he even that he had written on this point to Mr. Macartney, but he had not had any reply. We have a Waquil with him who brought me this reply to M. de Coutenceau, and as the Nawab knew about my arrival, he charged him with some verbal compliments for me. Before dispatching this Waquil, the prince's divan had a long conversation with him, in which he even ventured to mention that Muhammad Ali was surprised that the French had not demanded more territory in this part, and that if we had held him (the Nawab) by the ear (this was his expression) he would not have let himself pull it. I did not want to follow up this overture. I wrote to this Nawab a purely complimentary letter and in which I affected to assimilate him absolutely with the English. He did not reply to me because of the protocol style which I have used. This style had indeed been the subject of a great discussion between M. Law and him. Muhammad Ali Khan, however wretched may be his existence, is very infatuated with his dignity. He claims that, established in his kingdom, we owe him more than to any other Indian princes; and he would wish that I had used, while writing to him, a style called Argice, that is to say, of a petition. He sent word to me about it through our Waquil; he asked his divan to communicate it to mine, afterwards he proposed a mixed style. I sent a reply that I did not see any reason to write to him in an inferior tone, that our possessions in the province of Arcot gave him no rights as they were guaranteed to us by the English alone; that finally we have no dealings with him and that by writing to him I had fulfilled an act of pure civility; that I would be sorry if this relation, the only one there could be between us, could not exist, but that it would be through his fault and not through mine; that, finally, he was aware that I was entrusted with this charge by a very great and powerful Prince. We have got as far as that. I asked our Waquil to return, since the Nawab would not reply to me. The latter has retained him so far and shows the keenest desire to keep up some relations with us.

His younger son, whom he has placed at the head of his affairs and to whom he wishes to pass on his Nawaby after him, often sent for the Waquil to his residence and is also bent, like his father, on

maintaining some connections with us. In being firm about the style of my letters, in affecting to avoid all private correspondence and in bringing home to the Nawab all his dependence, I thought I was fulfilling two objects, that of not giving any ground to the English of suspecting a secret understanding which, really speaking, would lead us to nothing, and that of exciting still more intensely the vexation with which fumes this wretched prince when he thinks of his sad situation. Moreover, he is cunning, and if only we made him some; overture, he could very well convey information about it to Tipu Sultan, whom he will always consider as his rival, and try to rouse his suspicions and break our connections with him.

THE KING OF TANJAOUR is still much more subdued. No one can see him; the English keep him shut up in his seraglio and do not allow him the least correspondence with the exterior. M. de Coutanceau thought it advisable to write to him at the time of recovering Karikal and the four Manganams which have been ceded to us. He charged the divan of Karikal to carry his letter to him and at the same time a clock as a present. The English returned everything and did not allow at all our envoy to approach him.

I have not yet been able to obtain the statement of the revenues of the English in the extent of the possessions which they occupy on the Coasts of Orissa and Coromandel. But very certainly they are much below their expenses, and they are obliged to draw on the treasury of Bengal.

Here is the statement of their troops in the Presidency of Madras, that is to say, from Ganjam to Cape Comorin.

White troops

Five national artillery regiments.

Two Hanoverian ”

One cavalry ”

Two infantry regiments of the Company.

The formation of these regiments is of thousand men,

but they haven't actually more than 400 men each,

which comes to

4,000 men

Artillery corps

600 men

Total of White troops

4,600 men

The Sipahes were raised to 35 battalions, all of 500 men each. They are reduced to 350 to 400 men. They are actually reforming 15 battalions, but the men are distributed in the remaining 20 which they want to raise to 800 or 1,000 men each; that would bring the total to 16 or 20 thousand; but at this moment they do not exceed

14,000 men

Total of the white and black troops of the Presidency of Madras

18,600 men

The stretch of the territory which these troops occupy is vast and they are necessary to protect the possessions which they owe to force and which they enjoy only by force. It is reported that the national regiments were to return to Europe. In that case, they will surely leave here a very large portion of men who compose them, and this return will only compose of the general staff, officers and the ensigns.

Situation of the English on the Malabar Coast

Without having an exact knowledge of the forces of the English on the Malabar Coast, I know that they are much reduced, and I think that they have there only a single regiment of the Company

and the number of sipahees necessary for the protection of their establishments which are neither extensive nor productive.

Approximate estimate of the English forces in India :—

White troops

In Bengal	3,000 men
In the Presidency of Madras	4,600 men
At Bombay	800 men
Total of White troops	<hr/> 8,400 men <hr/>

Black troops

In Bengal	28,000	
In the Presidency of Madras	14,000	
In the Presidency of Bombay on the basis on conjecture	<hr/> 3,000 <hr/>	
		45,000 men
Total of the white and Black troops		<hr/> 53,400 men <hr/>

It is the treasury of Calcutta which pays for the expenses of these different establishments; but as this treasury is absolutely exhausted, they are at this moment obliged to use special resources, even for the expenses of Bengal. The Presidency of Bombay has raised special loans and its paper-currency loses from 60 to 70 per cent. I am not sure whether the individual debt of Bombay forms part of that of 800 lakhs of Rupees which I have mentioned in the item of Bengal; I would think not. The report is that the debts of this Presidency exceeded two hundred lakhs. I have verified that the individual debt of Bombay was included in this total for India.

The transaction made by Mr. Hastings for the Nawaby of Oudh and the reforms which followed, offer great resources for the future. But at the present moment the Company is as embarrassed as it could be. A prodigious amount is due to the troops and to the employees. The shipping is done by private arrangements. That of this coast is almost nil and consists only of the lots of copper, wooden-goods, etc., which are left over from the consignments of Europe.

If the English Company is in a very considerable financial embarrassment, the civil and military employees are in the same boat. Accustomed to a state of luxury carried to the highest point, they find it difficult to reduce their expenses, and there is hardly any one who is not in debt, right from the members of the Supreme and Higher Councils. The reductions made since then have caused lot of bad humour and murmurs. If Lord Macartney had accepted the office of the Governor-General, the reforms of every kind might have been much more considerable. Therefore this resolve (not to accept the post) created a general satisfaction. This former Governor of Madras is really the only one, since the establishment of the English in India, who has shown a disinterestedness and straightforwardness, the example of which will be hardly followed.

INTEREST OF THE DUTCH IN HUMBLING THE POWER OF THE ENGLISH IN INDIA

The other European powers would, indeed, each one of them, profit by it (the embarrassing situation of the English), but their establishments and their trade are so restricted that there is no ground to suppose that they would essentially pay their attention to it. The Dutch are in a different position. Without having large possessions in the peninsula, their establishments and the trade which they would carry on there, combined with the numerous and valuable branches of that which they carry on in the Eastern Seas, form an aggregate which does not permit them to shut their eyes to the

risks which they are running of losing a large part of it, if not the whole, at the next war, if they are not aided and if they do not take the greatest precautions from this very moment to put their principal establishments in a state of defence. However, that is a matter to which they are paying their attention only in a feeble manner. It is true that lack of actual means in India contributes much to it.

I saw, my Lord, in one of your dispatches to M. le Marquis de Bussy, dated October 25, 1783, that you desired that he should impress upon the Dutch all the danger which they were running in this part of the world, and how a treaty of union which they would conclude with us would be advantageous to them. You added, my Lord, that it would be desirable that this idea was instilled in the States-General by the chiefs of the establishments of the (Dutch) Company. Not having had as yet an occasion to write to the Governor-General of Batavia about it (I am going to do it now), I made a mention of it, in the meanwhile, to M. Wan de Graff, Governor of Ceylon, and I have charged M. Louis Monneron, who went to Ceylon for his own affairs, to bring home to him how such a union was important to the security and preservation of their possessions in the eastern seas. I attach herewith an extract of my letter to M. Wan de Graff, that of the instructions which I have given to M. Louis Monneron and the copy of a letter, written to me by the latter, from which you will see, my Lord, that the Governor of Ceylon realises fully the necessity of an intimate union between the States-General and France. I have not received the reply which he should have given to me. It has reached me and I attach an extract of it. He was very busy, at the moment when M. Monneron wrote to me, with the perpetual pesterings which take place in the Legion of Luxembourg. This corps has continuously created scandalous scenes, either at the Cape of Good Hope, or at Ceylon; and it is very unfortunate at a time when it is important to maintain most intimate union with the Dutch. The present discussions are very serious : M. Hugonnet, who arrived a short time back, and the Colonel-Commandant wanted to appoint higher officers against the advice of the Governor, this operation may not take place because of the capitulation of this corps. Several other causes of dispute led M. Hugonnet to go and set his camp with his corps in the Company's Garden near Colombo. He has entrenched himself there, and M. Wan de Graff was waiting for a reinforcement of Dutch troops from Galle to summon M. Hugonnet to return.

This M. Hugonnet, formerly Lieutenant-Colonel of this corps, had been dismissed from the Cape for an act of insubordination. I thought it my duty to inform you, my Lord, of this very extraordinary event. It would be desirable that M. le Prince de Luxembourg made a choice of higher officers in a more judicious manner.

My letter to M. Wan de Graff and the instructions which I had given to M. Louis Monneron dealt, independently of the subject-matter of which I have just spoken, with the various other matters to be discussed between Ceylon and Pondicherry.

One of the great drawbacks of this latter place, and on which you, my Lord, insisted in one of your dispatches to M. de Bussy, was deficiency of wood, coal, especially lime, and even bricks, and the obligation to obtain a large part of these articles from the English. We shall no longer be in this position, because of the orders which M. Wan de Graff has, at my request, recently sent to the parts of Ceylon which adjoin us and because of the contract which we are going to sign to obtain annually the necessary quantity of the above-mentioned objects from Jafna, Point Pedro and other points of this coast. Not only shall we obtain the said articles, but woods of different qualities, palings and freestone, if we need them. A picked person will be sent to Jafna who will be entrusted with concluding this contract and who will at the same time assure the means of import, so that it can take place every month to begin from that of January, epoch when the season permits the coastal traffic.

M. Van Senden, who commands at Trincomalee, fully realises the necessity of a union consolidated between his nation and us. He hasn't got great influence, but his opinion can have some weight in support of that of other chiefs of the Company. I have spoken and written to him in great detail on this subject, and I am convinced that in his correspondence to Europe he will make a special mention of it.

The Dutch have just recovered their establishments on this coast. They imagine that Negapatnam will be restored to them through some compensations. I do not know if this hope is well founded. They have a squadron of the States-General which is at present at Trincomalee and which is to return soon to Europe.

Situation of the French establishments in India

After presenting the situation of the different powers, European as well as Indian, in India, I shall submit to you, my Lord, ours, render you an account of the arrangements I have made and communicate to you my ideas on the manner in which we ought to be established there until fresh circumstances change the present situation.

Pondicherry

Pondicherry is almost as populated as it was in 1778. The census which was then taken raised the population of the black town and of the suburbs to 24 thousand souls. We are occupied with a fresh census and because of the precautions taken, it will be more exact than the first. I am justified in placing, on a rough estimate, the present population at 21 thousand souls, (The census is over and we have verified a population of 27 thousand souls), without counting the whites and the topas, who amount to 1800, or the garrison.

The number of the artisans of the town is nearly same as at the epoch about which I have spoken above, but those of the villages of the outskirts have considerably diminished. That founded by M. Law and which bears his name had up to 400 looms. At present it is reduced to 120. Another village by name Moutapet is reduced from 250 to 50 only. But some encouragement and an assured sale of goods can repeople these villages in a few years' time. That of Vilnaour was formerly very flourishing. The water is good; its situation is pleasant; an old and venerated Pagoda can alone contribute to attract workers there. I have not found a single one there, the English having neglected this village whilst they were in its possession. We are going to replant trees in the streets intended for the manufacturers, which is necessary to protect them from the sun; and I have agreed that an advance of 5 pagodas be made to each head of the family who would come and establish himself in this village as well as in others. These advances will be recovered in the first two years and M. Law, who had made similar ones, succeeded in attracting many craftsmen. Some have already arrived and have been settled, and I am sure that by continuing to pay our special attention to them, we shall soon see these villages repopled.

The districts of Vilnaour and Bahour have suffered more during the war than the district of Pondicherry and lost many more people. Their present population consists nearly of six thousand men and their number of ploughs goes to 684, each plough comprising two pairs of bullocks.

The suburbs employ about 350 ploughs. Independently of the bullocks intended for ploughing, we can count on 25,000 cows or calves or buffaloes in herds in the district of Pondicherry as well as in the districts of Vilnaour and Bahaour, 10,000 in the first and 15,000 in the other two.

But they are of small species and these bullocks would not be suitable to haul the artillery and serve in the field. It is from the north that we must obtain them for this purpose.

It appeared advisable and worthy of the benevolence and humanity of his Majesty not to set up different farmings, customs and other duties at this early moment of the retaking of possession. Consequently, the revenues of this year will consist of the produce of the district of Pondicherry valued at

Rs. 20,000

That of the cocoanut palms and the administration of public thoroughfares.

Rs. 6,000

Plus the produce from the districts of Vilnaour and Bahour valued at

Rs. 40,000

Total	Rs. 66,000
	165,000 francs.

The revenue of the following years will be much higher and will gradually augment. This is what we should expect for the next year :

Produce of the district of Pondicherry	Rs. 25,000
Revenue from the concessions made in the said district and which was not levied this year	Rs. 4,300
The total from the farmings amounted before the war to 75 thousand Rupees. For the first year it is calculated only at	Rs. 40,000
Administration of public thoroughfares	Rs. 7,000
Vilnaour and Bahour	Rs. 50,000
Total of the revenues of the second year	Rs. 1,26,300

or three hundred fifteen thousand seven hundred fifty francs.

From the third year, the revenues of the districts of Vilnaour and Bahour ought to be raised to Rs. 75,000, the limit of improvement which they cannot exceed. The taxes from Pondicherry will by slow degrees amount to nearly the same sum; the revenues of the administration of public thoroughfares can rise up to ten and twelve thousand Rupees, which will carry the total revenue of the town, the suburbs and the two districts to 450,000 francs, deduction made of all the expenses of administration, repairs of embankments, etc.

Karikal

Karikal has suffered much from the devastations and mortality caused by the war. The town and suburb have been plundered on several occasions by the parties from the army of Haider Ali Khan whose only profession is plunder. A simple surrounding wall would have sufficed to shelter the inhabitants of Karikal from these repeated and destructive incidents. The four Manganams or districts, which have just been ceded to us, have not less experienced the horrors of the war, because of which we should not expect that the early years would be very productive.

Here is the statement of the revenue on which we should count for this year, all the administrative expenses deducted.

The territory of the fourteen villages of Karikal	31,754 frs.
That of the four Manganams	115,472 frs.
The different farmings	22,437 frs.
Total	169,663 frs.

It will appear strange that the farmings of taxes have been set up at Karikal and not at Pondicherry. The same reasons of favour, which caused them to be suspended in the latter establishment, should have determined the conduct to be followed for the other. I can hardly explain the reasons for this difference, but when I arrived at Karikal, I found not only the usual farmings set up, but even that of betel and tobacco which had never existed and which had given rise to the discontent of the inhabitants and which had led them to retire out of the territory of Karikal. I thought it advisable to receive their representations and promise them the abolition of this new farming. This gracious concession satisfied them, and as the other duties were set up without any protests, I allowed them to subsist.

The fall in population is stupendous. One could count in 1778 in the 14 villages of Karikal 408 families of inhabitants; they are reduced to 145. The coolies or hirelings, men and women, numbered 1,821. There hardly exist 316. The herds have diminished in a much larger proportion, so that much time will be required to re-establish this unfortunate canton and we could help it only by lot of moderation and encouragements.

The big district of Karikal requires lot of it. Its manufactures were considerable and rose up to hundred thousand pagodas or 800,000 francs worth of sale.

The four Manganams have not suffered so much as the district of Karikal. The actual population consists of about 4,000 souls, occupying 1,246 houses. There are 701 which are not occupied. Cultivation employs 1,000 ploughs.

The soil of these four districts is much superior to that of the old territory and it admits of improvement. The produce can double at least, and combined with that of the 14 villages and with the customs which will successively augment, the total revenue of this establishment should amount to from 450,000 to 500,000 francs.

M. de Mainville, whom I have provisionally appointed as Commandant of Karikal and M. Vinay, Pay-Commissioner, are occupied, with great punctuality and activity, with the means which can raise this establishment to a degree of prosperity which it is capable. I gave an order to dismiss of attaining an Indian who, placed in the capacity of a divan, set up various monopolies and practiced harassment. I forced him to refund several sums which he had arrogated to himself. These people, when a close watch is not kept on them, become petty tyrants and misuse the confidence placed in them in a manner most harmful to the interests which are committed to them. They have carried these abuses to excess when they could find the means to accept the presents. I can assure you, my Lord, that this will not happen under the present administration and that Messrs de Cossigny and de Moracin will keep the strictest control over it.

The expenses of Karikal conform to the estimate fixed by His Majesty, so that from this very year there will be more than 100,000 francs in pure profit. It is true that I do not count the maintenance of 300 sipahees who are absolutely necessary, as I shall speak about it at the proper place.

Yanaon

The expenses of the factory of Yanaon will almost be covered by the produce of the small territory of this establishment and some duties. M. Martin, who is its chief, is one of the persons most capable of giving a great fillip to our commerce in this important part, important because of the quality and quantity of the articles which are manufactured there or which are obtained from inland. Some difficulties arose with the English, since the recovery of this factory, about some portions of land, but I have reason to believe that they will all be removed to our satisfaction. There is one of a more serious nature on which I am expecting an explanation from the supreme Council of Masulipatnam. In a reply given to M. Le Forestier, Chief of the Lodge at Musulipatnam, on the duties which, the English farmers or Rajas dependent on them, wanted to demand on our goods, this Council, by a wrong use of the words, appeared to compare us to the British subjects, who, by the permission of the Company, carry on trade in India by paying to the said Company duties fixed by it. This manner of eluding Article XIII of the last treaty, is too vulgar to be upheld, and I have no doubt that the positive explanation which I have demanded from the supreme Council of Masulipatnam will be satisfactory. In the contrary case, I shall immediately lodge a complaint to the Supreme Council of Madras which, I am sure, would disapprove the claim of the former.

This Article which assures us a free trade, secure and independent' ought to form the sole basis of our claims in all the parts of India which depend on the English. It is of the greatest importance not to allow it to be infringed in the slightest manner, and that is what I have mainly

recommended to the chiefs of the establishments and factories. Another point which we must not lose out of sight and which I have much recommended, is never to have any dealings with the Indian princes who are under the domination of the English, when their agents or they themselves wish to put obstacles in our trade or show other claims contrary to what is guaranteed to us by His Britannic Majesty by the last treaty of peace. The English would take advantage of it to next refer us to them and involve us into interminable discussions. It is therefore to the English alone that we must address our complaints since they alone have ceded to us certain territories and assured the liberty of our trade.

M. Martin, who had not at first realised the consequence of the approach to the Indians, had wanted to deal with some Rajas adjoining Yanaon and who are under the domination of the English. I informed him to stop all dealings of this nature with them; to address himself to the Council of Masulipatnam under whose jurisdiction the neighbouring districts are, and failing a satisfactory reply, to give me an account of it or to the Governor of Pondicherry in my absence.

Ideas on French Trade in India

The English, as I have already said it, are at present neglecting the trade of the Coromandel Coast. They have not at all entered into any contracts in the south and very little in the north. Consequently we could have drawn much from Yanaon if the shipping business from France could have been encouraged. I have just seen in the public papers a Decree about the formation of a new India Company. It will certainly concern itself with all these matters. I wish that it would conduct its affairs properly, but I cannot help thinking that private trade would have been more advantageous. I intended to communicate to you my Lord, some ideas on this subject, but there is no more time for it. I thought it was possible to encourage private societies and at the same time overcome the difficulty of too large a number of consignments from Europe, by informing the Chambers of Commerce of the quantities and the qualities of the articles which can be obtained from the different parts of India which the administrators of Pondicherry would have indicated according to the accounts of all the chiefs of establishments and factories. These societies could have dispatched a part of the funds in advance, either to the merchants known in the different establishments, or to the chiefs themselves of our factories. This advance could have been negligible by charging the said persons with the job for the account of the said societies, and it would have been possible to indicate the amount of these advances. The commission and the interest on the advances made for the societies would be less than the expenses which the agents in the different parts would demand and charge *ad-hoc*. This single item will surely cost much to the new Company.

If it was agreed to assemble the articles from the different parts of the coast at Pondicherry so that the ships would find their goods all ready on their arrival, it was very easy to do so with the coastal boats. By this means the returns would have been prompt.

There is reason to believe that by slow degrees the traders and merchants established in India would have had better means and that their number would have increased so that ere long it would not have been necessary perhaps to send funds from Europe in advance. Gradually, the trade of India would have freely assumed a regulated course and an increase which the limited means of the new Company cannot hope to achieve.

What I have just suggested for the Coromandel Coast could have also been possible in Bengal and on the Malabar Coast, but I repeat it and am grieved to see it, there is no more time to think of it.

This plan could have led to another more vast and more advantageous to the State from all points of view. The situation of the Isle of France seems designed to assemble all the commodities of trade of the Eastern Seas and form a depot for them. Country boats plied by the laskars or Indian sailors could have cheaply transported various goods to the Isles of France, where the ships from Europe would have found assorted goods, which would have been delivered into Lorient or in any other port of France a year after the departure of the ships dispatched from them.

These ideas will one day be realised. Perhaps they will be extended and it will be deemed that by making the port of the Isle of France free, the foreign nations will find it advantageous to come there and take in their supplies of goods from India, China, etc. etc.

I revert to the detail of our establishments.

Masulipatam

Masulipatam has only a lodge without revenue and the duty of the chief concerns trade alone.

Mahé

Mahé has been absolutely razed. There doesn't stand a single house. M. de Coutanceau had sent M. Marin, who had previously and for a long time performed there the functions of a pay commissioner, but without the order to take possession of this establishment, so that he was a stranger among the English who had kept there a garrison of sipahees. The object of M. de Coutanceau was to bring home to Tipu Sultan by this sort of unconcern how little advantageous this possession was to us. But it appeared to me that this same object could be fulfilled without leaving Mahé in the power of the English and especially whilst we had an official there. Besides I saw from the letters of M. Marin that about 600 persons who reassembled in this place under the huts, were extremely harrassed by the English garrison and that he himself could be exposed. Consequently, I authorised him to take possession of Mahé in the state in which it was by ascertaining it through the very process of recovery. He had sent me a report of the situation with the assessment of damage. I attach herewith a copy of the same. But if we claimed back the damages done to Mahé, that is to say the destruction, the English would shift at least a large part of it on the troops of Haider Ali Khan who occupied it for some time. I therefore think that it would be a sheer waste of time, if we claimed back the damages. Besides, the act of recovery will establish the fact that the territory is returned to us absolutely bare.

I have not received news from M. Marin since the orders I sent him; but as I intend to visit Mahé, I shall fully examine everything and I shall have the honour to render you, my Lord, accounts which will enable you to suggest the proper action to be taken. In the meanwhile M. Marin with 20 or 30 sipahees will suffice with a harbour-master for the service of the boats which will come there to load pepper and other articles. This very humble existence at Mahé will save a very large part of the funds which were meant for it.

Calicut

The lodge at Calicut will be re-established on my way to Mahé and I have selected M. Cornet to administer it. This old employee of the King at Pondicherry appears fit for this post and the result will be the discontinuation of a pension of 700 frs. which was granted to him whilst he was being posted.

Bengal

Shortly after my arrival here, I sent to M. Dangereux the King's order which established him as an agent of the French nation to look after the trade of Bengal at Chandernagore and other factories which depend on it, and at the same time I wrote to the Gentlemen of the Supreme Council of Calcutta to inform them of the powers which M. Dangereux had to receive our former possessions in Bengal. A deputy from Calcutta was at once appointed to proceed there. There were some difficulties about the garden of Gharaty which have been lifted by the agreement made to refer them to our respective courts. M. Dangereux is giving you an account of it directly, my Lord. In the meantime, we enjoy the possession of the said garden.

M. Dangereux has not yet replied to me on the subject of the import of salt into Bengal, to which it is possible that the English would object; but as this article of trade is not excluded from the

general liberty which is guaranteed to us by the treaty, I informed M. Dangereux that we must resist whatever difficulties that might be raised, show that a refusal to acquiesce in such a just demand would constitute on the part of the Supreme Council of Calcutta a formal deviation from the last treaty, and that finally, he must protest and give you, my Lord, an account of it directly as well as to me.

Sure enough, if we ceded on this point, I do not see what stronger defence we would have on others, and we would be exposed to gradually lose all the advantage that ought to result from the important article which assures and guarantees us the *liberty, security and freedom* of trade, especially in Bengal and in all the parts of India under the sway or dependence of the English.

The freedom to import salt into Bengal is all the more advantageous to us as Pondicherry and Yanam furnish it, and as for this latter establishment, it is a revenue for the King, and which, without that, will become worthless.

I can hardly insist, my Lord, on the necessity not to yield on any point of unlimited liberty of trade which the King of England has guaranteed to us. It is of an invaluable advantage to us, since the Company of England possesses all commercial ports of India with the exception of the Malabar Coast where they (the English) are very restricted. This guarantee gives us a very great advantage over all the other European nations and puts us indeed on an equal footing with the English Company in its own possessions. We ought indeed to expect some embarrassments, some misuse of force, but, in general, our trade could be more extensive than it has ever been, even in times prior to the war of 1755, and the purchase or first-hand prices could not exceed those of the English.

M. Dangereux has appointed chiefs in the different factories of Bengal. He will render you an account of it directly, my Lord, as well as of other matters concerning this port. I have strongly recommended to him to incur only indispensable expenses of re-establishment, to rent instead of constructing and finally to consider himself in a very precarious condition in an establishment which could be re-captured by the English from the first movements of the war.

Mocha

I have not at all provided for the post of the chief of the lodge of Mocha, raised to 4,000 frs on the King's list. After conferring on this subject with some persons and especially with M. de Lagrenée, who knows this establishment thoroughly, I thought that this post could be abolished and that a broker entrusted with the French lodge was sufficient. M. de Moracin and I, we are going to render you an account, my Lord, of a debt of the brokers of Mocha which they came to claim here.

Ideas on Mascat

It could be useful to devote to Mascat the funds meant for Mocha, but instead of a French Resident, the Consul of Basra could be asked to send and set up there a Syrian or a Greek knowing the Arabic language, who would facilitate commercial transactions which could be carried on there, and especially the dispatch of ministerial despatches.

Consulate of Surat

As for the Consulate of Surat, I thought that you were waiting, my Lord, to appoint some one to this important post. M. Louis Monneron would have been a very fit person to occupy it. I have spoken to him about it with the intention of proposing him to you; but his affairs, which summon him to Europe, do not permit him to accept it.

Plan of establishment in India

After giving you an account, my Lord, of our political, territorial and commercial situation in India, I shall offer my ideas on the manner in which, in my opinion, we ought to establish ourselves there.

If we consider India only from the point of view of direct trade which we carry on there, or even from the point of view of that, larger but of the same nature, which we can hope to carry on there, it appears not only useless but very detrimental to maintain there, as well as at the Isles of France and Bourbon, numerous corps of troops, a large administration and in short to devote for this part a sum of eight or nine million francs at least which, under this assumption, would be a pure loss.

His Britannic Majesty has assured and guaranteed us by the last treaty of peace a free, secure and independent trade in Bengal, on the Coromandel and Malabar Coasts and in all the parts of India in which it has possessions or influence. It is on our political and general situation with England that depends the confidence which we ought to have in this guarantee. If this power has some particular reasons which lead it to fear a rupture with France and if it has, on the contrary, a very great interest in maintaining peace with it, it will avoid all occasions which might disturb it. According to this supposition, in whatever manner we are established in India, our trade will be maintained there. One thousand or two thousand troops which we would keep there will not render our trade either more or less flourishing and would be insufficient to protect it.

Starting from this principle, the chiefs or agents in each of our establishments in India would be adequate to administer them. Pondicherry and Karikal would deserve some better attention because of their districts and the revenues which they bring. We would require a garrison of 400 sipahees for the one and of 300 for the other, and digging of ditches and construction of a simplest possible surrounding wall for both to protect them from momentary incursions. European troops would, in my opinion, be absolutely useless and would require a larger number of sipahees to guard them. As for law-courts, they could be left such as they are actually. Mahé would remain in a state in which it is, only two or three houses could be constructed for the chief, the harbour-master, etc. Supposing that at Mahé, at Yanam and in Bengal, 300 sipahees in all were necessary, the total number would rise to one thousand, who would cost about 250,000 frs. The additional expenditure could only rise to a similar sum, or at the most to 350,000 frs. so that from the summary given above the revenues of India would exceed the expenses by two or three hundred thousand francs.

This excess would be applied to the Isles of France and Bourbon, of which the garrison could be reduced to 300 men and the expenses of the administration as well as of the port to as little as possible. The consignments from Europe, either in money or in kind, would thus be limited to additional two or three hundred thousand francs.

But if considerations of a different nature and more important ought to fix our attention, if the rival nation, which has invaded India, can, by means of the immense resources which it draws from it, give cause for anxiety and usurp a preponderance from which the nature of its possessions in Europe caused it deviate, in short, if we wish to weaken this foreign source of preponderance, we must take measures which can achieve this object. A mixed plan would always be expensive, would be a sheer loss, would entail fresh expenses at the time of war and would weaken our general resources.

I, therefore, think that it is advisable and that it is necessary, under the present assumption, to have a mass of forces in India, such that not only should it assure us against all fears of a surprise attack, but that it could impose upon the rival nation. Its immense possessions and our mediocrity in this respect give us a very great advantage over it. Obligated to divide its troops in its numerous provinces or kingdoms, it requires a prodigious number of them to fulfil this object of primary necessity and form a respectable army or corps, whilst by assembling ours in a single point, we can always be superior in actual forces and ready to act. From the actual disposition of troops of the Government of Asia, we have or we shall have a full compliment of 2,600 men from Europe. This

number would be more than sufficient if the question was only to defend a fortified place, but it would not be so if we want to act offensively, and the maintenance of these troops during peace, the expenses in fortifications and in internal and civil works would end only in keeping ourselves shut up while waiting for succours which must be sent from 24,000 km. We cannot count on the aid of the Isle of France, whose garrison is reduced to 1,400 men and which itself would need succour.

However, I suppose that in the time of war, the Isle of France would not be attacked or that it would be reinforced in time; that the squadrons and the troops sent from Europe would arrive in India successfully and without any impediments and join the 2,600 men who would be there. A considerable interval would have passed even in this supposition, and the English would have profited by that to seize all our possessions with the exception of the place which would confine us and where keeping us blocked, not only would they enjoy our state of humiliation but advantages which would result from it for them by the real effect which it would produce against us on the Asiatic powers which would with difficulty shake off their early impression even on the arrival of our forces whatever they were. I am all the more justified in thinking so, because the example of the last two wars has already greatly prejudiced them against our power, and our object, the most essential, the most difficult perhaps and the one with which we ought to occupy ourselves most, is to change their opinion. The Indian princes can actually estimate the European nations only according to the situation in which they see them here, and it is evident that this appraisal cannot be in our favour. Thus, only a permanent force can bring them over to our side, at the same time as it will impose on our rivals.

The number which I would judge sufficient, but necessary, is 4,000 men in India and 2,000 at the Isle of France. To combine as much as possible economy with this increase, we need not send there fresh corps, but raise by one-third those which are there, by carrying each regiment to 1800 men and artillery to 600. It would be an increase in the expenses for the Government of Asia in times of peace.

To WIT

1800 men for the three regiments; salary, common fund and full ration	400,000 frs.
Two hundred men of artillery which are supposed to form two additional companies, judged necessary; allowance, pay, common fund and ration	92,962 frs.
Clothing to be purchased in the colony at the rate of 10 frs. per person	20,000 frs.
Days of hospitalisation at the rate of 73 frs. per person for 2,000 men	146,000 frs.
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Total	658,962 frs.
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I add the expenses of recruiting which can be estimated at about	200,000 frs.
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Approximate total	858,962 frs.

It is thus an excess of expenditure of a little more than eight hundred thousand francs, without which the eight or nine millions assigned for India or the Isles are almost a pure loss and with which we are in a position to operate everything and do everything.

This expenditure would be much diminished if we could suppose that the 2,000 additional men in India were deducted in Europe; then it would be limited to an excess of salary and would not exceed two hundred thousand francs, the extra cost of recruiting not included.

Perhaps while adopting this plan, it would be deemed more advisable to add a third battalion to each regiment of Asia, as it has been done at Martinique. While proposing it such as it is, my only idea was to economise as much as it is possible. However, I must observe in support of this economy that this way of augmenting our forces in India will create a less sensation in Europe and will avoid the explanations. On the other hand, we must create a sensation here. The question is to change the

opinion. That is what I can hardly repeat. My duty is to set forth before you, my Lord, matters such as they are or at least such as I see them, and I stick to it very scrupulously.

Struck by this necessity to change the opinion of the people of India, my main attention was focussed on this important object, and I think I have succeeded in preparing as much as it is possible a useful revolution in our favour. Circumstances favoured me immensely. Having arrived here with funds and troops at a time when the English lacked the first and reduced the second, this contrast has been noticed and has created all the greater sensation as the first dispatch could easily be exaggerated, and as the second made partially on different occasions and successively has caused our effective forces to be doubled at least through imagination. At the time of the landing of each dispatch of troops, either recruits or others, we took care to make them enter with apparel and display, and this little trickery produced its effect. The movement of ships, frigates and transport ships, which followed each other during four months consecutively, has also added to the general effect, more especially as at this moment the English have here only a single frigate, the rest of their division having left and not yet replaced. Simultaneously, I spread the report in all the Darbars or Courts that the King's intention was to constantly keep in India a respectable mass of forces, that the troops which had just arrived would be followed by others next year; and as it is actually necessary even to complete the corps to the present level, I did not go too far. I could exaggerate more, and I did it, with respect to the forces collected at the Isle of France, and as opinion was already favourable to this assertion, it could not be questioned. Finally, to fit in with everything and to add to the general effect, I thought it advisable to undertake the responsibility to commence the works of a surrounding wall at Pondicherry, as I had the honour to inform you in my previous account, my Lord, by my dispatch of July 8 No. 4, stamped India. I shall give details about it hereafter.

To these measures calculated to restore the opinion in our favour, I added these which you had ordered me to employ, my Lord, to give an idea to the Asiatic princes of the true situation of the English in Europe, in America and even in India. The copy of one of my letters to Montigny, inserted in this dispatch, will reveal to you if I have understood your intentions. It is the same spirit which prevails in my other correspondence.

Examination of the place where ought to be fixed the principal establishment in india.

After stating my opinion on the forces necessary to prepare and assure our success in India at the next war, I pass on to the examination of the place which it is advisable to choose to assemble them there. This place ought to be a single one. When they are divided, four thousand men would serve nothing, and assembled they will form everywhere and at all times a redoubtable mass of forces. Our great advantage over the English consists in this possibility of assembly which they haven't.

I have carefully studied, my Lord, your correspondence with M. le Marquis de Bussy on this place to be selected. Without recalling the different objections for or against the Coasts of Malabar and Coromandel recorded in your dispatches of March 17 and October 25, 1783 and the replies of M. de Bussy, I shall stick to follow those contained in the dispatch of August 29, 1784, addressed to this General. The preceeding details can serve as a reply to several ones. The only question is to recall them and to summarise them.

Your first observation, my Lord, deals with the little necessity to fortify Pondicherry if our only aim is trade and to collect there some additional blacks. You consider these views of trade only as secondary to those which would tend to form an establishment calculated to serve as a base of operations to more comprehensive plans. It is thus with reference to these latter views that I shall discuss this question, by, however, including in it others when they could fit in it without clashing.

As you point it out, my Lord, there are real advantages which militate in favour of the establishment of the seat of the French Government on the Coromandel Coast and especially at Pondicherry. Not only is it secure during about eight months, not only is the bar of Pondicherry the least dangerous on the coast, not only can its roadstead obtain some protection from the advanced

batteries, not only are we there within reach of receiving help from the Dutch, neutral or allied, and of ruining the trade of the English by cruises on Madras, the mouths of the Ganges, the Straits, etc. but it is from this coast that we are in a position to attack their important possessions, and even in the province of Arcot, since we would be there, and in Tanjaour, and especially in Bengal, the revolution of which, easier than one can imagine it, would bring about their complete ruin. Our connections with the Dutch, connections which everything ought to prompt France and Holland to draw closer, by assuring us the resources of Trincomalee, make the position of Pondicherry most important in the whole of India. Our squadrons will find at Trincomalee provisions which could be assembled there from everywhere, from Europe, Cape of Good Hope, the Isle of France, Batavia, Pegu, Persia, etc. etc., and the short distance between one point and the other, will enable us to furnish ourselves with these in no time.

The fear of a sudden blockade of Pondicherry of which you make a mention, my Lord, in your proceeding letters, is ruled out because of the supposition of a mass of forces such as I have proposed. This reason cannot induce us either to prefer Karikal, because of the slight difference of distance from Madras and because the same fear of a blockade could exist from Tanjaour. The roadstead of Karikal is without any protection from the land, and the slight advantage of provisions, insufficient for the needs of war, cannot balance the advantages of Pondicherry. Moreover, the expenses of constructions would be more considerable.

To these considerations of highest importance can be added those of the trade of the Coromandel Coast which we are in a position to carry on from now on even in competition with the English as I have already pointed out.

The Malabar Coast can neither offer the same security, nor the same external resources, nor the same plans of attack and conquest, nor the same target of trade.

Less security because, although hemmed in by the possessions of an ally and away from the English forces, the latter could attack us by sea with all the advantage which the resources of the port of Bombay would give them. They would have the same advantage from it as we would have here from Trincomalee.

Less external resources because of the distance from Trincomalee, repository of the squadrons and provisions, and even from Batavia, from where we ought to get many items as well as from Pegu and the Eastern Coast.

Scanty plan of attack and conquest, with the exception of Bombay, and the small establishments of Tellicherry, Anjangao and the factory of Surat.

Finally, a trade much inferior to that of the Coromandel Coast to which we can also add that of Bengal which we are in a better position to protect. The rounding off which we could demand at Mahé to the south, would only form a very mediocre item of revenue and this establishment would involve immense expenditure in constructions.

Onor [[Tahawwar Jang.](#)] would be better so far as the port is concerned and we could demand there more extensive concessions than at Mahé; but they could never compensate the immense expenses of establishment.

Mangalore would certainly be better than all the rest and would entail some less expenses, but we must not count on it, and very certainly Tipu Sultan will never cede to us this port on which he has the greatest designs. Chaul or Bassein with the Marathas, would separate us still much more from the centre of our resources, would require or involve a rupture with Tipu Sultan, or at least a great cooling. The same effect would take place, on the other hand, in the case of the Marathas, if our establishment was in the possessions of the former.

In either association, where should we direct our plans after capturing Bombay and the other small establishments of the English on this coast? Should we think of the province of Arcot or even of Tanjaour? We would deprive ourselves of the surest means to operate there successfully by abandoning the Coromandel Coast. However, these would constitute the only objectives which we could have in view, when united with Tipu Sultan. Supposing that we had the Marathas at our disposal and that we wanted to operate in Bengal, we must cross the peninsula in its widest stretch to converge on Agra, Delhi, begin our operations on the Nawaby of Audh and descend the Ganges to reach Calcutta.

Pondicherry is therefore the central point where we could assemble the largest resources, from where we could extend our plans towards all the English possessions, where we are in a position to strike the greatest blows from the earliest moment. As we do not owe this establishment to any of the independent powers whom we are interested in winning over to our side or simply inciting against the English, we can placate them all and act in concert with them according to the circumstances, which proceeding is impossible if our principal establishment is situated in the possessions of Tipu Sultan or of the Marathas. Established and in force at Pondicherry, we shall be assured of either of these powers, if not of both. If the former enters the carnatic and offers us his aid, we operate immediately and Madras must succumb. If by our connections with the Marathas, the Raja of Nagpur and Nizam Ali support our interests, we unite with them at Cuttack by landing at Ganjam and from there we shall easily penetrate into Bengal through its most important and weakest part, nearest to Calcutta. Finally, by coming to an understanding with these different powers, which is more assured if we do not have a recognised, authentic and in some sort exclusive alliance with one of them, we can attack the English on all sides, the surest and the quickest means to operate a general revolution which ought to fix all our attention and be our principal object.

To all these motives of preference for Pondicherry should be added that of economy. Whatever devastations this place may have suffered, there still remain civil and military buildings, and the old lay-out of the fortifications offers means less costly than anywhere else, to raise new ones. I attach herewith plans, memorials and estimates which could enable His Majesty to decide upon the one which he will deem it appropriate to prescribe and get executed.

The plan which was addressed to you, my Lord, last year by M. Beylié and which is described in the memorial of M. de la Lustière, requires an expenditure of six million two hundred thousand francs. By adding to it that of civil and military buildings which a garrison of 2600 men requires, the whole will amount to 70,71,500 frs. M. de la Lustière estimates that three years will be necessary for the main part of the place and six to seven years to complete the re-establishment. But as it is necessary to make every thing move together, since, by supposing a place to be in a state of defence, the troops must be lodged, the gun-powder also, the stores of every kind must be in a position to stock the provisions, etc., I think that with the greatest activity Pondicherry cannot be re-established on this footing in less than four or five years. Can we be assured that we shall be left the time and that, on the other hand, we shall never lack funds and consequently not slacken the works?

The adoption of the project to maintain 4,000 men at Pondicherry, while reassuring us for the safety, this place would seem to permit a plan of fortification much less costly, of a much quicker execution and the economy of which would compensate for the excess of expenditure proposed for the increase of the forces of the Government of Asia. It is the one which terminates the memorial of M. de la Lustière, a simple enceinte as well as the demilunes, etc. in earth covered with grass. The difference of the slope is almost the only weak point of this kind of fortifications. We are giving it a trial, as I have already stated and it is described with detail in the memorial of M. de la Lustière, in which you will see, my Lord, the motives which have induced us to begin by the side of the west. Those which mainly led me to commence these works from this very moment have been stated above.

The total expenditure of fortifications in earth, of doors in masonry, guard-rooms, military and civil buildings sufficient to lodge and provision 4000 men, would only amount to 21,61,500 frs. whereas the earlier plan amounts to 70,71,500 frs., while supposing only 2600 men.

If, consequently, we wanted to coat the main part of the place in masonry, we could execute it at leisure, and the extra expense which would result from the earlier enceinte in earth, amounting only 4,620 frs. per front, would be negligible in view of the importance of accelerating this important work, for its defence as well as for preventing desertion so easy to execute in a place open and bordering on the enemy's territory. M. de la Lustière calculates two years for terminating and perfecting the enceinte as well as for all the military and civil buildings. But as every thing has to move together, with the materials of every kind which we shall procure from Ceylon, I think I can assure you that if His Majesty deems it advisable to dispatch immediately his orders and order sufficient funds, the entire work will be completed in 18 months. M. de la Lustière and other engineers who are actually here declare that the annual damage will require a sum of ten thousand francs for repairs.

Messrs de Cossigny and de Fresne with whom I have examined this latter plan, think, like me, that it is the most advantageous because it is the one the very prompt execution of which eliminates the fear of being stopped before its execution, as it has already happened.

While occupying ourselves with Pondicherry, it is not advisable to neglect completely Karikal a possession important because of its lands and its trade. I had already the honour to inform you, my Lord, that these unfortunate inhabitants, devastated during the last war by the different parties, of friends or enemies, asked for an enceinte which would protect them from these transitory incursions. I have sent M. le Chevalier de Tersac, assistant officer of the corps of engineers, on the spot while recommending to him to submit different plans which could be executed according to the various views on Karikal. I attach herewith his memorials, estimates and plans, as well as those of Pondicherry, which I have examined, with Messrs de Cossigny and de Fresne. I thought, like them, that the curtailed plan was indispensable, the total sum which amounts to 2,40,850 frs. being very modest in view of its object.

By leaving at least for the present, Mahé such as it is nearly, a very large part of the funds allocated to this establishment would cover a part of the expenditure of others.

Is it advisable to have two establishments with forces in India?

You, however, think, my Lord, that it is advisable to maintain an establishment with forces on the Malabar Coast, even if the principal one was situated on the Coromandel Coast. But independently of the very large excess of expenditure which it would involve first in expenses for establishment and next in annual expenses, we must then divide our forces and lose this great advantage which their union would give us. Of what use would be at Mahé or in any other place on the Malabar Coast a corps of troops which I suppose to be 2,000 strong? We would not be able to execute great things with it, and the balance remaining on the Coromandel Coast would be very much weakened. Tipu Sultan or the Marathas who would find this corps within their reach, would demand that it should join their armies for isolated operations which would suspend or perhaps put an absolute obstacle to those on a large scale which ought to be our aim and the object of our present and future combinations.

There is every reason to believe that in times of war, the presence of an army of 4,000 Europeans, for, it is a very sterling and a very strong one in this country, will at once determine Tipu Sultan to cross the Ghats and join us, whilst a small corps on the Malabar Coast would give him the idea to use it for small scale and present interests. The same can almost be said about other Indian powers whom we must stir up in case of operations on a large scale to derive advantage from them.

The result of the details and of the observations contained in this very long letter and which I submit before you, my Lord, is that we must either have only factories and sipahees in India, or 4000 men there and 2000 at the Isle of France, if we wish to assure our success in the former and guarantee the possession of the second; that the 4000 men destined for India should not be divided there; that their mass will constitute their strength and that this mass will always be respectable in India; that Pondicherry is the point where this mass ought to be assembled; that this town, quite open as it is,

ought to be promptly surrounded by a wall to put it into a state of defence as well as to keep the garrison in check and prevent desertion, all the more to be feared as in the part of the limits which adjoin Valdavour, there is hardly a distance of 2 kms. to cover to be in the foreign territory; that finally the manner of fulfilling this essential object very promptly is to construct the enceinte of the place in earth only, except to coat it in masonry consequently if it is judged Necessary.

Necessity of keeping even now 1000 or 1200 drought-bullocks at Pondicherry

If His Majesty judged it proper to adopt this plan, it would be advisable, to complete our resources and put our army in a position to act at the very moment when such orders would be given to it, to maintain in the suburb of Pondicherry thousand or twelve hundred drought-bullocks for the artillery. This modest number, which must be augmented from the very first moment of war, would help from the very beginning to enter the field. The purchase price would not exceed fifty or sixty thousand francs, and the annual maintenance would be limited to fifteen hundred or two thousand francs, by keeping this flock with those of the inhabitants in the various pastures. They would be distributed in a certain number, taken alternatively from the flock of the farm-labourers to tame them and keep them in a good condition. This arrangement, favourable to the latter, would not entail any expenses, and a well ordered supervision would prevent the misuse. These very bullocks could be sometimes usefully employed for the King's service.

I attach herewith a summarised statement of the artillery, apparatus, gun-powders and guns assembled at Pondicherry. I am charging M. de Cossigny to send the complete census, which can be done only in the month of January at the earliest. But in the meantime, this summary will enable you, my Lord, to judge what are the most essential items to be completed for the defence of the place as well as for the field and siege trains. I found the means to house the whole set of artillery which was exposed on a piece of ground and whose deterioration, which had already commenced, would have soon been complete. The most defective parts are being repaired, and with the woods obtained from Ceylon and the Eastern Coast, I hope that we could be able to put from the very next year a good part of our artillery in the field.

While thinking of Pondicherry, you would kindly recall, my Lord, that the Isle of France has been stripped by the dispatches made to India during the war and especially in mortars and bombs. This item is also in shortage here, and in this case, it would be advisable to make the dispatches as early as possible.

Where is it advisable to establish the principal establishment of the Government of Asia?

From what has just been said, it would appear natural and even necessary to establish the seat of the Government (of the French possessions) to the East of the Cape of Good Hope in India. The principal mass of forces which would be fixed there, the works of fortification which would have to be undertaken there, the correspondence with the nearest European and Indian powers, everything would seem to leave no doubt on this point. I however, differ from this opinion and here are my reasons.

The capital and essential point on which I have insisted in all the course of this dispatch is to win the Indians in our favour by giving them the true opinion of our power. It is the object at which we ought to aim, and which during peace ought to prepare the minds, and assure the revolution during the time of war. However respectable a corps of 4,000 Europeans assembled in India may be, the weakness of our possessions, compared to the immensity of those of the English, will perpetuate an idea of inferiority which can be removed only by the opinion, already established and which must not be weakened, that the Isle of France or *Mauritius*, it is the name under which it is known, is an establishment of the greatest importance under all aspects, an arsenal, a centre of repository of troops, munitions and resources of every kind. The establishment of the seat of the General Government there fortifies this opinion, and necessarily it would be weakened if it was transferred to Pondicherry. In the first case, they will consider the number of troops fixed in India only as a small portion of the whole,

in the second it will be considered as the principal one. Moreover, the Governor-General can make tours nearly every two years, collect information about everything, revitalize correspondence which he will carry on even from the Isle of France, keep up and reawaken the ideas of greatness and force, which it is so important to give, of the French Empire. The result of the habit of seeing the Governor-General coming for inspection to India would be that people would not be surprised, if, according to the exigencies of war, he had orders to proceed there immediately. Besides Messrs Cossigny and de Fresne, who are actually here, one as provisional Governor, the other as Colonel of the Regiment of Bourbon, are officers whose merit is known and on whom we can count, irrespective of the arrangements which war might lead to, for an increase of higher or general officers.

I shall add by post script the news which I might receive from Tipu Sultan and the Marathas before the dispatch of this letter. Otherwise I shall put off sending you, my Lord, these subsequent details from the Malabar Court where I am definitely going to make a trip. I shall travel on the frigate *La Précieuse* commanded by M. de Kersanson and I am taking with me the *Corvette La Subtile* commanded by M. le Vicomte de la Croix. In case, I should judge very important the news which I would have to communicate to you, I would dispatch this *Corvette* by the Red Sea, or, if there is some obstacle, by the usual route. I, however, doubt that I shall have some intimation to communicate to you, my Lord, which might constitute an objection against the plan which I have just submitted to you. As a measure of precaution, you could address the triplicate of your urgent dispatches to Alexandria. If the *corvette* goes to Suez, it will reach it in January or February, and could leave it from the month of May to the end of July. Your orders, my Lord, would reach here earlier by this route than by the usual one, and it would be very important that they should arrive in July, if they are to prescribe the continuation of the works of the surrounding wall, whose suspension would produce a bad effect irrespective of the disadvantage of delay. It is in the month of July, as I have already said it, that the sum of hundred thousand francs, which I have fixed for these works, will be spent. M. de Cossigny to whom you will certainly directly address your orders, my Lord, will surely not lose any time in getting them executed, and in all the points you will have reason to be satisfied with his zeal, with his activity and with his talents. As for me, I expect to return towards the end of December to the Isle of France where I shall await your orders, my Lord, very happy if I could come up to the mark of confidence with which I have been honoured, and if my extreme desire to fulfil an important mission to the satisfaction of His Majesty and to yours could compensate the knowledge and the other means which it demanded.

I remain respectfully,

My Lord, Your very humble and very obedient servant,

Le Vicomte de Souillac.

September 30, 1785

P.S.—I have just received letters from Tipu Sultan, on the one hand, and from M. de Montigny, on the other, which force me to change my earlier resolve and dissuade me from going to the Malabar Coast.

The letter from the former is not at all a reply to the last one which I wrote to him and which he had not yet received. He sent it to me by our very Waquil whom I was very much surprised to see returning. I attach herewith a copy which will point out to you, my Lord, that the main object of this Prince is to justify his conduct towards the Marathas whom he claims to be the aggressors whilst it is evident that it is he who is so.

You will observe, my Lord, and I have been pleased to observe it myself, that while enumerating the services which he has rendered to the Marathas, Tipu Sultan says that it is according to the agreement made with them and to create a diversion for the English who were vigorously attacking them, that his father decided to cross the Ghats and attach the latter in the Carnatic. It is therefore no more on our account, as he continuously repeated it, that this expedition was undertaken. This confession is noteworthy and can serve us in due course.

At the same time as this letter from Tipu reached me, I received one from M. de Montigny who writes about the greatest hostile preparations of the Marathas against this Prince because of the attack and the capture of Nargund which belongs to a Brahmin, their friend and ally. Everything was on the move at Poona on August 24, date of the latest letter from M. de Montigny, to put a large army in the field. Nizam Ali makes common cause with the Regency, and the Raja of Nagpur was to furnish 20,000 men. The harakaras or couriers, who brought me these letters report that there are already 20,000 Maratha cavalrymen on the Krishna.

It is undoubtedly from the knowledge of these preparations that Tipu thought it advisable to hasten to write to me and justify his previous conduct towards the Marathas, who, in their turn, fear that we may be inclined to help this Prince. I hear from M. de Montigny that their Waquil or Resident with us had informed Nana Fadnis that we had received many troops and that we were going to send them to Tipu Sultan. The Regency appeared intrigued about it and it is possible that this report has led it to make some overtures and demands to the English. The rumour has spread and it is very true that a Maratha envoy has proceeded to Madras and from there he repaired to Tanjaour.

From this state of affairs, I thought it advisable to cancel the journey to the Malabar Coast, in order not to give any cause of mistrust to both, all the more as in a letter from Tipu Sultan to M. de Piveron, of the same date as his latest to me, this Prince expresses to him his desire to have talks with me and charges him to arrange this interview which would be sufficient not to leave any doubt to the Marathas about our special connections with him and against them. I am even sure that that was his aim. This interview would, moreover, involve much expenditure, at least 60,000 frs., and truly it is much better to devote this sum to the erection of the three bastions of Pondicherry.

On the other hand, if I went to Goa to have talks with M. de Montigny, Tipu Sultan would take umbrage and it is equally to be avoided. M. de Montigny presses me much to do so and insists that I could play the fine role of the mediator. But to play it between two powers who both claim that justice is on their side, we must be in a position or have the will to support this mediation by force and that is what would not be advisable for us to do even supposing that I were authorised to do so. Moreover, I think that there would not be any disadvantage, as I have already stated, if Tipu Sultan were a little beaten and humiliated. He will make his peace at the cost of some sacrifices and will be consequently more inclined to enter into agreements which could be advantageous to us.

I learnt from Ramrao, our Waquil, that this Prince had made a large reduction in his cavalry which does not actually amount to more than fourteen to fifteen thousand men. One of his great defects is sordid avarice, and as the cavalry costs much to maintain, he has reduced his from thirty

thousand men which he previously had, to the number which I have just mentioned. His army is composed of these fifteen thousand cavalrymen, sixty thousand sipahees of which twenty four to twenty five thousand are well trained and well kept and eighty or hundred thousand infantry, men armed with lances, pikes, sabres and some match-locks. His garrisons are not included in this total and are picked from this class of footsoldiers.

Ramrao, our Waquil, had made some overture to Tipu Sultan on our possessions on the Malabar Coast by impressing upon him how Mahé was a tiny place. The Prince replied that it was always sufficient to land troops there when the occasion arises, that, moreover, he would consider it in course of time. I had charged Ramrao to speak to him about the French detachment which is reduced to a very small number of men and at the head of which is one M. de Morampont quite unfit to command it. I proposed to augment it and place at its head an officer of merit. Tipu Sultan expressed himself in a vague manner on this subject, pretended that it was useless to send him men at the present moment, that, convinced of our feelings for him, as we ought to be about his for us, our troops were always to be considered as due to assist respectively both, when the occasion arose. He added that the English, with whom we were at peace at this moment, could take umbrage at it.

I thought it advisable to take advantage of this frankness to defer to his opinion and I pointed it out to him by a letter of which I attach herewith a copy.

My object in proposing to Tipu Sultan to re-establish the French detachment, was to reinstate ourselves again with him in the same position in which we were with Haider Ali Khan before the war. I could have sent him men, quite mediocre subjects from our corps, and several discharged men who would have willingly taken this decision, so that by slow degrees the detachment with this Prince would have been carried to the same level of 200 men at which it was previously and even more. The greatest advantage I found in it was to have with Tipu Sultan a picked officer who could assume an ascendancy over this Prince and who at the same time possessed military and political talents. I had cast my eyes for this post on M. de Touffreville, Captain in the Regiment of Pondicherry, who combines, with all the necessary qualities, the knowledge of this country. It would have been necessary to give him a higher grade and I would have taken the responsibility to give him provisionally that of a major. We would have had by this means with Tipu a trustworthy person who would have served as a Resident and who would not have been at the expense of the king.

I am sending back the Waquil Ramrao to this Prince, as you will see, my Lord, from the letter I am writing to him, and it is necessary that we must always have one with him. I am also persuading him to correspond with M. de Cossigny against whom the separation of the troops which he commanded had left some impressions which I hope will vanish.

I revert to Poona. M. de Montigny, who has addressed a packet to me for you, my Lord, which I shall join to the present dispatches, informs me that Nana Fadnis, the Regent, wished, before giving me a reply, to hear from Shinde, to whom he had communicated my dispatches; that since the great elevation of the latter, the Regency showed much deference for him, that consequently, Nana Fadnis had persuaded him (M. de Montigny) to postpone the dispatch of his courier to me, which he had done, but that as the time was running short, according to the advice I had given him about my departure, he had asked permission to send his dispatches, but that perhaps very shortly and before my departure, I would receive another courier with letters from the Regency.

These details proclaim favourable dispositions and M. de Montigny thinks that according to what he has explained to the Regency in pursuance of my instructions, it appeared to show more confidence in us than it had done previously. I abridge details which you will surely find, my Lord, in the dispatches of M. de Montigny.

I am writing to him and asking him to send his dispatches to Goa where the frigate la Subtile will proceed and bring them to me to the Isle of France.

I am delivering the first copy of this dispatch to M. de Traversuis, who is commanding the flute La Seine which brought here some recruits and which will return straight and perhaps without a halt, to Europe. M. de Piveron is travelling on this flute and I charge him to deliver my dispatches to you personally.

I shall deliver the second copy to M. le Chevalier de Kersaint who commands the corvette le Due de Chartres, which steams very well and which could speedily bring back your orders, my Lord. I can hardly repeat how urgent it is that those which concern Pondicherry should reach there promptly, that the suspension of works would produce a bad effect if they were to be continued at some other time and that it will only be subsequently when we send there successive instalments of troops that confidence will be re-established and that the Indian powers will be inclined to get on the move.

I shall very soon leave for the Isle of France where I am urgently called by the fears of a revolution which might result from the suppression of all circulating money. The permission which you have given, my Lord, to M. Monneron to return to France and of which he is taking advantage, is a fresh motive which makes my presence more necessary at the Isle of France at the end of this year. I shall do all that depends on me to relieve the financial pressure and stop the untoward movement which this epoch seems to announce.

I am sending la Subtile, commanded by M. le Vicomte de la Croire to the Malabar Coast to carry a Resident at Calicut and visit the establishment of Mahé, where I learnt indirectly that the French flag was hoisted, and bring me news from this establishment, from Tipu Sultan, and from the Marathas and from M. de Montigny from Goa, where this corvette will afterwards proceed.

Le Vicomte de Souillac.

Pondicherry, October 1, 1785.

My Lord,

I am fully aware of the account which M. Le Vicomte de Souillac has given you concerning the political, military and civil matters. It is the result of his hard work during his stay in India. He has kindly left with me a copy of it, which, combined with his instructions, ought to serve me as basis in the conduct which I have to adopt. M. Le Vicomte de Souillac proceeds straight to the Isle of France where I shall give him an account directly and at the same time to the Court.

You will notice, my Lord, the uncertainty in which we were till the last moment to determine the plan which we had to follow with respect to the Court of the Marathas and that of Tipu Sultan. Our remoteness from Poona and the knowledge which we have of the character of Tipu Sultan are the real cause of it. Today the likelihood of a certain war between these two powers led M. Le Vicomte de Souillac not to show any preference, reserving to do so in due course taking into consideration our greatest interest. It will be thus my responsibility, my Lord, to watch over the issue of a war which ought to determine the decision which we will have to take. I shall follow the correspondence in the two courts and in that of Nizam Ali who makes a common cause with the Marathas in the present war. M. de Montigny is at Poona; we shall have Brahmin envoys with Tipu Sultan and at Hyderabad. I shall have other means to procure the news from the place which will be the theatre of war. Finally, I shall pay all my attention to discover the political movements of the English in this circumstance. I am confident, my Lord, that I shall come up to your expectation on all matters which are entrusted to me. I take the liberty to assure you that I shall conduct myself with dignity, prudence and firmness in order to deserve your kindness and protection with which you honour me.

I have the honour to remain most respectfully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

Cossigny.

Copy of a letter from M. le Vicomte de Souillac to M. de Montigny.

Pondicherry, October 4, 1785.

I received, Sir, on the.....of the last month the three letters which you wrote to me on 18th and 29th July and 24th August under Nos. 1, 2 and 3. The No. 1 is stamped 'duplicate' and I have not yet received the first copy of the letter.

It is with great satisfaction that I received these dispatches, as I found that they were infinitely delayed and I feared that I would not receive them before my departure which is fixed to the 8th of this month.

You give me cause for hope, Sir, that the Regency of Poona could place more confidence in us than it had previously done. I count much on the means which you will employ to increase it, and I hope that everything will contribute to maintain it. This Regency cannot doubt that from this very moment, we have great subsequent plans, since, not needing great means to control and defend our possessions in India, which are very restricted, we are, however, bringing here, and since the commencement of peace, troops in number four times larger than there had ever been.

Whereas these dispositions reveal our plans, they demonstrate our power and our means, since, without any actual necessity, without important possessions to preserve, we assign considerable sums and numerous troops to India alone.

The object of these dispositions and of these plans is known to all the people of India and especially to the Marathas. They know that the French and the English nations are constantly in a state of rivalry, of which peace suspends from time to time the effects, but does not destroy the cause. You had explained its motives to the Regency of Poona, Sir, and the details contained in one of my dispatches can support this explanation, so that the Regency cannot doubt that it is solely against the English, if they provoked us, that our preparations are directed.

These preliminaries explained, the question is to know if the Marathas share the grounds of fear which this prodigious expansion of the English in the peninsula ought to instil in all the powers of India, if it is in their (of the Marathas) interest to oppose their (of the English) well-formed plan of aggrandisement and if they have not the strongest motives to restrict them to trade operations alone, just as the French intend to confine themselves to these voluntarily, desiring only some maritime establishments, with this sole object.

If, as there is no doubt about it, the Marathas are well impressed with the danger which they and the other Indian nations run, they ought then to seek eagerly the alliance and the support of a nation which naturally makes common cause with them, which fact should not give them any umbrage and which demonstrates the will as well as the means to help them effectively.

I see that our relations with Tipu Sultan can alone give umbrage to the Regency of Poona as well as to its allies. But these relations, a result of those which had existed between his father and us during the last war, had no other aim than that which ought to fulfil the expectation of all the nations of India, viz. that of humbling the power of the English. If, when we attacked them on the Coromandel Coast in concert with Haider Ali Khan, the Marathas had continued to act on the Malabar Coast or if they had simply caused them some anxiety, if Nizam Ali had made a movement in his turn, the English, unable to face (the enemies) everywhere, would have been crushed, their domination in India would have disappeared. Each power would have recovered what they had seized from them and the whole of India would have been free.

Should not this object, so great, so important, suspend these small grounds of individual quarrels which harm everyone, except the English who alone profit by them?

Moreover, you can say to the Regency, Sir, that our relations with Tipu Sultan are not of a nature to interfere with those which we seek with it; that we consider the Maratha power as the one with which we could undertake greatest operations if it wanted to contribute to them for its own advantage. You can assure it that the news that we are going to send troops to Tipu Sultan is false, that his Waquil has deceived him if he has informed him positively, or that he is mistaken if he has given this news only as a conjecture. You will add that we would not send forces to any Indian prince whatsoever, especially at the time when he is at war with the Marathas, that I am very sorry for the quarrels which have actually taken place between the Regency of Poona and Tipu Sultan, that I have just written to the latter about it, that on the contrary, I have strongly exhorted him to unite himself with it by ties which can become useful to both.

It is necessary to assure the Regency of Poona that we shall never interfere in the quarrels between the native princes, if it is not to induce them to stop them and to contrast this conduct with that of the English who are anxious to incite them by all possible means.

Tipu Sultan has informed me about the affair of Nargund. His letter, of which this is the only subject-matter is a kind of proclamation in which he recalls the services which his father had rendered to the Marathas, notably when he descended into the province of Arcot to effect a diversion and relieve them at their solicitations, as he asserts it. He claims that the Palegar of Nargund has revolted against him (this is his expression), in spite of the fact that he is under his dependence, that he wanted to plunder and ravage the territory of his Sarkar, that because he dispatched a detachment against him, the Marathas have taken the side of this Palegar against all justice. He expects, he says, that they will declare war against him, which he is ready to support.

You point out to me, Sir, that this Palegar is an ally of the Marathas. He might be so although subject to or dependent upon Tipu, of which fact, I am ignorant. In whatever manner it may be, it would be very desirable that they should come to an agreement and it is a matter with which it is very important that you should occupy yourself.

I shall wait for the news which you announce to me from Delhi and the details about the party which M. Evin heads, so that I shall see what is suitable to be done for him and some other officers, but with reservation, as I have already pointed out to you.

I am very sorry that Nana Fadnis has not written to me. I cannot expect that his letter, which you announce to me, Sir, will reach me before my departure. The serious attention, with which he listened to all that you told him on my behalf, shows the interest which he takes in the friendship of the French nation. I am sorry that he could have thought that we were demanding more than what the English possess and that you did not reply positively to the contrary. When I spoke about a reasonable territory around Bombay, I did not intend at all that it should be too large. I therefore request you to tell the Regency on my behalf that while making even the demand for Bombay, it is only to have a port of trade and warehouse. As a rule, let there not be a feeling at all that we wanted to be possessors of territory and powerful. Let us avoid all that could make them think that by making war with the English, we wanted to replace them. Don't even ask for Surat and speak about it only to the extent the Regency makes some opening on this subject. As for lodges in different places, it is quite natural that we should ask for them; it is a sequel to our trading plans.

I am absolutely not sorry that they should have postponed to a fuller deliberation the item of preparing a treaty, because that gives us time and because it appears to me advantageous that a matter of this importance should keep the Regency busy for a long time and take us to a time when by the King's arrangements, it would be necessary to conclude it. That could keep it off the petty private wars and an intimate connection with the English.

It would be very essential that Shinde in particular takes part in the project of a treaty and that the manner in which he would act was agreed upon. Naturally, it ought to be in the part of the upper Ganges by marching on Laknour [24]; there would result from it a powerful diversion and the greatest fears for the English. If this natural arrangement could take effect, another in support of that would be sufficient to make the English fear for the whole of Bengal from the first moments of the war. It would be to lead an army corps of the Regency to Cuttack in concert with the Raja of Nagpur and Nizam Ali. The allied troops could join ours by way of Ganjam where the latter would disembark and we would penetrate into the centre of Bengal by the weakest and the most important part. These plans could only be indicated and they must be stated only as possible ones. See that the English do not get wind of them and are not alarmed by them. Perhaps the Marathas of Poona would not see in this plan a sufficiently great advantage for them and I presume that they would prefer to act first of all on the Malabar Coast. All that will depend upon the political situation at the time of the war. But whether we begin with Bombay or with the province of Arcot or with Bengal, the first successes would lead to others.

In the special clauses we could stipulate that the Raja of Tanjaour would be put back again in full possession of his kingdom; he is a friend of the Marathas who have always taken interest in him.

I am offering these various plans leaving you free, Sir, to extend or curtail the details according as your general knowledge and especially that of the thinking of the Regency would guide you.

It would be very desirable that in a general plan, Tipu could be included and that his interests were well stipulated as well as the manner in which he must act.

On the whole, all that I have discussed is rather a general plan of future union, of which it is fit and proper to explain the great advantage, than a treaty to be concluded and signed actually; that especially of the Regency and of Shinde would be a forerunner of the other.

You think, Sir, that I could act as a mediator in the present quarrel of the Marathas and of Tipu Sultan; but that will be possible for me only by inviting both, as I am trying to do, to come together by each sacrificing something from his claims. To be really a mediator between two big powers, one must possess the actual means and the will to support the party which would be attacked unjustly, and that is what we do not want and ought not to do in the present circumstances.

Irrespective of the affairs which summon me to the Isle of France, I thought it advisable not to go to the Malabar Coast to avoid giving cause to Tipu, on the one hand, and to the Marathas, on the other, to think that I am inclined towards the one or the other. The former has expressed to me his desire to meet me. I could have hardly avoided an interview by going to the Malabar Coast and surely it would have sufficed to arouse the mistrust of the Marathas. On the other hand, if I had avoided, this interview which is sought and if I had one with you, Sir, at Goa, Tipu would have supposed a partiality for the Marathas, which would have alienated him from us. I am therefore avoiding all grounds for mistrust, by not visiting the Malabar Coast. I am sorry for it because of the special desire I had to have the pleasure to meet you there, Sir, and because of the advantage which could have resulted from our discussions.

The corvette La Subtile, commanded by M. le Vicomte de la Croix, is proceeding to this coast; it will touch Goa where I request you to send your dispatches for me as well as for the Court. I think that it will be about mid-November that La Subtile can reach Goa. M. de la Croix will immediately dispatch to you a pattamar. But perhaps your dispatches will precede the arrival of this corvette.

The packet which you have addressed to me for the Minister has just left by the flute La Seine which is proceeding directly to France.

Receive, Sir, the assurances of a very sincere attachment with which I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

(Signed) Le Vicomte de Souillac.

P.S.—M. de Cossigny, who remains here as a provisional Governor, will send me your packets, Sir, and you should address yourself directly to him for all the matters concerning your mission.

Pondicherry, October 8, 1785.

Copy of the instructions for M. de Cossigny, Provisional Governor of Pondicherry and of other French establishments in India

As I leave to M. de Cossigny all my correspondence with the chiefs of our various establishments, that with the Indian princes and our envoys at their courts, specially that with M. Van de Graaf, Dutch Governor of Ceylon, and finally a part of that with the Minister concerning India, the instructions, which I have to leave for him, will be very restricted since he will find their substance in this diverse correspondence.

My dispatch to the Minister, dated 15th September No. 15 covers all the matters with which I am occupied and it is that which ought to fix all the attention of M. de Cossigny.

In my correspondence either with the chiefs of various French establishments or with the Governors and Councils of the Presidencies of the English Company, I have taken as basis for our claims or defence Article 13 of the treaty of peace of September 3, 1783 by which His Britannic Majesty guarantees us liberty, security and independence of trade in all the parts of India which depend on him. As this Article is without restriction, there is no item of trade on which the English Governors or their representatives can raise justifiable difficulties, and if we relented on a single, we shall have no stronger grounds to defend others and the first act of condescension will entail new ones. It appears that Mr. Macpherson is inclined not to allow into Bengal salt which we shall be in a position to transport there. As soon as the formal refusal to import it will be communicated to M. de Cossigny, he will lodge the strongest protests and will support them with all the force of arguments which the treaty supplies us. The special reasons which Mr. Macpherson could advance about farming, of consequence for them, etc. etc. cannot be admitted. Moreover, this item of salt is very profitable for Pondicherry and Yanam.

M. de Cossigny will see from the same correspondence that I have prescribed to all the chiefs of factories to address themselves always to the English when difficulties arise and never to have any dealing with the Indians, either Nawabs, Rajas or Zamindars dependent on the English, for the redress of any infringement. It is with the English alone that we have concluded the treaty; they alone have made certain cessions of territory; finally, they alone have assured us the liberty, security and independence of our trade in all the places to which their influence extends. They would be delighted to see us at grips with the Indians to refer us to them afterwards and have a pretext to elude our most legitimate demands. M. de Cossigny is aware of all the importance of this great point and he knows what consequences a first risky step could have. He will be on his guard against all surprise in this regard, either on the part of the English or from that of the Indians. Muhammad Ali Khan shows much desire to discuss with us the difficulties which might arise in connection with our possessions in the province of Arcot. He must absolutely avoid all correspondence with him on this subject.

The only two independent powers in India with whom we should have relations are Tipu Sultan and the Marathas of Poona. Without entering into details of which M. de Cossigny has a perfect knowledge and which my correspondence with them could recall to him, I confine myself to say that we must treat both with consideration, avoid giving them umbrage mutually and try to unite them together as much as possible.

Our connections with the first appear more intimate and it is a natural consequence of those which existed between his father and us. If the character of the son was more like that of the father, if he had as great views and genius alike, I think that we could anticipate great advantages from our connections with him alone. But we are far from finding in Tipu the qualities of Haider Ali Khan. His distrustful, haughty, avaricious and irascible character is not compensated by any qualities and it is very difficult to place any confidence in him. We must, therefore, conciliate him but without binding

ourselves too closely with him. Moreover, our abandonment at the peace will not be easily wiped out from his memory.

The Marathas of Poona would offer us by themselves as well as by their allies much greater and, in my opinion, surer resources. Their political affairs are well conducted, and I have no doubt that if they found as more inclined in their favour, they would absolutely turn on our side. Our connections with Tipu Sultan lead them to mistrust us; they are his natural enemies, and it will be very difficult to reconcile them in a steadfast manner. At this moment they have a dispute and perhaps it will end be in an open war. This circumstance requires on our part still greater circumspection than ever.

If we were very genuinely united with the Marathas, we would have on our side all the independent powers of India with the exception of Tipu Sultan, and this league would be immensely formidable for the English. I would see difficulty only in the means of uniting in the province of Arcot where naturally we ought to operate in the early moments since it is there that our forces ought to be reassembled. If the Marathas dispatched there an army corps, they would like to become masters of a part at least of this territory, and I think that it would not suit us that a warlike power such as theirs became masters of it. I think it would be much better if we joined them at Cuttack, but then we must leave at Pondicherry a strong garrison and diminish as much the active force. But the circumstances at the time of war will determine the plans. In the meantime the one to which we ought to apply ourselves is to create a favourable opinion among the princes of India of our power and to convince them that we want to use it. All our steps ought to tend to assure them about it. The arrival of our troops as well as the other means which we adopt, have already contributed to it and if the Government backs up its first steps, the sensation produced to our advantage will increase and the doubts will disappear.

If following the replies of the Regency of Poona, there was reason to believe that we could form a common alliance with Nizam Ali, M. de Cossigny could send him the Brahmin Rajappa without any evident mission. It would be fit and proper if this prince could be advised of it in some way by the Regency itself. That would dispose him to treat seriously what this Brahmin would communicate to him and enter into a serious and real correspondence with us.

M. de Montigny has sent one of my letters to Shinde. I think that he will give a reply and in this case it would be necessary to continue to correspond with him through the intermediary of M. de Montigny.

As the instructions of His Majesty are not to become a territorial power in India, it is necessary indeed to convince the princes of this truth and show on all occasions much moderation in this respect.

M. de Cossigny knows that by undertaking to start the works of fortifications of Pondicherry in earth, my first object was to coincide this movement in the first moments with the arrival of our troops so as to show effectively the will to play a role in India at the next war and attract the attention of the native princes who will never make a move if they do not see in us the means as well as the will. I also thought that from the accounts which I have given to the Minister, His Majesty could adopt a plan of a surrounding wall for this town which would be promptly executed and at little expense, while a plan on a large scale entails much expense and especially much time, a terrible disadvantage for a place six thousand leagues away from the metropolis and situated in the heart of the possessions of the rival nation which would surely not leave us the time to complete the work.

I have only fixed a sum of hundred thousand francs for these works which M. de Cossigny will drag on in a manner not to exceed this sum until the months of July or August, 1786, epoch when the replies of the Court ought to be received. These same replies will surely determine the course to be followed either for external or internal matters. In the meanwhile nothing new should be undertaken and the expenses should only be moderate.

M. Mercier will go to Jafna to conclude the contract for supplies which must be made to us in this part of Ceylon according to the orders of M. de Van de Graaf. It is very important to ensure everything that can put us in a position not to buy anything from the English either for the fortifications or even for the civil requirements.

It is necessary for M. de Cossigny to maintain a friendly and close correspondence with the Governor of Ceylon and generally with all the Dutch chiefs. Our successes at the next war will depend on the harmony which will reign between them and us.

For the rest of instructions I refer M. de Cossigny to all that is recorded, as I have already said it, in my correspondence.

M. de Cossigny will seize every occasion to give me an account of all the events that will take place in the different parts of his administration and at the same time he will give a similar one to the Minister.

Le Vicomte de Souillac.

Translation of a letter in Kanarese addressed to M. Le Vicomte de Souillac by the Nawab Tipu Sultan Bahaddar, dated October 8, 1785 and received on the 18th.

After the usual compliments.

I am in perfect health till October 8 and I am anxious to know how you are keeping.

I acquainted myself fully with all the contents of your letter and I spoke at length to Ramrao (Waquil) whom I have sent back to you. He will thus give you an account of everything. You say in your (latest) letter that I did not give a straight reply to the first one with which Ramrao was entrusted on your behalf. Two or three days after the arrival of this Waquil here, as it was necessary for me to start for visiting the possessions and forts of the Sarkar, I did not have the time to give a detailed reply to your letter. However, I hope that today you are informed of everything by the report of Ramrao who, I think, must be with you now. For, on my arrival at Bangalore, I gave him an audience and had a long conversation with him on matters which it is necessary to treat. At the same time I handed him a letter for you which will explain everything to you.

You tell me that according to the orders which you have received from the Emperor of France, you must, after settling the affairs here, return to Mauritius from where you are going to give him an account of all that concerns India; that, for this purpose, you would send M. de Piveron to my Court by confiding to him all that you wish to communicate to me, provided I consent to this arrangement. I fully approve of this idea. Therefore, if you indeed wish to send M. de Piveron to my Court by charging him with all that you have to communicate to me, I could indeed make an agreement with him, after he and I have talked together, and I could very well send him back by confiding to him all that I wanted to inform you verbally, and at the same time give a written reply. If I did not think it necessary to give you a great detail in my (earlier) replies, it is because I thought that by putting in writing especially important things, which must remain secret, I am not sure whether they would not be divulged. I solicit you to send M. de Piveron to me as early as possible.

I received the address of the Emperor of France as well as that of his Minister which you kindly sent me in your letter. I intend to address you letters which I wish to write to them, as also the sarpeches or presents which I destine for them. And I hope that you will kindly send them to France and at the same time get me the replies. You were kind enough to indicate to me in your letter the different routes which my ship should take to go to France, and the shortest one was to pass *via* Mauritius. You were also kind enough to assure me that you would give a trustworthy and competent person to conduct my ship. I shall deliver this letter to my Waquil who would travel by this ship. I appreciate your advice to make a choice of a person of distinction for sending him to the Court of France, and rest assured that I shall select only such a person and not another, which act would be imprudent. I have great desire to write to the Emperor of France in order to urge him to beat our enemies. This task will undoubtedly be executed by the grace of the Supreme Being.

As I ardently desire to meet you in order to talk together on serious and secret matters, I would like you to proceed in a ship to Cochin first in order to see this place, and then you should take the route to Calicut and reach (Sriranga) patan where the interview could take place. But if it is impossible to carry out this plan, I shall then resolve upon confiding my plans to M. de Piveron whom I expect here. I have attached to this letter a *Radary* or passport for him. I hope that you would send him as early as possible.

You are quite right in your statement that I did not give a reply to your proposals to send me troops and an officer to command the French detachment as also on the subject of M. de Lalée and that you did not have an establishment (within reach of our terroitory) in order to join us more promptly to be in a position to act together as soon as the occasion arises. I have confided my reply to Ramrao on all these matters in great detail, and I still expect to speak with M. de Piveron on other

particularities which I want to communicate to you. Moreover, I think that it is unnecessary to say anything more to a person like you whose only intention is to maintain and consolidate the friendship and the union which has been existing between us since times immemorial. I request you to write to me often either to give me news about you or to ask from me whatever need here.

As I have to take the field shortly for some (important) affairs, I request you to kindly take the route to Calicut to proceed to (Sriranga) patan, as I have said above, so that we could discuss together many details.

Pondicherry, October 20, 1785

My Lord,

I have the honour to address you a copy of the two letters, one from the Nawab Tipu Sultan and the other from Nizam Ali, Subhedar of the Deccan. They reached me only after the departure of M. Le Vicomte de Souillac, and I have already communicated them to him by the King's Corvette La Juliette which was ready to sail for the Isle of France. I also attach herewith a copy of my letter to M. le Vicomte de Souillac.

You will see, my Lord, from the correspondence with Tipu Sultan that he had eluded to give a reply to M. le Vicomte de Souillac on the different important points. This Nawab today expresses himself more categorically in his latest letter. But can we completely rely on what he advances? Moreover, in accordance with the spirit of the instructions which have been left for me, this is not the time to confide entirely in Tipu Sultan, since, on the other hand, we would thereby give umbrage to the Marathas and alienate the Regency of Poona against us. I shall therefore, wait and see the result of a war which is going to be ignited between these two Indian powers, and in which our situation does not permit us to take any part. Nizam Ali, whose letter is attached herewith and which I am addressing you only not to omit anything, will surely join in. But as his Government is more particularly conducted by the English, I shall watch the movements of the latter in the course of this war, which I consider as inevitable from the preparations which these three powers are making to take the field. I am well posted with these preparations by the latest news that has arrived from Poona, Srirangapatan and Hyderabad.

As for the military movements, the English still appear to be neutral, but they are certainly not so by their underhand dealings in these three courts. I therefore, repeat my Lord, that I shall wait and see before placating these three powers alike, since we must rely little on the alliance of the Indian princes unless we act offensively, and at the moment the essential thing is to adopt a conduct towards them whereby we show them marks of interest and friendship which will gain us their good will. Since our forces alone can decide them in our favour when we wish to act in concert with one of these powers, I venture to assure you, my Lord, that if they are substantial, they will be effective, and will always procure for us the choice of our allies in the next war.

I refer, my Lord, to what M. Le Vicomte de Souillac had written to you by his dispatch of 15th September No. 15, concerning the obstacles which the English are ceaselessly putting in the liberty of our trade.

In Bengal, the difficulties arise on the issue of the liberty, of the salt trade; they claim the right to visit our ships at the entrance of the river and send armed boats for this purpose.

At Yanam, they want to demand the anchorage dues in the river of Coringuy; the black farmers of the English claim to have rights of custom which they demand from our ships which go to careen in this river.

Claims on their part, so little reasonable and so little consistent with Article 13 of the last treaty of peace, are certainly contemptible, but they want thereby to put us on the same footing as British subjects who are not incorporated with the English Company. On the whole, it is the height of dishonesty and of the harassing spirit which they practice for their own interests as well as to impose upon the natives. I am giving you an account only after having sufficiently made representations and lodged complaints. I shall protest in the name of His Majesty on everything which will be inconsistent with the liberty, security and independence of our trade. Up to the present moment, all these different items are under discussion; the Councils of Calcutta and Madras have not yet replied to the representations made by Monsieur le Vicomte de Souillac.

During the short interval of the departure of M. Le Vicomte Le Souillac and the account I am giving you today, nothing has happened, my Lord, worth reporting in military matters as well as in those of administration which are entrusted to me.

I have the honour to remain with a profound respect,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

Cossigny.

Poona, October 21, 1785.

Letter from M. de Montigny to M. le Vicomte de Souillac

Monsieur le Vicomte,

I had the honour to give you an account, by my letter of 16th September, of the situation of affairs at this Court, of my discussion with Nana Fadnis and Haripant Phadke, and to inform you at the same time that I had obtained the consent from the Regent to proceed to one of the ports on the Malabar Coast in the hope of meeting you there.

The Regent had first agreed to allow me to leave only when we received the news of your appearance on this coast. Consequently, I had proposed to dispatch in advance harkaras to Goa, where you are expected, to receive your orders on this subject. But as the complexion of affairs has altered here and as the Regency appeared to desire eagerly my interview with you, Monsieur le Vicomte, I thought it advisable to show my readiness to fulfil its views. Then, Nana Fadnis sent for me to attend the Darbar and after a discussion of two hours in which he explained to me the desire which the Regency of Poona as well as Nizam Ali had to make peace with Tipu on reasonable conditions, he urged me to go in advance to Goa in order not to miss the opportunity to meet you there and treat this important matter.

You see, Monsieur le Vicomte, after this little exposition, that if war takes place between these powers, it will neither be the fault of the Marathas, nor of Nizam Ali, but indeed that of Tipu Sultan who appears till the present moment not inclined to relax at all in his unjust claims towards the Regency of Poona and the Subhedar of the Deccan.

I took leave of Nana Fadnis yesterday. Tomorrow I shall go to the camp of the Marathas to take likewise leave of Haripant Phadke and shall start day after tomorrow morning for Goa. The Regency has promised me not to make any movement between now and my return to Poona which it has calculated to a month or six weeks at the most. God grant, Monsieur le Vicomte, that I have the good luck to meet you before this date and everything, I hope, will take a favourable turn. The English will certainly be very much annoyed at it since they only seek to arouse the resentment of these powers to kindle a war by means of which they would render themselves more formidable than they are today.

The Maratha Government sends a guard to the house which it has given me to look after the safety of my belongings during my absence and is giving me harkaras and a unit of cavalry to accompany me to the feet of the Ghats of Goa where it has orders to wait for me to accompany me back to Poona after treating with you, Monsieur le Vicomte, on the subject for which the Regency of Poona is dispatching me. I am carrying with me letters from Nana Fadnis and Haripant Phadke, and I am dispatching harkaras to Pondicherry to inform M. de Cossigny about the motive of my journey to Goa.

I have already taken the necessary measures so that the various letters which I expect from Delhi, Gujarat, Hyderabad and Pondicherry, reach me safely in the route I am going to take and I hope that the letters from the native princes will arrive sufficiently in time so that you could read them before your departure for the Isle of France.

I have the honour to be with most inviolable and most respectful attachment,

Monsieur le Vicomte,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

Sd. Montigny.

P.S.—Monsieur le Vicomte, I am requesting Monsieur Dom Frederic de Souza to kindly undertake to deliver to you the letter which I am addressing you and I am sure that he will be happy to do so. I must inform you that I have in my possession the strongest evidence to refuse to show henceforth my confidence in the Camotins, brokers of the nation, and which I intend to communicate to you at Goa.

Sd. Montigny.

Monsieur Is Vicomte,

Poona, [\[A mistake for Goa.\]](#) November 30, 1785.

I received on the 26th of this month your letter of 4th October, and I was grieved to notice the political considerations which prevented you from visiting the Malabar Coast where you were announced and desired.

The Regency of Poona, informed that you were to come to this coast and fearing lest I miss the opportunity to meet you there, at once took the decision to send me in advance to Goa where M. Dom Frederic, Governor of this colony, intimated by your letters, waited for you every day, and I reached there on the 10th of this month.

The object of the Regency in deputing me to you, Monsieur le Vicomte, was to convey to you on its behalf as well as on that of Nizam Ali, with whom they make common cause, the just motives which lead it to take up arms against Tipu Sultan, if this Nawab persists in the conduct which he has adopted up to the present towards these two powers, and to give you at the same time a definite proof of its moderation and of the special desire which the Regency of Poona has to concur with our views in maintaining harmony among the Indian princes. It charged me expressly to explain to you its intention as well as that of the Subhedar to make peace with Tipu on reasonable conditions. Herewith are attached letters from Nana Fadnis and Haripant Phadke.

From this simple exposition, it is easy to see who is the aggressor in the war which is preparing and that, therefore, if it takes place, it can be attributed only to the unbridled ambition of Tipu whose pride and tyranny have revolted all the princes of the Deccan.

This is, Monsieur le Vicomte, the important matter for which the Marathas deputed me to you and with which I am constantly occupied since the differences that have arisen between these powers, for, this was the most important point to be treated today. At the time of my departure from Poona, I was very happy to notice the moderate attitude in which I left the Regency with respect to Tipu. Finally, I prevailed upon Nana Fadnis not to make any movement against this Nawab before my return to the army, which lastly was fixed at two months at the latest.

I shall still wait at Goa till the 10th of the next month for the Corvetto La Subtile which, as you informed me, ought to appear at this place towards mid-November and if it does not come in this port before this date, I shall deposit a packet in the hands of the Governor containing my dispatches for you, Monsieur le Vicomte, and for the Court. This Portuguese General will deliver it either to the commandant of the La Subtile or to any other officer charged with your orders. I would have been very delighted to deliver it myself to M. le Vicomte de la Croix but I know how much my return to Poona becomes urgent, especially as I have been deprived of the honour of meeting you, Monsieur le Vicomte, and conferring with you on the subject for which the Regency had deputed me.

Day before yesterday, I dispatched a courier to Nana Fadnis and conveyed on your behalf to him as well as to Haripant Phadke the items of your dispatch of the 4th October, most appropriate to demonstrate to the Regency your special desire to see the end of the differences that have arisen between it and Tipu Sultan as well as the pressing exhortations which you have made to the Nawab to unite with the Marathas by ties which might become reciprocally useful to them.

I have laid great stress on your intention not to send any succour to Tipu Sultan, and that all what the Maratha Waquil or other persons could have said on this subject was false, that the King's orders expressly stated that the French should not interfere at all with the dissensions which might arise among the Indian princes, unless it is to urge them to re-establish peace and harmony among them; that, besides, it would not be at the moment of a rupture between the two powers of whom we

are seeking the alliance and the support that we would furnish the means to the one against the other, that this step would be very contradictory to the straightforwardness of our views and to the wisdom of our Minister; and that never would national dignity be compromised thus; that besides, the Regency ought to rest assured that our relations with Tipu Sultan were of such a nature that they could not interfere with those which we are seeking to form with the Marathas, a power otherwise most suited to operate a revolution on a grand scale, if it acted in concert with the French, to expel from India a nation which holds almost all the princes of the peninsula under its yoke and in a state of degradation; that finally, I deferred to my return to Poona to have a talk with the Regency on other matters contained in your dispatch. This is, in short, Monsieur le Vicomte, what I thought advisable to tell Nana Fadnis without delay to reassure him against the impressions which had been given to him on our partiality for Tipu, and to renew to him at the same time our special desire to ally ourselves closely with the Regency in case it concurred fully with our views against the common enemy.

I have reason to hope that this letter will produce a salutary effect on the mind of Nana and partly soothe the anxiety of the members of the Council. But if Tipu does not desist at all from his unjust claims and does not change his conduct towards the Marathas or the Subhedar, these two powers continuously provoked by this Nawab, will be forced, in spite of the spirit of moderation which animates them, to take up arms against him. In that case, whatever be the result of this war, if it takes place, the English alone will derive a certain advantage from it, and the injustice of Tipu towards the legitimate powers of the country will serve them better than all the hatred, which he has shown for them, has done them harm.

The letter which Tipu Sultan has written to you in the form of a manifesto to justify his venture on the fortress of Nargund which belonged to the friend and ally of the Regency is only a means advanced to cover the injustice of his conduct and his plan of usurpation. These tactics are well known in all the Darbars of the Deccan. In that, Tipu is following the method of his father Haider Ali who, on the emptiest pretexts, invaded the territory and the fortresses of his neighbours to aggrandize his possessions, as much as he could, with this difference that Tipu exceeds all the wicked qualities of his father without having all the good ones. This is the opinion of entire India on this Nawab and which fact the (French) nation will recognise perhaps too late.

It is, moreover, useless to feel henceforth concerned for the Raja of Nargund. After defending himself with the greatest valour, he finally surrendered after nine months of open trench, absolutely lacking water, provisions, and having been forced to it by sickness which had spread in his fort. The testimony of the treaties, the oaths on the Koran did not protect him from being put into fetters as soon as he descended into the plain and his brother, who was not watched so well, put himself to death which he would have undoubtedly met with in the tortures at (Sriranga) patan, and what is more singular is that Tipu, having marched against Nargund on the complaints of the Raja of Kittur, another Palegar who furnished a thousand men to the besieging army, has, through treachery, just seized this latter stronghold after demanding permission to pass by his walls in the rainy season during which he had first obtained two lakhs as contribution. The Governor of Goa has just received the news of the surprise attack on this fortress and immediately communicated it to me. I pass on to the other items of your dispatch.

I am very much convinced, Monsieur le Vicomte, that if the Marathas as well as Nizam Ali had each acted in their turn against the English, when we attacked the latter on the Coromandel Coast in concert with Haider Ali Khan, I am convinced, I repeat, that this general and combined attack would have effected a great revolution by forcing the English to face the enemy everywhere. I even think that entire India could have recovered its liberty if the French had had the time and means to capture Bombay or Madras before the publication of peace. I withhold on this point a number of reflexions which become superfluous at present and I revert to the Marathas whose inaction will cause you less surprise, Monsieur le Vicomte, when you will notice that at this epoch the English had made the greatest sacrifices by restoring to them all the territory and the fortresses which they had seized from them, such as Gujarat, Konkan, the ports and forts of Bassein, Bhadoch, etc. and that they had added to these great advantages the surrender of the person of Raghoba to the Regency of Poona.

The war of the Marathas against the English had for its aim the restoration of the territory and strongholds mentioned above, as well as the surrender of the person of Raghoba to the Regency. Once this great object was fulfilled, what else, very urgent, could the Marathas desire? Nothing except humbling the Nawab whose ambition and tyranny were becoming dangerous to them as well as to the Subhedar, and very particularly since they knew that he was supported by a French army.

Certainly, it would have been desirable that the Marathas had sacrificed their personal interests, however pressing they were, to the great objective of the collective liberty of India. But which is the Asiatic power capable of making such a sacrifice, sacrifice to remote objectives, to doubtful successes? At this time, the Marathas had to fear, on the one hand, the elevation of Haider Ali who had seized from them a territory worth a revenue of 82 lakhs of rupees, on the other hand, the defection of the Subhedar to the confederation formed some time before against the English between Nizam Ali, the Regency and Haider Ali Khan. Other considerations also combine with these. The discord between the leaders of the Regency : Shinde and the Raja of Nagpur were secretly interested in favour of Raghoba and did their utmost to urge Nana Fadnis to conclude peace with the English. Even Nizam Ali supported it. Finally, the Regent had to fear Raghoba so long as he was in the hands of the English. By signing the treaty, he (Nana) had removed all these obstacles, recovered his tranquility and brought back all the invaded territory under the Maratha domination. You will admit, Monsieur le Vicomte, that the position of Nana Fadnis was very delicate and very embarrassing.

In spite of all these considerations, which are, however, very weighty, I was very far from approving the past conduct of the Marathas in every respect. There is nothing which I did not do to incite their resentment against the English and urge them to advance on them and effect a diversion. I equally occupied myself with pointing out to them the necessity and the advantage of allying themselves with Haider and since with Tipu. But I could never overcome their aversion towards this Nawab, and as for the English, the Regent has always shows to me his hatred for them, and has constantly replied to me that when we would attack Bombay or when we would capture Madras, in short, when he could act with safety, he would openly break with the English, but that between now and this epoch, the Marathas would not stir, a fact of which I have given an account at the time to the Generals.

I can assure you, Monsieur le Vicomte, that Nana Fadnis continues to preserve the same attitude with regard to the English whom he detests in the extreme. Indeed, can he ever forget that they did their uttermost to remove him from the important post which he occupies? Without the success of the battle of Talegaon, Nana Fadnis was lost without resources; the English would have then been in a position to direct the movements of the Regency, since they would have placed at the head of the Maratha Government a man, who was devoted to them, in the person of Raghoba.

I have entered into these details and shall enter into some others only because I am convinced that it is impossible to judge from a distance the secret motives which govern the politics of the Darbars, and that one is liable to fall into an error even with much information when one is forced to calculate only according to, in reality, what ought to be for the general weal, but which too often cannot happen because of special considerations.

I had the honour, M. le Vicomte, to inform you by my dispatch of 16th September about the intentions of the Regency of Poona not to conclude any eventual treaty with the nation, before it has previously received the King's reply to the proposals which it had made in 1782. I had the honour to give you also an account that M. de Bussy had very positively informed Nana Fadnis that he had sent these proposals to the Court and that as soon as he received the King's reply, he would communicate it to the Regency of Poona, and that Nana Fadnis had replied to me on this subject that he awaited this reply from the King, and that I could be sure indeed that his attitude was always the same with respect to us.

From this reply of the Regency and the other details contained in my letter of 16th September, most of it relating to this subject, it is very probable that it will be very difficult to induce the

Marathas to conclude a treaty concerning the future general plan of union proposed by your last dispatch, as well as the particular one of Shinde with the Regency, especially in the present circumstances. But the point most difficult of all to treat is the one to have Tipu included in it and to stipulate in it the interests of this Nawab in a manner which could suit him and the other powers. I think, in general, that it is necessary to be very cautious in the overture that ought to be made on this point, and that this is for the moment only a matter of hint. Whatever it may be, Monsieur le Vicomte, you could rest assured that immediately on my return to Poona, I shall probe the minds in a manner as not to betray anything which could create an impression contrary to our interests. I shall confine myself to bring home, as you recommend it, the great advantage which would result from the execution of such a treaty. Next, I shall see what the members of the Regency think in particular, and I shall regulate my conduct in everything according to the attitude which they will reveal in this respect.

As for the plan to induce the Regency to send an army corps in Bengal through Cuttack in concert with the Raja of Nagpur to join our landing troops in this part, nothing could be more agreeable to the Court of Poona, since it itself expressed the most eager desire for it by Article 19 of the proposals which it made in 1782 and to which we have not yet replied at all.

By this 19th Article the Marathas undertook to give a jahagir to the French in consideration of the forces which the nation would furnish them in this expedition for the reduction of Bengal. This richest part of India is a prey which the Marathas have been mentally devouring until circumstances permit them to put this project into execution.

Since the last four years that I have been residing with the Regency, there have passed very few meetings of the Darbar in which there has not been a talk of it; it is the cherished project of the Marathas, as also that of the capture of Bombay. But this latter objective can never be fulfilled without the support and the succour of the French. Bengal could suffer a different fate even by the efforts of the native princes themselves without the assistance of the European nations. To prove this statement it would be necessary to enter into details which for the moment become very superfluous. I shall only say that if the Marathas proposed this expedition as far back as 1782 as it is plain from their proposals, they are today in a better position than ever to execute this great project, since the elevation of Shinde to the generalship of the Empire. This Maratha chief, a member of the Regency of Poona, could operate on the upper Ganges with all the forces of the Padshah whilst we would act in concert with the troops of the Regency and those of the Raja of Nagpur through Cuttack and our squadron at the mouths of the Ganges. Bengal thus attacked would be definitely lost for the English; the Marathas are so convinced of it that they say so themselves.

The Raja of Nagpur will not easily enter into an agreement until he is certain of a very impending rupture between France and England. He has too much to fear from the English because of the proximity of his territory of Cuttack with the possessions of the English Company in this part. Moreover, he is so watched by the Council of Calcutta that we can be sure of what I am advancing in this respect. The relations, which I have had with this Raja and those which I have had with the persons who know best his Darbar, confirm me in this opinion. The English have also an interest in placating him so that in times of war they can send the troops and munitions from Bengal through the Four Northern Circars to Masulipatnam and Madras. This communication is so important for the English that at the earliest hostilities, the Council of Calcutta immediately sends Waquils to this Raja who keep such a watch over his Darbar that it is impossible for him to make the slightest movement without the knowledge of the English.

Nizam Ali, although almost subject to their inquiry, will be less difficult to tackle. Whatever it might be, I imagine that it is very difficult to induce, in times of peace, the majority of the Indian princes to form a project of union capable of fulfilling the great object of a general confederation against the common enemy. Their fear of the English power, the uncertainty of a rupture, the interval between now and the fresh war suspend the effects of their resentment and keep them in a state of the greatest circumspection. They promise and will always promise to make a common cause when we

will come with forces capable of imposing and operating on a great scale. But it will be difficult to induce them to conclude solid arrangements before this period. This is at least what I have reason to think according to the knowledge which I was able to procure for myself on the politics of the Darbars.

A visit to the different Darbars of India such as I already had the honour to propose to you, would have furnished me better means to fulfil your views, Monsieur le Vicomte. But as I have not yet received your orders on this point, I shall continue to act from the Court of Poona, and in spite of the obstacles of which I have an imperfect notion, I shall try to do in this respect all that can be expected from my zeal for the interests which are entrusted to me.

When I took leave of Nana Fadnavis to come to Goa in the hope of fulfilling the objects of the Regency, there was still a talk about our future intentions regarding the establishments on the Malabar Coast. I profited by this occasion to convince the Regent that we desired only the port of Bombay and the town of Surat to serve as a port and warehouse to our trade operations on this coast. Therefore, Monsieur le Vicomte, set your mind at ease on this point. Nana Fadnavis is convinced of the moderation of our demands. But I did not think, in pursuance of the orders stated in your despatch of 20th June by which you charged me to demand from the Regency establishments around Bombay, I did not think it, I repeat, advisable to reply positively that we did not want them and that we confined ourselves to the port of Bombay alone as you prescribe it to me by your dispatch of 4th October, because I once again wanted to have your orders on this subject. But I replied at that time in a manner not to alarm the Regency concerning our views regarding the establishments on this coast. I know too well the intentions of the Marathas to lay stress on this cession of territory. Therefore, Monsieur le Vicomte, I think I have fully complied with your views on this subject. But one thing on which it appears to me necessary to insist, is the possession of the town of Surat on the same conditions which the English enjoy. The possession of this town is such a precious advantage for our trade on the Malabar Coast that it is advisable to make a demand for it from the Marathas in all the agreements which we could conclude with them. They have already granted it by their proposals in 1782. Why should they refuse it at present? Moreover, they do not appear to me at all disinclined on this point and I always thought, since my arrival in India, that I should not desist from the demand of this objective. Independently of the infinite advantages which this town would procure for our trade, it would open to us natural means to establish close relations with the Court of the Emperor where it is so essential for us to have connections. I shall not insist any more on this point since I have treated it in detail in another of my dispatches.

To day I have nothing else to do than to follow the great object of pacification between the Marathas and Tipu. But what else can I do if it is not to seek to point out to the Regency, as I have always done uptill now, the advantage which would result from making peace with this Nawab and in even uniting with him in order to make themselves more formidable for the English power while swearing indeed to the Marathas that the views of our Minister tend only to make a common cause with the Indian powers to destroy in concert with them that of the English whose ambition, tyranny and dishonesty are known to all the nations.

Monsieur le Vicomte, I shall only add a word to this letter; it is that I am very much grieved for being deprived of the honour of meeting you on the Malabar Coast, especially in a circumstance when, deputed by the Regency of Poona, I wanted to convey to you important things on its part, when, moreover, I wanted to speak to you of so many particular things concerning my mission. I pass over in silence all reflexions on this subject.

I have the honour to be with the most absolute and most respectful attachment,

Monsieur le Vicomte,

Your very humble and very obedient servant.

Montigny.

P.S.—Monsieur le Vicomte, just when I was about to close my dispatch, a courier from Delhi arrived with a letter from the Raja Himmat Bahadur which announces to me that I shall receive my other couriers only after some time, that is to say the replies of Shinde to your letter as well as that of the Emperor. No news about the party of Sombre. I shall probably receive letters from this party by my earliest harkaras. Herewith is attached the copy of the letter from the Raja Himmat Bahadur.

Montigny.

Today is 18th December and there is no news of the corvette which you have announced to me. I am closing my dispatches and I shall start for Poona immediately after with a very heavy heart, please.

Monsieur le Maréchal,

Goa December 16, 1785.

I have the honour to address you a copy of my correspondence with M. le Vicomte de Souillac from 16th September till 16th of this month to serve as a sequel to that which you will receive by the flute la Seine dispatched from Pondicherry directly to France in October.

I request you, my Lord, to kindly cast a glance on the dispatches stamped Nos. 4, 5, 6 and I venture to think that you will be happy to notice my work and my conduct at the Court of the Regency of Poona. At least I can assure you, my Lord, that I have employed with it all the springs of my activity and the confidence, with which it honours me, (has enabled me) to bring it round to a deputation aimed at a general pacification between the powers of the Deccan.

Upon the news reaching the Regency of Poona that M. le Vicomte de Souillac was to visit the Malabar Coast, especially Goa, it immediately deputed me to this General to convey to him on its behalf the just motives which will certainly force it to take up arms against Tipu Sultan, if this Nawab did not relax at all in his claims and did not absolutely change his conduct towards the Marathas and Nizam Ali with whom they are making common cause, and at the same time, to give definite proof of the spirit of moderation which animates it. The Regency charged me expressly to urge M. le Vicomte to represent to Tipu the dreadful consequences of the war which is preparing and of which he is the sole aggressor, and to induce him finally to conclude, if possible, a solid peace with the Marathas on reasonable conditions. This was, Monsieur le Maréchal, in substance, the object for which I was deputed to M. de Souillac.

I arrived at Goa on 11th November with the intention of fulfilling the views of the Regency, but I received on 26th a letter from M. de Souillac dated 4th October by which he communicated to me the political reasons which led him to cancel his visit to the Malabar Coast, and announced to me at the same time that he was dispatching the corvette la Subtile for this coast from Pondicherry and that it was to touch Goa to collect my dispatches. Today is 16th December and I have no news of the announced corvette which, in view of the season, ought hardly have taken more than a month to reach this place. From this fact it is to be presumed that it must have had another destination. Consequently, I have decided to deposit my dispatches with the Governor of Goa, on whom I can depend and who has been delighted to undertake to deliver them himself to the officer charged with the orders of M. le Vicomte de Souillac.

In the present circumstances, as my return to Poona becomes urgent, I shall leave without delay day after tomorrow to proceed to the Regency and communicate to it the decision which I thought it advisable to take, since my interview with M. de Souillac could not take place.

In accordance with the letter which I received from this General and the matters it contains relating to the Marathas, I wrote to the Regency in a manner to reassure it partly on the subject of its anxieties and its wishes. I shall try to do the rest by my insinuations, convinced as I am that the surest means to thwart the machiavellion designs of the English, is to maintain, if it is possible, harmony among the native princes.

Monsieur le Maréchal, you will notice from my correspond rice the present political situation, my observations to M. le Vicomte de Souillac on the various plans which he proposes on India, the conduct of the Marathas and of Nizam Ali towards Tipu Sultan, in opposition to that of this Nawab towards these two legitimate powers of the Deccan, and that finally, if war takes place, it cannot but be attributed to unbridled ambition of Tipu and to the injustice of his claims.

Immediately after my interview with the members of the Regency, I shall, Monsieur le Maréchal, give you an account of the decision which the Marathas and Nizam Ali will take with regard to Tipu Sultan.

I remain respectfully,

Monsieur le Maréchal,
Your very humble and very obedient servant,

Montigny.

Pondicherry, January 20, 1786.

My Lord,

I have the honour to give you an account of the result of the negotiation started by M. Le Vicomte de Souillac with the Regency of Poona, by addressing you the reply, translated from Marathi, which Nana Fadnis, first Regent of this Court, has given him. I attach herewith the letter from M. de Montigny which accompanied it.

These letters will acquaint you, my Lord, with what we ought to expect from this nation which does not appear inclined, at the present moment, to conclude an alliance with us. Nana Fadnis claims to await the replies of His Majesty to the proposals made in 1782. In this situation, I shall confine myself to keep good relations with the Regency by maintaining a friendly and useful correspondence, at least apparently. This is what I have already done by giving it the assurance that the King, my master, always depends on the harmony which ought to reign between France and the Court of Poona. I have also given to Nana Fadnis the promise to solicit from you, my Lord, a reply to the proposals made in 1782. I do not know whether you are aware of them. I find only in the correspondence of M. de Bussy that the Marathas wanted to send an ambassador to the Isle of France at this very epoch (1782), that M. de Montigny met this ambassador at Goa, induced him to return with him to Poona, dissuaded the Marathas from their plan, because he had power and capacity to treat with them, and that the only result from it was the proposals made to our Court on behalf of the Regency, which M. de Montigny agrees are not admissible. It is almost at this epoch that the treaty of peace between the Marathas and the English took place. M. de Montigny was not informed of it, and M. de Bussy was positively so only by you, my Lord. However, I was on the Malabar Coast with Tipu Sultan who charged me to announce this event to M. le Marquis de Bussy, which I did in detail. The Nawab at the same time gave me the order to write to this General that he was very sure about it, that he was going to act accordingly, that he requested him to do likewise. M. de Bussy did not put much reliance on this news all the more because M. de Montigny continuously assured him to the contrary.

M. de Montigny is very usefully employed at Poona, but everything is handled so secretly in this Darbar that I find that he is often not so well informed, perhaps because of lack of pecuniary means. He announced to me by a letter, subsequent to the one I am addressing you, that the Marathas were sending me six harkaras to wait for and fetch the news from Europe and the reply to the proposals of 1782. He did not know, since he does not say anything about it, that at the same time they had dispatched an influential Waquil to Madras escorted by 50 cavalymen, that this Waquil came to cement the peace between them and the English, and to combine and plan with them an expedition on the possessions of Tipu Sultan. This fact leads me to suppose rightly that the six harkaras sent to Pondicherry are rather to supply news about our movements than to await the reply which is expected from Europe and on which assuredly the Marathas are hardly counting.

We cannot conceal the fact, my Lord, that the person to whom His Majesty will entrust the administration of his possessions in India, has a difficult task to fulfil. Till then I shall do all that will depend on me to come up to the confidence with which you have honoured me. But there prevails today in all the Darbars of India a secrecy which can be penetrated only with big pecuniary means. If one day our forces appear preponderant, we shall undoubtedly find more facility in treating with the Indian princes, because then their interest will be involved in it.

Shall I venture to say, my Lord, what I think about any alliance that we could conclude with the Marathas? We must not imagine that we can make an eventual treaty with them. It is only at the time of war (which we must gauge) that it would be possible and useful at the same time to unite with this nation. If our views were aimed at Bombay and Surat, I think we could do nothing more advantageous for the nation and nothing more injurious to the interests of the English. If our forces permitted us an expedition on Bengal, we would also derive a great advantage from the alliance with

the Marathas if they would undertake to attack this territory to create a diversion. But as this nation carries on only cavalry warfare and in a manner which is not suitable to us, any combination of their armies with ours would be absolutely impracticable.

We must consider the Marathas not so much as a great nation governed by a single sovereign but as a kind of a federative republic of small sovereigns whose interests clash even when they appear united for the common cause. We can vouch that they are rarely of the same opinion, from which fact there results a very great delay in every negotiation, and little reliance can be put on a permanent treaty with them. I venture to assure you, my Lord, that their object is not so much to reconquer the provinces which, in more remote times, were under the domination of the native princes as to heap up to-day riches after riches with a view perhaps to expelling one day all the foreign powers from Hindustan.

Whatever may be their political objective, hardly a year passes when we do not see large hordes of Marathas coming out to fall upon the richest provinces, plunder them, force the princes who govern them to pay a tribute and retire with the same speed. There is no likelihood that they would carry their arms into the Carnatic where our feeble possessions are situated. This region is in a state of devastation which cannot excite their cupidity. It will therefore always be in the flourishing provinces of Bengal that they will direct their attention. I can assure you, my Lord, that any treaty of the Marathas with the English will not be of a long duration. However, they are today seriously occupied, in concert with the English and Nizam Ali, in providing themselves with means to come and practice their brigandage in the territories which are under the domination of Tipu Sultan. This most opulent prince of these territories excites their jealousy, that of the English and of Nizam Ali, because all the three of them are afraid of his power and his riches. In pursuance of the reports which I have from the inland, the respective armies are going to take the field. M. de Montigny writes to me on October 21, 1785, that the Maratha armies have assembled, camped and are about to take the field, that their plan is to reduce the power of Tipu. He informs me that this Nawab has adopted an unjust attitude towards the Maratha nation which action deserves to be put down, etc. etc.

In the account which I shall have the honour to give you of the negotiations with Tipu Sultan, I shall enlarge some of my ideas in order not to repeat myself uselessly.

I have the honour to remain with a profound respect,

My Lord,
Your very humble and very obedient servant,
Cossigny.

Copy of a letter No. 6 from M. de Montigny to M. de Cossigny.

Poona, January 27, 1786.

Sir,

I had the honour to communicate to you on 21st October of the motive of the Regency in sending me to Goa in the hope of meeting M. le Vicomte de Souillac and discussing its interests with this General. As my interview with M. Le Vicomte could not take place because of political considerations which are, no doubt, known to you, I could not wholly fulfil the views of the Regency in this respect.

Sixteen days after my arrival at Goa, that is to say on 26th November, I received the letter from M. le Vicomte de Souillac, dated 4th October, by which he informed me of the motives which obliged him not to visit the Malabar Coast this monsoon and about his departure from Pondicherry for the Isle of France, fixed for 8th October. It would be difficult for me to express to you, Sir, how much I was grieved at this accident, which prevented me from conveying viva voce to the General a whole lot of matters concerning the internal situation and the objects of my mission, details which can never be treated but very imperfectly through correspondence. In this state of affairs, this is the decision which I deemed it advisable to take and in which I succeeded fairly well, since it is true that I managed to allay the anxieties of the Regency on the nature of our relations with Tipu Sultan.

Two days after the receipt of the dispatch of M. le Vicomte de Souillac, I wrote to Nana Fadnis to convey to him the contents of the dispatch of the General, most appropriate to demonstrate to this Regent the particular desire which M. le Vicomte had to see the end of the differences that had arisen between the Regency and Tipu, as well as the urgent exhortations which he had made to this Nawab to unite with the Marathas by ties which can be reciprocally useful to them. I laid a strong emphasis on the intention of M. le Vicomte de Souillac not to send any succour to Tipu Sultan, and (declared) that all what the Maratha Waquil and other persons could have said on this subject was false, that the King's orders expressly stipulated that the French would not interfere at all with the quarrels which might arise between the Indian princes, except, however, only to urge them to re-establish peace and harmony between them; that, moreover, it would not be at the time of the rupture between the two powers whose alliance and support we are seeking that we would furnish means to the one against the other; that this step would be too inconsistent with the straightforwardness of our views and the wisdom of our Ministry, and that national dignity could never be compromised in this way; that, besides, the Regency ought to be assured that our relations with Tipu Sultan were of such a nature that they could not run counter to those which we were seeking to form with the Marathas, a power indeed most calculated to operate on a large scale if it co-operated with the French to expel from India a nation which is keeping almost all the princes of the peninsula under its yoke and in degradation, and that finally I deferred to my arrival at Poona to have a talk with the Regency on other matters contained in the dispatch of M. le Vicomte de Souillac. This is, in short, Sir, what I thought advisable to communicate to Nana Fadnavis without delay to reassure him against the impressions he had been given about our partiality for Tipu, and to renew to him at the same time the particular desire which we have to bind ourselves in friendship with the Regency if it actively co-operated with our plans against the common enemy, etc. This letter has created on the mind of Nana Fadnis the impression which I desired, and I have reason to believe more than ever since my return to Poona, that if Tipu wished to desist from his claims and change his conduct towards the Subhedar and the Regency, the war which is preparing would not take place. Whatever it may be, I continue to engage myself, in pursuance of the spirit of the dispatch of the General, in impressing upon the Regency the advantages which would result from making peace with the Nawab, and establishing between the princes of the Deccan the harmony and union so necessary to their respective situations with regard to the English. This is all what I can do and what alone occupies me today.

Nana Fadnis is now at Bermir Masser, and his interview with Nizam Ali is to take place, from the report at the Darbar, at Capaot-Singam. It is only after the meeting between the Subhedar and the Regent that we will know the result of the discussions to be held on the subject of Tipu Sultan.

Haripant Phadke, Tukoji Holkar and the Raja of Nagpur are to form an army corps of about 80,000 men, including the forces of Parsharam Bhau. I have not included the Pendaris. Nizam Ali has not yet disclosed the number of troops which he is to put into the field against Tipu, in case the war, which is preparing, takes place.

I am very shortly expecting harkaras from the Maratha army whom I had dispatched to Nana Fadnis to inform him of my return to Poona and to send him your letters which I received a few days after my arrival here. I very carefully read that of November 24, which you wrote to me about the conduct which we have to adopt regarding the Indian princes between now and the subsequent orders of the Court. When I have received the replies to your letters I shall be very prompt in dispatching them to you, along with the political situation at this epoch.

Nana Fadnis has sent me a word through Amritrao Pethe, who replaces the Regent here in his absence, that after his interview with Nizam Ali, he would let me know whether he would call me to the camp of the army or whether he would leave me at Poona.

It appears to me from all that I hear that they could indeed take the field only after the rains. I would not, however, vouch for it, but I presume it thus.

M. le Vicomte de Souillac had written to me that the corvette la Subtile, commanded by M. le Vicomte de la Croix, was to touch Goa towards mid-November to collect our packets for him and for the Court. I waited for this corvette till the 23rd December and as I had no news of its appearance on the Malabar Coast, I took the decision to deliver my packets to the Governor of Goa, who was kind enough to undertake to deliver them himself either to the Commandant of la Subtile if he came to Goa, or to the officer charged with the orders of M. le Vicomte de Souillac. I learnt from my latest harkaras, bearers of a letter from the Governor, that he had delivered my packets to M. le Vicomte de la Croix who had anchored in the port of Goa on 28th December and left it three days later for Mauritius.

At the same time I received a letter from Messrs le Chevalier de Fleury et Chevrean from the Isle of France dated 9th October which informs me that M. D'Entrecasteau, appointed by the King as Commander of the naval forces and Warden of the Ports and Arsenals of His Majesty beyond the Cape of Good Hope, is shortly leaving for India for the purpose of fulfilling these two functions. The frigate La Venus is also expected on the Malabar Coast.

You are certainly informed, Sir, that shortly after the capture of Nargund, Tipu who had marched against this Palegar only at the complaints of the Raja of Kittur, another Palegar who furnished one thousand men to the besieging army, seized in December the latter's fortress; he had asked permission to pass under its walls during the rainy season, during which he had first obtained two lacks as contribution. Immediately after this operation, he captured Jemouly [\[Manoli.\]](#) and M. Dom Frederic informs me that he has actually an army corps on the territory of Sodda, [\[Sondha.\]](#) another Palegar, who is defending himself with much stubbornness. The Portuguese are shortly expecting an attack by the troops of the Nawab on their territory. The Governor has consequently made his preparations.

I met at Goa M. Pinatel, Captain of the merchant ship, a 700-tonner, coming from Marseille. This Captain informed me that he had passed at Mahé with the intention of collecting pepper, etc., and that it had been impossible for him to buy them even a rupee worth, because the Nawab had prevented its export. If this news is true, as it is to be presumed, no one but you, Sir, must be better informed of it.

I have the honour to address you my detailed account with the Camotins, as well as a copy of the letter which I have written to M. le Vicomte de Souillac on this subject. You will see in it the conduct of the brokers with respect to me and the urgent need in which I am to have funds to pull me out of the extreme embarrassment which I am going to face infallibly, if you do not give orders to M. de Moracin on this point.

Today I owe a sum of more than Rs. 6,400, namely Rs. 2,211 to the brokers of the Nation at Goa, and the balance to various sahuks of Poona who are on the point of refusing me fresh funds and soliciting eagerly the repayment of those which they have advanced me. I request you, Sir, to kindly take into consideration my position and my demand. I indicate to M. de Maracin the means to send me the funds through the sarafs of Madras who are in close relation with those of Poona.

I have the honour to inform you, Sir, that the (French) Court granted me in 1782, a bonus of 6,600 frs. for my first mission to India, that from this sum 4,800 frs. were deducted before hand to discharge a promissory note for this sum which I owed to M. de Margany. I have still to claim 1,800 frs. from this bonus which has not to this day been paid to me. I wrote about it at the time to M. Monneron; he has not written to me a word on this point. You would oblige me infinitely, Sir, if you kindly order its payment. It would be absolutely necessary for me for my personal expenses.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Montigny.

P.S.—I am very anxious, Sir, about the so-called Moulargi and Bavranghi, harkaras whom I had dispatched to Goa (Pondicherry) on 22nd October before my departure from Poona. I am afraid they have been intercepted on the route by the English. I would not be surprised at it at all from what happened to me already on the Malabar Coast. That is what urges me at this moment not to risk a packet from Delhi which requires precautions. I shall send it only when I shall know by the return of the said harkaras that the route is safe.

At the time of closing my dispatches, the Sarkar has requested me to postpone the departure of my harkaras and has sent me a word that very shortly I shall receive the replies from Nana Fadnis and Haripant Phadke to your letters. I shall therefore wait for a few days.

To-day, 8th February, I received the letters from Nana Fadnis and Haripant Phadke and I attach them to my dispatch. Nana writes to me that he would have wished that you had written to him like M. le Vicomte de Souillac, who had charged me by his dispatch of 4th October to say to the Regency that the French were not sending any troops at all to Tipu, etc. I replied to him in a manner to reassure him on this point.

M. Dom Frederic informs me this very moment that Tipu has just seized the territory of Sodo [27], that the King's ship la Resolution and the frigate la Venus are at Mahé and that they are shortly to anchor at Goa.

Day before yesterday, I was told at the Darbar that an English Waquil was going to come to Poona and proceed to the camp of Nana Fadnis. He is the same who has come from the Emperor's Court (Mr. Mallet). I shall have my eyes open on this event. I must warn you, Sir, that Gopalrao, Maratha Waquil, has written to me a letter which expresses his disgust at his stay at Pondicherry. I do not know what he could have written to Nana Fadnis. I have on this point some presumptions which I shall explain in course of time. I am writing to Gopalrao in a manner which will compose his mind. Nana orders him to continue his stay. That is what I know for the present.

I request you, Sir, to kindly send my harkaras as early as possible, for, I cannot know what happens to them when they take double the time which they ought to take for their journey. It is more than three and a half months that I had sent you my last harkaras, and I am worried on this point. I

know the behaviour of the English; they are capable of anything, in peace time as well as in times of war; they would intercept the letters and thus interrupt the correspondence.

Translation of a letter from Nana Fadnvis to M. de Cossigny, dated January 24, 1786.

After the usual compliments.

I was very much delighted to receive your letter by which you announce to me your appointment as Commandant of Pondicherry and other places.

You add : “it is very necessary for me to inform the Emperor of France, my master, about everything that concerns and interests your Sarkar, the intention of my King is to consolidate the friendship which has been existing between him and your Sarkar since times immemorial. I have written in detail to M. de Montigny who will inform you about it; and I shall communicate to you the replies to your letters (proposals of 1782) as soon as I receive them from Europe.”

I am delighted to hear that you are appointed as Governor of Pondicherry and other places, and M. de Montigny has communicated to me in detail many matters. I have also charged him to inform you of what I have spoken to him and which you will know from the letter which he is writing to you. I have nothing else to say to you at this moment.

Note.—Another letter was received from Haripant Phadke, also addressed to M. de Montigny. This letter literally contains only the same thing.

Poona, February 18, 1786

Monsieur le Maréchal,

I beg to inform you that since my return to Poona where I arrived on January 5, I have been ceaselessly pressing the Regency to make peace with Tipu Sultan, and I foresee to day that matters have begun to take a favourable turn. I have not lost hope of shortly seeing the end of the differences which have been agitating the powers of the Deccan for the last eighteen months, if, however, Tipu finally wishes to restore to the Marathas the territory invaded by his father Haider Ali and pay to the Regency the contributions which he owes to it since five years.

I am awaiting any moment news from the Regent concerning the result of his interview with Nizam Ali.

The Maratha army composed of about 100,000 men is camping under Yadgir near the Krishna where Nizam Ali is to proceed with a part of his forces. It is hoped here at the Darbar that these threatening preparations will induce Tipu to enter into an agreement. In the contrary case, he would have to face all the Maratha forces and those of Nizam Ali. Perhaps the English would seize this opportunity to completely crush the Nawab.

Recently I once again met Amritrao Pethe, one of the principal leaders of the Regency, who appeared to me convinced that all this activity was soon going to be decided either in favour of peace or of war. I shall be very prompt, my Lord, in communicating to you the result. I must not forget to tell you, my Lord, that the Council of Calcutta has informed Nana Fadnis of the very impending return of Mr. Hastings to India. If this news is true, we must expect fresh movements; perhaps he will try to resume his old projects. Time will unfold his intentions.

In support of this, the Council has just dispatched an English envoy (Mr. Mallet) to the Regency of Poona. He is to arrive tomorrow or the day after from Bombay. I shall keep my eyes open on this event as on all the rest. I solicit you to believe, Monsieur le Maréchal, that I shall do all I can to open the eyes of the native princes to the machiavelism of the English company.

The harmony among the princes is its greatest despair after our appearance. There is nothing which it does not imagine to spread discord everywhere. I fear the return of Mr. Hastings. He is unquestionably the Englishman who knows best the Indian politics. His ambition will stick at nothing. His old projects ought to be known to you, Monsieur le Maréchal, for, I had the honour to give you an account thereof by my letters towards the end of 1784

I have the honour to inform you, my Lord, that I have delivered the commission of Second-Lieutenant to M. Robert de Corcelle (on the 6th of January this year) to give emulation to the zeal which he has shown to me for the King's service. He spent a year under me and I noticed in this officer education, conduct and great aptitude for the native languages. He has learnt the Persian language when he was at the Court of Hyderabad in the service of the Subhedar. His family affairs recall him to France where he went with the intention of returning to India. Allow me, my Lord, to recommend him to your favour.

Tipu Sultan poses a great threat to the colony of Goa. He has already reduced all the Palegars who adjoin it, and the Portuguese Governor informs me that he has made his preparations and expects to be attacked any moment. He had already made some overtures to me on this subject at the time of my sojourn in Goa. I, however, think that if war takes place between the Marathas and Tipu, this Nawab then obliged to face this power and the Subhedar, the colony of Goa would not be disturbed because of this powerful diversion, and its ruin, which Tipu has sworn, from what the Portuguese report, would be postponed to a more distant epoch.

I remain respectfully,

Monsieur le Maréchal,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

Montigny.

Copy of the reply of M. de Cossigny to the letter of M. de Montigny. No. 6.

Pondicherry, March 8, 1786.

On the 6th of this month, Sir, I received your letter No. 6, dated January 25 and February 8 of this year. I was impatient and a little worried not to have received your news. Your letter No. 5 was the last that I had received, in which you announced to me your departure for Goa, from where you are back again in good health. I am delighted to hear it, Sir.

I see from the sequence of the numbers of the letters which you have written to me that I have received them all. I did not reply at the time to No. 5, as I had nothing particular to say to you. Moreover, I had written to you only a few days back as well as to the Regency of Poona. It is this letter of which Nana Fadnis acknowledges to me the receipt. I read again, Sir, your letter No. 5. It's only object was to inform me of your journey to Goa. I can only say to you today that it is unfortunate that your objectives were not fulfilled in this journey. Nevertheless I find it hard to believe that M. Le Vicomte de Souillac could have succeeded in reconciling the Marathas, Nizam and Tipu, since on your return, the respective armies had already taken the field.

I now reply to your letter No. 6; Sir, I received it day before yeasterday. As I have already said to you, it is very unfortunate, I repeat it to you, that you could not see M. Le Vicomte de Souillac at Goa. I perfectly understand how much you could have explained in an interview on matters difficult to discuss in a correspondence.

You did the right thing in allaying the anxieties of the Regency on the nature of our relations with Tipu Sultan. From my letter you ought to reassure them more than ever. But make no mistake, Sir, Nana Fadnis is quite as well informed as you and I. He maintains too close a correspondence with the English not to be certain of the movements which we might make. Moreover, all that you have said to the Regency of Poona to reassure them is very discreet, since everything is founded on truth.

About two months ago I was informed of the relations which exist between the Marathas and Nizam. I know that the latter has assembled his troops and received the war-blessing. I also knew that the Marathas had made several movements, that the two armies were to unite and that I finally knew that during all these preparations Tipu was in the Coorg territory and that he unfurled his flag of war only on the 12th to the 14th of the month of February. According to that whatever combination I may make, I cannot see at all that Tipu is the aggressor. Our Minister will be informed of all these things by two ships which left a few days ago and which will go straight to France. I am sorry your dispatch arrived after their departure. It would have confirmed what I have learnt from other sources.

I am writing to Nana Fadnis in the same spirit as of the dispatch of M. Le Vicomte de Souillac and of what you have yourself spoken to him so often, that the English would profit one day from the discord of the native princes. If the Marathas, Nizam Ali and Tipu paid less attention to their interests, which are only momentary, it is very certainly on the power of the English that they ought to have their eyes always open. I would have very much liked, Sir, that you had the permission to follow the Maratha army; I would have received news from you quicker. I am dispatching from here an officer who is to proceed to Nizam Ali's Court, because if all these preparations are serious, they could produce a great change in the political system of India, and it would be necessary that our Court was informed of it earlier than later.

M. Le Vicomte de la Croix, commanding La Subtile left Mahé on the 12th January to return to the Isle of France; the frigate La Venus was at Mahé at the same time as la Subtile; the former left Cochin only in the early part of February.

M. D'Entrecasteaux, in fact, left the Isle of France early in November. From the latest letters which I receive from Mahé, dated 8th February, I do not find that the ship, which he commands, has appeared on the Malabar Coast. If I do not receive news of it by the earliest harkaras coming from this Coast, I shall be very much worried about it.

M. Haymont, staff-officer of Lalée's Party is here since three or four days; he has told me what you confirm to me about the capture of Nargund.

I was also informed of the ban laid by Tipu on the export of pepper, sandal, cardamom. But I think that this ban will not last at all for a long time.

M. de Moracin and I, Sir, have agreed that you would be paid the sum of Rs. 6,400 plus 1,800 frs. which are due to you for a bonus which you did not receive in full. M. de Moracin has also taken the measures so that you will receive every three months five hundred pagodas which will, at the end of the year, make up a sum of 18,000 frs.

I shall be obliged to you for making a payment of 2,000 frs. from this sum to M. Geslin as salary.

M. Le Vicomte de Souillac must have informed you that you were put down on the statement sent by the Court only for a sum of 16,000 frs. (it is the same by a special letter). I have already written to the Minister how this sum was insufficient. However, considering the state of destitution to which we are reduced, I request you to see that you do not exceed it without fresh orders from the Court.

I have gone through the statement of the sums which you have received for the last three years. I find that by adding to them Rs. 15,900, which are going to be paid, plus Rs. 6,400 and the 1800 frs. which is the balance from the bonus, the total sum will amount to 184,000 frs. or about. I consider as very essential, Sir, to send shortly to the Minister a statement of the expenses, absolutely necessary, which you were obliged to incur. Without this precaution, the letter of M. Le Maréchal de Castries which regulates your salary allocating to you only a sum of 16,000 frs., funds cannot be allowed for expenses so much in excess, and I would find myself forced to leave you perhaps in an embarrassment, if your expenses, such as have been incurred so far, are of such a kind that they cannot be reduced.

The two harkaras Moularji and Bavranji delivered to me after two months your letter of 22nd October No. 5.

I had already learnt that Mr. Mallet was to proceed to Poona on behalf of the English, that after conferring with the Regency, he was to further proceed, I am told, to the Court of the Subhedar of the Deccan. I am also informed that M. Carnet, another Englishman was to proceed to the Court of Tipu Sultan. The latter will have a little more difficulty in probing the secrets of this Darbar. You can, I think, give news of this embassy to Nana Fadnis.

I also know that Nana Fadnis has made proposals to the English to induce them to join the confederation and that the latter have not accepted them. They are undoubtedly quite satisfied with the harm which the native princes will do to each other between themselves.

The Maratha Waquil, resident here, is a stupid fellow, very little capable of corresponding with his masters in a satisfactory manner for them and for us. During the sojourn of M. Le Vicomte de Souillac at Pondicherry, this wretched fellow disappeared without saying a word, without knowing very much why or where he was going. The General sent men in search of him. He was contacted after travelling for several koss; he returned like a child without any other reason than that which had led him to quit us. He went on a pilgrimage for three months after, however, informing me about it. He has just returned. I assure you that he is perfectly well treated here; if he complains, he is wrong;

we cannot do anything about it. He is a sort of a fool or an imbecile, from what all the men of the Darbar say, who depends on the support of someone of his relatives who has access to Nana Fadnis.

The ship of the (East) India Company by name Le Calonne, which left Europe in August, has arrived here; it has not brought us any news, but only announces that Europe is at peace and that the Emperor and the Dutch were on the point of coming to an agreement. There was no change at this epoch in the Ministry. M. Beaudouin, charged with the correspondence of the continent of India, died in June. It is, as the report goes, M. de Boistel, Brigadier, who is charged with this job, with M. de Launay as his deputy.

I have the honour to inform you that the King has conferred on me the rank of a Brigadier from 20th May 1784.

M. Hartmann, Sir, is well. If some occasion offers itself in October, he will be given leave according to your wishes.

I have the honour to be, etc.

M. de Cossigny's letter to Nana Fadnis.

Pondicherry, March 8, 1786.

The usual compliments,

According to what you had communicated to me through M. de Montigny, I was impatient to have news from you. That, which I have just received, has given me great pleasure. However, I am grieved to see the quarrels which are going to break out among the princes of India, who rather ought to unite themselves against their common enemy than weaken themselves by fighting against each other, at the risk of being afterwards attacked separately by a new power, today very formidable by its riches which it derives from the country itself and by the invasion which it has made of the whole of Bengal and finally, many other territories. As God alone knows the destiny of the Empires, I can only express good wishes for the prosperity of your arms. Refer yourself to what M. de Montigny will tell you on my behalf, and let me often hear from you.

I shall also be careful to give you the news which I shall receive from the Emperor of France and from M. Le Vicomte de Souillac. You ought to believe what he has written to you and which I repeat here, that the French will never do anything which can harm your interests and your glory. M. de Montigny is charged to assure you that the orders of the Emperor of France are to cement the union and friendship which have been reigning from times immemorial between your Sarkar and the French Empire.

Note.—The same letter has been written to Haripant Phadke, Deputy Regent and Maratha General.

Pondicherry, May 4, 1786

My Lord,

However formidable may appear the preparations of war which the Marathas and Nizam Ali have made against Tipu Sultan, and whatever may be the efforts the latter could have made to assemble an army to be in a position to resist the combined forces of the two former powers, it is not at all possible for me, my Lord, to yet say definitely if the armies will come to grips or if all this display of war will finally end in a compromise. The season has already so advanced that towards the end of May, it will no longer be possible to take the field. The Marathas and Nizam Ali cannot then cross the Krishna, which makes me think that this year will not produce any great event among the three powers and that a compromise will follow.

I would not venture to state, my Lord, that there will also follow a reunion of all these focres against those of the English, but I wish it. As a measure of precaution, and in this supposition, I have written to the Regency of Poona, Nizam Ali and Tipu Sultan what I thought would be beneficial for their respective interests.

I have the honour to send you a copy of a letter which I have received from Nana Fadnis and of my reply. I also attach to it a copy of the last letter that I have received from M. de Montigny and of my reply.

The letter of M. de Montigny, my Lord, will reveal to you something about the dispositions in which the Marathas are and could be with respect to us, and his position at this Regency, of which I am grieved to see, that he does not enjoy the entire confidence.

From this letter you will also be in a position to judge of what importance can be his mission for the future. Besides, it is essential that you should give orders to determine the expenses which M. de Montigny ought to be authorized to make. I think that 16,000 frs. which are allocated to him are not sufficient. It is, however, necessary that we should have a Resident at Poona, especially in case of a rupture with England and if the views of His Majesty were aimed at making an expedition on Bombay, an expedition, I venture to say, my Lord, which would be easier than we think by outbalancing the English squadrons in this part of India.

In the course of the last war, there was a time when the garrison of Bombay consisted only of hundred men and some invalids.

The ship La Bretagne by which I am sending this dispatch, is the last to leave in this season till the month of July and August. I shall no more be in a position to have the honour to give you an account directly. I venture to declare to you that it is a great pity that because of our situation and our lack of means, we cannot give a different swing to our political system.

I remain with a profound respect,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

Cossigny.

Copy of a letter from M. de Montigny to M. de Cossigny (No. 9)

Poona, June 28, 1786

Sir,

I am replying very late to your letters of the 8th and 27th March of this year, but the political situation and the explanations which I thought it advisable to have directly with Nana Fadnis, added to his entreaties not to write to Pondicherry before his interview with me, compelled me to suspend the departure of my harkaras till today.

I shall first give in substance the account of the events since the union of the allied armies. I shall then pass on to the discussions which I had with the Regent as well as to the most essential items of your letter of 8th March.

I had the honour to inform you, Sir, by my letter of 27th January that the interview of Nana Fadnis with the Subhedar was to take place at Capaot-Singam or at Yadgir, and that it was only after the meeting of Nizam Ali and the Regent that we could know how the matters stand with respect to Tipu Sultan. This statement was so true that we knew nothing of their decidedly hostile views except after the interview of the Subhedar and the Regent. This interview took place on 16th April under Yadgir; and after many sufficiently sharp differences on both sides, the interests were reconciled, and the result of the discussions held on this subject was therefore to take the field vigourously in order to lead Tipu, willy nilly, to make peace on reasonable conditions by restoring to the Marathas the territory which belongs to them and to pay the contributions which he owes to the Regency of Poona, etc.

After this decision, arrived at between the Subhedar and the Regent, Nizam Ali left for Hyderabad and left Tedgenk [[Tahawwar Jang.](#)], his commander-in-chief, at the head of a corps of 22,000 men, half of which cavalry, to operate in concert with the troops of the Regency of Poona.

The siege of Badami was resolved upon, and the Marathas opened the trench on 3rd April, which they pushed with great vigour as far as the slopes of this stronghold and on 20th May at five o'clock in the morning, the fortress was stormed. The small forts in the neighbourhood of Badami, lacking water, surrendered on the next day. The garrison, numbering 2,000 men, offered a vigorous resistance. Of 8,000 Marathas, who mounted the assault, there were about 500 killed and wounded. They showed great courage on this occasion, although the majority of the ladders were too short and several were broken. Badami was delivered to Raste, its old master and member of the Regency of Poona.

Tukoji Holkar, another member of the Regency, captured Kittoor. Immediately after the capture of this fort, the Nawab of Savnur called the Marathas to his assistance to oppose Borandinne [[Burhan-ud-din.](#)], brother-in-law of Tipu and Governor of Mirisicota [[Mishrikot, in Dharwar District.](#)], who was coming at the head of 15,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry and 20 guns with the intention of seizing the Nawab and the territory of Savnur. But Ganissipondett-Beria [[Ganeshpant Behere.](#)] at the head of a corps of 20,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry, went with so much celerity to the assistance of this Nawab that he reached the place five days before Burhan-ud-din could appear with his army before Savnur, where a very lively action took place between the two armies; bayonets were used in it on both sides, but after two hour's fighting, the two armies separated, the Marathas retired under the walls of Savnur and the army of Burhan-ud-din went to Nagar, that is to say more than 40 koss from Savnur. This precipitate retreat of Tipu can hardly be explained, unless this Nawab had given orders to his General to draw the Marathas into the interior of his territory, where woods and mountains would be a difficult obstacle to surmount for the type of war of the latter. It is perhaps noteworthy to observe that in this action the Maratha infantry used bayonet and traversed with its cavalry 40 koss in a day and a half to proceed to

the fort of the Nawab of Savnur. There are two French partisans in this small Maratha army. It is still difficult to believe here how a corps of troops of Tipu composed of 15,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry and 20 guns should have offered such little resistance. Whatever it may be, the Marathas are seizing all the territory which lies between the Krishna and the Tungbhadra.

On the same day of the capture of Badami, that is to say on 25th May, Tipu Sultan (others report that it is Karim Khan, his brother) arrived in person before Adoni with an army of 40,000 sipahees, 25,000 cavalry and 60 guns, excluding the footsoldiers. On the 26th, he had the peth plundered; on the 27th he opened the trench. At this juncture, the son of Bassalat Jang wrote to the Marathas to send him succour by promising them 18 lakhs of rupees. Consequently, Bagipontana [Bajipant Anna.] was immediately dispatched with 20,000 cavalry to run to the succour of the Nawab of Adoni, and Nizam Ali wrote to several Maratha chiefs to urge them to join his troops which are only 26 koss away from Tipu's army, so that they should report as rapidly as possible to the camp of his nephew.

Parsharambhau, another Maratha leader, laid siege to Ramdurg, a fort situated 10 koss away from Badami. Gajendragad has just been reduced. It is reported that the Governor of Bellary has revolted against Tipu who wanted to dismiss him and send him to Sriranagapattam.

The situation of Tipu appears, at least for the present, to take a bad turn, and all the worse as this Nawab has alienated all the princes of the Deccan. In my opinion, matters have reached today such a stage that there is little hope of peace without prompt and great sacrifices on the part of Tipu.

This is, Sir, the actual position of the three powers of the Deccan. Most perfect harmony seems to reign between Nizam Ali and the Regency to oppose in concert the ambitious views of Tipu, and this Nawab has ranged against himself all the forces of the Regency of Poona, of the Raja of Nagpur and of Nizam Ali as well as of all those who are dependent on these three powers.

It is essential that you should know, Sir, that Tipu has written a letter to the Raja of Nagpur to urge him to become a mediator of the negotiations between him and the allied powers. The Raja should this letter to wait Nana Fadnis and the Subhedar. Both have agreed that this Raja be charged with the solicited mediation. Consequently, Mudhoji Bhonsle immediately dispatched a confidential man to Tipu with an envoy of this Nawab. Since the last five weeks Tipu has dispatched to the Raja of Nagpur two Waquils who had orders from this Nawab not to go to Nana. These Waquils represented on behalf of their master that Haider Ali Khan, his father, had spent large sums to wage war with the English partly, they said, because of the Marathas of whom he was a friend, and that the latter made peace with the English without informing him. They added that their master had communicated to the Marathas his intention to make war with Nizam Ali and urged them not to interfere with it, etc., and that after the close relations which he saw established between the Subhedar and the Regency, he had captured Nargund, Kittoor and several other places, etc. The Waquils further added that Tipu had made a treaty with the Regency by which he undertook to pay twelve lakhs of rupees per year and that the Marathas had acceded to it. The Raja of Nagpur replied to them that Tipu as well as his father had not kept the promises which they had given; that the conduct of Tipu with the Regency had impelled the Marathas, bound in friendship almost always with the Subhedar, to make a common cause with him, etc. Finally, after many reproaches on both sides, it is reported to me that the reply, as a last decision on the part of the Raja of Nagpur, was that Tipu had only to begin by paying five years' arrears of tribute which he owed and by restoring the territory and the forts which he had seized, like Nargund, Dharwar and others. They would then think of entering into a negotiation; that Badami which the Marathas had just captured would be returned to him, although he reproached him for having received it from the hands of Raghoba. The Raja of Nagpur added that the firman which had been given to him on this account was invalid, because Raghoba was a traitor to the Regency of Poona, since he was the perpetrator of the assaissination of Narayanrao, father of Sawai Madhavrao, who is reigning to day; that, however, the Marathas would overlook it, but that it was necessary to renew the old treaties with the new Government. After that the Waquils were dismissed, and Tipu's reply is awaited. This is, Sir, what I learn from very well-informed persons about the proceedings in

the Darbar of the Raja of Nagpur on this subject, and what I am trying to amplify here in the different interviews which I have with Nana Fadnis since the 8th of this month when he arrived at Poona. The replies of the Regent, although vague, confirm me in the majority of the points which have been conveyed to me on this subject.

I come back, Sir, to the discussions which I had with Nana Fadnis since his return here as well as to the important items of your letter of 8th March.

In a special interview which I had with the Regent on the 17th instant, I again insisted on the advantages which would result from making peace with Tipu Sultan, if only to interrupt the ambitious views of the English, whose insidious politics aims only at sowing discord among the native powers to rise afterwards on the ruins of all. I added that M. le Vicomte de Souillac had written to Tipu in a spirit in keeping with the circumstances to induce this Nawab to conclude a treaty with the Regency, calculated to reconcile the respective interests, and that nothing was more desirable than to see harmony re-established among the Indian princes whose politics ought to have for its aim to combine their resources against the ambition of the only enemy which they had to dread, etc. The Regent interrupted me at this juncture and said to me : “Rest assured, Sir, I fully realise the value and the soundness of your representations, and you cannot doubt my attitude in this respect, after all that I have said to you since your Residency at this Court, and especially when I urged you in October to go to Goa and negotiate this matter with M. le Vicomte de Souillac. I had even promised you to start operations only after your return here, if things did not take a favourable turn. But after the reasons, which you communicated to me in December by a letter written from Goa and which had prevented General Souillac from visiting the Malabar Coast, and as I no longer saw any chance of negotiation on this subject or any overtures on the part of Tipu which tended to peace, I followed my plan always aimed at inducing this Nawab, by force or agreement, to restore the territory seized from the Regency and pay the tribute which he owes to it for several years, a matter which he has always eluded under different pretexts. This fact clearly shows his reluctance to carry out both these items, without which, however, I cannot make peace with this Nawab.” The Regent continued, by saying to me : “I did not call you to the army camp because I knew I was returning to Poona and that would have involved you in useless expenses”. You see, Sir, in this interview with Nana, the motives which compelled him to take the field against Tipu before my return to Poona, as he had promised it to me before my departure for Goa, and the reason why I was not called to the army camp, in spite of my urgent solicitations with the Regent. The sequel of my conference with Nana Fadnis was sufficiently animated, as I was forced to explain myself energetically on our plans to send succour to Tipu if the Marathas happened to be allied with the English against this Nawab. The presence, the demands and the intrigues of the English Waquil was the cause and pretext for it. I knew that the latter importuned Nana to engage a corps of troops in the service of the Regency and that Nana’s reply on this point is sufficiently ambiguous to give us umbrage. In pursuance of that, I thought it advisable to ask the Regent if his intention was to be allied with the English against Tipu. I mentioned to him the passage of your letter in which you say, Sir, *that you know that Nana Fadnis has made proposals to the English to urge them to join the alliance and that the latter did not accept them*. The Regent replied to me : “It might be that the English flatter themselves with such a refusal to mislead the French in their conduct with the Regency and to dissuade them from an alliance with it. Perhaps that might even be the talk of Tipu, he added but nothing was more untrue, and that Mr. Mallet who had been sent from Bombay about a year back to the Emperor’s Court and from there to Calcutta, had been sent to him on behalf of the Supreme Council for other matters; but that he had never solicited the English to join the Marathas, that the English themselves had offered to furnish him sipahees commanded by Europeans and that no decision had yet been taken on this subject.” In actual fact, I know that the English Waquil has been soliciting the Regency, to have a corps of troops in its pay that he even asked a territory around the town of Surat in case the Regency did not wish to pay for the corps of troops which he has been offering, but that the Regent’s reply was very clear on this point. He replied to the English envoy that if he accepted his proposal, he would pay for the troops, as he did it in the case of the leaders of the parties who were in the service of the Court of Poona, but that he would not give any territorial possessions, or jahgir for the upkeep of this corps. I also know that the Waquil demanded the Regency’s permission to establish a commercial house at Poona, and that Nana Fadnis rejected this

proposal by saying that he would see after the war if he could negotiate on this point. This is, Sir, the situation, and to counterbalance the urgent solicitations of the English Waquil and perhaps the budding plans of the Regency on this point, I thought it advisable to impress upon the Regent by giving him to understand that in case the union of the English with the Marathas against Tipu Sultan took place, we would be obliged to support the latter, as the King's intention was to protect the weak against the strong, and that the troops which we were assembling at the Isles and in India were meant to act in such cases. In this connection, I made use of the very expressions recorded in the letter of 20th June of M. Le Vicomte de Souillac in which this Governor General recommended to me to explain myself thus in such circumstances, and never was it better indicated than today. This stand appeared to me appropriate to provide material for reflexion, and in actual fact, I saw the impression which this plain speaking had created on the mind of Nana Fadnis from the surprise and the silence he showed. But I did not get a sufficiently clear reply to know precisely how matters stand in this respect. I shall have occasion to re-open this subject in the subsequent interviews, and I shall not omit anything to settle this important point once and for all, if I can. I asked Nana if he intended to keep the English Waquil as Resident at Poona; he replied to me in the affirmative. The conference ended there by the arrival of an important courier for the Regency, which prevents me from sending my harkaras before another audience which I indeed wish to have.

In the next audience I communicated to Nana the item of your letter of 8th March by which you say, Sir, that Tipu was in the Coorg territory and that he displayed his war-flag under the walls of Srirangapattan only from the 12th to the 14th of February last and that whatever combination you could make, you do not find that Tipu is the aggressor. Nana replied to me that it was quite true that Tipu was at this epoch in the Coorg territory, but that more than six months back this Nawab had an army of 22,000 men which was laying everything under contribution in the district of Dharwar, and that after besieging Nargund, which belonged to a friend and ally of the Marathas, he had also seized Kittoor and the territory of the Raja of Sunda, etc., and that in the course of this devastation, Tipu had not listened to the representations made to him by the Regency which was trying to negotiate with him, and that he had never ceased to continue his unjust venture on Dharwar, etc., that finally, all the princes of the Deccan were witnesses of his conduct in this respect as well as of his tyranny towards the Brahmins whom he has forced to quit their religion and embrace Islam; that I myself ought to have been apprised of a part of these facts during my journey to Goa, all this added to the tribute which he owes and which he has not paid for a long time, that finally, all these grievances which are preferred against Tipu, sufficiently point him out to be the aggressor of the war which has taken place today. In fact, Sir, I cannot envisage it otherwise. It is more than six months that I have gone into so many details on this subject that I think that I can dispense with them here.

This is the result of the conferences I had with the Regent. I shall keep my eyes open on all the subsequent movements of the Darbar as well as on the conduct of the English envoy, and I shall be very prompt, Sir, in conveying to you all that will come to my knowledge.

Mr. Mallet, who, after spending six weeks in Poona, had quite a cold reception from Sawai Madhavrao in spite of his presents, decided to take his audience of leave on the 14th or the 15th of April, and proceeded to the camp of the Maratha army to meet Nana Fadnis, who gave him a better reception, at least outwardly. He reached the army, on the eve of the capture of Badami that is to say on 24th May, which he left some days later to return to Poona and reside there in his capacity as an envoy. He must not have met Nizam Ali, as you were informed of it. It is a part of the instructions of this English envoy to obtain from the Regency my discharge from the Court of Poona, and I am all the more certain of it as I have been apprised of it by letters coming from Delhi. Mr. Anderson, another English envoy with Shinde, is also soliciting it. But to day it appears to me certain that the Regent will not comply with their request.

Mr. Anderson was charged by the Council of Calcutta to demand the town of Agra and its dependencies for the eldest son of the Emperor who is still under the protection of the English; and Shinde, who has alienated almost all castes of Hindustan by his conduct towards the Mughals, the Rajputs and the Gossains, etc. and by his ambitious views, is so alarmed today in the post which he

occupies at the Emperor's Court, as to have run after Mr. Anderson and urged this Waquil, who had retired from his army, to return to it and resume his functions as an envoy. This pusillanimous step on the part of Shinde has surprised everyone, and I am awaiting every moment fresh information on this subject. Taimur Shah continues to have a bridge on Altock since he brought the province of Kashmir under his domination. His son crossed this river with a corps of 20,000 cavalry who cut several thousands of Sikhs to pieces, and his appearance is feared at Delhi. The return of the dry season will supply us much better information about the intentions of Taimur Shah than all the conjectures.

I come back to Mr. Mallet. In spite of the brazen or ridiculous luxury, whatever you may call it, which this English envoy displays here, he has not had the skill to conciliate all the people. But the political situation forces the Regent to placate him. He has 200 sipahees and several officers as his retinue, independently of 100 other persons for his house, two elephants and the rests in proportion. I do not know where the Company finds funds to maintain all its envoys; the one who resides with the Emperor receives Rs. 12,000 per month, and Mr. Anderson likewise, without including in it the daily presents which form a separate item.

I told Nana that you had written to me, Sir, that an English envoy was to be dispatched from Madras to Tipu Sultan (Mr. Carnet); he firmly assured me that his Waquil who resides at Madras had not written to him anything about it. In this connection, I know that Mr. Carnet was sent to Goa ostensibly to reside there in the capacity of the Company's Agent with a salary of Rs. 62,000 per year; I have this news from the Governor of Goa, and that this Agent has since received orders to go to Tellicherry, from where he returned to Goa. Fresh orders, which have come from the Court of London, awaited him in this colony to go to Bengal and from there to the Emperor's son. He told M. Dom Frédéric that he was to go to Tipu Sultan to claim back English prisoners, but that on the special orders which he had received, he merely wrote to the Nawab on this matter, that Tipu replied to him by a very courteous but very vague letter on this subject, that perhaps someone would be sent to him. This is all I have learnt about him.

But one important thing which I would like to point out, is that the conduct of Tipu has caused the greatest worries to the colony of Goa. Consequently, it thought it advisable to put itself in a state of defence to oppose, in case of an attack, the army of 22,000 men of which I have spoken above, which had already invaded Dharwar and almost all the territory of the different Palegars who adjoin this Portuguese colony. The Governor expected to be attacked any day. Tipu's army had already encircled a part of the Ghats which protrude on Goa. During my return from this colony to Poona, I was obliged to take a different route to avoid falling in the hands of this army which was then only 8 koss from Ramghat on 24th December, the day of my departure from Goa.

The Regency of Poona has written to M. Dom Frédéric to urge him to unite with the Maratha forces against Tipu in case of an open war. This Governor has prudently placated the Regency by giving it to understand that in case of an attack on the part of Tipu, he would gladly join in; but that it was essential before everything that the Regency, if it happened to make peace, should undertake to stipulate simultaneously that of the Portuguese with the Nawab; that without this condition, he would confine himself to remain on the defensive [\[It is a fact that the Marathas had made proposals for an alliance with the Portuguese. The latter had acceded to them with some alterations, but the treaty was not ratified.\]](#).

I since knew that as the Regency did not reply at that time in a sufficiently precise manner to the Governor of Goa, and as he, moreover, saw the storm blowing away from his side by the approach of the allied army, this Governor adroitly managed up till now to remain in a state of neutrality, and refused at the end of April a passage to Jivaji Gopal who was on the frontiers of the province of Bicholi with his small army of 8000 infantry and 300 cavalry from the 14th to the 22nd of the same month. This Maratha chief sent a letter from Sawai Madhavrao to M. Dom Frédéric concerning this matter, but the Governor rightly felt that this was a premature step; consequently, he replied by a very courteous letter refusing the passage and the union demanded; and to give more weight to his reply, he dispatched 4,000 troops in the district of Bicholi with 12 guns, while telling him (Jivaji) that he could not comply with his request. In view of this attitude on the part of this Governor, Jivaji Gopal

recrossed Ramghat on 22nd April. I have a letter from M. Dom Frédéric on this subject dated 24th of the same month.

A reflexion arises naturally from this attitude. It is that in case of an open war with Tipu, as the Regency would enter into the necessary agreements to create full confidence among the Portuguese, this nation could join the general mass against the Nawab, and although it would not be an augmentation of large forces, that would nevertheless still mean more than 10,000 men against Tipu, of which about 2,000 Europeans and an artillery sufficiently well mounted. It has been reported to me that Tipu had openly said that he would fall on this Portuguese colony at the earliest moment; the whole colony is imbued with it and repeats it.

I have communicated to Nana Fadnis, Sir, the state of madness or imbecility in which, as you inform me, is the Maratha Waquil, Resident at Pondicherry. The Regent replied to me that you had made no mention of it to him in your letters, as well as of the report which had reached you that the Regency had called the English to its succour against Tipu and that they had refused it. You know, Sir, what I had the honour to tell you, at the commencement of this letter, about the negative reply of Nana Fadnis on this matter. The demands and the conduct of the English envoy here sufficiently prove that it is the Council of Calcutta which is inducing the Regency.

I asked from the Regent a reply to your latest letters. He told me that he had no reply to give, that your letters were themselves replies to those which he had recently written to you. Allow me, Sir, to make an observation to you on this point; it is that when you henceforth send letters to the Regency, it would be essential that you join to them a copy of the same letters, so that I could be in a position to follow their spirit, and speak or consequently write about the interesting points they could contain. It is in this way that I have always received those from M. de Bussy for the Regency, and recently those from M. le Vicomte de Souillac. The latest which you sent me were without copies, and that throws me in a sort of an embarrassment with regard to the Darbar. I did not expect the reply of Nana Fadnis, when he spoke to me on the subject of the Waquil and the English envoy, that there was no mention of it in the letters which you had written to him recently. The Regent very courteously offered to show me your letters, saying to me that he did rely on my statement concerning the contents of your letters.

I now pass on to the item of funds. I received in the beginning of May Rs. 8,950 which you had sent me through M. de Moracin, namely, Rs. 6,400 for the payment of the loans which I had taken at Goa as well as at Poona for the King's service till the end of 1785, then again Rs. 750 for the payment of the bonus granted to me by the King in 1782, and 1800 frs. [A mistake for Rs. 1800-00.] for the first trimestre of 1786, including the salary of M. Geslin, which you put down at 2000 frs. a year, beginning from this year.

Allow me to point out to you, Sir, that when I had the honour to write to you in February that I owed a sum of Rs. 6,400 which I had borrowed from the Camotins as well as from the different Sahukars at Poona, I did not then expect that I had to pay on this sum an amount of Rs. 525 for the exchange at 6% on Rs. 8,950 which were delivered to me by the Sahukars Laxmidas Murlidas at Poona. This exchange of Madras on Poona entails on me a deficit of a sum of Rs. 525 which I still owe here and which I claim from you, Sir, to be able to pay off this debt as well as those which will follow and on which I could not then give you any information, as I was myself in the dark about the amount of interest on a sum of Rs. 2211 due to the Camotins brokers and of which I did not know the time of payment, as also of the items of extraordinary and indispensable expenditure which have taken place since, namely :

1785		Rs.
Dec. 20	For the subsistence of two sailors which the Camotins made me pay by the last bill of 30th May 1786, of which I attach a copy.	12
1786		Rs.

Feb. 1	For subsistence furnished by the Camotins to M. L'Echevin formerly 2nd Lieutenant in the Regiment of the Isle of France and paid by me.	42½
May 30	For the interest for 7 months of a sum of Rs. 2211 at 10% per annum.	129
June 20	Bill given by M. Geslin, Infantry Lieutenant, for the expenses which this officer incurred at the Darbar of Nizam Ali while delivering the letters of M. Le Vicomte de Souillac to the Subhedar. A copy is attached.	45
May 1	For the exchange of a sum of Rs. 8,950 mentioned above.	525
June 25	New palanquin	300
July 1	Renovation of the cowl and house reparations	72
		<hr/> 1,126½ <hr/>

I must again point out to you, Sir, that the indispensable expenses of the mission amount to an expenditure of about Rs. 225 per month, besides the salary fixed by the (French) Court, which will come, from the month of January 1786 till the end of September of this year, to a sum of Rs. 2,025 or about, the excess of salary which you mentioned to me and which you yourself recognised, Sir, as insufficient by your letter of 8th March last.

This sum of Rs. 2,025 added to that of Rs. 1,126½ mentioned above, makes a total of Rs. 3,151½

By adding this sum of Rs. 3,151½ to that of about Rs. 3,198 for the salary announced during the months of April, May, June, July, August and September of this year, at the rate of Rs. 533 per month, makes a total of Rs. 6,349½ which I shall owe at the end of September next.

I request you, Sir, to kindly take into consideration the position in which I am, and order, if it is possible, the payment of this sum of Rs. 6,349 for the end of September next.

I am fully aware, Sir, that you are authorized to send me only 16,000 frs. which are granted to me by the Court, but you are very assuredly convinced of the insufficiency of this salary to fulfil the requirements of my Residency here; and I can solemnly declare to you that neither M. de Bussy nor M. Le Vicomte de Souillac ever asked me by their orders not to exceed these 16,000 frs., convinced as they were undoubtedly of the impossibility to satisfy the indispensable requirements of the mission with this modest salary.

I have already explained this excess of expenditure over the salary fixed by the Minister by a letter of 3rd November 1784 to M. Monneron, to whom I was referred by order of the Minister to regulate my account, and recently again by a letter of 29th July 1785 to M. Le Vicomte de Souillac, of which here is an extract concerning the item of expenditure.

“In spite of the reduction I am making in all the items of my expenditure, it is impossible for me to spend less than Rs. 750 to Rs. 800 per month in order to fulfil the object of the mission, I mean all the expenditure included, namely : harkaras, interpreter, Persian and Marathi writers, palanquin, sipahees for my security, horses, domestic expenses, food and maintenance of an elephant presented to me by the Regency, an item alone involving an expenditure of Rs. 150 per month.”

“Please be convinced, M. Le Vicomte, that there is not a single rupee of expenditure which is not necessitated for the indispensable requirements of the mission, which will be easy for you to see by the details in which I have entered with M. Monneron. I would very much wish that M. Le Maréchal de Castries was as convinced as you are that the necessary expenses are so large.”

“The Minister appears to me to have fixed at 16,000 frs. per year all the expenditure concerning the expenses of the mission. You see, M. Le Vicomte, whatever reduction I may make

even after the disposal of my elephant, the impossibility of meeting the domestic expenses with this modest salary. I am sure that when you have made your representations to M. Le Maréchal de Castries on the necessity of a different salary, the Minister will give fresh orders in this connection.”

I have also communicated to M. Le Vicomte de Souillac about the travelling expenses which amounted to more than Rs. 200 per month, in excess of the expenses of Residentsip mentioned above, independently of the purchase of the animals for transport which would amount to Rs. 1,400 or Rs. 1,500.

M. Le Vicomte de Souillac did not write to me anything about this item of funds in the letter of 4th October which I received at Goa, in reply to my letter of 29th July 1785. But he informed me that he sent my letters with his packets for the Minister by the flute La Seine which must have gone straight to France. The Minister’s reply will not be long now, and I hope to receive some time in October next final orders from M. Le Maréchal de Castries concerning my Residentsip with the Marathas as well as those relating to the salary which will no doubt be announced in my connection, if my Residentsip in the interior is judged necessary.

I thank you, Sir, for writing to the Minister about the insufficiency of my salary. That will be an additional proof for M. Le Maréchal of the modest salary allocated to fulfil the object of a necessarily expensive mission.

In your letter of 8th March, you tell me, Sir, to see that I do not exceed the salary fixed by the Minister, without fresh orders from the Court. I have done the impossible to urge the Regency to take back the elephant which it had presented to me, in order at least to avoid an expense of Rs. 150 per month. But whatever I could do, I could not succeed in it, and I cannot find a way to dispose of it, either because of the rains or perhaps because of the secret orders of the Darbar, no one comes forward in spite of the steps and proposals which I had made in an underhand way. I know the bad effect which it is bound to produce here, but I would have overlooked this consideration, if I could have disposed of it, as this was the only means I could find to reduce the expense. You see, Sir, my embarrassment, and what the Regency can think of such an economy.

Herewith is attached a bill from the Camotins brokers which makes a mention of what is due to them. You will notice in it, Sir, that these brokers have forced me to pay the interest on Rs. 15,000 which you made them pay at Madras. This interest amounts to Rs. 562½. I was in such a hurry to pay off my debt to them that I did not notice that this interest had to be paid, and I settled my account with them. But I have written to them since that I shall certainly receive the total amount; thus I have not made any mention of it here.

You will also see, Sir, in this bill an item of Rs. 488, but it is an item which concerns me personally. Consequently, I do not include it in the account. My bonus of Rs. 750 partly served to pay for this item, and the balance to buy here articles necessary for my upkeep, for, I must not conceal from you, Sir, that from the expenditure of the mission mentioned above, not a single farthing is devoted to my upkeep, and that my bonus alone served to fulfil this need.

Excuse me, Sir, if I have entered into all these details with you. I have done it only with the greatest reluctance. But I thought at the same time that it was necessary that you should be posted with them. My cause could not be in better hands.

I was very much grieved to hear about the death of M. Baudouin; this staff-officer honoured me with his confidence, his esteem, and I venture to say, with his friendship. He has paid the debt of nature, that which I owe to his memory is to regret him for ever.

I also learnt by way of Basra that the correspondence of the continent of India had been entrusted to M. le Comte de Boistel, with M. de Launay as his deputy. I have also received intimation about packets which concern me, and which left by way of the Cape. I am very impatiently awaiting

them, for, I have not received any direct news either from the Minister or from my relatives since 27th August 1784. I do not understand anything about this interruption. I hope, Sir, that when my letters reach Pondicherry, you would kindly charge my harkaras with them. I swear to you that it is a great service you will render me, for, it is very painful to be deprived of the news of one's own relatives, when one is at the end of the world and in the interior of a continent always with one's own self.

Allow me, Sir, to congratulate you on the new grade which the king has conferred on you and which you were kind enough to communicate to me. I shall always be delighted to learn all the nice things that might befall you and contribute to your happiness and to your satisfaction.

I have the honour to be, etc.

Sd. Montigny.

Poona, July 26, 1786.

No. 10

Sir,

At the very moment when I was about to dispatch my harkaras, bearers of the letter of 28th June, which I had the honour to address you, Nana Fadnis invited me to the Darbar to communicate to me the news of the very impending arrival of the Raja of Nagpur to Poona, charged, as I had already told you, with the mediation sought by Tipu between this Nawab and the allied powers. Once again I postponed the departure of my courier, since the Regent desired it, to be in a position to convey to you anything important that was going to be decided on the subject of peace or war.

In actual fact, the Raja of Nagpur arrived on the 7th of this month with a Waquil of the Nawab to make proposals on behalf of his master, which, in substance, consist in paying 50 lakhs of rupees to the Regency and restoring Nargund, Dharwar, etc. But the Regent undoubtedly expected more advantageous terms and, as he was not at all satisfied with those which were made to him by Tipu, he dismissed his Waquil by telling him that the Regency wanted to have all the territory of which the Marathas were formerly in possession, that is to say, the territory lying between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra. As Tipu's envoy was not at all authorised to give more extension to the proposals with which he was entrusted, he retired to the camp of the Raja of Nagpur, which is today at a Koss from Poona. This Raja had his audience of leave, and is to shortly leave for Nagpur; he has left his son with the Maratha army.

Following this attitude, it appears to day that war is more decided than ever. I shall be very careful, Sir, in conveying to you gradually all the details arising out of this state of affairs.

It appears from all this conduct of Tipu that this Nawab is trying to wean the Marathas from the alliance of the Subhedar. But the Regency seems to understand its interests so well as not to be imposed upon, and knows fully well that after the fall of the Subhedar, Tipu would be a great cause of concern to it, a consideration which leads these two powers to be very careful about their mutual interests.

In 15 day's time I am likely to receive fresh harkaras from Delhi, and I shall have the honour to communicate to you something definite that will come to my knowledge concerning the camp of sombre. All that I know is that M. Even, formerly commandant of the camp under the orders of Sombre's son, was compelled to retire because of the revolt of the sipahees who no longer wanted to be commanded by him, and that it is today M. Saleur, Infantry Lieutenant, who is invested with the command of this camp, a man very honest, very brave and whom I know for the last ten years.

Tipu has seized Adoni. It is Sayyad Saheb, his uncle, from what I hear, who besieged it and razed the fortifications.

Nana Fadnis has just informed me that I should have one more interview with him before dispatching my harkaras. I think that he is awaiting every moment news from Shinde concerning Tipu Sultan. All the same, I am closing my packet, and I shall write again if he communicates to me something interesting.

I have the honour to be, etc.

Sd. Montigny.

Poona, August 10, 1786.

M. le Vicomte,

I had the honour to inform you by a letter of 30th November of the obstacles which I felt I would meet in the execution of a treaty to be made for a project of a future union with the native princes against our antagonists. The suggestions I made in this regard confirm me more than ever in my opinion. You will be less surprised at it, Sir, when you will notice what I have already conveyed to you with Nana Fadnis by my letter of 16th September about the interview in which this Regent of the Court of Poona said to me that he would not make any eventual treaty with the nation without previously receiving the King's reply to the proposals the Regency had made in 1782. We will find nearly the same attitude on the part of all the princes of India. Despotism does not foresee anything and takes into consideration only the present advantages or at least prompt and clearly demonstrated, and the situation in which we are here, combined with the comparative picture of that of the English, is not calculated, according to them, to urge them to enter into agreements the execution of which is, in their opinion, too distant and too uncertain, and all that can be said to them on this point does not produce any sensible change in their way of envisaging matters.

I see only one way which could perhaps induce them to enter into provisional agreements : it would be to make a tour in the different Courts of Hindustan and the Deccan, such as I had already proposed to you, and to display ourselves there with some dignity and the customary presents without which one can never succeed in opening up the Darbars so as to be in a position to treat important affairs. But judging from the state of affairs so far, it appears that the Ministry does not wish at all to involve itself into such kind of expenditure. Consequently, I see that we must confine ourselves to study the movements of the Darbars and keep an eye on the activity of the English at the different Courts of India in order to have at least a rough picture of the gradual situation of the political affairs, so that the Ministry is posted with the events in this part of the world, to be in a position to take into consideration, and in due course, matters which, in its opinion, ought to concern its dignity or fix its attention, as it alone can decide what ought to form part of its global views, and pronounce definitely on such interests.

This is, Monsieur le Vicomte, what constitutes and will constitute the basis of my conduct until I receive fresh orders on this subject.

I shall relate in substance what has taken place between the powers of the Deccan since my return to Poona. I attach to it the copies of the letters which I have sent to M. de Cossigny and which contain in greater detail all that you can desire on this point.

When Nana Fadnis had sent me to Goa in the hope that I would meet you there for the object of which I have given you an account at that time, he had promised not to make any movement before my return to Poona. But after the letter which I addressed to him from Goa and from which he learnt that my interview with you, Monsieur le Vicomte, could not take place, and as he no more saw any likelihood of negotiations on this subject or any overture on behalf of Tipu which might tend towards peace, Nana Fadnis followed the course of his project which had always been to induce this Nawab by force or by agreement to return the territory seized from the Regency and pay the tribute which he owed it since several years. The Regent therefore left Poona to meet Nizam Ali Khan, and his interview with the Subhedar took place on 15th April under Yadgir, in which, after many sufficiently sharp differences on both sides the interests were reconciled and the result of the conferences held on this subject was therefore to enter into a vigorous campaign against Tipu. After this decision, arrived at between the Subhedar and the Regent, Nizam Ali left for Hyderabad and left Tawer Jang, his generalissimo, at the head of a corps of 22,000 men, of which half cavalry, to operate in concert with the troops of the Regency of Poona.

The siege of Badami was resolved upon and the Marathas opened the trench on 3rd April and on 10th May the fortress was stormed. Badami was handed over to Raste, a member of the Regency.

Tukoji Holkar, another member of the Regency, seized Kittoor. Ganeshpant Behere, a Maratha chief, ran to the succour of the Nawab of Savnur, and forced Burhanuddin, brother-in-law of Tipu, to retire to Nagar after a very brisk fight, and by this vigorous action saved the fortress and the Nawab of Savnur whom the army of Burhanuddin wanted to seize.

Parsharambhau, another member of the Regency, laid siege to Ramdurg, situated at 10 koss from Badami. On the day of the capture of this last place, Tipu appeared before Adoni, that is to say, on 25th May. On the 26th he plundered the peth; on the 27th he opened the trenches and finally laid siege to this fortress which he has just seized. The Marathas are today almost masters of the whole territory lying between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra. The affairs of Tipu appear to take a bad turn so far. The return of the dry season will reveal things in a clearer perspective.

Most perfect harmony seems to reign between the Subhedar and the Regency of Poona to oppose the ambitious designs of Tipu, and this Nawab has today ranged against himself all the forces of the Regency, of the Raja of Nagpur and of Nizam Ali as well as of all those who are dependent on these three powers.

As I have a very large number of things to communicate to you, Monsieur le Vicomte, on this subject as well as on the present situation of the Deccan and of Hindustan, I can do nothing better than attach here a copy of the letter of 16 pages, dated 28th June which I have written to M. de Cossigny and in which I have informed him with the greatest detail about all the matters that can, in my opinion, interest our administration. The copy of this letter attached to that of 26th July will give you the exact picture of the situation in this continent from the date of my return to Poona to the present day. I shall be very prompt in conveying to you the sequel which cannot but be very interesting.

I now pass on to the packet of Delhi which you would have received long ago, Monsieur le Vicomte, if I had found a sure occasion. But considerations, which I shall communicate to you in the course of this letter, prevented me from sending it to you earlier. This packet contains the reply of Shinde to your letter and a letter from the Emperor who has conferred on you distinguished titles at his Court. I attach herewith the copy of the letters which they have also written to me, with a letter from M. Even addressed to you with a flying seal, as well as a cornelian on which the latter got engraved the Persian titles which the Padshah has conferred on you. He intended to send the patents of these titles by a sure occasion, but shortly after the dispatch of his letter, he was obliged to quit the command of the party by a revolt of the sipahees caused by the failure of payment from what is reported to me. But I cannot conceal from you, Monsieur le Vicomte, that the Europeans of the party have addressed me a letter signed in a body which shows their discontent at the conduct of M. Even. M. Saleur, Infantry Lieutenant, whom I had the honour to present to you during my passage at the Isle of France in 1781, invested to day with the command of the party of Sombre, writes to me in the same spirit as also Mme Sombre herself. I have shown these letters to M. Godard, [\[M. Godard was dispatched to Poona by Cossigny to get first hand information about the activities of the English at this Court, and especially about the English proposal to post a brigade commanded by Europeans in the service of the Maratha Government.\]](#) Infantry Captain, recently dispatched to Poona by the order of M. de Cossigny with letters for the Regency. On the other hand, M. Even has some partisans, actually out of the party, who write to me in his favour. He himself has tried to exculpate himself from the serious complaints which have been brought against him. I did not think it appropriate to reply to the letter signed in a body by the Europeans of the party, as I could not or, in my opinion, should not be judge in an affair with very complicated roots and which has taken place at a distance of 500 koss from the point which I occupy, and which, moreover, does not concern me at all.

On the representations of a Maratha chief, who is interested in M. Even, Mme Sombre has given to the latter a small command in one of her jahgirs with a salary of Rs. 150 per month. This is the actual position of in which M. Even finds himself. Perhaps he will get out of it if he can succeed in

conciliating the Europeans and the sipahees of the party whom he has alienated. I wish it this way; he is a brave person whose conduct in the past has always been irreproachable.

Two reasons prevented me, Monsieur le Vicomte, from sending you this packet earlier. 1^o. The uncertainty in which I was that it might not reach you with surety as it had to travel a distance of 80 koss on the territory of the English, and as I did not wish to compromise Shinde or the Emperor by exposing their letters which precaution they always recommend to me. The second consideration is that I took a marked interest in the promotion of M. Even, and as I knew that he was out of office immediately after the arrival of these letters, and as I continuously hoped to learn that after a vindication of the facts set forth against him, he could recover the command of the party, I impatiently awaited this event. But the latest harkaras, who arrived at the end of July, confirm to me that he is no longer in office and that it is M. Saleur who has succeeded him in the command. Sombre's son has placed himself at the head of his party. Consequently, I am profiting by the very sure occasion of M. Godard to send you the packet from Delhi.

I revert to the letters which Shinde and the Padshah have written to me. They make a favourable mention of M. Even, but he was then at the head of the party of Sombre which put him in a position to play a sort of a role. His position is quite different today. I pass on to the essential. The letters which Shinde and the Emperor have addressed to me will reveal to you in general the favourable attitude of the Court of Delhi, and drop a hint of their secret desire to see us shortly contributing to the fall of the common enemy. Perhaps we might induce them, even in times of peace, to enter into provisional agreements if circumstances required it. But we must appear there at least with some dignity, without which it would be difficult to cut through the Darbars of this Court to treat affairs of some importance.

In any case, I think that it would always be essential to appear at this Court, may be only to thwart the designs of the English and keep an eye on their conduct which aims to day only at following the old project of Mr. Hastings. The Emperor's son continues to stay at Lucknow under their protection, and the Council is eagerly soliciting Shinde to obtain the town of Agra and its dependencies to serve as an apanage to this young prince, heir presumptive to the Crown. The Company proposes to lead him there at the head of an army, which would put the English, if this plan were executed, in a position to direct the movements of the Court of Delhi, according to their private views. This is, Monsieur le Vicomte, the situation of affairs on this side, and which is no doubt bound to fix the attention of our Ministry if they preserve their views on this country, as there is no doubt about it.

I cannot help making an observation on this subject : it is that it would be, in my opinion, very dangerous to rely on what the English say and write about their situation and their conduct in India in London as well as here. The public papers which I am in a position to see every three years, either from Europe or from Calcutta, do not contain almost a word of truth, and I have no doubt that they are trying to delude all the cabinets of Europe on the real progress of their activity and the aim of their ambition in this part of the world.

I shall shortly convey to you, Monsieur le Vicomte, the subsequent situation of affairs which are going to take place, immediately after the rains in Hindustan and the Deccan. The scene which ought to unfold itself at this period, is bound to be very interesting. I shall attach to it my letters for M. le Maréchal de Castries which I would request you, Sir, to kindly send to France with your packets for the Court.

I am very impatiently awaiting news from the Minister regarding my position here as well as from you, Sir, of which I am deprived since 4th October.

I have the honour to remain with the most absolute and most respectful attachment,

Monsieur le Vicomte,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

Montigny.

P.S.—Monsieur le Vicomte, I introduced M. Godard to Nana Fadnis, and this officer has been a witness to the replies of the Regent, that this Court does not at all intend to call the English to their assistance. I shall know more about it at the end of October.

Herewith is attached the extract of a letter written to me by M. Even, on which I have made some observations which I submit to your judgment./M.

Copy of a letter from M. Godard to M. de Cossigny Governor of Pondicherry.

Poona, August 13, 1786.

My General,

I left Hyderabad on 13th July. The rains and bad roads prevented me from arriving here before the 8th August. I am staying with M. de Montigny, to whom my arrival gave all the greater pleasure as it was useful to him in his relations with the Regency. I delivered to him the packets from you. On the next day, he introduced me to Nana Fadnis, to whom I also delivered letters with which I was entrusted. Those addressed to Haripant Phadke were dispatched to the army.

In pursuance of your orders and your instructions, my General, I conducted myself here only in accordance with the counsels of M. de Montigny. This is what he advised me to say to the Sarkar and what he himself said : “that the Commandant of Pondicherry had received the information that the English ambassador, who had just arrived at Poona, was, according to the report, only a fore-runner of an English brigade which was shortly to leave Bombay and unite with the forces of the Marathas to make war with Tipu; that M. de Cossigny, Commandant at Pondicherry, could not believe this news, since it is contrary to the treaty of peace, but that with a view to getting confirmation on this point, he had dispatched me to the Regency to represent to it first, and next to give it to understand that an infringement of the treaty on the part of the English, could compel other orders on the part of the King of France. M. de Montigny also advised me to say that it was to get assurances on the movements of the English that I was dispatched and finally to deliver letters which I offered to Nana Fadnis.”

This Regent replied to me : “We have important affairs in the whole of Hindustan; it is not more surprising to have at this Court an English ambassador than to see a Waquil of any other power, that, moreover, there was no other Englishman (at this Court)”. He next asked me about our situation and the position of our forces at Pondicherry. I replied to him in accordance with your instructions and as I had done it at the Court of Nizam Ali Khan.

M. de Montigny terminated the session by saying that I would return to you as early as possible to give you an account and to reassure you against all the false reports, that it was certain that you would not take a wrong step, but that it was also for the Court of Poona to see that it did not take a wrong one, in its turn. Since this time, Nana Fadnis could not see the English ambassador; religious ceremonies and inauspicious days prevented him from doing so.

This morning, the 13th, we were invited to the residence of Amritrao Pethe, a member of the Regency, guardian of the Prince and of his treasures; the Diwan Nana Fadnis was present. After exchanging many questions and answers which had as their goal almost the same object, although more or less searching, M. de Montigny asked definitely whether they would receive succour from the English. The silence, the expression on the face of the Diwan and of several chiefs seemed to proclaim their annoyance at the fact that we could believe such a thing. But the Asiatics, are so untrustworthy that M. de Montigny is quite convinced that they would accept any proposal from the English if they were not afraid that we might take some step in favour of Tipu. That is indeed what M. de Montigny wants to impress upon them.

There is same preparation here as at Hyderabad for the commencement of the impending campaign. M. de Montigny is writing to you on all matters. As my mission is fulfilled, I shall return. I shall certainly find your orders at Hyderabad which will indicate to me if you deem it advisable that I should stay there till the commencement of fresh operations. Otherwise, I shall return to Pondicherry, ready to recommence my journeys.

M. de Montigny was very happy at my arrival at Poona, because it was useful to him in his relations with the Regency, and because he was in a position to open his heart to me on everything that affects him, convinced that I would not conceal it from you. He showed me the instructions of M. le Maréchal de Castries, by which he is ordered to correspond with the chiefs of India and particularly and as often as possible with the Minister. After reading this and going through his correspondence, he said : “You see my exactness! Well, my stay appears to be expensive to everyone. Messrs de Souillac and de Cossigny have told me that my salary was fixed by the Minister at 16,000 frs. M. de Cossigny tells me to be patient pending the Court’s orders, that he could not send me money if I exceeded this sum. However, I owe five to six thousand rupees. How can I pay them? This is, he said to me, the reward of my uprightness with all and my confidence in some persons.” I reassured M. de Montigny, my General, by telling him that since his last bill of Rs. 15,000 has been met, they would indeed still pay this expense, that in fact, at the time of my departure from Pondicherry, I had left you without money. This is, my General, all that I can point out to you in particular. I have only to congratulate myself on meeting and talking to M. de Montigny, he is loved and esteemed in Poona, and by many other persons whom he has known during his journey in the interior.

I remain respectfully,

(Signed) Godard.

Poona, August 14, 1786.

No. 11

Monsieur le Maréchal,

I had the honour to inform you by my letter of 15th [\[A mistake for 18th February.\]](#) February about my return to Poona and about the political situation at this period. Since then, the interview announced between the Regent of this Court and the Subhedar took place on 15th April under Yadgir, where after many sufficiently sharp differences on both sides, the respective interests were reconciled, and the result of the conferences held on this subject was to enter into a vigorous campaign to force, willy nilly, Tipu Sultan to make peace on reasonable conditions, that is to say, to return to the Marathas the territory which was seized from them and to pay them the tribute which is due to them for five years.

After this decision arrived at between the Subhedar and the Regent, Nizam Ali left for Hyderabad and left Tahaver Jang, one of his generals, at the head of a corps of 22,000 men to operate in concert with the troops of the Regency.

The siege of Badami was resolved upon and after 54 days of open trench the Marathas stormed it on 25th [\[A mistake for 21st May.\]](#) May as also several other places. To day the Marathas are masters of the territory included between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra. The war appears more decided than ever, and Tipu's affairs are up till now taking all the worse turn as he has alienated all the legitimate powers of the Deccan by his ambition and tyranny, and if this Nawab does not shortly adopt means of conciliation with the Regency of Poona and the Subhedar, he will be in the greatest embarrassment immediately after the rains. The English are raising many sipahees in Bombay, Bancout, Surat and Cambay. We yet do not know the destination of these troops. But if the English direct their forces against Tipu, this power will be destroyed, for, it is impossible for it to resist such a considerable mass.

I solicit you, my Lord, to kindly cast a glance on my letters Nos. 9, 10, 11 of my correspondence with M. de Cossigny. I have given a most detailed account to this Governor of the very critical situation of the affairs which today occupy the powers of India, and I venture to think that they deserve your attention.

The Council of Calcutta appears inclined to follow the old projects of Mr. Hastings, formerly Governor-General of Bengal. The English have already earnestly demanded from Shinde, generalissimo of the Emperor, the town of Agra and its dependencies for the eldest son of the Padshah whom they continue to keep under their tutelage [\[It is a fact that the English unsuccessfully tried to secure through Shinde, an apanage for Jawan Bakht, the eldest son of the Emperor who had fled and taken shelter with the English.\]](#). The war, which is preparing in the Deccan against Tipu, prevents this Maratha chief from pursuing his plans with all the vigour which he previously displayed. It is unfortunate that Tipu Sultan should not understand the common interest sufficiently well to stop his unjust ventures against the Regency and the Subhedar, for, whatever you may say, his violent conduct and unbridled ambition are the cause of the war which is taking place today in the Deccan and from which the English alone will reap a definite advantage by raising their power in India on the ruins of those who are exhausting themselves today for momentary interests.

I have done my utmost at the Court of the Regency to open its eyes to the common interest, but the members of the Council always replied to me that they were quite willing to make peace with Tipu if this Nawab wanted to be just towards them as well as towards Nizam Ali, that they were fully aware that this war could only be ruinous to all; but that they were indeed forced to have recourse to arms to vindicate their rights as incontestable as theirs, and that finally Tipu was the only aggressor in this war.

This is in substance, my Lord, the political situation to day. In two or three months everything will be cleared up, as also the destination of the troops which the English are raising on both sides of the Peninsula. I shall keep my eyes open on all these matters as well as on others and I shall be very prompt, Monsieur le Maréchal, in communicating to you all interesting happenings that are likely to result from this situation.

The English are leaving no stone unturned at the Court of the Regency to obtain my dismissal, but it appears to me certain today that they will not succeed in it.

I am very impatiently awaiting, my Lord, your orders on what else I should do in India.

I remain respectfully,

Monsieur le Maréchal,
Your very humble and very obedient servant,
Montigny.

Poona, August 14, 1786.

Sir,

I beg to inform you that M. Godard arrived on the 8th of this month at Poona, where, after informing me about the object of his mission, I showed him my correspondence and the state of affairs since your arrival in India till to day. I introduced him to the Regent on the 10th and to Amritiao Pethe, a member of the Council of Regency, on the 11th. This officer saw and heard all that he could desire on the object of his journey. He will give you an account of it.

I must tell you, Sir, that the arrival of M. Godard has produced a very good effect, first in demonstrating to the Regency that we were giving effect to our views, next in thwarting the project of the English to furnish troops to the Marathas against Tipu Sultan, a project which they are ceaselessly pursuing with Nana Fadnis since the Residency of the English envoy (Mr. Mallet) and about which I informed you by my letter of 28th June. I had an explanation on this subject at the Darbar in the presence of M. Godard. He as well as I, we saw how they have rejected this idea. The return of the dry season will reveal to us the outcome of the conspiracy of the English who, besides, are raising many sipahees in Bombay, Bancot, Surat and Cambay. As the report goes, three warships have recently arrived at Bombay with some landing troops and many officers, who have remained on board. I shall shortly know how the matters stand on this point.

I think, Sir, that you should urgently hear M. Godard not only on the situation of affairs in the interior but also on an infinite number of others which can always be dealt with very imperfectly by way of correspondence. And if you intended to send him back immediately afterwards to Hyderabad and Poona, he would then notice the effect of the latest resolution of the Courts. He would hear in the Darbar all that can have reference to this important matter and would give you an account of it directly. I think he is quite capable of fulfilling your views in this respect, and perhaps there would then be matters which would be difficult for me to treat properly in writing without devoting to the events packets which I would have the honour to address you.

I am so convinced, Sir, that you were only seeking to obtain information on the internal politics of this continent that I did not think it advisable to pass in silence over the observation which I take the liberty to make to you and which I submit to your judgment.

I thought that a journey was essential enough to assume the responsibility to déclassé it to the Regency and demonstrate to it the eagerness which the French Ministry displays in watching the steps of the English at the court of the native princes, and forces, in some sort, the Marathas to adopt a moderate conduct on this activity on our part, and finally, to find out their subsequent views towards Tipu Sultan.

I do not know, Sir, if you will approve the conduct which I have adopted in this respect, but the welfare of the nation, in my opinion, occasioned this attitude. Whatever it may be, you know better than I about the possible views of the (French) Court on this country. But they are directed towards it, and I think we can hardly pay too much attention to the attitude of the English, and keep a watch over the Darbars. Now, without Residency or journey in the interior, it is physically impossible to fulfil this object, at least, I see it this way.

I was very much delighted with the arrival of M. Godard at Poona. The intelligence, frankness and the zeal of this officer for the King's service and very particularly his personal attachment for you, Sir, have enabled him to give you an exact and faithful account about all that can be interesting for you to know on the affairs of the interior as well as on those who are charged with following their thread and from whose reports you can form your opinion.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Montigny.

Pondicherry, September 7, 1786.

(No. 59)

My Lord,

The latest news that I have received from the Nawab Tipu Sultan dates back to the 24th and 26th June. I haven't received any of more recent date from our Waquil, resident at the Court of this Prince, or from M. de Lalée or even from M. Pierre Monneron. This silence arouses only my impatience without causing me any anxiety, because I presume that Tipu Sultan is contemplating some operation for which secrecy is necessary for him for its success. In fact, if the success of his project depends upon secrecy which can be observed on it, this Prince possesses this talent in a superior degree. To day there is such order in his army and in all his frontier posts that during the last two months, it can be asserted that not a single person has come out of his territory, who is in a position to give some information about the operations which he is contemplating. All the Killedars, amaldars, chiefs or commandants of his frontier posts have orders to arrest all European or Indian emissaries, all articles, packets and letters, with the exception of those from the Commandant of Pondicherry. About a week back I received this advice from the commandant at Atour who apologises to me for having arrested my harkaras, bearers of my letters, on a very formal order which he had received from the Nawab even to arrest generally any person who was passing. This same amaldar informs me that he has just received fresh orders in explanation of the previous ones by which he (his master) recommends to him to pass on to him his (Cossigny's) letters, and send them to him with all expedition; this has been done by the dispatch of a camel runner.

I would have been very anxious, my Lord, to give you information about the projects of the Nawab Tipu by the Company's ship Le Calonne which is about to sail and which is returning straight to Europe. I shall no doubt soon receive news from him, but in the meantime, I am compelled to say that Tipu is the most singular being in the world. It is not because I am afraid that it is me from whom he wants to keep his projects and his operations secret. Therefore, my Lord, I repeat that his silence causes me more impatience than anxiety.

I know with certainty, my Lord, because I know it from the very Darbar of the Subhedar of the Deccan, that Tipu Sultan had got the better of Nizam Ali and the Marathas; that after being repulsed twice while attacking Adoni, he finally made himself master of it; that he obliged his enemies to recross the river Krishna; that this river now being in floods, he is today master of all the territory on this side of the Krishna.

Adoni is the capital of the province of this name which forms the Kingdom of the nephew of Nizam Ali who is at the same time his son-in-law. Adoni was the only base of operations which the armies of the Marathas and of Nizam Ali could have, which makes the campaign of Tipu as glorious as advantageous. So here is, my Lord, Tipu completely master of the campaign, and probably, in spite of the monsoon, he will return to his quarters only when he has seized the whole territory situated on this side of the river Krishna. The province of Guntur or Condavir, which belongs to Nizam Ali, one of the richest and the most fertile on the Coromandel Coast, will probably soon come under his domination. I am inclined to believe that that is the object of his ambition. This conquest, like that of the rest of the territory, will be easy for him, but as, after all, Condavir adjoins the possessions of the English, I do not even doubt that it forms at this moment the subject of their solicitude to Madras and the motive which makes them take such great precautions. If my conjectures are well-founded, we must not be surprised if some revolution takes place and if Tipu invades a part of the English possessions to the north of the Coromandel Coast. An event of this nature would force them no doubt to take the field. I have not the least doubt that if they have some intention to give succour to the Marathas and Nizam, provided, however, Tipu thus approaches their possessions, they will seize this

pretext. I confess to you, my Lord, that as it is difficult to sift truth from falsehood, I would be very much embarrassed if I saw the English take the field.

How shall I know if it is to defend themselves against Tipu or if it is to give succour to the princes who are his enemies and their allies? I had the honour to demand from you in my letter No. 51, instructions about the conduct I would have to adopt in this circumstance, as the treaty of peace said that neither the French nor the English will give any succour to the Princes of India, etc.

Among the letters, which I have received from Hyderabad and according to which I informed you about the capture of Adoni and about the situation of the armies of the three powers, there is one from Nizam Ali, one from M. Aumont and a third from M. de Raymond. These three letters are dated 1st August. The letter of Nizam Ali, after the customary compliments and assurances for the continuation of a most solid friendship between his Sarkar and the Emperor of France seeks to lodge complaints that M. de Lalée should remain in the service of Tipu. As he had already written to me on the same subject, my reply was the same as that which I have mentioned in my letter No. 51.

The letter from M. Aumont apprises me about the capture of Adoni, the news of which has created the greatest sensation at Hyderabad. The Sarkar of the Prince, he says, is in the greatest consternation and the affairs are in the greatest disorder; some people there speak of continuing the war; at the same time there are others who are inclined to solicit peace from Tipu. He adds that there is indeed no steadiness in the decisions of the Subhedar himself; that he is all the more affected as he considered Adoni as the key which defended his Kingdom on this side of the Krishna and the gate to all his expeditions in this part of the Peninsula. M. Aumont, although attached to this Prince, confesses that among the Darbar of Asia, that of Nizam Ali is today the weakest, the most timid and in which the greatest crime and treachery are committed.

M. de Raymond, without going into any political detail, confirms to me the disorder which the capture of Adoni has created at Hyderabad. Besides, there are several letters which mention this event. I also know that the English are posted with it, which fact leads me to think that they are occupied with making some movement to assist Nizam Ali and the Marathas, their allies, and that it is in pursuance of this event that they have ordered the augmentation of troops, and that all the preparations, which M. de Fresne has noticed and which are being made at Madras, etc. are aimed at stopping Tipu Sultan in his enterprises somehow or other, and preventing him from invading all the territory that lies on this side of the Krishna and which belongs to Nizam Ali and the English power.

I remain most respectfully,

My Lord,
Your very humble and very obedient servant,
Cossigny.

Copy of the reply of M. de Cossigny to M. de Montigny, Resident at Poona

Pondicherry, October 7, 1786.

I received, Sir, on the same day the three letters you wrote to me under Nos. 9, 10 and 11, dated 28th June, 26th July and 14th August 1786. I have just given an account of these to M. Le Maréchal de Castries and to M. Le Vicomte de Souillac, and I have sent them a copy of your three letters. This is all they could wish for on the situation of the Court at which you are residing, and which corroborates for them a part of the matters about which I have already informed them. Finally, Sir, I think that your letters will demonstrate the necessity of your continuation in your residentship. I would be very sorry, personally, if the Minister's orders were such as you appear to wish for. But on the contrary, I think that from the letters of M. Le Vicomte de Souillac to M. Le Maréchal de Castries, and from what I myself have written, the Minister will be convinced of the importance of your mission; that the favours, which you deserve, will be granted to you, and that, at the very least, they will feel the necessity of the compulsory expenses which you are obliged to make, and which, very certainly, you cannot meet with the modest salary which is allocated to you. I, therefore, exhort you, Sir, to have patience. Convince yourself that all the persons charged with public affairs have good need of it.

I shall, Sir, run through your three letters to reply to them.

It would be desirable that you were a little more free to dispatch harkaras when you have some interesting news to convey to me, since it is true that I did not receive any letter from you so long as the campaign of the Marathas and of Nizam Ali against Tipu lasted. Fortunately however, I was posted with it by other channels and I could successively give account to M. Le Maréchal de Castries.

I was, in due time, informed of the interview of Nana Fadnis with Nizam Ali, about the return of the latter to Hyderabad and of the former to Poona.

I also learnt about the capture of Badami, etc., etc. I was posted with the tenfold loss of men on both sides. I would be happy to believe that your version is the best.

For some time there were in Badami one commandant for the Marathas and one for Nizam. I know since that the town and forts were indeed delivered to Raste.

It is, Sir, more than one month ago that I gave an account of all these happenings to M. Le Maréchal. I, however, think that he will be delighted to read in your letter the details which you give me.

I was similarly informed of the arrival of Tipu before Adoni from 25th May to 29th June, and that he became master of this place.

As you say, Sir, the matter with which you ought to occupy yourself most is to upset, if it is possible, the ambitious plan of the English; and we would indeed succeed in it, if by conciliating the respective interests of the Indian princes, we induced them to unite themselves against our common enemy. It is towards that end alone that I am employing all the springs of the politics of which I am capable. I am quite convinced that among the Sarkars of India, that of Poona is the one in which everything is treated with the greatest secrecy and method.

I could never have believed that the Marathas would wait for your return from Goa to take the field. That is what I wrote at the time to M. Le Maréchal.

You will see, Sir, in the letter which I am writing by this same occasion to Nana Fadnis, of which I am sending you a translated copy, that I am giving him intimation of what you have said to the Regency on the proposals which the English have made to it. Six months ago I gave an account to M. Le Maréchal de Castries of the designs of the English on this subject and that I have asked for his orders in case they made such an infringement of the last treaty of peace.

It is very natural that the Marathas should have wished to avenge their allies from whom Tipu had seized Nargund and whose territory he was devastating, but the latter asserts that by punishing some princes who had essentially failed in their duty to him, he had never tried to attack the power of the Marathas, and he daily complains of their ingratitude, since his father had helped them in a very critical circumstance.

Besides, Sir, what I could say to you on those who were the aggressors or were not so, is a matter by itself very immaterial.

Peace and war are made by all the potentates of the world only when their interests, well or badly understood, are involved in them.

I shall be extremely delighted if you would send me your news as often as you can. I have been sending copies of your letters to the Minister, as I also send a copy of all those which I write. I have adopted this course in order to be set right in matters which I could have mis-conceived.

Since more than a month, the Maratha Waquil has been on a pilgrimage and I have not met him. Besides, this one is as good as another to reside at Pondicherry.

It is just by an oversight on my part that I did not send you a copy of the letters which I have written to the Regency. I also thought that the originals would be communicated to you. You were right in writing to me frankly about it; this will not happen in future. You will find herewith a translated copy of the letter which I am writing to Nana Fadnis.

I read most carefully all what you have written to me on the expenses, which you are obliged to incur. I have conferred over them with M. de Moracin, and we are agreed that you should draw a bill of exchange on the Treasury of Pondicherry for the sum which is necessary for you. Although we are not yet very affluent, we are a little more comfortable than when I wrote to you to see that you do not exceed your salary. We were then, you can believe it, more than embarrassed to defray the smallest running expenses.

All what I have just written to you also applies to your letter of 26th July.

I am impatiently awaiting the arrival of M. Godard, and the letters from Delhi which you have announced to me and which you announced to me more than six months ago. Unfortunately again, they can leave only in January or February, for you know that because of the bad weather, our roadstead is abandoned from the end of October to January.

I am obliged to you for the good reception you have given to M. Godard. His mission was none other than to carry my letters to you, and I had completely referred him to your orders. As a matter of fact, he is a brave and honest officer whom I like and esteem much.

The latest news which we had from Europe is dated 26th April; at this time there was no semblance of war.

As M. Le Vicomte de Souillac had asked for his recall, he obtained it, but we do not yet know the name of the officer who is to replace him.

I wish, Sir, that you receive some good news. I shall be extremely delighted to send it to you.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Cossigny.

C² 172, f. 181-181⁰ & f. 210-211.

Copy of a letter from M. de Cossigny to Nana Fadnis, Chief Maratha Regents, dated October 7, 1786.

After the Compliments.

M. de Montigny has given me news from you. I was delighted to receive it. I profited by the departure of a ship which left for France the very day I received your news, and I conveyed to the Minister of the King, my master, the assurance which M. de Montigny gives me on your behalf and on that of the Regency, of your good intention to always continue and even to draw closer the harmony which has been reigning for such a long time between your Sarkar and the Sarkar of the Emperor of France. Although some people might prejudice you against the good opinion which His Majesty has always had of the brave and powerful Maratha nation, don't believe it at all. These persons, whoever they may be, are your enemies, as much as the French are, on the whole, your friends. I call them your enemies, for, they say nothing and do nothing in all the Sarkars of India except serving their ambition and the desire to enslave you one day. Their power today in Bengal or rather the dependency in which they have placed all the princes of India from Delhi to Madura, is a very striking proof of it. Otherwise, certainly you wish to remain under a delusion.

I am well informed that against the faith of a solemn treaty, they are trying to obtain from you and from Nizam Ali the permission to maintain in your service a corps of troops under the pretext of helping you to destroy Tipu Sultan. But who does not know that it is rather to always possess in the heart of your territory a sure means of satisfying their ambition and to reduce you to the same deplorable state of all the other princes of India whom they keep under their tutelage to the disgrace of all the brave princes in India?

Well, supposing that you and Nizam Ali accepted such an offer, forgetting your interests, do you think that I would not also receive orders to furnish to Tipu and to other Nawabs or Rajas, who are likely to be oppressed, an equal number of men and perhaps double the number of that which they (the english) could furnish you? For, indeed they have today to defend a huge territory, whereas, on the contrary, and you know it well, I have orders not to try to conquer anything, as the Emperor of France is sufficiently powerful with the Kingdoms he possesses in the other parts of the world.

I maintain Waquils, and I am in correspondence with all the Indian princes, and no one can take umbrage at that, as all should rely on the integrity of the French and the generosity of their monarch, who never had any other design, any other desire, than to support the oppressed against the strongest. Beware, O Prince, for yourself, for all the Nawabs, for all the Rajas of India, of the power of the English. It is on them alone that you should keep your eyes open, and perhaps sacrifice, all of you, some personal hatred to unite yourselves against the common enemy.

Pondicherry, October 12, 1786.

My Lord,

I cannot give you a more detailed account of the situation of all the affairs at the Court of Poona than by sending you the three latest letters which I have received from M. de Montigny, that which I received at the same time from M. Godard, my reply to M. de Montigny and the letter which I have just written to Nana Fadnis.

The fear which the Marathas and Nizam Ali have that we might furnish an equal number of troops to Tipu Sultan, will compel them perhaps not to accept the proposals of the English to receive a corps in their service. In the contrary case, I confess to you, my lord, that I would not be little embarrassed to reply to Tipu, who surely would also claim our assistance. For, he knows perfectly well the articles of the last treaty of peace, and it would be difficult for him to convince himself that the English could infringe it, whereas we, on the contrary, would remain idle. This state of affairs would do us an irreparable harm in his mind and in that of all the Indian princes. Long time ago, my Lord, foreseeing such a possibility, I had asked from you orders on this point. I am impatiently awaiting them. It is not that I believe that it is prudent to use reprisals. While waiting for your orders, my Lord, I shall do, without compromising myself and in accordance with the circumstances, all that I can for the best. If I think it necessary, as M. de Montigny appears to desire it, to send back M. Godard to Nizam Ali and to the Marathas, I shall do it.

In several letters and more than six months ago, M. de Montigny announced to me letters from Delhi which he thinks are important. Since he did not venture to risk them by the channel of the harkaras, he has delivered them to M. Godard who cannot arrive here before the bad season, and they can then leave only in January or February.

I remain most respectfully,

My Lord,
Your very humble and very obedient servant,
Cossigny.

Extract of a letter from M. de Montigny to M. de Cossigny

Poona, October 18, 1786.

Sir,

Mr. White's harkaras delivered to me only on the 4th of this month the duplicate of your letter of 12th August. The first copy reached me a few days before. I saw from the details which this letter contains, the anxiety in which you must have naturally been not to receive news from me on the situation of the allied armies and very particularly of that of the Regency of Poona. But what reassures me on this subject is that shortly after the departure of the harkaras which Mr. White dispatched to me, you must have received two of mine, bearers of a packet containing four letters, of which three for you, Sir, and one for M. de Maracin. These letters must have given you full information in the greatest detail about every thing interesting that has taken place concerning the allied armies and the movements of the Darbars since the interview of Nana Fadnis with the Subhedar till the 14th August inclusively.

Since this epoch, nothing interesting has taken place between the armies of the Marathas and of Nizam Ali against Tipu Sultan because of the rainy season. But now the time approaches when the scene is going to unfold, and the big blows dealt. In the meantime, I have just learnt that the advanced units of Tipu had carried away 300 Maratha horsemen and killed many soldiers of the chiefs who formed the advance guard of the Maratha army. The latter also made some seizures. It is reported that Tipu has captured Savnur. The Regent is occupied here in sending men and money to the Maratha army. It indeed appears that the Regency is determined more than ever to vigorously take the field against Tipu immediately after Diwali. I cannot foresee the result of all the preparations which I see. Two more months passed, and we shall begin to see the turn which the affairs will take. Rest assured, Sir, that I shall not lose a moment in communicating to you all that I can learn about them as well as about the fresh revolution which is preparing at the court of Delhi.

About six weeks ago M. Godard left Poona for Hyderabad, I presented him to Nana Fadnis to enable him to take leave of this Regent who delivered to him the reply to your letter. The attitude of the Darbar continues to be the same since this epoch, Nana indeed appears not to wish for English succour, and I have not noticed that he has changed his mind in this respect since the very lively explanation which I believed necessary to have on this subject and which I communicated to you in my letter of 28th June. M. Godard is charged with the packet from Delhi for M. Le Vicomte de Souillac which I take the liberty to recommend to your care. I have apprised M. Godard of the contents of the packet; he will give you an exact account of them.

About three weeks back I sent two harkaras to M. Godard leaving him free to take them to Pondicherry if he deemed it proper. I communicated to him the news which I have just learnt from Bombay. I have received letters from Goa that orders have arrived at Bombay from the Court of London *via* Basra conveying express interdiction to furnish men to the Marathas or march upon Tipu, and orders to re-establish the battalions of sipahees which were invalided when peace was signed. Mr. Bodam of Bombay is to be relieved by a Governor appointed by the king.

I have the honour to be, etc.

Sd. Montigny.

True Copy.

Copy of a letter from M. de Montigny, Resident of the French Nation at Poona, to M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry.

Poona, November 17, 1786.

Sir,

I received only on the 16th of this month your letter of 7th October in reply to the three last ones which I wrote to you under Nos. 9, 10 and 11. One of my harkaras, who fell ill on the way, was the cause of this delay.

Immediately after the perusal of your letter, Sir, as well as of the copy of that which you have addressed to Nana Fadnis, I demanded an audience from the Regent of this Court. But as he is in state at this moment, and moreover, occupied in replying to a courier who has just arrived from the army, he requested me to wait for 4 or 5 days, and that he would then be delighted to see me and hear me on the subject of your letter. I am therefore obliged to suspend for a few days my activity on this subject. Believe me, Sir, there is not a single moment lost during this interval. I am occupied in persuading those, who enjoy the confidence of the Regent most to think over the contents of the letter you have written to him. This proceeding is, moreover, so much in keeping with the circumstances, and one which I have all along been following in the same spirit since the turn of events has demonstrated its necessity.

Nothing new has taken place between the allied armies and Tipu since my last letter dated 18th October and which must have now reached you : I mean the action which took place between the advanced army corps of Tipu and those of the Maratha army, which took place on the Dasara day, and of which the Marathas cannot conceal the discomfiture and the loss which they suffered, and without the very prompt arrival of the troops of Holkar who engaged the enemy vigorously, the loss would have been more considerable. Since this date, the armies have been inactive, the Marathas and the troops of Nizam Ali retired to Settety [\[Shirhatti.\]](#), in the vicinity and in front of Savnur. A distance of 12 Koss separates the two armies.

The Regent is occupied, as I have already written to you, Sir, in sending reinforcements and funds to the Maratha army, but as the latter item is insufficient for the salary of the troops, it spreads among them a general despondency, the effects of which cannot but be very harmful for the opening of this campaign. There is a report in the Poona Darbar that there are many chiefs in the army of Tipu who are discontent for the same reason, and that many are deserting. The Nawab has increased the chowkies to prevent desertion.

In spite of all the preparations which I see here, I am sure that the Marathas and Nizam Ali would be quite willing to see the end of this war, if Tipu would come to terms and if the respective interests were stipulated in a manner which would satisfy all the parties. I have good reason to make this assertion and the sequel will bring it out better.

M. Godard, who must now be with you, Sir, must have certainly given you an account of the dispositions of this Darbar. I did not neglect any detail while giving him full information about everything. This officer saw how eagerly they desired here that the heads of the French nation should prevail upon Tipu to make peace by waiving his illegal claims. I gave a strong assurance, and I continue to do it everyday here, that you are seriously occupied with it. It would be very glorious for the nation if these quarrels could be terminated and this war, which the English have been all along fomenting, ended.

Your letter, Sir, has fortunately come in support of all that I have already said, and which I continue to repeat. But the machiavelism of the English, the fear which they inspire and the blindness

of these princes, who sacrifice the public weal to momentary interests, constitute a powerful obstacle to our negotiations. Whatever it may be, we must not give up working zealously to open their eyes. Perhaps we shall succeed in it.

Allow me, Sir, to express to you an opinion which may, in view of the actual situation, prove very advantageous for achieving the objective in question : I submit it to your judgment.

It would be to urge Tipu Sultan to stipulate the conditions which he desires and which at the same time are acceptable to the Regency, and that he should state these in the clearest and the most precise manner. If he really wishes to curb his ambition and his claims and make peace, it is the most effective and the surest means which he could employ. Vague letters, general insinuations do not signify anything. He must stipulate the territory and the forts etc., which are at the root cause of the quarrels and when the Nawab communicates to you his ideas on it, furnished then with your instructions and your orders on this point, I would try here to treat this important matter, and I venture to presume sufficiently correctly from the present dispositions to assure you that the complexion of affairs would alter, at least I have reason to believe it according to the insinuations which are made to me by some one who enjoys the confidence of the Darbar, and finally by the Regent himself.

Nana has urgent motives to desire peace and which are known to me. Rest assured also that the Subhedar will be guided in everything by the movements of this Court whose support is of the greatest importance to him today.

I would have explained myself more frankly, if I had a cipher with you, Sir, on certain political matters which demand greatest caution. My letters could be intercepted by our antagonists and presented afterwards to the Regency, which would infinitely diminish the confidence it has in me, and would infallibly deprive me of the secret communications which I have been able to obtain for myself.

All that I have just said to you, Sir, is dictated to me by my idea that you would not disapprove if I made to you all the suggestions which I thought could contribute to the general welfare. Confidence, frankness, clearness ought, in my opinion, to form the basis of all correspondence when you wish to treat the affairs successfully.

As soon as I meet Nana Fadnis in connection with your letter, and settle once for all certain matters which occupy me today, I shall send you fresh harkaras. This is the time to increase the number of couriers, and I have spoken in the Darbar in such a manner that I experience today less obstacles in their dispatch. Three days back Nana dispatched 5 harkaras of the Sarkar to proceed to Pondicherry and meet the Waquil of the Regency. I was informed in case I wanted to profit by this occasion to send my letters. But it is easy for you to see, Sir, why I did not think it advisable to make use of this channel. Independently, my harkaras will, I hope, reach their destination in 22 or 23 days of march and consequently before those of the Regency, who, as they have no other object than to call on the Maratha Waquil, will go by short stages.

I now pass on to the item of your letter in which you tell me, Sir, that you have very carefully read what I have written to you about the expenses which I was obliged to incur, that you had conferred with M. de Moracin on it, and that you were agreed that I should draw a bill of exchange on the Treasury of Pondicherry for the sum which would be necessary for me. I thank you Sir, for your kind dispositions in this respect. But allow me to point out to you that as no one here wishes to accept a draft on Pondicherry, as they have no dealings with this town, I am forced to find out another channel to obtain funds. Here it is : it is the one I have already used, and I do not know any other.

The sarafs Laxmidas and Murlidas in Poona have close dealings with Murlidas, Kishandas and Bewendas, other sarafs of Madras. The former are now at my residence; they are writing to you and to M. de Maracin; they are at the same time writing to their correspondents by a letter, of which my harkaras are bearers, in order to inform them that they are ready to deliver me the funds in Poona

which will be paid to them at Madras, either every month or every three months, as it will be deemed appropriate. Thus, Sir, here is a very simple means to send me funds at Poona, and if you judge it appropriate to make arrangements with M. de Maraëin so that I should receive here every month or every three months the funds which the post I occupy require and of which you are now informed by the letter of 28th June. That will avoid the interest on the sums which I am obliged to borrow for the King's service and which unnecessarily augment the expenses of the mission. I beg to point out to you in this respect that before the return of the harkaras which I am sending to day for the purpose of the funds, ten months will have passed before I receive a single farthing from the treasury of Pondicherry and I have been obliged to borrow at one and often at 1½ per cent per month to defray my current expenses.

This is my financial situation.

I had informed you, Sir, by my letter of 28th June that I would owe at the end of September of this year the sum of Rs. 6,349½. As it is impossible for my harkaras to return with a bill of exchange before two months and which I shall receive only at the end of January 1787, that will again entail four months of additional expenses, which will amount to about Rs. 3,040. By adding Rs. 147 as extras for the writers of the Darbar and the chopdar on the Dasara day, the whole will amount to Rs. 9,536½ to which must be added the interest on this sum, which will amount to more than Rs. 460. From this it is easy for you to see, Sir, that I shall owe at the end of January 87 the sum of Rs. 9,996½ without including in it the salary which you have granted to M. Geslin, Infantry Lieutenant, whom you have sent to reside with me, and which will again amount to more than Rs. 660 at the end of January for ten months that he will not have received, like me, his salary on which I have advanced him something for his subsistence, independently of the succour which he has been able to procure for himself.

The result of this exposition is that I shall owe for my account, that is to say for the expenses of the mission at the end of January 1787	Rs. 9,996½
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For the salary of M. Geslin	Rs. 660
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Which amounts to	Rs. 10,656½
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And to receive this sum net at Poona through the channel of Madras, I must have a bill of exchange of about Rs. 11,295, the discount at Madras on Poona being 6 per cent.

I cannot conceal from you, Sir, that the return of my harkaras from Pondicherry without the bill of exchange has produced here the worst effect, and I have to day the greatest difficulty in the world to get funds. However, the course I have adopted with my creditors by communicating to them my situation and explaining to them the item of your letter, Sir, by which you authorise me to draw a bill of exchange on Pondicherry, has induced them to still have patience till the return of the harkaras which I am dispatching under their very eyes for the purpose of the funds, mentioned above, which I request you earnestly, Sir, to kindly send me by the return of my harkaras Dehromdas and Maussingue without which my credit here would be completely ruined.

I terminate my letter, Sir, by thanking you for the obliging and comforting things which you have the kindness to say to me concerning my position here. I have no doubts that the representations of M. de Vicomte de Souillac and yours to M. Le Maréchal de Castries will produce a favourable change in my situation. There is great need for it, I assure you. I am impatiently awaiting its result.

I have the honour to be, etc.

Sd. Montigny.

Copy of a letter from M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, to M. de Montigny, Resident of the French Nation at Poona.

Pondicherry, December 27, 1786.

I begin, Sir, with the item which ought to concern you most, as I know your situation from your letter dated 17th November 1786.

I remitted today Rs. 6,000 to Madras, from where I shall receive in 8 to 10 days' time a bill of exchange which I shall send you immediately. You can count on it and rest assured that I shall not lose a single moment. I hope that this sum of Rs. 6,000 added to that of Rs. 6,400 of the previous dispatch, will fairly support your credit until we receive letters from the Minister which will decide your salary and your future. I know, Sir, how eagerly you ought to desire that a decision should be taken one way or the other. For, if things are to remain, with regard to you, such as they are, you will remain in a very painful situation and we in the same embarrassment here. You should believe that it is not without difficulty that we are parting with the little that we are sending you. We are daily obliged to incur so many indispensable expenses that the credit alone of M. de Moracin can furnish such great resources. However, I confess to you that I would be very sorry as a good patriot if in this circumstance you should be reduced to discontinue your Residency and your mission with the Regency of Poona.

Although I have not received for a long time letters from Nana Fadnis, I thought, from your report to me, that I should once again try and write to him. Henceforward, it is for him to think it over, if he does not wish to entirely neglect his interests. If all that I have written to him as well as to the Subhedar of the Deccan, does not open their eyes and does not move them, I cannot help it. But you and I, Sir, we should be in no way to blame.

In the number of things about which M. Godard has spoken to me on your behalf, he told me and has submitted to me a note, which is attached herewith, to prove to me that our interpreters were very little capable of making themselves understood. In the beginning, it could have been so, but I think that today translations are more tolerable, because I have changed my interpreter. However, I think that it is necessary as a measure of greater precaution, to request you to kindly take care by your means to get fresh translations made. I am sending you my letter to the Regent as also that which I am writing to Nizam Ali Khan. As their interests are common at this moment, you could as well make use of it, by giving him the translation of the latter. By this means, I shall have quite adequately replied to all that both have said to me and given me to understand, and to what they could still write to me, if they did not wish to get out of the circle in which they are uselessly rambling, and which frankly speaking, is not good politics.

I have it from a reliable source that the Subhedar of the Deccan is quite as tired of the war as will soon be Nana Fadnis. I must not conceal from you that I am sufficiently well informed to fear that Tipu will be most difficult to be induced to come to a compromise; and if the allied powers cannot make up their mind to make sacrifices, they will perhaps call the succour of the English too late. I am not imparting to you any politics, Sir, it is my sincere opinion that I am communicating to you.

I am writing, as you will see it, to Nana Fadnis that I am always ready to serve him, if, in his turn, he is sincerely inclined to make peace. What are the conditions or rather the proposals which he wants to make? If they are reasonable and admissible, I undertake to make the overture to Tipu. But I solicit you to point out to the Regent that, far from appearing to desire peace, Tipu, on the other hand, writes to me that he intends to continue the war. You must not also hide from him the nature of our relations with him as I am not hiding them from Nizam Ali, as you will see it from my letter to this Prince. I think that you are now sufficiently well posted, Sir. Moreover, with the knowledge which

you have of the Sarkars and of their respective interests, you will make up for what I cannot foresee to treat an affair of such importance.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Cossigny.

Copy of a letter from M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, to Nana Fadnis, Chief Maratha Regent.

Pondicherry, December 27, 1786.

After the compliments,

I am grieved to see the preparations which I know you as well as Nizam Ali are making to continue the war against Tipu Sultan. I also know from a reliable source that the latter intends to attack you or defend himself to the very bitter end. Thus, indeed, your minds are becoming more and more embittered, and if God does not interfere, you will cease to shed blood of the peoples only when either of you is reduced to the last extremity.

A nation which, for some twenty years, has not been putting any check on its ambition in India, and whose all politics tends only to foment disharmony among you to destroy you at each other's hands, today offers you and to Nizam Ali a succour which you will perhaps accept. In this case, can a greater misfortune befall you? It is not your enemy whom they want to crush, but they want one day to have one less to fight. For, have no doubts about it, it will be either against you or against Nizam Ali that they will turn their arms, when they help you to fight Tipu. Is it indeed necessary to place before your eyes the conduct they have adopted in Bengal? Did they not seize these vast countries by offering help, which was always accepted, to the weakest against the strongest?

In what slavery aren't they today keeping the Nawab of the Carnatic and the Raja of Tanjaour, whose kingdom and power, they have apparently augmented and whom they, however, keep in a shameful slavery?

I, therefore, think with all the sincerity of my heart that you ought to make peace, even if you have to make some sacrifice. Why would Tipu not agree to the terms which will be proposed to him if they are reasonable? And what are those which could be made to him, if you were so disposed?

I would judge myself very fortunate if I could contribute to the success of all without any harm to your glory, because, you must believe it, I desire nothing so much as the prosperity of the brave and powerful Maratha nation. Let me often hear from you, and I am ready to offer you my services, if you so wish.

Copy of a letter from M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, to M. de Montigny, Resident of the French, Nation at Poona.

Pondicherry, January 5, 1787.

I have just received, Sir, the bill of exchange for Rs. 6,000 which I had announced to you in my previous letter dated 27th December No. 9. I am not losing a moment in sending you this fresh succour. I very sincerely desire that it should sustain your credit until news which you and I are awaiting from the Minister is received. It will not be long henceforward.

The Waquil of the Marathas came to my office to put me several questions on the part of the Regency to which I thought it advisable to give a reply. I even seized this pretext to write once again to Nana Fadnis the letter attached herewith which you will kindly deliver to him. I am sending you a copy translated from the Persian into French. If you wish to have a translation of it made in Marathi, I will be delighted all the more as it was not possible for me to do so since our interpreter was ill. You can well imagine, Sir, that I preferred to write to Nana Fadnis rather than leave the Waquil free to reply perhaps in an inaccurate manner to all the questions which he came to ask me and to which I replied very categorically. I assure you that it is not possible to employ less politics in my political correspondence. My letters to Tipu Sultan, to Nizam Ali and to the Marathas are in the same style. I speak to them all the language of truth. It is for them to profit by it.

The victories which Tipu has just won over the allied army will perhaps render him too difficult to agree to proposals of peace. However, assure Nana Fadnis well that if I can induce him (Tipu) to come to some agreement by my mediation, I am ready to do all that will depend on me to prove to him (to Nana) the interest which I ought to take in the glory of the Maratha nation and in his personally. Tell him at the same time that in this proceeding, I shall only be following the views of the Emperor of France who wishes to prove the affection and the harmony which ought to reign between his Court and the Sarkar of Poona.

Tipu has written to me in detail about the action which took place on the 3rd of December. I think that before this letter reaches you, you will receive information about it and that you will communicate it to me. This is necessary for me to form my opinion for the account which I have to give to the Minister.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Cossigny.

Copy of a letter from M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, to Nana Fadnis, Maratha Regent.

Pondicherry, January 5, 1787.

After the compliments,

Your Waquil Gopalrao put me several questions on your behalf, to which I replied properly and truthfully. But I am afraid that in spite of his good will, he may not report to you correctly what I said to him. I am, therefore, writing to you this letter in order to assure myself that you are properly informed.

Gopalrao asked me if it was true that after our last treaty of peace with the English, we cannot give assistance to the Indian princes who would wage war among themselves.

I replied to him, "Nothing is more true as it can be seen from Article 16 of the Treaty which categorically stipulates that the English and the French promise not to give any assistance to the Indian princes who would wage war among themselves". I am sending you a copy of this Treaty, printed in Europe so that you should be well assured or rather well convinced of the truth, when you get it interpreted.

Your Waquil asked me further on your behalf if it was true that the French and the Dutch had concluded an offensive and defensive treaty of alliance and friendship between them and if by this treaty the Dutch had ceded, as it was reported, a part of their establishments to the French.

I replied that a part of that was true, since it was stipulated in the treaty that we would mutually furnish assistance to each other in case either were attacked, but that the Emperor of France was sufficiently powerful with the kingdom which he inherited from his ancestors not to need the possessions of others, and that consequently, he had demanded nothing from the Dutch, although he had undertaken to furnish them forces to prevent their possessions from being invaded by a nation whose ambition would not yet be satiated even if they were masters of the universe. In order that you should be fully informed, I am sending you a copy of the Treaty which we have made with the Dutch.

Although they are not a great power in Europe, they nevertheless possess great resources in money and ships. Besides, the Emperor of France was disposed to conclude this alliance, less because it was necessary for him than because of his kindness. He has become the protector and benefactor of people whom other powers would wish to oppress.

Gopalrao also wished to know what would be my decision in case the English gave you and to Nizam Ali assistance, and whether, in my turn, I would also give it to Tipu Sultan, as he knows well that I have under my command here a large number of troops always ready to march to fight those who would attack us or who could commit a breach of the last treaty of peace. I did not repeat to him because it was needless, and I do not repeat to you here all what I have already said and written to you in all my previous letters. But I shall be delighted to continue to repeat to you that I desire nothing so much as the augmentation of your power, of your glory and of your prosperity. As my opinion has always been that you ought to seek peace at the moment, and if in that, as I have written to you, I can be useful to you, I am awaiting your advice. I am at your disposal and I shall consider myself very lucky if I can have a proof to give you of the sincere interest I have been taking in the brave and powerful Maratha nation and especially in your person to whom I desire a long life and all kinds of prosperities.

Copy of a letter from M. de Montigny to M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry.

Poona, January 8, 1787.

Sir,

I received on 1st January of this year your letter of 1st December as well as the duplicate of that of 21st November under the Nos. 7 and 8, and the bill of exchange for Rs. 8,000 which was attached to it, by the return of my harkaras from Pondicherry. I shall deal with the matter of the funds at the end of this dispatch, and begin by replying to other matters mentioned in the letter of 1st December [The letter of December 1, 1786, is missing.]

Nana Fadnis's letter, of which M. Godard was bearer, was for you, Sir, as I had pointed it out to you, and not for M. Le Vicomte de Souillac. If this reply to your letter for Nana was addressed to M. de Souillac, it was a mistake on the part of the Chitnis or the Munshi. I immediately sought information from the Darbar; the mistake could arise only from the *Maur* [Mohor hear means a 'seal'.] of the letter. That is all, and the Chitnis has earnestly solicited me to not to speak about it to the Regent. I demanded a copy of the letter which Nana had addressed to you, and I shall receive it along with the reply to your last letter, which I could not yet procure because of the changes that have occurred here due to the death of Amritrao (Pethe).

I do not know how my harkaras, whom I had sent to M. Godard, could not join this officer at Hyderabad. They probably stopped on the way for other special letters, for, my intention was that they should deliver to M. Godard the packet, which I had addressed to M. Le Vicomte de Souillac, for greater safety in the route, as I had informed you about it. If I did not deliver this packet to M. Godard at Poona, it is because I wanted to add to it the latest news to be conveyed to the General.

I had communicated its contents to this officer so that he could give you an account of them. It contains a reply from Shinde to M. Le Vicomte de Souillac and a letter from the Emperor with a copy of the letters which Shinde and the Padshah had written to me, and a patent of the titles conferred by the Emperor on M. Le Vicomte de Souillac, as well as a letter from M. Even. I showed the letters, which concern the latter, to M. Godard and posted him with everything.

I am very glad, Sir, that by your instructions M. Godard had the opportunity to come to Poona, and his presence has produced a good effect, because of the advantage I could derive from it *vis-a-vis* the Regent, by impressing upon him the attention which the Government of Pondicherry paid in watching the proceedings of the English with the Regency. This step of mine could only be prejudicial to the negotiations of the (English) Waquil here; it is in fact what I noticed here.

M. Godard would have found me at the camp of the Maratha army, if my urgent solicitations to proceed there had been complied with by Nana Fadnis at the time of my return from Goa, as I had communicated to you by my letter of 28th June. These are the words of the Regent on this subject : "*I did not call you to the army's camp, because I knew I was to return to Poona and because that would have involved you in useless expenses.*" In fact, the Regent returned to Poona and all the Waquils accompanied him there. You certainly know, Sir, that the envoys or Waquils at the Indian courts are obliged to follow the prince who is at the head of the Government, with the result that as today Nana Fadnis stays at Poona since his return from the army, all the Waquils, the English Waquil like all the others residing with the Marathas, are at Poona, because it is with the Regent alone that one can treat here the interests of his nation.

When I wrote to you, Sir, by my letter of 18th October that it would be easy for you to see from the expense which M. Godard's journey will cost to the administration, whatever economy I put in mine, I did not at all try to give you to understand that this expense was considerable. I am very

sure, on the contrary, that this officer employed in it all the economy that depended on him. I made this observation only to recall to you the moderateness of the salary which the Court has allocated to me so far for the expenses much exceeding those which M. Godard could incur and which I have necessarily to incur to fulfil the object of my Residentsip at the Regency of Poona.

The expense I have necessarily to incur is a matter which interests me so much that I speak of it whenever the occasion offers itself. That is the only motive of my observation on this subject.

As for the political situation here at the time of the departure of M. Godard, I am very much convinced that this intelligent officer must not have failed to give you all the details in this respect, and what I had occasion to notice since then has been conveyed to you by my letter of 17th November last. The dispositions of the Regent have not changed up to this moment, and there is no question here of the union of the English forces with those of the Marathas. This subject-matter which always fixes my attention is the one I have all along pursued at the Darbar whenever I go there, or whenever I have occasion to talk with some members of the Regency. This is the situation at the moment.

But one thing which you must know, Sir, is the following anecdote and which can, perhaps, provide material to reflexion. Towards the 11th or 12th of the last month, Heyasse [\[Ayaz.\]](#), formerly Governor of Nagar, who surrendered this fortress to Col. Mathews, was presented to Sawai Madhavrao by the English Waquil, Resident at this Court (Mr. Mallet). Nana Fadnis was sent for thrice; finally, he went there. After half an hour's audience, Heyasse was dismissed very coldly and left the same day for Bombay. It is quite certain that the English Waquil could not have gone to Sawai Madhavrao without the approval of Nana Fadnis, and this coolness of the Regent, is it feigned or otherwise? Could Ayaz have promised to raise a revolt in the Coorg territory or in some other? Or did Nana Fadnis only see a visionary in this man? That is about what we are in the dark here. As the meeting took place on the very next day of his arrival and as he left immediately, there was consequently, hardly any time to analyse it. It is reported that he did not accept the 'Sarpech' which was presented to him. But that could only be a game.

I relate to you this anecdote, Sir, because it may eventually be bound up with other circumstances and help to unravel the proceedings of the English and of these people with respect to Tipu.

I must not forget to add to this, Sir, the visit which Nana Fadnis paid to Naran-rao-doumeh [\[Narainrao Dhume.\]](#), a Brahmin, in-charge of Portuguese affairs at the Regency. This visit on the part of Nana has certainly an objective. I know sufficiently well the character of the Regent to feel sure that without an act of ceremony authorised among the Brahmins of the highest caste towards the lowest, he would never have paid a visit to this Waquil who does not play any role here. Nothing of this kind could justify this visit. But you may recall, Sir, what I have written to you in my letter of 28th June, about the anxiety in which the Colony of Goa then was with regard to Tipu, and about the letter of the Regency written to M. Don Frédéric, Governor of this Colony, to urge him to unite his resources with those of the Marathas against this Nawab, as well as about the very wise conduct which this Governor had adopted in this matter.

From all these considerations, I have reason to believe that the Regent, as he knew about the arrival of a new Governor of Goa (M. Don Francisco D'accunha) and consequently less acquainted with the caption politics of the Indians, could, with the help of the said Waquil, perhaps induce this new Governor to agree with his views concerning Tipu. I may be wrong in this respect, but after exhausting all my combinations on this proceeding of the Regent with respect to this Brahmin who is of no consequence here, added to the information obtained on the earlier dispositions of the Regent and on the striking blow he wants to attempt to compel the Nawab to come to terms as advantageous as possible, I think, I repeat it, that there cannot be any other motive on the part of Nana Fadnis in the approach he has just made to Narayanrao. This Waquil left for Goa about a fortnight ago with the tents and the camels of the Sarkar and an escort of 25 cavalry. I shall not lose sight of this affair as well as of the incidents which may throw flashes of light on the insidious conduct of these people.

The Sarkar of Poona has just dispatched reinforcements and a large quantity of funds to the Maratha army. A part of these funds is meant to make up for the big losses incurred in the action of 2nd December, in horses, camels, tents, etc. Nizam Ali is also to take action in his turn. Some lacks of rupees are being distributed, in addition, to the Maratha chiefs who have suffered most, such as Bomelon [\[Bhonsle.\]](#), and Parasharam Bhau; the latter received two lakhs as his portion. Much is expected here from these new preparations.

On the 8th, the Nawab, who commands the army of Nizam Ali, sent for the artillery which had been left at Raichur, when Nizam Ali's troops abandoned Adoni. He needs it much, for this army of the Subhedar lacks guns.

On the 17th Tipu's Waquil arrived at the camp of Holkar to come to an agreement with the Marathas and retired on the 27th without concluding anything.

The Marathas are camped near Gopal [\[Koppal.\]](#) Baher which they intend to besiege, and Tipu is three koss on the other side of the Tungbhadra and always on the move. Nothing striking has taken place to this day between the three armies since the action of 2nd December in which the Marathas and Nizam Ali's troops lost so heavily. The Marathas appear to be more determined since the last defeat.

I am now replying to the passage of your letter, Sir, concerning the two engagements which took place on the 1st and 6th October between the armies of the Marathas and of Nizam Ali and that of Tipu.

When I informed you by my letter of 18th June [\[October. 1786.\]](#) of the defeat which the Marathas and Nizam Ali had suffered at the hands of Tipu, as the first of my harkaras had not yet returned from the army with the details of this engagement, I could only communicate to you reports which were then being spread at the Darbar where, as a matter of fact, they did not announce such a considerable loss as there had been.

Here is the account given to me by M. Rivière, who commands a corps of Nizam Ali and was present at this defeat.

“On 31st September, Saturday at 3-00 a.m., Tipu was to our left, his army drawn up in battle array. He ordered the guns to be fired and.....dropped fouguettes [\[Men carrying bows of big bambooes, armed with arrows, blades of sabres and knives, fastened and floating, which are lanced like flying rockets, being horizontally directed with skill. This contrivance is called ‘fougnette’ among the people of the country.\]](#) in our camp. Our army was put under arms and the Maratha artillery replied to that of Tipu; but we were forced to abandon some tents of sipahees from the camp of the Nawab. At daybreak, Tipu was fighting at the head of his army with a formidable artillery and opened a terrible fire against which our cavalry could not hold on. We were obliged to abandon the field where we were camping. Tipu had detached Bawandine, his relative, towards Savnur, in order to try and seize it. Holkar, a Maratha chief, covered this part where there was a big impact, his cavalry charged upon Burhan-ud-din's infantry which, as it was much battered, was obliged to fall back on the side of Tipu; he lost many troops, two elephants and a gun. The Marathas too lost many cavalymen, and a relative of Murarrao, great Maratha chief, was killed in the action.”

“The Nawab's troops occupied a hillock on the right of Tipu where M. de Lalée was stationed; his intention was to dislodge us from the place. Tipu asked him not to be separated from him, as his plan was to support his left, on the side of Savnur. Gensimian, brother-in-law of Ted Jang, while trying to rush his cavalry, had a horse killed under him. Haripant Phadke, General of the Maratha army, sent a word to Taver Jang, who commands us, that we were too far removed from him and that he could not assist us if we were attacked, and asked him to join his cavalry. Orders after orders came; we retired from height to height. If we had four heavy guns to bring to the firing position, we would have beaten Tipu's army in the flank and would have caused him considerable

damage. The Marathas remained the whole day in battle array in front of Tipu. They had 12 guns to oppose an artillery as large as that of Tipu.”

“The army came and camped at three koss from Savnur to the west. Holkar and Haripant remained the whole night facing Tipu to prevent him from seizing Savnur. But the Nawab of this fortress abandoned his town and his fort with all his family, except his eldest son. Savnur was bestowed on his ancestors by the Emperor of Delhi. The Marathas were worshipping their arms because of the festival which they call Dasara, which prevented them from making a charge yesterday. They are very much determined to do so at the earliest opportunity.”

“The whole infantry had orders to proceed to the camp on 1st October, Sunday, Mokam. All the troops of the Nawab had orders to keep ready to join the Marathas, who are at half a koss from Tipu, with the Nawab of Savnur. Tipu spent the night and the whole day on the battlefield. His camp is at a koss and a half from the camp which we have abandoned. He has placed more than 100 guns in front of his infantry, loaded with case-shot, to receive the Marathas in case they charged upon him. This eventuality would have taken place but for the representations of Holkar, who sent a word to them that it was too hazardous and that they must wait for another occasion. This was a very wise advice, for the Marathas could not have succeeded against such an artillery and so well entrenched infantry. If Tipu took the field, there is no doubt that they would soon succeed in it. You must have seen them fighting to be able to speak of it and render them justice”, continues Rivière; “the Muslims are a mere trifle as compared to them, I can assert it.”

“One of the lieutenants of Holkar had written a letter to Tipu that for nine days the Marathas had sworn not to take up arms, that he was himself with his cavalry in bivouac, that he could come with all expedition to his side. Tipu gave a reply. The bearer of this letter, by mistake, delivered it to another lieutenant, who immediately sent it to the Maratha General. The traitor soon got news of it and thrust his Kattiyar in his belly. Tipu followed his reply with his army. [\[The fact that Holkar had a secret understanding with Tipu is corroborated in Prof. Mohibul Hassan's Tipu Sultan, pp. 118-119 \(notes\).\]](#) Holkar is furious, no one can approach him or talk to him.”

“The deserters from Tipu's army say that in the cannonade of the Marathas, there were many killed and wounded; the Marathas lost many more.”

Finally, to end the narration which is too long, I shall state the particulars which I also received on the capture of Savnur.

On the report of the arrival of Tipu with his formidable army, as the Nawab of Savnur, Abdul Ali Khan, [\[Abdul Hakim Khan.\]](#) had retired with his family, the majority of the inhabitants also abandoned this place, and the eldest son of this Nawab, whom his father had left in Savnur, came to terms with Tipu; his brother-in-law hoisted the flag of this Nawab at 3 p.m. on 6th October last. The Maratha army was at a koss and a half from this place at the time of this agreement, and all what I learnt about it, either from the Muslim or Maratha chiefs with whom I am in contact, all agree on this point. The Marathas apparently did not think it advisable to make a sacrifice for a Nawab who did not wish or did not dare to defend his fortress against his enemy. The Marathas have sent Abdul Ali Khan to Bijapur with his family.

In support of this, I shall cite the statement of an eyewitness. M. Burette, a Frenchman, who was present at the time of the capture of Savnur, came to Poona to my residence, and repeated to me several times that Tipu's troops seized this place in the manner stated above, that is to say, without an escalade, and with the Maratha army at more than one and a half koss away. I quoted the passage from your letter (as authority) in which you say, Sir, that Tipu seized Savnur by escalade and in the presence of the Maratha army. He swore to me on what was most sacred that an incorrect report had been given to you. M. Burette left day before yesterday to proceed to Pondicherry and proposes to meet you. You will be in a position to question him on this point. He does not lack intelligence and I informed him that I would quote him. He offered to state in writing how the event had taken place and

sign it; I did not think it necessary to accept his offer. Moreover, Sir, as I could have been misled by the reports which were given to me of the capture of Savnur, I am again writing to persons in the army with whom I am in contact, and shall convey to you their replies.

I entered into all these details only because I know how essential it is that you should be exactly posted with the situation of affairs before conveying it to the Minister immediately afterwards.

As for the appointment of Governor-Generals of the English Company by the King himself, this news was given to me by persons who thought that they were well informed. It is true that they added that the Court of Directors had indeed appointed them, but that the persons had been indicated by the King. As you tell me precisely the contrary, you must be fully informed, and I have nothing more to say. I was certainly misled, but I thought it my duty to communicate to you, Sir, what had been reported to me on this subject. Because this direct appointment by the King appeared to me quite important to know, as it indicated a clear change in the Constitution of the Company.

I pass on to the item of funds :

I received the bill of exchange for Rs. 8,000 which you have sent me and I received the total amount to day, 8th January 1787. From this bill of exchange for Rs. 8,000 were deducted, namely, Rs. 800 for M. Geslin which his brother had sent him and Rs. 800 on the account of M. Godard, as they formed part of the bill of exchange for Rs. 8,000.

After this sum of Rs. 1,600 was deducted from the bill of exchange for Rs. 8,000, Rs. 6,400 were left to me from which I gave Rs. 400 on account on the salary which is due to M. Geslin since the first trimester of 1786. Consequently, there are left for my account only Rs. 6,000 and after deducting the discount of Madras on Poona of 6 per cent, I received only the net sum of Rs. 5,640 for myself.

I informed you, Sir, by my letter of 17th November that I did not foresee that my hrkaras Dechewamdas and Maussingue would return here before the end of January, and that at this time I would owe Rs. 9,999.50 for my account and about Rs. 660.00 for the salary of M. Geslin, which would constitute a sum of Rs. 10,659.50 and that to receive this sum net, because of the exchange of Madras on Poona of 6%, a bill of exchange of about Rs. 11,295.00 was necessary.

As before the return of my harkaras which I expected only at the end of this month, I have received from this sum, for my account as well as for that of M. Geslin, that of Rs. 6,400.00 minus the exchange of 6 per cent i.e, only the net sum of Rs. 6,016.00, there will still be at the end of this month a balance, due at Poona of Rs. 5,279.00, which I await very impatiently by the return of my alkaras Deshewamdas and Maussingue to be in a position to pay off my debts to my creditors who harrass me for the repayment of this sum. Moreover, I refer to my letter of 17th November regarding very easy and very sure means to send me funds here, either every month or every three months, as you will deem appropriate, which would henceforth avoid all embarrassment and in addition interests on the sums which I am obliged to borrow here for the current expenses and which only needlessly augment the expenses of the mission.

The son of Krishnarao Ballal has just left Poona to proceed to the Court of Nizam Ali and negotiate there the agreements which I have communicated to you by my letter of 10th December.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Montigny.

P.S.—Herewith is attached the letter from the Regency in reply to your last letter as well as the copy of the letter of which M. Godard was bearer and of which the original was addressed, by the mistake of the Chitnis, to M. Le Vicomte de Souillac. The reply which the Regency is giving today,

will confirm to you what I have written to you in the most important paragraphs of my letters, and you will be able to notice in it that the Regency explains itself in it in a less equivocal manner than usual, and that it does not think that there is any need of the English for the war against Tipu. The motives of this war are expressed in it, and I can vouch that up to this day, the Regent has all along said to me the same thing concerning this alleged union. We shall see the sequence of the events. Rest assured, Sir, that I am not losing out of sight for a single moment this important item and that I continue to represent to the Council of the Regency the untoward consequences which would result from such a union. The Darbar appears to me very much convinced of it today.

The Regency has just delivered to me copies of the letters which it is addressing to you, and I could only procure the whole today 22nd January, whatever I could say and do. Amritrao's death suspended an infinite number of dispatches from this Court, and especially that for which I was pressing. Nothing fresh, at least worth noting, has come to my knowledge.

I have at this very instant received a letter from Shinde in reply to one which I wrote to him recently. I shall soon receive other harkaras from his army. I shall join all this news to my next courier. To this moment everything is calm on this side. The English Waquil, Anderson, Resident with the Emperor and Shinde, has left for Calcutta. The one who replaces him is expected any moment.

C² 179, f.216-217.

Translation of a letter written in Marathi from Nana Fadnis, Chief Maratha Regent, to M. de Cassigny, Governor of Pondicherry, received on February 24, 1787,

After the compliments.

I was delighted to receive your letter, and am pleased with all that you have written to me. It is quite natural that good friends should correspond to give each other news of their health.

You acknowledge my good dispositions for the French Nation, as you have written it to me and to M. de Montigny. You have also done well to write about it to the Minister and to the Emperor of France, since friendship has been reigning for such a long time between his Sarkar and ours.

You ought indeed to remember that to day the old agreements made and followed by Haider Ali Khan no longer stand, that every day there are new claims on the part of the son. That is what forced us to unite with the forces of Nizam Ali Khan Bahaddar to chastise those who adopt such an ambitious conduct and raise such false claims.

Far all times, the Indian princes have waged their war without the succour of the foreigners. Why should we have recourse to the English?

You speak to me in your letter that all the Indian princes ought to know well the ambitious pretensions of the English. But you ought to know that since a long time our Sarkar has never acted against any one or against the conventions and the treaties.

Recently I received from Pondicherry letters in which I am told that the intention of the Emperor of France is not to give any succour to the princes who would wish to seize the territory of their neighbours; that the orders are to return to the rulers the territory which might have been seized from them.

I am quite astonished today to read in your letter that the orders of your Emperor are to assist the weakest prince against the strongest. From these two statements it would appear that the Emperor of France would go against his own orders, which is impossible for me to believe. For, if this Prince considers as the weakest he who has begun the war, in the belief that he was the strongest and who is thus a traitor, the Emperor of France cannot be his ally.

M. de Montigny will communicate to you the rest.

C² 179, f. 220-220v⁰.

Translation of another letter from the Maratha Regent, Nana Fadnis, to M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, received on February 24 1787.

After the compliments,

I duly received your letter. It gave me the greatest pleasure.

You point out to me that you are grieved at the discord between the Indian princes who, on the contrary, ought rather to unite to attack the common enemy than to weaken themselves by fighting against each other. Moreover, you say that you desire nothing so much as the prosperity and augmentation of our power, that you daily express a wish for the continuation of the friendship which has been so happily reigning between the two Sarkars.

M. de Montigny has also communicated to me all that you have written to him. To all these points I can only reply that the intention of our Sarkar is to punish him who wished to cheat us and who acted openly against us and against the treaties. You can rest assured that in our turn, we shall never adopt such a conduct. We think that you will agree that it is always better to be the friend of someone who has never deceived than to be the friend of a traitor. I ask you if it is not just to punish the latter.

M. de Montingy will inform you more amply about matters which we would still to have say to you.

Let me hear from you as often as possible.

The Isle of France, February 1, 1787.

M. de Montigny at the Poona Court.

I hope, Sir, that a letter which I had the honour to write to you on 21st November, must have reached you. Its duplicate is attached herewith.

Since this letter was written, I learnt that the Nawab Tipu Sultan had won fresh successes, and that he was preparing to pursue his enemies with still greater ardour. It would be very desirable that this state of affairs should induce the Marathas to be less difficult in making proposals of peace which would be suitable to them. They can hardly close their eyes to the fact that in the matter of discipline and training of the troops of the Nawab, they can never stand up to him, that Nizam Ali will be a feeble resource for them and that if they want to sustain this war, they must have recourse to the English. Now everything ought to convince them that the succour which they will obtain from them will cost them very dearly and that they will augment the resources of a foreign nation which aims at invading the whole Hindustan. Therefore, impress well upon the Regency of Poona that it ought to hasten to come to terms with the Nawab, and wait for the moment when we could dispatch generals to deal certain blows and humble the power which all the Indian princes ought really to dread, because its existence depends on its possessions in India and the treasures which it draws from it and which will serve to pay off its huge national debt.

Since my last letter, I have not had any from the Minister, and I am very much surprised at it. I imagined that I would be at least ready to depart at the present moment and that my successor would have arrived long ago. I regret to see that I must wait for the next season to effect my return to France.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) Le Vicomte de Souillac.

Copy of a letter from M. de Montigny to M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry.

Poona, February, 17, 1787.

Sir,

I eagerly seize the occasion of the two harkaras whom I am dispatching to M. de Moracin on behalf of M. Boyer, Company's Agent, to inform you that nine days ago I received the letters of 27th December and 5th January, which you addressed me under Nos. 9 and 10 with documents relating to them, as well as the bill of exchange for Rs. 6,000 which was joined to them and which has raised my credit here, and for which I offer you, Sir, my thanks. I shall receive this sum day after tomorrow.

The packet, which you sent me through the channel of M. Aumont, reached me only on the day after my harkaras left for Pondicherry.

Your letters, Sir, arrived at a very interesting moment, for, I know that Tipu Sultan has sent a Waquil (Mirbadoudin) [Budr-uz-zaman Khan?] to Holkar, to make proposals of peace to this Maratha chief, and that eight or ten days back, Holkar sent back this Waquil to Tipu with one of his, bearer of proposals from the Regency. But I am in the dark about their contents. I do not know if Tipu has communicated to you the overtures he has made here. But it is certain that he has made them and is trying to detach the Marathas from Nizam Ali's party; this plan appears to me difficult to effect for reasons which I have already communicated to you by my previous letters.

I confine myself in this one to tell you briefly the situation of affairs postponing to convey to you the result of my conferences with the Regent after my meeting with him, for, up to the present it was impossible for me to meet him, and I am not sorry for it to a certain point, for, my Persian interpreter who is in the best position to render what I have to say on your behalf to the Council of the Regent was seriously ill for a fortnight. He is just recovering, and I hope to carry out my plan in this respect in a few days' time. Rest assured, Sir, that I am doing and shall do my best to compel the Regency to reveal his intentions on the project of peace between Tipu and the Regency of Poona.

We must first of all circumvent the persons who enjoy Nana's entire confidence. That is what occupies me today. After discussing the subjectmatter contained in your letters thoroughly, I shall send you the harkaras with the reply from the Regency.

Since my last letters, Tipu has seized Bender-banda [Bahadur Benda.]. His army is at present on the banks of the Tomandra [Tungabhadra.] near Anogordy. [Anagundi.] The Maratha army is at Janagurry, and that of Nizam Ali near Montgar; seven koss separate the allied armies and they will not make any movement (as the report goes) till the receipt of the reply of the Waquil, whom Holkar has just dispatched to Tipu.

My harkaras have not yet returned from the army. I await them every moment.

Today, I hope, Sir, that you have received my last courier of 8th and 22nd of the last month.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Montigny.

Pondicherry, March 11, 1787

My Lord,

On the 3rd of December of the last year, Tipu Sultan won a great and very signal victory over the combined armies of the Marathas and the Subhedar of the Deccan. You will read its detail in one of the four letters which I have received from this Prince and which I have the honour to attach herewith.

I do not think it needless to observe, my Lord, that I have always received the full confirmation of the news which was first given to me by Tipu Sultan himself. In fact, he has never written to me anything beyond the advantages which he has really secured over his enemies.

I received from Hyderabad the same details of the action of 3rd December and some additional particulars favourable to Tipu Sultan. This day is as glorious to him as it is humiliating for the Marathas, who, till to day, were feared and dreaded by all the India powers, subject for a long time to pay them indiscriminately an annual tribute (known as the right of Chauthai).

I beg to send you by this very occasion my correspondence with Nizam Ali Khan and M. Aumont. Kindly permit me, my Lord, not to repeat here needlessly what relates to Tipu Sultan in this correspondence.

If you permit me to express my opinion on the outcome of this rout of the allied armies, I think that Nizam Ali has already made or will soon make peace, that Tipu Sultan will be a little more difficult to grant it to the Marathas unless they make great sacrifices. If they do not take a decision, I am sure, from the knowledge I have of the character of Tipu Sultan, of his warlike spirit and of his ambition that he will profit by the great advantage he has to-day over the Marathas. Their Raja, still a child, is under the tutelage of Nana Fadnis, one of the Regents not much liked by his colleagues and the principal chiefs of this kind of federative Republic. I also think that he will profit by the occasion when Shinde, another Maratha chief, is occupied in preserving the post of the Diwan of the Great Mughal, which he seized to the great discontent of the Umraos, Nawabs and Subhedars, dependants and tributaries of this Emperor who is no more to-day than a fantom of a sovereign.

This, Shinde, of Maratha origin, who possesses by right of conquest some districts in the neighbourhood of the subha of Bengal, continues to preserve with the body of the Maratha nation and with the Regency of Poona a certain friendly relation which makes their interests common, when it is especially a matter of making war with the Mahomedan princes, who, in more or less distant times, had established their domination on the weak native princes. If Tipu Sultan had only succeeded in reducing this part of the Marathas whose territory is situated from the south of Goa to Gujarat, he would have operated one of the greatest revolutions which could take place in India, since the natives of the country would have almost no more resources to shake off the yoke of the Mahomedans.

As a measure of precaution, my Lord, I think that I have acted as I ought to have for the benefit of the nation by maintaining good relations with all, and more particularly with Tipu Sultan whom I consider henceforward as a power which has a very great stability in India. Our connection with this Prince to which we could give solidity which, in our opinion, could suit our interests, ought to serve us not only in times of war, but it can also contribute much to make peace last longer as it would keep the English in a sort of a state of war and oblige them to incur heavy expenses because of their fear that Tipu Sultan might burst suddenly into the Carnatic.

The letter which I am writing to you on the situation of the English on this coast, gives a more detailed account of my views on this subject.

The English view the growth of the power of Tipu Sultan with grief and anxiety. Since nearly two months, they are making preparations at Madras as if they had to support and declare a war. In his turn, Tipu Sultan believes or feigns to believe, as you will see, my Lord, from one of his letters that all these preparations are aimed against us. Strictly speaking, Tipu Sultan is today the cause of a very great anxiety for the English and they are taking precautions against this Prince in case he would wish to undertake something against them, which is bound to take place sooner or later.

I would not have been willing, my Lord, to send you one of the four letters, attached herewith, of Tipu Sultan which concerns me, if had not made it a rule and duty to faithfully address you a copy of all my correspondence during my administration.

I have already had the honour to give you an account, my Lord, of the plan, of Tipu Sultan to send ambassadors to the Court of His Majesty. I am awaiting M. Pierre Monneron's arrival to send them. These ambassadors have already arrived at 100 kms from here at a frontier post of Tipu Sultan's kingdom. They must have surely left this place and proceeded to Pondicherry where I am daily awaiting them.

I join to this dispatch two of my letters to Tipu Sultan.

I remain most respectfully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,
Cossigny.

Pondicherry, March 11, 1787

My Lord,

I have not received any news subsequent to 3rd December last, the day on which Tipu Sultan obtained a great victory over the allied army of the Marathas and of Nizam Ali Khan. If you permit it, I shall not enter into any detail of this action, the account of which I have given you in my letter No. 90 concerning Tipu Sultan.

If I can judge, my Lord, the discouragement of the Regent Nana Fadnis, from what M. de Montigny writes to me on a date previous to the action which took place on 3rd December between the armies of the three powers, I would soon receive the news that the Marathas are seeking peace, and that perhaps, in pursuance of the overture I have made to the Regent Nana Fadnis, I shall be charged with carrying the proposals to Tipu Sultan. But I think that the latter will be very difficult to tackle and that he would wish to continue the war against them to the bitter end. In fact, henceforth, the Marathas can no longer foregive Tipu for the State of humiliation to which he has reduced them in the course of this campaign, and that they would make only a feigned patee with him.

If it pleases, Sir, His Majesty to follow the plan of politics which I think I have indicated in all my correspondance, and if His Majesty wishes to maintain good relations with all the Indian princes, I consider M. de Montigny as a person whom it is very essential to keep at the Court of Poona. But this Resident cannot remain there on the salary which is assigned to him; the modest salary which is assigned to him, is, as you will see it, much below the large expenses which undoubtedly he has been obliged to incur. I beg to send you a statement attached to other papers of my correspondence with Poona so that you could finally judge what should be granted to M. de Montigny. Without that, Sir, the administrators of Pondicherry will always be in a position either to part with money necessary for other expenses or to leave M. de Montigny in an embarrassment and in a state little in keeping with the idea in which the Indian princes ought to be about the greatness and power of His Majesty.

I remain most respectfully,

My Lord,
Your very humble and very obedient servant
Cossigny.

Pondicherry, March 19, 1787.

My Lord,

With the ship Le Comte D'Artois ready to set sail, I receive a letter from Tipu Sultan, of which I am sending you a copy. You will see from it my Lord, that this Prince has made his peace with the Marathas.

I presume that he will soon make it with Nizam Ali, although he does not speak to me about it, unless the Marathas, who may have to complain against the lack of zeal which their ally has shown in this war, had quitted the alliance to turn their arms, in concert with Tipu Sultan, against the Subhedar of the Deccan. In any case, Nizam Ali can have no other alternative but to soon ask for peace, as he is not in a position to resist the union of two such formidable powers, even if indeed the English united themselves with him. I am, therefore, inclined to think that they will come to a general arrangement to the great displeasure of the English who had fomented this war to weaken and occupy Tipu Sultan, and oblige the allies to receive succour which they persistently offered to them and which they (the allies) did not accept.

Fully convinced, today I think that the English were only endeavouring to destroy them at each other's hands in order to finally become masters of the whole of India. You will see, my Lord, from all my correspondence, how I have tried to impress upon them (the Indian powers) the danger to which they were all exposed.

I consider, my Lord, the news of this peace as very momentous, since it leaves in all his glory a Prince who desires the alliance and friendship of His Majesty with so much ardour.

I am therefore today a little more tranquil on the succour which the English were offering to the allied army, and I think that they will not succeed so soon in fulfilling their views in all their scope. If they had succeeded, I beg you to believe, my Lord, that it would not have been due to my mistake.

I have just received, my Lord, a letter from Nizam Ali, the contents of which I have already got explained to myself and which is being translated. I hope that I shall have time to attach it to this dispatch. From a single ward of the Nizam on the subject of the district of Condavir, I suspect that he is, in fact, in negotiation with the English, and my ideas on the union of Tipu and the Marathas against the Nizam could indeed take effect, and the Nizam will be obliged to have recourse to the English. All the moves which are being made since a long time at Madras, would they not be a sequel of this plan of politics? Nevertheless, since Tipu has set out to proceed to Srirangapatan, it is to be presumed that the armies will take the field only next year as, the bad season begins and the flooding of the rivers takes place at the end of May.

I have also just received, my Lord, a letter from M. Marin, from Mahé dated 23rd February. At this time M. Monneron had not yet appeared on the Malabar Coast. Now, I do not think that he can leave before the month of June. In any case, this delay is an impediment which I could not have foreseen.

I remain most respectfully,

My Lord,
Your very humble and very obedient servant,
Cossigny.

Translation of a letter from Nana Fadnis, Maratha Regent, to M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, dated March 24, received on May 20, 1787.

After the compliments.

I am in very good health; I request you to give me news about your health.

I was extremely delighted to receive your letter in which you point out to me that in the treaty of peace made between France and England, it is stipulated that neither the French nor the English will give any succour to the Indian princes who could be at war among themselves.

That the intention of the Emperor of France is to confine his ambition to preserve the great kingdoms which he holds from his ancestors, that he has no desire to conquer the territory which belongs to other princes, especially, in India, that his generosity leads him only to support the weakest against the strongest, that it is for that purpose that he has made a treaty of alliance with the Dutch in order that the English should not seize their possessions.

You, moreover, write to me that you have sent me a copy of the Treaty of Peace with the English, as well as a copy of the Treaty of alliance of France with the Dutch, which I have received.

Finally, you write to me that it appears to you desirable that at this moment we ought to make peace with Tipu.

You have written to me about many other things, on which it suffices for me to say that I have grasped everything well.

At all times, war had been made among the Indian princes, but the Marathas have still never felt the necessity to have recourse to any foreign succour.

I got all that the Treaty of Peace between France and England contains explained to me, and I have understood everything well.

I have no doubt, and I consider it today as a certainty, that the Emperor of France does not desire to seize the territory of other princes.

We always believed that it was fair to punish those who, after signing conventions with our Sarkar, contravened them. That is why we united our forces with those of Nizam Ali. You have certainly been informed by the public news of all that has taken place till this moment. We have communicated all things in the greatest detail to M. de Montigny, as well as to Gopalrao so that you should be properly informed.

I have nothing else to add at the present moment.

(No. 54)

Isle of France, March 27, 1787

From M. Le Vicomte de Souillac, Governor General of all the French Establishments East of the Cape of Good Hope, to M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry.

I saw, Sir, from your diverse correspondence with the Indian princes, of which you have addressed me copies attached to the dispatch of 17th January, No. 89, to what extent the successes of the Nawab Tipu Sultan inspire fear in his adversaries. You have turned to account, Sir, this state of affairs, as much as it was possible, to impress upon both their real interests, and especially to dissuade Nizam Ali and the Marathas from the idea of having recourse to the English, who, as you have very well brought home to them, would sell them dearly the succour which they would give them. The former, whose kingdom suits them much more, appears to realise all the risks which he would run by putting himself into their hands, and I think that he will prefer to make some cessions to Tipu Sultan. The Marathas also appear to be tired of a war, the outcome of which so far, very far from procuring them what they claimed, can force them to seek peace by fresh sacrifices. I, therefore, hope that both will consent to suitable agreements to which, there is reason to believe that the Nawab will also agree, if he realises how precious is for him the glory which he has acquired and the tranquil and acknowledged possession of the territories to which his right was challenged.

If you succeeded, Sir, in becoming a mediator between them, the result would constitute a great advantage for the interests of the King, and the consideration, which it will give to the French nation in India, would infinitely favour the plans of operations which we propose to follow at the next war.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Vicomte de Souillac.

April 4, 1787

Report of the seizure of the ship L'Adelaïde and its cargo and crew by the Marathas, and a copy of the two letters, relating to it, of M. de Montigny to M.de Cossigny Governor of the French Establishments in India.

(Copy of the first letter of Monsieur de Montigny)

Poona, March 7, 1787

M. Beynard, Sir, immediately informed me about the incident that your ship met with at the hands of the Marathas. I have communicated it to the Regent of this Court who at once sent a courier to the Kizidar [Killedar.] of Vizendruk [Vijaydurg.] to collect all the information connected with this case and same time ordered the restitution of your ship and its cargo in all its entirety.

I beg you, Sir, to give me all the details of your encounter with the Maratha ship, the day, the hour, the region in which this event took place, because I have no doubt, after the strict orders which have just been sent from the Court of Poona, that the Captain of the ship, who attacked you, may seek all possible means to clear himself of this brigandage.

M. Beynard indeed informs me that the Governor of Goa immediately sent a Portuguese frigate to extricate you from the hands of the Marathas and that M. Blancard joined his ship to this frigate for the same purpose. But he does not tell me clearly what has been the outcome. At the Darbar I acted as if you have been captured.

The courier sent to the Kizidar [Killedar.] of Vizendruk [Vijaydurg.] will return in 7 or 8 days and from the report which he will make, I shall act accordingly. Set your mind at rest, Sir, about everything that can concern you in this respect. I am not losing touch for a moment of the subject-matter in question.

I have the honour to be perfectly,

Sir,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,
(Signed) Montigny.

March 15.

P.S—I just now learn that the report which has been given to Nana Fadnis is quite different from what M. Beynard has communicated to me. It is said that it is not a French ship which has been captured. I again spoke to the Regent and he has just sent fresh orders so that everything should be returned to you. The first copy of this letter has left for Goa. But I am sending you a special harkara to set your mind at rest.

My harkara was detained here for four days longer than I wished because I insisted again that two couriers should be sent to you with direct orders to return everything to you. They left yesterday with the order not only to return your ship and its cargo to you but to give you the Mervany; it is a native courtesy which will be shown to you. I hope that on the receipt of this letter your heart and mind will be at rest.

I have the honour to renew to you sentiments of perfect attachment with which I am,

Sir,

Your very, etc.
(Signed) Montigny.

I am waiting for a line in reply with the hararas whom I am dispatching to you.

Vizendruk, [\[Vijaydurg.\]](#) April 4, 1787.

True copy

Puren, Corbier, J. M. Dayot, Bussieres.

Copy of the second letter of Monsieur de Montigny.

Poona, March 25, 1787.

I have just at the moment received, Sir, two letters from Bombay, one from Monsieur Le Vicomte Corty, the other from M. Blancard. From the first I learn with the greatest surprise about the conduct which the government of Vijaydurg showed you, Sir, and your crew who, M. Blancard informs me, arrived at Bombay on the 21st. The sailors add that the Marathas of Vijaydurg are keeping you as well as the officers of your ship as prisoners and are demanding, it is reported, Rs. 12,000.00 for your liberty. You can judge, Sir, my indignation at this news. I at once communicated it to the Regency of Poona, and fresh orders have been dispatched on this object. The Regent could calm me only by the burst of rage in which I saw him fly on this question against the chiefs of the Marathas of Vijaydurg to whom he is writing in the severest manner.

As a measure of precaution, I have handed over to my harkaras 100 venitians which I request you, Sir, to utilise in case of need.

Especially, I urge you, Sir, not to omit the slightest detail about the treatment you must have suffered at the hands of the Marathas of Vijaydurg because I do not want to give in here until the Regency of Poona has given me full satisfaction.

I am going to write to Goa where your sailors ought to proceed, from what M. Blancard points out to me, so that they should rejoin you at Vijaydurg if you are still there. I assure you that they have nothing to fear after the orders which have been given.

The harkara whom I dispatched to you five days ago, Si., must have reassured you. The Regent's orders preceeded him or followed him very closely. But, the letter, which I have just received, affects me so much that I am sending you another one and I shall be reassured only after the return of my harkaras. I request you, Sir, to send them back to me at once, as also to convey my respect to all your officers whose situation I share with much feeling.

I have the honour to be most respectfully,

Sir,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,
(Signed) Montigny.

P.S.—I received the harkara from Bombay at 4 o'clock in the evening today the 25th. I am sending you two others at 7 o'clock after taking the necessary steps with the Council of the Regency. You will see, Sir, that I am not losing a single moment. My harkaras are paid to reach you in five days' time. They have to cover 120 koss (384 km.)

True copy.

Vijaydurg, April 4, 1787.

Puren. Corbier. J. M. Dayat. Bussieres.

The year one thousand seven hundred eighty seven, the fourth day of the month of April, the first day when we have the material and the liberty to write.

We, the undersigned, Captain and staff of the ship L'Adelaïde, declare and certify what follows :

That on the 15th of the month of February, reckoning at 40 kms. from the coast of Mangalore on the broadside, on the way to Bombay, and steering north-west with the southern winds, we became aware at day of a ship, moving north-north-west at about 12 km. on the same route as ours; that at noon we observed the latitude 13⁰45' and approached the ship to a distance of 4 km. As the weather was calm, and as this ship was a little broadside on to us, we recognised it to be a Dutch ship, and judged that it was the one which had left Cochin, as we were there, for Surat and which we had already seen broadside of Mahé, on the day we arrived there. As the sea-breeze started, it was to windward of us. We crowded on all sail to join it in order to speak to it and sail together. As the said ship, having apparently recognised us, displayed its colours, we displayed ours and moreover, a small Dutch flag to our foremast to induce it to diminish sails and to make it understand that we wanted to speak to it. But as we were moving faster than it, it neither changed its route nor its sails.

That at three o'clock in the afternoon the look-out man announced several sails in the north-north-east in full sight; half an hour afterwards we counted nine which were sailing in our direction; at four o'clock we saw them distinctly from below and we saw the Maratha flag; at half-past four, we at once cleared the decks and put ourselves in a state of defence as best as we could with eight three-pounders and two two-pounders. We counted five gallivats, two pals with two masts and two with three very big masts. At five o'clock this squadron passed half to leeward and half to windward of the Dutch ship which enforced its colours and continued its route without outstripping any distance. At half past five this squadron passed windward of us, out of reach of the guns, with the exception of two gallivats which passed leeward. We were then two to three kms. from the Dutch ship which remained windward of us on the port bow. We neither changed our route nor our sails presuming that as they had let the Dutch ship to pass and as they could think that we were sailing together, they would also let us pass without even speaking to us, since they had moved very far from us and since they continued broadside of south-west.

That at sun-set the squadron turned its course and veered for us. It had soon joined us although under topsail and foresail and we in full sail. A gallivat came to windward of us and spoke to us in the moorish language. It asked us who we were, from where we came and where we were going. To which the Captain, according to the instructions which he had, concerning a special mission which had been entrusted to him by the Government of the Isle of France, replied through M. Puren, an officer-interpreter, that we were a King's corvette which came from the Isle of France and was going to Bombay. It asked us if we had come straight; we replied that we had halted at the Cape of Galle and on the Malabar Coast. It asked us the same questions several times and about the ship which was ahead of us. We replied that it was a Dutch ship which was going to Surat. It made us repeat that several times. Two other gallivats came and asked us the same questions to which we replied in the same manner.

At halfpast-six, one of the frigates came to broadside of us and seeing the fire in our battery, shouted to us not to fire as we were friends and as they only wanted to know where we were going. We replied to them that we would not fire and that we knew we were friends. Then they spoke to us in English and asked us the same questions as the gallivats to which we gave the same replies in English. They next said to us that the commandant asked for the Captain and that he had to proceed on board his ship. We replied to him that it was too late and that we neither went nor did we receive anyone. They next asked about the cargo on our board. We replied that we had packets for Bombay on our ship. After repeating to us several times the same questions, the frigate passed behind us and went to

leeward. The whole night we were surrounded by the squadron, with the two frigates on the broadside, three gallivats and a pass ahead of us and the rest behind within gunshot. It was light weather throughout the night; the winds changed several times. But in all the manoeuvres which they employed, the squadron kept its position with respect to us.

This squadron, as we all knew it since, was composed of :

(1) One pal—24 guns in action, 4 bow-guns eighteen-pounders, bow chasers and stern chasers and 4 deck-guns—32 guns and 350 men.

(2) One pal—22 guns in action, eight-pounders and twelve-pounders, 4 bow-guns, eighteen-pounders and 2 deck-guns—28 guns and 300 men.

(3) One pal—16 eight-pounders, and 4 bow-guns, twelve-pounders—20 guns and 200 men

(4) One pal—14 six-pounders and 2 bow-guns—16 guns and 150 men

(5) Five gallivats with 1 bow-gun, eight-pounder and 2 small guns—12 guns and 500 men.

That at daylight, it was light air, they forced us to send men on their board. Messrs. C. Corbier, speaking a little English, and Puren, speaking moorish language, went on board of one of the frigates, which we believed to be that of the commander, no boat having any distinctive sign. They were nearly asked the same questions to which they gave the same replies. Next, they were told that the commander wanted to see the Captain and the packets which he had for Bombay, that if our papers were in order they would let us to, but that they did not think that we were French. As we were near the ship on which our officers had gone, they spoke to us and told us that they absolutely wanted to see the Captain and his packets. The Captain replied that he could neither quit his ship nor entrust his papers to anyone, that they could come on his board and that he would show them his consignment. The officers repeated that but they insisted on seeing the Captain, that they did not recognise any one else on board, that they would be sent back when the Captain came, it was repeated to us. And we saw a boat from broadside of the frigate with a European who came on board and asked the Captain in English for his papers. The Captain replied to him in Portuguese that he did not understand English, to which this man replied in Portuguese that he knew it. The Captain showed him his papers and the packet which was entrusted to him for Bombay with several letters for this place, to which this man said that we were quite in order, that when the commander saw that, he could not arrest us all the more because we were not at war with them and that they had allowed to pass a French ship a month ago, but that he had order to bring the Captain with him on board to show his papers. The Captain pointed out to him that the second (in command) was already on board the frigate, that he could not leave his ship and that, moreover, he had sent two officers and that was sufficient. This man replied that the Marathas did not know French colours, that the Captain was the only person whom they recognised on board, that a refusal could make them angry and that at the most a quarter of an hour would suffice to dispatch a passport which could not be refused to us especially as we were going to the English, their allies. The Captain demanded that the second (in command) should come on board. This man conveyed this to the frigate to which our officers replied that the boat, which would bring the Captain, would take them back and that (the Marathas) only wanted to see the packets which we had said were for Bombay and our consignment.

That when the Captain saw that the refusal could only arouse the suspicions in the mind of the commander and thinking that they simply wanted to see him, collected his papers and embarked. When he came on board the frigate, he was put the same questions as to the officers, to which he gave the same replies. They asked to see his sea-letters and his packets. He showed them and the European, who had come on board explained them to the Maratha Captain. When they had seen a part of them, they said that these were quite in order, that the officers would be sent back on board and that the Captain would go on board the commander's ship to show him his papers, that the Captain of the frigate could neither, since the commander was so near, give a passport nor send him back without the

knowledge of the commander. The Captain demanded that M. Puren should be with him to serve him as interpreter on board the commander's ship. They complied with this request saying that the second (in command) would be sent back on board his ship.

When the Captain and Monsieur Puren went on board the commander's ship, they were made to wait for some time on the gangway. Then they were admitted to the Darbar. There the questions of the eve were repeated. They asked to see the packets. The European, who had come on board our ship, explained them. The commander did not seem to pay much attention to them. M. Corbier came next. The Captain and Monsieur Puren, who thought that he was on board the Adelaide, asked why he had come on board the commander's ship. They replied that it was because we could go back all together. After spending an hour at the Darbar, the Captain asked to return because the ship was almost without officers. He was told that they were going to hold a council and that they would decide afterwards. He (the Captain) said that they should at least send back the two officers, but he was replied in the negative. He and his officers were sent to the forecandle; and the captains of other ships were sent for and a council was held.

When the Captain saw that the council was over, he wanted to go to the Darbar to know the decision, but he was prevented from doing so and told that the commander was having his meal and he was roughly pushed back. The Captain complained that he and his officer had not yet eaten anything and that it was time that they should go on board their ship for their meal. They were replied in the negative, but that they would speak to the commander about giving them food when he would wake up.

About two o'clock in the afternoon the two boatswain's mates and half the number of sailors were brought on board the commander's ship. Surprised at this, the Captain passed behind them to ask the reason to the Commander who had just woken up. He replied to him that he had orders from his king to stop all the boats and bring them to Vijaydurg and that they would decide there our fate, that he could only execute his orders. And we were disarmed; the Captain complained in vain at this violence but they did not listen to him. He demanded, since they wanted to take him to Vijaydurg, that he and his officers be sent back on board their ship to look after the ship and maintain order in it, and proposed to place on it a sufficient number of Marathas, pointing out that they would be sufficiently numerous and strong enough to force him to follow them, that, moreover, he would place someone from his ship on board the Commander's ship if they feared that he would run away, that he and his officers had all their belongings and their food on board, that they had not yet taken their lunch. The commander replied that he would send for our food and our belongings on board our ship. It was pointed out to him that as there was only one officer on board and many people, foreigners as well as French, the ship would be plundered and order would not be maintained. Thereupon the commander asked M. Puren to go on board and take note of everything that would be sent to us so that nothing should be lost; and drove us harshly to the forecandle.

As our ship passed very near that of the commander, we shouted for sending us by the boat which carried M. Puren, a couple of servants with linen and the most urgent necessities and food for several days. The officer on board replied to us in the affirmative, but as he wanted to go to the back to collect what we needed, he was prevented from doing so. He came to the front and shouted to us that the Marathas were masters and were plundering and breaking every thing and would not allow either him or our men to go into the rooms. The captain wanted to complain about it to the commander. But he could neither explain himself nor make himself understood. He asked for food for the men who were on board the commander's ship. They said that it was coming from board our ship and he was dismissed in front.

About 4 o'clock we all were made to pass astern and they began to strip the sailors and search them in the most indecent manner, stripping them to the skin and taking all they had in silver, either coins or chattels. The Captain wanted to protest but the commander told him that they wanted to prepare the account of all the money of each one so that it was not stolen and that they could return it to him at Vijaydurg. We had to be content with this reasoning. Even the two officers were searched

and even their collar rings were removed. They also wanted to search the Captain but he opposed it fearing that they would remove his papers and resisted in such a manner that he was exempted from the search this time. They even removed the boatswain's whistle which the Captain got returned but which was taken back from him after an hour. This search caused the Captain to fear that they might seize his papers. He wrapped them in a handkerchief and made of it a belt which he continued to wear until they removed it from him by force.

Towards the evening a boat came with a servant who brought the Captain's bed, his outfit, his writing-desk and supper. The servant told us that he wanted to bring provisions for several days but that the Marathas were masters on board and only allowed that to be taken. They took account of all that was brought, and they seized forks and a box of tin-knives thinking they were doubtless of silver; they left us two with wooden handle. In spite of the Captain's protest, they searched his writing-desk and his outfit and seized silver and some jewels which were in the writing desk with a bunch of keys which were those of the cupboards, officer's boxes, which the officer had taken the precaution to send. The recorded sum amounted to Rs. 250.00; there were two hundred fifty piastres in the outfit which they did not find because they were in a secret drawer. The belongings were then returned. As they had not brought food for the sailors, he asked for it. He was told that they would give them rice, but they were given nothing in spite of their demanding it.

The next day morning after persistent demands, rice was given to the sailors. When the Captain protested to the commander that he had neither food nor linen, he promised to send for it on board our ship, but he did nothing.

Towards ten o'clock the Captain was called astern and through a Cafreé who spoke a little Portuguese the pilot asked him how much he would give to buy back his ship; to which the Captain replied that this ship did not belong to him, that he had already told them that it was a King's corvette, that if the Marathas were at war with the French, the capture would be in order, but that if they were not at war, they were wrong in capturing it. The pilot said that he would speak about it to the commander and give his reply. But he has not heard about it any more.

In the afternoon the sailors were embarked on the plea that they were being taken on board the Adelaide; that delighted us and we hoped that the officers would soon be taken there.

Towards the evening as no provisions had come from our ship, we asked the chief for food, we were given rice and water; that has been our food since except some fowls which were given to us from time to time, one by one for four officers.

On the next day we noticed a sail in the wind; we ran up and towards noon we recognised a snow with an English flag, at 2 o'clock it was in the midst of the squadron. Then six marines were sent on the forecastle by asking us to remain quiet. Shortly afterwards the Captain of the frigate came with several persons and examined all our belongings which were there, especially the bed, the writing-desk and the outfit of the Captain; money escaped them as they could not find the secret. After taking a ring which the Captain had on his finger and putting it in the writing-desk, they wanted him to put his papers in it, but the Captain refused, and said that he would rather have his neck cut than surrender them; they wanted to force him but he held firm. They made a note of everything that was there. They closed the dressing-case, the writing-desk and carried away the key. Shortly afterwards they asked us to be ready to go on our ship. The Captain asked to see the commander to know his intention and get back his belongings which were detained. But they replied that he was sleeping and that he (M. Dayot) could not speak to him. They kept his writing-desk and returned his bed and dressing-box and he and his two officers and a servant embarked, thinking that they were going on their ship. But they were taken on board the other frigate where they were surprised to find the second mate and three sailors who they thought had been sent on their ship. But they had all been separated in fours.

On the next day of their arrival on the ship of the second commander the Englishman called Charles who had come on our ship and who was a gunner on this frigate told us that the commander asked for a declaration of everything that was on board so that nothing was misappropriated and that especially money and merchandise should be truthfully declared, because the ship could indeed be emptied if it was suspected that we wanted to cheat him, and then all that was not declared would be confiscated. We replied that we could not give this declaration from memory, but that the registers of the ship could be opened and that they would find in them everything recorded to a nail. He insisted especially on money and on our belongings which we ought to know, that as for the detailed tackle of the ship, these could be found on the ship. We had no objection to give a declaration about what we knew to be on board, presuming that if the ship were not seized as we thought it, we would have the right to claim from the ships book and from our declaration the goods which would be missing. Herewith is attached the declaration which the Captain, with the help of the second mate and the fourth officer, gave of the goods on the ship.

In the hold	40,000 lbs. of iron bars. 26 guns of which 17 six-pounders and 9 three-pounders and 700 to 800 bullets 1010 marble-tiles 40 barrels of water in various casks.
To be delivered at Bombay or at Goa in the hold.	4 chests of which one of glass-ware. 1500 lbs. of cloves in 22 sacs. 160 lbs. of Cinnamon sticks in one box. 2,500 lbs. of China sugar-candy in boxes.
Crew's provisions for six months.	Two barrels of wine Two barrels of brandy. 4 kegs of brandy. 6 quarts of salt-provisions. 200 lbs. of mantecca. 20 bags of various kinds of dried vegetables. 2,000 lbs. of rice. 300 lbs. of biscuit.
Provisions for the table.	15 cases of wine. 10 cases of brandy. 10 cases of liqueur. 8 cases of ratafia. 6 cases of dessert wine. 12 cases of capers, olives, etc. 3 jars of plums. 3 jars of sugar in white powder. 1 bale of coffee. 2 barrels of wheat flower. 10 sacks of fine rice. 4 cases of sausages and pickled meat, fowls, pigs, etc. All the tackles detailed in the inventory— of the boatswain of the pilot of the carpenter of the caulker of the sail-maker. of the gunner of the cooper

	of the clerk		
	of the baker		
	Battery of 10 guns mounted and serviced.		
	36 guns.		
	15 pairs of pistols.		
	6 blunderbusses.		
	Independently of the arms of each officer as swords, sabres, guns and pistols.		
	A complete set of spare sails and in addition 2 brand new topsails.		
	5 ancrees.		
	4 ropes or cables from Europe.		
	2 coir ropes, brand new.		
	Spare hawsers, ropes, riggings and all detailed in the inventory.		
In the rooms	2 cases filled with wine, beer, etc. and belongings of the Captain.		
	5 wardrobes of which three containing crockery and cuttlery, one about 150 volumes and another plans of journals and mathematical instruments, various boxes and effects of the Captain and a drawing-box.		
Cash	2 sealed bags of	1000 frs.	2,000 frs.
	1 bag containing	300 piastres	642 frs.
	Change	30 frs.	30 frs.
	pagodas with the star	150 frs.	600 frs.
	plus	120 frs.	120 frs.
		Total	3392 frs.

Silver plate, table linen and all the other effects and linen, furniture and jewels of each one, of which we cannot give here the detail and for which the inventory of each one must be seen.

Such is the summary declaration which the Captain gave and which the man named Charles translated into English to be translated next into Marathi by the ship's scribe. In the evening they anchored alongside the coast as l' Adleaide would not move and caused much of the distance to be lost. It was towed by a double-masted pal which occasioned, because of lack of care and precaution in conducting them, a lot of collision by which the prize has been greatly damaged. We were grieved, when it passed near us, to see it in the saddest state since it has already broken a topsail-yard which served as a boom.

On the 22nd having moored at 12 kms above Goa but in sight, as the winds were contrary, the squadron spent the whole day at anchor. The Captain repeated his demand about linen and food. They consented that our servant should go into the boat; he was sent on board the commander's ship, and make this demand to the commander. In the evening the boat returned after making several journeys on board l'Adelaïde, and the servant brought three shirts, two drawers, very little of biscuits all in pieces which they had broken to see if there was any money, as also the chirouttes which he wanted to bring, three bottles of wine and two of brandy. We were given wine one bottle a day but they kept the brandy. The servant told us that almost all our belongings were on the comandant's ship; the trunks were broken, and that all the sailors (Maratha) were wearing our clothes, handkerchiefs and other linen that the commandant himself had removed from his head a woollen cap with a tassel which the Captain had given him. On the same day they sent for the officer, who had remained on board with the cook and the butler, on the commander's ship, and they remained there till the arrival at Vijaydurg.

On the 23rd morning, we saw a ship, to windward of the squadron, which was sailing in the open sea. The squadron got into trimming sail and ran after it. At noon the ship tacked and came to

meet the squadron. The decks were cleared with much confusion and we were made to descend in the hold; the same thing was done on the other ships where there were Frenchmen. At 2 o'clock the ship turned to windward of the squadron with a Portuguese flag and we recognised a Portuguese frigate with 34 guns which had a boat astern. When it passed, we were allowed to come up. We judged that it was a guard-frigate which had come out of Goa to reconnoitre the squadron and the seizure. The sequence proved that we had judged rightly.

When it was at a distance of full two km., L'Adelaïde, which was tugged and which was at more than 4 km. leeward, turned and stood in for the land. Then the squadron also turned and chased the frigate. About 5 o'clock the Portuguese frigate brailed up its topgallant sails and lower sails and swooped down on the seizure which, when it saw its manoeuvre, turned on the squadron which followed. But the frigate reached it and followed it in close order astern, shooting from time to time bullet shots. The ship, which was towing, still turned before the wind and the frigate continued to follow while shooting. The squadron arrived and the commander, on whom the Portuguese frigate was firing, hauled. Then the tug of the seizure was cast off and Hyder's flag was hoisted on it. The Portuguese frigate again fired two shots and the commander sent his boat on its board. After sometime the Portuguese frigate turned and stood out to sea. The squadron moored very near the coast. We learnt since that the Portuguese frigate had spoken to let go the tug and to release the seizure, that on the refusal he had fired on the pal which was tugging and that the shot had even cut a stay and hit right in the wood, that afterwards the tug had been cast off, that the commander had spoken to hoist the flag of Tipu Saheb and shouted to the Portuguese frigate not to fire that they were friends, and that the boat was not Portuguese.

The frigate followed L'Adelaïde for a long time and so closely because it could not read its name which is on the stern in big letters and could not doubt that the ship was European from its construction, its rigging, its boats, especially from a dinghy with a very neat sheave-hole suspended along the side, from its sails and rigging of sails and European roping and more particularly from its masting which is in polacca. This workmanship is not utilized by the Indian nations. Having assured itself that the ship was not Portuguese, the frigate returned undoubtedly to make its report to Goa from which we presume that it had come out at night. The very evening the commander, certainly fearing a similar visit, gave orders to the galivats to take up the tug of L'Adelaïde and carry it in front along the coast. The next day we saw it far away along the coast tugged by six galivats with oars. We did not see again the Portuguese ship the next day and in the evening L'Adelaïde, which had gone on ahead, was out of sight. We moored along the coast but very close and during the day we got under sail. From this day till our arrival at Vijaydurg nothing particular happened to us. We continued to be treated in the same manner. Our sailors, who were sometimes given tobacco, were deprived of it because they would not help in manoeuvring and they were threatened that they would not be given any food if they did not work.

Finally, after many sufferings we arrived at Vijaydurg on the 1st of March at 4 o'clock in the evening. The whole squadron sailed into the river and moored in the port inside the fort. We found there L'Adelaïde which was moored having arrived there two days before. There were many rejoicings on this occasion. The commander was saluted by the full artillery of the fort and the ships replied. It was a cannonade throughout the day. At about 5 o'clock the commander landed in the midst of the sound of the canon. The governor was on the landing place to receive him. An hour later a boat came on board to look for us. We landed with the four sailors who were on the same ship. We were admitted into a hangar where the commander was. He got us searched by 25 sipahees and we had the humiliation to see ourselves stripped naked before the town without arms and without forces. It was impossible for us to avoid this insult which we had already undergone on board. They found nothing and once again the money, which was in the Captain's dressing case escaped them. But the weight of the chest surprised them and made them suspect something. But in spite of their search, they could not discover the secret of the drawer. We were told that we would be given a house and that they would send us supper. But nothing came. We were placed under a picket of sipahees which was posted under the hangar and we spent the night there in the midst of these soldiers who, throughout the night insulted us and entertained themselves at our cost. The next day in the morning order was given to

bring down all the sailors who were scattered on the different ships and those who had remained on board L'Adelaïde along with the servants and some negro women. For, although they had arrived two days before us, no one had landed. The commander came with a guard to the place where we had slept and ordered a search of all those who had just landed on the landing-place in the presence of the whole town, and in the most indecent manner. No one was spared, even the negro women were not spared this insult; they were searched and were almost stripped to the skin. They were not even left the hair-pin which tucked up their hair because they were of silver or at least white; a little girl whom the Governor of Colombo had entrusted to the Captain to be delivered to some one at the Isle of France and who had ear-rings and some buttons, all of which was not worth six rupees, was stripped of them in spite of her tears. In spite of his remonstrances, the Captain could not prevent these brigands from continuing their indecent searches. He was pushed back roughly by the sipahees and the commandant threatened to put him in chains if he did not remain quiet. The second mate was not so lucky, for, he was pushed back with blows and received among others two blows on the head of which he is still feeling the pain. The persons, who had already been searched, were not spared, and if they found on them two shirts, they stripped them of one and of their vest.

After this search, we were given food that is to say rice and water, and we were asked to go and lodge under a hangar which was near the shore and was open on all sides. We asked at least for a sail to protect us from the wind. They promised it to us and we were sent back with a numerous guard which did not allow us to walk a step.

The Captain asked to see the governor. He was told that when he (the governor) would like to speak to him, he would be sent for, and they did not wish to give him any other reply. He was forced to retire by the sipahees.

In the afternoon, as the governor had come, he sent for the Captain. He went there with his second and third mates. After admitting them into a secluded room, he asked him for his papers through the same Charles. The Captain, who had them all the time in his belt, showed them to him. He did not pay much attention to them. He asked him, if he had money; the Captain replied that they had taken away from him and from everyone all that they had and that as he had only a shirt and a drawer, he could not hide money, that moreover, the commander, who was present there, ought to know it. He (the governor) said that it was too late to go on board but that the next day the second mate would go there to collect our belongings and give them to us. The Captain wanted to lodge some protests to him on the seizure and explain his reasons but he retired.

In the afternoon we were told that there was not sufficient place for us and for our sailors under the hangar and that they were going to give a house to our crew. We feared that they wanted to separate us in order to send them inland and that they might meet with some dreadful hazard. We said that we would carry on well as we were. But we had to submit. In the evening they sent them to a place fixed for them. They left with us the servants and the negro women. The Captain asked to see at least the house in order to see that his crew were comfortable and could remain there. They put up great difficulties in permitting it to him, but nevertheless he was there with his second. But what was their surprise when, after passing through a part of the town, they were made to go down to the shore among the rocks where there was some piragua for salt and two other boats laid down. It is there that they were placed with a guard which was lodged in the only hut which stood in this place. On his return the Captain said that his crew could not stay like that in the open on the pebbles. They promised to erect tents but that was not done. We thought we would be able to see our men every day, so that they were furnished wood, water and rice. But we were mistaken; we could not communicate with them since and the Captain did not see them any more.

The next day as the commander had come with a guard, a Darbar was held. He sent for the Captain and asked him if he had no money and warned him not to deceive him, because he was going to order the ship to be unladen. He (M. Dayot) replied that he was the master, that he has already told him that all he had ought to be in his hands because he had been only left his shirts and his drawers. When he asked him what he intended to do with the ship and with us, he replied that he would order

the ship to be unladen and would sell it unless we wanted to buy it again. The Capatain said to him that the King of France did not buy back the boats which had been stolen from him, that before long he would see that the ship as well as the crew were demanded back. He (the commander) said that he would pay well those who would accept service with him and that he can very well make others serve him. The Captain asked for linen and other provisions than rice and water for him and his officers. He replied that he would see that these things were supplied to us and went away to visit the Maratha crew which had been put to sea...and which had just been withdrawn. All were covered with the clothes of the sailors, with the linen of the officers and of the Captain who, as he wanted to be restored especially to the sailors, who were almost naked, all that belonged to them, pointed out to the commander that he let go scot free all his men who were covered with the spoils of the French, but he did not listen to him. All that was best was put apart, the rest was abandoned to whomsoever who had taken it. As the Captain wanted to prevent a man who was going away with his dress and other linen, he was covered by the guards and forced to withdraw.

In the afternoon the commanders ent for the Captain and M. Puren They were taken to his residence where he received them and had them surrounded by a dozen guards who had all either a sabre or a dagger, the majority being bare. He gave many orders and after a long silence, he asked for money and said that we must have it. We told him that we could not do it and that he had taken all that we had. Since he was the master of ovr effects as of ovr persons, he next showed us an iron stick about two and a half feet long which he had in his hands and after unscrewing one end, he took out of it a dagger of about one foot long and after unscrewing the other end a stiletto of about six inches, looking at them fixedly. The Captain and M. Puren did not know what that signified especially as they noticed a big movement among the guards, some of whom got up and went out. However, they (French) appeared not to pay great attention to all that. The commander asked how we found his stick, the Captain replied without seeming to look at it attentively that it was very good. He sheathed his daggers and said to the Captain that he had to stay there, that he was going on board with the second mate and M. Puren to collect all that we needed and went out.

He was on board with these two officers but he did not send down anything for our use. He made a review of everything and asked where our money was. The officers replied that it was in our trunks which he had got opened and that he must have found it. He asked if there was any money hidden. He was told that he could have the ship broken up piece by piece and that then he would be satisfied. He came down and once again insulted the officers who had accompanied him by getting them searched on the landing, and did not permit them either to change or take from their dirty linen from the ship a shirt or a drawer as those which they were wearing since February 15, had fallen into rags because of grubbiness as they were obliged to sleep on red earth almost in dust. Thus, never had beggars, covered with rags, inspired greater pity than the sads tate to which we were all reduced.

In the evening as the Captain wanted to come back with his officers, he was detained and was told that henceforth he would not see them any longer. He was put in the guard-room with the sipahees where he was kept from this time till the 3rd April when we were set free. His food was carried by his servant who was always accompanied by a sentinel.

On all the following days, the commander was on board of the seizure to have it unladen. Sometimes he took there officers in order to obtain information on the different effects which he found there and one day he even wanted them.....a cask of salted meat because it was bacon. M. Puren, as he spoke the Moorish language, was called upon to assist at the fort on different occasions because it is there that all the effects were unladen pele mele and there they were left in the sun and in the rain. They wanted to know the names of the different articles and the prices because there were boats from Bassein which were returning to Bombay and which were asking to buy them. Even one of the men said in a very low tone to the officer to put the bottle of wine and liqueur only at half a rupee to have it cheaper. M. Puren reported to us that every time he went to the fort, his heart bled to see the sad state in which all the effects were, that all the chests were empty and smashed and....of which the lock or the chest itself could not be broken, that our linen was thrown with the rags and the jumble in a corner, and that everything was lost.

When the ship was unladen, they threw in it the rest of the very coarse stones; they were dropped heavily from above the deck so that we heard the noise from our place and the Captain from his prison which nevertheless was far off. The bottom of the ship must have definitely much suffered from it. They were often obliged to pump and the officers, when they had gone there, saw entire seams opened by the boardings and the shakings of the galivats which were surrounding it. The chain-boards, the lines, the fowl-cages, the oven, the kitchen, etc., were all broken entirely to dismantle the ship. They did not bother to unreeve the ropes; they cut them, and the masts of the ship are only pieces of wood from which hang a dozen bits of cords; the water-casks are open to the sky and you can see daylight everywhere; the cables are in the fort in a place where they unload wood for construction which passes over them every time they put it on the ground. Finally, the launch, which we were repairing when they captured us, was unloaded in such a way that the fore-part is on the rocks and the backside on the landing place at a gun-shot from there; our boats as well as our servants whom they force to work in the yard, serve them daily; all the biscuit has been turned into dead mash to see if there was any money inside. We asked for it in vain. At last, after repeated requests we obtained a little salted meat for us and for our crew.

The butler was sent on board to bring some morsels; he found in the room an open bag of money. Immediately, the commander got all the salted meat brought down and the rooms were emptied, and the meat was cut into small pieces to ensure if there was no other money. They found about Rs. 800.00 in the bag.

In the evening the commander, enraged, went to the prison, and having sent for M. Puren, he reproached him for having tried to cheat him by telling him that he had no money and that we had definitely a lot of it, that we were all scoundrels, but that he would get the better of us. The Captain told him that he could not have deceived him by telling him that he had no money, that he should have examined the account since he had given him his declaration in writing, and that presuming indeed that he had taken away everything, nothing must have remained on board. The commander appeared surprised and said that he had received no declaration. Then the Captain showed it to him and said that the man Charles had asked it from him on his behalf on board the frigate and which he had translated into English. The Commander denied having received this declaration, but the Captain insisted that the man Charles should be sent for.

When this man came, he could not deny it and said that he had translated the declaration of the Captain, and remembered it so well that he repeated it word for word. Then the commander asked his secretary to write down only the account of money and wanted the Captain to sign a desistance from any money which would exceed this declaration. But the Captain said that he did not sign a paper against his will, but he wrote on the back the amount of his declaration and moreover, declared that it was the only money at his disposal on board when he had left it, that he had no claim on any other which would be found on board as it did not belong to him. But he said to the commander that he did not know the account of the money of his officers and his crew, that this was the sum he had on board without counting what had been taken away from him. He sent for the officers to declare theirs, but as all their money had been taken to his ship, he only wanted to know what they had in their trunk and they declared it. The Captain wanted to make a mention of all that had been taken in his presence from the officers and the sailors, but he shut his mouth and did not wish to hear us harp on this cord. We were accused of having hidden this bag of money in order to hide it or steal it, for, that was the expression they used. But this charge failed when we told them that we had all been guarded on their ship and that we had not returned to ours and that those of our men who had remained did not enter either the room or the store-room since the Marathas distributed to them the provisions and did not allow them to go down to below the deck even to sleep, that the trunks had been smashed although the Captain had put all the keys in the hands of the commander and that only the Marathas had done the deed since he had declared this money on the very next day of his arrival on the ship of the second commander, and that the proof that they had stolen this money was that they had the linen and the clothes of the Captain from the same trunk which contained this money which was in sealed bags of thousand rupees. The Commander could not refute these reasons. He angrily gave orders and sent

back the officers; the Captain was reconducted to his prison and the commander retired, for, it was nearly ten o'clock in the evening.

The next day the commander appeared early on the landing place and having sent for the crew, he got them completely stripped of their clothes and even opened their knickerbockers.....to search them, after which they searched the sideboards and other utensils in which rice was cooked. The Captain's dressing-case was brought but its weight created suspicions and unable to discover its secret, the commander had it put into pieces; he found in it many articles which could satisfy his cupidity. The Captain had in it 250 pasters, a set of silver dress-buttons, all his jewels and his Freemason's badge and several stones and rings from Ceylon. He seized everything and did not even return the razors and the mirrors.

After this seizure he gave a passport to our crew with a little rice and a rupee per head to proceed to Bombay by land. He got them carried on the other bank of the river from where they left without the permission either to speak to us or see the Captain.

In the afternoon the commander took us on board to show him the place where our money was when we had quitted the ship. We showed him the place of the trunk and a wardrobe.....He once again asked if there wasn't any.....Then he ordered the partitions, the wainscotings of the rooms, the ceiling of the big room and even the inner planking of between the decks, with the partitions, store-rooms and lockers to be pulled to pieces. Everything was pulled to pieces with the stroke of an axe; but he found nothing and returned in the evening and went to the prison of the Captain where he asked him for his watch with a golden chain which so far he had left to him. He seized it, then he asked for his packets and papers. The Captain refused to do so by saying that he had seen them, already since it had not prevented him from arresting him, that they were written in French, which he did not understand at all and that there was no money in them. Then he got them removed from him by force in spite of the Captain's resistance and said that he would send the packets for Bombay to the governor, but he did nothing of the sort.

The next day morning the Captain said to the commander that he wanted to speak to him and asked him to send for M. Puren; he was sent for. The Captain asked where his crew had been sent and why he detained us with our servants. The commander replied that the crew had gone to Bombay and that he wanted Rs. 25,000.00 from us to set us at liberty. He asked us to reflect on it and turned his back on us.

In the evening the commander asked the Captain, through a Negro [\[Negro of the Coast of Guinea and other African Coasts. Cafrees are good soldiers.\]](#) who spoke Portuguese, for his reply to the demand he had made in the morning. The Captain said that he never replied to such questions, that he was not afraid of anything, that he had lost everything, but that soon the King of France would send someone to claim from him (the commmander) himself (the Captain) and his ship. He then made a proposal to the Captain to embark with him by offering him as much as he was earning in his own country. The Captain shrugged his shoulders and turned his back to him. This proposal had already been made to some officers and to all the sailors.

Two days later, the commander embarked and took away with him a servant by name Joli Coeur about 12 to 14 years old, and as this child wept, he got him carried away by force. During the night the squadron weighed anchor and sailed out.

We have been treated since in the same manner. The Captain asked repeatedly to speak to the governor; he never succeeded in it. He absented himself two days after the departure of the squadron and has not yet returned. It is only on the 1st of this month that the Captain was given the permission to go out once to see his officers. People were then talking that news favourable to us had come from Poona, but we had no certainty about it. At last on the 2nd the Divanji, who commands in the absence of the governor, sent for M. Puren and said to him that if he would give him a present, he would have the ship returned and that orders had come from Poona. On the 3rd, he sent for the Captain and said to

him that there was an order to return the ship but it was a custom to give a present to the governor and to him. The Captain thought that it was only a question of a jewel or an article like a watch or gun or something similar. He said that if he was satisfied with the manner in which he would be treated and that if everything was returned to him with damages, he would single out those who could have rendered him service. But the Divanji gave him to understand that he expected more than a thousand rupees. Then he delivered to him a letter from Monsieur de Montigny, our ambassador at the Court of Poona, which letter the governor had detained for eight days; it had left thirteen days ago. The Captain asked for his papers and the material to reply to Monsieur de Montigny. He was promised what he wanted.

In the afternoon, as he had not yet received anything, the Captain went to the Diwanji who delivered to him a second letter from Monsieur de Montigny which are both attached to this report. The harkara had once again been detained for three days on the route. He delivered to the Captain one hundred sequins which M. de Montigny had sent him for his more pressing needs. Then the Captain once again asked for his papers and the material to write, a lodging for himself and his officers. We were lodged in the place where the Darbar was usually held and where we made a frame-work, with the sails, and having received pens and paper and the necessary things, we drew up the present report which we certify to be the most exact truth in order to serve.....and in testimony whereof we have signed.

Vijaydurg, April 4, 1787.

Puren, Corbier, Dayot, Bussiere.

Translation of a letter from Nana Fadnis, Maratha Regent, to M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, dated April 12, received on May 20, 1787.

After the compliments.

I am in very good health; please give me news about your health.

I have received your letter; I was delighted to read it. I have well understood all its import. You write to me that you know about the continuation of our preparations of war against Tipu Sultan, with our forces allied with those of Nizam Ali Khan Bahaddar, and that we are seeking the succour of the English; that we ought to mistrust this perfidious nation which desires to give us succour less to fight our enemies than to seize the territory of the Indian princes; that, consequently, it appears to you more desirable that we should conclude peace with Tipu Fattah Ali Khan. We consider that all the exportations, which you have made to us, are in the fitness of things.

To preserve the friendship with all the persons, who show good will towards us, has been at all times the tradition of our Sarkar. But to try to punish those, who do not wish to put limits to their ambition, I think that that ought to appear just to all the powers of the world.

If it is true up to this moment that we never were obliged to demand foreign succour in all the wars which we have waged, why should we today wish to seek the assistance of the English?

We can easily continue to wage war, if the persons, who made conventions with our Sarkar, happen to break them. But we can also easily remain at peace with those who will keep their conventions, which, in our turn, will be faithfully observed.

I have no doubt that you know and that you are acquainted with all the proceeding and the conduct which Tipu adopts at this moments.

Copy of a letter from M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, to M. de Montigny, Resident at Poona.

Pondicherry, April 14, 1787

I received, Sir, duly the two letters which you wrote to me dated 8th January, No. 15 and 17th February, the latter without a number.

At the same time I received a copy of the letter which had been addressed to M. Le Vicomte de Souillac. It completely corresponds to the original which I had studied and of which I had got a translation made to send to M. Le Vicomte de Souillac who has no Marathi interpreter with him. I am sorry not to have informed you that I had orders to go through all the letters of the princes addressed to M. de Souillac, because that would have spared you the pain which you have kindly taken to send me a copy of the said letter which, moreover, did not contain anything interesting except the assurance which Nana Fadnis gave me that he can very well punish his enemies without the succour of anyone. Unfortunately for his reputation and the glory of the Maratha nation, what has happened is contrary to his expectations.

As the politics of the Regency of Poona has undoubtedly changed since the date of your letter, I shall not take up the matter relating to Ayaz with Tipu. Similarly, you know how matters stand today with respect to the proceedings of Nana with the Portuguese Waquil. I think that at this moment M. Francisco d'Acunha is in a greater anxiety than Don Frederic ever was.

I am extremely sorry, Sir, I say it to you with the greatest frankness, for the trouble you have taken to convey to me the details of the different engagements which took place between Tipu and the Marathas, especially on the capture of Savnur, since, in fact it is immaterial whether this place was captured in an abandoned state, or by escalade, since it is nevertheless certain that this Prince has all along maintained a great advantage over the Marathas and Nizam, that he has never been defeated and that he seized Adoni, Savnur, Bader-bander, etc., etc., that finally, today, Sir, laden with the spoils of the allied army, Tipu must have proceeded to Srirangapatan, after concluding peace in the beginning of February, according to what he himself writes to me on the 10th of this, very month, and sufficiently in time to enable me to convey the news and inform the Minister about it by the last ships which left in March. Has the Regency of Poona still concealed from you this peace? which you could have known at the time of the dispatch of your last letter, and of which, at the very least, I ought to be informed to day the 14th April. I have not yet received news from you on such an interesting event, which makes me presume that you must have been ignorant of it almost till mid-March, a month indeed after this peace was concluded. I say it to you, Sir, only because I see clearly that Nana Fadnis does not treat you at all with all the confidence you deserve, and you ought to complain to him about it.

I now reply, Sir, to one of the paragraphs of your letter, which appears, to me to have occupied you too much, allow me to say it to you, with the same frankness.

The Governor-Generals of the English Company were appointed in a meeting of the said Company by the majority of votes. They are today simultaneously commandants of the troops, but that has made no change in the Constitution of the Company. It is still in its name that are governed and administered all the affairs of India, civil as well as military, and the Governors directly receive orders from the Court of Directors. I think, as it has been reported to you, that his Britannic Majesty had the greatest influence in this appointment; that the majority for Lord Cornwallis and for the Governors of Madras and Bombay was only in pursuance of the desire of the King, etc. Moreover, all these matters are so perfectly known to our Ministry that what you and I can say and know about them, can only be very immaterial.

A few months more of patience, and I hope that you will know how you stand with regard to the salary which ought to be paid for your Residentsip, if the Minister judges that you ought to continue it. I think that it is a matter necessary for the interests of the nation, but that it would be better indeed not to maintain you in this post than to leave you in such a precarious situation.

Three persons of high rank whom the Nawab Tipu Sultan desired to send on his behalf to the King, have arrived at Pondicherry some time ago. I daily await the ship which is to carry them to Europe.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Cossigny.

Copy of a letter from M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, to M. de Montigny, Resident of the Nation at Poona.

Pondicherry, April 15, 1787.

It is only too true, Sir, that the ship L'Adélaïde, commanded by M. Dayot, was captured on 16th February by a Maratha flotilla almost off Mangalore. With their prize which they first thought was more considerable, they took refuge in one of their ports north of Goa, from where they have sent back 25 sailors whom they forced to take the route to Bombay in preference to that of Goa. M. Dayot, with his staff forming in all a number of 5, were imprisoned, and they were notified that they would have their liberty only by paying a very heavy ransom. From M. Dayot a sum of Rs. 50,000.00 was demanded as his personal ransom, which he replied he could not give since they had removed even his slippers. Subsequently, his ransom was reduced to only Rs. 15,000.00, a sum which it was quite as difficult for M. Dayot to pay as that of Rs. 50,000. They proposed to him that he should buy back his ship; it was equally impossible for M. Dayot who sought the permission to write to Goa and to Poona, which was refused to him. Matters stood thus when the said 25 sailors had the liberty to go in the direction of the north. Fortunately, they all arrived in Bombay where the majority entered the service of the English; two of these men, the cook and the butler of this ship, demanded their passage to a Captain of an English ship, which set sail for Madras, where these two men arrived some days back and today at Pondicherry. It is from them, Sir, that I received the details which I have just related to you and which I hasten to send you, so that you should claim back on my behalf from Nana Fadnis M. Dayot and his staff as well as the compensation due for the capture of the ship and that finally you should demand a reparation proportionate to such a grave insult offered to His Majesty's flag, so much in contravention of the law of nations and the friendship, at least apparent, of the Regency of Poona for the King of France.

You can declare, Sir, to Nana Fadnis and to all his colleagues in the Regency that if a prompt justice to my complaint is not made, they ought to remember that we have in station in India six warships belonging to His Majesty, that they are there only to protect the trade of his subjects, and that they ought to be very much convinced that it will be in the ports of these pirates, who, it is well known, are acknowledged by the Regency, that at the next season we will go and claim the same justice, if they are quite unmindful of their interests to refuse it on the demand which you will make to them on my behalf, whether these pirates depend on the Regency or do not depend on it. If they depend on it, we must expect on the part of Nana Fadnis a repudiation of his participation and a prompt justice; if they do not depend on it, His Majesty's forces in this country are more than sufficient to punish them. You ought to add, Sir, all what you judge to be most appropriate, and we shall be specially immensely obliged to you for the troubles you will take to set M. Dayot and his staff at liberty. I am writing a short note to Nana Fadnis, of which I attach herewith a translated copy. I have full confidence in you, Sir, in so far as what you have to say more or less on this matter.

It is to Vijaydurg, Sir, that the ship L'Adélaïde was taken, a port which belongs to the Marathas according to the avowal of the Waquil whom I sent for and who appeared to be very much pained by the detail which I gave him on this matter. I am writing on this occasion to the Regent; his letter is included herewith. Deliver it, I pray you, only when Nana Fadnis gives you his audience. Don't lose out of sight, Sir, whatever reparation is due to an insult offered to the King's flag. This ship had started from the Isle of France and after making a halt at Cochin and Mahé, it was on its way to Muscat.

If such an outrage could remain without reparation on the part of the Regency, you can declare to Nana Fadnis that it will be the signal for many untoward incidents. The English have already announced in public papers that a French frigate was captured by the Marathas. Hence, you could think how much the reparation ought to be authentic and known to everyone.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Cossigny.

C² 179, f. 250.

Copy of a letter from M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, to Nana Fadnis, First Maratha Regent.

Pondicherry, April 15, 1787

After the compliments.

I am writing on this very occasion a letter to M. de Montigny; it contains matters of the highest importance. I am giving him the order to communicate them to you. I request you not to refuse him a prompt audience. I am quite confident that he will discuss with you all the things to our mutual satisfaction.

I am expressing very sincere wishes for your long life and your prosperity.

Copy of a letter from M. de Montigny, Resident at Poona, to M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry.

Poona, April 15, 1787.

Sir,

I informed you by my letter of 17th February that Tipu Sultan had sent a Waquil to Tukoji Holkar to make proposals of peace to this Maratha chief, and that Holkar had sent back this Waquil to Tipu with one of his, bearer of proposals from the Regency. Sure enough, peace has been concluded, the whole question being referred to Haripant Phadke, and the respective agreements were signed shortly afterwards.

The territories of Raichur and Adoni are returned to the Subhedar; other matters are still in abeyance. But Sohrab Jang will probably settle that with Tipu. A part of the territory included between the Tungabhadra and the Krishna is restored to the Regency. Gajendragad remains with the Nawab; Nargund is returned to the Marathas, but not Dharwar. This will finally become the bone of contention. I shall return to this point. Sixty lakhs are to be paid to the Marathas, of which half is already delivered to the army, in cash as well as in jewels, elephants, etc. The rest is to be paid at Poona. This is in substance the position for the moment. But I venture to assert that without the intervention of some powerful Maratha chiefs (Holkar and Raste) with the Regency, this peace would not have been accepted by the Regent, and Dharwar, as I have already said it, will give rise to a war between the Marathas and Tipu, in circumstances more fortunate for the Regency than those in which it is today. The English are raging and fuming at the Marathas. They did their uttermost to kindle this war and since then to foment it. Muhammad Ali Khan, whom they set in motion, has all along pressed Nana Fadnis to continue this war, by promising to furnish to him 30,000 sipahees in his turn against the Nawab, and afterwards share half the conquered territory. This is what I learn from a reliable source. But Nana Fadnis fully understood what could be the sequel of such arrangements, and constantly refused to accept this proposal (more seducing than solid), although he is very much bent on possessing the district of Dharwar, the only object which continues to disturb him and which gives me cause for fear for the future.

The English Waquil continues to provoke Nana to break the agreements which he has just ratified, and I saw twenty times during the last fortnight the moment when the agreements were about to be set aside. This is, Sir, the motive which led me to suspend so far, the departure of my harkaras. Today things appear to me sufficiently solidly established to think that the Regency of Poona will not make any change for the moment in the articles stipulated in the treaty which has just been ratified. I say for the moment, because, I repeat it, this peace was accepted by the Regent only because of the pressing circumstances in which he is to re-establish, if possible, harmony among the chiefs of the Regency, or to operate a change in the distribution of the power which is entrusted to them, if he cannot succeed in repressing the ambition and the jealousy of certain chiefs towards the General of the Maratha army. I have already written to you, Sir, that I would be infinitely more clear on all these matters if I had a cipher with you. When you judge it appropriate to send it to me, I shall go into certain details in which prudence prevents me from entering, in view of the embarrassments which could result from it if my letters were intercepted, and I am justified in not being without anxiety in this respect.

The more I saw hesitation in the Regent for the conclusion of peace which has just taken place, the more I strove to impress upon him the advantages and even the necessity to terminate it promptly. Your latest letters of 25th December and 5th January under Nos. 9 and 10, and that of 21st November from M. Le Vicomte de Souillac, served me superlatively well in this important circumstance, and I was immensely satisfied to see the impression they had made on the mind of the Regent. I offered him your mediation, Sir, to negotiate this affair. He appeared to appreciate it. But

matters had progressed to such an extent with Holkar at this time that the Regent had to necessarily listen to these first arrangements. Nana Fadnis charged me expressly, Sir, to inform you that he was very sensible of the obliging offers your made to him, that the motive which prompted you was as praiseworthy as generous, and that he indeed recognised in it the national character. "The English do not think in this way", he added, "but the conduct, which I have adopted in all this affair, has frustrated their politics and dash their hopes." "You know", he said, "my way of thinking on this point. It would be useless to go into other details. If ever you appeared in force on this coast, you would see much better all what I have in my heart, but it is useless, I repeat it, to indulge at this moment in such projects. Peace is made; but I continue to mistrust Tipu, and Dharwar and several places which belong to us and which he has reserved for himself might indeed give rise to troubles later on. I am not satisfied with all this, you know it, as also the motive which led me to conclude this peace. I have said enough to you. Other days other cares. This is the reply I give to the letters of M. de Cossigny, which I request you to send him." I attach it with this letter. This is, Sir, the result of the last conference which I had with the Regent.

I informed him of the departure of the two Waquils of Tipu to France. He told me that he knew about it more than two months ago, that he had been informed of it from Bombay. I beg to tell you on this point, Sir, that our open connection with this Nawab, whatever I may say and do here, greatly worries him as well as Nizam Ali; and if they are placating the English, it is only to oppose force to force in case of emergency. This is the politics of this Darbar, which nothing can alter except when at the earliest war, our generous and magnanimous conduct is revealed. Then the native princes will no longer have doubts about the confidence which they ought to place in a powerful and formidable nation, which alone can deliver them from the humiliating yoke under which they are groaning.

The English have not failed to bring home to the Regency of Poona and to the Subhedar how redoubtable Tipu would become when his alliance with the French is once cemented, and that everything proclaims, even very publicly, this impending union. This talk, although partly appreciated by these powers, nevertheless makes a deep impression, and especially on the distrustful and apprehensive nature of the Brahmins. I impress upon the Regency, as much as it is possible for me to do so, how interested the English are in speaking thus. But whatever you may say and do, Tipu will always be considered by the legitimate powers of the Deccan as the son of a usurper, all the more dangerous as, to satisfy his unbridled ambition, he pours the immense treasures of his father to maintain himself in his usurpations and to make the entire conquest of the Deccan if he can do so. This is what the Marathas say who will continue to be his irreconcilable enemies unless this Nawab returns Dharwar to them and all the territory included between the Tungabhadra and the Krishna unreservedly, and unless he puts by a solid treaty fixed boundaries between his territory and that of the Regency, as well as the Kingdom of Nizam Ali, for, these two powers have the same way of thinking on this subject.

The English also know that without the succour and the alliance of the Marathas, it is impossible to effect the general revolution in India, and especially that of Bengal. They are, therefore, leaving no stone unturned to win the favour of this power and to set it against us. I have daily and quite recent proofs of it to which I shall have the occasion to return in the course of this letter.

The Marathas are fully aware of the insidious conduct of the English, but it can be considered as certain that the former will not make any move in favour of the French except after the arrival of our forces on the Malabar Coast and the attack of Bombay, etc., because the proximity of the English to their Kingdom fills them with awe sufficiently to adopt this conduct. These two articles can be considered as serving basis to the politics of both, and which nothing will alter without the conditions stated above. Excuse me, Sir, if I hark back so often again to the manner of envisaging things in this continent in so far as national interest is concerned. But this is an opinion formed for the last ten years that I know India, and what I see every day confirms me more and more in this opinion.

I have only a word to add to this. I shall be told that the Marathas are brigands, that the Brahmins which govern them are distrustful and cheats I know it. My long Residentsip at their Court has certainly taught me to know them. But have other powers a very different charactor? What does it matter to the French, provided with such instruments we succeed in expelling the English from Bengal, consequently in knocking over this giant of a power which supports itself only by the huge revenues of this rich province, and which are on the point of still augmenting. I shall add; does the alliance with other powers of India promise other advantages? Yes, certainly. But the complete revolution in India? No. This is what I think I can advance.

Today peace has returned to the Deccan, but it opens another scene in the north of this peninsula, which, if it is followed by success, ought necessarily to put the English in possession of a very large part of Hindustan.

The English are soliciting more vigorously than ever and are demanding from the Emiral Omrah, [Amir-ul-Umrah.] Waquil Mutalak, the district of Agra as an apanage for the fugitive Prince, Mirza-Jehander-Shah, eldest son of the emperor of Delhi.

Whatever may be the position in this respect, Captain Kit-Patecik, [Col. William Kirkpatrick.] who has replaced John Anderson, could not receive, at least publicly, a categorical reply to his demands, and the fortress of Agra is being placed in a state of supporting a siege.

Shinde is at present marching against the Rajputs who have risen against him, as also almost all the castes of Hindustan, whom he is alienating by his rapacity, his ambition and his tyranny. There is a great fear that for this expedition the number of the dissatisfied in his army is so great that if he experiences some treachery, he will probably succumb, and the English, who know his position, are profiting by it to fan the fire of discord and are trying to seize the district of Agra under the name of Mirza-Jehander-Shah, whom they are instigating. This is, Sir, the delicate position in which Shinde finds himself. I shall be very exact in conveying to you the result of this state of affairs as well as of the expedition for which the army of Shinde has taken the field since the 20th of March.

I wrote to you, Sir, by my letter of 10th December under No. 14 that I was negotiating a very delicate matter at the Darbar of Poona, and which could not fail to reveal to us to what point the Regency could be dominated by the English. This is the matter in question. I was hurt for a long time by the prerogative granted to the English merchant ships which sail on this coast with the greatest security, whilst others are exposed to their piracy. After communicating my protests to the individual councillors, who, of course, found them just, I went straight to the Regent to ask him a *Dastoc* for our merchant ships similar to the one which he has granted to the English. He seemed to appreciate my point and I thought that I could expect that this matter would be treated to my satisfaction. Since then insinuations on the part of our antagonists, supported by the fear which they inspire by their proximity here, have brought about the failure of my negotiations on this subject. Nana Fadnis finally refused to comply with my request by saying that the French ships had nothing to fear from the Marathas. This vague reply signified nothing. I first of all thought that an ill turn had been done to me and that I would not obtain a *Dastoc*. I was so angry with his reply that I demanded either a passport for our merchant ships on the lines of those of the English or my audience of leave. I pressed him so hard that he thought it advisable to show me sufficient consideration by repeating to me his earlier dispositions. I had no orders to quit my Residentsip. I, therefore, pretended to calm down. But all what I could do since, could not induce him to comply with my wishes. This outburst which I had intended to make since a long time has proved to me to what extent the Regent's politics placates the English.

I think, Sir, that it is urgent that you should write to the Regency on this point in order to obtain a clear reply which can chain down his promise in this respect. It is essential for the safety of the navigation of our merchant ships on this coast and also in keeping with the dignity of our flag.

The following incident will better stress its necessity. A month after the outburst which I made at the Darbar to obtain the *Dastoc* in question, I learnt *via* Goa, where I had Pattemars, that the

Marathas of Vijaydurg had seized a French ship on this coast which belonged to M. de Commezmont of the Isle of France and was commanded by M. Dayot. I immediately went to the Darbar to explain the ii regularity of the conduct of the Marathas of Vijaydurg to the Council of the Regency. Nana Fadnis appeared to me surprised and indignant like me. I claimed the restoration of this ship and of its cargo. The Regent admitted that my demand was indeed just and that he was going to write to the Killedar of Vijaydurg to return the ship L'Adelaïde and its cargo. I immediately sent harkaras with my letter to M. Dayot to inform him of this restoration and of the false reports given to the Regency of Poona by the Killedar. With the usual dilatoriness of the Darbar of Poona, time is being lost.

On the report made to me by Dayot of the difficulties which he was experiencing and the unworthy treatment which he as well as his officers met at the hands of the pirates of Vijaydurg, I once again met the Regent, who wrote in his own hand a very strict order on this subject. I have at this very moment received a letter from M. Dayot which I attach herewith along with a copy of mine, which will fully acquaint you, Sir, with all that has happened in this case, as well as the conduct which I thought it advisable to adopt.

Everything will be returned, but that is not sufficient. It is necessary that M. Dayot must obtain damages for the loss of the monsoon which he is experiencing and for an infinity of articles in bad condition which will be returned to him. I shall do my utmost to see that he gets all the satisfaction. Moreover, I have just sent to M. Dayot my Persian and Maratha scribes with my *Kismedar* who knows French and the native languages to enable him to explain himself and draw up in Marathi and Persian a statement of the situation. After the return of my interpreters and the receipt of the latest letters from M. Dayot, I shall communicate to you the result of the whole affair in which I am taking the keenest interest.

M. Le Chevalier de Kergariou wrote to me on this subject. But at this time, I had already obtained the restitution of the ship L'Adelaïde and of its cargo from the Regency. He also communicated to me the daring manoeuvre of the Maratha fleet against the King's frigate la Calypso. I have also lodged complaints about it with the Regent who immediately wrote to the commandants of his ports and of the fleet to respect the French flag in future. Herewith is attached the letter from M. de Kergariou and my reply to this Captain.

I also think that it would be necessary, Sir, that you should write to the Regency about the very irregular conduct which the Captain of the Maratha fleet adopted towards the King's frigate; and in case it does not reply in an appropriate manner, what shall I say to it? Would not a severe reproof on our part force it to adopt the correct attitude! towards a nation which it must learn to respect? At least I think so. I have clearly impressed it on Nana Fadnis, who is very sorry for the incident, but who perhaps needs to learn that we exist in India. The English have created an impression that we do not count for anything in this part of the world, so much so that they have succeeded in convincing him partly. However, I have seen the impression which our frigates, who happened to pass on the Malabar Coast, have produced here, and I am justified in thinking that if we appeared at the next monsoon to obtain from the Regency, a positive satisfaction which it owes to the French flag, and the damages which M. Dayot has a right to demand, I think, I repeat it, that the Regency, when it finds itself thus pressed to explain its conduct, would give all satisfaction in order to avoid exposing itself to reprisals. This action would give us on this coast the imposing tone, which we ought, in my opinion, to assume there, and would assure for ever to our merchant ships the safety they need to enjoy in the course of their navigation on this coast.

It is proper that you should know, Sir, that the Masmondar of Vijaydurg is partly the cause of the ill treatment which M. Dayot and his officers have suffered at the hands of the pirates of this place and that this Masmondar is the brother of Baron pont, a Brahim, who is charged here with the affairs of the English Company and who is interpreter of the English envoy with the Regency. The insinuations of the latter had their effect in the Darbar of Vijaydurg. I have known him at the Poona Darbar. The English seize every occasion to harm us and keep us away from an alliance with the

Marathas, whom they dread because of reasons already stated in the course of this letter. They openly say at Goa that the ship will not be returned to me. But I hope to give them the lie.

I hear it for certain from confidential men that I have at the Darbar, that if we display the conduct proposed above at the next monsoon, we shall counterbalance the sense of fear which the English inspire here and shall immensely diminish their influence in this Darbar. Nana Fadnis will feel more effectively the necessity to placate a nation which possesses so many means to command respect. I have entered into these details, Sir, only because I am much assured here about the impression which we shall create there and to what extent we shall diminish the influence of the English by adopting this conduct. Moreover, I submit these reflections to your judgement. The King's administrators ought to be posted with every incident that takes place and which concerns the national interest and with everything that can affect its dignity. Next, it is for them to adjudicate upon the importance of such matters. Now I think I have fulfilled my task.

I delivered to Nana Fadnis a copy of our last treaty of peace with the English, which you sent to him, as well as the copy of our treaty of alliance with the Dutch of which I explained to him the articles which concern India, the only ones which he demanded and which could interest him. As for our treaty with the English, I had already given him a copy at the end of the war, and since then I have all along recalled to him article 16 whenever there was a question of demonstrating to him that the English could not furnish assistance to the Regency without committing an infringement of this treaty, etc.

I also got translated for him in Marathi the letter which you wrote to Nizam Ali. If you deem it appropriate, Sir, to send me a copy in Persian of our treaty with the Dutch, of which you inform me that you have the original in this language, I would undertake, as you appear to desire it, to get it translated for you in the Marathi language in the purest style.

I have obtained fresh information on the capture of Savnur, as I have informed you, Sir, and all that which was given to me recently, absolutely corroborates that which I already had, that is to say, that this place of Savnur has not been captured by escalade in the presence of the Maratha army, as you were informed, but that it surrendered itself without striking a blow to this Nawab with the details which I have communicated to you. Thus, you are now in a position, Sir, to appraise the false report which was given you on this subject.

It was not the same with Bander bander [\[Bahadur Benda.\]](#). This latter place was captured by assault by the Nawab. The first was unsuccessful, and the Marathas, whose leaders were divided, did not at all oppose it. This is, Sir, what took place exactly and I shall vouch for the truth of this fact.

M. de Morampon, who succeeded M. Bouthenot in the command of the party attached to the service of Tipu, is detained, he says, unjustly by this Nawab who demands from him a sum of 6400 pagodas which M. Bouthenot owed to him. The Nawab refuses to give him a *Dastoc* to proceed to Pondicherry. This officer claims your justice and your good offices with the Nawab to procure him the permission to retire to Pondicherry. M. Rivière, his brother-in-law, has sent me a letter in this connection and requests me to write to you in his favour.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Montigny.

16th April.

P.S.—

Sir,

I learn at this very moment that fresh difficulties have arisen between the allied powers and Tipu concerning the surrender of places promised by this Nawab, and that Nizam Ali has ordered his artillery to march; it has already arrived at Kalatchi-Contra with a corps of troops.

I am going to send harkaras to the army of the Subhedar to know how the matters stand, after which I shall be very prompt, Sir, in communicating to you the news I shall receive on this point.

C² 180, f. 74v⁰–75

From M. de Cossigny to M. Le. Vicomte de Souillac.

Pondicherry, April 23, 1787.

No. 114

My General,

A few days after the departure of the King's frigate *La Précieuse* and the ship *La Reine* for Trincomalee, I received the two letters, one from Tipu Sultan, the other from Nizam Ali. I am sending you copies of these.

You will see, my General, from the letter of Tipu that he has made his peace with the Marathas. I presume that he will soon do it with Nizam Ali Khan, although he does not speak to me about it. In that case, it will be a general settlement, to the great dissatisfaction of the English, who had fomented this war to weaken and subdue Tipu Sultan and to oblige the allies to receive succour which they were constantly offering them and which they did not accept, well-convinced today that the English were only endeavouring to destroy the Indian princes at each other's hands to finally become masters of the whole of India. You will see, my General, from all my correspondence, how I tried to open the eyes of all the Sarkars and impress upon them the danger to which they were exposed.

I consider, my General, the news of this peace as very important, since it leaves a prince in all his glory, a prince who ardently desires the alliance and friendship of the French.

I have replied to Tipu Sultan with regard to the news which he has given me about the peace. I also attach herewith a copy of this letter.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Cossigny.

C² 180, f. 78

No. 119

From M. de Cossigny to M. Le Vicomte de Souillac.

Pondicherry, April 23, 1787.

My General,

The two letters of M. de Montigny and my reply are a sequence of our mutual correspondence which I have been successively addressing to you. These three latest documents contain nothing important. But they will give you to understand, my General, how difficult it is for a Resident at Poona to probe the secrets of this Sarkar, since M. de Montigny still speaks to me of the preparations of war on February 17 when, more than a fortnight ago, the Marathas had made their peace with Tipu. What is still very extraordinary is that he must have been left in this same ignorance long afterwards, since today is April 23 and I have not yet been informed by him of this important news. The English have announced in their public papers that the peace has not been made although Tipu wished to buy it with two crores of rupees and that the war ought to continue with greater vigour than ever. In this case, M. de Montigny must not have been deceived, and I would be so very much, for, Tipu, in all his correspondence, has never said anything to me but the truth. However, the Indian princes, and Tipu particularly, are persons so inexplicable that I would easily admit that I am in the wrong if, however, the news announced by the English was true.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Cossigny.

C² 180, f. 79-81.

M. de Cossigny to M. Le Vicomte de Souillac.

Pondicherry, April 23, 1787.

No. 121

My General,

I beg to inform you that the ship L'Adelaïde, commanded by M. Dayot, after calling at Colombo, Cochin, Mahé, was captured off Mangalore by the Maratha pirates and was carried to Vijaydurg, a port dependent on the Regency of Poona.

M. Marin had already sounded me on this unfortunate event without giving me any details. Nevertheless, I hastened at the time to inform Nana Fadnis and M. de Montigny about it. To day I knew it as a certainty from the cook and the butler of this ship, who proceeded from Bombay to Madras on an English ship and from Madras to this place, where they gave me the detail of this whole affair. You will find it in the letters attached herewith which I write to M. de Montigny as also to Nana Fadnis. Allow me, my General, to refer you to them in order not to repeat myself unnecessarily.

I think that I have done my duty by giving orders to M. de Montigny to speak to Nana Fadnis on my behalf with all the force and firmness, required by such a breach of the law of nations, and so inconsistent with the friendship which reigns between the Sarkar of Poona and us. I have no doubt that I shall obtain full satisfaction. But if it was otherwise, I await your orders, my General, well convinced that you will not allow such an insult offered to His Majesty's flag to remain unpunished. The 25 men, who were allowed to proceed to Bombay, met there the ship L'Alexandre whose Captain refused to pick up these unfortunate men, that is at least the statement of the two men who arrived here, which obliged, they add, the majority of the crew to take service on the English ships.

This same ship L'Alexandre, as well as the corvette L'Ecureuil, had already spread the news at Colombo, Cochin, Mahé, Mangalore, of the dispatch of the corvette which you intended to send to Tipu to convey the three Waquils of this Nawab to Europe; this corvette carried men, guns, cannons to Tipu, etc., etc. It is inconceivable, my General, how this dispatch has been divulged in all the ports of the Malabar Coast, from where it was announced to Pondicherry, where it was not a mystery to anyone, whilst I had not yet received from you the details of it. Putting two and two together, I am convinced that the ship L'Adelaïde was captured off Mangalore only because the corvette L'Aurore was expected there by the Maratha flotilla; that it is a new trick which has been played upon us by the English and that the Regency of Poona knew about it. There are Englishmen in Cochin, at Calicut, at Mangalore or very near in an Imperial lodge. The Marathas can have only been well informed of all the places mentioned above where it was public that you were sending a ship as a present to Tipu, laden with canons, guns and a sufficiently large number of men to strengthen the party of M. de Lalée. The English have already announced in their public papers of Madras that a French frigate had been captured by the Marathas on the Malabar Coast off Mangalore. The two men of the ship L'Adelaïde, who are here, have stated in their account that when they were carried to Vijaydurg, they had met a Portuguese frigate, which had fired on the Maratha flotilla to deliver the French ship and that the said frigate had stopped its hunt when the Marathas had announced that this ship, deemed to be French, was a ship which belonged to Tipu. After the combinations which can be made on all these facts which are only too probable, and which I have well foreseen, in accordance with the account which I have given you in my letter No. 9, I confess to you, my General, that although peace of the Marathas and of Tipu is made, I am nevertheless not without anxiety about the corvette which M. Monneron commands. To day is 23rd April and I have not yet heard from him although he was met at the Soloman Isles by L'Harmonie which arrived here about a month back. At the very least, M. Monneron must have appeared on the Malabar Coast at the same time as L'Harmonie reached here. I do hope, however, that he must have called at Cochin and at Mahé where he must have been warned that the pirates were infesting the coast. I very ardently wish that my fears do not come true. But

henceforward the departure of M. Monneron will take place only at the next season. This delay would be very immaterial if the poor Waquils were not to arrive in Europe in the dead of winter.

Recently, I sent for the Waquil of the Marathas, to whom I gave the detail of the capture of the ship L'Adelaide. He assured me that the Regency would satisfy our claim, but that a fleet, coming out of Vijaydurg, must have definitely been warned that we were sending arms and men to Tipu, that he was very glad to be assured that this was not so and that consequently he was going to write to his masters, which he did honestly, by handing over to me his letter which I got translated. It can be affirmed, my General, that it is an event very unfortunate for our credit and the sequence of our politics, for, if we do not punish the Marathas, it would be very humiliating for the nation.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Cossigny.

P.S.—I have just received, my General, a letter from M. Blancard, dated March 20, 1787 which announces to me the arrival of M. de Kergariou at Bombay; the latter has sent an express to M. de Montigny to claim the ship of M. Dayot, and undoubtedly also to demand a reparation for the insult offered to the King's flag.

Pondicherry, April 23, 1787.

No. 122
My Lord,

The two letters which I beg to send you from M. de Montigny and my reply do not contain anything important for our politics, and can be considered only as a continuation of our mutual correspondence, of which I had successively sent you all the papers. The mass of M. de Montigny's letters will enable you, my Lord, to judge his political talents, the importance of his mission and the necessity to continue it. His letter, dated 27th [\[17th February 1787.\]](#) February is noteworthy in that he is unaware that the Marathas have made their peace with Tipu and undoubtedly he still knew nothing of it for a long time afterwards, since today is 23rd April and I have not yet been informed by him of this very important news.

I learnt, my Lord, from several persons who met M. de Montigny, that he complains that he has not been treated well since I have been in command at Pondicherry. If he could have indulged in such a complaint with you, my Lord, and with M. Le Comte de Vergennes, my correspondence, if you kindly cast a glance over it again, will be, in my opinion, my justification.

I remain most respectfully,

My Lord,
Your very humble and very obedient servant,
Cossigny.

Pondicherry, April 23, 1787.

No. 124
My Lord,

I beg to inform you that the ship L'Adelaïde, commanded by M. Dayot and which left the Isle of France for Muscat, was captured on the Malabar Coast by the Maratha pirates who attack the ships of all the nations with the exception of the English ships. It is reported that an Imperial ship and two Dutch ships have fallen into the hands of these pirates.

Informed from Mahé by M. Marin, without, however, any certainty, I had already written to M. de Montigny, our Resident at Poona, when two men from the ship L'Adelaïde arrived at Pondicherry and gave me the detail of this unfortunate happening. I attach herewith, my Lord, the letter which I hastened to write to M. de Montigny so that he should claim the ship and the staff and that he should demand damages due for such an insult. I also attach herewith the account I have given to M. Le Vicomte de Souillac. I wish very much that I am mistaken in my statements and in the fears which I express to him on the expedition of M. Pierre Monneron. May they not come true!

The fourth document, which I also attach to this dispatch, is a letter from M. Blancard, Captain of the Imperial ship who writes to me from Bombay where the frigate La Calipso had just arrived. Since M. de Kergariou La Maria is apprised of the capture of the ship L'Adelaïde and since he has also written to the Regency of Poona, he will certainly obtain the liberty of the officers of the said ship and damages proportional to the insult dealt to His Majesty's flag. Since the documents which I am addressing you contain a circumstantial detail of the whole affair, allow me, my Lord, to refer to these.

I remain most respectfully,

My Lord,
Your very humble and very obedient servant,
Cossigny.

Copy of a letter from M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, to M. de Montigny, Resident at Poona.

Pondicherry, May 26, 1787.

I received, Sir, your letter of the 15th April, as well as all the papers attached to it concerning the capture made by the Marathas of the merchant ship L'Adelaïde. I do approve all the steps you have taken *vis-a-vis* the Regency of Poona, and I specially thank you for the interest you have shown for M. Dayot, Captain of the said ship.

You will see from my letter, dated 15th April that I was already informed of the conduct of the Maratha fleet. It does display, I must admit it, a great daring, as much as the said ship had hoisted the signal of the Kings ship, to which he was authorised by the Governor-General. Moreover, I refer to what I have written to you in my previous letter. It is not a favour which you should solicit, but much rather a reparation for an insult done to the nation and damages for what concerns the shipping business. I notice that Nana has given apparently very precise orders. That is what he could not refuse. It is a question of the execution of the orders and that is what I am impatiently awaiting. As the whole affair is entrusted to you, Sir, I have no doubt that it will be dealt with in a manner satisfactory for the nation and the unfortunate persons who have been the victims. In the contrary case, as M. d'Entrecasteaux, Commander of His Majesty's naval forces, has in his instructions the order to protect French trade, he will proceed to the Malabar Coast at the next monsoon, and demand satisfaction proportionate to the outrage. You realise the necessity of a conduct which we must adopt in this circumstance. What would happen if the navigation of the Malabar Coast was prohibited to French trade and if the ships could be insulted, captured, etc., etc.?

I also await some other details from you on the accord made between the Marathas and Tipu; what I learn from one side is not sufficient. I would be happy and at the same time it would be useful to the (national) service if you could inform me with greater promptitude. Undoubtedly, that is not possible and the reason is that you are not treated, I repeat it, as you should have good ground to expect it.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Cossigny.

C² 179, f. 267-270.

Copy of a letter from M. de Montigny, Resident of the French nation at Poona, to M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry.

Poona, June 8, 1787.

Sir,

I received almost at the same time your two letters of the 14th and 15th April under Nos. 11 and 12, as well as the letter for Nana Fadnis and that of Gopalrao, Waquil of the Regency.

I begin Sir, with what ought to interest you most, I mean the capture of the ship L'Adélaïde by the Marathas of Vijaydurg and the insult done to the King's flag.

When your letters reached me here, Sir, it was already more than two months that I had directly taken up this matter with the Regent of this Court and that I had obtained not only the restitution of the ship L'Adélaïde, commanded by M. Dayot but also its cargo, inspite of the obstacles which I had to overcome from the government of Vijaydurg as well as from the intrigues of the English, who greatly imagined that I would not succeed in it.

I also obtained from Nana Fadnis that he should write to all the commandants of the Maratha ports so that they should in future be extremely careful to respect the French flag, which measure they should have all along taken. In spite of this kind of reparation to the King's flag, I am anything but inclined to think that it is sufficient enough in the present circumstances, especially after the audacious manoeuvre of the commander of the Maratha fleet in respect of the King's frigate La Calipso, which I have already communicated to you by my letter of 15th April, as well as the details concerning the capture of the French ship L'Adélaïde. On the contrary, I am convinced that we must get very positive reparation from the Regency; it suits the dignity of our flag. It is from this consideration that I had urged you, Sir, to write to the Regency of Poona to obtain from it a Dastock like that granted to the English for the safety of the navigation of their merchant ships on the Malabar Coast, a matter with which I have already dealt with the Regency and which I was about to obtain when the insinuations of the English brought about the failure of this negotiation.

Although you have written, Sir, I think it will be difficult to obtain the Dastock in question, and the damages which M. Dayot claims for the goods destroyed as well as for those which were returned to him in a bad condition, and which amount, according to his estimate, to a very large sum. But at the same time I think that it would indeed be necessary to make a direct demand for it to the Court of Poona, and in case of refusal or of an equivocal reply, I am convinced, according to what I have learnt from confidential persons I have at the Darbar that the appearance of our warships on this coast at the next monsoon will compel the Regency to comply at once with the demands stated above and which it is appropriate to make to it.

I shall not enter into other details on this subject, as I have already dealt with it in my letter of 15th April.

Immediately after the receipt of your letters, Sir, I demanded audience from the Regent. Nana Fadnis sent me word that he would be delighted to see me if these letters contained something new. I informed him they concerned the capture of the ship L'Adélaïde. He immediately sent me a reply that it was a matter already treated two months ago, that he had granted me the restitution of this ship and of its cargo on the complaint I had made to him and that consequently he requested me to put off for some days the interview demanded, which could take place only day before yesterday.

I delivered your letter and that of the Maratha Waquil to the Regent, while explaining to him its contents. He replied to me : "This is a matter which is terminated long ago. You know that I have

already granted you the restitution of the French ship and its cargo. I shall write to M. de Cossigny.” Herewith is attached the letter from Nana Fadnis which will confirm to you, Sir, what I have said to you on this subject.

profited by this occasion to demand the permission to allow M. Dayot to come to Poona, and it was not easily obtained. My object is to introduce him to the Darbar so that he describe the bad treatment which he had suffered from the government of Vijaydurg and the commander of the Maratha fleet in order to obtain, if it is possible, damages proportional to the losses which he claims and at the same time impress upon the regent all the reparation he owes to the Nation in the person of an officer, who was as ill treated as M. Dayot, by the subjects dependent on the Maratha Government.

I immediately sent to Goa special letters which you recommended to me for M. Dayot in the hope that this officer must have already proceeded there. But on coming out of the river of Vijaydurg, as violent and adverse winds carried his ship on the rocks, open on all sides, he was obliged to re-enter the Maratha port with the two galivats which had orders to convey it to Goa.

I have just received the replies to these special letters. I am extremely delighted to attach them here in the hope that they will set your mind at rest, Sir, on the fate of M. Dayot as well as of all his respectable family. This officer requests me to join to these special letters the report he has drawn up on this subject and which he sent me at the time. This document will fully post you with all that concerns this incident, and you will be undoubtedly, Sir, as indignant as myself.

I now pass on, Sir, to some paragraphs of your letters which I would have discussed more thoughtfully if I were not so pressed to dispatch my harkaras, and if I were not, moreover, in the state of sufferance in which I am. I shall therefore confine myself to tell you, Sir, that I did not think that the details which I conveyed to you concerning the actions which took place between Tipu and the allied armies should affect you as much as it appeared to me that they did so. On the contrary, I have all along thought that you would be interested to learn the details of these actions which had come to my knowledge and which are known to the whole army.

As for the date of the peace of the Marathas with Tipu, I hope today, Sir, that when you read my last letter, you will have noticed that the Regent did not keep me in the dark about the negotiations which took place on this subject between Tipu and the Marathas and that I have no reason to reproach Nana Fadnis on the degree of confidence and, I dare say, respect which he shows me. I could cite in proof the restitution of the ship L’Adelaïde and its cargo which he granted me at once on my simple complaint. I cannot, however, help telling you, Sir, that our open connection with Tipu renders the Poona Darbar very circumspect, and that I gradually notice coolness on the part of the Regency with regard to us.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Montigny.
12th June.

P.S.—
Sir,

The kind of agitation there was about the surrender of places, about which I spoke to you in my last letter, has passed off and everything appears tranquil today. The leaders of the Maratha army have returned to Poona. I do not know yet if Nizam Ali has finally completely settled with Tipu. I am every moment expecting news of it.

I am grieved to learn at the very moment that the packet, which I had sent to Goa to the address of M. Le Vicomte de Souillac, could not reach in time to be delivered to the Captain of the ship L’Alexandre. The advent of the monsoon on this coast no more leaves me the hope of

dispatching it by this channel. Consequently, I take the liberty, Sir, to address you its duplicate and request you to kindly sent it with your letters at the earliest opportunity.

The harkaras could not leave earlier. I have just received the reply of Nana Fadnis to your letter.

Allow me to renew to you the assurances of respectful attachment with which I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Montigny.

C² 179, f. 272.

Translation of a letter in Marathi, written to M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, by Balaji Janardan *alias* Nana Fadnis, June 15, 1787.

After the compliments,

I am delighted to receive your letter by which you wrote to me that M. de Montigny was charged by you to tell me many things. He came and communicated to me the information you possess of the capture of one of your ships, of which you demanded the restitution. Before the receipt of your letter about the demand which had been made to us by M. de Colonel Montigny, we had given orders for the restitution of the ship. As for the rest, you will know everything from the letter which M. de Montigny is writing to you.

Let me hear from you.

C² 179, f. 274-274v⁰.

Copy of letter from M. de Montigny, Resident at Poona, to M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry.

Poona, June 22, 1787.

Sir,

I beg to inform you that the Regency of Poona is dispatching at this very moment four harkaras to Pondicherry to meet Gopalrao, its Waquil, with the reply of Nana Fadnis to the letter which he has written to him concerning the capture of the ship L'Adelaïde. I am glad, as you see, Sir, for not detaining the harkaras of Pondicherry to this day, to attach to my last letter this letter from the Regent to Gopalrao, for, that would have caused a delay of 10 days very unnecessarily, and moreover, would have left you, Sir, in the uncertainty about the steps which have been taken in favour of M. Dayot.

I am impatiently awaiting the arrival of this officer at Poona to discuss with the Regency the damages which he claims, but the question, according to all appearances, can hardly be resolved satisfactorily, whatever I may do and whatever you may write without the appearance of our warships at the next monsoon on the Malabar Coast. It will be likewise for obtaining the Dastock necessary for our merchant ships on this coast. I refer on this subject to all what my letters of 15th April and 8th June contain. I have therein enumerated all the reasons which lead me to think in this way.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Montigny.

P.S.—

Sir,

At the very moment when I was about to close my letter, my harkaras from Pondicherry have arrived with your reply to my letter of 15th April. I have absolutely nothing to add to this letter, as I had conveyed to you, Sir, by my letters of 15th April and 8th June, on the one hand, all what had come to my knowledge, and on the other, all what I thought appropriate to do in the present circumstances with respect to the Regency of Poona. When I come to know something fresh, I solicit you to believe, Sir, that I shall be very prompt in conveying it to you.

Pondicherry, July 19, 1787.

No. 131
My Lord,

I attach to this dispatch the documents which form the sequel of my correspondence with the Nawab Tipu Sultan. By one of my letters I had asked him to communicate to me the details about the articles of peace which he had made with the Marathas and the Subhedar of the Deccan. His reply, which forms part of this dispatch, deserves a special attention on your part, my Lord, as it appeared to me of some importance, because of the details which it contains on the peace made between these three powers. I consider it, I am not afraid to say it, as a consequence of my negotiations with these Princes; and if the basis on which is established this accord which they have concluded between them, was upset the fire of war would soon be kindled again. However, today not only do they not appear disposed to accept on a fresh occasion the succour of the English, but it is certain that they feel how much it is in their interest to remain united to resist the fourth power of which they speak and of which all the Sarkars know the ambition. We can believe that their eyes are opened. I even think that, sooner or later, as they have promised it to each other, they will make the sacrifice of their personal hatred to attack their common enemy. Finally, my Lord, I am convinced that the Commandant for His Majesty in India can exercise a very great influence on the decision which will be taken by the Indian princes in the more or less distant circumstances and that he will be in a position to co-operate in such a great revolution in accordance with the orders which he will have received.

I remain most respectfully,

My Lord,
Your very humble and very obedient servant,
Cossigny.

Pondicherry, July 19, 1787.

No. 132
My Lord,

I attach to this letter, to serve as a continuation of my correspondence with the Regency of Poona, the latest letter which I have received from M. de Montigny and the two from Nana Fadnis which reached me at the same time. The details contained in the letter of M. de Montigny will apprise you, my Lord, of a part of the conditions on which peace was made between the three belligerent powers, and the last letter which I received from Tipu Sultan, included in my dispatch No. 131, will likewise post you with the basis on which this peace has been established, peace which, in my opinion, more solid than M. de Montigny appears to believe. Whatever it may be, I shall give full credence to the conditions of which M. de Montigny speaks (although they are advantageous to Tipu) only when this Prince confirms them to me according to his promise, and only when I shall get news about them from Hyderabad, whence I every day await letters. If some Articles of this peace are not finally decided, it does exist all the same between the three powers since I knew for certain that in the whole course of the month of May, Tipu Sultan had already marched several miles to return to Srirangapatan and that he was already on the outskirts of Bangalore, about thirty leagues (129) km to the west of Arcot.

I shall not offer, my Lord, any reflexion on the report of M. de Montigny with regard to the attitude of Nana Fadnis on our apparent connections with Tipu Sultan. He sufficiently drops a hint that his desire and his politics would rather tend to give preference to an alliance with the Marathas, although I have yet seen nothing in his correspondence which can lead us to count upon this hope, supposing that it suited the King's interests. Perhaps, my Lord, in the letters which he has written to you and which he similarly wrote to M. de Vergennes, he has explained himself in a more positive manner. In that case, as I have maintained good relations with the three powers, His Majesty remains free to make the choice, in accordance with his interests and the circumstances. However, my Lord, I must say and perhaps it will be for the last time, since I am soon going to be relieved of my interim government, that even when an alliance would be practicable with the Regency of Poona, it would be a long distance from this city to Calcutta; that a French corps united with an army composed entirely of cavalry could never have a great influence in the different actions, in which this cavalry would take part, against the English armies; that in case of defection of this cavalry, the French corps would always remain compromised; that not only must we form an alliance with the Marathas on the Malabar Coast, whose leaders are more particularly united, but even with those of Gujarat, the States to day of Shinde, the Raja of Cuttack, etc. etc., and finally all the Rajputs, who all among them are more or less divided in their interest and who can be easily detached from the common cause with money. If, however, such an union could be formed, then nothing so easy as a complete revolution in India, according to the views of M. de Montigny. But so far, I do not see that either he or I have any evidence which might promise us such a general alliance, which, nevertheless, I do not consider as impossible in times to come.

I therefore think, my Lord, that while continuing to preserve the idea of such a vast plan, we must not neglect the alliance of a Prince who has just resisted the Marathas of Poona though united with Nizam Ali, who alone has a permanent and disciplined army corps in India, and who combines with great riches courage, good conduct and an implacable hatred against the English nation, whose enormous power constitutes the despair of the Indian princes, who are well penetrated to day with their real intentions. Thus, an alliance with Tipu, either at the present moment or in future, should not induce us to give up all hope of what can be done by a skilful hand according to the circumstances. But I think, my Lord, that we ought to begin by allying ourselves with Tipu to acquire in India a consistency which we cannot have by ourselves at the moment and in the actual state of affairs.

M. de Montigny, my Lord, is negotiating to day the restitution of the ship L'Adelaïde. All that he has already done so far on this subject, gives me hope of a favourable reply to the letter which I wrote to Nana Fadnis and which I am very impatiently awaiting.

The two letters, attached herewith, from Nana Fadnis, written in a sufficiently haughty tone *vis-a-vis* Tipu Sultan, could have led me to imagine a recommencement of the hostilities, following the information of M. de Montigny, if the last letter of Tipu had not assuaged me on this subject. Henceforward, it would be difficult for me to believe that Nana Fadnis would wish to commit his tottering power to the hasard of a fresh war in which the troops of the Nation would have nothing to gain as they have just experienced it.

I remain most respectfully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,
Cossigny.

India

It is at the end of the year 1785, that the Marathas united with Nizam Ali, Subhedar of the Deccan, began their preparations of war against Tipu Sultan. Their aim was to force this Nawab to surrender the territory under their domination which he or his father had seized from them, and to pay them the tribute which he owed to them. The capture of Nargund which Tipu Sultan seized about this time after nine months of siege from a Raja, their ally, further added to their grievances.

The allied armies of the Marathas and of the Subhedar took the field in the month of January 1786. They had not undertaken anything important in the month of May, and then the rainy season, which was approaching, led one to think that they would retire from before Badami of which they had commenced the siege. But this town, after an assault which had considerably diminished its garrison, was obliged to capitulate on May 23,

To create a diversion, Tipu Sultan had attacked the town of Adoni, in which Mabotzingue, [Mahabat Jang.] Nizam Ali's nephew, had shut himself up. He seized the lower town but he was obliged to withdraw from before the fort at the approach of an army of 40,000 men whom the Subhedar sent to the succour of his nephew.

As the rainy season was over, Tipu Sultan opened the campaign by a battle which he won on 30th September and which was followed by the capture of Savnur. He next seized Adoni and after some other successes, he succeeded in luring the armies of the enemy between Savnur and Bankapur; he attacked their camp and totally put them to rout. He seized 3,000 camels, 7,000 to 8,000 horses, 5 elephants and about 20,000 bullocks.

It is in this campaign that he decided to send to His Majesty ambassadors who arrived at Pondicherry in the month of February 1787, and left for France only in the month of June, as the boat which was to transport them could arrive in India only in the month of May.

In the month of February 1787, Tipu Sultan made to the Marathas overtures for peace, which was soon after concluded on the following terms :—

Nizam Ali recovers the territory of Tatchour. [Raichur.] Tipu Sultan returns to the Marathas a part of the territory included between the Tomandra [Tungabhadra.] and the Krishna as well as Nargund which had been seized in the beginning of the war.

This Prince keeps Gajendragad and Dharwar and he gave 60 lakhs of rupees (15 millions) to the Marathas payable in cash as well as in jewels, elephants, etc.

There is ground to fear that Dhairwar might be a pretext to recommence war, and that is founded on the fact that the Maratha Regency could be induced to adopt a peaceful attitude only because of the dissensions which existed among the chiefs who compose it, and whose leader is Nana Fadnis.

[Tipu Sultan spoke about this clause in a letter written on May 11, 1787 to M. de Cossigny in which he has not made any mention of the other conditions.] By one of the articles of the Treaty, the three powers have stipulated (*a*) that if there arose among them fresh dissensions and if a fourth power wished to profit by them to attack them, they would make the sacrifice of their mutual hatred to unite against that which would attack one of them.

N.B.—These terms are extracted from a letter of M. de Montigny, Resident at Poona, to M. de Cossigny, dated 15th April 1787.

Copy of a letter of M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, to M. de Montigny, Resident at Poona.

Pondicherry, August 1, 1787.

I was grieved to see, Sir, from your letter dated 8th June that it will be difficult to obtain anything from the Regency of Poona beyond the simple restitution of the ship L'Adélaïde and that they will not take into consideration the effects and merchandise which have been removed from it.

If Nana Fadnis sets his face against reason and justice, M. Dayot would perhaps have done better to abandon everything except to make complaints subsequently. I am very much afraid that the result of this shipping business may achieve his ruin and that of his shippers. He writes to us, Sir, that he is going to meet you. Kindly continue to him the same kindness, take the same interest in him, help him with your counsels, and accept the thanks which we, Mesdames de Cossigny and I and the whole family, offer you for the troubles and cares which you have already kindly taken in this affair.

I received the letter of Nana Fadnis which you sent me. He speaks to me of the restitution of the ship as if it is an affair which is to be considered as finished and terminated. This attitude on his part does not show the willingness to order the restitution of the stolen and plundered goods, and still less to make a just reparation for the insult done to the flag of His Majesty.

I attach herewith, Sir, a copy of the letter which I write to the Regent. I am counting very much on you to make him understand its real sense, if my interpreters have not succeeded in doing it. I have reasoned in this letter to the best of my ability and solemnly and sincerely, for, you feel as well I, Sir, that it is quite impossible for us to ignore such a breach of the law of nations. His Majesty maintains in the Indian seas six ships or frigates, solely to protect the trade of the nation and see that his flag is respected.

Immediately on the arrival of M. Le Vicomte de St. Riveul, who is coming to relieve M. Le Chevalier d'Entrecasteaux in the command of the station, I shall communicate to you the decision which will be taken on this subject in order that you should act consistently with the steps which could be taken on our part and which ought to be considered only as an act of indispensable reprisal.

I think, Sir, that you will find in the letter which I write to Nana Fadnavis what I could say to you yourself on this affair. I, therefore, abstain from any other reflexion.

It would be only fair, it seems to me, that M. Dayot was compensated for all the losses, that there should be a compensation for the loss of time, for the interest for the money and for the profit which would have been made on the articles of the cargo. It would also appear to me appropriate, in order to avoid similar incidents in future, that the Marathas should grant a Dastock to the French as they have done in the case of the English. I see only this way of making amends for the insult done to the King's flag. If the Marathas refuse it, we cannot reasonably count on their good dispositions for us.

I have not the honour to be little known to you, Sir, if you think, as it appears to me from a paragraph of your letter, that the details which you gave me on the campaign of the Marathas against the Nawab Tipu Sultan, and since then on the peace which has been concluded between them, could have hardly concerned or occupied me perhaps. I wrote to you, Sir, only to better know the truth and give an account to the Minister. I have all along been sufficiently well informed of every thing that took place by Tipu himself, by M. de Lalée, M. Pierre Monneron who stayed for two months in this army, Nizam Ali, M. Aumont and several other persons attached to the Sarkar of the Subhedar of the Deccan. As the interests of the three powers are not the same, the versions could indeed have differed in some details, but little important by themselves. As I have told you, I have sent all the different correspondences to the Minister who today ought to be apprised of our interests in India, those of the

English and of the other European nations, of the interests even of the native princes. If, as I think, I have sufficiently maintained good relations with each one of them, in spite of the preference which it appears I have given to the Nawab Tipu Sultan and which I have not at all hidden from them, M. Le Maréchal de Castries, while submitting to His Majesty your political work with the Regency of Poona and all the correspondence concerning the politics of India in general, could decide his choice, whether he finds advantageous for the nation to seek the alliance of one of the three powers of Hindustan, whether he wishes to seek the union and alliance of the three powers combined, a matter which I do not consider as difficult as it could be imagined, if, as we have every reason to hope so, the officer who will be employed in this work, is supported in the different Sarkars by persons well-informed as you are.

I would have very much desired, Sir, that I could convey to you some news which could have delighted you. But I have not received any letter for you. The news from Europe is dated 19th February. All the letters announce great changes, although neither M. Le Vicomte de Souillac nor I have yet received anything official.

This is, however, more or less, what we ought to consider as reliable :

M. de Souillac is relieved and replaced in the Government of the Isle of France by M d'Entrecasteaux; the letter is replaced by M. Le Vicomte de St. Riveul, who is coming to command the naval forces of His Majesty in India. M. Le Comte de Conway is appointed Governor of Pondicherry and Commandant-General of all the troops. M. Le Chevalier de Fresne, Colonel of the Regiment of the Isle of Bourbon, is Second-in-Command of the troops and keeps his Regiment. There is a strong report that His Majesty has entrusted to me the command of the Isle of Bourbon or that I shall have the choice to keep the Regiment which I have the honour to command.

M. de Canaple has obtained the command of Mahé, M. de Marguenat that of Karikal. Some letters state that you are appointed to the command of Chandernagore. I hope this news gives you pleasure. As soon as it is confirmed to me, I shall be really delighted to communicate it to you.

Finally, Sir, in all likelihood M. de la Fayette is reserved to be Governor-General of all the French establishments to the East of the Cape of Good Hope.

As M. Le Vicomte de Souillac has already received the permission to return to Europe, I think that he will not receive at the Isles the packet which you have sent me to his address. To make matters worse, your last harkaras took 53 days to proceed from Poona to Pondicherry.

On the 12th of January, M. Le Conte de Vergennes died, regretted by all. M. Le Conte de Montmorin has replaced him in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I am going to occupy myself, Sir, conjointly with M. de Moracin, with the means to send you money.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Cossigny.

Copy of a letter of M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, to Nana Fadnavis, Chief Maratha Regent.

Pondicherry, August 1, 1787

After the compliments.

Your Waquil Gopalrao had already announced to me that you had given orders so that the ship L'Adélaïde, captured by the Marathas of Vijaydurg, be returned to us. That is indeed what you confirm me in your letter which I was delighted to receive, although at the same time I am grieved to hear from M. de Montigny and M. Dayot, Captain of the ship L'Adélaïde, that I was wrong in my reckoning that your justice would lead you to order, not only the restitution of this ship and some goods of too heavy a weight which could not have been easily removed, but that you would even order the restitution of all money, all the jewels, all the belongings, all the garments in the use of the officers and finally all the merchandise which was also indecently plundered, stolen and destroyed. I also thought that you would have punished and chastised the Marathas of Vijaydurg, your subjects, for daring to insult the flag of the French with whom you were not at war. On the contrary, since, in all your letters, you show your desire to maintain good harmony which has existed at all times between your Darbar and that of the Emperor of France. It is thus that I have always written to his Diwan—Monsieur Le Maréchal de Castries.

It is therefore my duty to write to you this letter to demand once again from you the complete restitution of the ship L'Adélaïde and everything with which it was laden at the time of its capture, in money as well as in jewels, dry and liquid goods, according to a just estimate which will be made by M. de Montigny, who, by his uprightness, must have deserved your favour and your confidence since a long time.

Allow me a comparison : If the French had stolen from your Sarkar a box filled with gold, would you judge that it would be a sufficient restitution to return the box after the gold from it had been dispersed? And if this box had been removed by force of arms and without any declaration of war from some of the ports of your Kingdom where everything had been put to fire and sword by the French, would you still think that a simple restitution of the box even when gold had not been removed from it, would be a sufficient reparation for the insult done to your flag, to the general body of the Maratha nation, which step is a violation so manifest and so contrary to the law of nations, so well observed among all friendly and civilised nations? If you have the kindness to weigh all these things properly, I have no doubt that you would order an entire restitution of every thing that was taken, less because of its value, may it be ten times, than to avoid all the untoward events which will result from it for your nation and for the French nation. As a matter of fact, whatever may be the sum which is claimed back, it can be considered only as a grain of salt for a Sarkar as powerful and as rich as is that of Poona, and also as a grain of salt for the Emperor of France. Moreover, all the gold in the world, could it be put in comparison with all the untoward events which I foresee only too unfortunately and which will be the consequence of the acts of violence committed by your subjects of the port of Vijaydurg and which our instructions do not permit us to tolerate?

At the present moment, the Emperor of France maintains in the Indian seas six warships, solely for protecting French trade. M. de Montigny will confirm to you what I write to you. The Residents of other European nations posted with you can vouch for the truth of this fact. Some perhaps may dissuade you from doing justice in the hope of profiting by the harm which we may do to each other. But I solicit you to rest assured that what I have written to you in this letter, and what is going to follow, is written with the only object that I am in no way to blame and that I remain innocent of the blood which will perhaps be spilt on this occasion on the respective ships of the two nations, because I warn you that at the next season, the naval forces, which the Emperor of France maintains in India, will proceed to the Malabar Coast and visit all the ports of your territory and of

your dependence and particularly that of Vijaydurg. I also warn you that the commandant will lodge the same complaints with you which I am lodging with you, and if the French nation does not obtain your equity and your justice, a just restitution and a satisfactory reparation, we both ought to tremble at the consequence, whilst, in my opinion, we ought to put the life of a single man above all the gold in the world. But as the commander of the ships and I are answerable on our head for all the insult which can be offered to the honour of the French flag and of its trade, it is impossible for us not to obey the orders of the Emperor of France by asking from you a just reparation which you cannot refuse us.

I solicit you to reflect on all these points and kindly give a prompt reply. God is my witness that no one desires more than I, the prosperity of the brave and powerful Maratha nation and that my sole desire is that the good harmony which has all along been reigning between us and your power as well, continue to the end of the ages.

Copy of a letter of M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, to M. de Montigny, Resident at Poona.

Pondicherry, August 6, 1787.

I received, Sir, your letter of 22nd June, No. 20 which Gopalrao himself delivered to me. At the same time, he communicated to me that he has received several letters from the Regency. This simple Gopalrao, undoubtedly deceived by the tenor of these letters, is pleased to compliment me on the complete justice which had been rendered to us by the Regency, since he was informed, what, in fact, has been interpreted to me, that Nana Fadnis had given very precise orders for the restitution of the ship captured as well as the cargo, with damages, reparation, etc., etc. He appeared very much surprised, Sir, when I got interpreted for him the letter which you had written to me and which he had delivered to me. He assured me that it was possible that Nana Fadnis had been deceived by the pirates of Vijaydurg; that, moreover, he was informed, which also was interpreted to me from the very letters, that M. Dayot was to proceed to Poona, that all the necessary passports had been sent to him and even a palanquin to convey him to this town; that he had every reason to feel confident that I would shortly receive letters from M. Dayot himself who would express his entire satisfaction on all the objects claimed; and that he solicited me to suspend the departure of the three frigates which we have actually on this coast, La Resolution, La Venus and La Calipso, which I warned were ready to leave shortly for the Malabar Coast and claim justice which should have been by now rendered to us. M. Le Comte de Kergariou, commanding La Calipso, was with me at this very moment. He spoke to Gopalrao of his encounter last season with the Maratha fleet which he would have completely destroyed, he said, if he had known the acts of hostility committed against the French ship L'Adelaide, and particularly the insult offered to a flag as respectable as that of the Emperor of France; that he had all the less suspected such an indecent behaviour, as the commander of this fleet and the commanders of the other ships had had the meanness to claim from him old friendship which had existed at all times between the Sarkar of Poona and the French, of whom they were and always wished to remain friends. M. de Kergariou and I spoke to this Waquil in such a manner that he cannot fail to write to the Regency about our land and naval forces which His Majesty maintains in India only to protect his trade and have his flag respected.

From your very letter, Sir, you can assure Nana Fadnavis that the same complaints will be lodged to him at the next season by M. de St. Riveul, commanding the station and who, in any case, ought to take up his position on the Malabar Coast and proceed there as early as October. I delivered to Gopalrao an abridged copy of my last letter to Nana Fadnavis.

Gopalrao spoke to me with so much confidence that it is impossible for me not to rely a little on his promise to obtain all the satisfaction from the Regency. He is a good man. I confess that I did not believe that he was capable of such a sound sense. He repeated to me several times that we ought to all the more count on the satisfaction which would be granted to us on all the points of our complaints as, apart from the fact that justice was on our side, we ought to think that the Regency would reflect on the fact that the Maratha nation, quite powerful as it was, could not do any wrong to the French, that on the contrary, with our ships we can always attack them with advantage on the sea as well as on land and in the ports. He added that the interest of the Marathas was therefore not to break such an old friendship for a trifle of such little consequence, that he requested me to await patiently a reply to the letters which he was going to write. I rely still much more, Sir, on your negotiations.

We shall shortly send you money through the sahuks of Madras.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Cossigny.

Translation of a letter written in Marathi by Ganesh Pandit [Ganeshpant Behere.] to Gopalrao, Waquil for the Marathas at Pondicherry.

I received your letter in which you speak to me about the capture of the French ship L'Adelaïde, of which M. Dayot was Captain. M. de Montigny had received news of it and as soon as he knew that; the said ship had been carried to Vijaydurg by the captors, who were all men from this very port, he spoke of it to Nana Fadnavis and obtained the order to return the ship and the cargo at once to M. Dayot, who, till the orders of the Sarkar, had been confined and guarded at sight. Immediately on the receipt of the orders from Nana Fadnavis, he was set at liberty, and everything must have been restored to him : effects, cargo and ship. As a matter of fact, we know that M. Dayot had left Vijaydurg, but thwarted by the wind, he was obliged to return to the port from where he wrote to M. de Montigny to solicit for him the permission to proceed to Poona. It is I who sent him the Radary of the Sarkar and a palanquin. I think that he will soon arrive, and that if everything has not been returned to him, as in the mean time Nana Fadnavis has been informed, he will receive proper justice, and that on his statement, everything will be returned to him or the equivalent.

You wrote to me that the General was very angry on the report made to him by two men who arrived at Pondicherry and who were on the ship when it was captured. He should not have believed such reports. Can there be a difference between the two Sarkars? You ought to rest assured that M. Dayot will himself write to the General that he is satisfied and the General will be so undoubtedly. Where there is friendship, no wrong can ever take place. Do your utmost to please General Cossigny.

Pondicherry, August 10, 1787

My Lord,

The respect, which all the Indian princes have today for His Majesty, whom they recognise as the most powerful sovereign in Europe, has alone undoubtedly induced the Subhedar of the Deccan and the Nawab Tipu Sultan to seek his alliance, the latter by sending ambassadors to His Majesty to offer him a just tribute of his homage, Nizam Ali Khan by writing to him a letter which I addressed you in my dispatch No. 156. My correspondence with the Regency of Poona is neither so satisfactory nor so advanced. However, my Lord, I have fairly well maintained good relations with Nana Fadnis, and I have the greatest hope that before quitting my office as Governor of Pondicherry, I shall obtain a favourable reply from it, and a satisfactory reparation for the insult offered to His Majesty's flag by the Maratha pirates of Vijaydurg who captured the merchant ship L'Adelaïde. The papers attached herewith, which are a continuation of my correspondence with Nana Fadnavis and M. de Montigny, will post you, my Lord, with the actual position of negotiations initiated by M. de Montigny and me, and of which I have given you an account in my previous letters.

I am undoubtedly relying much on the zeal of M. de Montigny to terminate this affair, but I rely still much more on the Waquil of the Marathas who is Resident at Pondicherry and has several relatives and friends in the Regency, and who has promised me an entire and a just satisfaction.

Far be it from me, my Lord, to lodge a complaint against M. de Montigny, who undoubtedly does what he can and what he should. However, while casting a glance on the mass of my correspondence with M. de Montigny, one cannot fail to notice that in all his letters, he only gives me hope that those which will follow them will supply me the detail of the important matters which he is negotiating with the Sarkar. But I foresee that I shall quit the office of the Governor of India without knowing much of his politics at this Court. I presume that as M. de Montigny has a direct correspondence with M. Le Vicomte de Souillac, that as he has given account to you yourself, my Lord, and I think at the same time, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he must have explained himself with greater clarity and that he must have enlightend you on his politics. Nevertheless, it is my duty to inform you that it is impossible for my successor to continue with some success the negotiations and the correspondence with the native princes, if he has not full knowledge of the matters which the Residents are treating in the Sarkars to which His Majesty has appointed them and if these Residents are not entirely subordinate to him, so that on the instructions which he will give them, they can all work in agreement with him who ought to hold in his hands the threads of all the politics in general in the Sarkar of Nizam Ali Khan, Tipu Sultan, the Marathas and Shinde. It is certainly a difficult task to fulfil, but it will be less so if one is not scared away by the work. Heaven grant, my Lord, that I may have begun it to your satisfaction.

I remain most respectfully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,
Cossigny.

Copy of a letter from Poona, dated December 8, 1787, written by M. de Montigny to M. Le Comte de Conway.

M. Le Comte,

I received only towards the middle of the last month your letter of 29th September. Immediately after its perusal, I asked for an audience of the Regent of this Court, and could have it only on the 23rd. I delivered to him your letter and explained to him the order it contained about my recall to Pondicherry by the Minister's instructions. He replied to me that the Regency would very shortly give me my audience of leave and would reply to your letter. He added to me that I knew the position of affairs, that for the moment he was very busy, but that he would inform me at the earliest opportunity. I insisted on the order which I had to leave. He repeated to me not to worry on this point. Since then it has been impossible for me to meet him. The revolution, which is preparing in the Maratha Government, is the sole cause of it. However, I have reason to believe that I shall shortly meet him.

All my preparations are made for the departure. But I beg to point out to you, Sir, that from your letter in which you say that I ought to be already informed of your arrival in India, I thought that I would shortly receive another of your letters by the sea, as much because the Maratha Waquil who is resident at Pondicherry writes to me, as because I did not know by any official letter except by yours of 29th September that the King had entrusted to you the Government of his establishments and the command of his troops in India. Today, I am very delighted to hear of its certainty. Allow me, Monsieur le Comte, to congratulate you on your happy arrival at Pondicherry. Our situation in India will undoubtedly change; there is great need for it. The new dispositions of the Ministry, although vaguely announced, give me the greatest hope of soon coming out of the precarious situation in which we are. I am only aspiring for the moment to confer with you, Sir, on matters relating to the mission with which I was entrusted. I venture to hope that the ten years of observations which I was in a position to make on the respective interests of the Indian powers, will not remain entirely unfruitful.

I revert to my present position.

You could have noticed, Sir, from the latest letters of M. de Cossigny, especially that of 6th August, that he announced to me that he would shortly send me funds through the Sahukars of Madras. I shall add that I have not received a single farthing from the treasury of Pondicherry since the end of January of this year. It is now eleven months that my salary and my current expenses are due to me. Since this time I have been forced to borrow at heavy interest to defray the expenses which the mission entails. From this statement it will be easy for you to see, Sir, the extreme embarrassment in which I am in spite of all my zeal to comply with the orders of the Minister. I cannot leave the place where I have contracted debts for the King's service without repaying them.

I continue to rely on the arrival of some French ships sent from Pondicherry for this coast and charged with funds for me, since you have not sent them to me by the usual channel of the Sahukars of Madras. I am all the more justified in this hope as Gopalrao, Maratha Waquil, has sent me a letter with the harkaras of the Regency to whom you delivered your letter for Nana Fadnis as well as yours to me of 29th September that I was to receive a letter from the Minister and funds by a ship to Goa. I have yet no news on this subject, although I have harkaras stationed in this colony. As soon as I receive funds, I shall immediately start. Herewith is a copy of the letter of the Waquil.

I am at this moment occupied with the settlement, at the Regency, of the affair of the ship L'Adelaïde, a capture made by the Marathas of Vijaydurg. I had obtained at the time the order from the Sarkar of Poona for the restitution of the ship as well as of its cargo. The usual dilatoriness of the Darbars, dishonesty of these people, combined with the explanations which the Court of Poona wanted to have on this subject, have suspended up to the present moment the pronouncement of the

Darbar, on this affair as a last decision. The Computation of the cargo and the inventory of the ship are over and translated into Marathi. I am only waiting for the judgment of the Regency which will be announced at the earliest opportunity. I shall communicate to you, Sir, this affair in all its details as well as convey to you all the information about the political situation at this court as also at that of Delhi immediately on my arrival at Pondicherry.

I think it is my duty to refer to the reports of war which are current on the Malabar Coast and which have reached me *via* Goa. If these reports happened to be confirmed, there would not remain for me any road open to proceed to Pondicherry. Whatever it may be, here is the extract of the letter of M. Bonhomme, a shipper from the Isle of France, to M. Schoy, Captain of one of his ships written from Bombay to Goa : “A boat arrived on the 8th November at Bombay a from Basra; it announced that we were on the point of declaring war with the English; Russia is fighting with Turkey; the Stad (t) holder is at logger heads with the States of Holland; the King of England has signified to the States that if there was no means of conciliation, he would take up arms against them, and the King of France against the Stad (t) holder.

They are expecting at Bombay another boat from Basra at the end of December; it will undoubtedly bring the declaration of war.

M. Bonhomme has given order to M. Schoy to proceed immediately to Surat and leave with his other ships from the 10th to the 15th December, in view of the situation on the Malabar Coast.

I have harkaras stationed at Goa, at Bombay and at Surat, Thus, I am bound to be informed in time if these reports happened to be confirmed. In any case, I shall weigh my conduct according to the situation of affairs. I shall keep my eyes open on all these matters and shall find out the means to send you safely all the information that will come to my knowledge in this respect till the time of my departure for Pondicherry.

True Copy.

Conway.

Copy of a letter from Poona, dated December 25, 1787, written by M. de Montigny to M. le Comte de Conway.

Monsieur le Comte,

I had the honour to inform you by my letter dated the 8th instant that I had made my preparations to proceed to Pondicherry at the orders of the Minister and that to leave Poona, I was only awaiting my audience of leave from the Regency, the pronouncement of the judgment by it on the restitution of the ship L'Adelaïde and its cargo, as well as the funds necessary to repay the sums which I have borrowed here for eleven months for the King's service.

Up to the present moment, none of these three objects has been realised in spite of all the steps I have taken in this respect. The Regent has been absent for some time and will return here only after 6 or 7 days. But the greatest obstacle to my departure is the lack of funds for the repayment of the sums borrowed as well as to defray the expenses on my route.

I confess to you, Sir, that my embarrassment is still greater since the return of my harkaras from Goa when they came from this colony without bringing me any news from Pondicherry.

The more I reflect on the order you have signified to me, Sir, on the part of the Minister to proceed to Pondicherry and confer with you, the less I can bring myself to believe that you have not employed the safest means for this purpose, I mean to send me funds which are absolutely necessary for me to repay the loans which I have been obliged to take here since eleven months during which I have not received my salary and my current expenses as also for the expenses on my route, a sum which amounts today to nearly Rs. 15,000.00. Undoubtedly, if the funds have not yet reached me, it is because the ship which is carrying them must have met with some delay, or some other obstacle which I cannot foresee.

The usual channel of the Sahukars of Madras, having dealings with those of Poona, would have been, in my opinion, the quickest and the surest means. Finally, whatever arrangement you may have made in this respect. Sir, I am most impatiently waiting for funds to comply with your orders.

I continue to station harkaras at Goa to bring me immediately news of the French ships which can appear any moment in this port, as well as the news which is expected at the end of this month *via* Basra at Bombay concerning reports of war, which I have communicated to you by my letter of the 8th of this month.

I have just received from Goa a letter from M. Francisco d'a Cunha, Governor of this colony, by which he informs me that a Prussian army is already marching rapidly to support the claims of the Stadtholder, that the Turks and the Russians are at war, and that the French and the English are mutually observing each other. He also adds that the English are expecting a packet at Bombay at the end of this month concerning this subject-matter.

The English Waquil (Mr. Mallet) left this place a week back to proceed to Bombay and confer with M. Boddam, Governor of this place. We do not know here what is precisely the object of this hurried journey. Whatever it be, I have just dispatched again (a letter?) to the Governor of Goa with whom I am in close correspondence to get the news on the report of war which has spread on this coast.

The Portuguese continue to keep a small army of observation beyond the Ghats which protrude into the territory of Tipu. They are extremely worried about his movements and expect to be attacked at the earliest moment. However, the corps, which Tipu had in this part, has been withdrawn and the Portuguese are today a little more tranquil.

About two months back, there was a conspiracy of the blacks against the whites in this colony which has luckily been discovered before breaking out. The authors of the conspiracy are arrested and put into chains. There are officers implicated in this affair, which is today completely suppressed.

The Raja Bhonsle whose territory adjoins the northern provinces of the colony of Goa is at present at war with the Raja of Sanwote Barhy [Sawantwadi.] so that the Portuguese possessions are today enveloped with troubles on all sides. It is suspected that Tipu is secretly supporting the Raja of Sanwote.

The Poona Court has just dispatched Haly Bahadour [Ali Bahadur.] with 15,000 cavalry to Hindustan. The object is to assist Shinde against the Jaipurians who have almost completely defeated him in the last action which they had with this Maratha Chief, who is a member of the Regency. The latter has almost alienated all the castes of Hindustan by his rapacity and vexations of all kinds. The latest news from the Court of Delhi announces that he will regain favour with the Emperor and make peace with the Raja of Jaipur. I am every moment awaiting news from this quarter.

The Regency is also going to dispatch troops to fortify Chatpourbelgham which is disturbed by the approach of a corp of Tipu Sultan in this part especially since this Nawab recaptured Kittur.

This is the situation at the moment and the Marathas do not appear to wish to undertake any campaign this year, as everything is very quiet here. But I cannot, Monsieur le Comte, help saying to you that our open connection with Tipu Sultan renders this Darbar colder than ever towards us. I experience it only too markedly on several points, but very particular in the case of the restitution of the French ship L'Adelaide.

So far I have still not been able to urge the Regency to settle this affair in spite of all the activity I have employed in it. More than six months ago the Regent gave orders to restitute the ship and its cargo; he wrote about it to Pondicherry and also made me write about it. But the intrigues of the administration of Vijaydurg, combined with the insinuations of the English Waquil and the connection about which I have spoken above, render this affair more complicated than ever and more difficult to treat.

Captain Dayot, who is with me since four months and a half and whom I introduced to the Darbar to enable him to make his claims, has so far received only Rs. 24,000.00 in money and goods. I am trying to obtain for him the restoration of the rest of his cargo as well as cash which was removed from his ship and different items which belonged to him and his officers. The Regency has still to pay Rs. 6,000.00 for the cost of the cargo raised by the shipper to Rs. 30,000.00 cash. The effects of the Captain and his officers amount according to the staff of the ship, to more than Rs. 18,000.00 which in all comes to nearly Rs. 25,000.00 still to be claimed (and this without any damages).

The Sarkat appears to be willing to give from this sum only Rs. 10,000.00. On the arrival of Nana Fadnis, I shall see that he settles this affair appropriately if it is possible.

As for the ship, the Marathas have thrown it in such a bad state that the Captain does not wish to take charge of it unless, as I have already proposed it, this ship is taken to Bombay to be adjudicated there by the admiralty which will decide the amount necessary for the repair.

The Sarkar would like to return the ship such as it is, and pay at Poona a small amount to the Captain so that he should undertake the responsibility of all the repairs. As this arrangement can indeed be very disadvantageous to M. Dayot, I insist that the Darbar give him Rs. 30,000.00 which is the cost of the ship. Otherwise the repairs should be adjudicated by the admiralty of Bombay and the expenses paid for this purpose by the Regency of Poona.

I do not know what will be the decision on this point when the Regent arrives, and whether all that will not take a favourable turn, and whether M. Dayot will continue to suffer a heavy damage in this affair.

The appearance of some of our frigates on this coast would have appreciably cut short the difficulties, for, these men, like all the Indians, are guided more by fear than by good behaviour.

I have the honour to be most respectfully,

Monsieur le Comte,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

(Signed) Montigny

(True Copy)

Conway.

Poona, May 11, 1788

Copy of a letter from M. de Montigny to M. Le Comte de Conway

M. Le Comte,

I had the honour to inform you by my letter of 5th April that the Regency had terminated the affair of the ship L'Adelaïde, not in a manner favourable to the persons concerned but after all in a manner it was possible for me to get it executed at the Darbar so greedy in money matters. I had also informed you, M. Le Comte, that the Maratha Sarkar was going to send harkaras to Pondicherry 3 or 4 days after the departure of my last courier but fresh difficulties raised by the Darbar in connection with the affair of the ship L'Adelaïde deferred to this day the dispatch of my harkaras. The Regency has sent four harkaras to Pondicherry on the 5th of this month.

Here are, M. Le Comte, the details and the outcome of this affair which I had communicated to you by my courier of 5th April. The Regency has decided that the ship L'Adelaïde with its riggings and outfit should be taken to the port of Goa where Captain Dayot proceeded to receive it.

As for the cargo, money and belongings, the sum of Rs. 49,974-00 has been paid in kind as well as in cash, out of which Rs. 15,000.00 were given in cash for the loss in goods and for the effects which were lost either on the sea or in the very port of Vijaydurg. Moreover, the Regency claims to have returned all that had come to the knowledge of Gangadharant, Governor of Vijaydurg where the seizure had been carried.

This restoration is no doubt scanty as compared with the claims of M. Dayot and the time he spent in pursuing this affair. In addition, the Regency required that he should sign a receipt by which he would no more have any right to claim back anything for the present and for the future. This officer was very reluctant to sign this receipt, but when he saw that there was no other way to settle this affair, he thought that it was much more advisable to submit than to leave this matter in suspense, indeed without any evident likelihood of finishing it without this clause.

The Regency employed for more than six weeks all the possible direct and indirect means with me so that I should also sign this receipt. But I persistently refused to give my signature and my consent to an affair which did not appear to me to have been judged in accordance with all the justice which M. Dayot had the right to expect. My object was to leave to the government the chance to reconsider this question if it judged it necessary.

I shall add here that when I went to the camp of Sawai Madhavrao on 28th February to know the decision on the affair of the ship L'Adelaïde, from the commander-in-chief of this Court, I was given the reply that the Regency would pay Rs. 15,000.00 for the loss of the cargo and for the lost effects. In spite of all my arguments with the commander-in-chief, it was impossible for me to obtain a bigger sum for this particular item. When I saw that my protests in this respect were vain, I finally declared to him in the presence of Messrs Dayot, Puren and Bossu that I no longer offered myself as an intermediary in this affair judged as arbitrarily and with so little justice. Since then I solicited the Regent to reconsider this question but I obtained nothing from him and the matter was completely terminated only on the 2nd of this month. On the 5th after taking leave of Sawai Madhavrao and Nana Fadnavis, M. Dayot left for Bombay, from where he will immediately proceed to Goa to receive his ship. I have written to M. Francisco Da Cunha, Governor of this colony, in connection with this matter so that Captain Dayot should get all the assistance there.

On the 5th in the morning the Brahmin, in charge of French affairs in the Council of the Regency, came to my residence to deliver a letter from Nana Fadnavis in reply to yours. I could not obtain this letter earlier because the Regent wanted to inform you at the same time about the return of

the ship L'Adelaïde and its cargo. I noticed when the copy of this letter was read to me that Nana Fadnavis gave you to understand that I was in some sort in agreement with the arrangements which had been drawn up by the Regency in connection with the ship in question. I was so indignant at this insidious statement that I at once sent back the letter to the Darbar, declaring that I would not undertake to send to the General a letter in which truth was so visibly violated. This letter was kept for a day in the Darbar, after which it was dispatched to you by the harkaras of the Sarkar and after giving me to understand that the form of the letter had been changed. That is what I do not know. I replied that I was writing in my turn about everything that had taken place in this respect and that the Regency could rest assured that I would not omit the smallest detail about this matter, and that you would be informed of everything. As I feared after this discussion that my harkaras would be arrested by the orders of the government, I deferred for a few days sending them to you, and I have paid them and instructed them well enough so that they should arrive even before those whom the Regency has sent to the Maratha Waquil and who are at the same time bearers of the letter of Nana Fadnis for you, Monsieur le Comte.

If it had been possible for our warships to appear this year on the Malabar Coast, as M. de Cossigny had announced it by an ad hoc letter, to support his (of Dayot) claims, there is no doubt that I would have obtained a complete satisfaction. No doubt major circumstances have changed the destination of these ships.

I remain more convinced than ever, as I had already said it to you, M. Le Comte, that these people, like all Indians, are guided and moved only by the momentary interest and by fear, and I shall add that we will be obliged to display our flag on the coasts of India where we have trade relations, especially on this one if we wish that merchant sailing is to be carried on with security and safety which trade demands. It is a sure means at the same time to prevent that national dignity is not henceforth compromised.

I prevailed at the time of the capture of the ship L'Adelaïde on the Maratha government to write to all the commandants of these ports to pay in future the greatest attention to respect the French flag. But what confidence could be placed in the promises of this nation? In money matters, the Marathas are robbers by the very nature of their upbringing, and their pirates have almost never ceased to insult the flags of all the Europeans nations who carry on trade on the Malabar Coast. When they meet only merchant ships, they practise their piracy even with the nations who are at peace with them, witness the English from whom they seized one more ship about 18 months ago and of which the cargo was plundered. The ship was of course returned but empty, indeed at the solicitation of the English envoy who resides at Poona. And finally to sum up, Captain Dayot was witness that without the steps which I had vigorously taken with the Regency, he would not have indeed obtained either his ship or his cargo and perhaps even the liberty unless the French Government had sent warships to claim them.

M. Dayot, whom I introduced to the Darbar so that he could pursue directly his affair, knows perfectly everything that took place in this respect and the moves I made as well as the ardour I displayed in it. M. Puren, one of his officers who knows the language of the country, also saw all the difficulties which I had to overcome at the Regency for the restoration of the ship L'Adelaïde and its cargo. As interested parties, their evidence cannot be suspected. They will both convey to you, M. Le Comte, even the slightest details of their affair. I relate this only because it is impossible to get a clear picture of the countless obstacles which are experienced in the Darbars, especially in that of the Brahmins, when it is a question of negotiating money matters, and especially of restitution. Herewith is attached a detailed statement of what I could induce the Regency of Poona to restore in this case.

I now pass on to other matters. The bill of exchange for Rs. 8,000.00 which you had kindly announced to me as being dispatched to me with expedition on January 26, has not yet reached me on May 12. No doubt the bearers of this bill must have met with some accident. I would have been more afflicted by this long delay, if I had not very fortunately found credit for me here on your bill, Monsieur Le Comte, as well as on that of M. de Moracin, who, to help me out of my difficulty, has

kindly authorized me to draw a bill on him. I can finally quit to day my residentship at Poona with honour, since I found the funds to pay back the loans taken more than 15 months ago for the King's service. I am therefore, doing it with all the alacrity which I can and which I ought to show in it.

Yesterday, I took leave of the Regent at 7 koss (about 24 km) from here. He had given me the appointment to confer with me more at ease. I had to climb the Cattré's [Katraj.] Ghat on the way to Satara at the first Mokam (halt) of the journey which he made to attend the marriage of Sawai Pant, Vazir of the Raja of Satara, a near relative of the Prince who rules here.

To day the 12th I took leave of Sawai Madhavrao. To-morrow I am going to take that of Haripant Phadke, Generalissimo of this Court, and immediately afterwards I shall leave for Pondicherry. You will do me justice, M. Le Comte, that as soon as I could quit Poona, I have done it, and you will notice at the same time by my expedition in travelling a distance of 500 koss (1600 km), which separates me from Pondicherry, my desire to place myself under your orders and my zeal for the King's service.

I received your letter dated the 16th December No. 9, only on 28th April at 6 o'clock in the evening, in the presence of Messrs Dayot and Puren. The French brokers at Goa sent it in a letter of 16th April while informing me that your dispatch had reached them by way of Mahé. I do not know what could have been the cause of such a long delay so that it remained for 4 ½ months on the way.

I see from this dispatch, your surprise, M. Le Comte, at the fact that I had not written to Pondicherry for nearly six months. I shall point out to you that I knew to what extent M. de Cossigny was interested in the matter of the ship L'Adelaide, of which I have only just obtained the restitution. The Regency of Poona multiplied the obstacles and the promises in this regard and would not terminate. Every moment I expected the result of this affair in order to communicate it to him. Moreover, I awaited news from Delhi and from the different points where I placed harkaras who did not come, and as I had nothing definite or important to impart to this Governor, I thought it advisable to spare the administration the expenses of the harkaras, which thus became unnecessary. This is the motive for my silence, for, whenever I received interesting news, I have immediately conveyed it, and I shall add that if I were misled about the veracity of some of it, as you have pointed out to me by your dispatch of 26th January, it is because everybody in my place would have been so, because I have always communicated the news which I obtained either from persons of consideration among the Indians or from those who occupy the high posts in India among the Europeans with whom I have been in contact, and of which I have the originals in my portfolio.

From your letter of 16th December, you also appeared surprised, M. Le. comte, at the fact that I have not yet returned to Pondicherry. Allow me to point out to you that you had not yet sent me funds by this third dispatch which I received only in 28th April. Although M. de Cossigny, as I have written to you in December, had, by his letters of July and especially that of 6th August, announced to me that he was shortly sending me funds which I have not yet received on 12th May of this year as also the bill of exchange which you have kindly announced to me on 26th January. Consequently fifteen months have now passed and I have not received a single farthing from the Treasury of Pondicherry for my salary as well as for the indispensable expenses of the mission, since it is true that my salary is due to me since the end of January 1787. And in spite of my zeal to obey the orders of the Minister, it was impossible for me to quit Poona, as I had then incurred a debt of nearly Rs. 15,000.00 for the King's service, without including in it the expenses for the journey, salary of the officers, and purchase of animals for transport, and finally I would have been infallibly arrested if I had wished to leave without returning the loans which I had taken. It was certainly impossible for me to do so as I preferred honour before everything. Allow me to point out to you, M. Le Comte, that if I had received funds when you wrote to me 15 days after your arrival in India, I would have returned to Pondicherry 3½ months back. Your first letter is dated 29th September, it took about six weeks to reach me; 15 days would have sufficed me for preparations as well as to take leave of the different chiefs of the Regency.

I add two months to cover the journey of 500 koss from Poona to Pondicherry. It is easy to see from this simple exposition that I would have been in Pondicherry as early as the end of January, and that I could not have been charged in this respect with lack of zeal for the King's service or of respect for the orders of the Minister.

This leads me naturally, M. Le Comte, to reply to some paragraphs of your letter of 26th January, and which have affected me all the more as they are presented to me in the form of reproaches which I do not at all deserve.

I begin with the item of the expense as the one which is of the greatest importance to the administration.

I can assure you, Sir, that I have employed strictest economy in all the expenses relating to the mission and that they have rarely amounted, including the expenses of the Darbar, interpreters, Persian and Marathi writers, harkaras, sipahees, goats, food for the elephant, horses, domestic expenses, salaries of officers, to Rs. 1,000·00 per month and often much less.

When my expenses exceeded this sum, it is because of extraordinary expenses, as travelling, interest for money and loans taken to pay for the salaries which were not paid to me, passing travellers, etc. But on an average, the expenses have hardly amounted to more than Rs. 14,000·00 to Rs. 15,000·00 per year. On my arrival at Pondicherry I shall submit to you all the details relating to my general account, and I am sure that there is no one who is not aware of the expenses which a residentship at any courts in India requires are who does not admit that I have employed the strictest economy in my expenses. Those which one is forced to make at home cannot be compared at all with those abroad.

M. Le Vicomte de Souillac was so convinced of it that this Governor-General wrote about it to the Minister in these terms on September 15, 1786 :

“You have fixed, my Lord, the salary of Messrs de Montigny and de Piveron at 16,000 frs. per year, but it is necessary to assure you that even the double will not suffice. If an European envoy is not on a befitting footing, he would not obtain the least consideration, and it would be much better not to have any. You can count on the honesty and even on the moderation of M. de Montigny. He is aware that his expenses should be as reduced as possible. He has certainly done his best to adapt himself to it. And yet I saw on my arrival here that he had been forced to take heavy loans, and that a dispatch of Rs. 15,000·00 which I requested M. Monneron to send him was absolutely indispensable to fulfil his engagements and put him in a very restricted position. It is unfortunate that you were not given a sufficiently detailed and sufficiently positive account to enable you, my Lord, to take orders from his Majesty and definitely take a decision on some matters in which it is not possible to make a compromise and which we must abandon if we judge the expenses they inevitably entail as excessive. The expenses of the Residents at the courts of the Indian princes cannot be fixed; peace, war or some other circumstances augment them or reduce them. Here is an instance : an elephant has been presented to M. de Montigny; he is obliged to keep it; if not he would do very great harm to the Nation which he represents and debase himself in his turn in the eyes of the Indians. He is thus forced for this single item to an increase in the expense which nevertheless is very considerable. If, however, His Majesty deems that M. de Montigny ought to continue to reside at Poona, I think that we must pay him a special salary and independent of all extraordinary expenses of which he will furnish a statement annual or half-yearly to the administration of Pondicherry. This special salary could be 10,000 to 12,000 frs. It would be the same for any other European Resident at the courts of the Indian princes, etc.”

While running rapidly through my statements of expenses, I see, M. Le Comte, that sums paid and spent in 1781, 82 and 1783 have been entered for the period between from 5th April 83 to 31st December 1786, and you have been told perhaps without any explanations that the expenses during this space of time have amounted to more than 200,000 frs. If that was so, the Minister would no

doubt be justified in finding such expenses very considerable. And for that purpose the case must exist. I find that between these two dates the payment made to M. Warnet and Camotiers has been entered. I think that in 84 and 86 sums, borrowed and spent largely prior to the epoch of these payments, which, with the interests, could have produced the sum of 200,000 frs, which you mention, but which was not really spent, nearly half, for the period of from 5th April 83 to 31st December 86 as it is expressed in your letter of 26th January.

As for my Residentsip here, I formally asked in 1784 that if it was not the intention of the Minister to form a solid alliance with the Regency of Poona, all the expenses were absolutely unnecessary. But the Minister no doubt judged it appropriate that I should remain here since it is true that M. Le Vicomte de Souillac communicated to me, during his voyage to Pondicherry, the passage of a Setter from the Minister by which he stated that it was advantageous that I should still reside with the Marathas although away from our establishments, may be only as an observer. Since then M. de Cossigny wrote to me that my presence there was necessary in national interest.

Whatever it may be, my residentsip here has not been quite unfruitful since it is true that left to my own negotiations, I nevertheless got refunded by the Regency a sum of more than 200,000 frs. to a subject of His Majesty; that I made a treaty with this very Regency, the basis of which was advantageous for the Nation barring a few articles which it would have been easy to make it reconsider, if it had been judged appropriate to finalize this negotiation with it; and that my close correspondence with the Indian princes has nonetheless caused anxiety to the English, I can produce proofs of it, and finally, that I would have been more useful, if we had appeared on the Malabar Coast, because of the influence I had established at the Poona Darbar.

In order to negotiate affairs with greater liberty and advantage for the Nation, I persistently refused to accept from the Regency Rs. 500·00 as subsistence per month which it wanted to give me in accordance with the usage established in India of paying the subsistence to all the envoys. This proves the cleanliness of my conduct and my zeal for the King's service.

I do not see, Sir, that I could have given grounds for reflections contained in your letter of 26th January concerning the interest I am said to have shown during peace or war among the native princes. I am very far from this idea. I always confined myself to give an exact account of the different revolutions which took place among them and of the consequences which could result from them. That's all.

Whenever I found sure occasions, I have conveyed this very news to the Minister and always as accurately as possible to the Governor of Pondicherry. I have only followed in that the instructions which were given to me in 1781, signed by the King and the Minister.

Pardon me, Monsieur le Comte, if I have indulged in all these details. But it appeared to me essential not to leave serious charges unanswered, reflections are crowding on this subject; several oppress me. But I must end a letter already too long, while waiting to reply orally to all the paragraphs of your letter of 26th January and not leave any without a satisfactory reply.

I end my letter, Monsieur Le Comte, by telling you that I rely sufficiently on your justice, and convinced that you will not be without some regrets for hastening to write to the Minister when you have formed a direct opinion about someone who has ardently desired to earn your approbation and your esteem and who ventures to believe himself worthy of it.

I have the honour to be with the most respectful attachment,

Monsieur Le Comte,
Your very humble and very obedient servant,
Montigny.

Restitution made by the Regency of Poona against the claims made to it by Monsieur de Montigny for the ship L'Adélaïde captured by the Maratha fleet of Vijaydurg. February 16, 1787.

Namely, the ship with its riggings, outfit, etc., must be returned to Goa in its present condition.

	Rs.	a.	p.
Paid at Vijaydurg in cash	1,985	8	0
Paid for the cargo at Vijaydurg	17,032	0	0
Paid in addition for the cloves at Poona	5,347	8	0
Paid in addition at Poona for the rest of the cargo	8,000	0	0
Paid in addition at Poona in cash	5,532	8	0
Paid in kind at Vijaydurg for effects, furniture and goods, etc.	10,309	10	0
Paid at Poona for effects, furniture and goods, etc,	1,467	8	0
Interest for the goods sold to a merchant of Vijaydurg for 15 days which were paid only at the end of 6, 8 and 10 months.	800	0	0
Total paid	49,974	10	0

Sent back the whole crew consisting of 4 persons, staff as well as sailors, servants, negros and negresses.

MEMORIAL

Montigny, formerly Resident at Poona, since then Governor at Chandernagore, submitted sometime between 1798 and 1799 on a proposed expedition to India

When it is planned to execute a political and military operation, against a powerful and solidly established nation, 6,000 leagues away from the Metropolis, prudence requires that we should invest it with knowledge which can throw light on the most proper means to fulfil the object proposed.

We cannot think of a more important operation to discuss today than that of attacking the English possessions in the East Indies. We cannot conceal the obstacles of every kind to be surmounted. These obstacles have further increased since the last war; invasion of our factories, the seizure of the Island of Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope seem to put a finishing touch to the English power in this part of the world.

It would be in vain to try to conceal the resources and the immense advantages which the English possess in this vast continent. The establishments which they have on the Malabar Coast, the Coromandel, Orissa and Bengal Coasts, as also the military ports which assure to them the possession of these coasts, namely, Bombay, on the Malabar Coast, Trincomalee as well as Madras, on the Eastern Coast, Fort William on the Ganges, are the bulworks of their possessions in India.

An important consideration, and which ought to fix the attention of the Government, is that since the capture of Trincomalee, the English, in times of war, can and must have a squadron in this port during the course of the good as well as the bad weather, and ready at any moment to weigh anchor, whilst another squadron at Bombay ought to fulfil the same objective.

The capture of the Port of Trincomalee which they had been covetting since a long time, is of such importance for them that only the greatest reverses in India can ever force them to restore this port to the Dutch, its old masters. With this port, they can comfortably protect and cover their immense territorial possessions on the coasts of Coromandel, Orissa and Bengal.

Fourteen years spent in India, journeys in the interior in almost all the parts of this continent, a residence of nearly eight years at the Court of the Regency of Poona (with the Marathas) in the capacity of an envoy of the French Government, a close correspondence with the principal courts of Hindustan and of the Deccan, appear to give me, I believe, the right to express my opinion on a subject which has for a long time formed the object of our deliberations.

I consider in this respect the whole operation which could tend to compromise the French Government in such distant regions in which the Asiatic powers have had, since the war of 1757, only the distressing spectacle of our vain efforts and our reverses.

Really speaking, it must be admitted that these reverses were mainly due to the choice of the attack and the place of the landing which could not be, according to me, more unfavourable to the French and which incontestably prove to what point we were lacking in information on this subject.

A blindness or rather a fatality which I could never understand, have always directed the mass of our forces, land as well as naval, in the place least suitable to procure us real success, I mean, on the Coromandel Coast and in the South of Pondicherry at Cuddalore.

Certainly, if the English had presided over our plans of operations, in the cabinet of Versailles, they could have never directed them more favourably for them.

When the situation of the English in India is known—the neighbourhood of their territorial possessions, their ports, their fortresses, the distribution of their forces, their alliance with the native princes—we will be forced to confess that it is against all the principles of war and politics, to attack them in the south of the Coromandel Coast as we have always done so far. I was so convinced of this mistake on the part of our Government in the conduct of our land and naval forces that I continuously wrote to Maréchal de Castries, then Minister for the Navy, that so long as we shall attack the English in this part, we could expect only reverses, that the Marathas as well as Nizam Ali, Subhedar of the Deccan, will not make any movement in our favour and that the efforts of Tipu Sultan could not alone fulfil the great objective, viz. the destruction of the English. The events have only too well confirmed this sad truth.

On the return of my first journey to India which took place at the end of 1780, I delivered to the Minister of the Navy a memorial in which I demonstrated with evidence the advantage of the attack and a landing on the Malabar Coast over those which we wanted to operate on the Coromandel Coast, and since my second journey and my residentship at the Court of the Regency of Poona till 1788, I am more than ever, confirmed in this opinion.

Thus, I am convinced that, after all the local information which is obtained through these journeys in India, we can hope for real success only by beginning by an attack on the Malabar Coast. The choice of this attack and the place of landing will be determined by the circumstances and measured upon the forces destined for this expedition.

To impress the Executive Directory with the truth of this assertion, I have only to enter into details which will put it in a position to weigh, with its wisdom and knowledge, the plan which it is most appropriate to draw up for the national glory and interest.

The great object of the destruction of the English power in India can be effected only with very major forces in warships as well as in landing troops. I am going to rapidly discuss this subject but with sufficient exposition to demonstrate its truth.

I will next pass on to the presumed possibility of a partial operation, and in general very likely to subsequently prepare the overthrow of the English possessions in Asia, an operation, more consistent, undoubtedly, with the actual state of our naval forces.

But to discuss these two very distinct suppositions and present them in their proper perspective, it is indispensable to draw a picture of the country which shows their connections and their divergence.

The examination of the general map of the Indian continent is necessary here to fulfil preliminarily this object, after which it will be easier to base a judgement on the political and military operations which circumstances, prudence and force may endeavour to put into execution on a theatre so many times witness of our mistakes and our defeats.

The general map of Gefferys drawn in 1768 by the order of the Directors of the English Company is very useful for the object which we propose to examine here. We can also see that of Rennell prepared in 1782. Although made on a smaller scale, it contains precious details.

By casting a glance on these maps, we first of all see a vast continent whose outline presents a big triangle which goes on steadily diminishing from the base established nearly in latitude 29 north to the Cape Comorin, which constitutes nearly 2400 km in its greatest length.

Its greatest width consists in the longitude between 86° and 110° east, that is to say from the mouths of the Ganges to the westernmost point of the Coast of Gujarat, and presents a stretch of about 2,000 km, but soon confined between the eastern coast and the western coast by the Golfs of Bengal and Cambay, that is to say, between the Coromandel Coast and the Malabar Coast. This triangle offers

no more than a width of 800, 600 and 400 km; less still while approaching its summit or the Cape Comorin, to the east of which and in the south we notice the Island of Ceylon in which is situated Trincomalee, the finest port in India, capable of receiving the biggest squadrons.

Let us come back to the continent which forms here the object of our considerations. It is in this vast stretch, of which we have just given the main dimensions, are found the indigenous powers which occupy it and in the midst of which we surprisingly notice the political phenomena presented by the encroaching and tyrannical domination of the English Company, detestable to all the princes of the country.

Let us now speak of the geographical position of the preponderent powers of India. We shall next follow the chain of the establishments of the English Company in this part and we shall be in a better position to determine the point where a squadron should commence the attack in these regions and the place of landing to be preferred for the success of our arms and the security of our establishments.

The four preponderent powers of India occupy the four cardinal points of this continent.

Namely :—

(1) The Court of Delhi in the north of Hindustan.

(2) The Regency of Poona or the Marathas : in almost all the parts of India, but chiefly on the Malabar Coast where it keeps the mass of its forces.

(3) Nizam Ali or the Subhedar of the Deccan : towards the Coast of Orissa and of Coromandel, having his residence at Hyderabad.

(4) Tipu Sultan whom the warlike genius of his father Haider Ali has raised to the status of one of the most redoubtable powers of India. He occupies the south of the continent, from the right bank of the Krishna to towards the Cape of Comorin.

Since immemorial times, chiefly since 1739, epoch of the invasion of Thamas Koulikhan, [Tahmasp Quli Khan.] the troubles and the anarchy, which reign in this vast continent, have turned one of the most flourishing Empires into an emaciated and languishing body, of which the princes snatch the spoils at will.

In the midst of this mass of such diverse interests, it appears to be established so far, that there are only four preponderent powers which constitute, if I may be allowed to express myself thus, the political system of India. The other princes, rajas or nawabs, are dependent on and engulfed by the superior movements of the former.

These four powers are hemmed in by the English forces which occupy almost all the coasts and the best ports of India, without including in it Bengal which forms a single kingdom larger than the British Isles, so that the English are visibly occupied in tightening the chain which they have extended on all the points of the circumference.

This last passage is extracted from a memorial which I presented to the Minister for the Navy in 1780, in pursuance of my observations on the country, and the complexion of affairs has not altered so far as the powers of India are concerned, but much from the point of view of the domination of the English Company which has further increased since the beginning of this last war by the invasion of the Cape of Good Hope and the Island of Ceylon.

This general sketch of the situation of the powers of India and of that of the English Company suffices to give a general idea which we ought to form of their respective positions. But it is necessary to get down to the more particular details to understand and demonstrate the truth of our assertions :

(1) That we must not attack the English possessions in India by the south of the Coromandel Coast as we have always done so far.

(2) That we can promise ourselves real success only by beginning the attack on the Malabar Coast.

Everything now consists in the determination of the point of attack on either coast, and in invariably fixing the most advantageous place which might fulfil the desire object.

The political and military considerations which I intend to develop will be useful for the solution of this problem.

This being granted, let us broach the subject.

The English possess, with the exception of some enclaves, the whole eastern coast from off Tanjaour to the mouths of the Ganges, excepting the territory of Cuttack which belongs to a Maratha chief, and from the mouths of this river to towards the north of Delhi, an immense territory and the richest in India, known under the name of Bengal.

In this vast stretch they possess several forts and strongholds which require a regular siege : Madras on the Coromandel Coast and Fort William in Bengal. These forts and strongholds protect their establishments. Madras and Masulipatam hold in check the whole coast of Orissa and Coromandel where they have an immense territory which embraces Godavari, Masulipatam, the Isle of Divy and the districts of Mustafanagar, Elour, Rajmahendry and Srikakulam, known by the name of the Four Northern Circars, to which we must add the district of Guntur, of which they became masters twenty years ago. [\[The district of Guntur was ceded to the English by Bassalat Jang in 1779. This reference helps us to fix up the date of the Memorial, i.e. 1799.\]](#)

These fine and rich districts belonged to Nizam Ali, Subhedar of the Deccan; the English are in semblance only the farmers of the districts, but in fact they dispose of them as sovereigns.

These vast concessions belonged with the same rights to France before the war of 1757; they were the price of the important services which the French had rendered to Salabat Jang, by helping him in 1751 to obtain the possession of the Subha of the Deccan, vacant since 1748.

Independently of more than nine millions of revenue which these four Circars gave to France, she found other advantages which resulted from the possession of these districts. They cut the communication of the north of the coast with the English establishments situated in the south, that is to say of Bengal with Madras; and from the political point of view, they procured us a very precious advantage undoubtedly of having in our interests the most powerful princes of the Deccan.

Today everything has changed for us in this interesting part of India. It is the English who are enjoying this happy position which is inestimable for them since it assures them the free communication by land of Bengal with all their establishments of the coast of Coromandel and Orissa. This position reduces the Subhedar to the harsh necessity of putting himself into the hands of the English Government and this prince will always be under the domination of the Company as long as this state of affairs will last.

From the military point of view, it is easy to see of what extreme importance are these possessions for the English. They establish, as we have already said it, a sure and rapid communication between the north and the south of the richest territorial possessions which they have in India. They can send the troops necessary for the protection of their establishments on the coast of Orissa and Coromandel, and this measure they can easily effect in spite of the presence of an enemy squadron in the Gulf of Bengal, as it was indeed seen during the last war, when the French took

Cuddalore and when they were ready to march on Madras in support of Haider Ali Khan or of his son Tipu Sultan.

Admiral Suffren, who then commanded our naval forces, occupied at this epoch the Gulf of Bengal and was driven simply to capture a few merchant ships, while the English were dispatching with impunity fresh troops from Bengal by land through the four northern circars to reinforce those of the Coromandel Coast. This passage always enabled them to deploy fresh and superior forces.

Nevertheless, we were then masters of the Port of Trincomalee. What would then be the position today when the English have seized the Island of Ceylon and when they possess this same port from which they can get under way whenever there was a threat to their establishments on the eastern coast?

Before this latter epoch, that is to say, before the capture of Trincomalee, didn't the English possess the four northern circars since the war of 1757 and consequently the intercommunication and the contiguity of their establishments also continued to exist from Bengal to the south of Madras and of the eastern coast?

In this state of affairs, was it not against all the rules of war and politics to attack them in the south of Pondicherry and Cuddalore as we did in 1758 and again in the last war of 1782?

Did we not realise that the English held, the Subhedar of the Deccan in subjection, as a result of the possession of Madras and the districts of the north, and that in this state of affairs, the French were doomed to submit to the enemy because of the larger and always fresh forces which they could bring every moment from Bengal to the threatened spot? Besides, they surrounded the town of Pondicherry by the possessions which they held up to the foot of the ghats which separate the Prince of Mysore, Tipu, an ally of the French. The communication of this Prince with the armies was only precarious. Must we not realise that the more we pushed the English from the south towards the north of the Coromandel Coast, the more did we also increase the mass of their forces, and that this false manoeuvre brought them closer to the Subhedar of the Deccan, their ally?

Finally, I repeat it, was it not behaving against the rules of war and of politics? By this direction of our forces we augmented the obstacles at every step instead of diminishing them.

The attack made in the north of Madras off Masulipatam would have absolutely changed the complexion of affairs. By this arrangement we would have cut the communication, so important for the English, of Bengal with their establishments of the coast of Orissa and Coromandel. We would have forced the Subhedar of the Deccan to detach himself from the English alliance since we would have descended in his own kingdom. And we can be certain that the Subhedar Nizam Ali would have seized with transports of delight this happy occasion to deliver himself from the tyrannical yoke of the English Company. He would have made common cause with us against the common enemy whose usurpations he detested.

This arrangement would have led to innumerable advantages : masters of the communications, the alliance and support of the Subhedar, the loss of this alliance for the English, the recovery of the districts of the north on conditions more advantageous for the prince, or the surrender of these districts if we did not wish to be a territorial power in India and thereby preserving the favour of this prince. We would then have played a fine role of liberators of the native princes, and by this example, indeed political and generous at the same time, we would have simultaneously roused all the sovereigns of this vast country against the common enemy. The total subversion of the English power in India would have been definitely the natural consequence of this plan.

I revert to my argument. The advantage of a descent in a place, proposed and considered from the purely military point of view, would have indeed facilitated the means of attacking Madras with the greatest success. By directing the march of the army from the north to the south on this fortress

and Tipu marching in concert with a party of his troops in the opposite direction, that is to say from the south to the north, the place, invaded on all sides, could no longer have received fresh succour, the siege would have proceeded with all possible advantage, and Madras would surely have fallen into the hands of the French.

This really military plan of attacks, nonetheless, calculated on all the local circumstances which determine it.

From these considerations, am I not entitled to conclude that it is not from the south of the Coromandel Coast that we must attack the English possessions in India? Facts corroborate what I am advancing and prove the truth of my earlier first statement :

(1) That we must not attack the English possessions in India from the south of the Coromandel Coast as we had done so far.

(2) That we can expect real success only by beginning the attack on the Malabar Coast.

Let us enter into some details. The English possess on the western coast, known generally under the name of the Malabar Coast, the following establishments while moving towards the north of the coast : Anjango, Tellicherry, Bombay, the Island of Salsette, Bassein, [\[Bassein belonged to the Marathas; therefore, there was no question of seizing it.\]](#) Surat and Bhadoch. This last establishment to the north of Surat is situated on the Narbada, a river which separates Hindustan from the Deccan.

Surat, at the entrance of the Gulf of Cambay in latitude 30⁰ north, is situated on the left bank of the Tapti, about 16 km from the sea. This town is surrounded only by a simple wall flanked by round and square tower% at salient angles, not having any outer work, not even a ditch. The small fortress is only a matter of a surprise attack. This fort consists of some bastions without capacity, having sides so small that they are not susceptible of any defence, the moat which surrounds it is not more respectable.

Bombay, headquarters of their establishments on this coast, possesses the best port on the Malabar Coast and in which a squadron can lie up during the monsoon and dock. There is also a yard for construction and the place is, after Madras, the strongest which the English have in India.

Bombay, situated in an island near the continent, as it is well fortified and possesses, moreover, the precious advantage of an excellent naval port, undoubtedly makes the English masters, of the navigation of the Malabar Coast. The Emperor of Delhi confirmed them in the rank of Vice-Admiral of the Great Mughal to protect the navigation of the Musalmans in these regions. The Company enjoys this advantage in virtue of a firman which it has obtained as a result of the weakness of the Emperor, as it has done in the case of so many other places which fact it is useless to relate here.

Tellicherry where the English are carrying on pepper trade is not well fortified and Anjengo, not far from the Cape Comorin, is even less so in this respect.

We can add to these factories those of the Dutch at Cochin and Cranganur, which we today presume to be in the hands of the English.

This being granted, let us speak a little about their influence on the powers whose kingdoms adjoin these establishments. It will then be easy to deduce from it the consequences which are necessary for the formulation of a plan of attack, general and particular, and which form the object of this memorial.

The kingdoms of the Regency of Poona and the leading members who form it, stretch from the north of Goa in the west of the continent along the sea to near Agra, and in addition, again in the

west to Ajmer, a town where the coronation of the Mughal Emperor takes place. Holkar, Shinde, the Raja of Nagpur, who are members of the Regency of Poona, occupy the centre of the continent and their possessions stretch from the west to the East from Gujrat to near the Orissa Coast, that is to say, that the Marathas hold under their domination the largest part, of the Peninsula of India.

Poona is the capital and the seat of this power. It is there that the Regency holds its council and from where emanate the orders for the execution of all the political and military operations. When these orders are notified to the Maratha chiefs, they take the field against the common enemy.

However, it sometimes happens that most perfect harmony does not prevail among the members of the Regency. But the attraction of booty and an imminent danger finally always unite them.

Poona, capital of the Marathas, is situated at about 120 km from Bombay. This latter place, well fortified, holds them in check and is the cause of their despair. The continuous presence of warships in the port of Bombay adds to their fear, so that we can rest assured that the Regency will not make any movement in favour of the French so long as the English are masters of this place. The only means of fulfilling this object (of capturing Bombay from the hands of the English is to form a close alliance with the Marathas.

It would be in vain to try to conclude a treaty with the Regency. The same is true with respect to the Marathas as with all the princes of India. They see only with physical eyes. We must deploy major forces before their eyes to induce them, and after that everything will be easy.

It is thus established that we must make ourselves masters of Bombay to control the Malabar Coast and that we must ally ourselves with the Regency of Poona to fulfil this important object.

I had suggested this arrangement to the Government in 1780, and since my return to the Court of the Marathas, the Regency had proposed in 1783 [\[1782.\]](#) a treaty of alliance with the French which I sent with my notes to General Bussy so that he could make changes in it which he deemed necessary. There were, no doubt, articles which were unacceptable but the basis of the treaty was favourable to us. The Marathas were to join us to expel the English from the Malabar Coast, and they were to furnish us the means of every kind for the success of this important expedition. I am still in possession of a copy of this treaty.

From the position of the kingdom of the Marathas on the Malabar Coast which ends at the sea where they have ports and whose possessions surround on all sides the English factories in this part, we ought evidently to realise the necessity to ally ourselves with the Regency of Poona and act in concert with it to effect the destruction of the English on this Coast.

For the execution of this general plan, it is taken for granted, that we shall have the necessary land and naval forces. It is estimated that twelve thousand effective landing troops with a siege and field artillery, proportional to the object we want to fulfil, would suffice to achieve the goal of this first expedition.

The troops will be landed at the lower end of the left bank of the Tapti, and they would march straight on Surat which would offer only a feeble resistance to such a respectable army corps. This town will be the central point of all the operations in the interior of the continent. Surat would become the general depot of ammunition, provisions and camp equipment; military hospitals would be established there, and we would immediately occupy ourselves with forming a corps of sipahees of eight to ten thousand men from Gujarat; this corps would be subsequently augmented according to the needs and the circumstances. There is nothing easier in India than this levy and especially in this part.

The corps of sipahees will be destined to reinforce our army for the camp and siege works. It will be commanded by European corporals, sergeants and quarter-master sergeants, distributed at the

head of companies of 100 men. Four Europeans per company would suffice to lead them confidently into action. Animated by the presence of a French army, they could be trained into excellent soldiers. They were seen charging our troops in line at the last battle of Cuddalore with much courage and firmness.

The staff of this corps ought to be composed of superior European officers who, if possible, already possess the knowledge of local war. We must, especially, place at the guns only European gun-layers. After these preliminary arrangements, a strong detachment would be sent from Surat to seize Bhadoch, an English factory which we shall take care to restore immediately to the Regency of Poona as a proof of French loyalty and the fine role of liberators which we are going to play in India. The Marathas attach a great price to the possession of Bhadoch because of its manufactures on the one hand and of its position in Gujarat.

Indeed, they extremely dislike the presence of the English there. They never wanted to give this factory to the French by their treaty in spite of all my representations. The Regency of Poona would be very sensible of this first act of generosity, and that would create a most favourable impression for us on all the Darbars of India.

From this central position of Surat, agents, entrusted with letters, would be dispatched to the principal native powers, namely, the Emperor of Delhi, the Subhedar of the Deccan and Tipu. I do not speak of the Marathas who would be the first to be informed of the arrival of the French. These letters would announce to them the landing of the troops, the presence of a large number of warships on the Malabar Coast and the desire of the French Republic to ally itself with them against the English, the common enemy, to expel them (the English) from a continent of which they have usurped the most flourishing provinces and finally to liberate them (the Indian powers) from the shameful and tyrannical yoke under which they have been groaning for such a long time.

After leaving a strong garrison at Surat, the invading army would march along the coast to off Bassein. The French, united with the Marathas, would then seize this port and the Island of Salsette. From there they would proceed to Bombay and besiege it. During this march, which is only of 200 km, the squadron would move along the coast to the same latitude, appear before Bombay, and block this port and the town. By this arrangement and with the forces employed on this operation, Bombay is sure to fall into the hands of the French.

The capture of Bombay will make us absolute masters of the Malabar Coast and effect the total expulsion of the English from this part.

We can, with the help of the inland powers and mainly the Marathas, march wherever the English have their establishments.

From Surat we can join a corps of troops to a Maratha army (the latter had already proposed it) and march on the upper Ganges, create disorder in their establishments of the north-west and even drive them from the finest provinces which they have invaded. There is no doubt that by playing the role of liberators we shall succeed in expelling them entirely from Bengal.

The whole politics would consist in restoring to the Emperor the provinces which he possessed before 1760, epoch since which the English wield sovereignty in Bengal. The Marathas would be paid for the expenses of their expedition by the payment of the Chauthai. In all the operations we must act in concert with the Emperor of Delhi and the Regency of Poona. The respectable land and naval forces which we would maintain on the Malabar Coast would constitute a guarantee for the conduct of the Marathas towards the Emperor. At least, we would be sure to effect a powerful diversion in the north of Hindustan which would favour the expedition of the Orissa Coast; and in this assumption, we would inflict a fatal blow on the English.

We could adopt the same principles, with the Subhedar of the Deccan by restoring to him the five districts of the north invaded by the English and keep for ourselves on both the coasts only the towns and the factories necessary for our trade. Nothing would oppose the victorious and liberating march of the French in the interior of the continent when it followed the principles advanced in the course of this memorial.

To demonstrate the possibility of the march of an army in the interior of the continent, I shall cite a fact established in 1779. Colonel Goddard, at the head of a corps of 14,000 native troops, whose staff and officers were Europeans, crossed with impunity the country from Kenor [\[Kalpi?\]](#) to Surat. This corps, which followed a route of more than 800 km in the heart of the country, arrived, to my great surprise, from Bengal to the Malabar Coast, without finding any major obstacle in this march. It is true that the order, the discipline, the exact payment for provisions and the presents opened up the road. The disagreement which then existed among the chiefs of this region has no doubt also favoured the march of the English army.

The motives which would conduct ours would remove every kind of difficulty, because the princes would indeed consider us as their liberators.

I summarise. All the secret of this general attack would consist in cutting on both sides, the communication of the north with the south of the continent in the points indicated above, that is to say, at Surat on the Malabar Coast and off Masulipatam on the Orissa Coast.

This is the basis of my ideas on this great operation which would require superior numbers of forces in warships and landing troops. It is believed that for this reason, this project cannot suit the present views of the Government, but which can always serve as basis for the subsequent operations.

Let us pass on to the second hypothesis stated in this memorial, the object of which is to impress the presumed possibility of a partial operation, and from this point of view, which could be considered as preparatory to the general plan of which I have just spoken, an operation more consistent no doubt with the present state of our naval forces.

This operation ought to have as its principal aim the capture of Goa and the four districts which make up this establishment, headquarters of the Portuguese in India on the Malabar Coast.

These four districts, namely, Goa, Salsette, Bardesh and Phonda yield enough for the maintenance of 3,000 European troops and suffice all the expenses of the colonial administration. This information you get from the very lips of the Governor-General Dom Frederick De Souza with whom I was in close correspondence during the course of my residentship with the Marathas. Rice, wheat, hemp are the principal products of this colony. You can add to them some manufactures of Chittes [\[A kind of printed cotton cloth.\]](#) and ordinary linen.

This establishment, considered under all political and military aspects, offers important advantages.

Goa, situated towards the middle of the Malabar Coast in latitude 10°31' south, borders immediately, on the districts which depend on it, on the kingdom of Tipu Sultan, in the west and in the north on that under Maratha domination. This happy position would open the communication for us with the powers of the Deccan, and the English would not be able to put the smallest obstacle in it. Consequently, this fact would place us in a position to form alliances and come to an understanding with these same powers for more vast projects which time and circumstances could permit.

This establishment would have been, and would be, so favourable to France that I do not know how we did not try to negotiate this cession with the Court of Portugal which appeared disposed to this arrangement in 1760. But today the conduct, which the Portuguese are adopting with respect to us, appears to justify this conquest. I shall not venture other reflexions on this point.

The Governor-General almost always resides at Pendgy [\[Panaji.\]](#). The town of Goa, at the far end of the roadstead, is situated at more than 8 km from this spot. The joust is held there but the bad climate prevents the Government from staying there continuously. The swamps and stagnant waters, which exist to the south of the Albuquerque Causeway, are the principal causes of it. With the reclamations, carried out skillfully, and the military works relating to the defence of this colony, we would make of Goa one of the most beautiful establishments of India.

If this expedition suited the views of the Government, we think that 3,500 to 4,000 landing troops could suffice this partial operation. We would join to it an artillery train proportional to this enterprise.

The corruption of the inhabitants of this colony, the bad state of its military and the vices of its administration would no doubt make its conquest easy. But it will not suffice to conquer it; we must know how to preserve it.

The capture of the establishment of Goa once carried out, we could make use of the same warships and transport ships to proceed to the Red Sea at Suez with a view to receiving the troops of the army of Egypt and return to Goa to reinforce our troops already landed, send them to Tipu, to the Marathas, etc., if we wanted to set these powers into motion against England.

The epoch for the arrival of our ships on the Malabar Coast, which we suppose to be at the end of September, would coincide with the monsoon favourable for proceeding to Suez. Forty days suffice for this crossing if we leave from the Malabar Coast at the end of October. These ships laden with landing troops would be in a position to start again for the Malabar Coast and would arrive sufficiently in time to land this corps of troops. We know that only a month's crossing is necessary to proceed from Suez to the Malabar Coast. At Poona, I saw that letters from Suez had taken only thirty-two days to proceed from this port of Egypt to the capital of the Marathas.

With these combined forces, we would be in a position, after the change of the monsoon, to seize also Diu, a Portuguese establishment situated at the southernmost point of Gujarat. This possession would become very important subsequently because of the commercial operations which we could establish from this point to Gujarat, the most fertile region of India next to Bengal. The proximity to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea would add much to the importance of this establishment.

We cannot conceal the obstacles which we would have to surmount in this enterprise : the distance of the places, the enemy cruises, the extreme surveillance of the English on the Malabar Coast, the neighbourhood of Bombay. All these considerations ought to fix the attention of the Government. We must expect that they will not leave any stone unturned to wreck the enterprise in India, especially at this moment on the Malabar Coast.

But a partial expedition, conducted, as a whole, with intelligence and courage, can be crowned with success. It is certain that once we arrive in the roadstead of Goa, the conquest of this establishment appears to become a positive fact. The advantages, which would result from it, are already demonstrated, but we must also remember the obstacles we would have to surmount.

The plan of the harbour of Goa, which is attached herewith, gives the nautical details necessary for the direction of the naval forces in these parts.

I, therefore, sum up by saying that a squadron can proceed from the Isle of France in 30 days to the roadstead of Goa, lay anchor there at 8 to 9 fathom of muddy bottom, leaving the small fort of la Goade [\[Fort Aguade.\]](#), to the north, within cannon reach. The bar of this roadstead opens only towards 15th September : warships can safely lay anchor there, but without entering the bed of the roadstead or the river of Goa. At a distance of 2 km to the south of the Island of Goa, is situated the fort of Mormogoa under which warships can lay anchor with safety, and in case of need some warships can

lie up. However, it is fit and proper to observe with *Dapres* that at a distance of 2 km to the north-west of the cape of Marmagoa, we must beware of certain rocks which can be seen only at low tide. The timing of tides is at 4-30 a.m.

We can, besides, refer to the hydrographical details mentioned in the plan of the harbour of Goa, attached to our memorial and more particularly still to the sailors and pilots well acquainted with these regions.

A very well informed flag-officer of the marine corps observed to me that it would cost infinitely for constructing outworks which could put this anchorage in a position to provide a sure and convenient shelter to the warships.

Thus, we cannot consider the establishment of Goa as an acquisition which can serve as a war-port susceptible of providing laying up facilities for the ships of the line in the next monsoon. But it can be considered from the political and commercial point of view as a point d'appui which could serve as a basis to a plan of subsequent operation of greater latitude.

I feel that to specify further the means of execution, it would be necessary to know more particularly the views of the Government as well as the land and naval forces available for this expedition. But as I am denied information in this respect, I have ventured only views in general.

I may add that I am not trying to provoke the Government into sending today an expedition into India. But if its politics ever thought of attempting one there, I thought it advisable to submit to the Executive Government the advantages and the obstacles which such an expedition would present.

C² 179, f. 12-12v⁰.

Translation of a letter from the Nawab Tipu Sultan to M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, dated December 8, 1786.

After the compliments.

My enemies, on whom I had won several victories and whom I had seen continuously fleeing before me, had, however, rallied and formed during the past few days a formidable army corps of about 100,000 cavalry, infantry and a numerous artillery. The leaders of these allied forces of Nizam Ali and the Marathas had pitched their camp at ten to twelve koss from my army, camped near Savnur, with the intention of making a last effort to attack me vigourously. Being informed of it, I marched with all my baggage and artillery. On December 3, 1786, I gave them a battle. They did not even wait for my men to use bayonet; they were routed by my infantry and artillery which vomitted fire and fright on them for several hours. Unable to resist it, the enemy took to flight in the greatest disorder. My victorious army pursued them for two or three koss, killed many of their soldiers, made a large number of prisoners and plundered all their equipment which consists of 3,000 camels with their pack, seven to eight hundred horses, five elephants with their 20,000 bullocks, twenty pairs of *Nagara* and a number of flags. I sent several units of troops in their pursuit, and with the grace of God, I hope to give you soon the news that my enemies have been, obliged to return, the one to Poona and the other to Hyderabad. My intention is to pursue them to the gates of these two cities. I am writing to you all these things so that you should be posted with them in the greatest detail, as I wish that you should always be pleased, because you are the best among the number of my friends.

Copy of a letter from M. de Cossigny to the Nawab Tipu Sultan

Pondicherry, January 3, 1787.

After the compliments.

The complete victory which you have won over your enemies on December 3 is a very signal proof of the courage of your troops, of the affection of your army for your person, of your warlike qualities, and at a much greater mark of God's favour on all your enterprises.

I received this good news on January 1, 1787. It is the day, according the custom of European factories, on which we enter a new year. Thus, I could not begin the one we enter, with greater joy and satisfaction.

I see it clearly, Prince, that you are convinced of the pleasure which this news must have given to me as well as to the Frenchmen, since you had the kindness to convey it to me yourself with all the details. I hastened to spread it everywhere, and today you are the object of our admiration.

While replying recently to the letters which I received from Nizam Ali and the Marathas by which they were pressing me to give them a prompt succour, I did not leave them in the dark about the (friendly) relations which have been existing between your Sarkar and that of the Emperor of France, as well as about my opinion that their only resource is to try and make peace with you rather than to implore foreign aid. I do not think that they will accept that which is offered to them by the English or rather I do not think that the English will dare to furnish it to them. If you think you have done enough for your glory and if you wish to listen to the proposals which would be made to you, would you think it fit if this was done through my mediation if the Marathas and Nizam Ali requested me to undertake it?

I need no more speak about your Waquils. They ought to be on their way. I am waiting for them every day, as I am also waiting for M. M Monneron with a ship.

Translation of a letter from the Nawab Tipu Sultan to M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, dated January 20, 1787.

After the compliments.

On 20th January I am in good health and I wish that you also are doing well.

Your letter has kept me well informed and I approve all that you have written to me. I have reason to believe that the three persons, whom I have dispatched to proceed to the Court of the Emperor of France, are still at Atour. In pursuance of your desire and what you have pointed out to me, they are under your orders. You can therefore write to them to proceed to Pondicherry when you deem it appropriate.

You write to me that you receive news, not so reliable, from Poona and Hyderabad. They are our enemies, do not believe them. They would do wrong even to their mother, and what does that all matter, what they say, do and write?

I wrote to you several times about the shameful defeat of the Marathas by my army. On 12th January and on the 16th of the same month, I fell on their army; I once again beat them; they were dispersed and they disappeared before me in a shameful manner. Moreover, during one night I had only sent 200 cavalry and about fifty fougettes [Men carrying bows of big bambooes, armed with arrows, blades of sabres and knives, fastened and floating, which are lanced like flying rockets, being horizontally directed with skill. This contrivance is called 'fouquette' among the people of the country.]. At their approach, 60,000 Marathas (this was the number in their camp) had such a fright that they decamped as if they were attacked by my whole army. The 200 cavalymen, master of their camp, carried away with them all that was most precious; they made heaps of all the rest and burnt everything.

Henceforth, I think that to fight such terrible enemies I must only collect from my bazar 50 women, to whom I shall give horses and 200 cavalry men, whom they will lead tolerably to put to rout these so brave Marathas.

All this news deserves rightly to be written to all our good friends of Madras.

Write to me as often as you can. It will give me pleasure.

Translation of a letter in Telugu (Kanarese?) from the Nawab Tipu Sultan to M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, dated February 10, 1787, and received on March 19.

After the compliments.

I am in good health on February 10. I received your letter in which you point out to me that you have written to the Marathas that you find it more advisable for them to ask for peace from me than to continue a war in which henceforth they could only have a disadvantage, and that if they accepted the succour which was offered to them by the English, they would be doing the wrong thing, since you yourself are in a position to support one of the best allies of the Emperor of France. You have taken the right step in writing to them in this manner, and they too have done the right thing in following your advice.

I have communicated to you my victories over the Marathas. As I had finally driven them back beyond the Krishna, they did not feel ashamed to write to me that they were throwing themselves at my feet to do me the *Salam* [The Salam means the bow.] and implore my clemency by asking me for peace, which I have granted to them. Laden with their spoils I am leaving for Srirangapatan. I am writing to you this letter in order that you should be posted with this news by myself.

You have once again asked from me a general *Radary* [Radary means a passport.] so that all sorts of merchandise should be allowed to pass freely from my country. I am sending you one for the Amaldars and Killedars of Ceylon(?) who will surely henceforth allow the merchandise to pass on your own Radary.

The three distinguished persons, whom I am sending to the Court of the Emperor of France, ought to be now at your orders.

Do let me know about things which you may need from here, and let me hear from you as often as possible.

C² 179, f. 66-66v⁰.

Translation of a letter from the Nawab Tipou Sultan to M. Le Vicomte de Souillac, dated February 25, 1787.

After the compliments.

I received your letter of November 20 on February 23. I got all the information.

The Marathas and Nizam had entered my territory, but I drove them out of it. As they solicited for peace from me on conditions which were agreeable to me and as they were humiliated before me, I granted it to them.

M. Monneron must have certainly talked to you of the secret and important objects which he had orders to negotiate with me. I expect that you will see to it that such a good friendship, which has been reigning since times immemorial between my Sarkar and that of the Emperor of France, continues forever.

I have sent three distinguished persons to proceed to the Court of the Emperor of France. I have charged them with my orders and with what they have to say on my behalf. They have at present reached Pondicherry, and as soon as M. Monneron arrives, they will embark for their destination.

This is what you have written to me :

That you were going to send a ship furnished with all the materials necessary for the voyage. You request me to accept the ship on behalf of the King of France, and that when the three distinguished persons embark on this ship, it will give me a great renown on their arrival in Europe, and that finally, my envoys will return to my Court on this very ship.

You also write to me that there was no difference between the Sarkar of the Emperor of France and mine, that all his ships and his troops belonged to me just as my troops also belonged to the King of France.

What is a ship which I am sending to you, you say to me and you add that you are well convinced that when it will be a question of undertaking great things, I will do it for the Emperor of France. You desire that the ship should arrive in France with my flag. I consent to it. You finally say that my envoys will return with M. Monneron. Besides, you inform me that you are going to send soldiers for the party of M. de Lalée. It is a good thing; do send them.

C² 179, f 67-67v⁰.

Translation of a letter from the Nawab Tipu Sultan to M. de Cossigny, dated February 25, 1787.

After the compliments.

I received the letter in which you point out to me that M. de Souillac and M. Monneron have sent you their letters *via* Colombo, that these gentlemen have informed you that M. Monneron is coming to Mangalore; that you will write to him and ask him to proceed to Pondicherry where the three distinguished persons have arrived; that you have sent Ramrao to Atour to fetch them. You have taken the right step in all these matters; I approve of your conduct.

I also received *via* Mangalore a letter from M. de Souillac and one from M. Monneron; they have given me full information. I am sending you my reply for these gentlemen.

I have also sent a letter to my Amaldar of Mangalore and asked him to deliver it to M. Monneron immediately on his arrival.

I received the field-glasses set in gold and silver, sent by you.

As you know, having defeated several times the Marathas whom I chased beyond the Krishna, I did not mind granting them peace which they solicited from me. I am shortly leaving for Srirangapatan loaded with their spoils.

Let me hear from you; it will always give me pleasure.

Copy of a letter from M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, to the Nawab Tipu Sultan

Pondicherry April 7, 1787.

After the compliments.

I am replying to your letter of 25th February which I received only on 25th March; the letters for M. de Souillac and M. Monneron reached me simultaneously. A ship is leaving for the Isle of France in three or four days. It will carry the letter for M. de Souillac, and I shall deliver to M. Monneron that addressed to him, when he arrives at Pondicherry, which may not be long. I am almost sure that he must have arrived at Mangalore some days ago, since he was met on the way at the Isle of Soloman by a ship which arrived here more than a fortnight back. I can only presume that something extraordinary must have caused the delay in the arrival of M. Monneron. In fact, I have received letters from him as well as from M. de Souillac : They announce to me that this delay was caused by a terrible hurricane which struck the Isle of France on 15th December and in which we suffered a loss of several big ships, laden with merchandise. The ship commanded by M. Monneron also suffered a lot of damage. Time was necessary to repair it, and it was in a position to set sail only on the 6th of the month of February. By the grace of God, all these accidents will not stand in the way of the mission, and they will lead only to a little loss of time. I can hardly repeat to you that the three persons, whom you are sending to the Court of the Emperor of France, will be received with all the distinction due to the greatest Prince of India, who is a friend of the nation. On their return, you will be very pleased and very satisfied. I have already sent one of my friends who is a distinguished person, wise and well-informed. The delay in the departure of M. Monneron is perhaps fortunate, because the King and his Divan will have time to get full information, and make all the arrangements to receive your envoys and in this way, they will be able to return to your earlier.

During all the time I was in your service and since I have been Governor of Pondicherry, you have showered courtesies and affections on me. This fact is sufficient to render the post, I am occupying, very precious for me, and since it leaves me the hope that one day I will be entrusted with the troops which will have the order to unite with you to fight our common enemies. From now on I venture to assure you of the magnanimity of the King, my master, and so far as what concerns me personally, rest assured that I desire nothing but your glory and your prosperity, and I fervently hope that one day you will become the master of the whole of India. This will take place with the grace of God and when you have made a solid alliance with the Emperor of France.

You will give me the greatest pleasure by informing me about the conditions on which you have granted peace to the Marathas and to Nizam Ali, so that I can give an account of it to the Emperor of France and his Divan.

Heaven grant you long years to accomplish the greatest things to which you are destined.

Translation of a letter in Telugu from the Nawab Tipu Sultan to M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry.

May 3, 1787.

After the, compliments,

On the 3rd of May, I am doing well. I received the essence of sulphur which you got prepared and which you sent me.

You are so sensible of my glory that you speak to me about it in all your letters. You tell me that you have sent a ship to France and that you have written to the Divan of the Emperor of France about my victories give me pleasure. I have well understood all the other things.

After defeating the Marathas several times, they finally threw themselves at my feet and solicited me to make peace with them. I was pleased to grant it to them. Thus the Marathas have returned to their country and myself. I shall shortly return to Srirangapattan.

Henceforth I intend to work in accordance with the kindness and the goodwill of the Emperor of France. I hope that we shall succeed by the grace of God.

I have received the chemicals which you sent me. I still need five bottles of the essence of sulphur Send them to me. I am sending you the sample of the spirit.

I see from your letter that M. Pierre Monneron has not yet arrived at Pondicherry. He arrived at Mangalore whence I know he has left for Pondicherry where, I think, he must have now arrived.

Let me hear from you and let me know the things you may need.

C² 179, f. 81-82.

Copy of a letter from M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, to the Nawab Tipu Sultan

Pondicherry, May 8, 1787.

After the compliments.

My prayers are granted. M. Monneron arrived on the 5th of May in the roadstead of Pondicherry. After making all the necessary preparations, he will set sail, according to your orders, for France as early as possible. On the return of the three Waquils, you will know how great is the power of the Emperor of France, and you will have the assurance of his alliance. United by a sincere friendship and mutual confidence, what will you not achieve in future? I foresee greatest things for your glory. May God grant you long life to achieve them.

In view of the season, as the departure of a fortnight earlier or a fortnight later, is immaterial, M. Monneron will not be in a hurry, and everything will be for the better. Consequently, if you wish to honour me with a prompt reply, perhaps it will still arrive before his departure, and I could profit by this occasion to inform the Divan of the Emperor of France of your intentions on a matter on which I am making an inquiry.

If in a time more or less distant, the Emperor of France sent five or six hundred men of the excellent cavalry he maintains in France, could we expect on their arrival in this country, that you would furnish the necessary horses to mount this corps, all the more necessary, for, at this moment our neighbours are forming a similar corps of European cavalry? Your reply will decide the Emperor of France, for, of what use would be the dispatch here of such a corps, of which I feel so strongly the utility, if we were not assured of the horses to mount them? It will be very difficult for us to bring such a large number from whatever part of the earth it may be. I solicit you to deliberate on my request.

You are well convinced of my wishes for your glory and your prosperity. I am impatiently waiting for the conditions of your peace with the Marathas to blast the report which our enemies are spreading that you have surrendered everything and that you have given a crore of rupees. I have already written to the Divan of the Emperor of France to publish in all the public papers that this news cannot but be a lie.

C² 179, f. 88-89.

Translation of a letter from Tipu Sultan to M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, written in Telugu.

May 11, 1787.

After the compliments.

On the 11th of May I am enjoying good health. Continue to give me news about you. I was extremely satisfied with all that you have written to me in your letter. Here is my reply.

You have written to me that M. Pierre Monneron had left Mauritius simultaneously with another ship which arrived at Pondicherry a fortnight back, and that you consequently think that M. de Monneron should have likewise arrived at Mangalore, that you are impatiently awaiting him at Pondicherry so that my three Waquils should proceed as early as possible to the Court of the Emperor of France. You give me the assurance that they will be well treated and received there according to my desire which is also yours. My Waquils, as I have already written to you, are bearers of jewels and sarpeches to be presented on my behalf to the Emperor of France. I think that you must have taken all the measures so that they should be presented as a homage on my behalf, and which is due to such a great Emperor. You have therefore, done the right thing, as you point out to me, in having sent in advance two confidential persons to whom you have given orders and whom you have entrusted with letters, so that everything should be done and presented in a manner worthy of you and me.

I have already written to you that M. de Monneron arrived at Mangalore where he deposited all the things which I had demanded from him and which I was delighted to receive. After receiving the payment for all the advances which he had made for me, I knew that he had left for Pondicherry where undoubtedly he must have arrived long ago. I beseech you, send him as also my three Waquils to Europe as early as possible. I am satisfied with all that you have done so far.

Give me news about your health as often as you can. It will give me pleasure.

This is written by the Secretary Cherchayya.

P.S.—

You express to me the desire to know the conditions which we, the Marathas, the Mughals and I, have laid down. We have ceased all hostilities amongst us, and we have solemnly agreed that so long as the sun, the moon, the earth and the sea continued their different movements, peace will reign among us, and we shall forever remain united and allied; that, however, if something happened to disturb a peace so solidly established, we have agreed that we shall terminate our differences without having recourse on both sides to other forces than our own, and that if a fourth power wanted to profit by our dissensions to attack us, we shall unite our forces against this fourth power. Although we have not yet terminated our differences, we have promised each other the sacrifice of our mutual hatred to destroy the power which would be audacious enough to attack one of us. It is thus that we have made our peace. I am supplying you this news so that you should be apprised of it. If you wish to have additional information, I shall furnish it to you when our accords are terminated.

Copy of a letter of M. de Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry, to the Nawab Tipu Sultan

Pondicherry, June 8, 1787

After the compliments,

I received your letter of 11th May. I have already apprised you of the arrival of M. Pierre Monnerson whose ship laid anchor in the roadstead of Pondicherry on the 5th of the same month. At the same time I informed you that his departure would be delayed because of the bad season in certain regions through which he must necessarily pass. By the grace of God, I hope that he will set sail from the 20th to the 25th of June. Rest assured, Prince, that everything has been done for the best and be always well convinced of my respect and of my inviolable attachment for your person. Subject and servant of the greatest King of Europe, I have the good fortune to be also the servant of the greatest prince of India who is kind enough to honour me with his confidence and his friendship.

I have made it a point to this day to send to the Emperor of France, my master, all the letters you have written to me. I shall also deliver a translation of this last one to M. Pierre Monneron who will present it to the Diwan of His Majesty, so that the whole of France should know on what basis you have just established peace between the Marathas, Nizam Ali and yourself. I am infinitely delighted to visualize the possibility that the Fourth power, of which you speak to me and which you foresee as having the design to profit by your dissensions to satisfy its unbridled ambition, may one day be crushed and destroyed, if, after properly understanding your interests, as it appears to me, you remain united and allied, not only to defend yourself, but even to attack it and force it to return to the limits which it has transgressed, so that it should be restricted to a simple liberty of trade in your kingdoms. That is the goal to which has confined himself, out of justice, the Emperor of France who indeed possesses other means, which your enemy hasn't, to make distant conquests and to preserve them. On the return of your Waquils, you will be better informed of his intentions to replace one day all things in India on a just level. Is it not an extraordinary thing indeed that a handful of men should retain in slavery the sovereigns of the finest provinces in India and that they should enrich themselves with the toil and sweat of so many people who claim the protection of the Princes who are not yet subjugated to their avarice and their cupidity! The blood of all the ancient Kings of India is crying out, and Heaven has destined Tipu Sultan Bahaddar to be their avenger and to protect those to whom they have left alive after depriving them of their liberty.

God grant my prayers to see you crowned with glory, prosperity and a long reign.

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