Redistricting and Political Party Performance in Thailand: 2001 and 2005 comparison

By Sanittawan Nikki Tan

The Science of Elections and Campaigns | Final Project

Research Question

• What is the effect of the redistricting of the house of representative constituencies on the performance of the TRT party and the (Thai) Democrat Party in the 2005 general election?

Context

- 3 elections under the 1997 constitution: 2001, 2005, 2006
- Thai House of representative (lower house): Mixed-member system (MMS)
 - 400 members from single-seat constituencies (ssc)
 - 100 members from proportional representation (pr)
- Redistricting occurred in 8 provinces before the 2005 election
- Curious about the overall effect and how each party's performance varies across provinces





Data sources

- 2001 and 2005 election results at the provincial level (2-year party level panel)
- Collected from the Office of the Election Commission

Bangkok 2005

Bangkok 2005


democrat

trt

0.404544

0.595456

• Include single-seat constituency and proportional representation results



SSC

SSC

37.0

37.0

4.0

33.0

0.108108

0.891892

False

False



11

Research Design - Observational Studies

- Leverage the redistricting in 8 provinces as the shock
- Use OLS to determine if there is an effect at all
- Measure political party performance by two-party vote shares and the proportion
 of seats won in the single-seat constituency system by each party: only focus on
 TRT party and Democrat Party

Hypothesis and Functional Forms

$$H_0$$
: $\beta_1 = 0$

$$H_a$$
: $\beta_1 \neq 0$

Vote shares

Model 1

$$voteshares_i = eta_0 + eta_1 reform_{it} + \delta_0 d2005_t + lpha_i + u_{it}, t = 1, 2$$

Proportion of seats won

Model 2

$$proportionseats_i = eta_0 + eta_1 reform_{it} + \delta_0 d2005_t + lpha_i + u_{it}, t = 1, 2$$

Model 3

 $proportionseats_i = eta_0 + eta_1 reform_i + eta_2 democrat_i + eta_3 reform_i democrat_i + \epsilon_i$

Preliminary results: vote shares vs reform

Model 1

```
areg voteshares reform i.year if system == "ssc", absorb(province id)
Linear regression, absorbing indicators Number of obs = 304
                                  No. of categories =
Absorbed variable: province_id
                                                        76
                                  F(0, 226) =
                                    Prob > F =
                                    R-squared = 0.0000
                                    Adj R-squared = -0.3407
                                    Root MSE = 0.3185
 voteshares | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
    reform | 7.35e-13 .1190592 0.00 1.000 -.2346082 .2346082
     year |
     2005 | -7.35e-13 .0386279 -0.00 1.000 -.0761169 .0761169
     _cons | .5 .0258365 19.35 0.000 .4490887 .5509113
F test of absorbed indicators: F(75, 226) = 0.000 Prob > F = 1.000
```

Preliminary results: seat proportions vs reform

Model 2

areq proportion seats reform i.year, absorb (province id) Linear regression, absorbing indicators Number of obs = 304 No. of categories = Absorbed variable: province id F(2, 226) = 1.79Prob > F = 0.1693R-squared = 0.0716 Adj R-squared = -0.2447Root MSE = 0.4733proportion~s | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] reform | -.0181607 .1769076 -0.10 0.918 -.36676 .3304387 year | 2005 | .1044913 .0573964 1.82 0.070 -.0086092 .2175919 _cons | .3719825 .0383899 9.69 0.000 .2963345 .4476305 F test of absorbed indicators: F(75, 226) = 0.185 Prob > F = 1.000

Preliminary results: interaction term

Model 3

reg proportion seats democrat##reform if (year == 2005)


Source	SS	df	MS	Number of	obs =	152
+-				F(3, 148)	=	15.48
Model	7.78536303	3 2.5	59512101	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	24.8138161	148 .1	16766092	R-squared	=	0.2388
+-				Adj R-squa		0.2234
Total	32.5991791	151 .21	15888603	Root MSE	=	.40946
proportion_se~s	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	<pre>Interval]</pre>
1.democrat	4166584	.0702225	- 5.93	0.000 -	5554268	 2778901
1.reform	.1272703	.1530465	0.83	0.407 -	1751682	.4297089
democrat#reform	i					
1 1	·	.2164404	-1.24	0.215 -	6969917	.1584336
_cons	.6836672	.0496548	13.77	0.000	.5855431	.7817912

Results and Discussion

- Fail to reject (sharp) null hypothesis: redistricting does not have effects on
 TRT and Democrat parties based on 2001 and 2005 comparison
- $\bullet \quad \text{Model 4?} \quad \textit{proportionseats}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 reform_{it} + \beta_2 democrat_i + \beta_3 reform_{it} democrat_i + + \delta_0 d2005_t + \alpha_i + \epsilon_i$

Concerns

- Design: redistricting is not randomly assigned
- Confounders: politicians switching parties
- Data: party-level data is not enough; need individual-level panel data;
 measure redistricting effects on individuals



South -> 2 provinces out of 14 (0.14%)
North -> 0 provinces out of 17 (0)
Northeast -> 2 provinces out of 19 (0.11%)
Central -> 4 provinces out of 26 (0.15%)

Research Design (continued)

- Compare performance of TRT and Democrat Party in the 2001 election and the 2005 election in the single-seat constituency (SSC), at the provincial level
- Compare performance of TRT and Democrat Party in the 2001 and 2005 elections in the proportional representation (PR) system
- Test if redistricting has any effects on the two parties
 - Look at the provincial level
 - Look at the regional level

Preliminary results

• Democrat Party's 2005 performance comparison in the SSC system

Vote shares

- Mean of **two party vote shares** in the redistricted provinces = 0.2497525
- Mean of **two party vote shares** in the non-redistricted provinces = 0.3195542
- o Difference = 0.2497525 0.3195542 = -.0698017

Proportion of seats won

- Mean of **proportion of seats won** in the redistricted provinces = 0.125
- Mean of **proportion of seats won** in the non-redistricted provinces = 0.2670087
- o Difference = 0.125 .2670087 = -.1420087