

## TEXT.

Division of a Word according to the accident of its function.

30. Through the being distinguished by the three accidents of Denotation, &c. [§ 10.] a Word also is held [—as the Meaning thereof is—] to be of three kinds—Expressive, Indicative, and Suggestive.

## COMMENTARY.

a. When it has the accident of [the power of] Denotation, the word is [simply] Expressive (*vāchaka*):—when it has the accident of Indication, it is Indicative (*lakshaka*): when it has the accident of Suggestion, it is Suggestive (*vyanjaka*).

b. Moreover [—the senses conveyed by separate words, in virtue of their exerting one or other of these three functions, being supposed decided—a difference of opinion presents itself in regard to how words act in concert. On this the author proceeds to remark].

## TEXT.

The question whether the power of conveying knowledge belongs to the Sentence or to the Words in it.

31. Some say that there is a function [of the Sentence] called Purport (*tātparyya*) [which function consists] in making one apprehend the connection among the meanings of the words. Others say that the sense [alleged to come] from the Purport is [nothing else than] the sense [that comes] from that [Sentence itself], and the Sentence [itself] is what makes one apprehend that [sense].

## COMMENTARY.

a. Because of the surcease of the power of Denotation [—§ 23. a.—] when the meanings of the several words had been conveyed, there is a function, called Purport, declaratory of the *connection among the meanings of the words*, in the shape of *the sense of the sentence*;—such is the opinion of those who [—like the followers of the Nyāya—] say that a connection takes place among the [separate meanings] denoted [by the separate words in the sentence]. The opinion [on the other hand] of those who say that significance belongs [*not* to the words separately—but—] to the connected [words in the shape of a sentence], is this, that the sense [alleged to be] conveyed by the Purport [of the sentence] is just the sense of that [sentence itself]; and the declarer of that [sense of the sentence] is just the sentence itself.

b. So much for the 2nd chapter of the *Sāhitya Darpaṇa*, entitled the “Declaration of the nature of a Sentence.”