

reason, explains it as denoting the sum total of the various sections of which the system itself is made up.

The term Rhetoric, as employed to denote the subject of a treatise of this description, is liable—according to our view of the division and denomination of the sciences—to an objection the converse of that to which we hold the term Logic liable when employed to denote the all-embracing sphere of the Nyāya philosophy. In the *Sāhitya* we have but a part and the least important part of what, according to Aristotle,\* belongs to Rhetoric. In order to attain its specific end of convincing or persuading—between which we agree with Mr. Smart in thinking that there is more of a distinction than a difference†—Rhetoric does not hesitate to avail itself of the graces of language which gratify the taste; but in the *Sāhitya*, “taste” (*rasa*) is all in all. The difference between the political history of India and that of Greece or Rome so obviously suggests the reason why eloquence, in the two cases, proposed to itself ends thus different, that it would be idle to do more than allude to it in passing.

The *Sāhitya Darpaṇa* is divided into ten sections—of lengths varying from eight or nine pages to eighty or ninety. The first section declares the nature of poetry. The second treats of the various powers of a word. The third treats of taste. The fourth treats of the divisions of poetry. The fifth discusses more fully one of the powers of a word adverted to in section second. The sixth takes particular cognizance of the division of poetry into ‘that which is to be seen,’ and ‘that

\* The main consideration being that of Arguments—τὰ δ' ἄλλα προσθήκαι—“but the rest mere out-work.” *Rhet. B. I. c. 1.*

† “That common situation in life, *Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*, proves indeed that there are degrees of conviction which yield to persuasion, as there are other degrees which no persuasion can subdue: yet perhaps we shall hereafter be able to show that such junctures do but exhibit one set of motives outweighing another, and that the application of the term persuasion to the one set, and of conviction to the other, is in many cases arbitrary, rather than dictated by a correspondent difference in the things.” *Sematalogy*—p. 175.