

[—see the *Laghu Kaumudi*, p. 313.] The same thing is stated [by another authority, who says,] “Since its essence consists in its being tasted,\* Flavour is nothing other [in respect of its *body*—if it can be said to have one—] than the body [consisting] of [its] manifestation.” And so in similar places elsewhere such applications [of the term Flavour as denoting something distinct from its perception—see § 51. *a.*—] are to be understood tropically.

A supposed objection to this no objection.

*h.* “But then” [some one—fancying that he is giving utterance to an objection—may say] “by all this you assert that Flavour [—in which Poetry consists—see § 3.] is not an *object* of knowledge [but a *mode* of knowledge]; and since Suggestion is a mode of knowledge [the result of which also—see § 2. *r.* and 59—is declared to be alone Poetry—] it turns out that these two are one. And yet [hear what the author of the *Vyaktiviveka* says—viz.—] ‘What we mean by a Suggester [or manifester—*vyanjaka*—] is a cause, through the knowledge due to itself, of the knowledge of some other extant thing,—as a lamp [is, in relation to a jar or the like]. And if it be otherwise [—i. e., if you do not grant that Suggestion is the manifester of Flavour already *extant*] then what difference is there between this [manifesters of something *not* previously extant] and a *maker*? [which all deny, it to be—Flavour not being a *product*—see § 52]. According to this showing, [as opposed to your view of the identity of the manifestation and the thing manifested], there is really a *distinction* between the Suggested and the Suggester, as between a jar and a lamp,—and so how can *Flavour* [which you identify with the act of manifestation or Suggestion] be the thing *Suggested*?”—If, [O friendly objector, you say all this,] you say *rightly*. And therefore have they declared that this, the *making* [of Flavour] called Gustation, is a certain operation quite *peculiar* [and distinct] from the [ordinary] kinds of ‘making’ and ‘manifesting;’ and therefore [does the author of the *Vyaktiviveka* say] “Tasting, Relishing, and Wondering, are quite *peculiar* names.” And therefore, by myself and others who take it to be established as the only [explanation of the phenomena in question] that there is a function

\* Compare Berkeley’s expressions with respect to ideas—“the existence of an idea consists in its being perceived”—; and again with respect to things,—“their *esse* is *percipi*.” Principles of Human Knowledge, Chs. 2 and 3.