

Other similar definitions objected to. *q.* For the same reasons I reject such definitions as [that involved in the following verse of the Rájá Bhoja in his *Saraswatí Kanthábharaṇa*,—viz.,] “The poet, making Poetry—i. e., what is faultless and possesses Style, embellished with ornaments, and having Flavour—wins fame and favour.”

A definition admitted with a proviso. *r.* And as for what the author of the *Dhwani* says—that “the soul of Poetry is Suggestion”—what does he thereby mean? Is it Suggestion in its three-fold aspect—(1) as regards the action, (2) as regards embellishments, and (3) as regards the Flavour and the like,—that is the soul of Poetry? Or is it only that which takes the shape of Flavour? Not the first—for then it [—i. e., the definition of Poetry—] would improperly extend to such things as *enigmas* [—where more, no doubt, is suggested than is uttered]. But if the second [is what he means to assert—then] we say “Agreed.”

Objections to the proviso repelled. *s.* “But then [some one may object, to the definition with our proviso,]—if Suggestion be the soul of Poetry only when it is in the shape of Flavour and the like—then, in such cases as [the following—viz.,]

“ ‘My respected [mother-in-law] lies here ; and here I myself. While it is day, observe this ; and do not—O traveller, since you get blind at night [like other people afflicted with night-blindness]—lie down upon my couch [mistaking it for your own]’ ”—

[—in such cases as this—the objector may ask—] “as there is the suggestion of *actions* only [—the speaker here intending to suggest the traveller’s doing the reverse of what she says—] how [on such terms] can you apply the name of Poetry to *this* ?” If [any one asks this]—we say that here also [—whilst we admit that there *is* Poetry—we admit it] only because there is a *semblance* of Flavour [—and the semblances of Flavour, as we shall have occasion to declare further on—see § 3. *b.*—are admitted to constitute Poetry ;—and there is here the semblance of the Flavour of Love—a sentiment real only where legitimate—] for otherwise [—i. e., if we admitted the foregoing to be Poetry without shewing that it had any reference to Flavour] then there would [by parity of reasoning] be Poetry in the proposition “Devadatta goes to the village”—from its being understood that there is [here also] something *suggested*—in the shape, viz., of his being attended [as a gentle-