

This is not right—because the word “cow” cannot *denote* the thing [properly called] “man of the Panjáb,” in respect of which no convention was entered into [—it being only through *convention*—see § 11—that a word can primarily *denote* anything]; and because it [denotatively] makes one think only of the [dewlapped and long-tailed] thing meant by the word “cow,” since the power of denotation is exhausted therein, and there is no resuscitation of that power thus exhausted [—or *functus officio* in making one think of the genus “cow”—see § 12]. Others again, [partially correcting the statement above quoted, say,] “The *thing* [properly called] ‘man of the Panjáb’ is not *denoted* by the word ‘cow,’ but only the *qualities* belonging to the thing, the ‘man of the Panjáb,’ are *indicated* as being of the same kind as the qualities belonging to the thing which [the word ‘cow’] itself denotes.” This [second view] also others [and we ourselves] do not accept. To explain:—In this [expression under discussion], is the sense of “man of the Panjáb,” understood from the word “cow,” or is it not? On the former [of these alternatives—is this sense understood] *merely* from the word “cow” [employed denotatively], or, through the inseparableness [of qualities from that in which they inhere—is it, I ask, understood] from the qualities [of sluggishness, &c.] indicated [by the word “cow”]? Not the first, [of this subordinate pair of alternatives, can be accepted], because this word [“cow”] is not assigned by convention to the thing [properly called] “man of the Panjáb;” nor the second, because there is no room for a sense gathered from inseparableness [—such, e. g., as that of a quality in respect of that whereof it is inseparably the quality—] when there is a concordance between the *words* [—as we see there is in the example—the two words being in apposition—in the same case—as denoting the same thing], for a *word’s* expectancy [—when looking out for another to agree with it—see § 6. *b.*—] is fulfilled only by a *word* [—and not by a *sense* connoted in a word and such as, if expressly declared, would appear under the form of a word in a *different* case—e. g.—“a man of bovine stupidity”]. Nor is the second [alternative, of the *first* pair, admissible]—for, if the sense of “man of the Panjáb,” is *not* understood from the word “cow,” then the agreement in case, of this and of the word “man of the Panjáb,” [which the example exhibits], would be improper [—it being only words signifying the same