

[—viz., ‘Suggestion’—denied by the Grammarians and by the Naiyāyikas—] distinct from Denotation, &c., [therefore, I repeat, by myself and those who think with me] it is stated that the Flavours, &c. consist of [what we choose, for convenience, to regard sometimes as an object of knowledge, and which we then call] the [meaning] ‘Suggested’ (*vyangya*).

i. But again [—adverting to the assertion of the text that Flavour is made up of *joy*—some one may object—“Then, since the ‘Pathetic’ (§ 228) and such like Flavours are made up of *pain*, they cannot be Flavours at all.” To this it is replied [as follows].

TEXT.

Things painful in reality are in poetry sources of pleasure only.

34. Of the fact that, even in such a Flavour as the ‘Pathetic,’ &c. [in reality] *pleasure* only is produced—the consciousness of the intelligent is the only proof.

COMMENTARY.

a. By the “&c.” [he means such other Flavours as] the ‘Disgusting,’ the ‘Terrible,’ &c. [see § 234 and 233].

b. Still [—though the authority cited in the text ought to suffice—yet,] in order to close the mouths of the unintelligent, the opposite side of the argument [—see Aphorisms of the Nyāya, 39. a.—] is mentioned, [and disposed of, as follows].

TEXT.

35. Moreover, if in these (§ 34) there were *pain*, then no one would turn a look towards them [—which, however, people *do*—].

COMMENTARY.

a. For no one, possessed of understanding, engages [—knowingly, and without some ulterior view—] in paining himself; and [yet] we see that every one enters with engrossing interest into the ‘Pathetic,’ &c.

b. As another illustration of the unfitness [of the objection], he remarks [as follows].

TEXT.

36. [If it were] so [—see § 35—] then such [compositions] as the *Rāmāyaṇa* would be causes of pain [—instead of giving delight to every man of taste].

COMMENTARY.

a. For since [—according to the supposed objection—see § 33. i.] the ‘Pathetic’ is a cause of *pain*, we should find cause of pain even in