

b. Expectancy [—"the looking out for" some other word in construction—] means the absence of the completion of a sense; and this [absence of a complete sense] consists in the listener's desire [on hearing the word] to know [something which the other words in the collection will inform him of—if the collection of words *is* a sentence]. If the nature of a sentence belonged even to that [collection of non-inter-dependent words] where this expectancy is a wanting—then such [a collection of words] as "cow, horse, man, elephant" would be a sentence.

c. Proximity means the absence of an interruption in the apprehension [of what is said]. If there could be the case of a sentence even when there is an interruption in the apprehension, then there would be a coalescence [—into one sentence—] of the word "Devadatta," pronounced just now, with the word "goes" pronounced the day after.

d. Since expectancy [§ 6. *b.*] and compatibility [§ 6. *a.*] are properties, the one of the *soul*, and the other, of *things*;—it is by a figure of speech that they are here [—i. e., in the text § 6.] taken as properties of a collection of *words*.

TEXT.

7. A collection of Sentences is a Great Sentence.

COMMENTARY.

a. Only if this [Great Sentence too] possess [the requisites mentioned in § 6—of] compatibility, expectancy, and proximity.

TEXT.

8. Thus is a Sentence held to be of two kinds.

COMMENTARY.

a. "Thus"—that is to say, inasmuch as it may be a Sentence [see § 6] and inasmuch as it may be a Great Sentence [see § 7.]

b. And [if a justification of this employment of terms be required] it is said [by Bhartrihari in his *Vākya-padīya*] "Of Sentences, completed as regards the conveying of their own meaning, when put together, there becomes further, through their being viewed under the relation of parts and whole, the nature of a single Sentence."

c. [To give examples] of these [two kinds of Sentences], there is the Sentence simple—as [in the verses given at length under § 3. *b.*