

not absolutely, but] in the sense of ‘*a little.*’ ” If it were so, then, as [on this interpretation] the statement would be this—that “Poetry consists of words and meanings *a little* faulty,” [this absurdity would follow, that] the name of Poetry would not belong to what [words and meanings] are [absolutely] *faultless*.

Second objection—to a redundancy in the definition.

*j.* Granting the possibility [that Poetry may consist, as alleged in §. 2, *i.*, of words and meanings] when “*a little* faulty”—if, [I say, it be so,] still this is not to be mentioned in the *definition* of Poetry; just as, in the definition of such a thing as a jewel, one omits such a circumstance as its being perforated by insects—[that circumstance not tending to *constitute* anything a jewel, though it may not cause it to cease to be regarded as such,]:—for such circumstances as its perforation by insects are not able [I grant you] to *repel* a jewel’s claim to the name of jewel, but [the effect thereof is] only to render applicable to the case the *degrees of comparison*. In like manner, here, such faults as unmelodiousness [render applicable such terms as “superior” and “inferior”] in the case of Poetry: And it has been said [by the author of the *Dhwani*] “The nature of Poetry is held to reside even in faulty [compositions] where taste &c. are distinctly recognised, in like manner as [the character of a jewel, or the like, is held to belong to] such a thing as a jewel perforated by insects.”

A third objection.

*k.* Moreover [in the definition under § 2. *f.*] the application of the distinction [conveyed in the expression] “with Style” *to words and meanings* is inappropriate—[as is proved] by the fact of its having been declared by him [the author of the *Kāvya Prakāś’a*] himself, that the Styles are properties of the Flavour [or sentiment] alone [and hence not of words or their meanings], by means of such [unmistakable expressions employed by him] as this—viz., “which [Styles] are properties of the Flavour [or sentiment], just as heroism and the like are [properties] of the soul.”

A compromise in regard to the third objection rejected.

*l.* If [some one should yet argue, saying,] “This [employment of terms objected to in § 2. *k.*] is appropriate, because there is here a metaphor [the expression “words and meanings” standing for the Flavour], since these [viz., the words and meanings] are what *reveal* the Flavour [or sentiment];”—even that way it [the definition] would be unfitting. To explain:—in