15-213 Recitation 5Attack Lab and Stacks

Your TAs Monday, February 14th, 2022

OH Etiquette

- In Person vs Remote: Students must add the remote tag if you are joining OH over zoom. If you fail to, you may be frozen / kicked from the queue.
- In-person OH is strictly In-person. Remote OH is strictly remote.

Agenda

- Attack Lab Overview
- Stacks Review
- Activity 1
- Procedure Calling Review
- Activity 2

Learning objectives

By the end of this recitation, we want you to know:

- Stack discipline and calling conventions
- How to perform a simple buffer overflow attack

Refer to Lecture from Thursday:

Machine-Level Programming V: Advanced Topics

Reminders and Lab Overview

Reminders

- Attack Lab is due this Thursday, Feb. 17
- C Review Bootcamp this Sunday, Feb. 20 from 7-9pm in Rashid
 - Will be very useful for cachelab coming up!
 - Details will be on piazza

Attack Lab overview

- Attack programs by crafting buffer overflow attacks that hijack the control flow
- Provide inputs to the rtarget and ctarget programs that cause them to call certain functions
- Unlike in bomblab, the targets don't explode!

Stacks Review

Manipulating the stack

What instructions do we typically use to change the stack pointer, %rsp?

Growing the stack: Shrinking the stack:

Manipulating the stack

What instructions do we typically use to change the stack pointer, %rsp?

Growing the stack:

Shrinking the stack:

- sub \$0x28, %rsp
- push %rbx
- callq my function

Manipulating the stack

What instructions do we typically use to change the stack pointer, %rsp?

Growing the stack:

- sub \$0x28, %rsp
- push %rbx
- callq my function

Shrinking the stack:

- add \$0x28, %rsp
- pop %rbx
- retq


x86-64 Stack Frames

What kinds of data are stored on the stack?

x86-64 Stack Frames

What kinds of data are stored on the stack?

- Saved registers
- Local variables
- Arguments (7+)
- Saved return address



Which way does the stack grow?

- <u>Up?</u>
- Down?
- Left?
- Right?

Which way does the stack grow?



It depends on how you draw it!


The stack always grows towards **lower addresses** in x86-64.

(Informally, this usually means "down".)


Be aware of this possible ambiguity when reading diagrams.

Drawing memory

Stack diagrams




Everything else




Endianness

- Describes how integers are represented as bytes.
- Little-endian means that the least-significant 8 bits of an integer are stored at the lowest address.



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Activity 1

Part 1: Introduction to solve()

Let's look at solve() in the src/activity.c file.

What is it doing?

Is it possible for the program to call win()?

```
void solve(void) {
    long before = 0xb4;
    char buf[16];
    long after = 0xaf;
    Gets(buf);
    if (before == 0x3331323531)
        win(0x15213);
    if (after == 0x3331323831)
        win(0x18213);
```

Part 1: The gets() function

```
char *gets(char *s);
```

- gets() reads from standard input and writes characters into s until it reaches a newline.
- Since it has no information about the size of the buffer s, its design is fundamentally flawed. Never use gets() yourself!
- Gets() is a CS:APP wrapper function that checks for errors, and exits if it encounters any.

Part 1: Activity setup

- Split up into groups of 2-3 people
- One person needs a laptop
- Log in to a Shark machine, and type:

```
$ wget https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~213/activities/rec5.tar
$ tar xvf rec5.tar
$ cd rec5
```

Take a look at the code in src/activity.c.

Part 1: Diving into assembly

- Look at the disassembly of solve().
- Try drawing a stack diagram.
 - How large is the stack frame?
 - Where is the saved return address?
 - Where are before, buf, and after?
- Which variable will be overwritten if we perform a buffer overflow, before or after?

=> 0x4006b5 <+0>: sub \$0x38,%rsp return address rsp+0x38


Addresses increase towards the top of the slide

0x4006b5 <+0>: sub \$0x38,%rsp return address rsp+0x38 \$0xb4,0x28(%rsp) => 0x4006b9 <+4>: movq Addresses increase towards the top of the slide rsp

0x4006b5 <+0>: sub \$0x38,%rsp return address rsp+0x38 \$0xb4,0x28(%rsp) 0x4006b9 <+4>: movq \$0xaf,0x8(%rsp) => 0x4006c2 <+13>:movq before rsp+0x28 Addresses increase towards the top of the slide rsp


```
0x4006b5 <+0>: sub $0x38,%rsp
0x4006b9 <+4>: movq $0xb4,0x28(%rsp)
0x4006c2 <+13>: movq $0xaf,0x8(%rsp)
0x4006cb <+22>: lea 0x10(%rsp),%rdi
=> 0x4006d0 <+27>: callq 0x40073f <Gets>
```

Addresses increase towards the top of the slide



```
0x4006b5 <+0>:
                      sub
                              $0x38,%rsp
   0x4006b9 <+4>:
                              $0xb4,0x28(%rsp)
                      movq
                              $0xaf,0x8(%rsp)
   0x4006c2 <+13>:
                      movq
   0x4006cb <+22>:
                      lea
                             0x10(%rsp),%rdi
                             0x40073f <Gets>
   0x4006d0 <+27>:
                      callq
=> 0x4006d5 <+32>:
                              0x28(%rsp),%rdx
                      mov
```

Addresses increase towards the top of the slide




Part 1: Comparing with GDB output

Let's compare the stack diagram we drew with the actual values on the stack after Gets() returns.

```
0x4006d0 <+27>: callq 0x40073f <Gets>
=> 0x4006d5 <+32>: mov 0x28(%rsp),%rdx

(gdb) break *0x4006d5
(gdb) run

Starting program: act1
abcdefgh12345678
(gdb) x/8gx $rsp
(gdb) x/64bx $rsp
```



Part 1: Comparing with GDB output

```
(gdb) x/8gx $rsp
0x602020:
            0x00000000000000000
                                   0x0000000000000000af
0x602030:
            0x6867666564636261
                                   0x3837363534333231
                                                                          return address
                                                                                                  rsp+0x38
0x602040:
            0x00000000000000000
                                   0x000000000000000b4
0x602050:
            0x00000000000000000
                                   0x00000000000400783
(gdb) x/64bx $rsp
                                                                             before
                                                                                                  rsp+0x28
0x602020:
           0x00
                 0x00
                        0x00
                              0x00
                                    0x00
                                          0x00
                                                 0x00
                                                       0x00
0x602028:
           0xaf
                 0x00
                        0x00
                              0x00
                                    0x00
                                          0x00
                                                 0x00
                                                       0x00
0x602030:
           0x61
                 0x62
                        0x63
                              0x64
                                    0x65
                                          0x66
                                                 0x67
                                                       0x68
0x602038:
           0x31
                 0x32
                        0x33
                              0x34
                                    0x35
                                          0x36
                                                 0x37
                                                       0x38
0x602040:
           0x00
                 0x00
                        0x00
                              0x00
                                    0x00
                                          0x00
                                                 0x00
                                                       0x00
                                                                               buf
0x602048:
           0xb4
                 0x00
                        0x00
                              0x00
                                                       0x00
                                    0x00
                                          0x00
                                                 0x00
0x602050:
           0x00
                 0x00
                        0x00
                              0x00
                                    0x00
                                          0x00
                                                 0x00
                                                       0x00
                                                                                                  rsp+0x10
                                                                               buf
0x602058:
           0x83
                 0x07
                        0x40
                              0x00
                                    0x00
                                          0x00
                                                 0x00
                                                       0x00
                                                                                                  rsp+0x8
                                                                              after
Addresses
                                                         rsp
                                                                                                   Addresses
increase towards
                                                                                            increase towards
bottom of the slide
                                                                                             top of the slide
```

Part 1: Exploitation

- Try to find an input string that wins 1 cookie!
 - What do we need to overwrite before with if we want to have before == 0x3331323531?
- Constructing an exploit
 - gets() stops reading once it sees a newline. In the buffer, it replaces the newline with a null terminator.
 - gets() does not stop reading at a null terminator.

Part 1: Recap

- Buffer overflows can overwrite parts of the stack frame, including other local variables
- Stack frames may include padding, so looking at the assembly is crucial to drawing a correct diagram
- GDB prints output starting at the lowest address, whereas our stack diagrams start at the highest

Procedure Calling Review

Call and return instructions

Which registers do callq and retq change?

| %rax |
|------|
| %rdi |
| %rsi |
| %rdx |
| %rcx |
| %r8 |
| %r9 |
| %r10 |
| %r11 |

| %rbx |
|------|
| %r12 |
| %r13 |
| %r14 |
| %rbp |
| %rsp |
| %rip |

Call and return instructions

Which registers do callq and retq change?

| %rax |
|------|
| %rdi |
| %rsi |
| %rdx |
| %rcx |
| %r8 |
| %r9 |
| %r10 |
| %r11 |

| %rbx | |
|------|--|
| %r12 | |
| %r13 | |
| %r14 | |
| %rbp | |
| %rsp | |
| %rip | |

```
000000000400550 <mult2>:
   400550: mov %rdi,%rax
   •
   400557: retq
```

```
0x130

0x128

0x120

%rsp 0x120

%rip 0x400544
```

```
00000000000400540 <multstore>:
    .
    .
=>400544: callq 400550 <mult2>
    400549: mov %rax,(%rbx)
    .
    .
```

```
000000000400550 <mult2>:
   400550: mov %rdi,%rax
   •
   400557: retq
```

```
0x130
0x128
0x120
      0x120
%rsp
%rip
      0x400544
```


What happens next?

```
0000000000400550 <mult2>:

=>400550: mov %rdi,%rax

•

400557: retq
```



```
0000000000400550 <mult2>:
    400550: mov %rdi,%rax
    •
    -
    -
    400557: retq
```

```
0x130

0x128

0x120


0x118

0x400549

%rsp 0x118

%rip 0x400557
```

```
0000000000400550 <mult2>:
   400550: mov %rdi,%rax
   •
   400557: retq
```



Let's Rewind...

```
000000000400550 <mult2>:
   400550: mov %rdi,%rax
   • ?????
   • ?????
=>400557: retq
```

```
0x130
0x128
0x120
0x118
      0xbadbad
      0x118
%rsp
%rip
      0x400557
```

What if we mess up the return address?


Activity 2

Part 2: Exploitation

- Hijacking control flow
 - Is it possible to overwrite after? If not, what parts of the stack frame can we overwrite?
 - Is there anywhere we could jump to call win(0x18213)?
- Constructing an exploit

```
inputs/input2.txt

48 65 6c 6c 6f 20 31 35
32 31 33 21 # comment
```



inputs/input2.bin

Hello 15213!

Part 2: Recap

- retq always jumps to the saved return address, which it pops off the stack (at rsp).
- Overwriting the saved return address on the stack allows us to "fool" retq, and transfer control to an arbitrary instruction.

Attack Lab Tools

- \$ gcc -c test.s
 \$ objdump -d test.o
 Compiles the assembly code in test.s, then shows the disassembled instructions along with the actual bytes.
- \$./hex2raw < exploit.txt > exploit.bin
 Convert hex codes into raw binary strings to pass to targets.
- (gdb) display /12gx \$rsp
 (gdb) display /2i \$rip
 Displays 12 elements on the stack and the next 2 instructions to run GDB is also useful to for tracing to see if an exploit is working.

If you get stuck

- Please read the writeup carefully. Not everything will make sense on the first read-through.
- Other resources you can make use of:
 - CS:APP Chapter 3
 - Lecture slides and videos
 - x86-64 and GDB cheat sheets under <u>Resources</u>