

Risk analysis of botnet evolution

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I. INTRODUCTION

Botnet infection and evolution is a security issue that affects many parties in cyberspace, i.e. ISP, LAE, Cloud providers, botnet victims and zombie machine owners. Each party receive a different kind of harm because of this security problem. However, not every party can visualize the real dimension or even be able to fight against the problem, since they may have a limited scope. We name the ISPs as the problem owner because they have a better scope of the problem and they get direct consequences when a botnet evolves within their network.

II. WHO IS THE PROBLEM OWNER OF THE SECURITY ISSUE AS MEASURED IN YOUR FIRST ASSIGNMENT?

In this section we analyze the output of the metrics proposed in [?]. Based on this output we compare the performance of the distinct network owners. We detail how the security performance can be compared using applying the metrics to a subset of the the problem owners i.e. ISPs in China.

A. BN propagation

This metric can be used to measure the evolution of the botnet in side a network. Since each ISP know the number of clients this metric can be normalized using this value. If an external party would like to compute and compare its performance using this metric, the normalization can be performed using the number of IP available addresses.

B. Network infection radio


C. BN geographical and digital location

III. WHAT RISK STRATEGIES CAN THE PROBLEM OWNER FOLLOW TO REDUCE THE SECURITY ISSUE AS MEASURED IN YOUR FIRST ASSIGNMENT?

In this section we describe possible risk strategies that the ISP can follow in order to reduce the security impact of botnet evolution.

a) To work with Industry and other stakeholders on developing a policy to implement:

b) Defense against attack by Bot: Security must be built-in during each phase of the system development and this can be done by using Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), Transport Layer Security (TLS)/Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol and Correct coding of Web service/applications (without security flaws which makes it resistant to threats) [1].




c) Monitoring, detection and studying of Bot: All users of computers and the system administrators should detect presence and/or activities of Botnet and prevent it from influencing upon the computers by constant following of the activities on the computers such as monitoring log files, detecting threats and finding counter measures [1].

- a registration component
- an awareness-raising component
- guidance on network management
- high-level advice on how to respond to threats
- a reporting component

Attempting to instruct users about how to shield themselves from installing malware and inadvertently transforming their PCs into bots is a key component to raise the level of security awareness [1].

d) To develop legislative punishment policy: ISPs are in a better position to understand the issues associated with botnets and can act on the botnet threat. They stand a better chance at formulating the solution (legislative measures) along with legislative-punishment body to prevent the attackers from trying to carry the attacks [1].



Policy makers and ISPs must consider how best to implement authentication mechanisms that encourage reliable communications between ISPs, consumers and other actors.

e) The Addressing Layer: This involves strategies targeting the routing and the addressing layer of a botnet infrastructure. Bots in the local network cannot contact the original C&C server when intervened in addressing which usually take place in two steps.

In the first step, a site administrator can control the local DNS resolver(which handles the DNS requests forwards the request to an authoritative DNS server) and instruct to return a specially crafted response to specific queries. In the next step, local routers can be equipped with routing table entries to sinkhole certain addresses or redirect them to different hosts [?].

f) The Command Layer: This involves attacking the command layer of a botnet with the knowledge of the protocol used. An easy example would be an IRC-based network where a command like remove can instruct bots to uninstall themselves from infected systems [?].

g) Exploitation: Exploit based strategies make use of presence of bugs and programming flaws in bots that result in vulnerabilities which can be exploited to gain control either over a central component or over infected machines. An examples of such vulnerabilities would be security holes in software or remotely-exploitable buffer overflows [?].

IV. WHAT OTHER ACTORS CAN INFLUENCE THE SECURITY ISSUE AS MEASURED IN YOUR FIRST ASSIGNMENT?

Cloud Providers Cloud providers enable sharing of computing resources like storage, services, servers, networks, and application. They are provided with minimum management efforts and very quickly. With this background, attackers can use their cloud bots for distributed password-cracking, click fraud, or denial of service attacks that flood target websites with junk traffic. Because the cloud services offer far more networking bandwidth than the average home computer possesses, their botnet can funnel huge attack traffic at any given target which is undesirable for cloud providers.

LAE

Affected parties (DOS spam victims)

Public Sector / Governemnt / Public Private Partnerships
Vendors of Operating Systems / Softwares Information Security Agencies Telecom Providers - offering mobile web services like WAP, Edge, 3G and 4G National / International Cyber Security Alliances High Level Domain owners / Registrar e-Commerce, Online Banking, Auction and Payment Sites

V. IDENTIFY THE RISK STRATEGIES THAT THE ACTORS CAN ADOPT TO TACKLE THE PROBLEM

Government / Intelligence Agencies Ban Badware websites Effective Antispam and Cybercrime Laws and Regulation Dedicated laws on cybercrime Adapted to the paperless and cross-border nature of Internet crime Cross border jurisdiction established using a "country link" concept Capacity Building among relevant policy stakeholders Framework for local enforcement of Cybercrime and Botnet Mitigation Development of watch, warning and incident response centres Broad based education initiatives on Internet safety and security Facilitation of secure ICT access for users Capacity Building for Policy Stakeholders Framework for Efficient Cross Border Enforcement in Cybercrime Prosecutions Automated Detection and Reporting of Botnet Hosts Network Telescopes - Darknets and Flow Based Analysis Collection and Analysis of Anonymized Server Log Files from Participating ISPs

High Level Domain owners Registrar Detection and take-down of malware or botnet domains Phish tracking and repository sites such as Netcraft and Phishtank Trusted block lists such as Spamhaus and CBL Identification of IP Space Controlled by an ISP: Whois and Rwhois Records Real Time Feeds of DNS Block Lists that Target Malware Activity Fast Flux Hosting and Rock Phishing Whois Privacy and Domain Takedowns

Others Capacity building for e-commerce and online transaction providers Network Telescopes - Darknets and Flow Based Analysis

VI. PICK ONE OF THE RISK STRATEGIES IDENTIFIED PREVIOUSLY AND CALCULATE THE RETURN ON SECURITY INVESTMENT (ROSI) FOR THAT PARTICULAR STRATEGY

REFERENCES

- [1] S. Stankovic and D. Simic, "Defense strategies against modern botnets," *arXiv preprint arXiv:0906.3768*, 2009.