

Pre-Registration Reporting Table

URL to public anonymized registration: <https://aspredicted.org/25j6-s9t3.pdf>.

Location of URL in manuscript: Footnote 4.

	Specified in pre-registration? (Yes, no)	Reported in manuscript ? (Yes, page(s) in main text; Yes, page(s) in appendix; No)	Deviations (provide justification and location of discussion in the manuscript)
Sampling	Yes	p. 4	N/A
Sample Exclusions	Yes	No	N/A
Experimental Conditions	Yes	p. 4-5	N/A
Observed Measure 1 [<i>Immigration Preference</i>]	Yes	p. 5	N/A
Observed Measure 2 [<i>Trump Treatment Group</i>]	Yes	p. 8	N/A
Observed Measure 3 [<i>Democratic Respondent</i>]	Yes	p. 6	N/A
Hypothesis 1	Yes	p. 5	N/A
Hypothesis 2	Yes	p. 5	N/A
Empirical test of H1	Yes	p. 8	The empirical test presented in the paper includes separate indicators for Democratic respondents and Republican respondents, treating Independents as baseline category, whereas the PAP proposed comparing Democratic respondents with all others. We believe the specification reported in the paper is more theoretically appropriate. In Table C1 (cols. 3-4), we show that the specification proposed in the PAP produces substantively similar results, which remain consistent with H1.

Empirical test of H2	Yes	p. 8	The empirical test presented in the paper includes separate indicators for Democratic respondents and Republican respondents, treating Independents as baseline category, whereas the PAP proposed comparing Democratic respondents with all others. We believe the specification reported in the paper is more theoretically appropriate. In Table C1 (cols. 3-4), we show that the specification proposed in the PAP produces substantively similar results, which remain consistent with H2.
Were there studies included in pre-registration that are not reported in the manuscript? (If yes, explain)	No		
Additional comments	None		

Appendix A: Description of Survey

Table A1 compares the percent of the sample in various demographic groups with US Census-based estimates of the population shares of those groups. Our sample is broadly representative of the educational, age, gender and regional composition of the United States. However, it is not a perfect approximation. The sample has a larger share of highly educated, older, female, and Northeastern respondents compared to the population.

Table A1: Demographic Characteristics of Sample

<u>Education</u>	Population	Sample
HS or Below	37	29
Some College or Associate's Degree	25	28
Bachelor Degree or Above	37	43
 <u>Age</u>		
18-24 Years	13	8
25-44 Years	36	36
45-64 Years	34	37
65+ Years	17	19
 <u>Gender</u>		
Female	51	53
Male	49	47
 <u>Region</u>		
Northeast	17	20
Midwest	21	21
South	39	36
West	24	23

The variables included in the regression model are operationalized as follows.

- *Party Identification:* To measure party identification, we first asked the following: “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a (1) Republican; (2) Democrat; (3) Independent; (4) Another Party; (5) Do not think in these terms.” Those that responded to that question with categories 3, 4, or 5 were then asked “Do you think of yourself as closer to the (1) Republican Party; (2) Democratic Party; (3) Neither party”. Individuals that respond with (1) to either question are coded as Republicans; those that respond with (2) to either question are coded as Democrats; respondents are coded as Independents if


they do not initially identify with either party (categories 3-5) and subsequently think of themselves as closer to neither party (category 3).

- *Education* is measured as an ordinal scale with the following categories: (1) Did not graduate from high school; (2) High school graduate; (3) Some college or technical school, but no degree (yet); (4) Vocational degree, technical degree, or associate's degree; (5) Bachelor's degree; (6) Postgraduate degree.
- *Age* is measured as an ordinal scale with the following categories: (1) 18-24 years old; (2) 25-44 years old; (3) 45-54 years old; (4) 65+ years old.
- *Female*: The survey asked whether respondents identify as male, female, or other. We constructed a binary variable from this, where those that identified as female were coded as 1, and those that identified as male or other were coded as zero. Less than 0.2% of our sample selected the "Other" category.
- *White*: Binary variable coded as 1 if respondent identifies as non-Hispanic White, and 0 if respondent identifies with a different racial-ethnic category (Black or African American, Hispanic or Latino, Asian or Asian American, Native American, Middle Eastern, Two or more races, Other).
- *Ethnocentrism*: Five-point ordinal scale indicating extent of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: "It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions." Higher values on this scale indicate stronger agreement with this statement.
- *Nationalism*: Five-point ordinal scale indicating extent of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: "I would rather be a citizen of the United States than any other country in the world." Higher values on this scale indicate stronger agreement with this statement.
- *Internationalism*: Five-point ordinal scale indicating extent of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: "It is essential for the United States to work with other nations to solve problems, such as overpopulation, hunger, and pollution." Higher values on this scale indicate stronger agreement with this statement.
- *Trust*: Five-point ordinal scale indicating extent of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: "Generally speaking, most people can be trusted." Higher values on this scale indicate stronger agreement with this statement.

Appendix B: Manipulation Check

Figure B1 shows that our treatment successfully altered respondents' perceptions of immigrants' political preferences. Our manipulation check question was included on a separate survey page following the main experiment. The question asked: "From what you understand, which of the following Presidential candidates do you think [Venezuelan/Vietnamese] immigrants are most likely to vote for? (1) Kamala Harris; (2) Donald Trump." Figure B1 displays the proportion of respondents in the treatment and control conditions that reported that immigrants are most likely to vote for Donald Trump, along with 95% confidence intervals. The figure shows that the treatment substantially increased the perception that these immigrant groups support Trump.


Figure B1: Perceptions of Immigrant as Trump Supporters



Note: Main bars and error bars report sample means and 95% confidence intervals, respectively, by treatment condition.

Figure B2 plots the proportion of respondents in the control and treatment groups that believe that immigrants are likely to vote for Trump separately for the two countries of origin in the experiment. For both the Venezuelan and Vietnamese subgroups, the treatment has a large positive effect on this quantity. At the same time, there are some subtle differences across the groups. In the control condition, the proportion of respondents that believe that Vietnamese immigrants vote Republican is higher than the proportion that believe that Venezuelan immigrants are Republicans (.25 vs. 0.16). Additionally, the Trump treatment has a slightly larger effect on perceptions of immigrant partisanship for Vietnamese immigrants—a 45 percentage-point increase—than it does for Venezuelan immigrants, where the difference is 37 percentage points.

Figure B2: Perceptions of Immigrants as Trump Supporters by Country Treatment



Note: Main bars and error bars report sample means and 95% confidence intervals, respectively, by treatment condition.

Appendix C: Regression Results

Figure C1 presents the distribution of responses to our outcome question across experimental conditions and partisan groupings. The figure illustrates that, for Democrats, the share of respondents that support higher immigration (categories 6-10) decrease, and there is a clear increase in the share of Democrats that are both indifferent to higher immigration (category 5) and the share that strongly oppose this (category 0). While there is no statistically significant effect among Independents, the treatment condition shifts individuals in this group away from the extremes (0, 10) and toward indifference (5). Finally, among treated Republicans there is a clear move toward support for more immigration (6-10), with the largest share shifting away from strong opposition (0) and toward indifference (5).

Figure C1: Distribution of Responses Across Partisanship and Experimental Conditions




Table C1 presents the main regression results. The results in column 1 are the baseline specification, that includes no control variables. The second column presents results with demographic controls. The output from this model was used to generate Figure 2. The third column presents results from a model that controls for several additional attitudinal variables.

Columns 4-6 present results where we include a measure for Democratic Party identification and interact it with the treatment, but the baseline group includes both Independents and Republicans together. We report this specification because it is the one proposed in our pre-analysis plan. As can be seen, this specification produces substantively similar results to those in columns 1-3. However, we focus our analysis on the specification that distinguishes between Republicans and Independents, which we think is more theoretically appropriate. The statistically significant effects of Republican identification and its interaction with the treatment further suggest the relevance of these variables.

The results in Figure C2 are based on a model that adds interaction terms between the Trump treatment and each demographic variable (age, education, gender, income, and ethnicity) to the specification in column 1 of Table C1. The results in Figure C3 also include controls for the interaction between the treatment and the attitudinal variables (ethnocentrism, nationalism, internationalism, trust). Adding these controls helps account for the possibility that these demographic attributes that are correlated with partisanship are moderating the effect of our treatment (Kam and Trussler 2017). The results from these specifications are very similar to our main model, reinforcing our hypothesis that it is partisanship and not some other factor that shapes how people respond to the treatment.


Table C1: Regression Output

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.192 [0.228]	0.168 [0.224]	0.155 [0.219]	0.973*** [0.128]	0.940*** [0.126]	0.902*** [0.123]
Democrat	1.116*** [0.190]	1.102*** [0.187]	0.849*** [0.184]	1.919*** [0.138]	1.829*** [0.137]	1.474*** [0.137]
Republican	-1.189*** [0.194]	-1.089*** [0.192]	-0.957*** [0.189]			
Treatment×Democrat	-1.135*** [0.270]	-1.079*** [0.266]	-1.042*** [0.260]	-1.916*** [0.195]	-1.850*** [0.192]	-1.788*** [0.187]
Treatment×Republican	1.156*** [0.275]	1.139*** [0.270]	1.099*** [0.264]			
Income		-0.001 [0.031]	-0.008 [0.031]		-0.005 [0.031]	-0.011 [0.031]
Education		0.112*** [0.037]	0.060 [0.037]		0.116*** [0.037]	0.060 [0.037]
Female		-0.238** [0.095]	-0.196** [0.094]		-0.219** [0.096]	-0.184* [0.095]
Age		-0.571*** [0.061]	-0.581*** [0.062]		-0.582*** [0.061]	-0.583*** [0.062]
White		0.037 [0.114]	-0.054 [0.112]		-0.014 [0.114]	-0.097 [0.111]
Ethnocentrism			0.003 [0.039]			-0.003 [0.039]
Nationalism			-0.179*** [0.047]			-0.200*** [0.046]
Internationalism			0.306*** [0.048]			0.319*** [0.048]
Trust			0.411*** [0.043]			0.410*** [0.043]
Constant	4.169*** [0.160]	5.348*** [0.231]	3.936*** [0.351]	3.366*** [0.091]	4.674*** [0.200]	3.390*** [0.335]
Observations	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002
R-squared	0.073	0.104	0.149	0.061	0.095	0.141

Standard errors in brackets


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure C2: Model with Interactions Between Treatment Status and Demographic Controls



Note: Circles and lines display average treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals, respectively, of the Trump treatment.

Figure C3: Model with Interactions Between Treatment Status and Demographic and Attitudinal Controls



Note: Circles and lines display average treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals, respectively, of the Trump treatment.

Table C2 presents results using post-stratification weights. In order to address concerns about the generalizability of our experimental results to the broader US population, we applied post-stratification weights to our sample and reanalyzed our experiments with weighted data. We have drawn on the 2023 Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey of the US Census Bureau to calculate weights with respect to respondents' gender, age, and education levels. We considered four age groups (between 18 and 24 years old, between 25 and 44 years old, between 45 and 64 years old, and 65 years and above), three education categories (high school or below, some college, and bachelor's degree and above), and the gender (female and male) of respondents, resulting in 24 ($4 \times 3 \times 2$) exclusive groups of individuals. We calculated weights for each of these 24 groups based on a comparison of their distribution in the US population and in our sample. The coefficient estimates and standard errors in the weighted model are similar to those from the model without weights.

Table C3 presents results using different measures of partisanship. Column 1 uses a linear scale for the party identification variable where Strong Democrat = 1, Weak Democrat = 2, Independent = 3, Weak Republican = 4, and Strong Republican = 5. We measure this variable using a follow-up question in which respondents that initially identified as Democrats or Republicans were subsequently asked whether they would call themselves a “Strong Democrat/Republican” or “Not very strong Democrat/Republican.” Thus, we code “Strong Democrats” and “Strong Republicans” as those that initially identify with their party and then subsequently identify as strong partisans. “Weak” Democrats or Republicans are those that either initially identify with this party and subsequently identify as “not very strong” partisans or those that did not identify as partisans in the first question but subsequently reported as being closer to that party. Figure C4 presents the treatment effects for each group, based on this model. The results indicate that the treatment has larger effects among strong partisans than weak partisans.

In column 2 of Table C3, we use respondents’ Presidential vote intentions as an alternative way to capture partisan preferences, comparing three groups of voters: (1) those that intend to vote for Harris; (2) those that intend to vote for Trump; and (3) others, which include those that report an intention to vote for a third party or those that do not intend to vote in this election. The general pattern is similar: the treatment once again reduces support for immigration among Democrats and increases support for immigration among Republicans.

Table C2: Post-Stratification Weights

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	0.147 [0.250]	0.114 [0.251]	0.130 [0.235]
Democrat	1.070*** [0.211]	1.029*** [0.216]	0.793*** [0.203]
Republican	-1.316*** [0.226]	-1.177*** [0.228]	-1.068*** [0.216]
Treatment×Democrat	-1.154*** [0.293]	-1.072*** [0.291]	-1.069*** [0.275]
Treatment×Republican	1.245*** [0.315]	1.229*** [0.313]	1.172*** [0.297]
Income		0.018 [0.035]	0.017 [0.033]
Education		0.122*** [0.040]	0.062 [0.039]
Female		-0.251** [0.108]	-0.212** [0.104]
Age		-0.506*** [0.067]	-0.530*** [0.066]
White		-0.078 [0.132]	-0.160 [0.127]
Ethnocentrism			0.013 [0.046]
Nationalism			-0.132** [0.056]
Internationalism			0.330*** [0.059]
Trust			0.430*** [0.052]
Constant	4.239*** [0.184]	5.231*** [0.257]	3.475*** [0.412]
Observations	2,997	2,997	2,997
R-squared	0.078	0.117	0.166

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C3: Alternative Measures of Partisanship

	(1)	(2)
Treatment	-1.130*** [0.198]	-.145 [0.256]
Weak Democrat	-0.989*** [0.201]	
Independent	-1.571*** [0.209]	
Weak Republican	-2.514*** [0.204]	
Strong Republican	-2.822*** [0.212]	
Treatment×Weak Democrat	0.484* [0.286]	
Treatment×Independent	1.298*** [0.298]	
Treatment×Weak Republican	2.090*** [0.288]	
Treatment×Strong Republican	2.812*** [0.295]	
Harris Voter		0.920*** [0.210]
Trump Voter		-1.150*** [0.216]
Treatment×Harris Voter		-0.549* [0.291]
Treatment×Trump Voter		1.405*** [0.298]
Income	0.000 [0.031]	-0.015 [0.031]
Education	0.109*** [0.037]	0.112*** [0.037]
Female	-0.252*** [0.095]	-0.224** [0.095]
Age	-0.586*** [0.061]	-0.614*** [0.062]
White	0.055 [0.114]	0.041 [0.114]
Constant	6.963*** [0.228]	6.499*** [0.208]
Observations	3,002	3,002
R-squared	0.115	0.101

Standard errors in brackets


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix D: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Figure D1 shows the results of split-sample regressions, which test whether the main pattern in results is consistent across different attributes of the immigrants and respondents. The upper-left panel shows results split by immigrants' country of origin, which are based on separate regression models for two subsamples, those where respondents were asked about immigration from Venezuela and those when the respondents were asked about immigration from Venezuela. The pattern is similar for both Vietnamese and Venezuelan immigrants: in both cases, the Trump treatment reduces support for immigration among Democrats, increases support for immigration among Republicans, and the effect is close to zero and is statistically insignificant for Independents.

The remaining panels in Figure D1 perform the same exercise using the demographic covariates to see whether the basic pattern holds for respondents that are young and old (using a cutoff of 45 years old); high income and low income (using a 75,000 income threshold); those that have and have not completed a Bachelor degree; men and women; and White and non-White respondents. The basic pattern is consistent across all demographic groups. In all cases, the treatment reduces support for immigration among Democrats, increases Republicans' support for immigration, and has a statistically insignificant effect among Independent voters.

Figure D1: Testing for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects



Note: Circles/squares and lines display average treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals, respectively, of the Trump treatment.

The first three columns of Table D2 present the results of split-sample regressions, with separate models for each partisan group, from models that include a variable indicating the immigrant's country of origin. The first row shows once again that the Trump treatment has opposite effects among Democrats and Republicans. However, as we see in the second row, Democrats, Independents, and Republicans all report stronger support for immigration from Vietnam than from Venezuela.

Columns 4-6 in Table D2 examines whether the effect of the Trump treatment varies based on the country of origin. The interaction between the Trump treatment and Vietnam condition is not statistically significant for either Democrats or Independents. For Republicans, this interaction is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the Trump treatment has a stronger positive effect on Republicans' support for immigration when immigrants are from Vietnam than from Venezuela. The results indicates that the Trump treatment has a strong effect on Republicans' support for immigration across both immigrant populations, with point estimates of 0.9 and 1.6 for immigrants from Venezuela and Vietnam, respectively.

Table D1: Country of Origin Effects

	(1) Democrats	(2) Independents	(3) Republicans	(4) Democrats	(5) Independents	(6) Republicans
Trump Treatment	-0.899*** [0.130]	0.215 [0.219]	1.248*** [0.161]	-1.018*** [0.182]	0.060 [0.305]	0.896*** [0.233]
Vietnam Treatment	0.790*** [0.131]	0.514** [0.220]	1.398*** [0.162]	0.670*** [0.183]	0.359 [0.306]	1.056*** [0.230]
Trump×Vietnam				0.244 [0.261]	0.319 [0.438]	0.671** [0.322]
Income	-0.013 [0.043]	0.061 [0.073]	-0.005 [0.053]	-0.014 [0.043]	0.063 [0.073]	-0.003 [0.053]
Education	0.206*** [0.051]	-0.027 [0.087]	0.012 [0.063]	0.205*** [0.051]	-0.031 [0.087]	0.009 [0.063]
Female	-0.256* [0.132]	-0.276 [0.223]	-0.050 [0.163]	-0.260** [0.132]	-0.271 [0.223]	-0.051 [0.163]
Age	-0.638*** [0.082]	-0.378** [0.155]	-0.651*** [0.104]	-0.639*** [0.082]	-0.379** [0.155]	-0.656*** [0.104]
White	0.230 [0.148]	-0.181 [0.254]	-0.159 [0.218]	0.228 [0.148]	-0.178 [0.255]	-0.172 [0.218]
Constant	5.800*** [0.261]	5.037*** [0.442]	4.228*** [0.344]	5.872*** [0.272]	5.125*** [0.458]	4.434*** [0.357]
Observations	1301	535	1166	1301	535	1166
R-squared	0.109	0.035	0.141	0.109	0.036	0.144

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,

* p<0.1

Appendix E: Distinguishing the Effect of Partisanship from Ideology

Table E1 compares the explanatory of two different moderator variables: partisanship and ideology. Column 1 reproduces our main specification (without control variables). The second column shows results from a linear interaction model that uses a five-point party ID scale as a moderator, where 1 = Strong Democrat, 2 = Weak Democrat, 3 = Independent, 4 = Weak Republican, and 5 = Strong Republican. For more details on the construction of this variable, see Appendix C. The final two columns use ideology as a moderator. Column 4 uses an 11-point ideology scale, in which respondents were asked to place themselves on a scale from left to right using a slider bar. In column 3, we use a simplified version of this measure, which is more comparable to our main measure of partisanship, in which we code respondents based on whether they self-identify as being on the left of the political spectrum (0-4), center (5), or right (6-10).

The basic pattern we observe previously is similar using these measures of ideology: the treatment has negative effects among left-leaning individuals, and positive effects among right-leaning individuals. However, the models that use the ideology variables provide a poorer fit to the data. The R-squared and adjusted R-squared statistics are about twice as large in the models that focus on partisanship than those that examine ideology.

Table E2 further tests whether partisanship matters above and beyond the effects of ideology. We split the sample into three ideological groups (left, right, and center). The results reveal that partisanship is a strong and statistically significant moderator of the treatment effect for all three ideological subgroups. This implies that individuals with different partisan affiliations but similar ideologies respond differently to our treatment. This supports our interpretation that partisanship is a key factor shaping how people respond to immigrants' partisan preferences.

Table E1: Comparing Moderation Effects of Partisanship and Ideology

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.192 [0.228]	-2.04*** [0.217]	0.02 [0.193]	-1.58*** [0.220]
Democrat	1.116*** [0.190]			
Republican	-1.189*** [0.194]			
Treatment×Democrat	-1.135*** [0.270]			
Treatment×Republican	1.156*** [0.275]			
Party ID Scale		-0.76*** [0.047]		
Treatment×Party ID Scale		0.75*** [0.067]		
Left Ideology			1.25*** [0.187]	
Right Ideology			-0.32* [0.173]	
Treatment×Left Ideology			-0.84*** [0.262]	
Treatment×Right Ideology			0.85*** [0.243]	
Ideology Scale				-0.28*** [0.026]
Treatment×Ideology Scale				0.31*** [0.036]
Constant	4.169*** [0.160]	6.40*** [0.153]	3.97*** [0.139]	5.74*** [0.156]
Observations	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002
R-squared	0.073	0.079	0.035	0.040
Adjusted R-squared	0.071	0.079	0.033	0.039

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table E2: Moderation Effect of Partisanship Across the Ideological Spectrum

	(1) Left	(2) Center	(3) Right
Treatment	-1.00*** [0.174]	-0.67** [0.296]	-0.92*** [0.351]
Independent	-0.19 [0.399]	-0.55** [0.277]	-1.64*** [0.451]
Republican	-1.74*** [0.435]	-1.41*** [0.342]	-2.81*** [0.271]
Treatment×Independent	0.98* [0.590]	0.87** [0.389]	1.33** [0.651]
Treatment×Republican	1.31** [0.650]	1.40*** [0.467]	2.45*** [0.398]
Constant	5.36*** [0.124]	4.51*** [0.212]	5.73*** [0.235]
Observations	913	773	1,316
R-squared	0.049	0.024	0.097

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1