Feel me Flow: A Review of Control-Flow Integrity Methods for User and Kernel Space

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
Rationale












Rationale















Control Flow Graph

Intended flow



Memory error




Control Flow Graph





Memory error





Control Flow Graph

Intended flow




Memory error



Injected code

Actual flow





Control Flow Graph

Intended flow




Memory error



Injected code

Actual flow





Intended flow


Memory error



Injected code

Actual flow






Control Flow Graph

Intended flow



Memory error




Control Flow Graph

Intended flow



Memory error






Control Flow Graph





Memory error





Control Flow Graph

Intended flow




Memory error




Gadget

Actual flow







Abadi et al. CCS'05

Abadi et al. CCS'05

1 - Offline: CFG computation


Abadi et al. CCS'05





1 - Offline: CFG computation


Abadi et al. CCS'05



Control Flow Graph (CFG)

1 - Offline: CFG computation


Abadi et al. CCS'05



Control Flow Graph (CFG)


1 - Offline: CFG computation

Abadi et al. CCS'05




1 - Offline: CFG computation

Abadi et al. CCS'05




1 - Offline: CFG computation

Abadi et al. CCS'05




1 - Offline: CFG computation

Abadi et al. CCS'05




1 - Offline: CFG computation **2 - Runtime:** CFG enforcement

Abadi et al. CCS'05




1 - Offline: CFG computation **2 - Runtime:** CFG enforcement

Abadi et al. CCS'05




1 - Offline: CFG computation



Original CFG

Intended flow

Actual flow



Attacker's goal execution




Memory error



Gadget





Original CFG

Intended flow


Memory error



Gadget

Actual flow





Computation phase

Flow sensitive VS flow insensitive

Computation phase

Flow sensitive VS flow insensitive


```
1 | obj = &x;
2 |
3 | obj = &y;
```

Computation phase

Flow sensitive VS flow insensitive

Computation phase


Flow sensitive VS flow insensitive




Context sensitive VS context insensitive

Computation phase

Flow sensitive VS flow insensitive



Context sensitive VS context insensitive



Where can we return to from function C?


Computation phase

Flow sensitive VS flow insensitive

obj at
$$1 \rightarrow \{x\}$$

obj at $1 \rightarrow \{x\}$
obj at $2 \rightarrow \{y\}$
obj at $2 \rightarrow \{y\}$
Sensitive Insensitive

Context sensitive VS context insensitive




Where can we return to from function C?

Computation phase


Enforcement phase

Flow sensitive VS flow insensitive

Forward vs backward control-flow transfers



Context sensitive VS context insensitive




Where can we return to from function C?


Computation phase

Flow sensitive VS flow insensitive


Enforcement phase

Forward vs backward control-flow transfers





Context sensitive VS context insensitive



Where can we return to from function C?

- → B & E Insensitive
- → B if called from B, E if called from E:


Sensitive


Computation phase

Flow sensitive VS flow insensitive


Enforcement phase

Forward vs backward control-flow transfers





Context sensitive VS context insensitive



Where can we return to from function C?

- → B & E Insensitive
- → B if called from B, E if called from E:

Sensitive

Which control-flow transfers do we take into account?

Control Flow Transfers

Less secure **Backward Forward**

More secure

Control Flow Transfers

Less secure Forward Backward

Every control flow transfer is allowed

More secure

Ø

Every control flow transfer is allowed

Makes the assumption that two destinations are equivalent if they come from the same source

Control Flow Transfers

Equivalent classes

Forward

Every control flow transfer is allowed

Makes the assumption that two destinations are equivalent if they come from the same source

Heuristics

May or may not work on specially crafted cases



Control Flow Transfers

Less secure ∅ – · Equivalent classes ◄₁

→ Heuristics

Forward

Every control flow transfer is allowed

Backward

Makes the assumption that two destinations are equivalent if they come from the same source

May or may not work on specially crafted cases

Control Flow Transfers

Less secure

 \varnothing

(Hardware) Limited Context Sensitivity

Forward

Backward

Every control flow transfer is allowed

Makes the assumption that two destinations are equivalent if they come from the same source

May or may not work on specially crafted cases

There is some restriction on full CS

Control Flow Transfers

Less secure

 \varnothing

r - · Equivalent classes ←

- · Heuristics -----

(Hardware) Limited Context Sensitivity

Context Sensitive

Forward

Backward

Every control flow transfer is allowed

Makes the assumption that two destinations are equivalent if they come from the same source

May or may not work on specially crafted cases

There is some restriction on full CS



More secure

Userland CFI Implementations

Original CFI, Abadi et al. CCS'05

MoCFI, Davi et al. NDSS'12

CCFIR, Zhang et al. Oakland'13

Bin-CFI, Zhang et al. Usenix Sec.'13

kBouncer, Pappas et al. Usenix Sec.'13

ROPecker, Cheng et al. NDSS'14

SafeDispatch, Jang et al. NDSS'14

MCFI, Niu & Tan. PLDI'14

RockJIT, Niu & Tan. CCS'14

O-CFI, Mohan et al. NDSS'15

PathArmor, van der Veen et al. CCS'15

VTV / IFCC, Tice et al. Usenix Sec.'15

πCFI, Niu & Tan. CCS'15

TypeArmor, van der Veen et al. Oakland'16

Userland CFI - Binary

Backward	Ø	Equivalent Classes	Heuristics	Hardware limited CS	Context Sensitive
Equivalent Classes					
Heuristics					
Hardware limited CS					

Userland CFI - Binary

Backward	Ø	Equivalent Classes	Heuristics	Hardware limited CS	Context Sensitive
Equivalent Classes	TypeArmor	CCFIR Bin-CFI O-CFI			Original CFI MoCFI
Heuristics			kBouncer		
Hardware limited CS				PathArmor	

Userland CFI - Source Code

Backward	Ø	Equivalent Classes	Limited CS
Equivalent Classes			
Limited CS			
Context Sensitive			

Userland CFI - Source Code

Backward	Ø	Equivalent Classes	Limited CS
Equivalent Classes		MCFI RockJIT	
Limited CS			πCFI
Context Sensitive	VTV / IFCC SafeDispatch		

Kernel space CFI Implementations

State-based CFI (SBCFI), Petroni & Hicks. CCS'07

Hypersafe, Wang & Jiang. Oakland'10

kGuard, Kemerlis et al. Usenix Sec.'12

KCoFI, Criswell et al. Oakland'14

Kernel space CFI

Backward	Exists in kernel space	Equivalent Classes	Limited CS
Exists in kernel space			
Equivalent Classes			
Limited CS			

Kernel space CFI

Backward	Exists in kernel space	Equivalent Classes	Limited CS
Exists in kernel space	kGuard		
Equivalent Classes		KCoFI	
Limited CS			Hypersafe

CFI - Other Schemes

CFI - Other Schemes

Userland

Kernel space

ROPecker, Cheng et al. NDSS'14

SBCFI, Petroni & Hicks. CCS'07

Kernel module

Virtual machine monitor


Heuristics for forward and

Forward: compares CFGs


backward control flow transfers

Backward: Ø

Closing remarks



Closing remarks



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