


# Concurrent Stochastic Games with Stateful-discounted and Parity Objectives: Complexity and Algorithms



A. Asadi<sup>1</sup>



K. Chatterjee<sup>1</sup>



**R. Saona**<sup>1</sup>




J. Svoboda<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Institute of Science and Technology Austria (ISTA)

FSTTCS 2024



# Game



Concurrent zero-sum stochastic game

States:  $s_1, s_2$


2 opposite players

Actions:  $a, b$

Rewards per state and action profile:  $r(s, a, b)$

Stochastic transitions:  $\delta(s, a, b)$

# Deterministic game



Concurrent zero-sum deterministic game

# Objectives and values

- **Reachability:** Probability of reaching a state
- **Discounted:** Discounted sum of rewards
- **Parity:**  $\omega$ -regular objective
- **Stateful discounted:**  
State-dependent discounted sum of rewards

$$\text{Disc}_\Lambda((s_i, a_i, b_i)_{i \geq 0}) := \sum_{i \geq 0} \left( r(s_i, a_i, b_i) \Lambda(s_i) \prod_{j < i} 1 - \Lambda(s_j) \right)$$
$$\text{val}_\Lambda(s) := \sup_{\sigma \in \Sigma^S} \inf_{\tau \in \Gamma^S} \mathbb{E}_s^{\sigma, \tau} [\text{Disc}_\Lambda].$$

- **Limit (Stateful discounted) value:**  
Vanishing state-dependent discounted sum of rewards

$$\text{val}_\chi(s) := \lim_{\lambda_1 \rightarrow 0^+} \cdots \lim_{\lambda_d \rightarrow 0^+} \text{val}_\Lambda(s).$$

**Limit Value approximation.**

How hard is to  
approximate the limit value?

Hint: Parity is a special case of limit value.

## Previous.

- **Limit value:** EXPSPACE upper bound and double exponential time algorithm
- **Parity:** PSPACE upper bound and exponential time algorithm

## Our contribution.

For both values,

- TFNP[NP] upper bound
- Exponential time algorithm, which is polynomial for fixed number of states

Why approximation and not exact value computation?

Even for reachability objectives,

- **Irrational value:** exact value is irrational.
- **SQRT-SUM hardness:** at least as hard as SQRT-SUM, which is not known to be in NP.

What is the problem with guessing  $\varepsilon$ -optimal strategies?

Even for reachability objectives in deterministic games,

- **Double exponential patience:**  $\varepsilon$ -optimal strategies require very small numbers.



Theorem (Kristoffer et. al., 2013)

*Approximating the value of concurrent stochastic games with reachability objectives is in  $TFNP[NP]$ .*

Theorem (Attia and Oliu-Barton, 2019)

*Approximating the undiscounted value (vanishing discounted value) of concurrent stochastic games can be done in exponential space and time.*

Theorem (Alfaro et. al. 2003; Gimbert and Zielonka, 2005)

*There is a linear reduction from the computational problems of approximating the parity value to the approximation of the limit value of stateful-discounted objectives.*


# Technical tool

# Our technical contribution

## Lemma

Consider a nonzero polynomial  $P$  in  $x_1, \dots, x_\ell$  of degrees  $D_1, \dots, D_\ell$  with integer coefficients of bit-size  $B$ . Let  $D := \max(D_1, \dots, D_\ell)$  and  $B_1 := 4\ell \text{ bit}(D) + B + 1$ . Then,

$$\forall x_1 \in (0, \exp(-B_1)] \quad \dots \quad \forall x_\ell \in (0, (x_{\ell-1})^{D+1}]$$
$$|P(x_1, \dots, x_\ell)| \geq \exp(B_1 - \ell) \cdot (x_\ell)^{D+1}.$$



Root free zone in 2 dimensions

# Ideas

# Simple model: discounted reachability objective

Consider the reachability objective as the limit of the following discounted reachability objective.

**Discounted reachability.**

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Disc}_\lambda((s_i)_{i \geq 0}) &:= \sum_{i \geq 0} \mathbb{1}[s_i = \top] \lambda(1 - \lambda)^{(i-1)+} \\ \text{val}_\lambda(s) &:= \sup_{\sigma \in \Sigma^S} \inf_{\tau \in \Gamma^S} \mathbb{E}_s^{\sigma, \tau}[\text{Disc}_\lambda].\end{aligned}$$

# Idea: Algorithm

The discounted value is characterized as the unique parameter that makes a parameterized matrix game have value zero.

Bellman fixpoint equation. Fixing stationary strategies  $\sigma, \tau$  we obtain a Markov chain with

- **payoff:**  $\nu^{\sigma, \tau}(s) := \mathbb{E}_s^{\sigma, \tau} [\text{Disc}_\lambda]$ .
- **transition:**  $\delta^{\sigma, \tau}(s, s') := \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \sum_{b \in \mathcal{B}} \sigma(s)(a) \cdot \tau(s)(b) \cdot \delta(s, a, b)(s')$
- **reward:**  $r^{\sigma, \tau}(s) := \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \sum_{b \in \mathcal{B}} \sigma(s)(a) \cdot \tau(s)(b) \cdot r(s, a, b)$

In matrix form, the Bellman operator defined by Shapley can be written as a recursive expression:

$$\nu^{\sigma, \tau} = \lambda Id \odot r^{\sigma, \tau} + (1 - \lambda) Id \odot (\delta^{\sigma, \tau} \nu^{\sigma, \tau}) .$$



Bellman fixpoint equation.

$$\nu^{\sigma,\tau} = \lambda Id \odot r^{\sigma,\tau} + (1 - \lambda) Id \odot (\delta^{\sigma,\tau} \nu^{\sigma,\tau}) .$$

By Cramer's rule, we have

$$\nu^{\sigma,\tau}(s) = \frac{\nabla_{\lambda}^s(\sigma, \tau)}{\nabla_{\lambda}(\sigma, \tau)} ,$$

where  $\nabla_{\lambda}(\sigma, \tau)$  and  $\nabla_{\lambda}^s(\sigma, \tau)$  are determinants of  $n \times n$  matrices. Linearizing the equation, we get

$$0 = \nabla_{\lambda}^s(\sigma, \tau) - \nu^{\sigma,\tau}(s) \nabla_{\lambda}(\sigma, \tau) .$$

Linear equation

$$0 = \nabla_{\lambda}^s(\sigma, \tau) - \nu^{\sigma, \tau}(s) \nabla_{\lambda}(\sigma, \tau).$$

Define the parameterized matrix game on pure stationary strategies

$$M_{\lambda}[z](\hat{\sigma}, \hat{\tau}) := \nabla_{\lambda}^s(\hat{\sigma}, \hat{\tau}) - z \nabla_{\lambda}(\hat{\sigma}, \hat{\tau}).$$

Lemma (Attia and Oliu-Barton, 2019)

*The discounted value  $\text{val}_{\lambda}(s)$  is the unique parameter such that*

$$\text{val } M_{\lambda}[z] = 0.$$

*Moreover,  $z \mapsto \text{val } M_{\lambda}[z]$  is strictly decreasing.*

Lemma (Attia and Oliu-Barton, 2019)

*The discounted value  $\text{val}_\lambda(s)$  is the unique parameter such that  $\text{val } M_\lambda[z] = 0$ . Moreover,  $z \mapsto \text{val } M_\lambda[z]$  is strictly decreasing.*

As a consequence

$$\lambda \mapsto \text{val}_\lambda(s)$$

is a rational function by parts and there is an explicit bound on the degree and coefficients of the polynomials involved.

Theorem (Attia and Oliu-Barton, 2019)

*Consider  $\varepsilon > 0$ . There exists an explicit doubly exponentially small discount factor  $\lambda > 0$  such that*

$$|\text{val}_\lambda(s) - \lim_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} \text{val}_\lambda(s)| \leq \varepsilon.$$

Given a concurrent stochastic game with reachability objective,

- 1 Consider the discounted reachability objective that **approximates the limit value**.
- 2 Construct an (exponentially large) **parametric matrix game** whose only parameter that makes it zero value is the discounted value.
- 3 Use **binary search** to approximate the discounted value.

# Idea: Complexity

Given a concurrent stochastic game,

- 1 Guess  $\varepsilon$ -**optimal strategies** for each player.
- 2 Verify the  $\varepsilon$ -optimality of the guessed strategy using an **optimal counter strategy**.
- 3 Given " $\varepsilon$ -optimal" and optimal counter strategies, **approximate the value** of the corresponding Markov chain.

# TFNP[NP] complexity

## Theorem (Hansen et. al., 2009)

*Even deterministic concurrent games with reachability objectives require playing actions with **doubly exponentially small** probabilities to get approximately optimal strategies.*

Guessing  $\varepsilon$ -optimal strategies is impossible... using classic representations.

## Theorem (Hansen et. al., 2009)

*For all stochastic concurrent games with reachability objectives, there exists  $\varepsilon$ -optimal strategies that all positive probabilities are at least **doubly exponentially big** of the form  $\varepsilon^{2^{|A|}}$ .*

Guessing  $\varepsilon$ -optimal strategies is possible using floating point numbers.

Theorem (Frederiksen and Miltersen, 2013)

*Approximating the value of a Markov chain with reachability objective and floating point probabilities can be done in polynomial time.*



# Summary

# TFNP[NP] complexity

Given a concurrent stochastic game with limit objective,

- 1 Consider the discounted objective that **approximates the limit value**.
- 2 Construct a **reachability objective** game with the same value.
- 3 Guess  $\varepsilon$ -**optimal strategies** for each player.
- 4 Verify the  $\varepsilon$ -optimality of the guessed strategy using an **optimal counter strategy**.
- 5 Given " $\varepsilon$ -optimal" and optimal counter strategies, **approximate the value** of the corresponding Markov chain.

Given a concurrent stochastic game with limit objective,

- 1 Consider the discounted objective that **approximates the limit value**.
- 2 Construct an (exponentially large) **parametric matrix game** whose only parameter that makes it zero value is the discounted value.
- 3 Use **binary search** to approximate the discounted value.

Thank you!