LAB: SYSTEM CALLS


6.1810: Operating System Engineering

UNIX INTERFACE

- Kernel abstracts the CPU
- Kernel manages the use of CPU between the processes
 - o Processes do not access the CPU directly
 - o Several processes can run simultaneously
- RISC-V
 - o If 8 processes are running, the CPU is not used simultaneously
 - o 100ms, 100ms, ... processes take turns

KERNEL

- Isolates the applications from direct resources by HW support
- HW support
 - o User/kernel mode
 - o Virtual memory



ENTERING KERNEL

ecall (n)

Sys call number

```
fork
fork(){
            sys_fork
    ecall
                                   syscall
write(target, addr, ...){
                                                  write
            sys_write
    ecall
                                                 주소가 유효한지,
                                                 동일 어플리케이션
                                                 주소인지...
```

user

kernel


SYSTEM CALL PARAMETER PASSING

- Pass parameters in registers
- Parameters are stored in table(block) and address of block is passed as a parameter in a register
- Pushed into stack

KERNEL -> TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE (TCB)

- Kernel must have no bug
- Kernel must treat processes as malicious

CONSTRUCTION OF KERNEL (MAKEFILE)



RISC-V assembly

Binary version

DISASSEMBLED KERNEL

```
kernel > ASM kernel.asm
        kernel/kernel: file format elf64-littleriscv
        Disassembly of section .text:
    6
        0000000080000000 <_entry>:
            80000000: 00019117
                                          auipc sp,0x19
                                          addi sp,sp,-320 # 80018ec0 <stack0>
            80000004: ec010113
            80000008: 6505
                                            lui a0,0x1
   10
                                          csrr a1,mhartid
   11
            8000000a: f14025f3
   12
            8000000e: 0585
                                             addi a1,a1,1
   13
            80000010: 02b50533
                                          mul a0,a0,a1
   14
            80000014: 912a
                                             add sp,sp,a0
                                          jal 80004d1c <start>
   15
            80000016: 507040ef
   16
   17
         000000008000001a <spin>:
   18
             8000001a: a001
                                             j 8000001a <spin>
   19
```

CALLING SYSTEM CALLS - XV6

- User code calls system call "wrapper" functions
- Args initially in the registers, a0 a7 (RISC-V calling convention)

```
int main() { exit(123); }
```

```
8: 07b00513 li a0,123 c: 26e000ef jal 27a <exit>
```

CALLING SYSTEM CALLS — XV6

- Kernel trap code saves these register values into the trapframe
- In trampoline.S

```
# save user a0 in sscratch so
# a0 can be used to get at TRAPFRAME.
csrw sscratch, a0

# save the user a0 in p->trapframe->a0
csrr t0, sscratch
sd t0, 112(a0)
```

• sscratch: supervisor privilege level CSR (Control and Status Register) – used to hold user register value during trap handling

CALLING SYSTEM CALLS — XV6

- All information in the trapframe
 - => actual system call function called

```
void
syscall(void)
{
  int num;
  struct proc *p = myproc();

num = p->trapframe->a7;
  if(num > 0 && num < NELEM(syscalls) && syscalls[num]) {
    // Use num to lookup the system call function for num, call it,
    // and store its return value in p->trapframe->a0
  p->trapframe->a0 = syscalls[num]();
} else {
  printf("%d %s: unknown sys call %d\n",
    p->pid, p->name, num);
  p->trapframe->a0 = -1;
}
}
```

mapping to system call function pointer & calling it

CALLING SYSTEM CALLS

- All information in the trapframe
 - => arguments are passed to the system call

```
uint64
sys_sbrk(void)
{
  uint64 addr;
  int n;

  argint(0, &n);
  addr = myproc()->sz;
  if(growproc(n) < 0)
    return -1;
  return addr;
}</pre>
```

```
// Fetch the nth 32-bit system call argument.
void
argint(int n, int *ip)
{
   *ip = argraw(n);
}
```

```
static uint64
argraw(int n)
 struct proc *p = myproc();
 switch (n) {
  case 0:
    return p->trapframe->a0;
 case 1:
    return p->trapframe->a1;
 case 2:
    return p->trapframe->a2;
  case 3:
    return p->trapframe->a3;
  case 4:
    return p->trapframe->a4;
 case 5:
    return p->trapframe->a5;
 panic("argraw");
 return -1;
```

USING GDB

Lab: System Call

FIRE UP GDB

jina@Jinas-MacBook-Pro xv6-labs % make gemu-gdb

```
riscv64-unknown-elf-gcc -Wall -Werror -O -fno-omit-frame-pointer -ggdb -gdwarf-2 -DSOL_UTI
ltin-strncmp -fno-builtin-strlen -fno-builtin-memset -fno-builtin-memmove -fno-builtin-mem
uiltin-malloc -fno-builtin-putc -fno-builtin-free -fno-builtin-memcpy -Wno-main -fno-built
e -no-pie -c -o kernel/syscall.o kernel/syscall.c
riscv64-unknown-elf-ld -z max-page-size=4096 -T kernel/kernel.ld -o kernel/kernel kernel/e
l/swtch.o kernel/trampoline.o kernel/trap.o kernel/syscall.o kernel/sysproc.o kernel/bio.o
.o kernel/sysfile.o kernel/kernelvec.o kernel/plic.o kernel/virtio_disk.o kernel/start.o
riscv64-unknown-elf-ld: warning: kernel/kernel has a LOAD segment with RWX permissions
riscv64-unknown-elf-objdump -S kernel/kernel > kernel/kernel.asm
riscv64-unknown-elf-objdump -t kernel/kernel | sed '1,/SYMBOL TAB
riscv64-unknown-elf-objdump -t kernel/kernel | sed '1,/SYMBOL TAB
[jina@Jinas-MacBook-Pro xv6-labs % riscv64-elf-gdb
qemu-system-riscv64 -machine virt -bios none -kernel kernel/kerne GNU gdb (GDB) 15.2
0 -device virtio-blk-device, drive=x0, bus=virtio-mmio-bus.0 -S -qd Copyright (C) 2024 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
                                                                 License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <a href="http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html">http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html</a>
                                                                 This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
                                                                 There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
                                                                 Type "show copying" and "show warranty" for details.
                                                                 This GDB was configured as "--host=aarch64-apple-darwin24.1.0 --target=riscv64-elf".
                                                                 Type "show configuration" for configuration details.
                                                                 For bug reporting instructions, please see:
                                                                 <https://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/>.
                                                                 Find the GDB manual and other documentation resources online at:
                                                                     <http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/>.
                                                                 For help, type "help".
                                                                 Type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word".
                                                                 The target architecture is set to "riscv:rv64".
                                                                 warning: No executable has been specified and target does not support
                                                                 determining executable automatically. Try using the "file" command.
                                                                 0x0000000000001000 in ?? ()
                                                                 (gdb)
```

GDB

```
119
           [SYS_sbrk]
                        sys_sbrk,
    120
           [SYS_sleep]
                        sys_sleep,
           [SYS_uptime] sys_uptime,
    121
    122
           [SYS_open]
                        sys_open,
           [SYS_write]
    123
                        sys_write,
    124
           [SYS_mknod] sys_mknod,
   125
          [SYS_unlink] sys_unlink,
    126
           [SYS link]
                        sys_link,
    127
          [SYS_mkdir] sys_mkdir,
   128
          [SYS_close] sys_close,
   129
          };
   130
   131
          void
   132
          syscall(void)
   133
   134
            int num:
   135
            struct proc *p = myproc();
   136
    137
          num = p->trapframe->a7;
   138
            if(num > 0 && num < NELEM(syscalls) && syscalls[num]) {
    139
              // Use num to lookup the system call function for num, call it,
   140
              // and store its return value in p->trapframe->a0
   141
              p->trapframe->a0 = syscalls[num]();
   142
            } else {
   143
              printf("%d %s: unknown sys call %d\n",
   144
                      p->pid, p->name, num);
   145
              p->trapframe->a0 = -1;
   146
   147
                                                                                                      L137 PC: 0x80001c80
remote Thread 1.1 (src) In: syscall
(gdb) backtrace
#0 syscall () at kernel/syscall.c:133
#1 0x0000000000001a32 in usertrap () at kernel/trap.c:67
#2 0x0505050505050505 in ?? ()
(adb) n
(gdb) n
(gdb) p /x *p
$1 = {lock = {locked = 0x0, name = 0x800071b8, cpu = 0x0}, state = 0x4, chan = 0x0, killed = 0x0, xstate = 0x0, pid = 0x1,}
 parent = 0x0, kstack = 0x3fffffd000, sz = 0x1000, pagetable = 0x87f55000, trapframe = 0x87f56000, context = {
   ra = 0x800012b4, sp = 0x3fffffde90, s0 = 0x3fffffdec0, s1 = 0x80007d50, s2 = 0x80007920, s3 = 0x1, s4 = 0x3,
    s5 = 0x800189f0, s6 = 0x1, s7 = 0x4, s8 = 0xfffffffffffffffff, s9 = 0x0, s10 = 0x0, s11 = 0x0}, ofile = {
   0x0 <repeats 16 times>}, cwd = 0x80015e60, name = {0x69, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x74, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x65, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
    0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0)
(gdb) p /x $sstatus
$2 = 0x200000022
(gdb)
```

KERNEL TRAP

```
void
syscall(void)
{
  int num;
  struct proc *p = myproc();

// num = p->trapframe->a7;
  num = * (int *) 0;
  if(num > 0 && num < NELEM(syscalls) && syscalls[num]) {</pre>
```

```
xv6 kernel is booting
hart 1 starting
hart 2 starting
scause=0xd sepc=0x80001c7e stval=0x0
panic: kerneltrap
```

```
void
syscall(void)
                                   addi sp,sp,-32
   80001c6e: 1101
                                   sd ra,24(sp)
   80001c70: ec06
                                   sd s0,16(sp)
   80001c72: e822
   80001c74: e426
                                   sd s1,8(sp)
                                   addi s0,sp,32
   80001c76: 1000
 int num;
 struct proc *p = myproc();
   80001c78: 8e4ff0ef
                                 jal 80000d5c <myproc>
   80001c7c: 84aa
                                   mv s1,a0
 // num = n->tranframe->a7:
 num = * (int *) 0;
                                 lw a3,0(zero) # 0 <_entry-0x80000000>
   80001c7e: 00002683
 IT(num > 0 && num < NELEM(syscalls) && syscalls[num]) {
```

USING GDB

Lab: System Call

ATTACK XV6

Lab: System Call





Figure 2.3: Layout of a process's virtual address space

xv6 physical memory management

• It manages free physical memory pages in simple stack, implemented using a linked list



```
> struct {
        struct spinlock lock;
        struct run *freelist;
        kmem;
```


```
struct run {
   struct run *next;
};
```

fork

- We want to figure out how many pages are allocated.
 - how? gdb breakpoint at...
 - 1. start of fork
 - 2. kalloc
 - 3. end of fork

```
(gdb) info b
                  Disp Enb Address
      Type
                                         What
Num
      breakpoint
                  keep y 0x000000000000000107c in fork at kernel/proc.c:281
      breakpoint already hit 14 times
                  keep n 0x00000000800008ea in uvmcopy at kernel/vm.c:346
      breakpoint
      breakpoint already hit 3 times
      breakpoint
                  keep y 0x0000000000000116c in fork at kernel/proc.c:323
      breakpoint already hit 1 time
      breakpoint already hit 10 times
```

Why 10 allocations during fork?



=> 10 pages allocated in total

for exec: read elf of secret.c

```
~/xv6-labs > syscall readelf -l user/_secret

✓ < 33m 51s
</p>
Elf file type is EXEC (Executable file)
Entry point 0x5c
There are 4 program headers, starting at offset 64
Program Headers:
                 VirtAddr
        0ffset
                          PhysAddr
Type
        FileSiz
                MemSiz
                          Flags Align
0x00000000000000053 0x00000000000000000 R
                             0x1
LOAD
        0×1000
        LOAD
        0x1000
GNU STACK
        0x10
```

Similarly investigate exec

9 pages allocated, 9 freed

allocate: 5 page tables, 4 user memory pages

(2 for user memory, 1 for stack, 1 for stack guard)


free: 5 page tables of the original process, 4 user memory pages of the original process

(don't need to free trapframe)

secret.c

• allocate 32 pages, but we do not need more page tables, since it is linear in the virtual memory space

secret.c after allocating 32 pages




secret.c teardown by attacktest.c wait()

- dealloc everything of secret.c
 - trapframe
 - user memory
 - 1 stack
 - 1 stack guard
 - 34 user memory pages
 - 5 page tables
- => 42 pages in total freed

```
// free a proc structure and the data hanging from it,
// p->lock must be held.
static void
freeproc(struct proc *p)
 if(p->trapframe)
    kfree((void*)p->trapframe);
 p->trapframe = 0;
 if(p->pagetable)
    proc_freepagetable(p->pagetable, p->sz);
 p->pagetable = 0;
 p\rightarrow sz = 0;
 p->pid = 0;
 p->parent = 0;
 p->name[0] = 0;
 p->chan = 0;
 p->killed = 0;
 p->xstate = 0;
 p->state = UNUSED;
```

freelist after secret.c exits



moving on to attack...

```
~/xv6-labs > syscall readelf -l user/_attack
                                       ✓ < 29m 13s
Elf file type is EXEC (Executable file)
Entry point 0x3a
There are 4 program headers, starting at offset 64
Program Headers:
                     VirtAddr
                                PhysAddr
         Offset
 Type
                                Flags Align
          FileSiz
                     MemSiz
 0×00000000000000053 0×00000000000000000 R
                                     0x1
 LOAD
          0x00000000000000c7c 0x00000000000000c7c R E
                                    0x1000
 LOAD
          0x1000
 GNU STACK
          0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 RW
                                    0x10
```

user memory size is same as secret.c => fork & exec would alloc / free same size of memory

How to access the secret in attack.c

• secret.c saved the secret at 10th page

```
char *end = sbrk(PGSIZE*32);
end = end + 9 * PGSIZE;
strcpy(end, "my very very very secret pw is: ");
strcpy(end+32, argv[1]);
```

- which means, in the freelist, there are 27 pages (22 allocated by secret.c + 5 page tables) in front of the "secret page"
- 10 pages are popped from freelist when fork()ing attack.c
- 9 pages popped from freelist but then 9 pages pushed back (exec())
- access 17th

Answer

```
int
> main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    char* end = sbrk(PGSIZE * 32);
    end = end + 16 * PGSIZE;
    char* secret = end + 32;
    printf("secret: %s\n", secret);
    write(2, secret, 8);
    exit(0);
}
```

Why it won't work if the secret is stored without offset 32

- first 8B of each page used during memory managing
- i.e. overwritten with next pointer when maintaining the freelist

```
struct run {
   struct run *next;
};
```

33