Ilyazh-Web3E2E: A Post-Quantum Hybrid Protocol for Forward-Secure Decentralized Messaging

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Abstract—**This paper specifies Ilyazh-Web3E2E, a cryptographic protocol designed to provide robust, multi-layered security for peer-to-peer communication in the Web3 era. It addresses the dual threat of classical and quantum adversaries by implementing a hybrid authenticated key exchange (AKE) combining classical (X25519) and post-quantum (Kyber-768) primitives. The protocol ensures forward and post-compromise security through a Double Ratchet algorithm and guarantees confidentiality and integrity via AES-256-GCM, achieving IND-CCA security. We define its formal threat model, security goals, and cryptographic specification, positioning it as a practical and formally motivated candidate for next-generation secure messaging.**

Index Terms—**Post-Quantum Cryptography, End-to-End Encryption, Double Ratchet, Hybrid Encryption, Kyber, Secure Messaging.**

I. Introduction

The proliferation of decentralized technologies (Web3) necessitates cryptographic protocols that are not only secure against current threats but also resilient against future quantum adversaries. Existing secure messaging protocols, while robust, face the impending challenge of quantum computers capable of breaking classical public-key cryptography [2]. This paper introduces Ilyazh-Web3E2E, a protocol designed to address this challenge.

Its architecture is founded on the principle of **trust through transparency**, eschewing proprietary ”black-box” designs in favor of a verifiable composition of standardized, publicly scrutinized cryptographic primitives. By combining the classical Diffie-Hellman function X25519 with the NIST-standardized post-quantum KEM, CRYSTALS-Kyber [4], it provides a robust hybrid key exchange. This is coupled with a Double Ratchet mechanism inspired by the Signal protocol [3] to provide strong forward and post-compromise security.

The contributions of this paper are threefold:

- We present a complete specification for a hybrid, post-quantum authenticated key exchange.
- We detail a Double Ratchet integration providing forward and post-compromise security.
- We provide a comparative analysis against established protocols and outline a path to a secure implementation.

II. Related Work

The design of Ilyazh-Web3E2E builds upon decades of research in secure messaging and cryptography. Key influences include the Signal Protocol [3], the NIST PQC standardization process [4], and academic work on hybrid encryption [9].

III. Threat Model and Security Goals

A. Threat Model

The protocol is designed to be secure against a powerful, **active network adversary**. The adversary can read, modify, inject, replay, and delete packets at will. Our formal model focuses on these network-based attacks.

We explicitly note that local attacks, such as **side-channel analysis** or a **compromised Cryptographically Secure Pseudo-Random Number Generator (CSPRNG)**, are outside the scope of this protocol's formal model. However, we mandate in Section VII that any practical implementation must include countermeasures against these threats.

B. Security Goals

- **Confidentiality (IND-CCA):** The content of messages is computationally indistinguishable from random to any party other than the intended recipient.
- **Integrity & Authenticity:** It is computationally infeasible for an adversary to modify or forge messages without detection.
- **Forward Secrecy (FS):** The compromise of long-term keys does not compromise past messages.
- **Post-Compromise Security (PCS):** The protocol can ”heal” from a session state compromise.
- **Post-Quantum Security (PQS):** Confidentiality is maintained against a quantum adversary.

IV. Cryptographic Specification

The protocol is divided into phases, each building upon the last to establish and maintain a secure channel.

A. Cryptographic Primitives and Rationale

The default suite combines classical and post-quantum algorithms.

TABLE I
DEFAULT CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUITE

Component	**Specification**	**Rationale**
KEM (Classical)	X25519	High-performance, widely adopted classical security
KEM (PQ)	Kyber-768	NIST Level 3 PQC standard for post-quantum resistance
AEAD	AES-256-GCM	Standard for high-efficiency IND-CCA encryption
KDF	HKDF-SHA256	Robust derivation of cryptographically separate keys
Signature	Ed25519	High-performance signatures for strong authentication

B. Phase 1: Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE)

The initial handshake establishes a mutually authenticated shared secret. The resulting shared secret (ss) is derived as:

$$ss = \text{HKDF-Extract}(salt, \text{X25519}(sk_A, pk_B) \,\|\, \text{Kyber.Decaps}(sk_{A,p} \tag{1}$$

where $\|$ denotes concatenation.


Alice
Directory
Bob
Request Bob's public keys
Bob's Identity_PK + KEM_PK
Generate ephemeral KEM key pair (eph_sk_a, eph_pk_a)
Sign(eph_pk_a, Identity_SK_A) -> signature_a
KEM.Encaps(Bob's KEM_PK) -> (ss_a, kem_ct)
eph_pk_a, signature_a, kem_ct
Verify(eph_pk_a, signature_a, Alice's Identity_PK)
alt
[Signature is valid]
KEM.Decaps(kem_ct, eph_sk_b) -> ss_b
Session established! ss_a == ss_b
[Signature is invalid]
ERROR: Authentication failed!
Alice
Directory
Bob

Fig. 1. Session Establishment Flow (AKE)

C. Phase 2: Double Ratchet Messaging

The protocol uses a standard Double Ratchet algorithm [6] to manage session keys, providing both FS and PCS for every message.

D. Wire Format and Associated Data (AAD)

A fixed binary format is specified. All unencrypted header fields are authenticated as Associated Data.

V. SECURITY MODEL AND PROOF SKETCHES

A. Confidentiality and Integrity (IND-CCA)

We define security via the standard IND-CCA game.


Alice
Bob
Assume session is established, CKs_A and CKr_B are synchronized.
CKs_A -> HKDF.Expand("msg-key") -> MK_1
CKs_A -> HKDF.Expand("chain-key") -> next_CKs_A
Encrypt(message_1, MK_1) -> ciphertext_1
Send(ciphertext_1, header_1)
CKr_B -> HKDF.Expand("msg-key") -> MK_1
CKr_B -> HKDF.Expand("chain-key") -> next_CKr_B
Decrypt(ciphertext_1, MK_1) -> message_1
Alice's sending chain and Bob's receiving chain have advanced.
Alice
Bob

Fig. 2. Symmetric-key ratchet step for deriving a Message Key

Proof Sketch: We prove IND-CCA security by reduction. Assume a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ wins the game. We construct an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ that uses $\mathcal{A}$ to break either the IND-CCA security of AES-256-GCM or the IND-CPA security of the hybrid KEM. This contradicts the security assumptions of the underlying primitives.

Note: While these sketches provide a strong argument, a full, machine-checked proof using a formal verification tool such as Tamarin or ProVerif is left as future work.

VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

A. Implementation

A reference implementation is provided in Python to demonstrate the protocol's logic. For production, a rewrite in a memory-safe language such as Rust is required.

B. Preliminary Benchmarks

The following benchmarks are preliminary results from the non-optimized Python PoC on a consumer laptop (Intel Core i7).

TABLE II
PRELIMINARY PERFORMANCE BENCHMARKS (PYTHON POC)

Metric	**Approximate Value**
Handshake Latency (Full AKE)	150-200 ms
AEAD Throughput (1MB message)	20-25 MB/s

TABLE III
PROTOCOL COMPARISON

Feature	Ilyazh-Web3E2E	Signal	TLS 1.3	MLS
PQ Status	Hybrid	No	No	No
Forward Secrecy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PCS	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Handshake Latency	150-200 ms	50-100 ms	50-100 ms	High
Ciphertext Overhead	16 B (tag)	16 B (tag)	16 B (tag)	Moderate

C. Comparison with Existing Protocols

VII. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

A. Nonce Management

To prevent key reuse in AES-GCM, the 96-bit nonce MUST be unique for each message. The specified structure is the concatenation of a **64-bit random prefix** and a **32-bit monotonic counter**.

B. Limits and Invariants

An implementation MUST enforce session limits. A session MUST be re-established after 2^{32} messages or 24 hours.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The Ilyazh-Web3E2E protocol provides a complete, high-security specification for post-quantum E2E encrypted messaging. By composing standardized primitives, it achieves strong formal security goals, positioning it as a practical candidate for next-generation secure applications. Future work includes machine-checked formal verification in Tamarin or ProVerif.

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APPENDIX

A. Wire Format Specification

All protocol messages use the following binary format. Fixed-length fields are big-endian encoded.

TABLE IV
WIRE FORMAT STRUCTURE

Field	Size (bytes)	Description
Version	1	Protocol version (0x03)
Suite ID	2	Crypto suite identifier
Sequence Num	8	Monotonic message counter
Nonce	12	AEAD nonce (64-bit prefix + 32-bit counter)
Header Len	2	Length of encrypted header
Encrypted Header	*var*	CBOR-encoded ratchet headers
Ciphertext	*var*	AEAD ciphertext + 16-byte tag

Associated Data (AAD) = Version || Suite ID || Sequence Num

B. Protocol Invariants & Limits

- **Nonce Structure:** Nonce = `0xRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR || 0x000000CC`
  - `R`: 64-bit cryptographically secure random (per ratchet step)
  - `CC`: 32-bit monotonic counter (reset to 0 on ratchet)
- **Rekeying:** Mandatory after:
  - 2^{20} messages (per chain)
  - 24 hours of continuous use
- **Session Limits:** Terminate session after:
  - 2^{32} total messages
  - 7 days of activity

C. Handshake (AKE Phase)

- **Alice's Identity Key:** `1f2c3d4e...` (Ed25519 private key, 32 bytes)
- **Bob's Kyber Ciphertext:** `8956a7b8...` (Kyber-768 ciphertext, 1088 bytes)
- **Shared Secret Output:** `234bcd5e...` (64 bytes)

D. Message Encryption

- **AAD:** `0300010000000000000001` (Version 0x03, Suite 0x0001, Seq 1)
- **Nonce:** `4e3291d850a43b00000001` (64-bit random + 32-bit counter)
- **Plaintext:** `48656c6c6f2057656233` ("Hello Web3")
- **Ciphertext:** `89ab12cd...` (plaintext length + 16 bytes tag)

Full reproducible test vectors available in reference implementation.

E. Side-Channel Attacks

- **Threats:** Timing attacks on KEM operations, memory access patterns
- **Countermeasures:**
  - Constant-time implementations for Kyber/X25519
  - Hardware-isolated memory for ratchet states
  - Zeroization of sensitive buffers

F. Random Number Generation

- **Threats:** Low-entropy seeding, VM snapshot attacks
- **Countermeasures:**
  - Hybrid entropy sources (HW RNG + OS entropy)
  - Periodic reseeding (every 100 operations)
  - Forward-secure RNG design

G. Supply Chain Risks

- **Threats:** Compromised dependencies, malicious hardware
- **Countermeasures:**
  - Reproducible builds with auditable dependencies
  - Hardware roots of trust for key generation Multiple KEM diversity (e.g., add Dilithium)

H. Operational Security

- **Critical Requirement:** All countermeasures MUST be production-level
- **Verification:** Use formal methods (Cryptol, SAW) for primitives

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