Concurrent Algorithms in SPIN Model Checker

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*Abstract*—Analysis and finding errors in concurrent software/system particularly when it is used in safety or industrial critical systems is gaining more and more attention. Software testing is an important technique for finding errors, however for concurrent algorithms, testing often does not ensure correctness or absence of errors. The model checker SPIN is widely and successfully used to formally verify the correctness requirements for systems of concurrently executing processes. Software/system model is first developed in PROMELA modeling language and SPIN model checker accepts correctness claims that are declared as linear temporal logic (LTL) formulas. In this article, two famous concurrent algorithms for mutual exclusion problem (Bakery algorithm and Dekker algorithm) are analyzed and formally verified in SPIN. Mutual exclusion for both algorithms is verified with inline assertion and as correctness claims with the help of LTL formulas. Furthermore, safety and liveness properties of both algorithms are also verified with LTL formulas.

Keywords- Bakery algorithm, Dekker algorithm, SPIN, LTL, PROMELA, Liveness, Safety.

# Introduction

Formal methods offer rigorous mathematical frameworks that are used for the modeling and analysis of both hardware and software systems. Two popular frameworks in formal methods are *model checking* and *theorem proving* [1]. Model checking approach was developed in early 1908’s by Clarke and Emerson [2], Queille and Sifakis [3]. System finite model is build first and state space of the model is exhaustively searched by the model checker to investigate whether a property holds in that model or not. Model checking approach is fast and automatic; sometimes it produces results in few minutes. Model checking can also be used to check specifications that are considered to be partial. Therefore, in case of system that has not been fully specified yet, model checking can give effective information related to the system correctness [6].

Model checking suffers from the so called *state-explosion problem:* systems state space grows prohibitively large with increase in the number of system variables and components. On the other hand, theorem provers have the ability to handle any system. Theorem provers are based on logics and offer a formal language for system modeling and an environment for mechanical reasoning and proofs [5]. However, theorem provers are only partially automated and proof development can be hard and time consuming. If theorem prover fails to find any error, this does not necessarily mean that an error is present. It may be the case that user was unable to find the right proof.

In this article, we have used SPIN [7] model checker as it is well suited for the development and verification of concurrent and distributed systems. Other model checkers such as SLAM [10] model checker was originally build for verification of temporal safety properties in C programs and BLAST [4] for static analysis of C programs. However, SLAM and BLAST are widely used for the verification of device driver protocols. KRONOS [11] and UPPAAL [12] are more suitable for real time systems verification and PRISM [15] is used for modeling and analysis of systems with probabilistic behavior. Main focus in SPIN is on proving the correctness of process interactions. First, a model (in PROEMLA) is developed that describes the system behavior. Correctness properties for the model are then specified for expressing the requirements on system’s behavior. Finally, SPIN is run on the model for checking whether or not the desired properties hold in the model [17]. SPIN model checker can be used as a simulator and a verifier [7]. In simulation mode, SPIN is used to quickly look at the different types of behavior of a system model. It also demonstrates those events (for fairness and starvation) that are rare to occur randomly. SPIN's graphical user interface, *xSPIN* or *iSPIN* can be used for the efficient visualization of simulation runs. In the verification mode, SPIN automatically inspects the whole state space of the model and look for a counterexample. A counterexample is an incorrect computation that violates a correctness specification. If SPIN detects any counterexamples then these incorrect computations can be investigated in detail in the interactive simulator in order to find and correct the computation.

System models in SPIN are described in PROMELA (a Process Meta Language) language [17] and linear temporal logic (LTL) is used for expressing verification properties. The syntax and semantics of PROMELA expressions is similar to C/C++. The control statements used in PROMELA are taken from a formalism known as *guarded commands* invented by Dijkstra [23]. This formalism is well suited to express nondeterministic behavior. Therefore, PROMELA language is used to find good abstractions of system design. Main focus in PROMELA is on modeling of process synchronization and coordination among them. Puneli [16] suggested temporal logic as a suitable formalism for concurrent programs. One of the advantages of using LTL formula is that it can be converted into a Büchi automaton [24] and SPIN mechanically converts LTL formula to Büchi automata. Generated automata by SPIN only accept those system executions where the corresponding LTL formula is satisfied. Correctness claims in SPIN are generally used for formalizing spurious behaviors of system, such as unwanted behaviors. LTL formula can also be used for such claims by changing positive LTL formula into a negative one with the help of logical negation operator.

It is generally acknowledged that increasing the number of transistors in processor does not enhance the computing capability of a system due to physical limitation in modern processor designs. This limitation has led to the development of multi-core processors [20, 22]. In order to utilize multi-core processors, increased attention is given to algorithms that achieve maximal concurrency for high performance. Concurrent programming provides a framework to effectively use parallel, structure and distributed systems that execute different simultaneous tasks at a time. However, the unpredictable interaction among concurrently running processes may cause software defects which are hard to find. While program verification remains desirable, the advent of concurrent programming has made program verification both more necessary and more difficult. Dijkstra [8] first proposed the solution for the problem that concurrently running processes may require restricted access to resources that are shared among different processes. The problem is called as mutual exclusion in [9].

In mutual exclusion problem, several processes say *N* communicate through shared variables and these processes repeatedly make attempts to access a shared resource.

**process (N) =**

**begin loop**

*Non Critical Section;*

Entry; *Critical Section*; Exit;

*Non Critical Section;*

**end loop**

The PROMELA code for simple mutual exclusion problem for *N* processes and its corresponding transition system is shown in Fig. 1. The construct *proctype* is used for declaring the behavior of process. Here, *N* (*N* is a constant) instances of *proctype* is activated in initial system state. A Boolean variable *CS* is declared (*line 1*) that is set to 1 (*true*) by a process before entering critical section (*line 3*) and reset to 0 (*false*) after process leaves the critical section (*line 5*).

1 bool CS = false;

2 active [N] proctype P(){

3 NCS: //Non Critical Section (NCS)

4 Entry: CS= true; //Critical Section (CS)

5 Exit: CS= false;

6 goto NCS: }



**Fig. 1:** PROMELA code for mutual exclusion problem and resultant transition system generated by SPIN.

In mutual exclusion problem, *Non Critical Section* (NCS) and *Critical Section* (CS) are program fragments. *NCS* need not terminate while *CS* is assured to terminate. The problem is to device *Entry* and *Exit* in such a way that:

* The total number of processes in *CS* should remain ≤ 1.
* The progress requirement: If some process enters *Entry*, then eventually some process will enter *CS*.
* Freedom from starvation requirement: If some process enters *Entry*, then eventually that process will enter *CS*.

Among the proposed algorithms for mutual exclusion, Bakery algorithm [13] and Dekker Algorithm [9] stands out for their simplicity and elegance.

The goal in this work is to use SPIN model checker to analyze and formally verify the Bakery algorithm and Dekker algorithm. The rest of the article consists of two main parts. In first part, Bakery algorithm for *N* processes is first modeled in PROMELA. Correctness properties of Bakery algorithm are expressed in LTL syntax. Designed model of Bakery algorithm in PROMELA and its properties are then verified through SPIN. In second part, modeling of generalized Dekker algorithm and its verification in SPIN is carried out along with verification of its properties. Article concludes with some remarks in Conclusion.

# Bakery Algorithm in SPIN

Bakery algorithm [13] offers a simple solution for the mutual exclusion problem without depending on any form of central control such as semaphores. Furthermore, Bakery algorithm allows the processes to continue their operation despite the failure of any individual process. Bakery algorithm working is similar to the way customers get their turns in bakeries by drawing a number from a machine and the baker served the customer with the lowest number. Bakery algorithm for *N* processes is listed in Fig. 2.

**Process P(i);**

non critical section;

L1: choosing [i] := 1;

num[i] : = 1 + max(num[1], ..., num[N]);

choosing[i] := 0;

**for j in 1...N step 1 do**

**begin**

L2: **if** choosing[j] ≠ 0 then **goto** L2;

L3: **if** num[j] ≠ 0 and (num[j]) < (num[i]) then **goto** L3:

end;

critical section;

num[i] : = 0;

non critical section;

**goto** L1;

**end**

**Fig. 2:** Bakery Algorithm [13]

Each process in Bakery algorithm contains a part of CS and this part cannot execute concurrently with the CS parts of other processes. If a process shows interest to enter its CS, it will receive a number in NCS and the process with the lowest number is allowed to enter its CS. In SPIN, checking Bakery algorithm for arbitrary number of process is impossible as the drawn numbers are unbounded which will lead to an infinite state space. However, modifications have been done for restricting the drawn numbers that will lead to a finite state space. Baier and Katoen [33] developed model for Bakery algorithm for 2 customers (processes). Dedic and Meolic [19] formally modeled three versions of Bakery algorithm for two processes using process algebra. Properties of developed models are expressed in action computation tree logic (ACTL) [21], and model checker is used for the verification of ACTL formulas. Moreover, Hesselink [34] formally verified Bakery algorithm in theorem Prover PVS. We have developed a model for Bakery algorithm in PROMELA for *N* processes. The complete verification model of Bakery algorithm in PROMELA is included in Appendix A. The transition system for Bakery model generated by SPIN is shown in Fig. 3.



**Fig. 3:** Labeled transition systems for Bakery algorithm.

In PROMELA code, there is one asynchronously executing process *P*, which repeatedly makes call on again (*line 6* in Appendix A) routine. In PROMELA model, each process chooses its own number (*line 9*) which is modeled by a *bool* variable *choosing[N]* (*line 2*). Before entering CS part, each process gets a ticket number (*line 19*). After leaving CS, each process gets number 0 (*line 37*), which shows that the process is no more interested in accessing the CS.

To get a first glimpse of the complexity of Bakery model, an exhaustive verification with SPIN is done in order to prove some of the default safety properties that include deadlock absence, race conditions and unreachable code. The Bakery model is run with the default options for memory management and reduction techniques to measure the state space size that the SPIN verifier creates for proof completion. Verification results for different number of processes are shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1: COMPLEXITY INCREASES WITH TOTAL NUMBER OF PROCESSES

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Number of Processes** | **Total no. of States** | **Memory used (in MB)** | **Time**  **(in Sec)** |
| 2 | 178713 | 69.910 | 0.06 |
| 3 | 22862669 | 1023.914 | 15 |
| 4 | 30541985 | 1571.375 | 461 |
| 5 | X | X | X |

X: Verification cannot be completed on system with 2GB memory

It is clear from Table 1 that the state space for the model, memory and time required by SPIN for verification increases with increase in the total number of processes. We have performed the verification runs on Core i5 system with 4GB RAM. Bakery model can be verified for more than 4 processes on systems with higher memory.

For the formal verification of concurrent programs, safety and liveness properties are of primary importance and these two properties have been studied extensively. For verification, SPIN generates the state space of a program and then it searches for a counterexample (if one exists) to the correctness specification. We can use the construct *assertion* for correction specification inside PROMELA model. *Assertions* statement is also used to express simple safety properties. This statement can be added between any two statements of a program and if SPIN finds a single computation during the search of state space that leads to a false assertion, it means that either the developed model is incorrect or the *assertion* is unable to properly express the correctness property for that model. Note that a computation represents a sequence of states that starts with initial state and continue with the states that occur as each statement in the model is executed. Mutual exclusion property is proved by inserting an in-line *assertion* to the PROMELA model, *assert(nr\_pro == 1) (line 35)*. *Assertion* is added at the point where a process is in its critical section.

However, *assertions* are added at a specific control in the model so it can be used for specifying limited correctness properties. Generally, it is required to express a correctness property that does not depend on specific control points. Furthermore, *assertion* fails to express some properties as the property cannot be checked by evaluation of an expression in a single state of computation. For example in mutual exclusion problem, consider the two properties (absence of deadlock and absence of starvation) that can be represented by means of a relation between two computation states: a state *s* where a process intends to enter CS and another state *t* where process does enter CS. In this case, state *t* may occur hundred (or even thousands) of states later than state *s* in the computation.

Such properties can be expressed in SPIN with a finite automaton known as never claim that is executed together with automaton generated from the PROMELA. However, specifying a correctness property as a never claim is hard. SPIN can automatically translate a property written as LTL formula into a never claim. LTL is based on propositional calculus and LTL formula is made from atomic proposition combined with operators of propositional calculus and temporal operators that are listed in Table 2.

TABLE 2: PROPOSITIONAL CALCULUS AND TEMPORAL OPERATORS IN PROMELA

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Propositional Calculus operators** | **Math Symbol** | **SPIN Symbol** |
| Not | ¬ | ! |
| And | ˄ | && |
| Or | ˅ | || |
| Implies | → | −> |
| Equivalent | ↔ | <−> |
| **Temporal Operators** | **Math Symbol** | **SPIN Symbol** |
| Always | □ | [] |
| Eventually | ◊ | <> |
| Until | ***U*** | U |

The □ and ◊ temporal operators in Table 2 are unary, whereas *U* is a binary operator. LTL formula can be used in PROMELA to express both the safety and liveness properties of a system as a global property.

## Safety Properties

Safety is typically described as those set of properties that the system should not violate. Therefore, safety defines the bad things that should be avoided [17]. Formal definition of safety properties is:

**Definition 1.** Let *F* represents an LTL formula and a computation is represented as *C = (s0, s1, s2,…)*. Then *□F* (read as always *F*) is *true* in state *sj* iff *F* is *true*  *sj* in *C* such that *j i*

Formula □*F* is a safety property as it shows that the computation is safe in a sense that only ‘good’ things will happen and “bad” things will never happen. To prove that mutual exclusion holds in the Bakery model, we defined the following:

*# define mutex (nr\_pro<=1)*.

LTL formula *![]mutex* is checked in SPIN. Negation on the formula expresses the existence of a computation where total number of process in CS is greater than 1. Generated never claim and its corresponding Büchi automaton is shown in Fig. 4.

never { /\* ![]mutex \*/

T0\_init:  
 do  
 ::atomic{!(mutex)-> assert(!(!(mutex)))}

::(1)-> goto TO\_init

od;  
accept\_all:  
 skip }



**Fig. 4:** Never claim and corresponding Buchi automaton

For verification of generated never claim, SPIN generates a Büchi automaton by computing the synchronous product of automaton for the model and the Büchi automaton for never claim. If the resulted Büchi automaton accepts empty language then the correctness claim is not satisfied by the model. However, if the accepted language is nonempty then the language contains those system behaviors that satisfy the corresponding LTL formula. The entire computation is done by SPIN using nested depth first search (DFS) algorithm [25]. Nested DFS algorithm terminates in case an acceptance cycle is found that represents a counterexample to the never claim or in case when the overall product has been computed. In later case, no counterexample exists for the never claim. The working of nested DFS algorithm in SPIN is explained in [26]. Along-with nested DFS algorithm, SPIN used several other optimization algorithms in order to make verification runs more effective, it includes:

* Partial order reduction [27],
* Bit-state hashing (Memory Management) [28]
* State vector compression (Memory Management) [29]
* Minimized automaton encoding of states [30]
* Slicing algorithm [31]

Mutual exclusion is also proved with LTL formula *{[] ((P@CS) −> (nr\_pro==1))}*

## Liveness Properties

Liveness represents those set of properties that the system must satisfy. Liveness also defines the good things that capture the required functionality of a system [7]. Liveness properties can be formally defined as:

**Definition 2.** Let *F* represents an LTL formula and a computation is represented as *C = (s0, s1, s2,…)*. Then *◊F* (read as eventually *F*) is *true* in state *sj* iff *F* is *true* for some *sj* in *C* such that *j i*.

Formula *◊F* is a liveness property as it shows that *eventually* something good will happens. For Bakery algorithm, a liveness property can be: if any process shows interest to enter its CS, then that process will eventually access its CS. This property is proved with formula {*P[1]@again ̶ > <> P[1]@CS*}. This property can also be proved by adding Boolean variable *cs* to the code.

34 nr\_pro++;

35 cs = true;

36 CS: assert(nr\_pro==1)

37 nr\_pro--;

38 cs = flase;

Variable *cs* is used in formula *ltl b1 {< >cs}*. Similarly, initially some process may have no interest to enter CS but it shows interest after some time. We have proved this latching property with formula *ltl b2 {< > [ ] ((P[3]@again) −> (p[3]@CS))}*. Formula *b2* ensures that if a process say *process* *3* shows its interest for CS, eventually *process 3* will always get a chance to enter its CS. Absence of starvation is proved with *ltl b3 { [ ] <> ((P[3]@again) −> (P[3]@CS))}*. This formula also expresses the property that formula *F* is true *infinitely often.* It is important to note that a counterexample for safety property consist of one state where the formula evaluates to *false* which shows that something ‘bad’ has happened. On the other hand, a counterexample for liveness property consists of an (infinite) computation which shows that something ‘good’ never happened.

# Dekker Algorithm in SPIN

Dekker first proposed the mutual exclusion problem and Dijkstra [8] give the first solution to the mutual exclusion problem for two processes and attributed the proposed solution to Dekker. Dekker algorithm for arbitrary number of processes were presented and proved in [8, 9]. In Dekker algorithm for two processes, behavior of both the processes is same. Process say *p1*, for example, show its interest for the critical section by setting its variable (*x1*) to *true*. Process *p1* then tests *x*2 (variable of process say *p2*) to check whether second process *p2* is interested in the critical section. If *p2* is not interested, then *p1* enters its critical section. If *p2* is interested, then *p1* sets its variable to *false* and tries again. Same is also the case for process *p2*. Due to the same behavior of both processes, a form of deadlock known as *after-you-after-you* may occur. In this kind of deadlock, both processes are trying to enter their critical section and keep withdrawing at the same time. This deadlock can be avoided by adding a shared variable *turn* that can be either 1 or 2. *Turn* variable is used to give priority to a process. When a process wants to leave its critical section, it will change the value of *turn* to *false*.

Martin [14] proposed a new generalization of Dekker algorithm for *N* processes. Proposed Dekker algorithm for *N* processes is listed in Fig. 5.

**Begin Process P(i);**

non critical section

L1: n(i) := true;

**for j in 1...N step 1 do**

**begin**

**if** j ≠ i **and** n[j] = true:) → n(i) := false;

(turn = 0 ˅ turn = i)

turn := i;

n(i) := true;

**end;**

critical section

n(i) := false;

turn:= 0;

non critical section

**goto** L1

**end**

Fig. 5. Generalized Dekker algorithm for *N* processes

The specification of Dekker algorithm in PROMELA is shown in Appendix B.

In Process p(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ *N* , where *N* represent the total number of processes. Each process uses its bool variable *n(i)* to declare its interest to enter the CS, In Dekker model, one asynchronously executing process *P* repeatedly makes call on *again* (*line 6*) routine. If a process *i* wants to enter its CS then it sets *n(i)* to *true* (*line 9*). Checking of interest of other processes is done by testing in the *do* loop. If other process has interest to enter its CS then process *i* withdraw its candidacy by setting *n(i)* to *false* (*line 14*). Global variable *turn* is declared (*line 2*) that is used in the same way as in Dekker’s first solution. When a process wants to leave CS, it set the value of *n(i)* to *false* (*line 26*). Fig. 6 shows the transition system for Dekker model.



Fig. 6. Labeled transition system for Dekker algorithm

## Verification Results

During verification of basic properties of Dekker model, the total number of state space that is explored, memory used and the elapsed time by SPIN for different number of processes is shown in Table 3. Verification was completed in less than 0.05 seconds for *N ≤ 4* and memory usage was less than 64 MB.

# TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF STATE SPACE, MEMORY USED AND TIME FOR DIFFERENT NUMBER OF PROCESSES

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Number of Processes** | **Total no of States** | **Memory Used(in MB)** | **Time (in Sec)** |
| 2 | 65 | < 64.539 | <0.05 |
| 3 | 426 | < 64.539 | <0.05 |
| 4 | 2245 | < 64.539 | <0.05 |
| 5 | 10454 | 64.832 | <0.05 |
| 6 | 44961 | 66.004 | <0.05 |
| 7 | 182986 | 71.472 | 0.08 |
| 8 | 715157 | 94.519 | 0.32 |
| 9 | 2709702 | 178.211 | 1.37 |
| 10 | 10018657 | 523.132 | 5.85 |
| 11 | 19345424 | 1023.914 | 13.5 |

Mutual exclusion for Dekker algorithm is proved with inline *assertion* and LTL formula. Same like bakery algorithm, safety and liveness properties for Dekker algorithm are proved with LTL formulas and two of them are mentioned here:

* Freedom from starvation: If any process wants to enter CS, that process will eventually enter its CS: *ltl c1 {n[1] == true ̶ > <> P[1]@CS*}.
* Only one process should be in CS at any time: *ltl c2 { ![] (P[1]@CS && P[2]@CS) }.*

# Conclusion

In this article, properties of algorithms for mutual exclusion problem were formally verified with model checking technique. Two concurrent algorithms Bakery algorithm and Dekker algorithm were formally specified in PROMELA modeling language and their correctness properties were verified in SPIN by *assertion* statements and with the help of LTL formulas. Correctness properties in PROMELA model can be declared within or outside the model. Inside the model, correctness properties are generally formalized using *assertion* statements and temporal logic formulas are used for declaring correctness properties outside the model. In LTL, knowing if a formula represents a liveness or safety property can be helpful in selecting the proper proof method for proving whether a concurrent program will satisfies the property that is specified by the LTL formula. One of the main advantages of using SPIN is that it is fully automatic. However, it suffers from state space explosion problem. Checking Bakery and Dekker algorithm for arbitrary number of processes in SPIN is impossible as increase in number of processes in both algorithms will lead to an infinite state space. In this article, Bakery algorithm is model checked for 4 process and Dekker algorithm is checked for *N* = 10. Bakery algorithm can be checked for *N* > 4 with more powerful systems.

Mechanical verification of concurrent algorithms in theorem provers such as Coq [32] and PVS [18] is an interesting future work, especially deriving an automatic technique that can be used for conversion of PROMELA code into specifications that theorem provers can understand.

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**Appendix-A: PROMELA Model for Bakery Algorithm**

Available at: https://github.com/saqibdola/ConcurrentAlgoinSPIN

**Appendix-B: PROMELA Model for Dekker Algorithm**

Available at: https://github.com/saqibdola/ConcurrentAlgoinSPIN