Liz Quin – Response 3

According to Thupten Jinpa, Tsongkhapa distinguishes between the ultimate and conventional perspectives by explaining that they are objects of knowledge. All things are ideas or objects have two natures, ultimate and conventional, yet if a person sees an object’s conventional existence they cannot see the objects ultimately and when a person finally perceives an objects ultimate existence it no longer sees the object’s conventional nature. A conventional mind that sees the conventional nature of an object is not discredited. “Objects of conventional reality, such as form, sound … exist” they are knowledge obtained by the person, yet this knowledge is deceptive and false (Jinpa, 43). The conventional nature exists within a person who does not see the world as it is (suchness). An ultimate nature of an object can be perceived by someone who does see the world as it is. The nature of all things is emptiness; emptiness is the absence of intrinsic nature (Jinpa, 98). It is a property of every object. The ultimate truth, to Tsongskapa, is not greater or higher than a conventional truth, they both exist, but objects are perceived differently based on the achievements of the observer. Tsongkhaba believes that without the dual nature of objects karma is not relevant, thus the teachings of the Buddha are not relevant. He integrates the negations of the Mâdhamaka with a place where humans can see objects conventionally to create meaning to the Buddha’s practices.