

Pragmatic Reasoning Ability Predicts Syntactic Framing Effects on Social Judgments

Sarah H. Wu¹, Nan Elpers¹, Evan M. Doherty², Stephen J. Flusberg³, and Kevin J. Holmes¹

Pragmatic reasoning

- Language conveys implicit information about the speaker's/ writer's beliefs or knowledge¹⁻²
- Observers make accurate inferences about the implications of specific grammatical structures³⁻⁴

Subject-complement syntax



The headline above frames the complement (“boys”) as the reference point (“boys”) to which the subject (“girls”) is compared

- Such statements yield *framing effects*: the group in the complement position is judged as having superior ability⁵⁻⁶
 - Thus, the headline reinforces the stereotype it tries to refute
- A possible role for **pragmatic reasoning**: framing effects are weaker in those who recognize the influence of subject-complement syntax on their judgments⁶

Our research questions

1. Are the **framing effects** of subject-complement syntax driven by **pragmatic reasoning ability**?
2. If so, does pragmatic reasoning ability predict framing effects even when there is **no preexisting stereotype**?

Overview

Participants

U.S. MTurkers ($N = 1390$ across 3 experiments)

Procedure

1. **Paragraph** that framed 1 group as the reference point for the other in 3 subject-complement statements about math ability
2. **Dependent measures**: forced-choice response (*Which group is better at math?*), *confidence rating ($0 = \text{not at all}$, $100 = \text{very}$), *rationale (copy/paste the most influential part of the summary)
3. **Predictors**: **pragmatic reasoning ability**, reflective thinking (CRT-2, need for cognition), social sensitivity (reading the mind in the eyes, autism quotient), social desirability, demographics
* results not reported here, but converged with previous findings⁵⁻⁶

Measuring pragmatic reasoning

- Participants read a cover story about two novel groups (Balurians & Arigans) who were found to have similar abilities (e.g., running, drawing). Then they were asked to infer:
 1. which of 2 subject-complement statements a person would choose, given whether they believe Balurians or Arigans are better at a certain skill (*infer frame*; 4 trials)
 2. which of 2 beliefs a person is more likely to hold, given the order in which they mentioned Balurians and Arigans in a subject-complement statement (*infer belief*; 4 trials)
- Correct response = choosing the statement/belief consistent with the syntactic frame
 - Total correct across all 3 experiments (out of 8; $\alpha = .83$): $M = 6.24$, $SD = 2.24$


Experiment 1: stereotyped groups

Recent Study: *[Girls/Boys] Equal [Boys/Girls] at Math*

A recent study has shown that *[girls/boys] do just as well as [boys/girls] at math*. At the University of Wisconsin, a team of researchers analyzed scores from standardized tests taken in 2005, 2006, and 2007 by approximately seven million students in ten different states. Overall, they found that *[girls/boys] perform as well as [boys/girls]* in grades two through eleven. A troubling finding from the study, however, is that many tough math questions seem to have been removed from state tests. The researchers worry that teachers, as a result, may start dropping harder math problems from their curriculums.

Results

- Participants were more likely to choose boys as having better math ability in the *Girls = Boys* condition than the *Boys = Girls* condition ($p < .001$), replicating previous findings⁵⁻⁶
- Participants who were **better at pragmatic reasoning** ($p < .001$) and reading the mind in the eyes ($p = .05$) showed **stronger framing effects** (see top right)




Experiment 2: no stereotype, but baseline bias

- The paragraph about math ability described groups of children from Canadian provinces, likely unfamiliar to most U.S. residents
- Yet we found a *baseline bias*: when no subject-complement statements were presented (*Baseline* condition; $n = 203$), most participants (73%) judged children from Alberta as having superior math ability
 - Future research: why do people converge in choosing between similar comparison groups?

Results

- We found a **framing effect** analogous to Experiment 1 ($p = .009$)
- Again, participants who were **better at pragmatic reasoning** ($p < .001$) showed **stronger framing effects** (see top right)




Experiment 3: no stereotype or baseline bias


- In a pilot study, we found no significant baseline bias for children from Montana (57%) vs. Wyoming (43%); sign test: $p = .19$

Results

- Once again, we found the expected **framing effect** ($p = .002$)
- Participants who were **better at pragmatic reasoning** ($p = .04$) and had higher incomes ($p = .03$) showed **stronger framing effects** (see top right)



Pragmatic reasoning predicts the framing effect



Conclusions

- Subject-complement syntax yielded **reliable framing effects** on judgments of math ability, regardless of the existence of stereotypes or baseline biases
- **Skilled pragmatic reasoners** were consistently more likely to choose the group in the complement position as having better math ability
- Our findings suggest a **rational basis** for syntactic framing effects: people infer that the syntactic positions of the groups were chosen *for good reason*, as a reliable signal of which group has better ability
- Future research: are other well-attested framing effects (e.g., risky choice framing, metaphor framing) also driven by the ability to read between the lines and discern what the frame is implicitly communicating?

References

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Acknowledgments

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