cs 4/5789 18 Apr 2022 Prof sarah Dean Lecture 22: Imitation Learning 1) Motivation & Examples - Slides 2) Setting: Behavioural Cloning Discounted Infinite Horizon MDP m = & S, A, P, V, 83 possibly unobserved Expert knows optimal policy IT\* and we have a doctaset  $0 = (s_{i}^{*}, a_{i}^{*})_{i=1}^{M} \sim d^{\pi^{*}}$ Behavioral Cloning

Reduction to supervised machine learning. Define some policy class TT

e.g. parametric policies  $T = \xi T_0 | \theta \in \mathbb{R}^d \xi$ where  $T_0$  e.g. deep network with weights  $\theta$ .

Then we estimate a policy with empirical nox minimization Tr = argmin Zl(Tr, Si, ai)

Depending on the problem, there are many choices of loss function.

- discrete action spaces: view problem as classification
- continuous action spaces: Veiw problem as regression.

$$ex - Negative log likelihood  $l(T_1, S, a) = -log(H(a|S))$$$

$$ex-Square\ loss  $e(T_1, s, a) = 1/T(s) - all_2^2$$$

3) BC Analysis

Assumption: Supernised learning is successful:

Notice: train and test distribution mismatch.

We train on data from distribution included

by TT\*, and our error guarantee is with

respect to this distribution.

towever, our actual performance will be determined by data from the distribution included by IT.

Recall: State distribution
$$d_{\gamma_0}^{TT}(s) = (1-8) \sum_{h=0}^{\infty} \chi^h P_h(s_{j,\gamma_0})$$

Recall: Performance Difference Lemma (PDL)

$$\mathbb{E}\left[V(s) - V(s)\right] = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} \mathbb{E}\left[\mathbb{E}\left[A^{T}(s, \alpha)\right]\right]$$

$$SNM = \frac{1}{\gamma} \mathbb{E}\left[A^{T}(s, \alpha)\right]$$

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The difference in value is given by the advantage of 71 over T/ averaged over the distribution induced by TT.

Theorem (BC Performance): Assume r(s,a) & E0,17 + s,a. And assume that supervised learning is  $\varepsilon$ -saccessful. Then BC returns a policy  $\widehat{T}$  with  $\mathbb{E}\left[V^{\dagger t}(s) - V(s)\right] \leq \frac{2}{(1-s)^2} \varepsilon$ 

$$\mathbb{E}\left[V^{\sharp *}(s) - V^{\underbrace{A}}(s)\right] \leq \frac{2}{(1-\delta)^2} \mathcal{E}$$

Proof: 
$$V^{\dagger}(S) - V^{\dagger}(S) = \frac{1}{1-8} \underbrace{F}_{S \sim d_{\mathcal{H}}^{\dagger}} \left[ A^{\dagger}(S, TT^{*}(S)) \right]^{(PDL)}_{optimal policy}$$


(add D)

$$= \frac{1}{1-1} \left[ F(A^{\hat{\Pi}}(S, \Pi^{*}(S)) - A^{\hat{\Pi}}(S, \hat{\Pi}(S))) \right]$$

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$$\leq \frac{2}{(1-8)^2}$$
 &

Example: Distribution Shiff



So initial state.

$$r(S,\alpha) = \begin{cases} 1 & S=S, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

aptimal policy is:  $TT(s) = \begin{cases} a_1 & s \neq s_1 \\ a_2 & s = s_1 \end{cases}$ 

The distribution induced by the optimal policy is  $d_{s_0}^{tT*}(s) = \begin{cases} 1-x & s = s_0 \\ x & s = s_1 \end{cases}$   $0 \quad S = s_2$ 

Consider the following policy  $\hat{T}$ :  $\hat{T}(S_0) = \begin{cases} a_1 & \text{w.p. } 1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{1-\delta} \\ a_2 & \text{w.p. } \frac{\varepsilon}{1-\delta} \end{cases} \qquad T(S_1) = a_2, \quad T(S_2) = a_2$ 

This policy could be returned by SL and has low error

FI [ F ] { a × TT\*(s) }] = E

The quadratic error in performance:  $V_{S_{1}}^{\dagger \dagger} = \frac{8}{1-8} \quad V_{S_{1}}^{\dagger \dagger} = \frac{8}{1-8} - \frac{8}{1-8} = (1-8)^{2}$ 

is directly caused by our bad behavior in sz which prevents us from accumulating reward!