



# Interpret Vault Identity Entities and Groups



# Vault Entities



- Vault creates an entity and attaches an alias to it if a corresponding entity doesn't already exist.
  - This is done using the Identity secrets engine, which manages internal identities that are recognized by Vault
- An entity is a representation of a single person or system used to log into Vault. Each has a unique value. Each entity is made up of zero or more aliases
- Alias is a combination of the auth method plus some identification. It is a mapping between an entity and auth method(s)




# Vault Entities




Julie Smith

Finance Specialist




UserPass




# Vault Entities

Julie Smith

Finance Specialist




Auth Options:  
UserPass  
LDAP  
GitHub



# Vault Entities

- An entity can be manually created to map multiple entities for a single user to provide more efficient authorization management
- Any tokens that are created for the entity inherit the capabilities that are granted by alias(es).



# Vault Entities

Entity

Name: Julie Smith  
Entity\_ID: e48de234-58fa-0093-5fde-e5b99abe8b33  
Policy: *management*



Aliases:

GitHub: jsmith22 Entity_ID: 4c9ed3482-4894-ced9-a1b2-90344be93aa Policy: <i>finance</i>
LDAP: jsmith@example.com Entity_ID: e93d24b2a-b894-0998-43ce-4294cb9ea9b Policy: <i>accounting</i>
UserPass: jsmith Entity_ID: b81de864-75fa-5619-1fca-ddd72bbe5b29

Aliases



# Vault Entities



# Create an Entity



TERMINAL

```
$ vault write identity/entity name="Julie Smith" \
  policies="it-management" \
  metadata="organization"="HCVOP, Inc" \
  metadata="team"="management"
```



# Add an Alias to an Entity



TERMINAL

```
# Add GitHub auth as an alias
$ vault write identity/entity-alias name="jsmith22" \
    canonical_id=<entity_id> \
    mount_accessor=<github_auth_accessor>

# Add LDAP auth as an alias
$ vault write identity/entity-alias \
    name="jsmith@hcvop.com" \
    canonical_id=<entity_id> \
    mount_accessor=<ldap_auth_accessor>
```



# Vault Groups

- A group can contain multiple entities as its members.
- A group can also have subgroups.
- Policies can be set on the group and the permissions will be granted to all members of the group.



Name: Finance\_Team  
Policy: *finance*

Members:




Entity\_ID: 4c9ed3482-4894-ced9-a1b2-90344be93aa  
Policy: accounts\_payable



Entity\_ID: e93d24b2a-b894-0998-43ce-4294cb9ea9b  
Policy: management



# Vault Groups



TOKEN  
Policies  
super-user  
management  
finance

Token inherits  
**capabilities** granted by  
alias, entity, and the  
group



# Vault Groups

## Internal Group

Groups created in Vault to group entities to propagate identical permissions

Created Manually

## External Group

Groups which Vault infers and creates based on group associations coming from auth methods

Created Manually or Automatically




# Vault Groups

## Internal Groups



- Internal groups can be used to easily manage permissions for entities
- Frequently used when using Vault Namespaces to propagate permissions down to child namespaces
  - Helpful when you don't want to configure an identical auth method on every single namespace




# Vault Groups

## External Groups



- External groups are used to set permissions based on group membership from an external identity provider, such as LDAP, Okta, or OIDC provider.
- Allows you to set up once in Vault and continue manage permissions in the identity provider.
  - Note that the group name must match the group name in your identity provider





# END OF SECTION






# Vault Policies



# How Do We Determine Who Should Access Secrets



# Vault Policies



- Vault policies provide operators a way to permit or deny access to certain paths or actions within Vault (RBAC)
  - Gives us the ability to provide granular control over who gets access to secrets
- Policies are written in declarative statements and can be written using JSON or HCL
- When writing policies, always follow the principle of least privilege
  - In other words, give users/applications only the permissions they need




# Vault Policies



- Policies are Deny by Default (implicit deny) - therefore you must explicitly grant to paths and related capabilities to Vault clients

No policy = no authorization

- Policies support an explicit DENY that takes precedence over any other permission
- Policies are attached to a token. A token can have multiple policies
  - Policies are cumulative and capabilities are additive



# Out of the Box Policies



- **root** policy is created by default – superuser with all permissions
  - You cannot change nor delete this policy
  - Attached to all root tokens
- **default** policy is created by default – provides common permissions
  - You can change this policy, but it cannot be deleted
  - Attached to all non-root tokens by default (can be removed if needed)



# Out of the Box Policies

```
$ vault policy list
default
root
```

```
$ vault policy read root
No policy named: root
```

```
$ vault policy read default
# Allow tokens to look up their own properties
path "auth/token/lookup-self" {
    capabilities = ["read"]
}

# Allow tokens to renew themselves
path "auth/token/renew-self" {
    capabilities = ["update"]
}

# Allow tokens to revoke themselves
path "auth/token/revoke-self" {
    capabilities = ["update"]
}

# Allow a token to look up its own capabilities on a path
path "sys/capabilities-self" {
    capabilities = ["update"]
}
.....
```



# Out of the Box Policies



The root policy does not contain any rules but can do anything within Vault. It should be used with extreme care.



A terminal window with three colored tabs (red, yellow, green) at the top. The title bar on the right says "root policy". The main area contains the following text:

```
path "*" {  
    capabilities = ["read", "create", "update", "delete", "list", "sudo"]  
}
```



If it *did* have rules, it would probably look something like this....





# Managing Policies Using the CLI




# Managing Policies in Vault

Command Line Interface (CLI)



Use the `vault policy` command

- delete
- fmt
- list
- read
- write



Terminal

```
$ vault policy list
admin-policy
default
root
```

Terminal

```
$ vault policy write admin-policy /tmp/admin.hcl
Success! Uploaded policy: admin-policy
```



# Managing Policies in Vault

Command Line Interface (CLI)



```
vault policy write webapp /tmp/webapp.hcl
```



Type of Vault  
object you want  
to work with



Subcommand



Define the name  
of the policy you  
want to create



The location of the file  
containing the pre-written  
policy



# Managing Policies in Vault

Command Line Interface (CLI)



```
TERMINAL
$ vault policy write webapp -<< EOF
path "kv/data/apps/*" {
    capabilities = ["read", "create", "update", "delete"]
}
path "kv/metadata/*" {
    capabilities = ["read", "create", "update", "list"]
}
EOF
```





# Managing Policies Using the UI



# Managing Policies in Vault

User Interface (UI)

ACL Policies

Filter policies

Create ACL policy +

admin-policy

Click to Download/View/Edit Policy

default

Click to View/Edit/Delete Policy

root

The root policy does not contain any rules but can do anything within Vault. It should be used with extreme care.

## Create a New Policy





# Managing Policies Using the API



# Managing Policies in Vault

HTTP API



## Creating a new Vault policy

- Method: POST

Create  
Vault  
Policy

```
Terminal
$ curl \
  --header "X-Vault-Token: hvs.bCEo8HFNIIR8wRGAzwUk" \
  --request PUT \
  --data @payload.json \
  http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/sys/policy/webapp
```

Don't forget you need  
a valid token

API Endpoint

Name of the new policy



# Managing Policies in Vault

HTTP API



## Payload File:

```
payload.json
{
  "policy": "path \\"kv/apps/webapp\\" { capabilities... "
}
```





# Anatomy of a Vault Policy



# Anatomy of a Vault Policy



- Remember: Everything in Vault is path based
  - Policies grant or forbid access to those paths and operations

Two key parts to a Vault policy:

```
path "<path>" {  
    capabilities = ["<list of permissions>"]  
}
```



# Anatomy of a Vault Policy



```
path "<path>" {  
    capabilities = ["<list of permissions>"]  
}  
  
path "<path>" {  
    capabilities = ["<list of permissions>"]  
}  
  
path "<path>" {  
    capabilities = ["<list of permissions>"]  
}
```



# Anatomy of a Vault Policy



```
path "kv\data\apps\jenkins" {
    capabilities = ["read", "update", "delete"]
}

path "sys/policies/*" {
    capabilities = ["create", "update", "list", "delete"]
}

path "aws/creds/web-app" {
    capabilities = ["read"]
}
```





# Vault Policies - Path



# Vault Policies - Path



- Path: we already know what a path is
  - see Vault Architecture and Pathing Structure in Section 1 for a review
- Examples of paths:
  - sys/policy/vault-admin
  - kv/apps/app01/web
  - auth/ldap/group/developers
  - database/creds/prod-db
  - secrets/data/platform/aws/tools/ansible/app01
  - sys/rekey



# The Details are in the Path



## Path of an Object

secrets/data/platform/aws/tools/ansible

Path where the  
secrets engine  
is mounted

Required  
for a KV v2  
secrets  
engine

Higher-Level Paths  
(data could be stored at each  
one if needed)

Where the  
key/value pairs are  
stored and  
retrieved



# Vault Policies - Path




- Root-Protected Paths
  - Many paths in Vault require a root token or sudo capability to use
  - These paths focus on important/critical paths for Vault or plugins
- Examples of root-protected paths:
  - auth/token/create-orphan (create an orphan token)
  - pki/root/sign-self-issued (sign a self-issued certificate)
  - sys/rotate (rotate the encryption key)
  - sys/seal (manually seal Vault)
  - sys/step-down (force the leader to give up active status)



# Vault Policies - Path



- Examples of root-protected paths:
  - sys/rotate (rotate the encryption key)
  - sys/seal (manually seal Vault)
  - sys/step-down (force the leader to give up active status)



The terminal window shows the contents of a file named "admin-policy.hcl". The code defines three paths, each with the "sudo" capability:

```
admin-policy.hcl

path "sys/rotate" {
    capabilities = ["sudo"]
}
path "sys/seal" {
    capabilities = ["sudo"]
}
path "sys/step-down" {
    capabilities = ["sudo"]
}
```





# Vault Policies - Capabilities



# Vault Policies - Capabilities



- Capabilities define what can we do?
  - Capabilities are specified as a list of strings (yes, even if there's just one)

Capability	HTTP Verb
create	POST/PUT
read	GET
update	POST/PUT
delete	DELETE
list	LIST

Capability	Description
sudo	Allows access to paths that are <i>root-protected</i>
deny	Disallows access regardless of any other defined capabilities

create = if the key does not yet exist

update = if the key exists and you want to replace/update it



# Vault Policies - Capabilities



- **Create** – create a new entry
- **Read** – read credentials, configurations, etc
- **Update** – overwrite the existing value of a secret or configuration
- **Delete** – delete something
- **List** – view what's there (doesn't allow you to read)
- **Sudo** – used for root-protected paths
- **Deny** – deny access – always takes precedence over any other capability

**Note:** Write is not a valid capability



# Vault Policy - Example



## Requirement:

- Access to generate database credentials at `database/creds/db01`
- Create, Update, Read, and Delete secrets stored at `kv/apps/dev-app01`

```
path "database/creds/dev-db01" {
    capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "kv/apps/dev-app01" {
    capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete"]
}
```

One Policy  
With  
Multiple Rules




# Vault Policy - Example

## Requirements:

- Access to read credentials after the path  
**kv/apps/webapp**
- Deny access to **kv/apps/webapp/super-secret**

```
path "kv/apps/webapp/*" {
    capabilities = ["read"]
}

path "kv/apps/webapp/super_secret" {
    capabilities = ["deny"]
}
```



# Pop Quiz



Q: Does this policy permit access to kv/apps/webapp?

A: No, because the policy only permits access to secrets AFTER kv/apps/webapp

```
path "kv/apps/webapp/*" {
    capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "kv/apps/webapp/super_secret" {
    capabilities = ["deny"]
}
```




# Pop Quiz



Q: Does this policy permit you to browse to kv/apps/webapp in the UI?

A: No, because the policy only permits list at the listed path, not the paths leading up to the desired path

```
path "kv/apps/webapp/*" {
    capabilities = ["read", "list"]
}
```





# Customizing the Path



# Using the \* to Customize the Path



- The glob (\*) is a wildcard and can only be used at the end of a path
- Can be used to signify anything "after" a path or as part of a pattern
- Examples:
  - secret/apps/application1/\* - allows any path after application1
  - kv/platform/db-\* - would match kv/platform/db-2 but not kv/platform/db2



# The Details are in the Path



secret/apps/application1/\*



Path where the  
secrets engine  
is mounted



Path created on the secrets engine  
called `secret`



Apply capabilities on  
anything AFTER  
application1



# Does it Match?



secret/apps/application1/\*

Path must start with this – nothing else

Must ALSO include something beyond application1

## Paths that Match

- ✓ secret/apps/application1/db
- ✓ secret/apps/application1/data/production
- ✓ secret/apps/application1/web-app
- ✓ secret/apps/application1/keys/api\_key

## Paths that Do Not Match

- ✗ secret/apps/database
- ✗ secret/apps/application2
- ✗ secret/data/front-end
- ✗ kv/secret/app/application



# Pop Quiz



Given the policy:

```
path "secret/apps/application1/*" {  
    capabilities = ["read"]  
}
```



Can I read from the following path?

secret/apps/application1

Answer:

No, because the policy only permits read access for anything AFTER application1, not the path secret/apps/application1 itself



# Pop Quiz



If we wanted to ALSO read from `secret/apps/application1`, the policy would look like this:

```
path "secret/apps/application1/*" {
    capabilities = ["read"]
}

path "secret/apps/application1" {
    capabilities = ["read"]
}
```

NEW



# Using the + to Customize the Path



- The plus (+) supports wildcard matching for a single directory in the path
- Can be used in multiple path segments (i.e., secret/+/+/db)
- Examples:
  - secret/+/db - matches secret/db2/db or secret/app/db
  - kv/data/apps/+/webapp – matches the following:
    - kv/data/apps/dev/webapp
    - kv/data/apps/qa/webapp
    - kv/data/apps/prod/webapp




# The Details are in the Path



secret/data/+/apps/webapp



Path where the  
secrets engine  
is mounted



Used for KV V2  
Secrets Engine



Can be ANY  
value



Remaining path



# Does it Match?



secret/data/+/apps/webapp

Path must start with  
this – nothing else

Can be  
ANY value

Path must end with  
this – nothing else

## Paths that Match

- ✓ secret/data/production/apps/webapp
- ✓ secret/data/dev1/apps/webapp
- ✓ secret/data/team-abc/apps/webapp
- ✓ secret/data/456/apps/webapp

## Paths that Do Not Match

- ✗ secret/data/apps/webapp
- ✗ secret/app123/dev
- ✗ secret/data/front-end/apps
- ✗ secret/dev/apps/webapp



# Example Policy



• Using multiple + in a policy

```
path "secret/+/+/webapp" {  
    capabilities = ["read", "list"]  
}
```

```
path "secret/apps/+/team-*" { ←  
    capabilities = ["create", "read"]  
}
```

Combining the \* and + in a policy



# ACL Templating



- Use variable replacement in some policy strings with values available to the token
- Define policy paths containing double curly braces: {{<parameter>}}

Example: Creates a section of the key/value v2 secret engine to a specific user

```
path "secret/data/{{identity.entity.id}}/*" {
    capabilities = ["create", "update", "read", "delete"]
}

path "secret/metadata/{{identity.entity.id}}/*" {
    capabilities = ["list"]
}
```



# ACL Templating



Parameter	Description
identity.entity.id	The entity's ID
identity.entity.name	The entity's name
identity.entity.metadata.<<metadata key>>	Metadata associated with the entity for the given key
identity.entity.aliases.<<mount accessor>>.id	Entity alias ID for the given mount
identity.entity.aliases.<<mount accessor>>.name	Entity alias name for the given mount
identity.entity.aliases.<<mount accessor>>.metadata.<<metadata key>>	Metadata associated with the alias for the given mount and metadata key
identity.groups.ids.<<group id>>.name	The group name for the given group ID
identity.groups.names.<<group name>>.id	The group ID for the given group name
identity.groups.names.<<group id>>.metadata.<<metadata key>>	Metadata associated with the group for the given key
identity.groups.names.<<group name>>.metadata.<<metadata key>>	Metadata associated with the group for the given key





# Working with Policies



# What Policies are Attached?



Create a new token with "web-app" policy attached:

```
$ vault token create -policy="web-app"

Key          Value
---          -----
token        s.7uBlZwXSxOg31uGXIUetEdXD
token_accessor 18r88muoe3x1xEqVqXd1TMwJ
token_duration 768h
token_renewable true
token_policies ["default" "web-app"]
identity_policies []
token_policies [default web-app]
```

Every token gets the **default** policy  
plus the assigned policy or policies



# Testing Policies



Test to make sure the policy fulfills the requirements

## Example Requirements:

- Clients must be able to request AWS credential granting read access to a S3 bucket
- Read secrets from secret/apikey/Google

TERMINAL

```
$ vault token create -policy="web-app"

# Authenticate with the newly generated token
$ vault login <token>

# Make sure that the token can read
$ vault read secret/apikey/Google

# This should fail
$ vault write secret/apikey/Google key="ABCDE12345"

# Request a new AWS credentials
$ vault read aws/creds/s3-readonly
```

# Administrative Policies



- Permissions for Vault backend functions live at the sys/ path
- Users/admins will need policies that define what they can do within Vault to administer Vault itself
  - Unsealing
  - Changing policies
  - Adding secret backends
  - Configuring database configurations



# Administrative Policies



CERTIFIED  
OPERATIONS  
PROFESSIONAL

Licensing

Setup New Vault Cluster

Configure UI

Rotate Keys

Seal Vault

```
# Configure License
path "sys/license" {
    capabilities = ["read", "list", "create", "update", "delete"]
}
# Initialize Vault
path "sys/init" {
    capabilities = ["read", "update", "create"]
}
# Configure UI in Vault
path "sys/config/ui" {
    capabilities = ["read", "list", "update", "delete", "sudo"]
}
# Allow rekey of unseal keys for Vault
path "sys/rekey/*" {
    capabilities = ["read", "list", "update", "delete"]
}
# Allows rotation of master key
path "sys/rotate" {
    capabilities = ["update", "sudo"]
}
# Allows Vault seal
path "sys/seal" {
    capabilities = ["sudo"]
}
```



# END OF SECTION





# Understand Sentinel Policies



# What is Sentinel?



Sentinel is an embeddable **policy as code** framework to enable *fine-grained, logic-based* policy decisions that can be *extended* to source external information to make decisions.






## Policy as Code

Treat policy like an application — version control, pull review, and automate tests. Use programming constructs to determine policy decisions beyond the limited constraints of typical ACL systems.



## Enforcement Levels

Advisory, soft-mandatory, and hard-mandatory levels allow policy writers to warn on or reject offending behavior.



## Fine Grained, Conditioned-Based

Treat policy like an application — version control, pull review, and automate tests. Use programming constructs to determine policy decisions beyond the limited constraints of typical ACL systems.



## External Information

Sentinel can permit or deny actions based upon external information available to the token, such as time, IP address, requested path, etc.



## Embedded

Sentinel is embedded to enable policy enforcement in the data path to actively reject violating behavior instead of passively detecting.



## Multi-Cloud Compatible

Ensure infrastructure changes are within business and regulatory policy on every infrastructure provider.

# Multi-Platform



**Sentinel is NOT just a Vault feature.**

It is available in the Enterprise versions of other HashiCorp Products.



# Types of Sentinel Policies



## Role Governing Policies (RGPs)

- Sentinel policies that are tied to **tokens**, **identity entities**, or **identity groups**
- Access to rich set of controls across various aspects of Vault

## Endpoint Governing Policies (EGPs)

- Sentinel policies that are tied to **paths** instead of tokens
- Access to as much request information as possible
  - Can take an effect even on unauthenticated paths (e.g., login paths)



# Anatomy of a Sentinel Policy



- **Import** – access to reusable libraries to import information or use features
- **Main** – (required) the main rule to be evaluated
- **Rule** – describes a set of conditions resulting in either true or false
- **Variables** – optional, dynamically typed variable

```
import "<library>"  
<variable> = <value>  
<name> = rule { <condition_to_evaluate> }  
main = rule {  
    <condition_to_evaluate>  
}
```



# Imports



Example of **Imports** that can be used with Sentinel:

- **base64** – encode & decode Base64 values
- **decimal** – provides functions for operating on numbers as decimals
- **http** – enables the use of HTTP-accessible data outside of the runtime in Sentinel rules
- **json** – parse and access a JSON document
- **runtime** – contains various information about Sentinel runtime
- **sockaddr** – enables working with IP addresses
- **strings** – enables common string operations
- **time** – provides access to execution time and time functions
- **types** – ability to parse an object's type
- **units** – provides access to quick calculations for various byte units
- **version** – used to parse versions and version constraints

These allow fine-grained controls over your Vault environment



# Sentinel Policy Example - RGP



Only allow a specific entity or groups

```
main = rule {
    identity.entity.name is "jeff" or
    identity.entity.id is "fe2a5bfd-c483-9263-b0d4-f9d345efdf9f" or
    "sysops" in identity.groups.names or
    "14c0940a-5c07-4b97-81ec-0d423accb8e0" in keys(identity.groups.by-id)
}
```

If the user "Jeff" is deleted and recreated, the match will fail because we're also enforcing the entity ID



# Sentinel Policy Example - EGP



Disallow all previously-generated tokens based on date:

- You could apply this EGP to the "\*" endpoint

```
import "time"

main = rule when not request.unauthenticated {
    time.load(token.creation_time).unix >
    time.load("2022-12-25T00:00:01Z").unix
}
```

Could be used as a "break-glass" scenario where previous tokens were compromised



# Sentinel Policy Example - EGP




```
import "sockaddr"
import "mfa"
import "strings"

# We expect logins to come only from a specific private IP range
cidrcheck = rule {
    sockaddr.is_contained(request.connection.remote_addr, "10.0.23.0/16")
}

# Require Ping MFA validation to succeed
ping_valid = rule {
    mfa.methods.ping.valid
}

main = rule when request.path is "auth/ldap/login" {
    ping_valid and cidrcheck
}
```

Sets the scope of policy



# Enforcement Levels



Sentinel offers three different enforcement levels that can be set per Sentinel policy:

Enforcement Level	Description
Advisory	The policy is allowed to fail
Soft Mandatory	The policy must pass unless an override is specified
Hard Mandatory	The policy must pass no matter what

To override a Sentinel policy (soft mandatory), use the `-policy-override` flag when executing the Vault command



# Deploy Sentinel Policies via UI



A screenshot of the Vault UI interface. The title bar shows "Vault" and the URL "vault.hcavp.com:8200/ui/vault/rgp". The navigation bar includes "Secrets", "Access", "Policies", and "Tools". A yellow arrow points from the title bar down to the "Policies" section. Within the "Policies" section, there are three items: "ACL Policies", "Role Governing Policies" (which has a green arrow pointing to it), and "Endpoint Governing Policies" (which has a blue arrow pointing to it). The main content area is titled "RGP Policies" and shows a message: "No RGP policies yet. A list of policies will be listed here. Create your first RGP policy to get started." It includes "Create RGP policy" and "Learn more" buttons.



# Deploy RGP Sentinel Policy via UI



The screenshot shows the Vault UI for creating a new Role Governing Policy (RGP). The left sidebar shows "POLICIES" with options for "ACL Policies", "Role Governing Policies" (which is selected), and "Endpoint Governing Policies". The main panel is titled "Create RGP policy". The "Name" field contains "business-hours-access" with a yellow arrow pointing to it. The "Policy" field contains the following Groovy script:

```
1
2
3 import "time"
4
5 # Expect requests to only happen during work days (Monday through Friday)
6 # 0 for Sunday and 6 for Saturday
7 workdays = rule {
8     time.now.weekday > 0 and time.now.weekday < 6
9 }
10
11 # Expect requests to only happen during work hours (7:00 am - 6:00 pm)
12 workhours = rule {
13     time.now.hour > 7 and time.now.hour < 18
14 }
15
```

A small note at the bottom of the policy editor says: "You can use Alt+Tab (Option+Tab on MacOS) in the code editor to skip to the next field". Below the policy editor, the "Enforcement level" dropdown is set to "hard-mandatory" with a blue arrow pointing to it. At the bottom are "Create policy" and "Cancel" buttons.



# Deploy EGP Sentinel Policy via UI




The screenshot shows the Vault UI interface for creating a new EGP policy. The left sidebar lists "POLICIES" with options for "ACL Policies", "Role Governing Policies", and "Endpoint Governing Policies". The main area is titled "Create EGP policy".  
The "Name" field contains "cidr-validation-jenkins" with a green arrow pointing to it.  
The "Policy" code editor contains the following Groovy script:

```
1 import "sockaddr"
2 import "strings"
3
4 # Expect requests to come only from our Jenkins server
5 cidrcheck = rule {
6     sockaddr.is_contained(request.connection.remote_addr, "10.0.16.88/32")
7 }
8
9 main = rule {
10     cidrcheck
11 }
```

A note below the code editor says: "You can use Alt+Tab (Option+Tab on MacOS) in the code editor to skip to the next field".  
The "Enforcement level" dropdown is set to "hard-mandatory" with a blue arrow pointing to it.  
The "Paths" input field contains "kv/automation/jenkins" with a red arrow pointing to it.  
At the bottom are "Create policy" and "Cancel" buttons.



# Policy Evaluation





# END OF SECTION





# Define Control Groups and Describe their Basic Workflow



# Control Groups



- Control groups add an **additional authorization** requirement on configured paths
- When a control group is created, the following will occur:
  1. The client makes a request to a path as normal
  2. Vault returns a wrapping token – rather than the requested secrets
  3. The authorizers defined in the control group policy must approve the request
  4. Once all authorizations are satisfied, the client can unwrap the secrets




# Control Group Factors



- Control Group requirements can be specified in either **ACL policies** or within a **Sentinel policy**
- Currently, the only supported Control Group **factor** is an Identity Group
  - An authorizer must belong to a specific identity group
  - The policy will define the group, or groups, who are approvers for the requested path



# Control Group Workflow



# Control Group Workflow




Note: If the authorization can not be satisfied, the token is revoked



5. vault unwrap hvs.CAESIPvNkRg...

6. Response

```
"data": {  
    "order": "5830375749202",  
    "customer": "HCVOP9943250D2",  
    "data": "25-12-2002",  
    "creditcard": "1234-5678-0987-6553",  
    ...  
}
```



Policy with Group Control on  
kv/data/customers/orders

4. Authorize  
4. Authorize



# Control Groups in Vault Policies



```
path "kv/data/customers/orders" {
    capabilities = ["read"]
    control_group = {
        factor "acct_manager" {
            identity {
                group_names = ["account-managers"]
                approvals = 2
            }
        }
    }
}
```

Regular ACL Policy

Control Group

We need two account managers to approve this request



# Control Groups in Sentinel Policies (EGP)



Deploy this EGP against  
kv/data/customers/orders

```
import "controlgroup"

control_group = func() {
    numAuthzs = 0
    for controlgroup.authorizations as authz {
        if "account-managers" in authz.groups.by_name {
            numAuthzs = numAuthzs + 1
        }
    }
    if numAuthzs >= 2 {
        return true
    }
    return false
}

main = rule {
    control_group()
}
```



We need two account  
managers to approve  
this request



# Control Groups in Action (CLI)



```
$ vault login hvs.CAESIA7Y-LwSxnE926onQwdxIUF7w7KJ5-  
Success! You are now authenticated. The token information displayed below  
is already stored in the token helper. You do NOT need to run "vault login"  
again. Future Vault requests will automatically use this token.  
  
Key          Value  
---          ----  
token        hvs.CAESIA7Y-LwSxnE926onQwdxIUF7w7KJ5-  
token_accessor    72N0rlUJDuMy4LWiTbUhh8n6  
token_duration    767h59m51s  
token_renewable    true  
token_policies   ["ctl-grp-cust-data" "default"]  
identity_policies []  
policies        ["ctl-grp-cust-data" "default"]  
  
bk~$ vault kv get kv/customers/orders  
Key          Value  
---          ----  
wrapping_token:      hvs.H5IATHFed2Aqk5RSvW1eEF4d  
wrapping_accessor:  vGIHUUfodJLCUho87VZjsCb4  
wrapping_token_ttl: 24h  
wrapping_token_creation_time: 2022-12-25 10:00:31 -0400 EDT  
wrapping_token_creation_path: kv/data/customers/orders
```

TERMINAL

I authenticated with a token tied to a policy with a Control Group

Requested data from KV store

Got wrapping token and accessor instead of data



# Authorizer Actions (Account Manager)



The screenshot illustrates the process of granting access to a specific path in HashiCorp Vault. The interface shows three nested panels:

- Outer Panel:** Shows the main navigation bar with "Access" selected. The left sidebar lists "Leases" and "Control Groups".
- Middle Panel:** Shows a sub-navigation bar with "Access" selected. The left sidebar lists "Leases" and "Control Groups". A red box highlights the "Authorize" button in the bottom right corner of this panel.
- Inner Panel:** Shows the "Control Groups" page. It displays a message: "Thanks! You have given authorization" and "Bob Smith is authorized to access kv/data/customers/orders". It also shows a note: "Already approved by Ellen Wright".

# Not yet Authorized



TOOLS

- Wrap
- Lookup
- Unwrap**
- Rewrap
- Random
- Hash

## Unwrap data

**✗ Error**  
Request needs further authorization

Wrapping token

```
hvs.H5IATHFed2Aqk5RSvW1eEF4d
```

**Unwrap data**



# Unwrap the Secrets After Approvals

The screenshot shows two instances of the HashiCorp Vault UI running in separate browser tabs. Both tabs have the URL `127.0.0.1:8200/ui/vault/tools/unwrap`.

The left tab displays the 'Tools' menu with several options: Wrap, Lookup, Unwrap (which is highlighted in blue), Rewrap, Random, and Hash. A red box highlights the 'Tools' button in the top navigation bar.

The right tab shows the 'Unwrap data' interface. It has a 'Wrapping token' input field containing the value `hvs.CAESICgyw13`. Below it is a large blue 'Unwrap data' button. The main area is titled 'Unwrap data' and contains tabs for 'Data' (which is selected) and 'Wrap Details'. The 'Data' tab displays the 'Unwrapped Data' in JSON format:

```
{  
  "data": {  
    "customer_id": "3dj204d2",  
    "order_data": "25-12-2022",  
    "order_number": "582984729"  
  },  
  "metadata": {  
    "created_time": "2022-06-24T13:52:43.946922Z",  
    "custom_metadata": null,  
    "deletion_time": "",  
    "destroyed": false,  
    "version": 1  
  }  
}
```

At the bottom of the right tab, there are 'Copy' and 'Back' buttons.





# Describe and Interpret Multi-Tenancy with Namespaces

# What are Namespaces?



- Allows organizations to provide “Vault as a Service”
  - Provides isolated environments on single Vault environment
  - Multi-tenant but centralized management
  - Allows delegation of Vault of responsibilities
- Available in all versions of Vault Enterprise
- Each namespace can have its own:
  - Policies
  - Auth Methods
  - Secrets Engines
  - Tokens
  - Identities




# What are Namespaces?



- The default namespace is 'root'
- Namespaces are created in a hierarchical fashion
- Just like root, paths and ACLs are relative to the namespace, making easier to re-use commands and policies across multiple namespaces
- Tokens are only valid in a single namespace, but you can create an entity who has access to other namespaces






# Namespaces




# Assigning Namespaces

Production Vault Cluster



Cloud Engineers




DevOps Engineers




Core Developers



# Administrative Delegation



# Authenticating to Namespaces



# Common Namespace Commands



## Create Namespace

```
$ vault namespace create <namespace>
```

## List Namespaces

```
$ vault namespace list
```

## Delete a Namespace

```
$ vault namespace delete <namespace>
```



# Using Namespaces on the CLI



Set Namespace Environment Variable – then run commands as normal

```
$ export VAULT_NAMESPACE=<namespace>
```

Reference a Namespace on the CLI when running a command

```
$ vault kv get -namespace=<namespace> kv/data/sql/prod
```



# Referencing Namespaces in the API



## Add the API Header = X-Vault-Namespace

```
curl \  
  -header "X-Vault-Token: "hvs.a83b50ed2aa548212" \  
  -header "X-Vault-Namespace: "development/" \  
  -request GET \  
  https://vault.hcvop.com:8200/v1/kv/data/sql/prod
```



# Referencing Namespaces in the API



## Add the Namespace to the API Endpoint

```
curl \  
-header "X-Vault-Token: \"hvs.CAESIA7Y-LwSxnE926onQwdxIUF7\" \  
-request GET \  
https://vault.hcvop.com:8200/v1/development/kv/data/sql/prod
```



# Writing Policies for Namespaces



The path is relative to the Namespace

Root Namespace

Cloud-Team Namespace



database/

```
path = "database/creds/prod-db" {  
    capabilities = ["read"]  
}
```



```
path = "cloud-team/database/creds/prod-db" {  
    capabilities = ["read"]  
}
```



# Authenticating to a Namespace via UI



### Sign in to Vault

Namespace  

Method 

Username

Password

[More options](#)

[Sign In](#)

Contact your administrator for login credentials



# Authenticating to a Namespace via CLI



```
$ vault login -namespace=cloud-team -method=userpass username=bryan  
Password (will be hidden):
```

Success! You are now authenticated. The token information displayed below is already stored in the token helper. You do NOT need to run "vault login" again. Future Vault requests will automatically use this token.

Key	Value
---	-----
token	hvs.CAESIM5RikdMODs5nZrFrsecgqUKggrnXgSOZrkvXMtUXnwKGicKImh2cy5oOXlrNWFQRHNQM1Y4M G5xZkF0VFB6dVcubjU3eTYQwAM
token_accessor	rOH7HYtHmZ6fDX4z0RCJVxbF.n57y6
token_duration	768h
token_renewable	true
token_policies	["default"]
identity_policies	[]
policies	["default"]
token_meta_username	bryan



# Enabling an Auth Method In a Namespace



```
$ vault namespace create cloud-team
Key      Value
---      -----
id      n57y6
path    cloud-team/

# Enable userpass auth method using the namespace flag
$ vault auth enable -namespace=cloud-team userpass
Success! Enabled userpass auth method at: userpass

# Enable aws auth method using environment variable
$ export VAULT_NAMESPACE=cloud-team
$ vault auth enable aws
```




# Working with Namespaces in the UI




The screenshot shows the HashiCorp Vault UI interface. On the left, a sidebar lists 'Secrets Engines' with entries: 'aws/' (AWS), 'certificates/' (TLS certificates), and 'cubbyhole/' (a custom secrets engine). A large yellow arrow points from the top-left towards the 'Secrets' tab in the main header. The main content area has a dark header with tabs: 'Secrets' (which is active and highlighted in blue), 'Access', 'Policies', and 'Tools'. Below the header, a modal dialog is open over the main content. The dialog title is 'CURRENT NAMESPACE'. It shows 'root' with a green checkmark. Below that is a section titled 'NAMESPACES' with a single entry 'bryan'. At the bottom of the dialog is a button labeled 'Manage namespaces'. The background of the main content area shows the same three secrets engines listed again.




## Administrative Delegation



## Control Group Workflow



## Assigning Namespaces



## Oh No...Our Cluster...It's Broken

