

March 23/24: Critique of Values

[Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §260](#) 

[Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morality 1.4, 13-5; 2.16, 18-25; 3.11-12, 24-26](#) 

NB: Make sure to read the translations of the long Latin quotations in the footnotes for §1.15.

[Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science §344](#) 

☞ **Friedrich Nietzsche** ☞ (1844-1900) was a German philosopher and cultural critic. Our first session this week will focus on Nietzsche's diagnosis: his account of what is the case that demands the rather striking way of life that he advocates. Our second will focus on the substance of that way of life: the life of overcoming.

Questions to consider as you read:

How does the transition from "good and bad" to "good and evil" take place?

How does Christianity lead toward nihilism, in Nietzsche's analysis?

How does Nietzsche's claim that "there is only a perspectival seeing" affect the task of discerning the shape of a life worth living?

Friedrich Nietzsche

Beyond Good and Evil /
On the Genealogy of Morality

*Translated, with an Afterword,
by Adrian Del Caro*

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unpublished writings based on the original manuscripts.

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260

While wandering through the many subtler and cruder moralities that have prevailed so far on earth or still prevail, I found certain traits regularly recurring with one another and connected to each other: until finally two basic types revealed themselves to me and a fundamental difference leapt forth. There is *master-morality* and *slave-morality*;—I hasten to add that in all higher and more mixed cultures attempts at mediation of both moralities also appear, even more frequently the intermingling of the two and mutual misunderstanding, indeed on occasion their close coexistence—even in the same human being, within a single soul. Moral value-distinctions have arisen either under a dominating type, that became pleasantly aware of its difference vis-à-vis the dominated—or under the dominated, the slaves and those who are dependent to every degree. In the first case, when the ruling group determines the concept “good,” it is the elevated, proud states of the soul that are perceived as distinguishing and determining the rank order. The noble human being sets apart from himself those in whom the opposite of such elevated, proud states expresses itself: he despises them. We note at once that in this first kind of morality the contrast between “good” and “bad” amounts to “noble” and “contemptible”:—the contrast between “good” and “evil” is of a different origin.³ Contempt is felt for the cowardly, the anxious, the petty, and the one who thinks about his own narrow utility; likewise the suspicious with their burdened glances, those who debase themselves, the dog-like people who allow themselves to be abused, the begging sycophants, and above all the liars:—it is a basic belief of all aristocrats that the common folk are mendacious. “We truthful ones”⁴ —this is what the nobility in ancient Greece called themselves. It is plain to see that moral

value-distinctions were first applied everywhere to *human beings* and only derivatively and later to *actions*: that is why it is a serious mistake when historians of morality proceed from such questions as “why are compassionate acts praised?” The noble kind of human being feels *itself* to be value-determining, does not need approval, judges “what is harmful to me is harmful in and of itself,” knows itself to be that which imparts honor to things in the first place, is *value-creating*. Everything it recognizes in itself it honors: such a morality is self-glorification. In the foreground there is the feeling of fullness, of power that wants to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of wealth that would bestow and give of itself:—the noble human being also helps the unfortunate, but not or almost not from compassion, but from an urge produced by an excess of power. The noble human being honors in itself the one who is powerful, also the one who has power over itself, who knows how to speak and to keep silent, who joyfully exercises discipline and harshness over itself and respects everything that is severe and harsh. “A hard heart Wotan has put into my breast” reads a line from an old Scandinavian saga: this is fitting poetry indeed from the soul of a proud Viking. Such a human being is proud that it is *not* made for compassion, which is why the hero of the saga adds the warning “if someone’s heart is not already hard in youth, his heart will never become hard.” Noble and courageous human beings who think in this manner are furthest from that morality that sees the distinguishing feature of morality precisely in compassion or in acting on behalf of others or in *désintéressement*;⁵ belief in oneself, pride in oneself, a fundamental hostility and irony toward “selflessness” belong just as surely to noble morality as a mild disdain and caution toward sympathy and a “warm heart.”—It is the powerful who *understand* how to honor, it is their art, their realm of invention. Deep reverence for age and for one’s background—all law is based on this double reverence—faith and prejudice in favor of one’s forefathers and at the expense of future generations are

typical in the morality of the powerful; and conversely when people of "modern ideas" almost instinctively believe in "progress" and "the future" and increasingly lose their respect for age, this in itself suffices to expose the ignoble descent of these "ideas." But most of all a morality of ruling types is foreign and painful to contemporary taste in the severity of its principle that one has duties only to one's peers; that toward beings of a lower rank and toward everything alien one can behave as he pleases or "as the heart desires" and in any case "beyond good and evil"—: this is where compassion and so on might belong. The capacity and duty for long gratitude and long revenge—both only among peers—subtlety in retaliation, refinement of the concept of friendship, a certain necessity for having enemies (as it were as safety valves for the affects of envy, quarrelsome ness, impudence—basically in order to be a good *friend*): all of these are typical traits of noble morality which, as indicated above, is not a morality of "modern ideas" and is therefore difficult to empathize with today, also difficult to excavate and uncover.—Things are different with the second type of morality, *slave-morality*. Suppose the violated, oppressed, suffering, unfree, those who are unsure of themselves, and the weary were to moralize: what would their moral valuations have in common? Probably a pessimistic suspicion of the whole condition of humanity will find expression, perhaps a condemnation of humanity along with his condition. The slave's gaze is not favorable to the virtues of the powerful: he is skeptical and suspicious, he has a *subtle* mistrust of everything "good" that is honored there—he wants to convince himself that even their happiness is not genuine. Conversely those qualities are foregrounded and highlighted that serve to alleviate the existence of sufferers: here compassion, the obliging and helping hand, a warm heart, patience, industriousness, humility and friendliness are held in honor—since here these are the most useful qualities and practically the only means of enduring the pressure of existence. Slave-morality is essentially the morality of

utility. This is the cradle of the emergence of that famous opposition of "good" and "evil":—power and danger are sensed to belong to evil, a certain dreadfulness, subtlety and strength that prohibits the rise of contempt. According to slave-morality then, "evil" arouses fear; according to master-morality it is precisely the "good" who arouse and want to arouse fear, whereas the "bad" are perceived as contemptible. The opposition comes to a head when, following the logic of slave-morality, ultimately a tinge of disdain is also associated with the "good" of this morality—it may be mild and benevolent—because the good within the slave's way of thinking has to be the *undangerous human being* in any case: he is good-natured, easy to deceive, maybe a bit stupid, *un bonhomme*.⁶ Wherever slave-morality gains the upper hand, language reveals a tendency to conflate the words "good" and "stupid."—One last fundamental difference: the longing for *freedom*, the instinct for happiness and the subtleties of feeling for freedom belong just as necessarily to slave-morals and slave-morality⁷ as the art and fanaticism of reverence and devotion are regular symptoms of an aristocratic way of thinking and valuing.—From this we can readily understand why love as *passion*—it is our European specialty—absolutely has to be of noble lineage: as is well known its invention is traced to the knight-troubadours of Provence, those magnificent, inventive human beings of the "*gai saber*"⁸ to whom Europe owes so much and nearly its very self.—

On the Genealogy of Morality
A Polemic



220

ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY



4⁶

—I was pointed in the *right* direction by the question of what the terms for “good” really mean in an etymological respect as formulated by the different languages: here I found that they all lead back to the *same conceptual transformation*—that ev-

everywhere in the context of classes "noble," "lordly" is the basic concept from which "good" in the sense of "noble of soul," "lordly," of "superior of soul," "privileged of soul" necessarily develops: a development that always runs parallel with the other that ultimately causes "common," "rabble-like," "lowly" to cross over to the concept "bad." The most eloquent example of the latter is the German word "*schlecht*"⁷ itself: which is identical with "*schlicht*"⁸—compare "*schlechtweg*," "*schlechterdings*"⁹—and originally referred to the simple, common man still viewed without a suspicious second glance, simply contrasted with a nobleman. Around the time of the Thirty Years' War, late enough therefore, the meaning shifted to that used today.—This seems to me an *essential* insight with respect to moral genealogy; that it was only discovered so late is due to the inhibiting influence exerted by the democratic prejudice in the modern world concerning all questions of descent, and this extends into the seemingly most objective sphere of natural science and physiology, as can merely be suggested here. But the mischief that this prejudice can cause especially for morality and history, once it is unleashed to the point of hatred, is shown by the infamous case of Buckle;¹⁰ here the *plebeianism* of the modern spirit, which is of English extraction, burst forth once more from its native soil, violently like a muddy volcano and with the oversalted, overloud, vulgar eloquence with which all volcanoes so far have spoken.—

—But let us return: the problem of the *other* origin of "good," of the good man as conceived by the man of *resentiment*, demands its conclusion.—It does not seem strange that lambs bear a grudge against the great birds of prey: only this is no reason to hold it against the great birds of prey that they snatch themselves little lambs.⁴⁸ And when the lambs say to each other "these birds of prey are evil; and whoever is a bird of prey to the least possible extent, rather even its opposite, a lamb—does he not have to be good?" then there is nothing wrong with this construction of an ideal, even if the birds of prey were to look upon this a bit sarcastically and perhaps say to themselves: "*we do not bear a grudge against them, these good lambs, in fact we love them: nothing is tastier than a tender lamb.*"—To demand of strength that it *not* express itself as strength, that it *not* be a will to overwhelm, a will to topple, a will to become master, a thirst for enemies and obstacles and triumphs, is just as absurd as demanding of weakness, that it express itself as strength. A quantum of force is just such a quantum of drive, of will, of effect—moreover it is nothing but this very driving, willing, effecting, and it can only appear otherwise under the seduction of language (and the basic errors of reason petrified in it), which understands and misunderstands all effecting as conditioned by something that effects, by a "subject." For instance, just as ordinary people separate lightning from its flashing and take the latter as its *doing*, as the effect of a subject that is called lightning, so too popular morality separates strength from the expressions of strength, as if behind the strong one there were an indifferent substratum *free to* express strength or not to. But there is no such substratum; there is no "being" behind the doing, effecting, becoming; the "doer" is merely tacked on as a fiction to the doing—the doing is everything. The people basically double the doing when they have the lightning flashing; this is a doing-doing: it posits the same occurrence once as cause and

then once more as its effect. Natural scientists do no better when they say "force moves, force causes" and so on—despite all its coolness, its freedom from affect, our entire science still stands under the seduction of language and has not gotten rid of the false changelings foisted upon it, the "subjects" (the atom for instance is such a changeling, likewise the Kantian "thing in itself"): no wonder that the repressed, secretly glowing affects of revenge and hatred exploit this belief for themselves and basically even uphold no belief more ardently than the one that says *the strong is free* to be weak, and the bird of prey to be a lamb:—this way after all they gain the right to make the bird of prey accountable for being a bird of prey . . . When from the vengeful cunning of their impotence the oppressed, the downtrodden, and the violated encourage one another, saying: "Let's be different than the evil ones, namely good! And good is whoever does not violate, injures no one, who ever does not attack, does not retaliate, leaves revenge to God, who ever like us keeps himself hidden, steers clear of all evil and generally demands little of life, like us patient, humble, righteous souls"—then this really means, heard dispassionately and without prejudice, nothing more than: "we weak ones simply happen to be weak; it is good that we do nothing that we are not strong enough to do"—but this harsh matter of fact, this prudence of the lowest sort possessed even by insects (who presumably play dead when in grave danger in order not to do "too much"), has disguised itself in the pomp of resigning, quiet and patient virtue thanks to that counterfeiting and self-deception of impotence, just as if the very weakness of the weak—that is of course his *essence*, his effect, his entire singular, unavoidable, inseparable reality—were a voluntary achievement, something willed, chosen, a *deed*, a *merit*. This kind of human being needs the belief in an indifferent elective "subject" due to his instinct of self-preservation and self-affirmation, in which every lie tends to sanctify itself. The subject (or, to speak in more popular terms, the *soul*) is perhaps the best article of faith on earth so far, because it enabled the

majority of mortals, the weak and oppressed of every kind, to interpret weakness itself as freedom, and their being thus-and-such as a *merit*.

14

— Does anyone want to go down and take a little peek into the secret of how *ideals are fabricated* on earth? Who has the courage to do this? . . . Well then! Here we have an open view into this dark workshop. Wait just another minute, Mr. Nosey and Daredevil: Your eyes need first to get used to this falsely shimmering light . . . So! Enough! Speak up now! What's going on down there? Tell us what you see, man of the most dangerous curiosity—now I am the one who's listening.—

— "I don't see anything, but I hear all the more. There's a cautious, malicious, soft rumor and whispering coming from all the corners and nooks. It seems to me people are lying; a sugary smoothness clings to every sound. Weakness is in the process of being lied into a *merit*, there is no doubt—it's just as you said it was." —

— Go on!

— "and impotence that does not retaliate into 'kindness'; anxious baseness into 'humility'; subjugation to those whom they hate into 'obedience' (namely to the one they say commands this subjugation—they call him God). The inoffensiveness of the weak man, cowardice itself, of which he has a wealth; his standing-at-the-door, his unavoidable having-to-wait assume a good name here, as 'patience,' it is even called *the virtue*; not being able to avenge oneself is called not wanting to avenge oneself, perhaps even forgiveness ('for *they* know not what *they* do'⁴⁹—we alone know what *they* do!). They're also talking about 'love of their enemies'⁵⁰—and sweating⁵¹ at the same time."

— Go on!

— "They're miserable, no doubt about it, all these whisperers and nook-dwelling counterfeiters, even though they're

crouching together warmly—but they tell me their misery is an election and selection by God, that people beat the dogs they love most; maybe this misery is also a preparation, a test, a schooling, maybe it's even more—something that will one day be compensated for and paid out with tremendous interest in gold, no! in happiness. They call it 'blessedness.'

—Go on!

—“Now they’re letting me know that they’re not only better than the mighty, the rulers of the earth whose spittle they have to lick (*not* out of fear, not in the least out of fear! but because God commands that all the authorities be honored⁵²)—that they are not only better, but even ‘have it better,’ or in any case will have it better someday. But enough! enough! I can’t take it anymore. Bad air! Bad air! This workshop where they *fabricate ideals*—it seems to me it stinks of nothing but lies.”

—No! Wait a minute! You haven’t said anything yet about the masterpiece of these black magic artists who produce white, milk and innocence from every black:—haven’t you noticed what is their ultimate in refinement, their boldest, subtlest, most ingenious, most mendacious artistic stroke? Pay attention! These cellar animals full of vengeance and hatred—what exactly do they make out of vengeance and hatred? Did you ever hear these words? If you trusted only their words, would you suspect you were among people of *ressentiment*? . . .

—“I understand, I’ll open my ears again (oh! oh! oh! and close my nose). Now I am hearing again what they have so often said before: ‘We good—we are the just’—what they demand they do not call retaliation, but ‘the triumph of justice’; what they hate is not their enemy, no! they hate *injustice*, *godlessness*; what they believe and hope is not the hope for revenge, the drunkenness of sweet revenge (—‘sweeter than honey’ Homer⁵³ already called it), but the victory of God, of the *just* God over the godless; what remains for them to love



on earth are not their brothers in hate, but their ‘brothers in love,’⁵⁴ as they say, all the good and just of the earth.”

—And what do they call that which serves as their comfort against all the sufferings of life—their phantasmagoria of anticipated future blessedness?

—“What? Did I hear right? They call it “the last judgment,” the coming of *their* kingdom, the ‘kingdom of God’—meanwhile however they live ‘in faith,’ ‘in love,’ ‘in hope.’”⁵⁵

—Enough! Enough!

15

In faith in what? In love of what? In hope of what?—These weak ones—for *they* too want to be the strong ones someday, there is no doubt, someday *their* “kingdom” too shall come—“the kingdom of God” as they simply call it, as I mentioned earlier: they are so humble in all things after all! Even to experience *that*, people will need to live a long time, beyond death—indeed, they need eternal life so that in the “kingdom of God” they can recoup their losses from that earthly life “in faith, in love, in hope.” Recoup their losses for what? Recoup their losses through what? . . . It seems to me Dante committed a gross blunder when, with terror-instilling ingenuousness, he placed the inscription “eternal love also created me”⁵⁶ over the gate to his hell:—in any case, over the gate of Christian paradise and its “eternal blessedness” a more justified inscription would be “eternal hatred also created me”—assuming a truth can be displayed over the gate to a lie! For *what* is the blessedness of that paradise anyway? . . . We would probably guess it on our own; but it is better to have it expressly confirmed by Thomas Aquinas,⁵⁷ the great teacher and saint, an authority not to be underestimated in such matters: “*Beati in regno coelesti*,” he says, gently as a lamb, “*videbunt poenas damnatorum, ut beatitudo illis magis complaceat.*”⁵⁸ Or if one wishes to hear it in a stronger key, say from the mouth of a triumphing church father who counseled his Christians against the cruel delights of the public spectacles—and

why? "Faith offers us much more indeed,"—he says, *De Spectaculis* chs. 29f.—"something much stronger; thanks to salvation there are entirely different joys at our disposal; instead of athletes we have our martyrs; if we want blood, well, then we have the blood of Christ . . . But what awaits us only on the day of his return, of his triumph!"—and now he continues, the rapturous visionary:⁵⁹ "At enim supersunt alia spectacula, ille ultimus et perpetuus judicii dies, ille nationibus insperatus, ille derisus, cum tanta saeculi vetustas et tot ejus nativitates uno igne hauientur. Quae tunc spectaculi latitudo! **Quid admirer!** **Quid rideam!** **Ubi gaudeam!** **Ubi exultem,** spectans tot et tantos reges, qui in coelum recepti nuntiabantur, cum ipso Jove et ipsis suis testibus in imis tenebris congemescentes! Item praesides (the provincial governors) persecutores dominici nominis saevioribus quam ipsi flammis saevierunt insultantibus contra Christianos liquecentes! Quos praeterea sapientes illos philosophos coram discipulis suis una conflagrantibus erubescentes, quibus nihil ad deum pertinere suadebant, quibus animas aut nullas aut non in pristina corpora reddituras affirmabant! Etiam poëtas non ad Rhadamanthi nec ad Minois, sed ad inopinati Christi tribunal palpitantes! Tunc magis tragedi audiendi, magis scilicet vocales (in better voice, even worse screamers) in sua propria calamitate; tunc histriones cognoscendi, solutores multo per ignem; tunc spectandus auriga in flammea rota totus rubens, tunc xystici contemplandi non in gymnasiis, sed in igne jaculati, nisi quod ne tunc quidem illos velim vivos,⁶⁰ ut qui malim ad eos potius conspectum **insatiabilem** conferre, qui in dominum desaevierunt. *'Hic est ille, dicam, fabri aut quaestuariae filius* (as everything that follows shows, and likewise this well-known term from the Talmud for the mother of Jesus, Tertullian from here on means the Jews), *sabbati destructor, Samarites et daemonium habens.* *Hic est, quem a Juda redemistis, hic est ille arundine et colaphis diverberatus, sputamentis dedecoratus, felle et aceto potatus.* *Hic est, quem clam discentes subripuerunt, ut resurrexisse dicatur vel hortulanus detraxit, ne lactucae suae frequentia commeantium laederentur.* Ut talia species, **ut talibus**

exultes, quis tibi praetor aut consul aut quaestor aut sacerdos de sua liberalitate praestabit? Et tamen haec jam habemus quodammodo **per fidem** spiritu imaginante repraesentata. Ceterum qualia illa sunt, quae nec oculus vidit nec auris audivit nec in cor hominis ascenderunt? (1 Cor. 2:9) *Credo circa et utraque cavae* (first and fourth rank or, according to others, the comic and tragic stage) *et omni stadio gratiora.*"—**Per fidem:**⁶¹ thus it is written.

16

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At this point there is no getting around helping my own hypothesis on the origin of "bad conscience" to its first preliminary expression: it is not easy to voice and it needs to be thought out, watched over and slept on for a long time. I regard bad conscience as the deep sickness to which humans had to succumb under the pressure of that most fundamental of all changes they could ever experience—that change of finding themselves locked once and for all under the spell of society and peace. No differently than it must have been for aquatic animals when they were forced either to become land animals or to perish, so too it must have been with these semi-animals who had adapted so successfully to the wilderness, warfare, roaming around and adventure—all at once all of their instincts were devalued and "disconnected." From now on they would have to go on foot and "carry themselves," when earlier they were carried by the water: a horrific gravity lay upon them. They felt awkward doing the simplest chores, they no longer had their old guide for this new unknown world, the regulating drives that unconsciously guided them safely—they were reduced to thinking, inferring, calculating, combining causes and effects, these wretches, reduced to their "consciousness," to their most feeble and most mistake-

prone organ! I believe that never on earth had such a feeling of misery, such a leaden uneasiness, existed—and what's more those old instincts had not all of a sudden ceased to make their demands! Only it was difficult and rarely possible to comply with them: for the most part they had to seek out new and as it were subterranean gratifications. All instincts that do not discharge themselves externally now turn inward—this is what I call the *internalization* of human beings: now for the first time human beings grow what later is called the "soul." The whole inner world, originally thin as if stretched between two membranes, spread out and opened up, gained depth, breadth and height to the same extent that the external discharging of human beings became obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which the state apparatus protected itself against the old instincts of freedom—punishments above all belong to these bulwarks—managed to turn all those instincts of the wild, free, roaming human beings backward *against human beings themselves*. Enmity, cruelty, lust in persecution, in assault, in change, in destruction—all of that turning against the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of "bad conscience." The human being who for lack of external enemies and obstacles impatiently tore at himself, persecuted, gnawed on, stirred up and mistreated himself, jammed into an oppressive narrowness and routine of customs, this animal that hurled itself raw against the bars of its cage, that others want to "tame"; this deprived creature eaten up by homesickness for the desert, who had to make himself into an adventure, a torture chamber, an unsafe wilderness—this fool, this yearning and desperate prisoner became the inventor of "bad conscience." But along with him the greatest and uncanniest sickness was introduced, from which humankind has not recovered to this day, the suffering of humans *from humans*, from *themselves*: this as the result of a violent separation from his animal past, of a leap and plunge as it were into new situations and conditions of existence, of a declaration of war against the old instincts upon which till then his

strength, joy and terribleness had rested. Let us immediately add, on the other hand, that the existence of an animal psyche turning against itself, taking sides against itself, brought about on earth something so new, profound, unheard of, enigmatic, contradictory and full of future that the aspect of the earth changed essentially as a result. Indeed, it required divine spectators to appreciate the spectacle that began here and whose end is by no means foreseeable—a spectacle too subtle, too wonderful, too paradoxical for it to play out senselessly and unnoticed on some ridiculous planet! Since then humanity *too* has counted among the most unexpected and exciting lucky throws played by the “great child” of Heraclitus,⁴² whether we call it Zeus or chance—he has been stimulating interest in himself, an anticipation, a hope, almost a certainty, as if something new were announcing and preparing itself in him, as if humanity were not a goal, but only a way, an episode, a bridge, a great promise . . .

We should beware of thinking contemptuously of this whole phenomenon just because from the outset it is ugly and painful. At bottom it is in fact the same active, state-building force⁴³

at work on a grander scale in those violence-artists and organizers that here, internally, on a smaller, pettier scale, in a backward direction and in the "labyrinth of the breast"⁴⁴ as Goethe called it, creates for itself the bad conscience and negative ideals, precisely that *instinct of freedom* (in my language: the will to power): only the material on which the formative and violating nature of this force vents itself is precisely humanity itself, its entire animal ancient self—and *not*, as in that greater and more obvious phenomenon, the *other* human being, *other* human beings. This secretive self-violation, this artist's cruelty, this joy in giving a form to oneself as heavy, resisting, suffering matter, in branding oneself with a will, a critique, a contradiction, a contempt, a No, this uncanny and appallingly enjoyable labor of a soul voluntarily split in itself, making itself suffer out of delight in making itself suffer, this whole *active* "bad conscience" as the genuine womb of all ideal and imaginative events has ultimately—as we already guessed—also brought to light a plenitude of strange new beauty and affirmation, perhaps even beauty *itself*... For what would "beautiful" be if contradiction had not first risen to consciousness of itself, if the ugly had not first said to itself: "I am ugly"?... At least after this hint there will be less riddle to the enigma of how an ideal, a beauty can be implied by contradictory concepts such as *selflessness*, *self-denial*, *self-sacrifice*; and one thing we know henceforth, I have no doubt of it—namely what kind of *joy* it is that the selfless, the self-denying, the self-sacrificing person feels from the beginning: this joy belongs in the realm of cruelty.—So much for the time being on the descent of the "unegoistic" as a *moral* value and for staking out the ground from which this value has grown: only bad conscience, only the will to self-mistreatment provides the prerequisite for the *value* of the unegoistic.—

It is a sickness, bad conscience, this is not subject to doubt, but a sickness as pregnancy is a sickness. Let us seek out the

conditions under which this sickness has reached its most terrible and most sublime pinnacle:—we will then see what really made its first appearance in the world. For this we will need to take a deep breath—and first of all we must return once again to an earlier viewpoint. The civil-law relationship of the debtor to his creditor, of which we already spoke at length, was once again interpreted into a relationship, moreover in a way that historically is exceedingly remarkable and disturbing, in which it is probably most incomprehensible for us modern human beings: namely into the relationship of the *present generation* and their *ancestors*. Within the original tribal community—we are speaking of primeval times—the living generation each time acknowledges a juridical obligation to the earlier and in particular to the earliest, tribe-founding generation (and by no means a mere sentimental liability: there are grounds on which the latter could even be denied altogether for the longest period of human existence). Here the conviction prevails that the tribe absolutely *exists* only through the sacrifice and achievements of the ancestors—and that they have to *repay* them through sacrifice and achievements: thus a *debt* is acknowledged that constantly grows inasmuch as these forebears do not cease in their continued existence as powerful spirits to grant the tribe new advantages and advances drawing on their strength. For nothing perhaps? But there is no "for nothing" in these brutal and "soul-impoverished" ages. What can they give back to them? Sacrifices (initially only nourishment in the crudest sense), festivals, shrines, tributes, and above all obedience—for all customs, as works of ancestors, are also their statutes and commands—: are they ever given enough? This suspicion remains and grows: from time to time it forces a great pay-off in one fell swoop, some kind of tremendous counter-payment to the "creditors" (the notorious sacrifice of the first-born, for instance, blood, human blood in any case). The *fear* of the ancestor and his power, the awareness of debts to him necessarily increases according to this kind of logic in exactly the same

measure as the power of the tribe itself increases, since the tribe itself emerges ever more victorious, independent, revered and feared. By no means the other way around! Every step toward the atrophying of a tribe, all miserable chance occurrences, all signs of degeneration, of approaching dissolution on the contrary always *diminish* the fear of the spirit of the founder and provide an ever smaller notion of his cleverness, foresightedness and presence of power. This crude kind of logic should be thought to its conclusion: ultimately the ancestors of the *mightiest* tribes must have grown to prodigious proportions through the imagination of growing fear, and they must have been pushed back into the darkness of a divine uncanniness and inconceivability:—in the end the ancestor is necessarily transfigured into a *god*. Perhaps here we have even the origin of the gods, hence an origin from *fear!* . . . And whoever finds it necessary to add: “but also from piety!” would scarcely be right for that longest period of the human race, for its prehistory. All the more, to be sure, for the *middle* period in which the noble tribes develop:—who in fact returned with interest to their progenitors, their ancestors (heroes, gods) all the qualities that meanwhile had become obvious in themselves, the *noble* qualities. Later we will take a look at the aristocratizing and ennoblement of the gods (which of course is absolutely not their “hallowing”): for now let us just trace this whole development of the consciousness of guilt to its conclusion.

20

The consciousness of having debts to the deity, as history teaches, has by no means come to an end after the decline of the “community” organized according to blood relationships; in the same way it inherited the concepts “good and bad” from the tribal nobility (along with its basic psychological tendency to establish rank orders), with the inheritance of tribal and family deities humankind also received the pressure of yet

unpaid debts and of the longing to discharge them. (The transition is made by those broad slave and serf populations that adapted to the cults of their masters’ gods, whether through force or through submissiveness and mimicry: from them this inheritance then overflows in all directions.) The feeling of debt to the deity did not cease to grow for several millennia, and in fact it continued always in the same proportion as the concept of God and the feeling for God grew on earth and was carried to the heights. (The whole history of ethnic fighting, triumphing, reconciling, merging, everything that precedes the final rank order of all ethnic elements in every great racial synthesis,⁴⁵ is reflected in the genealogical confusion of their gods; the advance toward universal empires is always also the advance toward universal deities; despotism with its overpowering of the independent nobility also always paves the way for some kind of monotheism.) The rise of the Christian God as the maximal god achieved to date therefore also brought to the fore a maximum of guilt feeling on earth. Assuming we have set out in virtually the *opposite* direction, then with no small probability we can infer from the inexorable decline of faith in the Christian God that now we also have a considerable decline in the human consciousness of guilt; indeed the prospect cannot be dismissed that the perfect and ultimate victory of atheism could redeem humankind from this entire feeling of having debts to its beginnings, to its *causa prima*.⁴⁶ Atheism and a kind of *second innocence* belong together.—

21

This for the time being, briefly and crudely, on the relationship of the concepts “guilt” and “duty” to religious presuppositions: I have deliberately left aside the actual moralization of these concepts (how they are pushed back into the conscience, or more specifically, the conflation of *bad* conscience with the concept of God) up till now, and at the conclusion of the

previous section I even spoke as if this moralization did not exist, consequently as if those concepts necessarily came to an end once their prerequisite fell through, namely faith in our "creditor," in God. But the facts contradict this in a terrible way. With the moralization of the concepts guilt and duty, with their being pushed back into *bad* conscience we actually have the attempt to *reverse* the direction of the development just described, or at least to put a stop to its movement: now precisely the prospect of an ultimate discharge once and for all *is supposed to* be pessimistically closed, now the gaze *is supposed to* disconsolately ricochet and recoil off a brazen impossibility, now those concepts "guilt" and "duty" *are supposed to* turn themselves backward—but against *whom*? There can be no doubt: first against the "debtor," in whom bad conscience now firmly takes hold, eating into him, spreading out and growing like a polyp in all directions, until along with the impossibility of discharging debt, the thought of the impossibility of discharging penance is also conceived, the notion that it cannot be discharged (of "*eternal punishment*")—; but in the end even against the "creditor," think here of the *causa prima* of humankind, of the beginning of the human race, of its progenitor who is now afflicted with a curse ("Adam," "Original Sin," "unfreedom of the will") or of nature, from whose womb humans arise and into which the evil principle is now placed ("demonizing of nature") or of existence in general, remaining only as *worthlessness in itself* (nihilistic turning away from it, a longing for oblivion or longing for its "opposite," for a different being, Buddhism and the like)—until all of a sudden we stand before the paradoxical and horrifying way out in which tortured humankind found a temporary relief, that stroke of genius of *Christianity*: God sacrificing himself for the guilt of humanity, God himself making payment to himself, God as the only one who can redeem from humans what for humans has become irredeemable—the creditor sacrificing himself for his debtor, out of *love* (can you believe it?—) out of love for his debtor! . . .

22

One will have already guessed *what* really happened with all of this and *under* it all: that will to self-torment, that suppressed cruelty of the human animal who had been made inward and scared back into himself, of the creature imprisoned in the "state" for the purpose of taming, who invented bad conscience in order to hurt himself after the *more natural* outlet for this desire to hurt was obstructed—this human of bad conscience has taken over the presupposition of religion in order to drive his self-torture to its most gruesome harshness and sharpness. Guilt before *God*: this thought becomes an instrument of torture for him. He captures in "*God*" the ultimate antitheses he is able to find for his actual and inescapable animal instincts, he even reinterprets these animal instincts as guilt against God (as hostility, rebellion, insurrection against the "master," the "father," the primal ancestor and beginning of the world), he stretches himself between the contradiction "*God*" and "*devil*," every kind of No he says to himself, nature, naturalness, to the actuality of his being he inverts and throws out as a Yes, as existing, corporeal, actual, as God, as the holiness of God, as God's judging, as God's executing, as Beyond, as eternity, as torment without end, as hell, as immeasurability of punishment and guilt. This is a kind of madness of the will in psychic cruelty that has absolutely no equal: the *will* of a human being to find himself guilty and reprehensible to the point of unatónability, his *will* to imagine himself punished without the possibility of the punishment ever being equivalent to the guilt, his *will* to infect and poison the deepest ground of things with the problem of punishment and guilt in order to cut himself off once and for all from a way out of this labyrinth of "fixed ideas," his *will* to erect an ideal—that of the "*holy God*"—in order to be palpably certain of his absolute unworthiness in the face of this ideal. Oh this insane sad beast human being! What ideas occur to it, what anti-nature, what paroxysms of nonsense, what *bestiality of idea* immediately

breaks out as soon as it is prevented a bit from being the *beast of deed!* . . . All of this is interesting to the point of excess, but it is also of such black, gloomy, unnerving sadness that we have to forcibly forbid ourselves from looking too long into these abysses. Here is *sickness*, there is no doubt of it, the most terrible sickness that ever raged in humans:—and whoever can still hear (but today people no longer have the ears for it!—) how in this night of torment and absurdity the cry of *love* rang out, the cry of the most longing delight, of redemption in *love*, he will turn away, seized by an invincible horror . . . There is so much of the horrific in humans! . . . The earth has been a madhouse for too long! . . .

23

Let this suffice once and for all regarding the descent of this "holy God."—That *in itself* the conception of gods must not necessarily lead to this degradation of the imagination whose calling to mind we could not forgo for a moment, that there are *nobler* ways of using the creation of gods than for this self-crucifixion and self-defilement of humanity, in which the last millennia of Europe have had their mastery—that fortunately can be read from every glance we cast at the *Greek gods*, these reflections of noble and autocratic human beings in whom the *animal* in humans felt itself deified and did *not* tear itself apart, did *not* rage against itself! These Greeks used their gods for the longest time precisely to keep "bad conscience" at a distance, in order to remain cheerful about their freedom of soul: and so in the opposite sense of Christianity's use of its God. They went *very far* in this, these magnificent and lion-hearted foolish children; and no less an authority than Homer's Zeus himself lets it be understood here and there that they make it too easy for themselves. "A wonder!" he says once—it concerns the case of Aegisthus, a *very serious case*—

"A wonder how much the mortals complain against the gods!"

Only from us evil comes, they think; but they themselves Create through lack of understanding, even counter to fate, misery for themselves.⁴⁷

Yet at the same time we hear and see here that even this Olympian spectator and judge is far from holding a grudge against them for this, and thinking evil of them: "how *foolish* they are!" is how he thinks of the misdeeds of mortals—and "folly," "lack of understanding," a bit of "disturbance in the head," this much even the Greeks of the strongest, bravest age *allowed* themselves as the reason for much that was bad and disastrous:—folly, *not sin!* do you understand this? . . . But even this disturbance in the head was a problem—"yes, how is it even possible? where could it have come from really, with minds such as *ours*, we human beings of noble descent, of fortune, of good breeding, of the best society, of nobility, of virtue?"—for centuries the noble Greek asked himself such questions in the face of every incomprehensible atrocity and sacrilege with which one of his peers had sullied himself. "Certainly a *god* must have beguiled him," he said finally, shaking his head . . . This way out is *typical* for Greeks . . . In this manner the gods back then served to some extent to justify humans even in bad things, they served as causes of evil—in those days they did not take the punishment upon themselves, but, as is *nobler*, the guilt . . .

24

—I am concluding with three question marks, as is plain to see. "Is an ideal being erected here or is one being broken down?" one might ask . . . But have you ever asked yourselves sufficiently how dearly the erecting of *every* ideal on earth had to be purchased? How much reality always had to be slandered and denied, how much lying sanctified, how much conscience disturbed, how much "God" sacrificed each time? In order for a temple to be erected *a temple must be destroyed*: that is the law—show me the case where this is not fulfilled! . . .

We modern human beings, we are the heirs of thousands of years of conscience-vivisection and self-animal-cruelty: in this we have our longest practice, perhaps our artistry, in any case our subtlety, our pampered taste. Humans have all-too-long regarded their natural inclinations with an "evil eye," so that in them they have finally become wedded to "bad conscience." A reverse attempt would be possible *in itself*—but who is strong enough for it?—namely to wed to bad conscience the *unnatural* inclinations, all those aspirations to the Beyond, to what is counter to the senses, instincts, nature, animal, in short, the previous ideals, all of which are ideals hostile to life, ideals that slander the world. To whom should we turn today with *such* hopes and demands? . . . For this we would have precisely the *good* people against us; additionally, as is only fair, the comfortable, the reconciled, the vain, the fanatical, the weary . . . What offends more deeply, what distinguishes as thoroughly as letting show something of the rigor and loftiness with which we treat ourselves? And in turn—how accommodating, how kindly everyone behaves toward us as soon as we do things like everyone else and "let ourselves go" like everyone else! . . . For that goal a *different* kind of spirit would be needed than is probable in this age of ours: spirits strengthened by wars and victories, for whom conquest, adventure, danger and pain have even become a need; for this, people would need to be acclimatized to sharp, high air, to winter journeys, to ice and mountains in every sense of the word; what would be needed for this is a kind of sublime malice itself, a final superlatively self-confident mischief of knowledge that belongs to great health, in brief, and bad enough, precisely this *great health* would be needed! . . . Is such health even possible today? . . . But someday, in a stronger time than this decaying, self-doubting present, he really must come to us, the *redeeming* human being of great love and contempt, the creative spirit who time and again is driven away from any aloofness or Beyond by his surging strength, whose solitude is misunderstood by the common people as if it were a flight

from reality—: whereas it is merely his immersion, burial, absorption *in reality*, so that someday when he again comes to light he can bring home with him the *redemption* of this reality: its redemption from the curse placed on it by the previous ideal. This human of the future who will redeem us from the previous ideal as much as from *what had to grow out of it*, from the great nausea, from the will to nothingness, from nihilism; this bell-chime of noon and of the great decision, that makes the will free, that gives back to the earth its goal and to humanity its hope; this anti-Christian and anti-nihilist; this conqueror of God and of nothingness—*someday he must come . . .*⁴⁸

25

—But what am I saying here? Enough! Enough! At this point only one thing befits me, to be silent: otherwise I would profane what only a younger man is at liberty to do, a "more future one," a stronger one than I am—what *Zarathustra* alone is at liberty to do, *Zarathustra the godless* . . .

II

Only now, after we have caught sight of the *ascetic priest*, do we seriously come to grips with our problem: what does the ascetic ideal mean?—only now does it get “serious”: now the actual *representative of seriousness* stands facing us. “What does all seriousness mean?”—perhaps this even more fundamental question is already on our lips here: a question for physiologists, as is only fair, but one we will sidestep for the time being. The ascetic priest has not only his faith in that ideal, but also his will, his power, his interest. His *right* to existence stands and falls with that ideal: no wonder we are up against a terrible opponent here, supposing of course that we were the opponents of that ideal? someone who fights for his existence against the deniers of that ideal? . . . On the other hand it is improbable from the start that such an interested stance toward our problem will be particularly useful to it; the ascetic priest himself will hardly represent the most successful defender of his ideal, for the same reason that a woman tends to

fail when she wants to defend “woman as such”—and even less will he be the most objective assessor and judge of the controversy stirred up here. Therefore we would sooner have to help him—this much is already quite plain—defend himself well against us, than we need fear being too effectively refuted by him . . . The idea we are fighting about here is the *valuation* of our life on the part of the ascetic priests: this life (along with that to which it belongs, “nature,” “world,” the whole sphere of becoming and of transitoriness) is connected by them to a completely different existence that it opposes and excludes, *unless* perhaps it were to turn against itself, *deny itself*: in this case, the case of an ascetic life, life is considered to be a bridge for that other existence. The ascetic treats life as a wrong path that has to be traced back finally to its starting point; or like an error that is refuted by a deed—*should* be refuted: for he *demands* that others go along with him, he forces *his valuation* of existence where he can. What does this mean? Such a monstrous manner of valuation is not inscribed into the history of humankind as an exception and curiosity: it is one of the broadest and longest facts there is. Read from a distant star perhaps the majuscule script of our earthly existence would lead to the conclusion that the earth was the genuine *ascetic planet*, a pocket of discontented, arrogant and repulsive creatures absolutely incapable of ridding themselves of a deep displeasure with themselves, with the earth, with all of life, and who harm themselves as much as possible out of pleasure in doing harm:—probably their only pleasure. Let us consider after all how regularly, how universally, how in almost all times the ascetic priest emerges; he does not belong to a single race; he flourishes everywhere; he grows from all social classes. Not that he cultivates and propagates his manner of valuation through heredity: the reverse is the case—instead a deep instinct forbids him by and large from reproducing. There must be a necessity of the first order that makes this *life-inimical* species grow and prosper time after time—it must surely be an *interest of life itself* that such a type of

self-contradiction does not die out. For an ascetic life is a self-contradiction: here reigns a *resentiment* without equal, that of an insatiable instinct and power-will that wants to be master not over something relating to life, but over life itself, over its deepest, strongest, most primitive conditions; here an attempt is made to use energy to stop up the sources of energy; here the gaze rests green and malicious on physiological flourishing itself, especially on its expression through beauty and joy; whereas pleasure is felt and *sought* in deformity, atrophy, pain, accidents, the ugly, in voluntary deprivation, unselfing, self-flagellation, self-immolation. All of this is paradoxical to the highest degree: we stand here before a conflict that *wants* itself to be conflicted, that *enjoys* itself in this suffering and even becomes increasingly self-confident and triumphant to the extent that its own precondition, its physiological capacity for life, *decreases*. "Triumph precisely in the ultimate agony": under this superlative sign the ascetic ideal has fought since time immemorial; in this enigma of seduction, in this image of delight and torture it has recognized its brightest light, its salvation, its final victory. *Crux, nux, lux*³⁸—it is all the same to the ascetic ideal.—

12

Supposing that such an incarnate will to contradiction and anti-nature could be prevailed upon to *philosophize*: on what would it vent its innermost capriciousness? On what is most certainly perceived as true, as real: it will look for *error* precisely where the actual life-instinct most unconditionally posits truth. For instance, like the ascetics of the Vedanta philosophy, it will disparage physicality as an illusion, likewise pain, multiplicity, the whole conceptual opposition "subject" and "object"—errors, nothing but errors! To renounce faith in its ego, to deny itself its own "reality"—what a triumph!—and not merely over the senses, over appearance, but a much higher kind of triumph, a violation and cruelty against *reason*: a lustful delight that reaches its pinnacle when ascetic self-contempt

and self-mockery decree: "there *is* a realm of truth and of being, but precisely reason is *excluded* from it!" . . . (Incidentally: there is something of a residue of this lustful ascetic conflict even in the Kantian concept "intelligible character of things," which loves to turn reason against reason: that is, "intelligible character" in Kant means a kind of constitution of things whereby the intellect comprehends just enough to know that for the intellect—it is *utterly incomprehensible*.)—In the end, particularly as knowing ones, let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with which the spirit has all too long raged against itself, blasphemously and futilely as it seems: for once to see things differently like this, to *want* to see differently is no small training and preparation of the intellect for its future "objectivity"—the latter not understood as "disinterested contemplation" (which is a non-concept and absurdity), but as the capacity to *have control* over one's pro and con and to deploy them: so that we know precisely how to make the *diversity* of perspectives and affective interpretations useful for knowledge. That is to say, gentlemen philosophers, let us be better from now on in guarding against the dangerous old conceptual mythmaking that posits a "pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge," let us guard against the tentacles of such contradictory concepts as "pure reason," "absolute spirituality," "knowledge in itself":—here it is always demanded that we think an eye that cannot be thought at all, an eye that is supposed to have absolutely no direction, in which the active and interpreting forces through which seeing first becomes seeing-something are supposed to be shut down, supposed to be missing; so what is demanded of the eye here is always an absurdity and a non-concept. There is *only* a perspectival seeing, *only* a perspectival "knowing"; and *the more* affects we allow to express themselves on a given thing, *the more* eyes, different eyes we know how to engage for the same thing, the more perfect will be our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity." But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each

and every affect, supposing that we even could: what? would this not amount to *castrating*³⁹ the intellect? . . .

24⁸⁴

—And now have a look on the other hand at those rarer cases of which I spoke, the last idealists there are among philosophers and scholars: do we perhaps have in them the sought-after *opponents* of the ascetic ideal, its *counter-idealists*? Indeed, they *believe* themselves to be such, these “unbelievers” (for that is what they all are); precisely that seems to be their last piece of faith, namely in being opponents of this ideal, so serious are they on this point, so passionate at just this point do their words and gestures become: —must it therefore be *true*, what they believe? . . . We “knowing ones” are by now mistrustful of every kind of believer; our mistrust has gradually trained us to infer the very opposite of what was previously inferred: namely to infer a certain weakness of demonstrability, even the *improbability* of what is believed, wherever the strength of a belief shows up too prominently in the foreground. We too do not deny that faith “makes blessed”: *but for this very reason* we deny that faith *proves* anything—a strong faith that makes someone blessed is a suspicion against that in which he believes; it does not establish “truth,” it establishes a certain probability—of *deception*. Now how does it look in this case?—These negaters and outsiders of today, these people who are unconditional about one thing, their claim to intellectual cleanliness; these harsh, strict, abstinent, heroic spirits who constitute the honor of our age, all these pale atheists, antichristians, immoralists, nihilists, these skeptics, ephectics, *hectics* of the spirit (the latter is what they all are, in some

sense), these last idealists of knowledge in whom alone today the intellectual conscience dwells and became incarnate—they believe themselves indeed to be as detached as possible from the ascetic ideal, these “free, *very* free spirits”: and yet, to divulge to them what they themselves cannot see—for they stand too close to themselves—this ideal is precisely *their* ideal too, they themselves represent it today and perhaps nobody else, they themselves are its most spiritualized spawn, its most advanced front-line troops and scouting party, its most insidious, delicate, intangible form of seduction:—if I am a guesser of riddles in anything, then I want to be one with *this* proposition! . . . Those are not *free* spirits by a long shot: *for they still believe in truth* . . . When the Christian crusaders in the orient encountered that invincible order of Assassins, that free spirit order par excellence whose lowest ranks lived in an obedience whose like was never achieved by an order of monks, by some means or another they also got a hint about that symbol and watchword reserved for only the highest ranks as their *secretum*:⁸⁵ “Nothing is true, everything is permitted” . . . Well then, *that was freedom* of the spirit, *with that*, faith in truth itself was *renounced* . . . Has any European, any Christian freethinker ever strayed into this proposition and its labyrinthine *consequences*? does he know the minotaur of this cave *from experience*? . . . I doubt it, and moreover I know otherwise:—nothing is more foreign to these men who are unconditional about one thing, these *so-called* “free spirits” than freedom and being unfettered in that sense; in no respect, in fact, are they more strictly bound; precisely in their faith in truth they are rigid and unconditional like nobody else. I know all this perhaps too much from close up: that venerable philosophers’ abstinence to which such a belief obligates; that stoicism of the intellect that ultimately forbids itself a No just as firmly as a Yes; that *wanting* to halt before the factual, the *factum brutum*,⁸⁶ that fatalism of the “*petits faits*” (*ce petit fatalisme*,⁸⁷ as I call it), in which French science now seeks a kind of moral superiority over German, that renunciation of

interpretation generally (of violating, forcing together, abbreviating, omitting, padding, inventing, falsifying and whatever else belongs to the *essence* of all interpretation)—on the whole this expresses asceticism of virtue just as much as any denial of sensuality (at bottom it is only a mode of this denial). But what *compels* one to this, to this unconditional will to truth, is the *belief in the ascetic ideal itself*, even if as its unconscious imperative—we must not deceive ourselves about this—this is the belief in a *metaphysical* value, a *value in itself of truth* as it is guaranteed and chartered by that ideal alone (it stands and falls with that ideal). Judging strictly, there is no science “without presuppositions” at all, the thought of such a thing is unthinkable, paralogical: a philosophy, a “belief” must always be there first, so that science can gain a direction, a meaning, a boundary, a method, a *right* to existence from it. (Whoever understands it as the opposite, whoever for example embarks on placing philosophy “on a strictly scientific foundation,” will first be required to stand not only philosophy but truth itself *on its head*: the most egregious violation of decency there can be with respect to two such venerable females!⁸⁸) Indeed, there is no doubt—and at this point I shall allow my *Joyful Science* to speak; compare its fifth book, sec. 344—“the one who is truthful, in that audacious and ultimate sense that the faith in science presupposes, *thus affirms another world* than that of life, nature and history; and insofar as he affirms this ‘other world,’ what? must he not precisely in so doing—deny its counterpart, this world, *our world*? . . . It is still a *metaphysical faith* upon which our faith in science rests,—even we knowing ones of today, we godless ones and anti-metaphysicians, we too still take *our fire* from that flame lit by a thousand-year-old faith, that Christian faith that was also Plato’s faith, that God is the truth, that the truth is *divine* . . . But what if precisely this is becoming more and more unbelievable, if nothing more turns out to be divine except error, blindness, the lie—if God himself turns out to be our *longest lie*?⁸⁹ —At this point it becomes necessary to pause and

reflect for a long time. Science itself now *requires* a justification (which is not to say that there is one for it). On this question look at the oldest and the latest philosophies: in all of them a consciousness is lacking for the extent to which the will to truth itself first requires a justification, here every philosophy has a gap—why is that? Because so far the ascetic ideal was the *master* of all philosophy, because truth was posited as Being, as God, as supreme authority itself, but truth was not *allowed* to be a problem at all. Do you understand this “allowed”?—From that moment when faith in the God of the ascetic ideal is denied, *there is also a new problem*: that of the *value of truth*.—The will to truth requires a critique—let us here determine our own task—the value of truth has to be for once experimentally *called into question* . . . (Whoever finds this stated too briefly is advised to read up on that section of *Joyful Science* bearing the title “In What Way We Too Are Still Pious” (sec. 344), or better still the entire fifth book of that work, likewise the preface to *Dawn*.)

25

No! Do not speak to me of science when I am looking for the natural antagonists of the ascetic ideal, when I ask: “*where is the opposing will in which its opposing ideal expresses itself?*” For this, science does not nearly stand sufficiently on its own, it first needs a value-ideal in every respect, a value-creating power in whose *service* it *may believe* in itself—science itself is never value-creating. Its relationship to the ascetic ideal is in itself not yet antagonistic in the least; on the whole it sooner represents the forward-driving energy of its inner development. More closely examined, its contradiction and struggle does not at all relate to the ideal, but only to its outworks, disguise, and masquerade, to its temporary hardening, dignifying, dogmatizing—it again liberates the life in the ideal by negating its exoteric aspects. Both of these, science and the ascetic ideal, they do after all stand on the same ground—I already indicated this—: namely on the same overestimation

of truth (more accurately: on the same belief in the *inestimability, uncriticizability* of truth), which is why they are *necessarily* allies—so that, supposing they are resisted, they can only be resisted and called into question together. A value-estimation of the ascetic ideal unavoidably entails a value-estimation of science: we must keep our eyes open and our ears pricked to this while there is still time! (*Art*, let me say for the moment, since I will return to it in detail later on—art, in which precisely the *lie* sanctifies itself, in which the *will to deception* has good conscience on its side, is much more fundamentally opposed to the ascetic ideal than science: this was sensed by Plato’s instinct, this greatest enemy of art ever produced by Europe. Plato *contra* Homer: that is the complete, the genuine antagonism—there the best-willed “man of the Beyond,” the great slanderer of life, here its involuntary deifier, the *golden* nature. Therefore an artist’s subservience in the service of the ascetic ideal is the truest artist’s *corruption* there can be, and unfortunately one of the most common forms: for nothing is more corruptible than an artist.) When calculated physiologically, science also rests on the same soil as the ascetic ideal; a certain *impoverishment of life* is the presupposition here—the affects cooled down, the tempo slowed down, dialectic in place of instinct, *seriousness* stamped on the faces and gestures (*seriousness*, this most unmistakable sign of a more laborious metabolism, of a struggling, harder-working life). Look at those ages in the history of a people in which the scholar comes to the fore: they are ages of exhaustion, often of evening, of decline—overflowing energy, certainty of life, certainty of the *future* are gone. The predominance of mandarins never signifies anything good; any more so than the rise of democracy, of peace-arbitration courts in place of wars, of equal rights for women, of religion of compassion and whatever other symptoms there are of declining life. (Science formulated as a problem; what does science mean?—on this cf. the preface to *Birth of Tragedy*.)—No! this “modern science”—just open your eyes to it!—is sometimes the *best ally* of the ascetic ideal,

and precisely because it is the most unconscious, the most involuntary, the most secret and subterranean! Up till now they have played one game, the "poor in spirit"⁹⁰ and the scientific opponents of that ideal (we should guard against thinking, by the way, that they are their opposites, say the *rich* in spirit:—they are *not* that, I called them *hectics* of the spirit). These famous *victories* of the latter: without doubt they are victories—but over what? The ascetic ideal was not at all conquered in them, it sooner became stronger, namely more incomprehensible, spiritual, captious by the fact that again and again a wall, an outwork that had built itself onto the ideal and *coarsened* its appearance, was mercilessly dismantled and broken down by science. Does anyone really believe perhaps that the defeat of theological astronomy meant a defeat of that ideal? . . . Have humans perhaps become *less in need* of an otherworldly solution to their riddle of existence now that this existence looks even more arbitrary, loitering and dispensable in the *visible* order of things? Has not the self-belittlement of humankind, its *will* to self-belittlement been on an unstoppable progression since Copernicus? Oh the belief in its dignity, singularity, irreplaceability in the hierarchy of beings is gone—it has become *animal*, literally and without qualification and reservation an animal, when in its earlier belief it was nearly God ("child of God," "God-man") . . . Since Copernicus the human being seems to have gotten onto an inclined plane—he now rolls away ever faster from the midpoint—where to? into nothingness? into the "*penetrating* feeling of his nothingness"? . . . Well then! exactly this would be the straight path—into the *old* ideal? . . . All science (and by no means only astronomy, about whose humiliating and degrading effect Kant made a noteworthy confession, "it annihilates my importance"⁹¹ . . .), all science, the natural as well as the *unnatural*—this is what I call the self-critique of knowledge—aims today to dissuade humans of their previous respect for themselves, as if this has been nothing but a bizarre conceit; we could even say it has its own pride, its own austere

form of stoic ataraxy, in upholding this laboriously won *self-contempt* of humanity as its last, most serious claim to respect from itself (justifiably, in fact, since the despiser is always still someone who "has not forgotten how to respect" . . .) Does this actually *work against* the ascetic ideal? Do people still in all seriousness believe (as the theologians for a time imagined) that perhaps Kant's *victory* over theological conceptual dogmatism ("God," "soul," "freedom," "immortality") damaged that ideal?—setting aside for the time being whether Kant himself even had any such intention. What is certain is that all kinds of transcendentalists have been playing a winning game since Kant—they have been emancipated from the theologians: what luck!—he revealed to them that secret path on which from now on they may pursue on their own initiative and with the best scientific decorum "their heart's desires." By the same token: who could now begrudge agnostics if, as votaries of the unknown and the mysterious in itself, they now worship the *question mark itself* as God? (Xaver Dou-dan speaks at one point of the ravages inflicted by "*l'habitude d'admirer l'inintelligible au lieu de rester tout simplement dans l'inconnu*";⁹² he thinks the ancients dispensed with this.) Supposing that everything humans "know" does not satisfy their desires, but rather contradicts them and makes them shudder, what divine escape to be allowed to seek the blame for this not in "desiring" but in "knowing"! . . . "There is no knowing; consequently—there is a God": what a novel *elegantia syllogismi*⁹³ what a *triumph* of the ascetic ideal!—

26

—Or did perhaps the whole of modern historiography reveal a stance more sure of life, more sure of the ideal? Its noblest claim now is that it aspires to be a *mirror*; it rejects all teleology; it no longer wants to "prove" anything; it scorns playing the judge and has its good taste in this—it affirms as little as it denies, it ascertains, it "describes" . . . All of this is ascetic to a high degree; but to an even higher degree it is *nihilistic* at the

aid of the spiritually flatfooted, how many *comedians* of the Christian-moral ideal would have to be exported today from Europe so that its air could smell fresh again . . . Obviously given this overproduction a new *trade* opportunity has opened up, obviously there is new "business" to be made of little ideal-idols and their accompanying "idealists"—if anyone out there can take a hint! Who has enough courage for it?—we have it in our *hands* to "idealize" the whole earth! . . . But why am I talking about courage: here one thing is needful,¹⁰⁴ just the hand, an uninhibited, a very uninhibited hand . . .

being slave: "nature" is in both—and "morality" too is a piece of nature.—

2. *Pd*: *Corruption* in a ruling caste means something different from in a serving and servile one. E.g., effusive mildness and decrease in energy of the will is corruption in the former. In the latter the increase of independence is corruption, e.g., Eugen Dühring. The privileged of the French Revolution are an example of corruption.

3. *origin*] *Herkunft*

4. "We truthful ones"] Cf. *GM* I, 5.

5. *désintérêtement*] "disinterestedness"

6. *un bonhomme*] "a good man"

7. Heretofore in this section, N has used *Herren-Moral* and *Sklaven-Moral*, translated as "master-morality" and "slave-morality." Here, however, he writes "*Sklaven-Moral und -Moralität*."

8. *gai saber*] "gay science"

9. *slaves*] *Pm* crossed out after this:—and so often in history something similar has happened,—

10. *feels . . . atavism*] *Pd*: tries to seduce to good opinions of itself in order later to seduce itself to belief in them:—thus the ignoble type wants it.

11. *nurtures*] *züchtet sie gross* (from the separable prefix verb *grosszüchten*) vs. *züchten* on its own, which means "to breed" or "to cultivate."

12. *now?*] *Pm* crossed out after this:—it is the time for Socrates and Socratic

13. *mediocrity!*] *Pm* crossed out after this: (whatever Schopenhauer may say, who was not subtle in these things)

14. *différence engendre haine*] "difference engenders hatred"

15. *Horace*] *Epistles*, I, 10, 24: "*naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret*" = "Try to expel nature with a pitchfork, it always returns."

16. *with . . . recurret*] *Pm*: but which is the formula for modern education

17. *irritable*] *reizbar*, i.e., in the biological sense capable of feeling stimuli.

18. *inter pares*] "among equals"

bourgeois voluptuary and house-mouse ((presumably in accordance with N's instructions to the publisher)). (On 5 October 1887 {KGB III:5, 163} N wrote to his publisher, C. G. Naumann from Venice:) To be inserted as the eighth section of the preface: so that the last section now gets 9 as its number./8./ Finally, to at least point with a word to a tremendous and still completely undiscovered state of affairs that has slowly, slowly dawned on me: up till now there were no problems *more fundamental* than moral ones, it was their driving force from which all great conceptions in the realm of values so far have taken their origin (—thus everything that is commonly called “philosophy”; and this down to its final epistemological presupposition) *But there are problems still more fundamental than moral ones:* these are first glimpsed when moral prejudice is left behind, when one knows how to look into the world, into life as an *immoralist* . . . (Yet on the same day, 5 October 1887, N took these instructions back in the following postcard {KGB III:5, 163}): Most Esteemed Publisher, the manuscript revision I sent this morning (supplement to the preface) should **not** be used; we will therefore stay with the original arrangement, according to which the preface has 8 sections.

15. *writings*/ Crossed out after this in *Pm*: line for line

First Treatise

1. *partie honteuse*] “shameful or private parts”
2. *vis inertiae*] “force of inertia”
3. Cf. *CW* 16:1[7, 10].
4. *spiriti* *Pm*: sense
5. *Herbert Spencer*] in *The Data of Ethics*; cf. *CW* 13:1[11].
6. Cf. *CW* 13:3[134]; *D* 231.
7. “*schlecht*”] “bad”
8. “*schlicht*”] “plain”
9. “*schlechtweg*, ”*schlechterdings*”] “plainly, simply”
10. *the . . . Buckle*;) Cf. N to Peter Gast, Chur, 20 May 1887 {KGB III:5, 79}: The library in Chur, ca. 20,000 volumes, provides me with a variety of edifying things. For the first time I saw the much celebrated book by Buckle, *Geschichte der Civilisation*

in England {2 vols. Trans. from the English by Arnold Ruge (Leipzig and Heidelberg: Winter, 1860, 1861). Henry Thomas Buckle, *History of Civilization in England* {London: John W. Parker and Son, 1857, 1861}}—and how odd! It turns out Buckle) is one of my strongest antagonists.

11. Cf. *CW* 15:25[472].
12. *Arya*] Sanskrit: “noble”
13. *Theognis*] ed. Diehl: I, 57, 71, 95, 189, 429, 441; cf. also *BGE* 260.
14. ἐσθλός] “good,” “brave,” “noble”
15. *Theognis*] ed. Diehl: I, 66–68, 607–10.
16. *noblesse*] “nobility”
17. χακός] “bad,” “ugly”
18. δειλός] “cowardly,” “worthless”
19. ἀγαθός] “good,” “well-born,” “noble”
20. *malus*] “bad,” “evil”
21. μέλας] “black,” “dark”
22. *hic niger est*] “he is black.” Horace, *Satires*, I, 4, 85.
23. *fin*] Gaelic: “white”
24. *Virchow*] Source not identified.
25. *bonus*] “good”
26. *duonus*] older form of *bonus*
27. *unio mystical*] “mystical union”
28. *only . . . more!*] *Pm*: general sense of being fed up and longing for an *unio mystica*—be it with God, be it with nothingness—it is *one* longing——{This translation does not usually italicize words N capitalizes for emphasis; here N's capitalization of *Ein* (*one*) warrants an exception.}
29. “*redeemer . . . disintegrator*” {*Erlöser*=redeemer, *Auflöser* (same stem verb)=dissolver, disintegrator.}
30. *sub hoc signo*] “under this sign”
31. *Quaeritur*.] “That is the question.”
32. {*Freigeist*; as opposed to *der freie Geist* (the free spirit); cf. *BGE* 44.}
33. *resentiment*] “resentment,” here emphasized by N. Throughout *GM*, N uses the French spelling, though always with an initial capital, suggesting a partially germanized loan word.

48. *that . . . lambs*] Cf. Z IV “The Song of Melancholy” 3; *DD*
‘Just a Fool! Just a Poet!’
49. *They . . . do*] Luke 23:24.
50. *love . . . enemies*] Matthew 5:44.
51. *and sweating*] Cf. Z II “On Scholars.”
52. *God . . . honored*] Cf. Romans 13:1.
53. *Homer*] *Iliad* 18, 109.
54. *brothers in love*] 1 Thessalonians 3:12.
55. *in . . . hope*] Cf. 1 Thessalonians 1:3. {Cf. also 1 Corinthians 13:13.}
56. *eternal . . . me*] *Divine Comedy, Inferno* III, 5–6.
57. *Thomas Aquinas*] *Commentary on the Sentences* IV, L 2, 4, 4.
58. {“The blessed in the kingdom of heaven will see the punishments of the damned *in order that their bliss be more delightful to them*.} *Summa Theologica* III, *Supplementum* Q. 94, Art. 1.}
59. Tertullian, *De Spectaculis*, ch. 30. English translation by Rev. S. Thewell in *Ante-Nicene Christian Library: Translation of the Writings of the Fathers, Down to AD 325*. Vol. 11: The Writings of Tertullian. Vol. 1, ed. Rev. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1869), 34–35: “Yes, and there are other sights: that last day of judgment, with its everlasting issues; that day unlooked for by the nations, the theme of their derision, when the world, hoary with age, and all its many products, shall be consumed in one great flame! How vast a spectacle then bursts upon the eye! *What there excites my admiration? what my derision? Which sight gives me joy? which rouses me to exultation?*—as I see so many illustrious *monarchs*, whose reception into the heavens was publicly announced, groaning now in the lowest darkness with great Jove himself, and those, too, who bore witness of their exaltation; governors of provinces, too, who persecuted the Christian name, in fires more fierce than those with which in the days of their pride they raged against the followers of Christ! What world’s wise men besides, the very philosophers, in fact, who taught their followers that God had no concern in ought that is sublunary, and were wont to assure them that either they had no souls, or that they would never return to the bodies which at death they had left, now covered

with shame before the poor deluded ones, as one fire consumes them! Poets also, trembling not before the judgment-seat of Rhadamanthus or Minos, but of the unexpected Christ! I shall have a better opportunity then of hearing the tragedians, louder-voiced in their own calamity; of viewing the play-actors, much more ‘dissolute’ in the dissolving flame; of looking upon the charioteer, all glowing in his chariot of fire; of witnessing the wrestlers, not in their gymnasia, but tossing in the fiery billows; unless even then I shall not care to attend to such ministers of sin, in my eager wish rather to fix a gaze *insatiable* on those whose fury vented itself against the Lord. ‘This,’ I shall say, ‘this is that carpenter’s or harlot’s son, that Sabbath-breaker, that Samaritan and devil-possessed! This is He whom you purchased from Judas! This is He whom you struck with reed and fist, whom you contemptuously spat upon, to whom you gave gall and vinegar to drink! This is He whom His disciples secretly stole away, that it might be said He had risen again, or the gardener abstracted, that his lettuces might come to no harm from the crowds of visitants! What quæstor or priest in his munificence will bestow on you the favor of seeing and *exulting in such things as these*? And yet even now we in a measure have them by *faith* in the picturings of imagination. But what are the things which eye has not seen, and ear has not heard, and which have not so much as dimly dawned upon the human heart? Whatever they are, they are nobler, I believe, than circus, and both theatres, and every race-course.”

60. *vivos* erratum for *visos*, as already noted by Maurice de Gandillac in his commentary: cf. Nietzsche, *Œuvres philosophiques complètes* (French translation of *KGW*), *Par-delà bien et mal. La généalogie de la morale*, Paris[; Gallimard,] 1971, 392f. The transcription by Overbeck, who sent this passage to N in Sils-Maria in July 1887, has not been preserved.

61. *Per fidem*] “by [my] faith”
62. *convicted . . . race*] Cf. Tacitus, *Annals* XV, 44.
63. *Chinese*] *Pm*: Indians
64. *ad acta*] “to the files (shelved)”

offensive to intellectual justice:—it is perhaps our greatest triumph over the *vis inertiae* of the human intellect

31. *causa fiendi*] “cause of the origin”

32. *toto coelo*] “by the whole heavens,” “diametrically”

33. *counter-actions*] *Pm* crossed out after this: of spontaneous attacks, interferences, efforts on the part of the thing that is developing. The thing, as a quantum of organized force, must for its part move from the inside to the outside, as weak as it may be, in order to animate and enrich itself on this “outside,” in order to take it into itself and to impress *its* law, *its* meaning on it. Even——

34. *Huxley*] {Thomas Henry Huxley, *More Criticism on Darwin, and Administrative Nihilism* (New York: Appleton, 1872); cf. also “Administrative Nihilism [1871]” in *Collected Essays I: Method and Results* (London: Macmillan, 1893), 251–89.]

35. *per analogiam*] “by analogy”

36. *according to Chinese law*] Cf. J. Kohler, *Das chinesische Strafrecht. Ein Beitrag zur Universalgeschichte des Strafrechts* (“Chinese Criminal Law: A Contribution to the Universal History of Criminal Law”), Würzburg{: Stahel}, 1886. *NL*.

37. *Fischer*] N’s source on Spinoza; cf. the note to *CW* 13:11[193] {Kuno Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie I, 2, Descartes’ Schule. Geulinx, Malebranche. Baruch Spinoza.* 2nd ed. (Heidelberg: Friedrich Bassermann, 1865).}

38. *morsus conscientiae*] “sting [literally: bite] of conscience”

39. *sub ratione boni*] “for a good reason”

40. “*but . . . absurdities.*”] Spinoza, *Ethics* I, 33, schol. 2.

41. *gaudium*] “joy”

42. *Heraclitus*] fragment 52 (Diels–Kranz).

43. *state-building force*] *Pm*: , but turned outward

44. “*labyrinth of the breast*”] Cf. Goethe, “To the Moon.”

45. *everything . . . synthesis*,] *Pm*: the entire actuality of the final rank order of all elements of the people in every great synthesis of peoples

46. *causa prima*] “first cause”

47. *Odyssey* I, 32–34.

48. *reality . . . come . . .*] *Pm*: becomes . . . This human of the future who will redeem us from previous ideals, the conqueror of God *must* come some day (later revised by adding § 25)

32. “*je combats l’universelle araignée*”] “I combat the universal spider”

33. *violate . . . living?*] *Pm*: crack around on us today, like nut-crackers of the soul, as if we were nothing but nuts and riddles; what is certain is that *precisely* with this we are daily becoming more enigmatic to ourselves, that we love life itself ever more tenderly for the sake of our riddle-man nature—*learn to love it!*

34. *jus primae noctis*] “right of the first night,” i.e., right of rulers to deflower the wives of their subjects on the wedding night.

35. *vetitum*] “something forbidden”

36. {N has changed one word from the passage as it appears in *D* (in the first sentence, “*welches*” becomes “*was*”), and in *D*, “actual . . . humankind” is emphasized, while “change” is not. In this passage cited from *CW* 5, *Sittlichkeit der Sitte* is translated “morality of mores”; elsewhere in this volume, it has been translated “morality of custom.”}

37. *I . . . heaven*] Cf. *D* 113.

38. *Crux, nux, lux*] “Cross, nut, light”; cf. *CW* 13:12[231].

39. *what? . . . castrating*] *Pm*: that would mean castrating the intellect—Even worse: it would mean—not thinking!

40. Cf. *CW* 16:1[7, 10].

41. *homines bonae voluntatis*] “men of good will”; cf. Luke 2:14 in the Latin Vulgate translation.

42. *hyena*] {Cf. Post, *Bausteine für eine allgemeine Rechtswissenschaft auf vergleichend-ethnologischer Basis*, I, 67.]

43. *further*] Crossed out after this in *Pm*: often enough even without awareness of pain even if [———]

44. *nervus sympatheticus*] “sympathetic nerve”

45. *deficiency . . . phosphate*] Cf. *CW* 13:11[244]; 12[31].

46. *One thing is needful*] Luke 10:42.

47. *back . . . guilt*] Cf. *JS* 250.

48. {Literally: world pain or grief; in cultural and intellectual history, a romantic suffering from the world; in general emotional terms, sadness at the state of the world. Cf. Goethe’s *The Sufferings of Young Werther*.}

49. *vegetarians*] N’s English.

50. *Andrew*] Crossed out after this in *Pm*: I am a great eater of beef, I believe [———] {N uses “Squire Christopher” instead

{"Arthur Schopenhauer Portrayed from Personal Acquaintance"}, Leipzig{: Brockhaus,} 1862; A{lexander} W{heelock} Thayer, *Ludwig van Beethoven's Leben*, Berlin{: Ferdinand Schneider,} 1866ff. For Richard Wagner's autobiography, cf. note 16 above.

69. *Jansen*] J{oann} Janssen, *Geschichte des deutschen Volks seit dem Mittelalter* {"History of the German People since the Middle Ages"}, Freiburg{: Herder,} 1877; N bought this work on 31 December 1878, but it is not among his books in *NL*. Concerning Janssen, cf. N to Peter Gast on 5 October 1879 {KGB II:5, 451}.

70. *causa fortior*] "stronger cause"

71. *diplomat*] Talleyrand; cf. CW 17, 10[78].

72. *out of joint*)] {N is most likely alluding here to August Wilhelm Schlegel's German translation of "the time is out of joint" ("die Zeit ist aus den Fugen") from *Hamlet* (1798).}

73. *my . . . world!*] John 18:36.

74. *Goethe*] to Eckermann, 14 February 1830 {Eckermann's *Conversations with Goethe*}.

75. "evviva la morte"] "long live death"

76. *Quaeritur*.) "That is the question."

77. *magno sed proxima intervallo*.) "next but by a great distance" {Cf. Vergil, *Aeneid*, 5, 320.}

78. *in artibus et litteris*) "in arts and letters"

79. "Here . . . otherwise."] {Luther's famous words at the Diet of Worms, 1521, where he refused to recant his ideas and teachings as expressed in part in his Ninety-Five Theses.}

80. *I . . . taste*.) like Julien Sorel in Stendhal's *Le Rouge et le noir*; cf. CW 15:25[169].

81. "the crown of eternal life"] {Cf. Revelation 2:10.}

82. *God*] In German, God is addressed using the familiar second-person pronoun *Du*, "thou" in archaic English (as in the Bible, the Lord's Prayer, etc.). This archaic "thou" is also used in poetry.

83. "non plus ultra."] "highest of its kind."

84. Cf. CW 15:25[304, 340]; 26[225].

85. *secretum*]) "privileged information"

86. *factum brutum*]) "mere fact"

87. "petits faits" (ce petit fatalisme) "small facts" (that petty fatalism {N puns here with "fatalism."})

88. *females*] In German, the words for "philosophy" (*die Philosophie*) and "truth" (*die Wahrheit*) are both grammatically feminine.

89. In JS 344, "longest lie" is not italicized and is followed by an em dash.

90. "poor in spirit"] {Cf. Matthew 5:3.}

91. {Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Conclusion, 269: "The first view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my importance as an animal creature, which after it has been for a short time provided with vital force (one knows not how) must give back to the planet (a mere speck in the universe) the matter from which it came."}

92. "l'habitude d'admirer l'inintelligible au lieu de rester tout simplement dans l'inconnu]" "the habit of admiring the unintelligible instead of remaining quite simply in the unknown" {Cf. Ximénès Doudan, *Lettres* (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1879), III, 24.}

93. *elegantia syllogismi*]) "elegance of syllogism!"

94. *metapolitics . . . compassion*.)] *Pm*: metaphysics and Dostoevsky

95. *sweet ingeniuous*] *Pm*: sweet cowards

96. *truly . . . proletariat*.) *Pm* first version: listen for once to that poor screaming devil of an agitator (like that [poor communist] Dühring who, by slobbering over the whole of history, wants to persuade us in this manner that he is its "historian" [just as much as its] and "Judgment Day" [likewise that his slobber means justice itself])

97. *χάσμα ὄδοντων*] "chasm of teeth" *Anacreon tea*, 24.

98. *whited sepulchres*] {Cf. Matthew 23:27.}

99. {German national anthem refrain based on Hoffmann von Fallersleben's poem "Das Lied der Deutschen."}

100. *paralysis agitans*) "shaking palsy"

101. *diet . . . ideas*.) *Pm* second version: ideas, the *paralysis agitans* of modern ideas that calls itself "progress," the democratization to which Germany has now fallen victim along with all of Europe's countries: an incurable disease!

102. *either, . . . everywhere.]* Pm first version: nor the [piously eloquent idealists] speculators in “idealism,” who today roll their eyes with a Christian-German-anti-Semitic pathos and [cleverly enough] want to cloak their [bad instincts] [little] worms and private matters, envy, [coarseness, wounded vanity] spasms of vanity and incurable mediocrity through a display of disdainful moral attitudes (—that *no* kind of swindle spirit fails to succeed in today’s Germany is connected to the virtually undeniable and already palpable [dumbing down and] *desolation* of the German spirit, whose cause I [may seek] seek in an all-too-exclusive diet of newspapers, politics, beer and Wagnerian music, along with what provides the prerequisite for this diet, the whole national-patriotic [neurosis] hysteria which has now sickened Germany along with all countries in Europe and *above all* Germany. *Cette race douce énergique méditative et passionnée* {that gentle energetic meditative passionate race [another quotation from Douzan]}—where has it gone! where have the Germans gone! . . .) The idealistic swindle ruins the air not only in Germany; today it ruins the air throughout Europe—Europe today is in an embarrassing manner terribly in foul-smelling———

103. *la religion de la souffrance* “the religion of suffering” {Cf. BGE 21, where N also quotes these final words of Paul Bourget’s novel *Un crime d’amour* (1886).}

104. *needful,*] {Cf. note to GM III, note 46 above.}

105. *a . . . preparing]* Pm: my main work currently in progress

106. *feminism]* Femininismus. At the time, both “Feminismus” and “Femininismus” were in use, although the former was more common.

107. {In JS 357, “good” is italicized but “Europeans” is not.}

108. “*patere legem, quam ipse tulisti.*”] “submit to the law you yourself proposed.”

109. “*faute de mieux*”] “for lack of anything better”

110. *counterwill*] Widerwille, aversion or strong reluctance; “counterwill” preserves the stem noun *Wille*.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

The Gay Science

*With a Prelude in German Rhymes
and an Appendix of Songs*

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In what way we, too, are still pious. — In science, convictions have no right to citizenship, as one says with good reason: only when they decide to step down to the modesty of a hypothesis, a tentative experimental standpoint, a regulative fiction,¹ may they be granted admission and even a certain value in the realm of knowledge — though always with the restriction that they remain under police supervision, under the police of mistrust. But doesn't this mean, on closer consideration, that a conviction is granted admission to science only when it ceases to be a conviction? Wouldn't the cultivation of the scientific spirit begin when one permitted oneself no more convictions? That is probably the case; only we need still ask: *in order that this cultivation begin*, must there not be some prior conviction — and indeed one so authoritative and unconditional that it sacrifices all other convictions to itself? We see that science, too, rests on a faith; there is simply no 'presuppositionless' science. The question whether *truth* is necessary must get an answer in advance, the answer 'yes', and moreover this answer must be so firm that it takes the form of the statement, the belief, the conviction: '*Nothing is more necessary than truth; and in relation to it, everything else has only secondary value.*' This unconditional will to truth — what is it? Is it the will not to let oneself be deceived? Is it the will *not to deceive*? For the will to truth could be interpreted in this second way, too — if 'I do not want to deceive myself' is included as a special case under the generalization 'I do not want to deceive.' But why not deceive? But why not allow oneself to be deceived? Note that the reasons for the former lie in a completely different area from those for the latter: one does not want to let oneself be deceived because one assumes it is harmful, dangerous, disastrous to be deceived; in this sense science would be a long-range prudence, caution, utility, and to this one could justifiably object: How so? Is it really less harmful, dangerous, disastrous not to want to let oneself be deceived? What do you know in advance about the character of existence to be able to decide whether the greater advantage is on the side of the unconditionally distrustful or of the unconditionally trusting? But should both be necessary — a lot of trust *as well as* a lot of mistrust — then where might science get the

¹ See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 670, 799.

unconditional belief or conviction on which it rests, that truth is more important than anything else, than every other conviction? Precisely this conviction could never have originated if truth *and* untruth had constantly made it clear they were both useful, as they are. So, the faith in science, which after all undeniably exists, cannot owe its origin to such a calculus of utility; rather it must have originated *in spite* of the fact that the disutility and dangerousness of 'the will to truth' or 'truth at any price' is proved to it constantly. 'At any price': we understand this well enough once we have offered and slaughtered one faith after another on this altar! Consequently, 'will to truth' does not mean 'I do not want to let myself be deceived' but – there is no alternative – 'I will not deceive, not even myself'; and with that we stand on moral ground.

For you have only to ask yourself carefully, 'Why do you not want to deceive?' especially if it should seem – and it does seem! – as if life aimed at semblance, i.e. error, deception, simulation, blinding, self-blinding, and when life on the largest scale has actually always shown itself to be on the side of the most unscrupulous *polytropoi*.² Charitably interpreted, such a resolve might perhaps be a quixotism, a slight, enthusiastic folly; but it could also be something worse, namely a principle that is hostile to life and destructive. 'Will to truth' – that could be a hidden will to death. Thus the question 'Why science?' leads back to the moral problem: *Why morality at all*, if life, nature, and history are 'immoral'? No doubt, those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense which faith in science presupposes *thereby affirm another world* than that of life, nature, and history; and insofar as they affirm this 'other world', must they not by the same token deny its counterpart, this world, *our world*? . . . But you will have gathered what I am getting at, namely, that it is still a *metaphysical faith* upon which our faith in science rests – that even we knowers of today, we godless anti-metaphysicians, still take *our fire*, too, from the flame lit by the thousand-year old faith, the Christian faith which was also Plato's faith, that God is truth; that truth is divine . . . But what if this were to become more and more difficult to believe, if nothing more were to turn out to be divine except error, blindness, the lie – if God himself were to turn out to be our longest lie?

² 'sly, knowing all the tricks, devious'. Nietzsche uses the plural of this word which in the singular is used in the *Odyssey* (e.g. Book i, line 1) to describe Odysseus.