Introduction to Machine Learning

DBDA.X408.(33)

Instructor:

Bill Chen



UCSC Silicon Valley Extension

E: xchen375@ucsc.edu

Week 8

Unsupervised Learning.

Anomaly Detection.

Final Project Touch-up.

Download from: https://drive.google.com/file/d/18BGj39vlQMC4MVyEmsR1idRzYk9C46Ce/view?usp=drive_link

Google drive: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1jgfM6s5H5-bzShH4SqogKc3zGUnufQBo



Prerequisites

Professional Data Science Background with Python

Basics of Deep Learning – Have trained a DNN

Agenda

- Introduction to Anomaly Detection
- Supervised Learning with XGBoost
- Break
- Unsupervised Learning with Autoencoders
- Unsupervised Learning with GANs
- Assessment: Apply one technique to a new dataset

Introduction to Anomaly Detection


WHAT IS AN ANOMALY?

A data point which differs significantly from other data points


- An observation that is likely generated by a different mechanism
- Finding anomalies can be useful in telecom/sp networks, cyber security, finance, industry, IOT, healthcare, autonomous driving, video surveillance, robotics.
- Many other problems can be framed as anomaly detection: customer retention, targeted advertising.



SPOT THE ANOMALY



SPOT THE ANOMALY



EXERCISE

- What are some of the scenarios that produce anomalies in your organization/domain?
- What data sources might affect or record those anomalous activities?
- What kind of data analytics techniques could be applied or have been applied to detect those events?



Why is Anomaly Detection Important?

Case Study



Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)






The Stuxnet Worm

Case Study

- A 500-kilobyte malicious computer worm that targets SCADA systems.
- Spread:
 - Through infected removable drives such as <u>USB flash drives</u>.
- Operation:
 - Analyzed and targeted Windows networks and computer systems.
 - Compromised the Step7 software, the worm gained access to 45 S7 to the PLCs.
 - Virus modified project communication configurations for the PLC's Ethernet ports

Result:

- Infected over 100,000 computers & 22 Manufacturing sites
- Appears to have impacted Natanz nuclear facility destroying 984 uranium enriching centrifuges.



DATASET

At a glance!


Name	KDD99 Intrusion Detection Dataset Publicly available at http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html
Size	743 Mb
No. of Features	Numeric = 22 ; Categorical = 9
No. of Rows	18 Million
No. of Classes	23 (Including the Normal category)
Variable Types	Numeric & Categorical
Goal	Detect Anomalies by studying Network Packet logs

DATASET

Basic Features	Content Features	Traffic Features	
duration	hot	count	
protocol_type	num_failed_logins	serror_rate	Numerical
service	logged_in	rerror_rate	ramonoa
src_bytes	num_compromised	same_srv_rate	Categorical
dst_bytes	root_shell	diff_srv_rate	
flag	su_attempted	srv_count	
land	num_root	srv_serror_rate	
wrong_fragment	num_file_creations	srv_rerror_rate	
urgent	num_shells	srv_diff_host_rate	
	num_access_files		
	num_outbound_cm		
	is_hot_login	Detailed Description @	
	is_guest_login	https://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddc	up99/task.htm

DATASET

Visualization by class



Handling Time Series Data

For Classification

Averaging Features

	Duration	Feature 1	Feature 2	Feature 3
1	1	Avg(Val_1,Val_4)	Avg(Val_2,Val_5)	Avg(Val_3,Val_6)
	1	Avg(Val_7,Val_10)	Avg(Val_8,Val_11)	Avg(Val_9,Val_12)

Time	Feature 1	Feature 2	Feature 3
00:00:00	Val_1	Val_2	Val_3
00:00:01	Val_4	Val_5	Val_6
00:00:02	Val_7	Val_8	Val_9
00:00:03	Val_10	Val_11	Val_12

Sampling Features

	Duration	Feature 1	Feature 2	Feature 3
¥	1	Val_4	Val_5	Val_6
	1	Val_10	Val_11	Val_12



IN THE NEWS

Telecom

Operators beware: DDoS attacks—large and small—keep increasing

by Brian Santo | Jun 6, 2017 12:19pm

Telecoms industry and DNS attacks: attacked the most, slowest to fix

Networks are a prized target for hackers, as each attack costs £460,000 on average to remediate

https://www.information-age.com/telecoms-industry-dns-attacks-attacked-slowest-fix-1234690

Telecom operators are not properly prepared for cyber-attacks: A10 Networks

Mobile network operators are not properly prepared for cyber attacks, and the core of 3G and 4G networks is generally not protected.

ETTelecom | Updated: January 15, 2018, 13:41 IST

https://telecom.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/telecom-operators-are-not-properly-prepared-for-cyber-attacks-a10-networks/62504221

Hackers Are Tapping Into Mobile Networks' Backbone, New Research Shows



Parmy Olson Forbes Staff

AI, robotics and the digital transformation of European business.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2015/10/14/hackers-mobile-network-backbone-ss7/#59d777f8

Hack Attack: Sony Confirms PlayStation Network Outage Caused By 'External Intrusion'

Rip Empson @npemp / 8 years ago

Comment

https://techcrunch.com/2011/04/23/hack-attack-sony-confirms-playstation-network-outage-caused-by-external-intrusion/

ANDY GREENBERG SECURITY 04.16.18 07:52 PM

THE WHITE HOUSE WARNS ON RUSSIAN ROUTER HACKING, BUT MUDDLES THE MESSAGE

https://www.wired.com/story/white-house-warns-russian-router-hacking-muddles-message/




ANOMALY DETECTION IN NETWORKS

Why do we need it in Telecom?



What sort of data can we leverage?



DETECTION METHODS IN THIS COURSE

Anomaly Detection

Supervised (When you have Labels)

Unsupervised (When you don't have labels for your data)

XGBoost



Autoencoders



Generative Adversarial Networks








Definition

66

XGBoost is an implementation of gradient boosted decision trees designed for speed and performance.






It is a powerful tool for solving classification and regression problems in a supervised learning setting.


PREDICT: WHO ENJOYS COMPUTER GAMES

Example of Decision Tree




Source: https://goo.gl/eTxVtA


ENSEMBLE DECISION TREES



GRADIENT BOOSTED TREES FOR STRONGER PREDICTIONS



Intuitive Example for Tree Construction



Step 1: Start as a single leaf Input all residuals

Step 2: Calculate similarity score
For all residuals

Set Threshold @ Arbitrary
Drug Dosage 15

-10.5, 6.5, 7.5, -7.5


Sum of residuals squared


No. of residuals + Regularization

-10.5, 6.5, 7.5, -7.5


S0 = 4Setting Reg = 0


Intuitive Example for Tree Construction






Intuitive Example for Tree Construction






G2 = 4
Since G2 = 4 < G1 = 120.33
Tree 1 had better split

Intuitive Example for Tree Construction





Lower Leaves cluster similar residuals than root?

Gain = Left Similarity + Right Similarity


– Root Similarity


G3 = 56.33

Since G3 = 56.33 < G1 = 120.33 Tree 1 had better split



Intuitive Example for Tree Construction






Step 9: Calculate Gain

Lower Leaves cluster similar residuals than root?

G12 = 42.25 - 14.0 = 28.17

Intuitive Example for Tree Construction



Intuitive Example for Tree Construction

Re - Calculate Residuals : Assuming Gradient Multiplier = 0.3


• R1: 0.5 + 0.3 (-10.5) = - 2.65

• R2: 0.5 + 0.3(7) = 2.6

• R3: 0.5 + 0.3(7) = 2.6


• R4: 0.5 + 0.3(-7.5) = -1.75

Step 13:
Construct new tree with updated
Residuals




TRAINED MODELS VISUALIZATION

Single Decision Tree vs Ensemble Decision Trees



Models fit to the *Boston Housing* Dataset

Source: https://goo.gl/GWNdEm






ROC CURVE

Construction

Move Threshold



		Actual	
		Anomaly	Not Anomaly
Predicted	Anomaly	TP	FP
	Not Anomaly	FN	TN

True Positive Rate TP / (TP+FN) = Sensitivity

False Positive Rate FP / (FP +TN)




https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4jRBRDbJemM

ROC CURVE

Construction


Move Threshold



		Actual	
		Anomaly	Not Anomaly
Predicted	Anomaly	TP	FP
	Not Anomaly	FN	TN


True Positive Rate TP / (TP+FN) = Sensitivity


False Positive Rate FP / (FP +TN)



ROC CURVE


Interpretation






ROC CURVE


Interpretation





WHICH ML ALGORITHM PERFORMED BEST


Average rank across 165 ML datasets



Source: https://goo.gl/R8Y8Pp

RAPIDS


End-to-End Accelerated GPU Data Science






TIME TO TRAIN

Rapid Data Science







Model Selection and Hyper-Parameter Tuning

best_model = init_model

for (m,h) in zip(models, hyperparams):

my_model = train(m,h)

if acc(my_model) >
acc(best_model):

best_model = my_model

RAPIDS WITH XGBOOST

Multi-GPU, Multi-Node, Scalability

XGBoost:

- Algorithm tuned for eXtreme performance and high efficiency
- Multi-GPU and Multi-Node Support

RAPIDS:

- End-to-end data science & analytics pipeline entirely on GPU
- User-friendly Python interfaces
- Relies on CUDA primitives, exposes parallelism and high-memory bandwidth
- Benefits from DGX system designs (NVLINK, NVSWITCH, dense compute platform)
- Dask integration for managing workers & data in distributed environments

Work through the first reflection

1.2 Dataset Modification

Notice that the dataset has more anomalies than normal data. Reflect for a moment about the implications of having more anomalies might be. Reflect either here in the notebook, on a piece of paper, or with a peer sitting next to you.

Reflection:

We'll come back to test your hypothesis shortly.

Section 3: Impact of Skewed Data

As we prepared our data, we pointed out that there were more anomalies than normal data and considered the implications of this dataset skew that doesn't match the real world. Take a moment now see how adjusting our dataset impacts performance.

```
In [2]: def reduce anomalies(df, pct anomalies=.01):
            labels = df['label'].copy()
            is anomaly = labels != 'normal.'
            num normal = np.sum(-is_anomaly)
            num anomalies = int(pct anomalies * num normal)
            all anomalies = labels[labels != 'normal.']
            anomalies to keep = np.random.choice(all anomalies.index, size=num anomalies, replace=False)
            anomalous data = df.iloc(anomalies to keep).copy()
            normal data = df[~is anomaly].copy()
            new df = pd.concat([normal data, anomalous data], axis=0)
            return new df
```

```
df = reduce anomalies(df)
```

Return to data preprocessing and rerun cells to this point, comparing and contrasting performance. Again, reflect below, on paper, or with a peer. Reflect on

Let's see what anomalies we have after the reduction.

Answer:

```
In [ ]: pd.DataFrame(df['label'].value counts())
```

why the reduction of anomalies had the impact that it did.

What was the impact of reducing anomalies in the dataset and why do you think that is?

Multi-Class Classifier Challenge

In the field below, set up dtrain, dtest, evals, and model as exemplified when we trained our binary classifier.

Note: Multiclass labels are in y_train and y_test. Hint: Control F will help you find dtrain, dtest, evals and model.

You can see how adding multiple classes doesn't increase the complexity in training this type of model.

```
dtrain = ##SEE BINARY CLASSIFIER FOR HINT##
dtest = ##SEE BINARY CLASSIFIER FOR HINT##
evals = ##SEE BINARY CLASSIFIER FOR HINT##
model = ##SEE BINARY CLASSIFIER FOR HINT##
```


Exercise 2

WHAT IF YOU DID NOT HAVE LABELS FOR YOUR DATASET?

UNSUPERVISED DETECTION METHODS

Statistical, proximity, and deviation

- Statistical methods assume that the data can be modeled from a specific distribution
 - Anomalous if probability is less than threshold
- Proximity methods use distance to define anomalies
 - Anomalous if distance from centroid greater than threshold
- Deviation methods use lower-dimensional embeddings and reconstruction error
 - Anomalous if reconstruction error is greater than one or standard deviations




https://stats.stackexchange.com/questions/160260/anomaly-detection-based-on-clust

AUTOENCODERS

Deviation based anomaly detection method


- Autoencoders are a form of unsupervised learning and have applications outside of anomaly detection
- An autoencoder consists of two parts the encoder and decoder
- Encoder is a neural network that maps the input to a (typically) lower-dimensional space
- Decoder is a neural network that maps the encoded data back to the input
- Anomalies have high reconstruction error




Denoising

AUTOENCODER FLAVORS

Sparse





 $\widetilde{x} = x + \text{noise}$








































MODULARITY

Deep



https://deeplearning4j.org/deepautoencoder


Convolutional

Convolution step (convolution + pooling)

Fully connected encoding step

Deconvolution step (deconvolution + unpooling)

https://swarbrickjones.wordpress.com/2015/04/29/convolutional-autoencoders-in-pythontheanolasagne/




https://arxiv.org/pdf/1506.01057v2.pdf



Autoencoder based Anomaly Detection

Input Data

duration	0					
src_bytes	215					
service	http (1)					
flag	SF (1)					
src_bytes	215					
	•					
	•					
dst_host_ srv_rerror _rate	0					




Reconstructed Data


duration	0	v
src_bytes	215	·
service	http (1)	·
flag	SF (0)	3
src_bytes	215	V
dst_host_ srv_rerror _rate	1 ·	×

$$\hat{x} = g_{\Theta}(f_{\Theta}(x))$$

AUTOENCODER RECONSTRUCTION ERROR




AUTOENCODER RECONSTRUCTION ERROR






RECONSTRUCTION ERROR OF REGULAR SAMPLE



RECONSTRUCTION ERROR OF AN ANOMALY




CATEGORICAL FEATURES

One-hot encoding vs Entity Embedding

			X1	C1	C2				X1	C1a	C1b	C1c	C2a	C2b	C2c
		1	Xa	C1a	C2a			1	Xa	1	0	0	1	0	0
		2	Xb	C1b	C2a	One-hot		2	Xb	0	1	0	1	0	0
		3	Xc	C1b	C2c	encoding		3	Xc	0	1	0	0	0	1
_															
	C1		Embedo	ding	C2	Embedding			X1	C11	C12	C13	C21	C22	C23
-	C1a		[0.1,0.2	2,0]	C2a	[-0.5,0.2,0.4	—	1	Xa	0.1	0.2	0	-0.5	0.2	0.4
	C1b		[0.5,0.7,	0.1]	C2c	[0.3,0.7,0.8]		2	Xb	0.5	0.7	0.1	-0.5	0.2	0.4
				ntity mbeddi	ing			3	Xc	0.5	0.7	0.1	0.3	0.7	0.8

EMBEDDING CATEGORICAL FEATURES





ERROR METRICS

Comparing the different Metrics

Mean Absolute Error (MAE): This measures the absolute average distance between the real data and the predicted data, but it fails to punish large errors in prediction.

Mean Square Error (MSE): This measures the squared average distance between the real data and the predicted data. Here, larger errors are well noted (better than MAE). But the disadvantage is that it also squares up the units of data as well. So, evaluation with different units is not at all justified.


Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE): This is actually the square root of MSE. Also, this metrics solves the problem of squaring the units.

$$MAE = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} |y_i - \hat{y}|$$

$$MSE = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} (y_i - \hat{y})^2$$


$$RMSE = \sqrt{MSE} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} (y_i - \hat{y})^2}$$


Auto-Encoder on Time-series Data Bonus



Time	Feature 1	Feature 2	Feature 3
00:00:00	Val_1_1	Val_2_2	Val_3_3
00:00:01	Val_4_4	Val_5_5	Val_6_6
00:00:02	Val_7_7	Val_8_8	Val_9_9
00:00:03	Val_10_10	Val_11_11	Val_12_12

Reconstruction Error – Training Performance









LAB 2 HANDS-ON

Python 3 O

Network Anomaly Detection using Autoencoders ¶

Welcome to the second lab of this series!

In the previous lab we used XGBoost, a powerful and efficient tree based algorithm for classification of anomalies. We were able to near perfectly identify the anomalous data in the KDD99 dataset and which type of anomaly occurred. However, in the real-world labeled data can be expensive and hard to come by. Especially with network security, zero-day attacks can be the the most challenging and also the most important attacks to detect.

So how do we approach this problem?

For starters, we could have security analysts investigate the network packets and label anomalous ones. But that solution doesn't scale well and our models might have difficulty identifying attacks that haven't occurred before.

Our solution will be to use unsupervised learning. Unsupervised learning is the class of machine learning and deep learning algorithms that enable us to draw inferences from our dataset without labels.



In this lab we will use autoencoders (AEs) to detect anomalies in the KDD99 dataset. There are a lot of advantages to using autoencoders for detecting anomalies. One main advantage is the that AEs can learn non-linear relationships in the data.

While we will not be using the labels in the KDD99 dataset explicitly for model training, we will be using them to evaluate how well our model is doing at detecting the anomalies. We will also use the labels to see if the AE is embedding the anomalies in latent space according to the type anomaly.

```
import numpy as np
import pandas as pd
import pandas as pd
import matplotlib.psylot as plt
from IPython.display import Image

from sklearn.model_selection import train_test_split
from sklearn.metrics import mean_squared_error
```

Choose one


How does the ratio of anomalies to normal data impact results and why?

Recall that when using XG Boost, the ratio didn't impact training meaningfully. Anomalies were simply a class of our dataset, not made special in any way by their rare nature. Using AutoEncoders, you'll see that that's no longer true. We'll explore the questions of how rare is rare enough? and how does that impact our ability to identify multiple classes of anomalies?


In the cell below, choose to either use 1% or 5% anomaly in your dataset by setting the pct_anomalies parameter to .01 or .05 respectively. If you are taking this in an in-person workshop, choose a partner and do both so you can compare and contrast.

```
In [ ]: pct_anomalies = ##.01 or .05##
In [ ]: !python preprocess data.py --pct anomalies $pct anomalies
```

Problem of Vanishing Gradients



As hidden layers increase the partial derivative terms starts becoming smaller and smaller.




The discriminator doesn't provide enough information for the generator to make progress.

Weak Classifier Weak Generator


Problem of Non-Convergence

GANs involve two players

- Discriminator is trying to maximize its reward.
- Generator is trying to minimize Discriminator's reward.
- SGD was not designed to find the Nash equilibrium of a game.
- Problem: We might not converge to the Nash equilibrium at all




Problem of Mode Collapse



No Mode Collapse



Mode Collapse




- Generated images converge to x[^] that fool D the most -- most realistic from the D perspective
- Discriminator gets stuck in a local minimum and doesn't find the best strategy.
- Generator keeps producing small set of modes or output types.


Some Solutions - WGAN

The major difference is due to the cost function:

- Discriminator does not actually classify instances rather outputs a number.
- Discriminator training just tries to make the output bigger for real instances than for fake instances => Called a " critic" than a discriminator.
- If the discriminator gets stuck in local minima, it learns to reject the outputs that the generator stabilizes on. So the generator must try something new.
- Helps avoid problems with vanishing gradients & model collapse.



Adversarial Attacks



White - Box attacks:


- Attackers have access to Model architecture, weights.
- Calculate the perturbation δ based on loss function.
- Attackers push the perturbed image to be misclassified to a specific target class.

Black - Box attacks:

- Attackers do not have access to the classifier or defense parameters.
- Trains a substitute model using a very small dataset augmented by synthetic images labeled by querying the classifier.
- Examples that fool the substitute end up being misclassified by the targeted classifier.


DEFENCE GAN

Pipelining a GAN with Anomaly Detection Classifier



- WGAN trained on legitimate (un-perturbed) training samples to "denoise" adversarial examples.
- At test time, prior to feeding an image x to the classifier, x is projected onto the range of the generator by minimizing the reconstruction error ||G(z) x||²₂ and produce output to a given image which does not contain the adversarial changes.
- The resulting reconstruction G(z) is then given to the classifier. Results in a substantial reduction of any potential adversarial noise.

SHORT RECAP



LAB 3


WHAT IF YOU HAD NO IDEA WHAT YOUR ANOMALIES ARE GOING TO LOOK LIKE?

LAB 3 (OR) YOUR DATA DOES NOT FOLLOW A

GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION?

GENERATIVE ADVERSARIAL NETWORKS

- A generative model that learns to generate samples that have the same characteristics as the samples in the dataset.
- The Generator, `G`, produces fake samples
- The discriminator, 'D', receives samples from both G and the dataset.
- During Training: The generator tries to fool the discriminator by outputting values that resemble real data and the discriminator tries to become better at distinguishing between the real and fake data.




GAN APPLICATIONS



Figure 5: 1024×1024 images generated using the CELEBA-HQ dataset. See Appendix F for a larger set of results, and the accompanying video for latent space interpolations.



Figure 2: From left to right: bicubic interpolation, deep residual network optimized for MSE, deep residual generative adversarial network optimized for a loss more sensitive to human perception, original HR image. Corresponding PSNR and SSIM are shown in brackets, [4x upscaling]









pix2pixHD


STEP 1




Meaningless Output



STEP 3




BACK TO STEP 1



Meaningful Output

ANOMALY DETECTION



ANOMALY DETECTION

