

# Merkle Damgard Transform

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## 1 Merkle Damgard Transform Idea:

The Merkle Damgard Transform constructs a collision resistant hash function  $H$  to hash arbitrary length messages given a fixed length collision resistant hash function  $h$  which maps messages of size  $2n$  to a hash of size  $n$ . Assume we need to hash a message  $m$ , where size of  $m$  is larger than key size. Let key size be  $n$ ,  $IV$  be an initialization vector. Each message chunk and  $IV$  is of size  $n$ , if the size of the last chunk is lesser than key length, its padded with zeros to equal key size. Each block is the fixed length collision resistant hash function  $h$ . Input to  $i^{th}$  block (except the last one is:

$$m_i z_{i-1}$$

,  $z_0 = IV$ . For the last block, the input is:  $|m|z_l$ , where  $l$  is the number of message chunks and  $|m|$  is the message size. The output  $z_i$  is a  $n$  bit hash.

## 2 Merkle Damgard Transform Algorithm:

Let  $(Gen, h)$  be a fixed-length collision-resistant hash function for inputs of length  $2\ell(n)$  and with output length  $\ell(n)$ . Construct a variable-length hash function  $(Gen, H)$  as follows:

- $Gen$ : remains unchanged compared to fixed hash collision resistant function.
- $H$ : on input a key  $s$  and a string  $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$  of length  $L < 2^{\ell(n)}$ , do the following (set  $\ell = \ell(n)$  in what follows):
  - Set  $B := \lceil \frac{L}{\ell} \rceil$  (i.e., the number of blocks in  $x$ ). Pad  $x$  with zeroes so its length is a multiple of  $\ell$ . Parse the padded result as the sequence of  $\ell$ -bit blocks  $x_1, \dots, x_B$ . Set  $x_{B+1} := L$ , where  $L$  is encoded using exactly  $\ell$  bits.
  - Set  $z_0 := 0^\ell$ .
  - For  $i = 1, \dots, B + 1$ , compute  $z_i := h^s(z_{i-1} || x_i)$ .
  - Output  $z_{B+1}$

### 3 Merkle Damgard Transform Explanation:

#### 3.1 Theorem:

If  $(\text{Gen}, h)$  is a fixed length collision resistant hash function, then  $(\text{Gen}, H)$  is a collision resistant hash function

#### 3.2 Proof:

- Case 1:  $L \neq L'$ . In this case, the last step of the computation of  $H^s(x)$  is  $z_{B+1} := h^s(z_B \| L)$  and the last step of the computation of  $H^s(x')$  is  $z'_{B'+1} := h^s(z'_{B'} \| L')$ . Since  $H^s(x) = H^s(x')$  it follows that  $h^s(z_B \| L) = h^s(z'_{B'} \| L')$ . However,  $L \neq L'$  and so  $z_B \| L$  and  $z'_{B'} \| L'$  are two different strings that collide for  $h^s$ .
- Case 2:  $L = L'$ . Note this means that  $B = B'$  and  $x_{B+1} = x'_{B+1}$ . Let  $z_i$  and  $z'_i$  be the intermediate hash values of  $x$  and  $x'$  during the computation of  $H^s(x)$  and  $H^s(x')$ , respectively. Since  $x \neq x'$  but  $|x| = |x'|$ , there must exist at least one index  $i$  (with  $1 \leq i \leq B$ ) such that  $x_i \neq x'_i$ . Let  $i^* \leq B + 1$  be the highest index for which it holds that  $z_{i^*-1} \| x_{i^*} \neq z'_{i^*-1} \| x'_{i^*}$ . If  $i^* = B + 1$  then  $z_B \| x_{B+1}$  and  $z'_B \| x'_{B+1}$  are two different strings that collide for  $h^s$  because

$$h^s(z_B \| x_{B+1}) = z_{B+1} = H^s(x) = H^s(x') = z'_{B+1} = h^s(z'_B \| x'_{B+1}).$$

If  $i^* \leq B$ , then maximality of  $i^*$  implies  $z_{i^*} = z'_{i^*}$ . Thus, once again,  $z_{i^*-1} \| x_{i^*}$  and  $z'_{i^*-1} \| x'_{i^*}$  are two different strings that collide for  $h^s$ .