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Assessed Coursework 1 — Symmetric Encryption

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Introduction

This coursework is for the subject F21CN: Computer Network Security. The main topic for this given coursework is on Symmetric encryption. Each task given in the course work is attempted to the best of my comprehension on the given assignment. Ever task is divided into objective, methodology and then snippets/output of the respective tasks.

All tasks are clearly described below whilst referencing the sources that helped me achieve my desired output. I hope that within this assignment given I can comprehend various methods used in Symmetric Encryption and how they are implanted. Through this I hope to broaden my knowledge in cryptography especially with -AES-128 cipher and the different modes of operation whilst using appropriate key and iv.

I look forward to comprehending how frequency analysis is used in Task 1 and how it displays Monoalphabetic Substitution Ciphers as being incredibly inadequate.

I look forward to understanding in Task 2 the affect of padding during encryption and decryption in different file sizes.

I look forward to comprehending how different modes of encryption get affected when the file is corrupted in Task 3.

I hope to match two cipher files with the help of a password for Task 4

Specifications

Windows OS Version 10.0.22000, Openssl version 3.0.1, CentOS Stream release 9, VirtualBox 6.1.40

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Task 1: Frequency Analysis: Monoalphabetic Substitution Cipher

Objective

The objective of the task is to decipher the encrypted text with the help of frequency analysis. Frequency analysis is the rate at which each individual letter or a group of letters gets repeated the most in common English language. Long paragraphs or texts are required to get an accurate rate of frequency of letters which is then matched to the frequency of letters of the encrypted message to possibly decipher it. Through this process I will be attempting to decrypt the file cipher-task1-197.

Links

Using the first resource provided (https://onlinetoolz.net/letter-frequency) helped me obtain the frequency analysis of my cipher text. The following resources were used to compare the rate of general English frequency to that of mine cipher text in attempt to decrypt the file. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frequency_analysis), (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bigram) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trigram)

Methodology

Through the websites and links used above, I compared the frequency of letters and replaced them with Bigram and Trigram frequency as they seemed most efficient than single letter frequency. Initially starting with Trigram, I was able to replace the highest frequent combination of letters 'kmn' with 'THE' as it's the most common word. This process as whilst it works can seem inefficient due to the time taken and the rate of error that could occur. The first 7 lines of code contained errors as the second highest 3 letter word 'AND' didn't compute to make logical sense. I then shifted to Bigram and attempted different combinations until I replaced 'kmnvewp' with 'THENAOI'.

I then followed to interchange the alphabets mapped in Bigram as the next indexed alphabet then has the second highest chance of being the correct alphabet.

Lastly, I found the analysis works best initially with replacing up to 4-5 letters, as after that the frequency analysis was not as accurate since words such as Names, Places could wary country to country. Trigram and Bigram are most efficient as it covers a larger portion of words .

```
[sashasuhel@localhost CWI]$ tr 'kmn' 'THE' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CWI]$ tr 'kmngwq' 'THEAND' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CWI]$ tr 'kmngwqr' 'THHEINERANE' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CWI]$ tr 'kmngwqe' 'THEANDO' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CWI]$ tr 'kmngwq' 'THEAND' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CWI]$ tr 'kmn' 'THE' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CWI]$ tr 'kmnv' 'THEN' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CWI]$ tr 'kmnvwe' 'THENAO' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CWI]$ tr 'kmnvwe' 'THENAO' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CWI]$ tr 'kmnvew' 'THENAO' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
```

Figure 1.1

Snippet

```
[sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmn' 'THE' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
 [sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmngwq' 'THEAND' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
 [sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmmnnyynwqr' 'THHEINERANE' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmngwqe' 'THEANDO' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmngwq' 'THEANDO' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmngwq' 'THE' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
 [sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmmv' 'THEN' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmnvwe' 'THENAO' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
 [sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmnvew' 'THENAO' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmnvewp' 'THENAOI' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
 [sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmnvewpxyl' 'THENAOIWRK' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt[sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr
 kmnvewpxyls' 'THENAOIWRKD' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmnvewpxylszg' 'THENAOIWRKDGY' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmnvewpxylszgs' 'THENAOIWRKDGYA' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmnvewpxylszgsfa' 'THENAOIWRKDGYACS' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CWI]$ tr 'kmnvewpxylszgsfa' 'THENAOIWRKDGYACS' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CWI]$ tr 'kmnvewpxylszgsfa' 'THENAOIWRKDGYACS' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CWI]$ tr 'kmnvewpxylszgsfaqdrho' 'THENAOIWRKDGYACSUM' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CWI]$ tr 'kmnvewpxylszgsfaqdrho' 'THENAOIWRKDGYACSUMLBF' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CWI]$ tr 'kmnvewpxylszgs' 'THENAOIWRKDGYA' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CWI]$ tr 'kmnvewpxylszg' 'THENAOIWRKDGY' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CWI]$ tr 'kmnvewpxylszg' 'THENAOIWRKDGY' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
 [sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmnvewpxylszgqdfa' 'THENAOIWRKDGYUMCS' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmnvewpxylszgqdfauro' 'THENAOIWRKDGYUMCSPLF' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmnvewpxylszgqdfauroh' 'THENAOIWRKDGYUMCSPLFB' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$
[sashasuhel@localhost CW]]$ tr 'kmnvewpxylszgqdfaurohi' 'THENAOIWRKDGYUMCSPLFBV' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CW]]$ tr 'kmnvewpxylszgqdfaurohic' 'THENAOIWRKDGYUMCSPLFBVX' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CW]]$ tr 'kmnvewpxylszgqdfaurohict' 'THENAOIWRKDGYUMCSPLFBVXZ' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmnvewpxylszgqdfaurohictb' 'THENAOIWRKDGYUMCSPLFBVXZQ' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$ tr 'kmnvewpxylszgqdfaurohictbm' 'THENAOIWRKDGYUMCSPLFBVXZQH' <ciphertxt-197> new.txt
 [sashasuhel@localhost CW1]$
```

Figure 1.2

Alphabet Mapping

= SQXMACYBVJTKHEFIULDZPNOWRG (Cipher key)

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	1	m	n	0	p	q	r	S	t	u	V	W	X	y	Z
S	Q	X	M	A	С	Y	В	V	J	T	K	Н	Е	F	I	U	L	D	Z	P	N	О	W	R	G

The above key was used to encrypt <ciphertext-197> which mapped every letter of the English alphabet to the key and replaced them to create a cipher text. When the key is remapped to the ciphertext, the output is the decrypted/original message (Plain.txt).

Task 2: Symmetric encryption: Padding

Objective

To explore padding during the process of encryption and be able to view the process of padding while decrypting to see the change in the byte size. Padding involves adding extra bytes to a plaintext message before encryption when the size of a plaintext message is not a multiple of the block size during block ciphers.

Methodology

Step 1 is to create 3 files of exact 5,10 and 16 byte respectively named as shown

```
[sashasuhel@localhost Task2]$ ls -l
total 12
-rw-rw-r--. 1 sashasuhel sashasuhel 5 Oct 2 16:55 plain1.txt
-rw-rw-r--. 1 sashasuhel sashasuhel 10 Oct 2 16:58 plain2.txt
-rw-rw-r--. 1 sashasuhel sashasuhel 16 Oct 2 16:59 plain3.txt
[sashasuhel@localhost Task2]$ cat plain1.txt plain2.txt plain3.txt
meow
treasures
mathematics1234
```

Figure 2.1

Step 2 is to encrypt each of these files to another file. The algorithm which is used to encrypt is -aes-128-cbc which is 128-bit size. While encrypting, it pads the byte size of each file to the next multiples of 128 to secure the data. For ex. 5 to 16, 10 to 16, 16 to 32.

```
[sashasuhel@localhost Task2]$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in plain1.txt -out cipher1.b in -K 001122334455667788899aabbccddeeff -iv 0102030405060708 hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length hex string is too long, ignoring excess [sashasuhel@localhost Task2]$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in plain2.txt -out cipher2.b in -K 001122334455667788899aabbccddeeff -iv 0102030405060708 hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length hex string is too long, ignoring excess [sashasuhel@localhost Task2]$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in plain3.txt -out cipher3.b in -K 001122334455667788899aabbccddeeff -iv 0102030405060708 hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length hex string is too long, ignoring excess
```

Figure 2.2

```
[sashasuhel@localhost Task2]$ ls -l
total 100
-rw-rw-r--. 1 sashasuhel sashasuhel
                                      16 Oct 2 17:12 cipher1.bin
-rw-rw-r--. 1 sashasuhel sashasuhel
                                      16 Oct 2 17:15 cipher2.bin
-rw-rw-r--. 1 sashasuhel sashasuhel
                                      32 Oct 2 17:15
                                                       cipher3.bin
                                      5 Oct 2 16:55 plain1.txt
rw-rw-r--. 1 sashasuhel sashasuhel
rw-rw-r--. 1 sashasuhel sashasuhel
                                      10 Oct 2 16:58
                                                      plain2.txt
                                                       plain3.txt
rw-rw-r--. 1 sashasuhel sashasuhel
                                      16 Oct 2 16:59
rw-r--r-. 1 sashasuhel sashasuhel 77528 Oct 2 17:08 'Screenshot from 2022-10-02 17-0
```

Figure 2.3

As seen above when mentioned to list the details of the files, cipher1.bin and cipher2.bin went to the next byte allocation which is 16, while cipher3.bin went to 32 bytes.

Step 3 is to convert these encrypted cipher files to a new decrypted file while keeping its padding by using the command '-nopad'

```
sashasuhel@localhost Task2]$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc
  xt -nopad -K 001122334455667788899aabbccddeeff -iv 0102030405060708
hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length
hex string is too long, ignoring excess
[sashasuhel@localhost Task2]$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -d -in cipher2.bin -out newpln2.
 txt -nopad -K 001122334455667788899aabbccddeeff -iv 0102030405060708
txt -nopad -K 001122334455667788899aabbccddeeff -iv 0102030405060708
hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length
hex string is too long, ignoring excess
[sashasuhel@localhost Task2]$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -d -in cipher3.bin -out newpln3.
txt -nopad -K 001122334455667788899aabbccddeeff -iv 0102030405060708
hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length
hex string is too long, ignoring excess
[sashasuhel@localhost Task2]$ ls -l
 total 232
                                                                        16 Oct 2 17:12
16 Oct 2 17:15
32 Oct 2 17:15
16 Oct 2 18:14
16 Oct 2 18:14
32 Oct 2 18:14
  rw-rw-r--. 1 sashasuhel sashasuhel
                                                                                                      cipher1.bin
  rw-rw-r--.
                                                                                                      cipher2.bin
                     1 sashasuhel sashasuhel
                     1 sashasuhel sashasuhel
                                                                                                      cipher3.bin
  rw-rw-r--.
                     1 sashasuhel sashasuhel
                                                                                                      newpln1.txt
  rw-rw-r--. 1 sashasuhel sashasuhel
                                                                                                      newpln2.txt
  rw-rw-r--. 1 sashasuhel sashasuhel
                                                                                                      newpln3.txt
                                                                                     2 16:14
2 18:08
2 16:55
2 16:58
2 16:59
                                                                    4375 Oct
5 Oct
                      1 sashasuhel sashasuhel
                                                                                                      Notepad .
  rw-rw-r--. 1 sashasuhel sashasuhel rw-rw-r--. 1 sashasuhel sashasuhel
                                                                                                      plain1.txt
                                                                        10
                                                                            0ct
                                                                                                      plain2.txt
                      1 sashasuhel sashasuhel
                                                                        Figure 2.4
```

Outlook

```
[sashasuhel@localhost Task2]$ hexdump plain1.txt
0000000 656d 776f 000a
0000005
[sashasuhel@localhost Task2]$ hexdump newpln1.txt
0000000 656d 776f 0b0a 0b0b 0b0b 0b0b 0b0b 0b0b
0000010
[sashasuhel@localhost Task2]$ hexdump plain2.txt
0000000 7274 6165 7573 6572 0a73
000000a
[sashasuhel@localhost Task2]$ hexdump newpln2.txt
0000000 7274 6165 7573 6572 0a73 0606 0606 0606
[sashasuhel@localhost Task2]$ hexdump plain3.txt
0000000 616d 6874 6d65 7461 6369 3173 3332 0a34
0000010
[sashasuhel@localhost Task2]$ hexdump newpln3.txt
0000020
[sashasuhel@localhost Task2]$
                                  Figure 2.5
```

Using the 'hexdump' function it is clearly visible on the comparison between the plaintext file and the decrypted newpln that there are additional bytes added.

Task 3: Encryption Mode — Corrupted Cipher Text

Objective

To understand how a file would change if the encrypted file got corrupted while through different modes of encryption ECB, CBC, CFB, and OFB, while using a general key and iv for the following. A standard AES-192 cipher is used throughout.

Methodology

The resource (https://www.rapidtables.com/convert/number/decimal-to-hex.html) helped me ensure that for the first part of corruption that I changed only a single bit of the 46th position of the hexadecimal value of the encrypted file. All files that were corrupted decrypted, but with varying results as every mode of operation uses a different mode of matrix to encrypt so as a result during decryption, we can further understand how every mode of encryption works. Some modes encrypt independently, while others rely on previous block of bytes.

Step 1: To create a file 128bytes with exactly 128bytes which will be used throughout.

```
[sashasuhel@localhost Task3]\$ echo -n "My name is Sasha.I am currently a Heriot Watt student in dubai. I am studying Msc.Data Science .I love the color red and sports." >128b ytes.txt Figure 3.1
```

Step 2: Is to encrypt the file '128bytes' with different modes of encryption . The command -nopad is used here so no additional padding is done while encrypting the files.

```
[sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$ openssl enc -aes-192-ecb -e -in 128bytes.txt -out 128byt esecb.bin -nopad -K 001122334455667788899aabbccddeeff hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length [sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$ openssl enc -aes-192-cbc -e -in 128bytes.txt -out 128byt escbc.bin -nopad -K 001122334455667788899aabbccddeeff -iv 0102030405060708 hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length [sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$ openssl enc -aes-192-cfb -e -in 128bytes.txt -out 128byt escfb.bin -nopad -K 001122334455667788899aabbccddeeff -iv 0102030405060708 hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length [sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$ openssl enc -aes-192-ofb -e -in 128bytes.txt -out 128byt esofb.bin -nopad -K 001122334455667788899aabbccddeeff -iv 0102030405060708 hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length [sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$ openssl enc -aes-192-ofb -e -in 128bytes.txt -out 128byt esofb.bin -nopad -K 001122334455667788899aabbccddeeff -iv 0102030405060708 hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length [sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$ ■
```

Step 3: Once encryption is done, next I have installed the library **hexedit** on my terminal using the command, "yum install hexedit" to help me corrupt the files and modify the hexadecimal values for each of the ciphertext files. Now let's view the process for the different modes on what happens when I modify a single bit in the 46th byte and remove the block containing the 86th byte from each of the ciphertext files.

Figure 3.3

ECB (Electronic Codebook)

The binary value for 86(decimal) is 1010110, so after changing one bit the binary value will be 1010111 (87). To remove the block containing the 86th byte I have modified it to 00

```
sashasuhel@localhost:~/Documents/CW1/Task3 — hexedit 128bytesecb.bin
 ∄
                                                             E2 B7 5F
49 48 5F
5A C3 E6
99 99 91
B1 90 B9
13 1B EF
D2 E7 EC
00000000
00000010
                         C5
48
                                              2C DD
58 04
                                                         24
58
                                                                             06
85
                                                                                 D3
DF
                                                                                                 ..H..!X.XIH_..c,
..h.*0.=nZ....
                                         21
                                    2A 4F D1 3D
15 68 EB 79
0A A0 PF DF
83 0F 73 DD
53 9B 33 AD
                                                                            85 DF 82 2C
82 C0 86 22
24 8E 25 5D
FE F9 B4 93
B7 D4 01 5B
53 46 B9 31
79 13 31 A4
90000020
                    87 68 E1
F6 78 B6
               4E F6 78 B6
6E 03 3C 5B
E2 B7 01 8A
C6 8F CB 3
                                                                                                 N.x..h.yn...$..]
90000030
                                                         6E
0000040
90000050
                                                         18
                                                                                                  2A
                                                                                                                D1
                                                                                                                       3D
                                                                                                                                 6E
                                                                                                                                       5A
                                                                                                                                              С3
                                                                                                                                                      E6
                                                                                                                                                                82
                                                                                                                                                                      C@
                                                                                                                                                                             87
                                                                                                                                                                                    22
                                    82 83 2F
                                                                                                  15
0000070
                                                  BE
                                                         A6 6C 54 70
                                                                                                         68
                                                                                                                EΒ
                                                                                                                       79
                                                                                                                                 6E
                                                                                                                                       99
                                                                                                                                              99
                                                                                                                                                     91
                                                                                                                                                                24
                                                                                                                                                                      8E
                                                                                                                                                                             63
                                                                                                                                                                                    5D
                                                                                                  0Α
                                                                                                                 PE
                                                                                                                                       B1 90
                                                                                                                                                                      F9
                                                                                                                       DF
                                                                                                                                                     В9
                                                                                                                                                                FΕ
                                                                                                                                                                             В4
                                                                                                                                                                                    93
                                                                                                         A0
                                                                                                                                 39
                                                                                                               00 DD
                                                                                                  83
                                                                                                        0F
                                                                                                                                        13
                                                                                                                                              1B
                                                                                                                                                     EF
                                                                                                                                                                В7
                                                                                                                                                                             01
                                                                                                                                                                                    5B
                                                                                                                                 18
                                                                                                                                                                     D4
```

Figure 3.4 Left Image: Before Corruption, Right Image: After corruption

CBC (Cipher Block Chaining)

The binary value for 76(decimal) is 1001100, so after changing one bit the binary value will be 1001101 (77). To remove the block containing the 86th byte I have modified it to 00

```
CB
B8 17 DD
           F5
              CD 5D
                     EC
                          48
                            33 76 B6
FB 7D D5
           0C
              CB
                 41
                     21
                         D3
                             3E
                                  17
                                     DD
                                              CD
                                                  5D
                                                          48
                                                             33
                                                                    В6
35 F2 8D
           5F
                         Α7
                            EF
                                1
              2D 9D
                    4A
                                  7D
                                     D5
                                          OC.
                                              CB
                                                  41
                                                     21
                                                          D3
                                                             3E
                                                                 HO
                                                                     E5
9D 74 F1
           0C
              72 FC 8A
                         05 90
                                      8D
                                          5F
                                              2D
                                                  9D
                                                     4A
                                                          Α7
                                                             EF
                                                                 17
                                                                     30
                                  00 F1
                                          0C
                                              72
                                                  FC
                                                     8A
                                                          05
                                                             90
                                                                 F5
                                                                     EF
                                      E1
                                           53 91
                                                  D9
                                                     09
                                                          9Α
                                                             D1
                                                                 2F
                                                                    BC
                                      89
                                                     7A
                                                          45 45 6A 1E
                                           A0 28
                                                  2B
```

Figure 3.5 Before and after image of CBC hexadecimal modification

CFB (Cipher Feedback)

The binary value for 76(decimal) is 1001100, so after changing one bit the binary value will be 1001101 (77). To remove the block containing the 86th byte I have modified it to 00




Figure 3.6 Before and after image of CFB hexadecimal modification

OFB (Output Feedback)

The binary value for 79(decimal) is 1001111, so after changing one bit the binary value will be 1001100 (78). To remove the block containing the 86th byte I have modified it to 00

```
sashasuhel@localhost:~/Documents/CW1/Task3 — hexedit 128bytesofb.bin
                                                                              ..i..g..c3.x..[!
.Yi..:.?.....
rV.*.B.cC.#y..y+
0000000
             B0 59 69 14
72 56 1D 2A
0C 28 71 19
DA 00 B1 EA
                                              A2 CC
                             A8 42 0B 63
9A BF F9 AB
CD 2E 60 4A
                                             43 10 23 79
2D D1 5F C8
9D C7 74 4D
                                                              FD C9 79 2B
8E E6 27 50
76 51 9A D0
00000020
                                                                              .(q.....P
00000030
                             3E C7 35 C1
CC FA FB 4E
B6 64 67 91
                                                                               0B 63
                                                                                            43 10
                                                                                                      23
                                                                                                                         C9 (78)
             59 69 27 CD
34 19 A0 7C
                                                              17 C8 0F DC
9000050
                                             BC DE EB 2F
                                             3D CB
                                                     B8 78
                                                              E8 40 1C D1
 0000060
                                                                               F9
                                                                                    AB
                                                                                            2D D1
                                                                                                      5F
                                                                                                            С8
                                                                                                                    8E E6 A7
                                                                                                                                    50
                                                                               B9 4A
                                                                                            9D
                                                                                                 C7
                                                                                                       74
                                                                                                            4D
                                                                                                                    76
                                                                                                                         51 9A
                                                                                                                                    D0
                                                                               00 C1
                                                                                            BC
                                                                                                 DE
                                                                                                      EΒ
                                                                                                            2F
                                                                                                                    17
                                                                                                                         С8
                                                                                                                              0F
                                                                                                                                    DC
                                                                               FB 4E
                                                                                            ЗD
                                                                                                      В8
                                                                                                            78
                                                                                                                              10
                                                                                                 CB
                                                                                                                    E8 40
                                                                                                                                    D1
                                                                                                                    7F
                                                                               67 91
                                                                                            7D
                                                                                                 FF
                                                                                                      6B 50
                                                                                                                         89
                                                                                                                              E9 73
```

Figure 3.7 Before and after image of OFB hexadecimal modification

Hypothesis

Once the modifications are done, the respective files are decrypted with the appropriate key and iv along with -nopad.

```
[sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$ openssl enc -aes-192-ecb -d -in 128bytesecb.bin -out ecb pt.txt -nopad -k 001122334455667788899aabbccddeeff hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length [sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$ openssl enc -aes-192-cbc -d -in 128bytescbc.bin -out cbc pt.txt -nopad -k 001122334455667788899aabbccddeeff -iv 0102030405060708 hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length [sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$ openssl enc -aes-192-cfb -e -in 128bytes.txt -out 128byt escfb.bin -nopad -k 001122334455667788899aabbccddeeff -iv 0102030405060708 hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length [sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$ openssl enc -aes-192-cfb -d -in 128bytesofb.bin -out ofb pt.txt -nopad -k 00112233455667788899aabbccddeeff -iv 0102030405060708 hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length hex string is too short, padding with zero bytes to length
```

Figure 3.8 Decrypt cipher text files

```
[sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$
[sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$ cat 128bytes.txt
My name is Sasha.I am currently a Heriot Watt student in dubai. I am studying Msc.Data
Science .I love the color red and sports.[sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$
[sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$
[sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$ cat rececbpt.txt
My name is Sasha.I am currently 🗘 q00000000;000udent in dubai. I am studying Ms00008V000l
🕏z🏶YI love the color red and sports.[sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$
[sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$ cat reccbcpt.txt
My name is Sasha.I am currently �����ju�59�E��udent in dubai/ I am studying Ms�� ]E����l;
I loveTthe color red and sports.[sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$
[sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$ cat reccfbpt.txt
My name is Sasha.I am currently a Heriot Watt rt{w�h����������� am studying Msc.DataRS
cience .QHQ:Q辴 eE6QaQ red and sports.[sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$
[sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$ cat recofbpt.txt
My name is Sasha.I am currently a Heriot Watt rtudent in dubai. I am studying Msc.DataS
cience .I love the color red and sports.[sashasuhel@localhost Task3]$
```

Figure 3.9 Corrupted ciphertext result

1. ECB => $c_i = E_k(x_i)$

From the output I can understand that all the blocks in which the corrupted bit is held is recoverable. So, every block of plaintext is independently encrypted as a result there is no direct connection between the blocks of encrypted plaintext. Only the corrupted block is irrecoverable.

```
2. CBC => c_0:c_i = E_k(x_i \text{ XOR } c_{i-1})
```

From the output I have understood that all the blocks that are corrupted and the remaining blocks successive to it is irrecoverable as well.

In CBC each cipher text block uses the previous cipher text blocks during encryption and for decryption. That's why in the output you can see the following texts after the corrupted block have been corrupted as well.

3. CFB =>
$$C_i = E_k(c_{i-1}) \text{ XOR } x_i$$

For CFB encryption I have understood that the problem CFB face is similar to CBC. Due to the similar formula, we can understand here that all the blocks after the corrupted block will be irrecoverable.

4. OFB
$$\Rightarrow$$
 $c_j = O_j XOR x_j$
 $O_j = E_j(O_{j-1})$

I have understood in OFB that only the single bit that is corrupted is irrecoverable. The encryption is not directly applied to the plain text but rather applied to the vector, which means that only one bit will be affected during decrypting as seen above, leaving rest of the blocks recoverable.

Task 4: Ciphertext-only cryptanalysis, with and without padding Objective

The objective of this task is to utilize a dictionary file and one word from the dictionary file is encrypted using -aes-128 using CBC encryption. No such key or iv is implemented but rather a password(word from the dictionary with a number [0-9] appended) is used to match the words from two files

Methodology

First step is to encrypt the dictionary file with aes-128

- openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -d -in plain.txt -out cipher.txt -pass pass: sea5 Once encryption is done then we need to create a bash file that runs all the

dictionary(encrypted) words with the cipher.txt file.

My logic to tackle this task is to create a bash file that duplicates all the words from the dictionary to another file that contains all the words from the dictionary appended with a number

For example :small.txt file contains (sea, treasure,etc). And the new file 'duplicate.txt' That would look like (sea1,sea2,sea3......treasure1,treasure2,....etc)

Duplicate file is created to contain all the possible passwords to check with. Once this is done then the bash file should be able to match back the password with the duplicate file it should match up the word.

References

• https://command-not-found.com/hexedit

Appendices

Appendix A. Monoalphabetic Substitution Cipher (Plain.txt)

COMPUTER THAT CONTROLS

THE MFE NET

YOU MEAN THE HACKER IS ENTERING OUR LAB THROUGH THE MFE NETWORK YEAH HES COMING FROM LAWRENCE LIVERMORE LABORATORY THE MAGNETIC

FUSION

ENERGY NETWORK

I CALLED DOWN THE HALLWAY HEY DAVE GUESS WHOS VISITING LIVERMORE DAVE AMBLED OVER TO WAYNES OFFICE HOWD HE GET THERE THERES NO CONNECTION

FROM THERE INTO OUR UNIX SYSTEM

I DONT KNOW HOW HE GOT INTO LIVERMORE BUT HES IN OUR ETHERNET COMING FROM

LIVERMORE

TWO

YOU

DAVE RAISED HIS EYEBROWS I DIDNT KNOW YOU COULD DO THAT YOUR HACKER FOUND A

PATH TO THE UNIX SYSTEM THAT I DIDNT KNOW ABOUT

WAYNE LAUNCHED INTO DAVE WITH HIS USUAL TIRADE AGAINST UNIX I LEFT THE

BOSOM ENEMIES AND CALLED LIVERMORE

IT TOOK THREE CALLS TO FIND THE SYSTEM MANAGER OF THE MFE NETWORK HI

DONT KNOW ME BUT YOUVE GOT A HACKER IN YOUR SYSTEM

A WOMAN ANSWERED HUH WHO ARE YOU

I WORK AT LBL SOMEONES MESSING AROUND IN MY COMPUTER AND HES COMING IN FROM

THE MFE NETWORK IT LOOKS LIKE HES LOGGED IN FROM LIVERMORE
OH HELL ILL SCAN OUR USERS THERES ONLY ONE JOB THATS CONNECTED

FROM LIVERMORE TO BERKELEY ACCOUNT IT BELONGS TO SOMEONE NAMED CROMWELL

THATS HIM I SAID THE HACKER FOUND THE PASSWORD A COUPLE HOURS AGO GOT THE PASSWORD FROM A COMMAND FILE HERE IN BERKELEY

ILL KILL THAT ACCOUNT CROMWELL CAN USE OUR SYSTEM WHEN HE LEARNS TO KEEP

HIS PASSWORDS SECRET SHE SAW THE PROBLEM AS IGNORANT USERS NOT UNFRIENDLY

SYSTEMS THAT FORCED PEOPLE TO USE BIZARRE PASSWORDS LIKE AGNITFOM CAN YOU TRACE THE CONNECTION I WANTED LIVERMORE TO KEEP THE HACKER ON LINE

AT LEAST LONG ENOUGH TO TRACE THE LINE

NO WERE NOT AUTHORIZED TO MAKE ANY TRACES YOULL HAVE TO TALK TO OUR MANAGEMENT FIRST

BUT BY THE TIME ANYONE DECIDES THE HACKER WILL BE GONE WE RUN A SECURE INSTALLATION SHE SAID IF ANYONE FINDS OUT THERES A

AT LIVERMORE HEADS WILL ROLL

UNLESS YOU TRACE WHERE THE HACKERS COMING FROM YOULL NEVER KNOW IF HES OUT

OF YOUR SYSTEM

HACKER

MY JOB IS TO RUN A COMPUTER NOT TO CATCH CRIMINALS LEAVE ME OUT OF YOUR

WILDGOOSE CHASE

SHE DECIDED TO CHOP OFF ALL ACCESS AND DISABLE THE STOLEN ACCOUNT THE HACKER

DISAPPEARED FROM LIVERMORES COMPUTER AND FROM OURS

MAYBE IT WAS JUST AS WELL EVEN IF SHE HAD STARTED A TRACE I COULDNT MONITOR

WHAT THE HACKER WAS DOING I COULD DETECT THAT HE WAS IN MY COMPUTER ALL RIGHT

BUT THE MFE NETWORK CONNECTED DIRECTLY INTO MY COMPUTER WITHOUT GOING THROUGH THE

SWITCHYARD MY PRINTERS WOULDNT CAPTURE WHAT THE HACKER TYPED DEPRESSED I SHUFFLED TO LUNCH AT THE LBL CAFETERIA LUIS ALVAREZ SAT DOWN

ACROSS FROM ME INVENTOR PHYSICIST AND NOBEL LAUREATE LUIE WAS THE TWENTIETH

CENTURY RENAISSANCE MAN HE DIDNT WASTE TIME ON BUREAUCRACY HE DEMANDED RESULTS

HOWS ASTRONOMY EVEN FROM THE STRATOSPHERE ALVAREZ STILL FOUND TIME TO TALK

TO PIPSQUEAKS LIKE ME STILL BUILDING THAT TELESCOPE

NAW IM WORKING AT THE COMPUTER CENTER NOW I OUGHT TO BE WRITING PROGRAMS

BUT IVE BEEN SPENDING ALL MY TIME CHASING A HACKER

ANY LUCK

ITS PLAYING HIDEANDSEEK OVER THE WIRES FIRST I THINK HES COMING FROM BERKELEY THEN OAKLAND THEN ALABAMA THEN VIRGINIA LATELY IVE TRACED HIM TO

LIVERMORE

CALLED THE FBI

SIX TIMES THEYVE GOT BETTER THINGS TO DO THE FRUSTRATING PART IS THE COMPLETE LACK OF SUPPORT I TOLD HIM ABOUT THE MORNINGS ACTIVITY AT LIVERMORE

YES THEYVE GOT THEIR JOBS TO WORRY ABOUT

BUT IM TRYING TO HELP THEM DARN IT THEY DONT CARE THAT THEIR NEIGHBORS BEING BURGLARIZED

STOP ACTING LIKE A CRUSADER CLIFF WHY DONT YOU LOOK AT THIS AS RESEARCH

NOBODY ELSE IS INTERESTED NOT LIVERMORE NOT THE FBI HELL IN A WEEK OR TWO PROBABLY NOT EVEN OUR LABS ADMINISTRATION

THEY GAVE ME THREE WEEKS ITS ALREADY UP

THATS WHAT I MEAN WHEN YOURE DOING REAL RESEARCH YOU NEVER KNOW WHAT ITLL

COST HOW MUCH TIME ITLL TAKE OR WHAT YOULL FIND YOU JUST KNOW THERES UNEXPLORED TERRITORY AND A CHANCE TO DISCOVER WHATS OUT THERE

THATS EASY FOR YOU TO SAY BUT IVE GOT TO KEEP THREE MANAGERS OFF MY BACK

THERE ARE PROGRAMS TO WRITE AND SYSTEMS TO MANAGE
SO WHAT YOURE FOLLOWING A FASCINATING SCENT YOURE AN EXPLORER THINK

OF

WHO MIGHT BE BEHIND IT SOME INTERNATIONAL SPY PERHAPS

MORE LIKELY SOME BORED HIGH SCHOOL KID

WELL THEN FORGET WHOS CAUSING THE PROBLEMS LUIE SAID DONT TRY TO BE A COP BE A SCIENTIST RESEARCH THE CONNECTIONS THE TECHNIQUES THE HOLES APPLY

PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES FIND NEW METHODS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS COMPILE STATISTICS

PUBLISH YOUR RESULTS AND ONLY TRUST WHAT YOU CAN PROVE BUT DONT EXCLUDE

IMPROBABLE SOLUTIONS KEEP YOUR MIND OPEN

BUT WHAT DO I DO WHEN I HIT A BRICK WALL

LIKE LIVERMORES SYSTEM MANAGER ASKED LUIE

OR THE TELEPHONE COMPANY WITHHOLDING A PHONE TRACE OR THE FBI REFUSING A

COURT ORDER OR OUR LABORATORY SHUTTING ME DOWN IN A COUPLE DAYS DEAD ENDS ARE ILLUSORY WHEN DID YOU EVER LET A DO NOT ENTER SIGN KEEP YOU

AWAY FROM ANYTHING GO AROUND THE BRICK WALLS WHEN YOU CANT GO AROUND CLIMB OVER

OR DIG UNDER JUST DONT GIVE UP

BUT WHOS GOING TO PAY MY SALARY

PERMISSION BAH FUNDING FORGET IT NOBODY WILL PAY FOR RESEARCH THEYRE ONLY INTERESTED IN RESULTS LUIE SAID SURE YOU COULD WRITE A DETAILED PROPOSAL

TO CHASE THIS HACKER IN FIFTY PAGES YOULL DESCRIBE WHAT YOU KNEW WHAT YOU

EXPECTED HOW MUCH MONEY IT WOULD TAKE INCLUDE THE NAMES OF THREE QUALIFIED

REFEREES COST BENEFIT RATIOS AND WHAT PAPERS YOUVE WRITTEN BEFORE OH AND DONT

FORGET THE THEO