           BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature Formats

Abstract

   This document specifies the algorithms, algorithm parameters,
   asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key sizes, and signature formats
   used in BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security).  This document
   updates RFC 7935 ("The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use
   in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure").

   This document also includes example BGPsec UPDATE messages as well as
   the private keys used to generate the messages and the certificates
   necessary to validate those signatures.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
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   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
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Table of Contents

1.  Introduction

   This document specifies the following:

   o   the digital signature algorithm and parameters,

   o   the hash algorithm and parameters,

   o   the public and private key formats, and

   o   the signature formats

   used by Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification
   Authorities (CAs) and BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security)
   speakers (i.e., routers).  CAs use these algorithms when processing
   requests for BGPsec Router Certificates [RFC8209].  Examples of when
   BGPsec routers use these algorithms include requesting BGPsec
   certificates [RFC8209], signing BGPsec UPDATE messages [RFC8205], and
   verifying signatures on BGPsec UPDATE messages [RFC8205].

   This document updates [RFC7935] to add support for a) a different
   algorithm for BGPsec certificate requests, which are issued only by
   BGPsec speakers; b) a different Subject Public Key Info format for
   BGPsec certificates, which is needed for the specified BGPsec
   signature algorithm; and c) different signature formats for BGPsec
   signatures, which are needed for the specified BGPsec signature
   algorithm.  The BGPsec certificates are differentiated from other
   RPKI certificates by the use of the BGPsec Extended Key Usage as
   defined in [RFC8209].  BGPsec uses a different algorithm [RFC6090]
   [DSS] as compared to the rest of the RPKI to minimize the size of the
   protocol exchanged between routers.

   Appendix A contains example BGPsec UPDATE messages as well as the
   private keys used to generate the messages and the certificates
   necessary to validate the signatures.

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Algorithms

   The algorithms used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec
   Router Certificates, and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are as
   specified in Section 2 of [RFC7935].  This section addresses BGPsec
   algorithms; for example, these algorithms are used by BGPsec routers
   to request BGPsec certificates, by RPKI CAs to verify BGPsec
   certification requests, by BGPsec routers to generate BGPsec UPDATE
   messages, and by BGPsec routers to verify BGPsec UPDATE messages:

   o  The signature algorithm used MUST be the Elliptic Curve Digital
      Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with curve P-256 [RFC6090] [DSS].

   o  The hash algorithm used MUST be SHA-256 [SHS].

   Hash algorithms are not identified by themselves in certificates or
   BGPsec UPDATE messages.  They are represented by an OID that combines
   the hash algorithm with the digital signature algorithm as follows:

   o  The ecdsa-with-SHA256 OID [RFC5480] MUST appear in the Public-Key
      Cryptography Standards #10 (PKCS #10) signatureAlgorithm field
      [RFC2986] or in the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
      POPOSigningKey algorithm field [RFC4211]; where the OID is placed
      depends on the certificate request format generated.

   o  In BGPsec UPDATE messages, the ECDSA with SHA-256 algorithm suite
      identifier value 0x1 (see Section 7) is included in the
      Signature_Block List's Algorithm Suite Identifier field.

3.  Asymmetric Key Pair Formats

   The key formats used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec
   Router Certificates, and CRLs are as specified in Section 3 of
   [RFC7935].  This section addresses key formats found in the BGPsec
   Router Certificate requests and in BGPsec Router Certificates.

   The ECDSA private keys used to compute signatures for certificate
   requests and BGPsec UPDATE messages MUST come from the P-256 curve
   [RFC5480].  The public key pair MUST use the uncompressed form.

3.1.  Public Key Format

   The Subject's public key is included in subjectPublicKeyInfo
   [RFC5280].  It has two sub-fields: algorithm and subjectPublicKey.
   The values for the structures and their sub-structures follow:

   o  algorithm (an AlgorithmIdentifier type): The id-ecPublicKey OID
      MUST be used in the algorithm field, as specified in Section 2.1.1
      of [RFC5480].  The value for the associated parameters MUST be
      secp256r1, as specified in Section 2.1.1.1 of [RFC5480].

   o  subjectPublicKey: ECPoint MUST be used to encode the certificate's
      subjectPublicKey field, as specified in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480].

3.2.  Private Key Format

   Local policy determines private key format.

4.  Signature Formats

   The structure for the certificate's and CRL's signature field MUST be
   as specified in Section 4 of [RFC7935]; this is the same format used
   by other RPKI certificates.  The structure for the certification
   request's and BGPsec UPDATE message's signature field MUST be as
   specified in Section 2.2.3 of [RFC3279].

5.  Additional Requirements

   It is anticipated that BGPsec will require the adoption of updated
   key sizes and a different set of signature and hash algorithms over
   time, in order to maintain an acceptable level of cryptographic
   security.  This profile should be updated to specify such future
   requirements, when appropriate.

   The recommended procedures to implement such a transition of key
   sizes and algorithms are specified in [RFC6916].

6.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC5480], [RFC6090],
   [RFC7935], and [RFC8209] apply to certificates.  The security
   considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC6090], [RFC7935], and [RFC8209]
   apply to certification requests.  The security considerations of
   [RFC3279], [RFC6090], and [RFC8205] apply to BGPsec UPDATE messages.
   No new security considerations are introduced as a result of this
   specification.

7.  IANA Considerations

   The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) has created the
   "BGPsec Algorithm Suite Registry" in the Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) group.  The one-octet "BGPsec Algorithm Suite
   Registry" identifiers assigned by IANA identify the digest algorithm
   and signature algorithm used in the BGPsec Signature_Block List's
   Algorithm Suite Identifier field.

   IANA has registered a single algorithm suite identifier for the
   digest algorithm SHA-256 [SHS] and for the signature algorithm ECDSA
   on the P-256 curve [RFC6090] [DSS].

                    BGPsec Algorithm Suite Registry

| Algorithm Suite Identifier | Digest Algorithm | Signature Algorithm | Specification Pointer |
|------------|-----------|-------------|----------------------|
| 0x0        | Reserved  | Reserved    | This document        |
| 0x1        | SHA-256   | ECDSA P-256 | [SHS] [DSS] [RFC6090] This document |
| 0x2-0xEF   | Unassigned | Unassigned  |                      |
| 0xFF       | Reserved  | Reserved    | This document        |

   Future assignments are to be made using the Standards Action process
   defined in [RFC8126].  Assignments consist of the one-octet algorithm
   suite identifier value and the associated digest algorithm name and
   signature algorithm name.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

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8.2.  Informative References

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Appendix A.  Examples

A.1.  Topology and Experiment Description

   Topology:

   AS(64496)----AS(65536)----AS(65537)

   Prefix Announcement: AS(64496), 192.0.2.0/24, 2001:db8::/32

A.2.  Keys

   For this example, the ECDSA algorithm was provided with a static k to
   make the result deterministic.

   The k used for all signature operations was taken from [RFC6979],
   Appendix A.2.5, "Signatures With SHA-256, message = 'sample'".

     k = A6E3C57DD01ABE90086538398355DD4C
         3B17AA873382B0F24D6129493D8AAD60


   Keys of AS64496:
   ================
   ski: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154

   private key:
     x = D8AA4DFBE2478F86E88A7451BF075565
         709C575AC1C136D081C540254CA440B9

   public key:
     Ux = 7391BABB92A0CB3BE10E59B19EBFFB21
          4E04A91E0CBA1B139A7D38D90F77E55A
     Uy = A05B8E695678E0FA16904B55D9D4F5C0
          DFC58895EE50BC4F75D205A25BD36FF5

```
   Router Key Certificate example using OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   Certificate:
       Data:
           Version: 3 (0x2)
           Serial Number: 38655612 (0x24dd67c)
       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
           Issuer: CN=ROUTER-0000FBF0
           Validity
               Not Before: Jan  1 05:00:00 2017 GMT
               Not After : Jul  1 05:00:00 2018 GMT
           Subject: CN=ROUTER-0000FBF0
           Subject Public Key Info:
               Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
                   Public-Key: (256 bit)
                   pub:
                       04:73:91:ba:bb:92:a0:cb:3b:e1:0e:59:b1:9e:bf:
                       fb:21:4e:04:a9:1e:0c:ba:1b:13:9a:7d:38:d9:0f:
                       77:e5:5a:a0:5b:8e:69:56:78:e0:fa:16:90:4b:55:
                       d9:d4:f5:c0:df:c5:88:95:ee:50:bc:4f:75:d2:05:
                       a2:5b:d3:6f:f5
                   ASN1 OID: prime256v1
           X509v3 extensions:
               X509v3 Key Usage:
                   Digital Signature
               X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
                   AB:4D:91:0F:55:CA:E7:1A:21:5E:
                   F3:CA:FE:3A:CC:45:B5:EE:C1:54
               X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
                   1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.30
               sbgp-autonomousSysNum: critical
                   Autonomous System Numbers:
                     64496
                   Routing Domain Identifiers:
                     inherit

       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
            30:44:02:20:07:b7:b4:6a:5f:a4:f1:cc:68:36:39:03:a4:83:
            ec:7c:80:02:d2:f6:08:9d:46:b2:ec:2a:7b:e6:92:b3:6f:b1:
            02:20:00:91:05:4a:a1:f5:b0:18:9d:27:24:e8:b4:22:fd:d1:
            1c:f0:3d:b1:38:24:5d:64:29:35:28:8d:ee:0c:38:29
```

```
     -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
     MIIBiDCCAS+gAwIBAgIEAk3WfDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAaMRgwFgYDVQQDDA9ST1VU
     RVItMDAwMEZCRjAwHhcNMTcwMTAxMDUwMDAwWhcNMTgwNzAxMDUwMDAwWjAaMRgw
     FgYDVQQDDA9ST1VURVItMDAwMEZCRjAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNC
     AARzkbq7kqDLO+EOWbGev/shTgSpHgy6GxOafTjZD3flWqBbjmlWeOD6FpBLVdnU
     9cDfxYiV7lC8T3XSBaJb02/1o2MwYTALBgNVHQ8EBAMCB4AwHQYDVR0OBBYEFKtN
     kQ9VyucaIV7zyv46zEW17sFUMBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMeMB4GCCsGAQUF
     BwEIAQH/BA8wDaAHMAUCAwD78KECBQAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDRwAwRAIgB7e0al+k
     8cxoNjkDpIPsfIAC0vYInUay7Cp75pKzb7ECIACRBUqh9bAYnSck6LQi/dEc8D2x
     OCRdZCk1KI3uDDgp
     -----END CERTIFICATE-----


     Keys of AS(65536):
     ==================
     ski: 47F23BF1AB2F8A9D26864EBBD8DF2711C74406EC

     private key:
       x = 6CB2E931B112F24554BCDCAAFD9553A9
           519A9AF33C023B60846A21FC95583172

     public key:
       Ux = 28FC5FE9AFCF5F4CAB3F5F85CB212FC1
            E9D0E0DBEAEE425BD2F0D3175AA0E989
       Uy = EA9B603E38F35FB329DF495641F2BA04
            0F1C3AC6138307F257CBA6B8B588F41F
```

```
   Router Key Certificate example using OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   Certificate:
       Data:
           Version: 3 (0x2)
           Serial Number: 3752143940 (0xdfa52c44)
       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
           Issuer: CN=ROUTER-00010000
           Validity
               Not Before: Jan  1 05:00:00 2017 GMT
               Not After : Jul  1 05:00:00 2018 GMT
           Subject: CN=ROUTER-00010000
           Subject Public Key Info:
               Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
                   Public-Key: (256 bit)
                   pub:
                       04:28:fc:5f:e9:af:cf:5f:4c:ab:3f:5f:85:cb:21:
                       2f:c1:e9:d0:e0:db:ea:ee:42:5b:d2:f0:d3:17:5a:
                       a0:e9:89:ea:9b:60:3e:38:f3:5f:b3:29:df:49:56:
                       41:f2:ba:04:0f:1c:3a:c6:13:83:07:f2:57:cb:a6:
                       b8:b5:88:f4:1f
                   ASN1 OID: prime256v1
           X509v3 extensions:
               X509v3 Key Usage:
                   Digital Signature
               X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
                   47:F2:3B:F1:AB:2F:8A:9D:26:86:
                   4E:BB:D8:DF:27:11:C7:44:06:EC
               X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
                   1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.30
               sbgp-autonomousSysNum: critical
                   Autonomous System Numbers:
                     65536
                   Routing Domain Identifiers:
                     inherit

       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
            30:45:02:21:00:8c:d9:f8:12:96:88:82:74:03:a1:82:82:18:
            c5:31:00:ee:35:38:e8:fa:ae:72:09:fe:98:67:01:78:69:77:
            8c:02:20:5f:ee:3a:bf:10:66:be:28:d3:b3:16:a1:6b:db:66:
            21:99:ed:a6:e4:ad:64:3c:ba:bf:44:fb:cb:b7:50:91:74
```

```
     -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
     MIIBijCCATCgAwIBAgIFAN+lLEQwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwGjEYMBYGA1UEAwwPUk9V
     VEVSLTAwMDEwMDAwMB4XDTE3MDEwMTA1MDAwMFoXDTE4MDcwMTA1MDAwMFowGjEY
     MBYGA1UEAwwPUk9VVEVSLTAwMDEwMDAwMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcD
     QgAEKPxf6a/PX0yrP1+FyyEvwenQ4Nvq7kJb0vDTF1qg6Ynqm2A+OPNfsynfSVZB
     8roEDxw6xhODB/JXy6a4tYj0H6NjMGEwCwYDVR0PBAQDAgeAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRH
     8jvxqy+KnSaGTrvY3ycRx0QG7DATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDHjAeBggrBgEF
     BQcBCAEB/wQPMA2gBzAFAgMBAAChAgUAMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIQCM2fgS
     loiCdAOhgoIYxTEA7jU46Pqucgn+mGcBeGl3jAIgX+46vxBmvijTsxaha9tmIZnt
     puStZDy6v0T7y7dQkXQ=
     -----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

A.3.  BGPsec IPv4

   BGPsec IPv4 UPDATE from AS(65536) to AS(65537):
   ===============================================
   Binary Form of BGPsec UPDATE (TCP-DUMP):

   FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF   FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
   01 03 02 00 00 00 EC 40   01 01 02 80 04 04 00 00
   00 00 80 0E 0D 00 01 01   04 C6 33 64 64 00 18 C0
   00 02 90 1E 00 CD 00 0E   01 00 00 01 00 00 01 00
   00 00 FB F0 00 BF 01 47   F2 3B F1 AB 2F 8A 9D 26
   86 4E BB D8 DF 27 11 C7   44 06 EC 00 48 30 46 02
   21 00 EF D4 8B 2A AC B6   A8 FD 11 40 DD 9C D4 5E
   81 D6 9D 2C 87 7B 56 AA   F9 91 C3 4D 0E A8 4E AF
   37 16 02 21 00 90 F2 C1   29 AB B2 F3 9B 6A 07 96
   3B D5 55 A8 7A B2 B7 33   3B 7B 91 F1 66 8F D8 61
   8C 83 FA C3 F1 AB 4D 91   0F 55 CA E7 1A 21 5E F3
   CA FE 3A CC 45 B5 EE C1   54 00 48 30 46 02 21 00
   EF D4 8B 2A AC B6 A8 FD   11 40 DD 9C D4 5E 81 D6
   9D 2C 87 7B 56 AA F9 91   C3 4D 0E A8 4E AF 37 16
   02 21 00 8E 21 F6 0E 44   C6 06 6C 8B 8A 95 A3 C0
   9D 3A D4 37 95 85 A2 D7   28 EE AD 07 A1 7E D7 AA
   05 5E CA

   Signature from AS(64496) to AS(65536):
   --------------------------------------
   Digest:    21 33 E5 CA A0 26 BE 07   3D 9C 1B 4E FE B9 B9 77
              9F 20 F8 F5 DE 29 FA 98   40 00 9F 60 47 D0 81 54
   Signature: 30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B   2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD
              9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87   7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E
              A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00   8E 21 F6 0E 44 C6 06 6C
              8B 8A 95 A3 C0 9D 3A D4   37 95 85 A2 D7 28 EE AD
              07 A1 7E D7 AA 05 5E CA
```

```
Signature from AS(65536) to AS(65537):
--------------------------------------
Digest:    01 4F 24 DA E2 A5 21 90    B0 80 5C 60 5D B0 63 54
           22 3E 93 BA 41 1D 3D 82    A3 EC 26 36 52 0C 5F 84
Signature: 30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B    2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD
           9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87    7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E
           A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00    90 F2 C1 29 AB B2 F3 9B
           6A 07 96 3B D5 55 A8 7A    B2 B7 33 3B 7B 91 F1 66
           8F D8 61 8C 83 FA C3 F1
```

The human-readable output is produced using bgpsec-io, a bgpsec
traffic generator that uses a wireshark-like printout.

```
Send UPDATE Message
  +--marker: FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
  +--length: 259
  +--type: 2 (UPDATE)
  +--withdrawn_routes_length: 0
  +--total_path_attr_length: 236
     +--ORIGIN: INCOMPLETE (4 bytes)
     | +--Flags: 0x40 (Well-Known, Transitive, Complete)
     | +--Type Code: ORIGIN (1)
     | +--Length: 1 byte
     | +--Origin: INCOMPLETE (1)
     +--MULTI_EXIT_DISC (7 bytes)
     | +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Non-transitive, Complete)
     | +--Type Code: MULTI_EXIT_DISC (4)
     | +--Length: 4 bytes
     | +--data: 00 00 00 00
     +--MP_REACH_NLRI (16 bytes)
     | +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Non-transitive, Complete)
     | +--Type Code: MP_REACH_NLRI (14)
     | +--Length: 13 bytes
     | +--Address family: IPv4 (1)
     | +--Subsequent address family identifier: Unicast (1)
     | +--Next hop network address: (4 bytes)
     | | +--Next hop: 198.51.100.100
     | +--Subnetwork points of attachment: 0
     | +--Network layer reachability information: (4 bytes)
     |    +--192.0.2.0/24
     |    +--MP Reach NLRI prefix length: 24
     |    +--MP Reach NLRI IPv4 prefix: 192.0.2.0
```

```
        +--BGPSEC Path Attribute (209 bytes)
           +--Flags: 0x90 (Optional, Complete, Extended Length)
           +--Type Code: BGPSEC Path Attribute (30)
           +--Length: 205 bytes
           +--Secure Path (14 bytes)
           |  +--Length: 14 bytes
           |  +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes)
           |  |  +--pCount: 1
           |  |  +--Flags: 0
           |  |  +--AS number: 65536 (1.0)
           |  +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes)
           |     +--pCount: 1
           |     +--Flags: 0
           |     +--AS number: 64496 (0.64496)
           +--Signature Block (191 bytes)
              +--Length: 191 bytes
              +--Algo ID: 1
              +--Signature Segment: (94 bytes)
              |  +--SKI: 47F23BF1AB2F8A9D26864EBBD8DF2711C74406EC
              |  +--Length: 72 bytes
              |  +--Signature: 3046022100EFD48B   2AACB6A8FD1140DD
              |                 9CD45E81D69D2C87   7B56AAF991C34D0E
              |                 A84EAF3716022100   90F2C129ABB2F39B
              |                 6A07963BD555A87A   B2B7333B7B91F166
              |                 8FD8618C83FAC3F1
              +--Signature Segment: (94 bytes)
                 +--SKI: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154
                 +--Length: 72 bytes
                 +--Signature: 3046022100EFD48B   2AACB6A8FD1140DD
                                9CD45E81D69D2C87   7B56AAF991C34D0E
                                A84EAF3716022100   8E21F60E44C6066C
                                8B8A95A3C09D3AD4   379585A2D728EEAD
                                07A17ED7AA055ECA
```

A.4.  BGPsec IPv6

   BGPsec IPv6 UPDATE from AS(65536) to AS(65537):
   ================================================
   Binary Form of BGP/BGPsec UPDATE (TCP-DUMP):

   FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF    FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
   01 10 02 00 00 00 F9 40    01 01 02 80 04 04 00 00
   00 00 80 0E 1A 00 02 01    10 20 01 00 10 00 00 00
   00 00 00 00 00 C6 33 64    64 00 20 20 01 0D B8 90
   1E 00 CD 00 0E 01 00 00    01 00 00 01 00 00 00 FB
   F0 00 BF 01 47 F2 3B F1    AB 2F 8A 9D 26 86 4E BB
   D8 DF 27 11 C7 44 06 EC    00 48 30 46 02 21 00 EF
   D4 8B 2A AC B6 A8 FD 11    40 DD 9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D
   2C 87 7B 56 AA F9 91 C3    4D 0E A8 4E AF 37 16 02
   21 00 D1 B9 4F 62 51 04    6D 21 36 A1 05 B0 F4 72
   7C C5 BC D6 74 D9 7D 28    E6 1B 8F 43 BD DE 91 C3
   06 26 AB 4D 91 0F 55 CA    E7 1A 21 5E F3 CA FE 3A
   CC 45 B5 EE C1 54 00 48    30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B
   2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD    9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87
   7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E    A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00
   E2 A0 2C 68 FE 53 CB 96    93 4C 78 1F 5A 14 A2 97
   19 79 20 0C 91 56 ED F8    55 05 8E 80 53 F4 AC D3


   Signature from AS(64496) to AS(65536):
   ---------------------------------------
   Digest:    8A 0C D3 E9 8E 55 10 45    82 1D 80 46 01 D6 55 FC
              52 11 89 DF 4D B0 28 7D    84 AC FC 77 55 6D 06 C7
   Signature: 30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B    2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD
              9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87    7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E
              A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00    E2 A0 2C 68 FE 53 CB 96
              93 4C 78 1F 5A 14 A2 97    19 79 20 0C 91 56 ED F8
              55 05 8E 80 53 F4 AC D3


   Signature from AS(65536) to AS(65537):
   ---------------------------------------
   Digest:    44 49 EC 70 8D EC 5C 85    00 C2 17 8C 72 FE 4C 79
              FF A9 3C 95 31 61 01 2D    EE 7E EE 05 46 AF 5F D0
   Signature: 30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B    2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD
              9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87    7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E
              A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00    D1 B9 4F 62 51 04 6D 21
              36 A1 05 B0 F4 72 7C C5    BC D6 74 D9 7D 28 E6 1B
              8F 43 BD DE 91 C3 06 26

The human-readable output is produced using bgpsec-io, a bgpsec
traffic generator that uses a wireshark-like printout.

```
Send UPDATE Message
  +--marker: FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
  +--length: 272
  +--type: 2 (UPDATE)
  +--withdrawn_routes_length: 0
  +--total_path_attr_length: 249
     +--ORIGIN: INCOMPLETE (4 bytes)
     | +--Flags: 0x40 (Well-Known, Transitive, Complete)
     | +--Type Code: ORIGIN (1)
     | +--Length: 1 byte
     | +--Origin: INCOMPLETE (1)
     +--MULTI_EXIT_DISC (7 bytes)
     | +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Non-transitive, Complete)
     | +--Type Code: MULTI_EXIT_DISC (4)
     | +--Length: 4 bytes
     | +--data: 00 00 00 00
     +--MP_REACH_NLRI (29 bytes)
     | +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Non-transitive, Complete)
     | +--Type Code: MP_REACH_NLRI (14)
     | +--Length: 26 bytes
     | +--Address family: IPv6 (2)
     | +--Subsequent address family identifier: Unicast (1)
     | +--Next hop network address: (16 bytes)
     | | +--Next hop: 2001:0010:0000:0000:0000:0000:c633:6464
     | +--Subnetwork points of attachment: 0
     | +--Network layer reachability information: (5 bytes)
     |    +--2001:db8::/32
     |    +--MP Reach NLRI prefix length: 32
     |    +--MP Reach NLRI IPv6 prefix: 2001:db8::
```

```
        +--BGPSEC Path Attribute (209 bytes)
           +--Flags: 0x90 (Optional, Complete, Extended Length)
           +--Type Code: BGPSEC Path Attribute (30)
           +--Length: 205 bytes
           +--Secure Path (14 bytes)
           |  +--Length: 14 bytes
           |  +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes)
           |  |  +--pCount: 1
           |  |  +--Flags: 0
           |  |  +--AS number: 65536 (1.0)
           |  +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes)
           |     +--pCount: 1
           |     +--Flags: 0
           |     +--AS number: 64496 (0.64496)
           +--Signature Block (191 bytes)
              +--Length: 191 bytes
              +--Algo ID: 1
              +--Signature Segment: (94 bytes)
              |  +--SKI: 47F23BF1AB2F8A9D26864EBBD8DF2711C74406EC
              |  +--Length: 72 bytes
              |  +--Signature: 3046022100EFD48B   2AACB6A8FD1140DD
              |                 9CD45E81D69D2C87   7B56AAF991C34D0E
              |                 A84EAF3716022100   D1B94F6251046D21
              |                 36A105B0F4727CC5   BCD674D97D28E61B
              |                 8F43BDDE91C30626
              +--Signature Segment: (94 bytes)
                 +--SKI: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154
                 +--Length: 72 bytes
                 +--Signature: 3046022100EFD48B   2AACB6A8FD1140DD
                                9CD45E81D69D2C87   7B56AAF991C34D0E
                                A84EAF3716022100   E2A02C68FE53CB96
                                934C781F5A14A297   1979200C9156EDF8
                                55058E8053F4ACD3
```

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