# The Generational Divide: Who Gained and Who Lost from the 2021–23 Inflation Surge?


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# High inflation surge post pandemic

Introduction

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


Additional Slides

Introduction

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# & aggressive monetary policy tightening





## Why does it matter?

- ► High inflation and monetary policy tightening can have significant redistributive effects across age groups.
- ▶ Two Examples:
  - ▶ Inflation benefits the young: reduces real debt burdens.
  - Contractionary policy benefits the old: provides higher returns on savings.

## What do I study?

- ▶ I study the intergenerational redistributive effects of:
  - Surprise inflation
  - Monetary tightening

#### **Major Questions:**

- Who gained and who lost from high inflation?
- How do redistributive effects differ across the age distribution and life cycle?
- What is the impact of stricter anti-inflationary policy on redistribution?

#### Model outline

- Builds on Bielecki et al. (2022, JEEA), O-HANK model.
- The model economy includes:
  - ► Households: 80 overlapping cohorts (ages 20–99).
  - Firms (4 types)
    - Final good producers: Create a homogeneous final good using intermediate inputs.
    - Intermediate goods producers: Produce differentiated goods using capital and labor.
    - Capital producers: Combine existing capital and investment goods to create new capital.
    - Investment funds: Intermediate nominal assets and rent physical capital.
  - ► Government: Fiscal authority and central bank
- ▶ The model parameters are calibrated to the Euro Area, and the model is solved non-linearly using perfect foresight simulation.



## Key changes: inflation dynamics

Introduce cost-push shock to firms' price markups to model high inflation.

Results

- Model a stronger anti-inflation stance via increased policy rule responsiveness.
- Compare model responses with Euro Area data from the 2021–23 inflation surge.

#### Model in a nutshell: households

A representative j-aged household maximizes her expected remaining lifetime utility:

$$U_{j,t} = \mathbb{E}_{t} \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \beta^{s} \frac{N_{j+s,t+s}}{N_{j,t}} \begin{bmatrix} \log (c_{j+s,t+s} - \varrho \bar{c}_{j+s,t+s-1}) \\ +\psi_{j+s} \log \chi_{j+s+1,t+s+1} \\ -\psi_{j+s} \frac{h_{j+s,t+s}^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \end{bmatrix}$$

Results

Subject to the budget constraint:

$$\begin{split} c_{j,t} + p_{\chi,t} [\chi_{j+1,t+1} - (1 - \delta_{\chi}) \, \chi_{j,t}] + a_{j+1,t+1} \\ = & \left(1 - \tau_{t}\right) w_{t}(\iota) z_{j} h_{j,t}(\iota) + \frac{R_{j,t}^{a}}{\pi_{t}} a_{j,t} + beq_{j,t} + beq_{j,t}^{\chi} + \Xi_{j,t}(\iota) \end{split}$$

► A key optimality condition for households:

$$(c_{j,t} - \varrho c_{j,t-1})^{-1}(1 - \varrho) = \beta E[(1 - \omega_j)(c_{j+1,t+1} - \varrho c_{j+1,t})^{-1}(1 - \varrho)(R_{t+1}/\pi_{t+1})]$$

Results

The Euler equation tells us how the household allocates consumption between today and tomorrow, depending on the interest rate. Final goods aggregated from differentiated intermediate products:

$$y_t = \left[\frac{1}{N_t} \int_0^{N_t} y_t(i)^{\frac{1}{\mu_t}} \mathrm{d}i\right]^{\mu_t}$$

Results

Markups  $(u_t)$  are subject to an AR(1) stochastic cost-push shock:

$$\mu_t = \exp\left(\varepsilon_t^\mu\right)\mu, \quad \varepsilon_t^\mu = \rho_\mu \varepsilon_{t-1}^\mu + \varepsilon_t^\mu, \quad \varepsilon_t^\mu \sim \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}, \sigma_\mu^2)$$

Cost-push shock captures inflationary pressures by raising markups and marginal costs.

#### Central bank


▶ The nominal interest rate are set according to a Taylor rule:

$$\frac{R_t}{R} = \left(\frac{R_{t-1}}{R}\right)^{\gamma_R} \left[ \left(\frac{\pi_t}{\pi}\right)^{\frac{\gamma_{\pi}}{R}} \left(\frac{y_t}{y_{t-1}}\right)^{\gamma_y} \right]^{1-\gamma_R} \exp\left(\varepsilon_t^R\right)$$


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
- Policy Scenarios:
  - **B** Baseline:  $\gamma_{\pi} = 1.97$ , standard response to inflation.
  - Alternative:  $\gamma_{\pi} = 21$ , stricter anti-inflation stance.

## Smoothed age profiles of assets after matching raw data




## Aggregate effects of a cost-push shock







Results

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Results



## On-impact redistribution (baseline scenario)



Note: Heatmap values represent the marginal utility of consumption at specified age.





Results

#### On impact vs life-time effects

What matters for redistribution is where you are on the path of asset accumulation (Auclert, 2019).

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Example: Lower house prices are good for a 40 year old HH despite a fall in house prices, because they are in the process of accumulating housing.


## Lifecycle redistribution (baseline scenario)



Note: Heatmap values represent welfare gains/losses, weighted by the marginal utility of consumption




## Lifecycle redistribution (alternative scenario)




#### Inflation shock: model predictions & observed data


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




Note: IRFs to sequential cost-push shocks (12.8% in period 1, 6% in period 2) with  $\gamma_{\pi}$  adjusted (1.97 to 1.2). Compared with Euro Area annual data (2006-2023).









#### Conclusion

► High inflation redistributes welfare unevenly across age cohorts.

Results

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- Immediate (on-impact) redistribution differs significantly from lifetime effects.
- ▶ Households in their late working years and early retirement phase (ages 50–70) benefit over the life cycle, while younger (ages 20–40) and older post-retirement cohorts (ages 80+) face welfare losses.
- ► A stricter anti-inflation stance amplifies immediate losses but improves welfare for individuals aged 50 and above over the life cycle.

#### Future work

- ▶ The complementarity of fiscal and monetary policy interactions.
- Assessing the properties of optimal monetary policies emphasizing welfare functions and the trade-offs faced by monetary authorities.

#### Welfare decomposition: key components

- Framework: Lifetime utility is decomposed into contributions from key economic variables.
- Utility Decomposition:

$$d\mathcal{W}_{j,0} = \Gamma_j^{\chi} + \Gamma_j^b + \Gamma_j^f + \Gamma_j^I + \Gamma_j^t + \Gamma_j^h$$

- Key Components:
  - $ightharpoonup \Gamma_i^{\chi}$ : House price changes
  - $ightharpoonup \Gamma_i^b, \Gamma_i^f$ : Returns on nominal and real assets
  - $ightharpoonup \Gamma_i^l$ : Labor income and taxes
  - $ightharpoonup \Gamma_i^t$ : Transfers and bequests
  - $\Gamma_i^h$ : External habits
- Key Insight: Welfare impacts vary by cohort due to life-cycle positions and exposure to these variables.



#### Welfare decomposition

▶ Welfare effects decompose into contributions from key variables:

$$d\mathcal{W}_{j,0} = \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \left[ \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}}{\partial p_{\chi,s}} dp_{\chi,s} + \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}}{\partial r_s} dr_s + \cdots \right]$$

Example: House prices (Γ<sup>χ</sup><sub>j</sub>)

$$\Gamma_j^{\chi} = -\mathbb{E}_0 u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} \left[ (1-\delta_{\chi})\chi_{j+s} - \chi_{j+s+1} \right] \mathrm{d}p_{\chi,s}$$

Example: Labor income  $(\Gamma_j^l)$ 

$$\Gamma_{j}^{\prime} = \mathbb{E}_{0} u_{j}^{c} \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} z_{j+s} \left[ (1-\tau) h_{j+s} dw_{s} + \frac{\mu_{w} - 1}{\mu_{w}} dh_{j+s} \right]$$

 Key Takeaway: Each term quantifies how specific variables—such as house prices or labor income—contribute to welfare changes across cohorts.

