


The Generational Divide: Who Gained and Who Lost from the 2021–23 Inflation Surge?


Satyam Goel
University of Liverpool

19 November 2024

High inflation surge post pandemic



& aggressive monetary policy tightening



Why does it matter?

- ▶ High inflation and monetary policy tightening can have significant redistributive effects across age groups.
- ▶ Two Examples:
 - ▶ Inflation benefits the young: reduces real debt burdens.
 - ▶ Contractionary policy benefits the old: provides higher returns on savings.

What do I study?

- ▶ I study the intergenerational redistributive effects of:
 - ▶ Surprise inflation
 - ▶ Monetary tightening

Major Questions:

- ▶ Who gained and who lost from high inflation?
- ▶ How do redistributive effects differ across the age distribution and life cycle?
- ▶ What is the impact of stricter anti-inflationary policy on redistribution?

Model outline

- ▶ Builds on Bielecki et al. (2022, JEEA), O-HANK model.
- ▶ The model economy includes:
 - ▶ **Households:** 80 overlapping cohorts (ages 20–99).
 - ▶ **Firms** (4 types)
 - ▶ Final good producers: Create a homogeneous final good using intermediate inputs.
 - ▶ Intermediate goods producers: Produce differentiated goods using capital and labor.
 - ▶ Capital producers: Combine existing capital and investment goods to create new capital.
 - ▶ Investment funds: Intermediate nominal assets and rent physical capital.
 - ▶ **Government:** Fiscal authority and central bank
- ▶ The model parameters are calibrated to the Euro Area, and the model is solved non-linearly using perfect foresight simulation.

Key changes: inflation dynamics

- ▶ Introduce cost-push shock to firms' price markups to model high inflation.
- ▶ Model a stronger anti-inflation stance via increased policy rule responsiveness.
- ▶ Compare model responses with Euro Area data from the 2021–23 inflation surge.

Model in a nutshell: households

- ▶ A representative j -aged household maximizes her expected remaining lifetime utility:

$$U_{j,t} = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \beta^s \frac{N_{j+s,t+s}}{N_{j,t}} \left[\begin{array}{l} \log(c_{j+s,t+s} - \varrho \bar{c}_{j+s,t+s-1}) \\ + \psi_{j+s} \log \chi_{j+s+1,t+s+1} \\ - \varphi_{j+s} \frac{h_{j+s,t+s}^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \end{array} \right]$$

- ▶ Subject to the budget constraint:

$$\begin{aligned} c_{j,t} + p_{\chi,t} [\chi_{j+1,t+1} - (1 - \delta_{\chi}) \chi_{j,t}] + a_{j+1,t+1} \\ = (1 - \tau_t) w_t(\iota) z_j h_{j,t}(\iota) + \frac{R_{j,t}^a}{\pi_t} a_{j,t} + beq_{j,t} + beq_{j,t}^{\chi} + \Xi_{j,t}(\iota) \end{aligned}$$

Production sector: cost-push shock

- ▶ Final goods aggregated from differentiated intermediate products:

$$y_t = \left[\frac{1}{N_t} \int_0^{N_t} y_t(i)^{\frac{1}{\mu_t}} di \right]^{\mu_t}$$

- ▶ Markups (μ_t) are subject to an AR(1) stochastic cost-push shock:

$$\mu_t = \exp\left(\varepsilon_t^\mu\right) \mu, \quad \varepsilon_t^\mu = \rho_\mu \varepsilon_{t-1}^\mu + \epsilon_t^\mu, \quad \epsilon_t^\mu \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_\mu^2)$$

- ▶ Cost-push shock captures inflationary pressures by raising markups and marginal costs.


Central bank

- ▶ The nominal interest rate are set according to a Taylor rule:





$$\frac{R_t}{R} = \left(\frac{R_{t-1}}{R} \right)^{\gamma_R} \left[\left(\frac{\pi_t}{\pi} \right)^{\gamma_\pi} \left(\frac{y_t}{y_{t-1}} \right)^{\gamma_y} \right]^{1-\gamma_R} \exp(\varepsilon_t^R)$$





- ▶ Policy Scenarios:
 - ▶ Baseline: $\gamma_\pi = 1.97$, standard response to inflation.
 - ▶ Alternative: $\gamma_\pi = 21$, stricter anti-inflation stance.

Smoothed age profiles of assets after matching raw data




Aggregate effects of a cost-push shock





On-impact redistribution (baseline scenario)




On-impact redistribution (alternative scenario)




On impact vs life-time effects

- ▶ What matters for redistribution is where you are on the path of asset accumulation (Auclert, 2019).
- ▶ Example: Lower house prices are good for a 40 year old HH despite a fall in house prices, because they are in the process of accumulating housing.



Lifecycle redistribution (baseline scenario)







Lifecycle redistribution (alternative scenario)



Inflation shock: model predictions & observed data



Note: IRFs to sequential cost-push shocks (12.8% in period 1, 6% in period 2) with γ_π adjusted (1.97 to 1.2). Compared with Euro Area annual data (2006–2023).



Conclusion

- ▶ High inflation redistributes welfare unevenly across age cohorts.
- ▶ Immediate (on-impact) redistribution differs significantly from lifetime effects.
- ▶ Households in their late working years and early retirement phase (ages 50–70) benefit over the life cycle, while younger (ages 20–40) and older post-retirement cohorts (ages 80+) face welfare losses.
- ▶ A stricter anti-inflation stance amplifies immediate losses but improves welfare for individuals aged 50 and above over the life cycle.

Future work

- ▶ The complementarity of fiscal and monetary policy interactions.
- ▶ Assessing the properties of optimal monetary policies emphasizing welfare functions and the trade-offs faced by monetary authorities.

Thank You!

Welfare decomposition: key components

- ▶ **Framework:** Lifetime utility is decomposed into contributions from key economic variables.
- ▶ **Utility Decomposition:**

$$d\mathcal{W}_{j,0} = \Gamma_j^{\chi} + \Gamma_j^b + \Gamma_j^f + \Gamma_j^l + \Gamma_j^t + \Gamma_j^h$$

- ▶ **Key Components:**
 - ▶ Γ_j^{χ} : House price changes
 - ▶ Γ_j^b, Γ_j^f : Returns on nominal and real assets
 - ▶ Γ_j^l : Labor income and taxes
 - ▶ Γ_j^t : Transfers and bequests
 - ▶ Γ_j^h : External habits
- ▶ **Key Insight:** Welfare impacts vary by cohort due to life-cycle positions and exposure to these variables.

Welfare decomposition

- Welfare effects decompose into contributions from key variables:

$$d\mathcal{W}_{j,0} = \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} \left[\frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}}{\partial p_{\chi,s}} dp_{\chi,s} + \frac{\partial \mathcal{W}_{j,0}}{\partial r_s} dr_s + \dots \right]$$

- Example: House prices (Γ_j^χ)

$$\Gamma_j^\chi = -\mathbb{E}_0 u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} [(1-\delta_\chi)\chi_{j+s} - \chi_{j+s+1}] dp_{\chi,s}$$

- Example: Labor income (Γ_j^l)

$$\Gamma_j^l = \mathbb{E}_0 u_j^c \sum_{s=0}^{J-j} (1+r)^{-s} z_{j+s} \left[(1-\tau)h_{j+s} dw_s + \frac{\mu_w - 1}{\mu_w} dh_{j+s} \right]$$

- Key Takeaway:** Each term quantifies how specific variables—such as house prices or labor income—contribute to welfare changes across cohorts.