


Internet Security

CSCE 813

IPsec

A decorative blue arc starts from the left edge of the slide, curves downwards and to the right, and then continues as a straight line towards the bottom right corner.


TCP/IP Protocol Stack



Network Layer

- Provides connectionless service
- Routing (routers): determine the path a path has to traverse to reach its destination
- Defines addressing mechanism
 - Hosts should conform to the addressing mechanism


Communication Between Layers



Network Layer and Security

In most network architecture and corresponding communication protocol stack: *network layer protocol data units are transmitted in the clear:*

- Easy to inspect the data content
- Easy to forge source or destination address
- Easy to modify content
- Easy to replay data



Need network layer security protocol

Network Layer Protocols

Several protocols have been proposed:

- *Security Protocol 3 (SP3)*: U.S. NSA and NIST as part of the secure data network system (SDNS)
- *Network Layer Security Protocol (NLSP)*: ISO for Connectionless Network Protocol (CLNP)
- *Integrated NLSP (I-NLSP)*: NIST, for both IP and CLNP
- *swIPE*: John Ioannidis and Matt Blaze at Berkley Univ. Used in Unix environment

Internet Engineering Task Force Standardization

- IPv6 development requirements: Strong security features
 - Security features algorithm-independent
 - Must enforce wide variety of security policies
 - Avoid adverse impact on Internet users who do not need security
- 1992: IPSEC WG (IETF)
 - Define security architecture
 - Standardize IP Security Protocol and Internet Key Management Protocol
- **1998: revised version of IP Security Architecture**
 - *IPsec protocols* (two sub-protocols AH and ESP)
 - *Internet Key Exchange* (IKE)

IPsec

- Provides security for IP and upper layer protocols
- Suit of algorithms:
 - Mandatory-to-implement
 - Assures interoperability
 - Easy to add new algorithms

IP Security Overview


IPSec: method of protecting IP datagrams

- Data origin authentication
- Connectionless data integrity authentication
- Data content confidentiality
- Anti-replay protection
- Limited traffic flow confidentiality

IP Security Architecture

IPsec module 1

IPsec module 2



Security Association

- Associates security services and keys with the traffic to be protected
 - Identified by Security Parameter Index (SPI) □ retrieve correct SA parameters from Security Association Database (SAD)
 - Ipsec protocol identifier
 - Destination address (direction)
- Simplex connection □ need to establish two SAs for secure bidirectional communication

Security Association

- Defines *security services* and *mechanisms* between two end points (or IPsec modules):
 - Hosts
 - Network security gateways (e.g., routers, application gateways)
 - Hosts and security gateways
- Security service, parameters, mode of operation, and initialization vector
 - e.g., Confidentiality using ESP with DES in CBC mode with IV initialization vector

Security Association

- May use either Authentication Header (AH) or Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) but not both ☐ if both AH and ESP are applied, need two SAs
- Bundle: set of SAs through which traffic must be processed

SA -- Lifetime

- Amount of traffic protected by a key and time frame the same key is used
 - Manual creation: no lifetime
 - Dynamic creation: may have a lifetime

SA -- Security Granularity

User (SSO) specified


- Host-oriented keying
 - All users on one host share the same session key
 - Not recommended!
- User-oriented keying
 - Each user on one host have one or of more unique session keys
- Session-unique keying
 - Single session key is assigned to a give IP address, upper-layer protocol, and port number

Security Policy Database (SPD)

- Defines:
 - What traffic to be protected
 - How to protect
 - With whom the protection is shared
- For each packet entering or leaving an IPsec implementation SPD is used to determine security mechanism to be applied
- Actions:
 - Discard: do not let packet in or out
 - Bypass: do not apply or expect security services
 - Protect: apply/expect security services on packets

Anti-replay Protection

- Not explicitly part of the architecture
- Protection by sequence number (32-bits) and sliding receive window (64-bits)
- When SA is created: sequence number is initiated to zero
- Prior to IPsec output processing: sequence number is incremented



IPSec


- Protection for IP and upper layer protocols
- IPSec protocols
 - *Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)*
 - Proof of data origin, data integrity, anti-replay protection
 - **Data confidentiality and limited traffic flow confidentiality**
 - *Authentication Header (AH)*
 - Proof of data origin, data integrity, anti-replay protection

IPsec

- Security provided by ESP or AH is dependent on the cryptographic algorithms applied to them
- Default encryption algorithm: DES CBC
 - Not suited for highly sensitive data or
 - For data that must remain secure for extended period of time
- Authentication and/or confidentiality requires shared keys
- Manual key addition is supported but scales poorly
- Internet Key Exchange (IKE): key management protocol


AH and ESP

- Transport mode: protect upper layer protocols
 - IPSec header is inserted between the IP header and the upper-layer protocol header
 - Communication endpoints must be cryptographic endpoints



AH and ESP


- Tunnel mode: protect entire IP datagram
 - Entire IP packet to be protected is **encapsulated in another IP datagram** and an IPsec header is inserted between the outer and inner IP headers



Authentication Header (AH)

- Does NOT provide confidentiality
- Provides:
 - Data origin authentication
 - Connectionless data integrity
- May provide:
 - Non-repudiation (depends on cryptographic alg.)
 - Anti-replay protection
- Precision of authentication: granularity of SA
- Protocol number: 51

AH Protected IP packet



AH Header

Next header	Payload length	Reserved
Security Parameter Index		
Sequence number		
Authentication data ($n \times 32$ bit)		

← 32 bit →


Authentication Data

- Computed by using
 - authentication algorithm (MD5, SHA-1)
 - cryptographic key (secret key)
- Sender: computes authentication data
- Recipient: verifies data

Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)

- Provides:
 - Confidentiality
 - Authentication (not as strong as AH: IP headers below ESP are not protected)
 - Limited traffic flow confidentiality
 - Anti-replay protection
- Protocol number: 50


ESP Protected IP packet



ESP header and trailer

- ESP packet processing:
 1. Verify sequence number
 2. Verify integrity
 3. Decrypt
- ESP header: not encrypted
 - Contains: SPI and sequence number
- ESP trailer: partially encrypted
 - Contains: padding, length of padding, next protocol, authentication data

ESP Format



ESP

- SA has multiple algorithms defined:
 - Cipher: for confidentiality
 - Authenticator: for authenticity
 - Each ESP has at most:
 - one cipher and one authenticator or
 - one cipher and zero authenticator or
 - zero cipher and one authenticator or
 - Disallowed: zero cipher and zero authenticator or

Encryption

- **Block ciphers in Cipher Block Chain (CBC) mode**
- Need
 - Padding at the end of data
 - Initialization vector (IV) – contained in the packet

Encryption and Compression

- Interdependence between encryption and compression
 - When encryption is applied at Internet layer ☐ prevents effective compression by lower protocol layers
 - IPsec: does not provide data compression

Key Management Protocols

- IP security architecture supports manual and automated SA and key agreement
- Key management protocol: e.g., IKE
- Proposals for automated key management protocol