

Nash's equilibrium


or when to get sick during a pandemic

Steffen Backmann and Timur Levent Kesdogan

Pandemic characteristics

- Virus spread
 - Dependent on human carriers
 - Can be artificially reduced through reduced contact (social distancing) and hygienic behaviour
→ individual level actions
 - Influence by seasonality (elevated during winter)
 - Diminishes with share of immunised individuals
- Hospital care
 - Severely sick patients have better health outcomes through hospital care
 - Capacity issues do not allow for all severely sick patients to be treated
- Indirect effects of containment
 - Death rate is a bad metric for health benefits
 - Stress, depression and mental health concerns are very important with regards to containment considerations

Simulation states for agents



Agents in the game

Two types of agents

- Passive agent: $a^{(1)}(t) = a^{(1)}$
- Dynamic agent: $a^{(2)}(t) = \begin{cases} \textit{risky} & \text{if risk conditions fulfilled} \\ \textit{low-risk} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

Conditions for behaviour

- Dependent on overall pandemic situation
- Important metric: hospital capacity c_t

$$a^{(2)}(t) = \begin{cases} \textit{risky} & \text{if } c_t < 0.5 \cdot C \\ \textit{low-risk} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Infection rate dependent on infected (I), severely infected (SI), recovered (R) and susceptible (S), with higher rate for agent 2 individuals, if they decide to engage in infection



$$p^{(1)}(t) = z(t) \cdot \left(1 + \frac{\#I_t + \#SI_t}{\#S_t + \#I_t + \#SI_t + \#R_t}\right) \cdot \left(1 - \frac{\#R_t}{\#S_t + \#I_t + \#SI_t + \#R_t}\right)^{w_r}$$

$$p^{(2)}(t) = \begin{cases} f \cdot p^{(1)}(t) & \text{if } a^{(2)}(t) = \textit{risky} \\ p^{(1)}(t) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Distinguishing features

- Action space awareness
 - Two distinct set of groups, where one does not realise the possibility to take action and plays passively against the other group
 - Based on Keynesian hand-to-mouth consumer idea, with passive group as law-abiding citizens
- Hospitalisation extension
 - Hospitals as a way of making the pandemic more bearable
 - Need to be smoothed over, as supply of health care is inelastic
- Self interest for type 2 agents
 - Own health outcome is only one of several self-focussed objectives type 2 agents attempt to achieve
 - No regards for primary, passive group

Results - 1



Results - 2

- Dynamic group suffers from higher death rates regardless of hyper-parameters
- Socially beneficial results can be achieved, as seen in the table
 - Upper row reflects base case with no dynamic group, where death rate is 0.7%
 - Lower row reflects two group model, where the overall death rate is 0.6%

Chance / Baseline	Deliberate
0.700%	nan
0.142%	1.666%



Social benefit of individual decision making for
share of population

Conclusion

- Policy recommendations
 - More laissez-faire policies during summer months, when health-care capacities are available
 - Increased hospital capacity to smooth over more infections in less time
- Individual level results
 - More awareness of individual level decision making and revealed preferences between freedom and risk of death
 - Positive for rule adheres no matter the result for the dynamic group - passivity pays off (w.r.t death rate)
- Caveats
 - Data for hospitalisation and disease spread not readily available in a real pandemic
 - Reinfection not considered
 - Parameters need to be adjusted to fit exact real life values