Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results: Replication Assignment

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1 Introduction[1]

Before the unilateral and no-fault divorce laws, the U. S. had a legal system that needed mutual and fault divorce (wiki). In previous law the married couple had to combinedly decide if they want to end their marriage and for that they had to officially show fault as reason for a divorce. Therefore, the divorce process was head aching and time-consuming process and no possibility to get success over there. As a result, many married individuals were forced to manipulate in contrast to their desires for a divorce. Also, if an individual who wanted to end a marriage without the consent of their spouse was forced to either settle down with their spouse or seek help from the court. The consequences of this is that the marriage turned into the unhappy marriage. In U. S. the divorce laws began to change in 1970 when California adopted no-fault divorce. "No fault divorce describes any divorce where the spouse asking for a divorce does not have to prove that the other spouse did something wrong". Many states adopted unilateral divorce law.

After adoption of the unilateral divorce law several economists studied the effect of this law on divorce rate. In this paper the author Wolfers replicates the research paper of the economist Friedberg on the question that Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? (question posed in the original paper)

Friedberg used the panel data for seeing the impact from year 1968 to 1988 by making the year and state fixed effect. However, Wolfers made replication on the same topic by considering the large range of panel data from year 1956 to 1988 by using the same model of difference in difference as the Friedberg used in her paper. The main theme of Wolfers' replication paper is Quasi Experimental Design that is it looks like an experimental design but lacks the key ingredient such as random assignment.

Wolfer's results in his paper indicates the contradiction to the results found by Friedberg. According to Wolfers, the Friedberg's results are overestimating the effect of the unilateral divorce laws on the divorce rate. The difference between the Friedberg's and Wolfers' estimation is that the Friedberg estimated the impact of the unilateral divorce laws over her entire

[1]References : FRIEDBERG, L. (1998): "Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel Data," The American Economic Review, 88(3), 608–627.
WOLFERS, J. (2006): "Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results," The American Economic Review, 96(5), 1802–1820.
Wikipedia for knowing about the policy.

sample from year 1968 to 1988, in comparison the Wolfers estimated the effect by considering the two-year increments. By considering the two-years increments and extending the sample to 1956 to 1988, Wolfers captured the trends that were present prior the law was implemented. Using the same model as Friedberg used, only changing the sample size, the Wolfers observed that first 8 years after the state adopted the unilateral divorce, the raise in the divorce rate was two-third of the Friedberg's result. Additionally, Wolfers' observed that after 10 years of period the law was enacted, unilateral divorce has tiny effects on the divorce rate that is contrast results from the Friedberg's results. However, the similarity between the Friedberg's and the Wolfers' results is that both result shows that the unilateral divorce causes some increase in divorce rates, at least for the short duration.

We are aware that the correlation does not mean the causality but for getting the causality the first main assumption is that let us assume there is a correlation between the variables and if the output variable (divorce rate) get changed by keeping all the variable hold constant except the treatment variable (unilateral law) then there is a casual effect. For this replication, the primary methodology based on the fact of Quasi experiment where the unilateral divorce law is considered to be exogenous(partially true). The identification strategy includes the interpretation of causality by using the weighted least squares which is treated as an extension of OLS. The main dataset used here are census dataset and the administrative divorce data. The difference in difference is the main imperial strategy in this replication paper. Here, for replication we used the dataset provided by the author namely Divorce-Wolfers-AER.dta. While replication of tables we followed the author from taking the same dataset to the same identification strategy. In general, we made the dummy variables for year and state. The main dummy variable(divx1-17) used in table1 is originally generated by the Friedberg which is mentioned in appendix part of her paper. We weighted the state population and make regression of the divorce rate on unilateral law by assigning the fixed effect to Friedberg's dummy variable, state, and year. For c2 of table1 we interact the state and time and run the regression. The interaction of the state and time square was performed in order make the c3 of table1. Here we use the command testparm command, which provides the useful alternative to test that permits variable list rather than a list of coefficients, for getting the fixed effects F values. For getting the other tables we did the clustering of state and year, weighting the number of observations. Most of the procedure is same for the remaining tables except for some changes. The detail interpretation of table would be given on the next part of interpretation.

This replication assignment taught us many things about the empirical research. While doing this replication, we came to know that the empirical research process is very interesting and at the same time very brainstorming. We need to be vigilant during making any assumptions and need to thoroughly understand the causal story behind the impact of any law or policy.

The model used for the estimation is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} DivorceRate_{s,t} = & \sum_{k>=1} \beta_k \text{Unilateral divorce has} \\ & \text{been in effect for k periods} \\ & + \sum_{s} \text{State fixed effects}_s \\ & + \sum_{t} \textbf{Time fixed effects}_t \\ & [+ \sum_{s} \text{State}_s * \text{Time}_t + \epsilon_{s,t} \\ & + \sum_{s} \text{State}_s * {\text{Time}_t}^2] \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

In this assignment, we replicate the Wolfers's paper's results including tables and the figures. While doing this we learned a lot. We

understand that the replication process making proper assumptions, analysis through the coding[2] and finally the exact interpretation of what we expected the result are too crucial things. Here we approached our finding of the table and figures through the same model, using the same administrative divorce data and the census data used by the Wolfers. The all results we got are same upto three digits except for some fixed effect F-values in table1.When the trend prior the policy in the panel specific (like state effect or year effect), take as a control then the difference in difference approach may produce the wrong results. This paper highlight the bias that might cause due to the specification of control group. Here author not used the OLS for finding instead he used WLS (weighted list square) as there is the "heteroskedasticity" in the model.

[2]The coding for some calculation part like Elasticity and mean is borrowed from the Wolfers' coding.

2 Replication[3]

Table 1: FRIEDBERG'S RESULTS COMPARISION
(Dependent variable: Annual divorces per 1,000 persons)

	Basic specification (c1)	State-specific trends linear (c2)	State-specific trends quadratic (c3)
For Panel A: Friedberg (1998)			
Unilateral	0.004	0.477	0.441
	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.055)
Year effects	F = 89.0	F = 95.3	F = 8.9
State effects	F = 217.3	F = 196.2	F = 131.1
State trend, linear	No	F = 24.7	F = 9.3
State trend, quadratic	No	No	F = 6.5
Adjusted R^2	0.946	0.976	0.982
For Panel B: Wolfers'(2006)			
Unilateral	0.000	0.431	0.435
	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.055)
Year effects	F = 89.3	F = 95.3	F = 9.0
State effects	F = 216.5	F = 191.6	F = 129.1
State trend, linear	No	F = 24.4	F = 9.3
State trend, quadratic	No	No	F = 6.6
Adjusted R^2	0.946	0.976	0.981
For Panel C: Wolfers' Replication (2020)			
Unilateral	0.000299	0.431***	0.435***
	(0.0570)	(0.0506)	(0.0554)
Year effects	F = 89.32	F = 95.49	F = 10.85
State effects	F = 216.48	F = 191.63	F = 129.08
State trend, linear	No	F = 24.41	F = 9.3
State trend, quadratic	No	No	F = 21.59
Adjusted R^2	0.950	0.979	0.985

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Sample: 1968–1988, n=1043 (unbalanced panel). Estimated using state population weights. Standard errors in parentheses.
Sources: Divorce rate data coded by Friedberg (1998) from Vital Statistics. Divorce laws coded from Friedberg's Table 1. Population weights downloaded from www.census.gov.

[3]The detailed coding that lead to estimations can be found in the do file provided with this assignment in zip file.

During 1968 and 1988, 29 states changed their legal systems, from consent divorce to a unilateral divorce law. The table 1 is consist of the panel A, the panel B, and the panel C where the estimates for the unilateral are shown from Friedberg's, Wolfers, and our replication, respectively. From 1968-1988, Friedberg considered the small durational sample after the policy implemented. A significant effect of divorce reform can be only seen in Friedberg finding when she adds state-specific trends (as in columns 2 and 3 of Table 1). In c1, estimated coefficients suggesting almost no change in the divorce rate meaning yielded estimates for the US close to zero. In c2, the coefficient on unilateral increase a bit that suggesting that the divorce rate rose by 0.447 percentage point due to controlling for the state time trends linear. The c2 specification on X-axis can be found in the figure 6 for visualization. Similarly, in the c3, the coefficient on unilateral seems to be increasing due to the controlling for the state time trend quadratic. By seeing c2 and c3, Friedberg concludes that unilateral divorce caused the divorce rate to rise significantly.
Wolfers' results in all columns, the results are extremely like the Friedberg's results. Similarly, our replication assignment's results got are similar to the Wolfer's estimates as the data and estimation strategy are identical.

The table2 shows the estimates for the effect of the divorce law in two years interval for the specifications. The c1 estimates represents the specification that includes only state and year fixed effects as controls and are close to zero as like in c1 of table1. In c1, divorce rate started to fall after the decade, therefore we can see the negative coefficient in year 9-10 which is also statistically insignificant. The c2 the adds state-specific time trends which also start to fall after decade. The c3 includes quadratic state-specific time trends which is decreasing after the decade but there is no negative coefficient. Although as one adds more controls, the long-run effects become less negative, and indeed are small, positive, and statistically insignificant when controlling for state-specific quadratic trends.

Table3 shows the comparison of Gruber's results and the Wolfers' replication results according to sex. In c1, Gruber analyze that from the population about 12 percent increased in divorce rate can be seen after adopting the unilateral divorce law. The c1 results are borrowed from the Gruber's results. The c2 estimations from our replications are very similar too the Grubers and Wolfers's estimations by comparison. c3 estimates are very close to c1 and c2 columns calculated from the small that is restricted sample. C4 is analyzing the effect of divorce laws on the proportion of the population who have ever been divorced. The everdivorced population combines both those currently divorced plus past divorced but then remarried. This indicates that on the divorce rate, the effect of unilateral divorce law is negligible or almost null.

In table4, the divorce rate can be seen in the interval of each two years. Panel A is showing the effects on the flow data and the negative coefficients in columns remains unchanged after the reform law. We can see in each column that after the decade the coefficients starts to decrease which shows the unilateral law has temporarily affects the divorce rate. c3 and c4 of are analyzing divorces per 1,000 married persons. For the panel B, we used the census data and here only female samples are considered which leads to the compatible results. We can see the estimations for all columns are almost same. See the coefficient in the decade of 1 to 10 in columns, the stocks of divorces increased strongly in decade after the reform and then diminished after that.

The table 5 is for the robustness testing. The c1 represent the control for the shock to local norms by putting a control for the proportion of nearest states with unilateral divorce laws. The norms-based coefficients in c1 represents the positive estimates and those are negative they are statistically significant as well that indicates the migratory divorce. c3 and

c4 are having the simple control strategy which is the interaction of the measure of state's historical divorce propensity with a linear time trends and time fixed effects, respectively. The c3 estimates seen in table can be interpreted as the divorce rate is increase for while then after decade the rate start to decrease as negative coefficients are indicated. c4 has somewhat different estimates than its neighbor columns and also shows the statistically insignificant that tells us, there is no effect of unilateral divorce laws on divorce rate. The c5 undertake the variation that vividly quasi experimental and has the limited samples to reform states. The estimates in c5 also starts to decrease that indicates the falling of divorce rate after while and notice here, there is no negative coefficient that is no negative effect.

In tableA1, the estimates can be analyzed by extending the sample in the Wolfers panel and compare with the Friedberg's panel. If we see and compare the coefficients for the Friedberg and Wolfers, the c2 is exact however the c3 has the difference state specific trend quadratic has includes and the c1 is showing the negative estimates that after extending the sample that indicates that if we add or extend the sample then the bias issue can be solved and could provide us with the consistent estimates.

Table 2: DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF ADOPTING UNILATERAL DIVORCE LAWS
(*Dependent variable* : *Annual divorces per* $1,000$ *persons* (*Cellmean* = 3.9))

SPECIFICATION	(c1) Basic specification	(c2) State-specific linear trends	(c3) State-specific quadratic trends
First 2 years	0.267***	0.342***	0.302***
	(0.0849)	(0.0623)	(0.0538)
Years 3-4	0.210**	0.319***	0.289***
	(0.0853)	(0.0697)	(0.0648)
Years 5-6	0.164*	0.300***	0.291***
	(0.0848)	(0.0773)	(0.0791)
Years 7-8	0.158*	0.322***	0.351***
	(0.0842)	(0.0843)	(0.0966)
Years 9-10	-0.121	0.0812	0.161
	(0.0838)	(0.0915)	(0.117)
Years 11-12	-0.324***	-0.102	0.0469
	(0.0832)	(0.0989)	(0.142)
Years 13-14	-0.461***	-0.202*	0.0315
	(0.0838)	(0.107)	(0.167)
Years 15	-0.507***	-0.210*	0.251
	(0.0805)	(0.119)	(0.205)
Onwards control			
Year FE	F = 145	F = 54	F = 71
State FE	F = 220	F = 468	F = 523
State * time	No	F = 49	F = 56
State * time^2	No	No	F = 16
Replication assignment			
Year FE	F = 145.04	F = 53.42	F = 70.25
State FE	F = 220.29	F = 468.16	F = 522.54
State * time	No	F = 49.43	F = 55.55
State * time^2	No	No	F = 19.10
Adjusted R^2	0.9310	0.9732	0.9822
Sample 1956-88,	n = 1631 state-years		
Constant	5.010***	3.540***	6.579***
	(0.329)	(0.469)	(1.582)
Observations	1,631	1,631	1,631
R-squared	0.935	0.975	0.984

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Estimated using state population weights.

The figure1 represents the average divorce rate by comparing the reform states with the controls [4]. The graph is drawn as year versus divorce rate. The graph shows that the 29 states adopted the unilateral divorce law within a year of 1968-1988. The Friedberg's can be seen in this graph. The dark black curve represents the reform states and the thick gray line indicates the control states. The dotted line***we unable to capture in our replication which is the difference in divorce rate. By observing the graph, we can see that the difference in divorce rate is falling after the decade after implementing the law. However, the Friedberg's interpretation for this is that, "these trends reflect omitted variables, and thus their inclusion remedies an omitted variable bias." But we can vividly see the dark black line, the divorce rate is increased within the decade and then start to fall. The solution on this is that we could do the state fixed effect to see the visualization clearly.

The figure 2[5], is about the dynamic response of the divorce rate which we were unable to draw properly hence not added here.

Figure3 captures the response of the divorce rate to unilateral laws. This graph is drawn as years versus divorce rate. Here we can clearly see the comparison among different trends. The state trends is pointed from the c2 of table 2 with the linear state trend. Similarly, the no state trends pointed on the graph by using the value from the c1 of table 2. Also, the quadratic state trends values are taken from the c3 of table2. Here we can see that the states where the divorced rate increased, they are belonging to first 8 years after the policy has adopted.

The figure4 represents the year versus divorce rate graph. Here we can compare the effect on the divorce rate by observing the trends from the different authors empirical work. Here, we are interested in the comparison with the Friedberg's results. By comparing the trend in this graph with Friedberg's, we can conclude that the Friedberg's results are misleading.

In figure5, the graph shows the California's divorce rate. The thick line in figure 5 indicates the misleading results due to the incorrect estimates because we cannot see the prior trend However if we see the thin line, it has the prior trend and the divorce rate is decreasing after a while. See the first graph in the figure5, at the year duration from 1970-1980, and the late 60's, they have likely similar trend in divorce rate then start to decrease rate in both cases.

The figure 6 captures the estimates of the State-specific linear time trends. The X-axis represents the specification from the c2 of table2 and the Y-axis represents the specifications of c2 of table1. The states that reformed divorce laws include the 29 states. The remaining 21 states are in the control group. In this graph we can compare the Estimated state time trends of Wolfers' verses Friedberg's. By seeing the graph, the specifications estimated by the Frieberg has the negative state-specific time trend in reform states compared to Wolfers'.

3 Conclusion

By replicating this paper and by considering all the possible results through replication, it is merely proven that the Friedberg's results were misleading indeed. Her results were overestimating the effect of unilateral law on divorce rate. However, by replicating the Wolfers' paper we reach to the conclusion that, the pretrend before the policy was crucial too for making the analysis and increased in the sample size helps to remove the biasness and to obtain the consistency, which was proven by Wolfers and we confirm that he was true. However, the

[4]Controls are defined as those states that did not change their divorce laws during Friedberg's 1968–1988 sample
[5]We unable to make the figure 2 from Wolfers paper hence the figure numbering here allotted is mismatched

large sample data could not be that much informative as the further extension of data could make the bias problem, as the results are not shows dependency on the sample data. From this replication it can be conclude that the divorce rate shows the fluctuations over period of time, showing that the divorce rate rose within the decade after the policy has enacted and then start to fall which supports the Wolfer's finding and contradict the Friedberg's results.



Figure 1: AVERAGE DIVORCE RATE: REFORM STATES AND CONTROLS (figure1)



Figure 2: RESPONSE OF DIVORCE RATE TO UNILATERAL DIVORCE LAWS (figure3)



Figure 3: RESPONSE OF DIVORCE RATE TO DIVORCE LAW REFORM (figure4)
Notes: Figure shows regression coefficients from a specification including state and year fixed effects (and also state-specific linear time trends in bottom panel), estimated over the 1956–1988 sample.

(a) Friedberg (1998) codes when unilateral divorce laws, with no separation requirements are adopted, using mostly secondary sources.
(b) Gruber (2004) codes unilateral divorce laws, with no separation requirements, using both primary and secondary sources. (c) Johnson and Mazingo (2000) code unilateral divorce laws, citing Friedberg and Brinig as sources.
(d) Ellman and Lohr (1998i) code when each state adopted "irretrievable breakdown" as grounds for divorce, citing both primary and secondary sources.
(e) Ellman and Lohr (1998ii) code when each state adopted either "irretrievable breakdown" or "incompatibility/separation" as grounds for divorce.
(f) Brinig and Buckley (1998) code the date by which both no-fault grounds for dissolution and no-fault grounds for financial settlements have been adopted, citing both legislation and court decisions.
(g) Nakonezny et al. (1995) code the date of the state's adoption of no-fault grounds for either marital dissolution or financial settlements, citing mainly secondary sources.

Divorce rate relative to state and year fixed effects



Divorce rate relative to fitted trend (and state and year fixed effects)



Figure 4: CALIFORNIA'S DIVORCE RATE (figure 5)



Figure 5: ESTIMATES OF STATE-SPECIFIC LINEAR TIME TRENDS (figure 6)
Population-weighted least squares regression, 1956-1988. Nevada off-scale (-0.60, -0.63).



Figure 6: U.S. DIVORCE RATE: EFFECT OF DIVORCE LAWS (figure 7)
Notes: Figure is constructed based on the specification in column 3 of Table 5.

Table 3: EFFECTS OF UNILATERAL DIVORCE LAWS ON THE STOCK OF DIVORCES—CENSUS DATA

	p(Currently Divorced)			p(Ever divorced)
	(c1)	(c2)	(c3)	(c4)
Dependent variable	Gruber's results	Replicating Gruber (same sample)	Replicating Gruber (shorter sample)	Dependent variable is Ever divorced (shorter sample)
		Panel A: Women		
unilateral coefficient	0.0128	0.0101***	0.0104***	0.000865
	(0.0040)	(0.00250)	(0.00283)	(0.00372)
Constant	-	-1.783***	-4.284***	-5.352***
		(0.347)	(0.371)	(0.511)
Observations	5,304	5,304	3,978	3,978
R-squared	-	0.911	0.902	0.924
		Panel B: Men		
unilateral coefficient	0.0095	0.00816***	0.00824***	0.000431
	(0.0038)	(0.00290)	(0.00273)	(0.00423)
Constant	-	-0.918***	-2.699***	-3.548***
		(0.230)	(0.342)	(0.456)
Observations	5,304	5,304	3,978	3,978
R-squared	-	0.891	0.867	0.923

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Weighted to reflect underlying microdata. Standard errors clustered by state. All regressions based on IPUMS data from the 1950–1990 Censuses: 1960 1-percent state sample, 1970 Form one 1-percent state sample, 1980–2000 5-percent state samples. Restricted to U.S.-born population age 25 to 50. Each coefficient is from a separate regression, controlling for race, state of residence dummies, age dummies, year dummies, and age year dummy interactions.

Table 4: LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF UNILATERAL DIVORCE LAWS
Panel A. Dependent variable is divorce rate (administrative flow data)

	Divorce rate per 1,000 persons/year		Divorce per 1,000 married persons age 18 +	
	(c1)	(c2)	(c3)	(c4)
	1956-88 sample	1956-98 sample	1956-88 sample	1956-98 sample
Dependent variable	n = 1,631	n = 2,102	n= 1,631	n = 2,102
Cell mean	3.9	4.1	5.8	6.2
Law change has been in effect for:				
First 2 years	0.267***	0.271***	0.419***	0.418***
	(0.0849)	(0.0959)	(0.115)	(0.132)
Years 3-4	0.210**	0.218**	0.369***	0.369***
	(0.0853)	(0.0963)	(0.116)	(0.132)
Years 5-6	0.164*	0.174*	0.345***	0.343***
	(0.0848)	(0.0953)	(0.115)	(0.131)
Years 7-8	0.158*	0.173*	0.388***	0.391***
	(0.0842)	(0.0947)	(0.114)	(0.130)
Years 9-10	-0.121	-0.0979	0.0112	0.0263
	(0.0838)	(0.0941)	(0.114)	(0.129)
Years 11-12	-0.324***	-0.291***	-0.260**	-0.237*
	(0.0832)	(0.0930)	(0.113)	(0.128)
Years 13-14	-0.461***	-0.418***	-0.450***	-0.417***
	(0.0838)	(0.0925)	(0.114)	(0.127)
Years 15-16	-0.507***	-0.397***	-0.455***	-0.355***
(Year 15 + cols 1, 3)	(0.0805)	(0.0928)	(0.109)	(0.127)
Years 17-18	-	-0.471***	-	-0.457***
		(0.0915)		(0.126)
Years 19-20	-	-0.608***	-	-0.673***
		(0.0929)		(0.128)
Years 21-22	-	-0.685***	-	-0.800***
		(0.0948)		(0.130)
Years 23-24	-	-0.627***	-	-0.680***
		(0.103)		(0.141)
Years 25+	-	-0.751***	-	-0.809***
		(0.0986)		(0.135)
Constant	5.010***	4.738***	6.724***	6.358***
	(0.329)	(0.314)	(0.447)	(0.432)
R-squared	0.935	0.907	0.949	0.928

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Panel B. Dependent variable is share of women currently divorced (census data)

	p(Current divorced)		p(Current divorced| ever married)	
	(c1)	(c2)	(c3)	(c4)
	1960-90	1960-00	1960-90	1960-00
Dependent	sample	sample	sample	sample
variable	n = 5,304	n = 6,630	n = 5,304	n = 6,630
Cell mean	11.2%	12.2%	12.8%	14.1%
Law change has been in effect for:				
1 to 10 years	0.0101***	0.0102***	0.0104***	0.0104**
	(0.00279)	(0.00329)	(0.00369)	(0.00419)
11 to 20 years (11 years + cols 1, 3)	0.0100***	0.00927**	0.0106***	0.00973***
	(0.00343)	(0.00349)	(0.00311)	(0.00341)
20 years +	-	0.00637	-	0.00679
		(0.00526)		(0.00463)
Constant	-1.785***	-1.100***	-4.284***	-3.252***
	(0.320)	(0.309)	(0.358)	(0.304)
Observations	5,304	6,630	5,304	6,630
R-squared	0.911	0.912	0.915	0.910

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Panel A: See notes to Table 2. Panel B: See notes to Table 3.

Table 5: ROBUSTNESS TESTING
(Dependent variable: Annual divorces per 1,000 persons)

	From Table 4 (col 2) (c1)	Control for neighbor's reforms (c2)	Control for historical divorce rate*time trend (c3)	Control for historical divorce rate*time FE (c4)	Reform states only (c5)
Law change has been in effect for:					
First 2 years	0.271***	0.282***	0.363***	0.146	0.405***
	(0.0959)	(0.0957)	(0.0909)	(0.0932)	(0.139)
Years 3-4	0.218**	0.265***	0.349***	0.127	0.502***
	(0.0963)	(0.0971)	(0.0915)	(0.0944)	(0.162)
Years 5-6	0.174*	0.248**	0.343***	0.116	0.583***
	(0.0953)	(0.0976)	(0.0908)	(0.0940)	(0.183)
Years 7-8	0.173*	0.251***	0.379***	0.170*	0.678***
	(0.0947)	(0.0973)	(0.0906)	(0.0935)	(0.201)
Years 9-10	-0.0979	-0.0158	0.145	-0.0267	0.492**
	(0.0941)	(0.0969)	(0.0904)	(0.0931)	(0.217)
Years 11-12	-0.291***	-0.206**	-0.0107	-0.169*	0.345
	(0.0930)	(0.0962)	(0.0899)	(0.0921)	(0.231)
Years 13-14	-0.418***	-0.331***	-0.0977	-0.187**	0.272
	(0.0925)	(0.0959)	(0.0900)	(0.0917)	(0.245)
Years 15-16	-0.397***	-0.307***	-0.0305	-0.103	0.323
	(0.0928)	(0.0964)	(0.0910)	(0.0922)	(0.259)
Years 17-18	-0.471***	-0.378***	-0.0552	-0.0709	0.281
	(0.0915)	(0.0954)	(0.0907)	(0.0914)	(0.275)
Years 19-20	-0.608***	-0.510***	-0.130	-0.139	0.165
	(0.0929)	(0.0971)	(0.0933)	(0.0943)	(0.293)
Years 21-22	-0.685***	-0.591***	-0.199**	-0.218**	0.144
	(0.0948)	(0.0986)	(0.0951)	(0.0949)	(0.315)
Years 23-24	-0.627***	-0.535***	-0.161	-0.120	0.360
	(0.103)	(0.106)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.346)
Years 25+	-0.751***	-0.651***	-0.165	-0.0373	0.465
	(0.0986)	(0.103)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.388)
Controls					
% Unilateral (adjoining states)	-	-0.30	-	-	-
		(0.09)			
Time*historical divorce rate	-	-	-0.72	-	-
			(0.05)		
Time FE*historical divorce rate	-	-	-	Yes	-
Sample	1956-98 n=2,102	1956-98 n=2,102	1956-98 n=2,102	1956-98 n=2,102	1956-98 n=1,288 (31 states)
Constant	4.738***	4.551***	5.041***	6.097***	4.081***
	(0.314)	(0.319)	(0.298)	(0.822)	(0.423)
Observations	2,102	2,102	2,102	2,102	1,288
R-squared	0.907	0.907	0.916	0.923	0.866

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimated using state population weights. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The "historical divorce rate" is the share of the population aged 25–50 in each state ever divorced in the 1950 census. For Alaska and Hawaii, 1960 values are substituted.

Table 6: EXTENDING THE SAMPLE
(Friedberg's specification)

	Basic specification (c1)	State-specific trends linear (c2)	State-specific trends quadratic (c3)
For Panel A: Friedberg's (1998)			
Unilateral	0.004	0.477	0.441
	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.055)
Year effects	F = 89	F = 95	F = 8.9
State effects	F = 217	F = 196	F = 131
State trend, linear	No	F = 25	F = 9.3
State trend, quadratic	No	No	F = 6.5
Adjusted R^2	0.946	0.976	0.982
For Panel B: Wolfers'(2006)			
Unilateral	-0.055	0.477	0.334
	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.046)
Year effects	F = 137	F = 69	F = 76
State effects	F = 207	F = 454	F = 511
State trend, linear	No	F = 51	F = 54
State trend, quadratic	No	No	F = 17
Adjusted R^2	0.927	0.972	0.982
For Panel C: Wolfers' Replication(2020)			
Unilateral	-0.0548	0.477***	0.334***
	(0.0504)	(0.0538)	(0.0457)
Year effects	F = 136.66	F = 70.86	F = 76.69
State effects	F = 206.54	F = 454.41	F = 511.24
State trend, linear	No	F = 50.79	F = 53.89
State trend, quadratic	No	No	F = 21.73
Adjusted R^2	0.930	0.974	0.984

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Panel A: Friedberg's sample: 1968-88 (1,043)
Panel B: Wolfers' sample: 1956-88 (1,631)
Notes: Estimated using state population weights.