

Computing optimal equilibria and mechanisms via learning in zero-sum extensive-form games

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0. Abstract

- **Key idea** - introduces a new approach for computing optimal equilibria.
- Reformulates the optimal equilibria problem as minimax equilibrium strategies, allowing for the application of zero-sum game techniques.
- Approach can be applied to mechanism design and information design. And, used to solve for correlated, communication, and certification equilibria.
- **Result** - yields first learning dynamics that converge to optimal equilibria.
 - SotA results on empirical benchmarks.