

# Carrots vs Sticks: Climate Policy with Government Turnover

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## Abstract

With regards to climate policy, there is an active debate among economists on the relative merits of clean energy subsidies vs the more textbook economic solution of a carbon tax. However, the models used to inform this debate have a common simplifying assumption: the preferences of the government are kept constant over time. In reality, control of the government often rotates between parties with very different policy preferences. This paper finds that adding turnover in party control of the government can have significant implications. Specifically, the party more concerned about the environment (“the green party”) finds it optimal to subsidize irreversible investments in clean energy, even when carbon taxes are available and can be placed at any level. We then provide quantitative evidence on the green party’s optimal subsidy using two approaches: sufficient statistic estimation and a calibration exercise. The results suggest that the optimal subsidy is quantitatively significant, between 5% and 17% of the cost of investment. Furthermore, if the green party naively uses just a carbon tax, clean investment is 34% lower than when they use their optimal subsidy.

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# 1 Introduction

Textbook economic models suggest that the optimal climate policy is a pigouvian tax (i.e. a carbon tax). While carbon taxes are fairly common in reality, many countries' climate plans have instead relied heavily on clean energy subsidies. Perhaps motivated by this disconnect, there is an active debate among economists on the relative merits of subsidies vs carbon taxes<sup>1</sup>.

This paper contributes to that policy debate by relaxing a standard assumption: that the preferences of the government are constant over time. Instead, I use a model where control of the government rotates between two parties who may disagree on the size of the externality from carbon emissions. I find that if the parties' valuations are identical, then the optimal policy only involves a carbon tax, as in the textbook model. However, if the parties' valuations of the externality differ, then the more environmentally-conscious party (the green party) finds it optimal to subsidize clean energy investments rather than to rely exclusively on carbon taxes. The intuition is that clean investment today crowds out future fossil fuel production that would occur under a less-environmentally-conscious party (the brown party), and this crowd-out benefit is not internalized by the private sector.

We use a model with perfect competition, where the only market imperfection is from carbon emissions. This is what guarantees the textbook result that if one party has control forever, their optimal policy is just a carbon tax.

The model has two types of energy, green and brown, which are substitutes in consumption. Production of each type of energy requires a specialized type of capital (i.e. power plants). Furthermore, we assume that green energy is highly capital intensive and that investment is irreversible. These assumptions imply that once green capacity is built, it produces electricity at very low marginal cost, so it will continue to produce electricity throughout its lifetime regardless of the carbon tax level. This is what drives the result that the green party can reduce future carbon emissions by increasing green investment.

When considering cases with party turnover, we make election outcome probabilities exogenous, which allows us to isolate the effects of party turnover from any effects due to electoral competition. We consider two versions of the model. The first is the "single-election" case, where green party is in charge in the first period, but if they lose the second period election then they lose power in all future periods. This model is a useful starting point for building intuition, and it allows for more general functional forms. Next we look at the "multi-election" version of the model where there is an election in every period. While this model requires more functional form restrictions, it allows for a more realistic calibration

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1. See the literature review section below.

exercise.

Both models provide the same sufficient statistic for the green party’s optimal subsidy, which depends on a few objects: the discount factor, the extent of polarization between the two parties, the marginal cost of green energy, and how much increased green energy production crowds out emissions. These objects can be estimated from existing empirical studies. By plugging these estimates into the sufficient static formula, we find an optimal clean investment subsidy of between 5 and 18%. This is a fairly large subsidy. For context, the base level of the clean investment subsidy in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 is 6%<sup>2</sup>.

While the sufficient statistic approach has the advantage of being transparent and less dependent on functional forms, it comes at the cost of relying on local estimates of endogenous objects. For example, we use an estimate for the marginal cost of green energy that is measured using US data from 2019; if a very large subsidy were put in place, the marginal cost of green energy would increase above that 2019 level, and thus our estimate may be inaccurate. To address this concern, we provide an alternative estimate of the optimal subsidy using a structural approach. This requires calibrating the full cost and demand functions for energy. In the baseline calibration, we find a subsidy of between 5 and 13%, only slightly lower than the results from the sufficient statistic approach. This provides further evidence that party turnover can justify quantitatively significant subsidies.

The calibrated model also allows us check what would happen if the green party were to naively use their no-turnover optimal policy (that is, if they were to use only use a carbon tax). We find that this would lead to significant under-investment from the green party’s perspective. Specifically, green investment would be about 34% lower than their optimal level.

What about the behavior of the brown party? First, note that our model is asymmetric: in the baseline case, we assume that capital does not depreciate and that the initial stock of brown capital is high. This makes it so that the brown party has no incentive to subsidize brown capital investment<sup>34</sup>. Next, one may think that the brown party would benefit from

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2. In the Inflation Reduction Act, the base level of the subsidy is 6%. It increases to 30% if the investment meets prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements, and up to 50% if it relies on American made products and is located in an environmental justice community. Many of the apparent goals of this policy (i.e. protectionism and redistribution) are outside of our model. The key point is just that our model predicts an optimal subsidy level that is non-trivial relative to what is observed in practice. Source: <https://www.energy.gov/eere/water/inflation-reduction-act-tax-credit-opportunities-hydropower-and-marine-energy>

3. Intuitively, there is already an excess amount of brown capital in the economy, so further brown investment has no impact on future production decisions.

4. While we think these are reasonable approximations given that the primary focus of the paper is on the green party’s optimal policy (see the model setup section for more discussion of these approximations), we think that a valuable opportunity for future work is to relax these assumptions and look more carefully at whether the brown party wants to subsidize fossil fuel investment.

taxing green investment. We don’t find that in any version of the model. Instead, we find that in some cases the brown party wants to *subsidize* green investment<sup>5</sup>. The intuition is that since firms expect large green investment subsidies under a future green government, they significantly reduce green investment under the brown party. If the brown party only uses a carbon tax instead of a subsidy, firms end up investing below the brown party’s optimal level. In our calibration exercise, the brown party’s optimal subsidy is 60% as large as the green party’s.

## 1.1 Literature Review

As was mentioned above, there is an active debate among economists on the merits of clean energy subsidies vs carbon taxes<sup>6</sup>. A common argument against subsidies, which is present in my model, is that they do not provide proper incentives to conserve energy. By lowering the cost of energy, subsidies lead to increased energy consumption, which is the opposite of the efficient decrease in consumption caused by a carbon tax. Related arguments say that clean energy subsidies do not give the proper incentives to phase out relatively high emissions sources like coal instead of relatively low-emissions sources like natural gas (Borenstein and Kellogg 2023). Finally, subsidies must be financed with distortionary taxation, whereas the revenue from carbon taxes can be used to reduce distortionary taxes (see Jorgenson et al 2013). Economic arguments in favor of subsidies include the idea that the electricity market has large mark-ups (Kellogg and Borenstein 2023) and that there are positive externalities from clean energy due to learning-by-doing (see Rodrik 2014 for an example). All of these papers use models in which the preferences of the government are constant over time. Our paper’s contribution is to relax that assumption, which we find provides an alternative consideration in favor of subsidies.

By introducing political economy considerations into public economics models, we follow the broad suggestion made by Acemoglu and Robinson (2013). They suggest that in contrast to the standard economics approach, which “ignores politics”, “sound economic policy should be based on a careful analysis of political economy”. While we don’t think our paper provides a complete analysis of the political economy concerns regarding clean energy subsidies, we

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5. This result does *not* say that the brown party wants more investment with turnover than they want without turnover. In our model, they want the same level of investment in either case. Without turnover, that level of investment can be implemented with just a carbon tax. With turnover, they need to use a subsidy.

6. In light of all the existing arguments, there does not seem to be a consensus on this topic. In a 2017 IGM poll of expert economists, 18% of respondents believed that subsidies were more efficient policies than carbon taxes, 60% stated that carbon taxes were more efficient, and 22% were uncertain. In written responses to the poll, many economists question existing arguments in favor of subsidies. No one mentions the mechanism highlighted in this paper. Source: <https://www.kentclarkcenter.org/surveys/energy-sources/>

think that it is a valuable step in the right direction, especially relative to the standard approach of assuming one-party rule.

In using a model with party turnover in control of the government, this paper relates to a literature going back to Persson and Svensson (1989) (see Persson and Tabellini (2002) for a more detailed review). Most of this early literature focused on debt accumulation, and it was primarily theoretical. In environmental economics specifically, there are a few papers looking at government turnover, but none of them focus on the choice of carbon taxes vs subsidies for clean energy investment. Hochman and Zilberman (2021) use a model where the government can only use taxes, whereas Watten (2021) uses a model where the government can only use subsidies. Schmitt (2014) works almost exclusively with social planner models that don't decentralize the optimal policy in terms of taxes and subsidies<sup>78</sup>. Finally, Ulph and Ulph (2013) focus on R&D subsidies instead of physical capital subsidies. They use a two period model where governments can subsidize a binary clean energy R&D project, and they show that a subsidy is optimal for the green party when there's turnover. While their model contains a similar mechanism, our more general setting allows us to clearly identify the theoretical mechanism<sup>9</sup> and allows for more realistic empirical exercises.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: first we present the setup of the model and the results for the case where there's no turnover. Next, we present theoretical results for the single-election case, where power only changes hands once. We then provide an estimate of the sufficient statistic for the optimal subsidy. Finally, we present theoretical and calibration results for the multi-election case, where elections occur in every period.

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7. This is an important difference. In our baseline model the green party's optimal amount of investment is identical with or without government turnover. However, their way of implementing that level of investment with tax policy is significantly different with turnover. So, if we only worked with social planner models and didn't consider the decentralized implementation, we would be left with the misleading conclusion that government turnover is irrelevant for optimal policy.

8. In Schmitt (2014)'s two period model, they point out that subsidies are needed to decentralize the optimal policy. However, in their infinite horizon model and their quantification section, they only look at the planner solutions.

9. Specifically, Ulph and Ulph (2013) state that subsidies are optimal because turnover increases the benefit of R&D investment for the green party, while decreasing the benefit for the private sector. Our analysis shows that while their conditions are sufficient to make subsidies optimal, they aren't necessary. In our model, it's ambiguous whether turnover increases the marginal benefit of green investment for the green party, but it's unambiguous that the green party wants to use a subsidy. The only thing needed to make a subsidy optimal is that green investment crowds out future carbon emissions under the opposite party. See section 4.2 for details.

## 2 Model Setup

### 2.1 Technology

There are two types of energy, brown ( $E_b$ ) and green ( $E_g$ ), which are perfect substitutes in consumption. Green energy is produced with only capital<sup>10</sup> and has a strictly increasing and strictly concave production function  $F(K_t)$ . Brown energy is produced with only non-durable inputs (e.g. fuel)<sup>11</sup> and has a constant marginal cost of production  $mc$ .

We assume for tractability reasons that capital does not depreciate over time<sup>12</sup>. Investments  $x_t$  immediately add to the capital stock according to the following law of motion:  $K_t = K_{t-1} + x_t$ . Importantly, investment is fully irreversible ( $x_t \geq 0$ ).

Carbon emissions in each period  $C_t$  are proportional to brown energy production  $C_t = \gamma E_{bt}$ . Green energy production is completely carbon-free.

### 2.2 Preferences and Consumer Problem

Following Kellogg and Borenstein (2023), we use a partial equilibrium model of the electricity sector. In appendix A.1, we show that this partial equilibrium model is equivalent to a general equilibrium model with quasi-linear utility and production. The value of electricity consumption for a representative consumer at time  $t$  is given by  $v(K_{gt} + E_{bt})$ .  $v$  is increasing and strictly concave.  $v'(\cdot)$  satisfies  $\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} v'(x) = 0$  and  $\lim_{x \rightarrow 0^+} v'(x) \rightarrow \infty$ .

There is a representative consumer who acts as a price taker. Prices at time  $t$  are conditional on the history of election outcomes  $h_t$ . The representative consumer problem is to choose energy consumption  $E(h_t)$  for each time  $t$  and history of election outcomes  $h_t$ <sup>13</sup> to maximize consumer surplus:

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \sum_{h_t \in H_t} \Pi(h_t) \beta^{t-1} (v(E(h_t)) - p(h_t)E(h_t))$$

where  $p(h_t)$  is the price of energy,  $H_t$  is the set of possible histories at time  $t$ , and  $\Pi(h_t)$  is

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10. This assumption, while made for tractability reasons, is not too far from reality. In 2022, capital costs represent 73% and 79% of the levelized cost of new wind and solar plants, respectively (Nalley and LaRose 2022).

11. In appendix A.2, we show that this assumption can be micro-founded in a model where brown energy requires capital, but where the initial stock of brown capital is large enough that there is excess brown capacity available. Empirical evidence suggests that this is a reasonable approximation.

12. Empirically, power plants are long-lived assets, with a lifespans of between 25-50 years (Rhodes et al (2017)). This translates to a depreciation rate of 2% to 4% per year.

13. In the full control case, there's only one possible history at every period in time. In the single-election case, the history is simply a binary variable for any  $t \geq 2$ , specifying who won the election at the beginning of period 2.

the probability of  $h_t$  being realized.

The solution to this problem is to set  $E_t$  to satisfy  $v'(E(h_t)) = p(h_t)$  for all  $h_t$ . Thus,  $v'(E)$  gives the inverse demand for energy and  $D(p) \equiv v'^{-1}(p)$  is the demand curve for energy.

## 2.3 Firm Problem

A representative firm, taking prices  $p(h_t)$ , carbon taxes  $\tau(h_t)$ , and investment subsidies  $s(h_t)$  as given, chooses paths for green investment  $\{x(h_t)\}$ , green capital  $\{K(h_t)\}$ , and brown production  $\{E_b(h_t)\}$  to maximize expected profits:

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \sum_{h_t \in H_t} \Pi(h_t) \beta^{t-1} \left( \underbrace{(F(K(h_t)) + E_b(h_t))p(h_t)}_{\text{Revenue}} - \underbrace{(1 - s(h_t))x(h_t) - (mc + \tau(h_t)\gamma)E_b(h_t)}_{\text{Cost}} \right)$$

Subject to the law of motion and irreversible investment constraints for all  $h_t$ :

$$K(h_t) = K(h_{t-1}) + x(h_t)$$

$$x(h_t) \geq 0$$

where the exogenous initial capital stock  $K_0$  is zero.

## 2.4 Competitive Equilibrium

A competitive equilibrium is a set of quantities  $(\{x(h_t)\}, \{K(h_t)\}, \{E_b(h_t)\}, \{E(h_t)\})$ , prices  $(\{p(h_t)\})$ , and tax rates  $(\{\tau(h_t)\}, \{s(h_t)\})$  which solve the firm problem, solve the consumer problem, and satisfy the market clearing conditions  $E_b(h_t) + F(K(h_t)) = E(h_t)$  for all  $h_t$ .

## 2.5 Party Social Welfare Functions

The two parties have identical payoffs except for their valuation placed on the externality from emissions. Both are interested in maximizing total surplus, inclusive of climate damages from carbon emissions. The green party and the brown party value the externality from a unit of carbon emissions at  $d_g$  and  $d_b$ , respectively, with  $d_g > d_b$ . Party  $j$ 's utility is given by:

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \sum_{h_t \in H_t} \Pi(h_t) \beta^{t-1} \left( \underbrace{v(F(K(h_t)) + E_b(h_t))}_{\text{Consumption Value}} - \underbrace{x(h_t) - mcE_b(h_t)}_{\text{Cost}} - \underbrace{d_j \gamma E_b(h_t)}_{\text{Externality}} \right)$$

Note that taxes and subsidies do not appear in this formula, since we assume that lump sum taxes are available (see the general equilibrium model in appendix A.1 for details).

We do not take a stance on which party has the “correct” social welfare function. The purpose of the model is to analyze the (realistic) case where the two parties disagree about the size of the externality.

## 2.6 Tax Instruments

The party in power in period  $t$  can use two tax instruments: carbon taxes  $\tau_t$  and green energy investment subsidies  $s_t$ . As we’ll see, these instruments turn out to be sufficient to implement each party’s optimal allocation as a competitive equilibrium.

## 3 No Turnover Case

### 3.1 Solution Concept

As a baseline, we’ll first look at the textbook case, where the same party is always in power. Following standard practice, we’ll solve for that party’s optimal policy in two steps: first, solve the planner problem to find the optimal allocation, then find the tax policy which decentralizes that optimal allocation as a competitive equilibrium.

The planner problem for party  $j$  is to choose an allocation  $(\{x_t\}, \{K_t\}, \{E_{bt}\})$  to maximize their social welfare function:

$$\left[ \sum_t \beta^{t-1} \left( \underbrace{v(F(K_t) + E_{bt})}_{\text{Consumption Value}} - \underbrace{x_t - mc E_{bt}}_{\text{Cost}} - \underbrace{d_j \gamma E_{bt}}_{\text{Externality}} \right) \right]$$

Subject to the law of motion and irreversible investment constraints for all  $t$ :

$$K_t = K_{t-1} + x_t$$

$$x_t \geq 0$$

Note that there is no implementability constraint here. We are assuming that the solution to this planning problem can be implemented with carbon taxes and investment subsidies. This assumption is later verified in theorem 2.

We make the following assumptions on parameter values, which guarantee that both parties use a positive amount of both types of energy in their no-turnover planner solution:

#### Interior Assumptions:

1.  $F'(0)(mc + \gamma d_b) > 1 - \beta$



$$2. F'(F^{-1}(D(mc + \gamma d_g)))(mc + \gamma d_g) < 1 - \beta$$

The first of these guarantees that both parties use some green energy in their no turnover solution. The second guarantees that both parties use some brown energy in their no turnover solution.

### 3.2 Results

First, we characterize the planner solution for each party.

**Theorem 1:** *Party  $j$ 's no turnover solution has the following features:*

1. *The capital stock in each period is equal to a constant  $K_j^*$ , which is the unique solution to the following condition:  $(mc + \gamma d_j)F'(K_j^*) = 1 - \beta$*
2. *Investment is positive in the first period and zero in all future periods*
3. *Brown energy production is constant in all periods and is equal to  $D(mc + \gamma d_j) - F(K_j^*) > 0$*

So, the planner immediately makes enough investment to bring the capital stock up to its steady state level,  $K_j^*$ . Because there's no depreciation, investment in all future periods is zero. Brown energy production is constant and positive in each period.

The condition in the first part of theorem 1 for the steady state level can be rewritten as:

$$\sum_{t=0} \beta^t F'(K_j^*)(mc + \gamma d_j) = 1 \quad (1)$$

The left side of this equation is the marginal benefit of a one-time increase in investment, while the right side is the marginal cost. The marginal benefit is the present value of the marginal product of capital  $F'(K_j^*)$  times the marginal benefit of energy consumption, which in equilibrium is equal to the full marginal cost of brown energy  $(mc + \gamma d_j)$ .

The third part of theorem 1 pins down the level of brown energy production. Since brown energy has constant marginal costs, optimal brown energy production for party  $j$  is simply given by the difference between demand at the social marginal cost  $D(mc + \gamma d_j)$  and the supply of green energy  $F(K_t)$ .

Theorem 2 below gives the familiar result that a pigouvian tax on carbon emissions is sufficient to implement the optimal allocation as a competitive equilibrium:

**Theorem 2:** *Party  $j$ 's no-turnover planner solution can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with a carbon tax equal to  $d_j$  and a subsidy equal to zero in every period.*

Theorem 2 establishes that subsidies aren't needed to implement the optimal allocation. One may still think that subsidies could be used instead of carbon taxes to implement the optimal allocation. The following theorem shows that that's not the case. It is impossible to implement the allocation with positive subsidies.

**Theorem 3:** *There is no tax policy  $(\{\tau_t\}, \{s_t\})$  which implements party  $j$ 's no turnover solution and has  $s_t > 0$  for any  $t$*

To see why this equation holds, consider a perturbation where the firm makes a one-time marginal increase in investment at time  $t$ . In any competitive equilibrium, this deviation can't increase profits, which gives the following condition:

$$\sum_{t'} \beta^{t'} (mc + \gamma d_j) F'(K_j^*) \leq 1 - s_t \quad (2)$$

The left side is the marginal revenue from the deviation<sup>14</sup>, while the right side gives the marginal cost. Notice that this condition is identical to equation 1, except for the presence of the subsidy on the right side. So, the only way for both equation 1 and condition 2 to hold (which they must if the tax and subsidy policy implements the planner allocation) is for  $s_t \leq 0$ <sup>15</sup>. If positive subsidies were used, then firms would invest in green energy to the point where the social marginal benefit is greater than the social marginal cost (from the perspective of party  $j$ ).

## 4 Single-election Model

Now we add turnover into the model. The green party is in power in period 1. At the beginning of period 2, there's an election which the green party wins with probability  $1 - \theta$ . Whoever wins that election is in charge for all  $t \geq 2$ .

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14. The marginal revenue is the discounted sum of the price of energy times the marginal product of capital. In equilibrium, the price of energy is equal to the marginal benefit of energy consumption,  $mc + \gamma d_j$

15. For  $t = 0$ , the firm FOC must hold with equality since positive investment is made in that period, which means that  $s_1 = 0$  in any tax policy which implements the planner allocation. For  $t > 0$ , no investment is made, so  $s_t$  could be strictly negative (an investment tax) and still implement the planner allocation.

## 4.1 Solution Concept with Turnover

Following the public finance literature<sup>16</sup>, our solution concept in this case is analogous to the no turnover case. First, we find the equilibrium allocation by solving for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the “social planner game”, where the party in power in each period directly chooses that period’s allocation. Next, we find tax policies for each party which decentralize the equilibrium allocation as a competitive equilibrium.

The idea behind this solution concept is to analyze settings where governments have a large enough range of policy instruments available to achieve any allocation (this includes tax instruments, but also quantity setting instruments such as cap and trade policies). So, to pin down the equilibrium allocation, we can first analyze a model where the party in power in each period directly chooses that period’s allocation. We then want to focus on the specific case where parties choose to use taxes and subsidies, so we solve for the tax and subsidy policies which implement the equilibrium allocation.

## 4.2 Turnover Results

### 4.2.1 The Equilibrium Allocation

First, we characterize the equilibrium strategy for the party who wins the second period election. This is easy to solve for, since from period 2 on the game collapses to the no-turnover planner case considered in the previous section. The difference is that instead of the capital stock starting at zero, it now starts at  $K_1$ , the capital stock inherited from the first period:

**Theorem 4:** *In any subgame perfect equilibrium, the party  $j$  who wins the period 2 election chooses the following allocation, conditional on the amount of capital inherited  $K_1$ :*

1.  $K_t = \max\{K_j^*, K_1\}$  for all  $t \geq 2$
2.  $E_{bt} = \max\{0, D(mc + \gamma d_j) - F(K_t)\}$  for all  $t \geq 2$

The first part of theorem 4 states that the party who wins the second period election sets capital to their no-turnover optimal level  $K_j^*$  if feasible. If they inherit  $K_1 > K_j^*$ , then  $K_j^*$  isn’t feasible due to the irreversible investment constraint, so they instead invest nothing in all future periods and keep the capital stock at  $K_1$ .

The second part of theorem 4 pins down the level of brown energy production. Like in theorem 1, optimal brown energy production for party  $j$  is simply given by the difference

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16. See Farhi and Werning (2008), and the references cited therein, for examples.

between total energy demand  $D(mc + \gamma d_j)$  and the supply of green energy  $F(K_t)$  (if that difference is negative, then brown energy production is zero).

Theorem 4 leads to an important follow up result:

**Corollary 1:** *Let  $\bar{K}$  equal the unique solution to  $D(mc + \gamma d_j) - F(\bar{K}) = 0$ . If  $K_1 \in [K_j^*, \bar{K})$ , then  $\frac{dE_{bt}}{dK_1} = -F'(K_1) < 0$  for all  $t \geq 2$*

In other words, corollary 1 says that if  $K_1$  is above party  $j$ 's optimal level but not high enough to completely crowd out brown energy production, then a marginal increase in  $K_1$  crowds out  $F'(K_1)$  units of brown energy production in period 2 on. So, the party in charge in period 1 can reduce future emissions by increasing period 1 investment. This crowding out effect is what leads to the result that the green party wants to subsidize green investment in the first period.

The following result characterises the on-path equilibrium allocation:

**Theorem 5:** *There is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium allocation with the following characteristics on the equilibrium path:*

1. *In period 1, the green party sets  $K_1$  to  $K_g^*$  and  $E_{b1}$  to  $D(mc + \gamma d_g) - F(K_g^*)$*
2. *In period 2 on, the party in power  $j$  sets  $K_t = K_g^*$  and  $E_{bt} = D(mc + \gamma d_j) - F(K_1)$  for all  $t$*

So, the green party immediately invests up to their full control optimal level  $K_g^*$ . If they win the election in the second period, they keep the capital stock at that optimal level. If the brown party wins the second period election, they also keep the capital stock at  $K_g^*$ , since they are bound by the irreversible investment constraint.

It may seem surprising that the green party's optimal level of investment is the same in the case with turnover as it is in the case where they have control forever. As we mentioned above, with turnover investment has the additional benefit of crowding out future emissions, so why wouldn't the green party want to invest more in that case? To see why, consider a one-shot deviation where the green party marginally changes investment in period 1. This deviation can't be profitable in equilibrium, so we get the following condition:

$$\underbrace{p_1 F'(K_g^*) + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} [(1-\theta)p_2(g)F'(K_g^*) + \theta p_2(b)F'(K_g^*)]}_{\text{Consumption Benefit}} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{1-\beta} \theta \gamma (d_g - d_b) F'(K_g^*)}_{\text{Crowd-out benefit}} = 1 \quad (3)$$

where  $p_1 = p_2(g) = mc + \gamma d_g$  (the marginal benefit of energy consumption under the green party) and  $p_2(b) = mc + \gamma d_b$  (the marginal benefit of energy consumption under the brown

party). The right side is the marginal cost of the investment, which is just equal to one. The left side is the marginal benefit. The first two terms on the left side correspond to the consumption benefit of increased green energy production. The third term on the left side is the benefit from crowding out future emissions by the brown party.

The analogous condition in the no turnover case (equation 1) can be written in a very similar form:

$$\underbrace{p_1 F'(K_g^*) + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} p_2(g) F'(K_g^*)}_{\text{Consumption Benefit}} = 1 \quad (4)$$

Comparing the conditions with turnover (equation 3) and without turnover (equation 4), we see that there are two differences:

1. Equation 3 has the crowd out term on the left side. This makes the marginal benefit of investment larger in the turnover case than in the no turnover case.
2. Equation 3 has a lower consumption benefit term than equation 4. This is because with turnover there's a chance that the brown party will have power in the future and will significantly increase brown energy production, which lowers the marginal benefit of energy consumption. This makes the marginal benefit of investment *lower* in the turnover case than in the no turnover case.

So, there are two countervailing forces. In this version of the model with constant marginal costs of brown energy production, these two forces perfectly cancel out, and the optimal level of investment for the green party is identical in the case with turnover vs without turnover. If we relax the assumption of constant marginal costs (see the model in appendix A.3), the two forces may not perfectly cancel out, and instead it's ambiguous whether optimal investment is larger or smaller with turnover than without turnover. The key conceptual point, however, goes through in both models: the green party doesn't necessarily want to invest more when there's turnover vs when there's no turnover. The presence of party turnover doesn't have robust implications for the level of investment. However, as we see in theorem 6, the presence of party turnover does have robust implications for investment subsidy policy.

#### 4.2.2 Equilibrium Tax Policies

**Theorem 6:** *The unique subgame perfect equilibrium allocation can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with the following tax policies:*

- In period 1, the green party uses:

1. A positive investment subsidy equal to  $\theta(\frac{1}{1-\beta})(d_g - d_b)\gamma F'(K_g^*)$
  2. A carbon tax equal to  $d_g$
- From period 2 on, whichever party  $j$  is in power uses:
    1. No investment subsidies
    2. A carbon tax equal to  $d_j$

The second part of theorem 6 is straightforward. From the second period on, whichever party is in power is back to the no turnover setting, where the optimal policy is a carbon tax and no subsidies.

The first part of theorem 6 establishes that, unlike in the case with no turnover, it can now be optimal for the green party to subsidize green investment in the first period. The result below strengthens this, by establishing that the only way for the green party to implement their allocation is to use a positive subsidy in the first period:

**Theorem 7:** *Any tax policy that implements the subgame perfect equilibrium allocation has the following feature: In period 1, the green party uses a positive investment subsidy equal to  $\theta(\frac{1}{1-\beta})(d_g - d_b)\gamma F'(K_g^*)$*

To build intuition behind this result, suppose that the green party naively used just a carbon tax equal to  $d_g$  (their no turnover optimal policy). In the no turnover case, this is enough to generate the efficient amount of investment  $K_g^*$ . In that case, firms expect brown energy to be expensive now and forever, so they find it optimal to immediately make large investments in green energy. Things are different when we add turnover. In that case, firms expect that, with probability  $\theta$ , carbon taxes and energy prices will be much lower in the future. So it becomes optimal for them to invest less than  $K_g^*$  in the first period. To get around this under-investment issue, the green party can use an investment subsidy, which gets firms to again invest  $K_g^*$  in the first period.

An alternative way the green party could try to stimulate first period green investment is to use a carbon tax above their valuation of the externality  $d_g$ . In some cases, this can be enough to implement their optimal level of investment  $K_g^*$ . However, this can never implement their full optimal period 1 allocation because it will induce underproduction of brown energy.

To get intuition behind the exact expression for the optimal subsidy, consider a perturbation where the firm marginally changes investment in the first period. This must not be

profitable in equilibrium, which gives us the following condition:

$$\underbrace{p_1 F'(K_g^*) + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} [(1-\theta)p_2(g)F'(K_g^*) + \theta p_2(b)F'(K_g^*)]}_{\text{Marginal Revenue}} = \underbrace{1 - s_1}_{\text{Marginal Cost}} \quad (5)$$

where  $p_1 = p_2(g) = mc + d_g$  (the price of energy under the green party) and  $p_2(b) = mc + d_b$  (the price of energy under the brown party). This condition is very similar to the condition from the green party's problem (3). The differences are:

1. Equation 5 includes the value of the subsidy on the right side.
2. Equation 3 includes an additional term on the left hand side which captures the marginal benefit of crowding out future emissions under the brown party. This crowding out term is not internalized by firms because carbon taxes in the event that the brown party gains power are equal to  $\gamma d_b$  rather than  $\gamma d_g$ .

To make the two equations hold, the subsidy must be equal to the size of the crowd-out externality:  $s_1 = \frac{1}{1-\beta} \theta (d_g - d_b) \gamma F'(K_g^*)$ .

#### 4.2.3 The Sufficient Statistic

To get a more general and convenient expression for the optimal subsidy, first note that we can write equilibrium carbon emissions if the brown party gains control as a function of first period investment:  $C_b(x_1) = \gamma(D(mc + \gamma d_b) - F(x_1))$ . The optimal subsidy can then be rewritten as:

$$s_1 = -\frac{1}{1-\beta} \theta (d_g - d_b) \frac{dC_b(x_1)}{dx_1} \quad (6)$$

This expression turns out to also hold when the model is generalized to allow for upward sloping marginal costs of brown energy (see appendix A.3), and we find the same expression in the multi-election version of the model.

Equation 6 says the the optimal subsidy only depends on:

1.  $\frac{dC_b(x_1)}{dx_1}$ , the extent to which increased investment today reduces future carbon emissions *in the event that the brown party gains power*. Notice that increased investment today also crowds out future emissions in the event that the green party keeps power, but (from the green party's perspective) there's no externality from that because emissions under future green governments are correctly priced.
2. The level of polarization ( $d_g - d_b$ ). If there is no polarization, green party expects that future brown governments will correctly price carbon emissions, and so there's no need to subsidize green investment. As polarization increases, subsidies increase.

3. The probability of losing power  $\theta$ . If  $\theta = 0$ , then we are back to the case where the green party has full control, and the optimal subsidy is zero. As  $\theta$  increases, the probability that investment today will crowd out under-priced future emissions increases, and so the subsidy increases.
4. The discount factor  $\beta$ . If the discount factor is higher, then the green party cares more about reducing future emissions, and thus the subsidy is higher.

#### 4.2.4 The Importance of Irreversibility

Finally, we would like to point out that the irreversibility constraint plays a key role here, as the theorem below shows:

**Theorem 8:** *If investment is fully reversible, then there is a unique equilibrium allocation and any tax policy which implements that allocation involves:*

1. *Each party  $j$  uses a carbon tax equal to  $d_j$  whenever they're in power*
2. *Investment subsidies are always equal to zero*

So, if investment is fully reversible, then we're back to the textbook case where subsidies are suboptimal. In this case, equation 6 still holds, but marginal first period investment has no impact on future emissions ( $\frac{dC_b(K_1)}{dx_1} = 0$ ), since future governments can simply reverse the investment. So, regardless of other parameter values, the optimal subsidy is always zero with fully reversible investment. Although fully reversible investment is commonly assumed in economic models for tractability purposes, we consider it to be very unrealistic, as it implies that an existing wind or solar farm can be taken apart and sold to recover the entire original cost of building it.

## 5 Estimating the sufficient statistic

This takes us to our first method for quantifying the optimal subsidy: estimating the quantities in the sufficient statistic formula (equation 6).

First, we'll rewrite equation 6 in a way that can be directly estimated from the data. As was noted earlier, we can write carbon emissions under the brown party from period 2 on as a function of  $x_1$ :  $C_b(x_1) = \gamma(D(mc + \gamma d_b) - F(x_1))$ . Since  $x_1$  can be written as a function of green energy production from period 2 on ( $x_1 = F^{-1}(E_g)$ ), we can also write future carbon



emissions as a function of future green energy production:  $\hat{C}_b(E_g) = \gamma(D(mc + \gamma d_b) - E_g)$ . Taking derivatives, we find:

$$\frac{dC_b}{dx_1} = -F'(x_1) \frac{d\hat{C}_b}{dE_g}$$

Estimates of  $\frac{d\hat{C}_b}{dE_g}$  (the change in emissions caused by increased green energy production) already exist in the literature.

Next, define the marginal levelized cost of electricity as:

$$MLCOE(K) = (1 - \beta)/F'(K)$$

This corresponds to the marginal cost of producing a unit of green energy.

With these definitions, we can rewrite our expression for the optimal subsidy as:

$$s_1 = -\frac{\beta\theta(d_g - d_b)\frac{d\hat{C}_b}{dE_g}}{MLCOE(x_1)} \quad (7)$$

We estimate the quantities in equation 7 in the following way:

- The discount factor  $\beta$  is estimated from market interest rates. For the baseline estimates, we use 5% a year (sensitivity analyses are done for 7% and 3% as well). Since the period length is taken to be four years, this corresponds to  $\beta = .95^4 = .81$
- $\theta$  is set to 1/2, based on the balance of power between the two US political parties in the past 30 years.
- $d_g = \$51$  per ton of CO2, based on the Biden and Obama administrations' official social cost of carbon estimate<sup>1718</sup>.
- $d_b = \$1$  per ton of CO2, based on the Trump administration's social cost of carbon estimate.
- The crowd out effect  $\frac{d\hat{C}_b}{dE_g}$  is taken from Abrell et al (2018). They give a range for the the crowd out effect of .17 to .59 tons of CO2 per MWh of wind and solar production. We report estimates for both the upper and lower bound.
- $MLCOE(x_1)$  is taken from Kellogg and Borenstein (2023), who estimate the full marginal levelized cost of solar and wind in 2019 to be equal to \$64 per MWh.

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17. Source: <https://www.eenews.net/articles/federal-agencies-can-use-social-cost-of-carbon-for-now/>

18. In the US, government agencies are required to do a cost benefit analysis when passing new regulations. The president sets an executive-branch wide number, called the social cost of carbon, which is to be used by agencies to value the externality from carbon emissions. So, these social cost of carbon numbers have real consequences for policy decisions.

More details on these estimates are presented in the appendix A.4.

## 5.1 Results

Using these estimates, we find the optimal subsidy to be between 5 and 17%. For reference, the clean investment subsidies included in the inflation reduction act have a base level of 6%, and rise to 30% if the investment meets prevailing wage and investment requirements. So, our estimates are roughly in line with the level of subsidies observed in practice.

A number of sensitivity analyses are shown in appendix A.4.3. These show that the plausible range for the optimal subsidy is very large. The lowest value found in the sensitivity analysis is an optimal subsidy of 4.3%. The highest value found is 66%. In light of this wide range, we interpret these results as only suggestive evidence that government turnover justifies large subsidies for the green party. We also think it highlights important opportunities for future empirical work. More precise empirical estimates of the crowd out effect  $\frac{d\hat{C}_b}{dE_g}$  would greatly increase the precision of our estimates.

One especially important sensitivity check to highlight involves the social cost of carbon estimates. The Biden administration is currently using a temporary value of \$51 per ton of CO<sub>2</sub>. They are considering an updated value of about \$191/ton of CO<sub>2</sub><sup>19</sup>. If we use this new value in our estimation, then the optimal subsidy range rises to between 20 and 66%, which is in line with the higher end of the subsidies in the Inflation Reduction Act.

Finally, a caveat to these estimates is that they are based on local empirical estimates of the crowd out effect and of the marginal cost of green energy. As policies change, these empirical objects change endogenously, which means that the local estimates used in this exercise may not be accurate. This is a common issue with the sufficient statistic approach, and it motivates the use of a more structural approach, such as our calibration exercise in section 7.

## 6 Multiple-election Model

The setup of the multiple-election model is the same, except now elections happen in every period. We assume that each party has a 50% chance of winning each election.

In this more realistic setting, we end up finding the same behavior for the green party as in the first period of the single-election model (Theorem 9 shows that they choose the same level of investment. Theorem 10 shows that they choose the same subsidy). The brown

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19. Source: <https://www.eenews.net/articles/epa-floats-sharply-increased-social-cost-of-carbon/>

party's behavior is different from the single-election model, as they now want to subsidize green investment (see theorem 10 and the following discussion).

Before showing the results in detail, we first define our equilibrium refinement in this case.

## 6.1 Solution Concept

This version of the model has an issue that is common with many infinitely repeated games: if the discount factor is low enough, the set of subgame perfect equilibria is extremely large. For example, there's a subgame perfect equilibrium where both parties use no green energy, and if any party does use green energy, then the other party will punish them by producing a very high amount of brown energy in future periods<sup>20</sup>. To rule out these implausible-seeming punishment equilibria, we need a stronger equilibrium refinement.

To motivate our equilibrium refinement definition, recall that in the full-control case and the single-election case, the parties' optimal investment strategies had the following form:  $x_t = \max\{0, K_j^* - K_{t-1}\}$ . That is, party  $j$  has some capital target  $K_j^*$ ; if at any time  $t$  they inherit a capital stock below  $K_j^*$ , then they invest enough to bring the capital stock up to  $K_j^*$ ; if they inherit a capital stock above  $K_j^*$ , then they invest nothing. Our refinement proposed below requires that strategies have this same form:

**Definition 1:** A “History Independent Capital Target Equilibrium” is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium where strategies satisfy the following condition:

- There exists some  $(K_b, K_g)$  such that whenever party  $j$  is in power, they set  $x_t$  to  $\max\{0, K_j - K_{t-1}\}$

The Markov Perfection requirement means that equilibrium strategies can only depend on payoff relevant variables, which in this case is just the inherited level of capital  $K_{t-1}$ . This rules out strategies which use brown energy production as a punishment for past behavior. The requirement on investment behavior rules out strategies which use investment as a punishment for past behavior<sup>21</sup>. In what follows, we will refer to any History Independent Capital Target Equilibrium as simply “an equilibrium”.

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20. This is in the spirit of standard folk theorem results that rely on minimax punishments (see Fudenberg and Maskin 1986). A full example of an equilibrium strategy profile is spelled out in appendix A.6

21. We haven't proven that there exist other Markov Perfect Equilibria other than the unique History Independent Capital Target equilibrium. There's a chance that any Markov Perfect equilibrium also has history independent capital targets.

## 6.2 Results

**Theorem 9:** *There is a unique equilibrium allocation with the following characteristics:*

1. *Whenever party  $j$  is in power, they set investment to  $\max\{0, K_j^* - K_{t-1}\}$*
2. *Whenever party  $j$  is in power, they set  $E_{bt}$  to  $D(mc + \gamma d_j) - F(K_t)$*

So, if the brown party gains power first, they raise the capital stock to  $K_b^*$  and keep it there until the green party comes to power. Once the green party first gains power, they raise the capital stock to  $K_g^*$  and it stays there forever.

Recall that  $K_j^*$  is party  $j$ 's capital target when they have permanent control of the government. So, like in the single-election model, we find that each party sets a capital target equal to their target in the no-turnover case. And, similar to the single-election model, the theorem below says that to implement that capital target requires a different tax policy than in the no-turnover case:

**Theorem 10:** *Any tax policy which implements the equilibrium allocation as a competitive equilibrium has the following characteristics:*

- *Whenever party  $j$  is in control, they use a carbon tax equal to  $d_j$ .*
- *In the first period that the green party gains control, they use a subsidy  $s_g^*$  equal to  $(1/2)(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta})(d_g - d_b)\gamma F'(K_g^*)$*
- *In the first period, if the brown party has control, they use a subsidy equal to  $\frac{(1/2)\beta}{1-(1/2)\beta}s_g^*$*

There are a few things to notice about theorem 10. First, the green party's behavior is the same as their behavior in the first period of the single-election model. They use both a carbon tax and a subsidy on green investment. The expression for the subsidy is also identical, and the intuition is the same: Marginal investment today crowds out under-taxed brown energy production under future brown governments. From the green party's perspective, this is a positive externality and thus investment should be subsidized.

A new thing here is the result that the brown party wants to subsidize clean investment. To get intuition for this, consider first what happens when the brown party has permanent control. In that case, the brown party finds it optimal to only use a carbon tax equal to  $d_b$ , and firms respond by setting the capital stock to  $K_b^*$ . Now consider the case where there's turnover, and the brown party naively uses just a carbon tax equal to  $d_b$  in the first period.

Since firms expect investment to be subsidized by a future green government, they find it optimal to invest less than  $K_b^*$  and wait until the green party comes to power to invest more. According to theorem 9, the brown party still wants firms to invest  $K_b^*$ , so they get around this underinvestment issue by using a subsidy<sup>22</sup>. Note, however, that the subsidy is still smaller than the green party's (with a discount factor of 5%,  $s_b^*$  is about 60% as large as  $s_g^*$ )<sup>23</sup>. Also recall that we assumed that the initial stock of green capital is zero. If the initial stock is at or above  $K_b^*$ , then there's no need for the brown party to use any subsidy since their optimal level of investment is zero anyway.

Finally, note that theorem 8 only says that subsidies are positive for the green party in the first period when they have control. What about the periods after that? In the equilibrium allocation, after that period, no investment is made by either party. Since investment is irreversible, this means that firms are at a corner solution in those periods, and so any subsidy which is low enough to get them to invest zero can implement the equilibrium allocation. They could implement the optimal allocation by using the same subsidy that they used in the first period, but they could also implement it by using any subsidy level below that. The same reasoning applies to why theorem 10 only pins down the brown party's optimal subsidy in the first period<sup>24</sup>.

### 6.2.1 The Sufficient Statistic

We can rewrite the optimal subsidy to get the same sufficient statistic formulas that we found in the single election case (equations 6 and 7). First, consider a deviation where the green party increases investment in the first period to  $x_1 \geq x_1^*$ . Given the equilibrium behavior in theorem 9, we can write emissions in all future periods when the brown party has control as function of  $x_1$ :

$$C_b(x_1) = \gamma(D(mc + \gamma d_b) - F(x_1))$$

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22. Another way of looking at this: from the brown party's perspective, investment under a future green party has a negative fiscal externality due to it being subsidized. Investment today crowds out future investment, which mitigates the negative fiscal externality, so investment today has a positive externality.

23. Preliminary evidence suggests that this result of a positive subsidy may not be robust to changes in the setup. For example, if investment doesn't immediately add to the capital stock, but instead increases it next period, then it's ambiguous whether the brown party wants to tax or subsidize green investment. However, even in that model, the mechanism driving the brown party to want to subsidize investment is still present. There's just another force pushing in the opposite direction which may turn out to be stronger.

24. More formally:

**Proposition 1:** *The equilibrium allocation can be implemented with party  $j$  using a carbon tax equal to  $d_j$  and an investment subsidy equal to  $s_j^*$  whenever they're in power.*

Using this expression, we can rewrite the optimal subsidy formula as:

$$s_g^* = -(1/2) \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} (d_g - d_b) \frac{dC_b(x_1)}{dx_1}$$

where the derivative  $\frac{dC_b(x_1)}{dx_1}$  is evaluated at the equilibrium investment level from theorem 9 ( $x_1^* = K_g^*$ ). This is the same as what we found in the single election case (equation 6), except now the probability of turnover  $\theta$  is set equal to 1/2. Just as in the single-election case, the optimal subsidy depends on the level of polarization, the discount factor, and how much investment today crowds out future emissions under brown governments.

Next, following the same steps we used to derive equation 7, we find an identical expression in this version of the model:

$$s_g^* = - \frac{(1/2)\beta(d_g - d_b) \frac{d\hat{C}^b}{dE_g}}{MLCOE(x_1^*)}$$

where  $\frac{d\hat{C}^b}{dE_g}$  is the impact of a marginal increase in green energy production on carbon emissions under the brown party<sup>25</sup> and  $MLCOE(x_1^*)$  is the marginal levelized cost of green energy.

Since the sufficient statistic formula is identical, the empirical estimates of the optimal subsidy that we found in section 5 also apply in this version of the model. As was mentioned in section 5, this sufficient statistic approach has the benefit of being transparent and relying on well-identified micro estimates, but it comes at the cost of relying on local estimates of endogenous objects. To address this concern, in the next section we provide alternative estimates of the green party's optimal subsidy using a more structural approach.

## 7 Calibration

In this section we calibrate the model to provide alternative estimates for the optimal subsidy and to get policy counterfactuals.

We assume a constant elasticity of demand function and a linear marginal cost function for green energy<sup>26</sup>.

Values for parameters  $\beta$ ,  $d_g$ , and  $d_b$  are the same as in the sufficient statistic exercise. Other parameters are calibrated in the following way:

- The demand elasticity is taken from the long run estimate in Deryugina et al (2020).

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25. This is evaluated at the equilibrium level of green energy production given in theorem 9 ( $F(K_g^*)$ ).

26. See appendix A.5 for details of what these assumptions imply for the functional forms of  $v(E)$  and  $F(K)$

- The constant in the demand function is set to match 2022 levels of electricity demand.
- The parameters of the linear marginal cost function are taken from Borenstein and Kellogg (2023).
- The emissions content of brown energy  $\gamma$  is set to match the crowd out effect from Abrell et al (2018).

Details of these estimates are in the appendix A.5.

One key parameter estimate is the value of  $\gamma$ , the emissions content of brown energy. In the baseline, we report results for  $\gamma = .18$  and  $\gamma = .59$  tons of CO2 per MWh. This value was chosen so that the crowd out effect of increased green energy production (measured at the laissez faire equilibrium) agrees with the upper and lower bound from Abrell et al (2018), which is the same study that was used in the sufficient statistic estimation. An alternative way to set  $\gamma$  is to use the average emissions content of non wind and solar energy in the US economy. This leads to a value of .46 tons of CO2 per MWh, which is within our baseline range<sup>27</sup>. In either case, the crowd out effect in the calibrated model agrees with the micro-evidence. This is important since the sufficient statistic formula tells us that the crowd out effect is a key determinant of the optimal subsidy.

## 7.1 Results

In the baseline calibration, we find that the green party’s optimal subsidy is between 5 and 13%. These bounds are slightly lower than what we found in the sufficient statistic estimation. The reason for this discrepancy is that the sufficient statistic relied on local estimates of the marginal cost of green energy around the laissez faire equilibrium. With positive subsidies in place, the marginal cost of green energy rises, which reduces the optimal subsidy.

For the brown party, we find optimal subsidies of between 3% and 9%, suggesting that government turnover can justify non-trivial subsidies even for the party who cares less about climate change.

Figure 1 shows a key comparative static: the green party’s optimal subsidy as a function of the amount of polarization<sup>28</sup>. We see that for low levels of polarization, subsidies are near

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27. Average emissions content of non solar and wind energy is taken from Nalley and LaRose (2022)

28. This figure uses  $\gamma = .3$  tons CO2 per MWh, which makes the crowd out effect equal to the average value in Abrell et al (2018). For every point on the graph, the average of the two party’s social costs of carbon  $\frac{d_g + d_b}{2}$  is held constant at  $\bar{d} = \$26$  per ton of CO2 (the average social cost of carbon in our baseline estimate). As polarization  $\sigma$  increases, the two parties’ social costs of carbon become further apart:

$$d_g(\sigma) = \bar{d}(1 + \sigma)$$

the full control level of zero. As polarization rises, subsidies rise to non-trivial levels.




Figure 1: *The green party's optimal subsidy as a function of polarization. With no polarization, we get the textbook result that subsidies are not optimal. As polarization rises, the optimal subsidy increases.*

Appendix A.5.4 shows a number of sensitivity analyses. One important scenario to highlight is if we set  $d_g$  equal to the Biden Administration's suggested social cost of carbon number of \$195/ton of CO<sub>2</sub>. In this case, the green party's optimal subsidy is much larger, between 14 and 39%.

The calibration exercise also allows us to check what would happen in the counterfactual where the green party naively uses their no-turnover solution of just a carbon tax equal to  $d_g$ . For this exercise, we assume that the brown party also acts naively and uses their no-turnover solution of a carbon tax equal to  $d_b$ .

The results are shown in figure 2 for the case where  $\gamma = .3$ . The first bar shows the steady state level if the green party had full control and just used a carbon tax. This permanent carbon tax is enough to get firms to invest up to the green party's optimal level. The next bar shows what happens if the green party naively follows that same policy when there's turnover. In this case, investment from firms is 29% lower, since they expect low carbon taxes under future brown governments. The final bar shows what happens if there's turnover and the green party acts optimally (that is, if the green party uses the optimal policy of a

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$$d_b(\sigma) = \bar{d}(1 - \sigma)$$

$\sigma = 0$  gives the full control case, where the two parties have identical preferences.  $\sigma = 1$  corresponds to the extreme case where the brown party places no value on the externality and the green party places  $2\bar{d}$ . In our baseline calibration,  $\sigma = .96$ .



tax *and* subsidy). In that case they induce the same large amount of investment as in the full control case.




Figure 2: *The steady state capital stock in three scenarios. “Permanent carbon tax” is the case where the green party has full control and acts optimally. “Temporary carbon tax” is the case where there’s turnover and the green party naively uses just a carbon tax. “Temporary subsidy and tax” is the case where there’s turnover and the green party uses their optimal policy, which is a carbon tax and an investment subsidy. The y axis is measured relative to the laissez faire level of capital.*

## 8 Conclusion

This paper makes a novel contribution to the debate over the value of clean energy subsidies. Specifically, if control of the government rotates between parties with different levels of concern about climate change, then the more concerned party finds it optimal to use clean energy subsidies. This result relies on the assumption that investment is irreversible, so that renewable plants built under the green party will remain operational under future brown governments, and thus will crowd out future fossil fuel production.

The model gives a simple sufficient statistic formula for the optimal subsidy. The key empirical objects that it depends on are the discount factor, the difference between the two

parties' social costs of carbon, and the extent to which increased clean investment reduces future carbon emissions. This both guides our quantification exercises, and (as is discussed more below) suggests opportunities for future empirical work.

We use two methods to investigate whether the green party's optimal subsidy is quantitatively large. First, we estimate the objects in the sufficient statistic formula using existing estimates in the literature. This has the advantage of being transparent and less dependent on functional forms, but comes at the cost of relying on local estimates of endogenous objects. To address some of these concerns, our second method is to calibrate the full model. In each case, the results suggest that the optimal clean energy investment subsidy is relatively large, between 5% and 17%. The calibration exercise also gives results for the counterfactual case where the green party naively uses just a carbon tax rather than a subsidy. In this case, we find that this leads to large underinvestment in green energy relative to the optimal level. In total, these results provide suggestive evidence that government turnover matters quantitatively for optimal climate policy.

There are many opportunities for future work on this topic. First, the models presented in this paper are still fairly stylized, and a number of assumptions could be relaxed to test the robustness of the results. A promising route to do this is to switch to a finitely repeated game, as in Schmitt (2014), since many of the strong assumptions in our model were needed to make the infinitely repeated game tractable<sup>29</sup>. With a finite time horizon, we could likely use a model with non-zero depreciation, more than two types of energy, and more than one input for each type of energy.

Next, the results in this paper suggest opportunities for future empirical work. Specifically, more precise estimates of the impact of green investment on future emissions would significantly reduce uncertainty about the green party's optimal subsidy.

An interesting extension of the model would be to look at possible pareto-improving compromises between the two parties. For example, if the brown party agrees to raise their carbon taxes conditional on the green party lowering their subsidies, then both parties could potentially be better off.

Finally, and more broadly, future work could use a similar model to examine whether government turnover matters in other policy contexts. For example, previous empirical work has found that trade policy reforms in developing countries are often reversed by future governments (Rodrik 1992). Perhaps in this context a reform-minded political party would find it optimal to subsidize irreversible investments in exporting sectors, rather than to just

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29. The specific issue was the multiplicity of subgame-perfect equilibria in the infinitely repeated game. Our strong assumptions were needed so that we could use a sensible refinement to shrink the set of equilibria. With a finitely repeated game, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is typically much smaller.

lower trade barriers. Similar mechanisms may be at play for a wide variety of policy issues on which political parties are polarized.

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# A Appendix

## A.1 General Equilibrium Microfoundation

Consider a general equilibrium economy with two consumption goods: energy  $E_t$  and general consumption  $y_t$ . Consumer preferences are quasilinear in  $y_t$ :

$$U(\{y(h_t)\}, \{E(h_t)\}) = \sum_t \sum_{h_t} \beta^{t-1} \Pi(h_t)(y(h_t) + v(E(h_t)))$$

The technology for energy production is the same as in the body of the text. In each period  $t$ , there's a total endowment of labor equal to  $L$ , which can be used for consumption, brown energy production, or investment according to the following constraint:  $y_t + mcE_{bt} + x_t = L$ .

The consumer problem is to choose an allocation  $\{y(h_t)\}, \{E(h_t)\}$  to maximize utility:

$$\sum_t \sum_{h_t} \beta^{t-1} \Pi(h_t)(y(h_t) + v(E(h_t)))$$

subject to the budget constraint:

$$\sum_t \sum_{h_t} \beta^{t-1} \Pi(h_t) p_y(h_t)(y(h_t) + p(h_t)E(h_t) - T(h_t)) \leq A$$

where  $T(h_t)$  are transfers from the government and  $A$  is the expected present value of firm profits.

Due to the quasilinear structure of preferences, all prices  $p_y(h_t)$  must be constant in any competitive equilibrium<sup>3031</sup>, so we can normalize them to 1 and simplify the constraint to:

$$\sum_t \sum_{h_t} \beta^{t-1} \Pi(h_t)(y(h_t) + p(h_t)E(h_t) - T(h_t)) \leq A$$

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30. A competitive equilibrium in this GE economy is a set of quantities  $(\{y(h_t)\}, \{E_b(h_t)\}, \{K(h_t)\}, \{x(h_t)\}, \{E(h_t)\})$ , prices  $\{p(h_t)\}$ , and tax policies  $(\{\tau(h_t)\}, \{s(h_t)\}, \{T(h_t)\})$  which satisfies:

1. The firm problem
2. The consumer problem
3. The market clearing constraint for all  $h_t$ :  $E_b(h_t) + F(K(h_t)) = E(h_t)$
4. The government budget constraint for all  $h_t$ :  $T(h_t) = \tau(h_t)E_b(h_t) - s(h_t)x(h_t)$

31. Proof: The FOC for  $y(h_t)$  is:  $1 - \lambda p_y(h_t) = 0$ , where  $\lambda$  is the lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. Since we have no nonnegativity constraint here, this FOC must hold with equality for all  $h_t$ .

The constraint must hold with equality since utility is strictly increasing in  $y$ . We can now rewrite the constraint as:

$$\sum_t \sum_{h_t} \beta^{t-1} \Pi(h_t) y(h_t) = \sum_t \sum_{h_t} \beta^{t-1} \Pi(h_t) (p(h_t) E(h_t) - T(h_t))$$

By plugging this constraint into the objective function, the consumer problem simplifies to:

$$\max_{\{E(h_t)\}} \sum_t \sum_{h_t} \beta^{t-1} \Pi(h_t) (v(E(h_t)) - p(h_t) E(h_t))$$

which is identical to the consumer problem in the partial equilibrium model.

The firm problem is to choose an allocation  $(\{y(h_t)\}, \{E_b(h_t)\}, \{K(h_t)\}, \{x(h_t)\})$  to maximize expected profits:

$$\sum_t \sum_{h_t} \beta^{t-1} \Pi(h_t) (y(h_t) + p(h_t) (F(K_t) + E_b(h_t)) - \gamma \tau(h_t) E_b(h_t) + s(h_t) x(h_t))$$

Subject to the resource constraint, law of motion, and irreversibility constraints:

$$y(h_t) + mc E_b(h_t) + x(h_t) = L$$

$$K(h_t) = K(h_{t-1}) + x(h_t)$$

$$x_t \geq 0$$

Using the first constraint to eliminate  $y_t$ , and the firm problem simplifies to choosing an allocation  $(\{E_b(h_t)\}, \{K(h_t)\}, \{x(h_t)\})$  to maximize:

$$\sum_t \sum_{h_t} \beta^{t-1} \Pi(h_t) (p(h_t) (F(K_t) + E_b(h_t)) - (mc + \gamma \tau(h_t)) E_b(h_t) - (1 - s(h_t)) x(h_t))$$

subject to the law of motion and irreversibility constraints. This is identical to the firm problem in the partial equilibrium case.

Finally, the social welfare for party  $j$  is:

$$\sum_t \sum_{h_t} \beta^{t-1} \Pi(h_t) (y(h_t) + v(E(h_t)) - \gamma d_j E_b(h_t))$$

Using the resource constraint to eliminate  $y(h_t)$ , this becomes:

$$\sum_t \sum_{h_t} \beta^{t-1} \Pi(h_t) (v(E_t) - mc E_b(h_t) - x(h_t) - \gamma d_j E_b(h_t))$$

which, again, is equivalent to party  $j$ 's social welfare function in the partial equilibrium version of the model.

## A.2 Microfoundation with Brown Capital

In this section we show that the assumption that brown energy production only requires non-durable inputs can be microfounded in a model where the initial stock of brown energy capacity is sufficiently large.

Consider a model where brown energy requires both nondurable inputs  $L_f$  and brown capital  $K_f$ <sup>32</sup>. The production function is leontief:  $E_{bt} = \min\{K_{ft}/k, L_{ft}/mc\}$ , where  $k$  and  $mc$  are the capital and labor requirements to produce a unit of brown energy, respectively. Aside from that change, the setup of the model is the same as the baseline case.

Party  $j$ 's planner problem in the no-turnover case is now to choose an allocation  $(\{x_t\}, \{K_t\}, \{E_{bt}\}, \{x_{ft}\}, \{K_{ft}\})$  to maximize social welfare:

$$\sum_t \beta^{t-1} (v(F(K_t) + E_{bt}) - (mc + \gamma d_j)E_{bt} - x_t - x_{ft})$$

subject to the laws of motion, irreversibility constraints, and the capacity constraint for brown energy:

$$K_t = K_{t-1} + x_t$$

$$K_{f,t} = K_{f,t-1} + x_{f,t}$$

$$x_t, x_{ft} \geq 0$$

$$E_{bt} \leq K_{bt}/k$$

Intuitively, if the initial stock of brown capital is sufficiently large, then the capacity constraint on brown capital won't bind. In that case, there will be no reason to invest any more in brown capital, and the solution will coincide with the case where brown energy only requires nondurable inputs (that is, it will coincide with the baseline model). Below we show this formally.

Let  $E_b^* \equiv D(mc + \gamma d_b) - F(K_b^*)$  be the brown party's no-turnover level of brown production in the baseline model, as is defined in theorem 1. The following proposition establishes that if the initial stock of brown capital is greater than  $K_b^*$ , then each party's no-turnover solution in the model with brown capital is identical to that in the baseline model:

**Proposition A.3:** *If  $K_{f0}/k > E_b^*$ , then party  $j$ 's no turnover solution is to set  $x_{ft} = 0$*

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32.  $f$  is the subscript here since  $b$  is already used to denote the brown party



and  $K_{ft} = K_{f0}$  for all  $t$ , while setting all other quantities to the same levels as in theorem 1.

*Proof.* The Bellman equation for this problem is:

$$V(K, K_f) = \max_{K', K'_f, E_b} v(F(K') + E_b) - (mc + \gamma d_j)E_b - (K' - K) - (K'_f - K_f) + \beta V(K', K'_f)$$

Subject to the constraints  $K' \geq K$ ,  $K'_f \geq K_f$ ,  $E_b \geq 0$ , and  $E_b \leq K'_f/k$ . Guess that the policy function is to set  $K'_f(K, K_f) = K_{f0}$ ,  $K'(K, K_f) = \max\{K_j^*, K\}$ , and  $E_b(K, K_f) = \max\{0, D(mc + \gamma d_j) - F(K')\}$ . This is consistent with the behavior in the proposition. With this guess the value function doesn't depend on  $K_f$  and is identical to the value function in the proof of theorem 1. Plugging this value function into the Bellman equation, we see that all FOCs are uniquely satisfied at the policy function that we guessed.  $\square$

Following similar steps, we can show that the equilibrium allocations in the single-election model and the multi-election model will also be the same as in the baseline model.

So, as long as there is enough initial capital to meet the brown party's demand for brown energy (without any additional investment), then the behavior in the model with brown capital is identical to the behavior in the baseline model.

Empirically, in 2022 there was enough installed fossil fuel capacity in the US to meet at least 115% of US electricity demand, assuming that the plants ran at full capacity (Nalley and LaRose (2022)). In practice, fossil fuel only provided 60% of US generation because much of the capacity went unused. This suggests that it is reasonable to assume that there is initially sufficient brown capital available in the economy to fully meet brown energy demand without any new investment.

Note, however, that this result hinges on our assumption that capital does not depreciate over time. While we believe this is a reasonable approximation to make as a first step (as was noted above, the lifespan of fossil fuel plants is very long, between 30 and 50 years), we think that relaxing this assumption presents a useful opportunity for future work.

### A.3 Single-election model with upward sloping marginal costs

In this section we relax the assumption that brown energy has constant marginal costs and show that this leads to the same sufficient statistic for the optimal subsidy.

The cost function for producing brown energy is  $c(E_b)$ , which is increasing and convex. The consumer problem is unchanged. The firm problem is now to choose an allocation

$(\{x(h_t)\}, \{K(h_t)\}, \{E_b(h_t)\})$  to maximize expected profits:

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \sum_{h_t \in H_t} \Pi(h_t) \beta^{t-1} \left( \underbrace{(F(K(h_t)) + E_b(h_t))p(h_t)}_{\text{Revenue}} - \underbrace{(1 - s(h_t))x(h_t) - c(E_b(h_t)) - \tau(h_t)\gamma E_b(h_t)}_{\text{Cost}} \right)$$

Subject to the law of motion and irreversible investment constraints for all  $h_t$ :

$$K(h_t) = K(h_{t-1}) + x(h_t)$$

$$x(h_t) \geq 0$$

where the exogenous initial capital stock  $K_0$  is zero.

The definition of competitive equilibrium is unchanged.

Party  $j$ 's expected utility is now:

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \sum_{h_t \in H_t} \Pi(h_t) \beta^{t-1} \left( \underbrace{v(F(K(h_t)) + E_b(h_t))}_{\text{Consumption Value}} - \underbrace{x(h_t) - c(E_b(h_t))}_{\text{Cost}} - \underbrace{d_j \gamma E_b(h_t)}_{\text{Externality}} \right)$$

Just as we did in the baseline model, here we make assumptions on parameter values which guarantee that positive amounts of both types of energy are used in each party's no-turnover solution. First, define  $p_{0b}$  as the equilibrium price if the brown party had permanent control and green energy wasn't available and  $p_{0g}$  as the equilibrium price if the green party had full control and brown energy wasn't available<sup>33</sup>. The interior assumptions are then:

1.  $F'(0)p_{b0} > 1 - \beta$
2.  $p_{g0} > c'(0) + \gamma d_g$

As in the baseline model, let the function  $C_b(K_1)$  give  $C_b^{SS}$  as a function of the first period capital stock, where  $C_b^{SS}$  is the equilibrium level carbon emissions for  $t \geq 2$  in the event that the brown party wins the second period election.

The following result establishes that we get the same sufficient statistic formula as in the baseline model:

**Theorem A.4** Take any subgame perfect equilibrium allocation  $\mathcal{A}$ . Any tax policy which implements the allocation  $\mathcal{A}$  has the following feature: in the first period, the green party uses a subsidy equal to  $\theta \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} (d_g - d_b) \frac{dC_b(K_1)}{dx_1}$ .

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33. Formally, first let  $\tilde{E}_b$  be the unique solution to  $v'(\tilde{E}_b) = c'(\tilde{E}_b) + \gamma d_b$ .  $p_{0b} \equiv v'(\tilde{E}_b)$ . Similarly, let  $\tilde{K}$  be the unique solution to  $v'(F(\tilde{K}))F'(\tilde{K}) = 1 - \beta$ .  $p_{g0} \equiv v'(F(\tilde{K}_g))$ .

## A.4 Sufficient Statistic Estimation Details

### A.4.1 Details on Abrell et al (2018)

To estimate how much increased green energy production reduces carbon emissions ( $\frac{dW}{dE_g}$ ), we use estimates from Abrell et al (2018). This paper uses hourly variation in weather as a source of exogenous variation in green energy production. The data is from Germany and Spain from 2014-2015. There are a few caveats with applying these estimates to our setting:

- There are external validity concerns from using European results from eight years ago to the present US context.
- Because this paper uses hourly variation, it is a short run analysis. Long run crowd out effects could be different since long run demand and supply elasticities could be different.

I would like to note, however, that estimates from have been used in a number of well-cited policy papers as a measure of the impact of clean energy subsidies on emissions (see Gillingham (2018) and Greenstone and Nath (2021)). So, it seems that this is the current best available quasi-experimental evidence on the crowd out effect. As is mentioned in the main text, further empirical research could improve on these estimates, which are important not just for the question of the optimal subsidy under government turnover, but also the more basic question of the impact of clean energy subsidies on carbon emissions.

The lower panel in table 1A shows the relevant estimates from Abrell et al (2017). They give 12 different estimates of the crowd out effect, which vary in:

- The type of clean energy (wind vs solar)
- The country analyzed (Germany or Spain)
- Assumptions about how much reducing imports reduces emissions.

This third bullet point is the largest driver of heterogeneity in their estimates. Because they are analyzing small countries (relative to the size of the US), increased green energy production significantly reduces electricity imports. Abrell et al (2017) don't directly have data on how reducing these imports reduces emissions, so they consider three possible scenarios:

1. Reducing imports causes no reduction in emissions
2. Each MWh of reduced imports decreases global coal production by 1 MWh, which reduces emissions by  $\approx 1$  ton of CO<sub>2</sub>.

3. Each MWh of reduced imports decreases global natural gas production by 1 MWh, which reduces emissions by  $\approx .4$  ton of CO<sub>2</sub>.

As can be seen from figure 3, all of their estimates are within the range of .18 to .58 tons of CO<sub>2</sub> per MWh. The average of their 12 estimates is .3 tons of CO<sub>2</sub> per MWh.

TABLE 5. Average marginal CO<sub>2</sub> emissions offset from RE  $e$  by technology by market (kg CO<sub>2</sub>/MWh of intermittent RE  $e$ )

	Market $r$ and RE type $e$			
	Germany		Spain	
	Wind	Solar	Wind	Solar
Offset by technology ( $= \varphi_{ir} \Delta X_{ir}^e$ )				
Coal	-109.2 (6.0)	-147.6 (9.0)	-150.2 (9.1)	-85.4 (9.1)
Gas	-21.3 (1.9)	-29.2 (2.8)	-93.9 (3.6)	-91.0 (7.3)
Lignite	-46.7 (4.0)	-48.8 (6.1)	—	—
Net imports				
“Domestic offsets only”	0	0	0	0
“Exports replace coal”	-258.0 (13.6)	-360.1 (23.0)	-69.5 (10.4)	-168.1 (19.5)
“Exports replace natural gas”	-108.6 (5.7)	-134.9 (8.6)	-27.6 (4.1)	-66.7 (7.8)
Total annual carbon offset ( $= \Delta E_r^e$ )				
“Domestic offsets only”	-177.2 (7.5)	-225.6 (11.2)	-244.1 (12.8)	-176.5 (11.7)
“Exports replace coal”	-388.5 (15.5)	-585.6 (25.6)	-313.6 (14.3)	-344.6 (22.8)
“Exports replace natural gas”	-239.1 (9.4)	-360.5 (14.2)	-271.7 (10.7)	-243.2 (14.0)

Notes: Numbers in parentheses refer to robust standard errors.

Figure 3: *Crowd out estimates from Abrell et al (2017). The lower panel (starting with the heading “Total Annual Carbon Offset”) gives the relevant 12 estimates of the crowd out effect. Note that the units are kg of CO<sub>2</sub> per MWh. Divide by 1000 to get this in units of metric tons of CO<sub>2</sub> per MWh.*

#### A.4.2 Details on Borenstein and Kellogg (2023)

To estimate the marginal levelized cost of green energy, we use estimates from Borenstein and Kellogg (2023). This paper has detailed cost data on fossil fuel plants. They estimate the marginal cost of fossil fuel plants in 2019 to be \$64 per MWh, and infer that the full marginal cost of green energy must also be equal to \$64 per MWh around the current equilibrium.

### A.4.3 Sensitivity Analyses

Table A2 shows the optimal subsidy results for discount factors of 3 and 7 percent.

	$\beta = .95^4$	$\beta = .97^4$	$\beta = .93^4$
Optimal Subsidy	[5.4, 17.7]	[5.9, 19.2]	[5.0, 16.2]

*Table A2. Sufficient statistic estimates for green party's optimal subsidy with different levels of  $\beta$ . Note that the  $\beta$  is equal to the annual discount factor raised to the fourth power, since the period length is four years. Like in the main body of the text, the lower bound in the intervals is for  $\gamma = .18$  and the upper bound is for  $\gamma = .59$  (taken from the upper and lower estimates in Abrell et al (2017))*

As was mentioned earlier, in light of new evidence on the damages from climate change and on changes in capital markets, the Biden administration is considering increasing their social cost of carbon by nearly a factor of 4, to  $d_g = \$190$  per ton of CO2. Table A3 shows how the results change if we set  $d_g$  to that updated level and scale up  $d_b$  by the same factor.

	Baseline	Updated
Optimal Subsidy	[5.4, 17.7]	[20.1, 65.8]

*Table A3. Sufficient statistic estimates for green party's optimal subsidy with different values for the parties' social costs of carbon. The first column is for the baseline levels of  $d_g = \$51$  and  $d_b = \$1$ . The second column is for the updated levels of  $d_g = \$190$  and  $d_b = \$4$ .*

## A.5 Calibration Details

### A.5.1 Details of Demand Function Calibration

We start by assuming a constant elasticity of demand function:

$$D(p) = Ap^{-\epsilon}$$

This implies an inverse demand function of:

$$v'(E) = (E/A)^{-1/\epsilon}$$

There's a small issue here. Since the inverse demand diverges at  $E = 0$ , if we try to directly define  $v(E) = \int_0^E v'(x)dx$ , then  $v(E)$  doesn't exist. To get around this, we use a piece-wise function for  $v'(E)$ :

$$v'(E) = \begin{cases} (E/A)^{-1/\epsilon} & E \geq \alpha \\ (\alpha/A)^{-1/\epsilon} & E < \alpha \end{cases}$$

where  $\alpha$  is an arbitrarily small constant. This keeps  $v'(E)$  from diverging, so  $v(E)$  is well defined. As long as  $\alpha$  is smaller than  $K_b^*$ , the exact value that we pick won't impact our results.

To calibrate the demand elasticity  $\epsilon$ , we use micro estimates from Deryugina et al (2020). They use changes in local utility suppliers as a source of long run exogenous variation in electricity prices. Their point estimate for the long run demand elasticity is -.27, with standard errors of .04.

The parameter  $A$  in the demand function is set so that with laissez faire policies, the equilibrium level of  $E$  equals total electricity consumption in 2022 times four (to account for our period length of four years).

### A.5.2 Details of Cost Function Calibration

Following Borenstein and Kellogg (2023), we assume a linear specification for the marginal levelized cost of green energy:

$$MLCOE(E_g) = ME_g + b$$

In words, this is the marginal cost, per period, of producing an additional MWh of green energy each period.

We can find the total present value cost of providing  $E_g$  units of green energy by integrating the marginal levelized cost and multiplying by  $\frac{1}{1-\beta}$ :

$$C(E_g) = \left(\frac{1}{1-\beta}\right) \int_0^{E_g} MLCOE(x)dx = (.5*ME_g + bE_g)/(1-\beta) = (.5*M*F(K) + b*F(K))/(1-\beta)$$

where in the last step we plugged in  $E_g = F(K)$ . We also know that the total present value cost of producing  $F(K)$  units now and forever is just the investment cost  $K$ . Setting these two equal to each other gives a quadratic equation, which we can solve to obtain the following expression for  $F(K)$ :

$$F(K) = (1/M)(b^2 + 2(1-\beta)MK)^{1/2} - (b/M)$$

Now, to calibrate  $M$  and  $b$  we use numbers from Borenstein and Kellogg (2023). Based on engineering cost data, they estimate that the marginal cost of zero emission energy starts at \$64/MWh at 2019 levels of production and rises to \$91/MWh if zero emission sources provided 90% of total electricity generation in 2019<sup>34</sup>. In 2019, wind and solar provided 368 million MWh. Assuming that all new zero emission electricity would come from solar and wind (which is in line with projections from Nalley and LaRose (2022)), then for zero emission sources to provide 90% of 2019 levels, wind and solar generation would have to rise to 2528 million MWh/year. These values, combined with the baseline value for  $\beta$ , imply that  $M = \$1.26 * 10^{-8}/MWh^2$  and  $b = \$59.40/MWh$ .

### A.5.3 Finding the Optimal Subsidy

First, we check whether numerically the calibrated demand and cost functions satisfy the interior assumptions from the baseline model setup. In the baseline case, they do, so the green party's optimal subsidy is just given by the expression in theorem 9:

$$s_g^* = (1/2)(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta})(d_g - d_b)\gamma F'(K_g^*)$$

And  $K_g^*$  is the unique solution to the following FOC:

$$(mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_g^*) = 1 - \beta$$

Solving this for  $F'(K_g^*)$  and plugging it into the subsidy expression gives:

$$s_g^* = (1/2)\beta\gamma(d_g - d_b)/(mc + \gamma d_g)$$

This only depends on exogenous parameter values, so it can be used directly to find  $s_g^*$

For some specifications in the sensitivity analyses, the second interior assumption, listed below, doesn't hold:

$$F'(F^{-1}(D(mc + d_g)))(mc + d_g) < 1 - \beta$$

In this case, the theorems 9 and 10 don't apply. Instead, we introduce a new assumption, which can be shown to hold in all of the specifications that we consider. First, define  $K^{**}$  as the solution to following equation:  $v'(F(K^{**})) = mc + \gamma d_b$ . For any capital stock at or above  $K^{**}$ , the brown party finds it optimal to use no brown energy. Our new assumption is:

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34. They also consider robustness checks where marginal cost at 90% of 2019 production is \$70/MWh and \$110/MWh. We use these same numbers for the sensitivity analysis in table A7.

**Assumption A.1:**

$$v'(F(K^{**}))F'(K^{**}) - 1 + (1/2)(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta})(v'(F(K^{**}))F'(K^{**}) + (mc + d_g)F'(K^{**})) < 0$$

The following proposition pins down the value of the optimal subsidy in this case:

**Proposition A1:** *When the first interior assumption and Assumption A.1 hold, then there is a unique equilibrium allocation in the multi-election game which has the following features:*

- *The green party's target capital level (the steady state level)  $K_g$  satisfies the following condition:*

$$v'(F(K_g))F'(K_g) - 1 + (1/2)(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta})(v'(F(K_g))F'(K_g) + (mc + d_g)F'(K_g)) = 0$$

- *Any tax policy which implements the allocation involves the green party uses a subsidy  $s_g$  in the first period that they gain control which is equal to  $(1/2)(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta})(d_g - d_b)\gamma F'(K_g)$*

So, to solve for the optimal subsidy, we first numerically solve for the  $K_g$  which satisfies the first condition in Proposition A1. Then plug that into the expression for  $s_g$  from proposition A1.

#### A.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis

As with the sufficient statistic estimate, we first show sensitivity checks for the value of the discount factor and for the two parties' social costs of carbon. In table A4, we see that higher discount factors (more patience) lead to higher subsidies, but the impact is not large. Table A5 shows that increasing the green party's social cost of carbon to the Biden Administration's suggested new value leads to significantly higher subsidies.

	$\beta = .95^4$	$\beta = .97^4$	$\beta = .93^4$
Optimal Subsidy	[5.0, 12.8]	[4.6, 11.7]	[5.4, 13.9]

*Table A4. Calibration results for green party's optimal subsidy with different levels of  $\beta$ . Note that the  $\beta$  is equal to the annual discount factor raised to the fourth power, since the period length is four years. Like in the main body of the text, the lower bound in the intervals is for  $\gamma = .18$  and the upper bound is for  $\gamma = .59$  (taken from the upper and lower estimates in Abrell et al (2017))*



	Baseline	Updated
Optimal Subsidy	[5.0, 12.8]	[13.9, 39.4]

Table A5. Calibration estimates for green party’s optimal subsidy with different values for the parties’ social costs of carbon. The first column is for the baseline levels of  $d_g = \$51$  and  $d_b = \$1$ . The second column is for the updated levels of  $d_g = \$190$  and  $d_b = \$4$ .

In addition, table A6 shows the sensitivity analysis for the three cost functions for green energy considered in Borenstein and Kellogg (2023). In the case where the supply curve is more elastic (less steep), we see slightly higher subsidies, as the marginal cost of clean energy doesn’t rise by as much when subsidies are introduced. But overall, the subsidy levels are nearly identical to the baseline levels.

	Baseline	High Elasticity	Low Elasticity
Optimal Subsidy	[5.0, 12.8]	[5.0, 12.9]	[5.0, 12.8]

Table A6. Calibration results for green party’s optimal subsidy for different specifications of the green energy cost function. In the baseline, the marginal cost is equal to \$91/MWh at 90% 2019 production levels. In the “High elasticity” case, this number is \$70/MWh. In the “Low elasticity” case, it’s \$110/MWh.

Finally, table A7 shows sensitivity of the results to the demand elasticity. We see that this has no impact on the results. This is due to the constant marginal cost assumption for brown energy, which guarantees that an extra unit of green energy production will crowd out one unit of brown energy<sup>35</sup>. If the supply of brown energy wasn’t perfectly elastic, then crowd out would be less than one-for-one, and the demand elasticity would have some impact on the optimal subsidy.

Demand Elasticity	-0.186	-0.272	-0.358
Optimal Subsidy	[5.0, 12.8]	[5.0, 12.8]	[5.0, 12.8]

Table A7. Calibration results for green party’s optimal subsidy for different values of the demand elasticity  $\epsilon$ . The highest and lowest values are taken from the 95% confidence interval in Deryugina et al (2021)

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35. Except for the case where brown energy production ends up at a corner solution. In that case, there is zero crowd-out at the margin

### A.5.5 Solving for the competitive equilibrium in the naive case

First, we define the following function, which equilibrium level of brown production when carbon taxes are equal to  $d_g$  and the capital stock is  $K$ :

$$E_b^g(K) = D(mc + \gamma d_g) - F(K)$$

The following theorem characterizes the competitive equilibrium in the case where both parties act naively.

**Theorem A.2:** *If each party  $j$  always uses a carbon tax equal to  $d_j$  when in power and assumption A.1 holds, there is a unique competitive equilibrium with the following features:*

- *If the brown party is in power in period  $t$ ,  $K_t = \max\{0, K_{t-1} - K_b^*\}$*
- *If the green party is in power in period  $t$ ,  $K_t = K_n > K_b$ , where  $K_n$  is the unique solution to:*

$$-1 + (1 + \frac{\beta}{2(1-\beta)})v'(F(K_n) + E_b^g(K_n))F'(K_n) + \frac{\beta}{2(1-\beta)}(mc + \gamma d_b)F'(K_n) = 0$$

So, to solve for the steady state level  $K_n$ , we just need to solve for the condition in the second part of theorem A.2.

## A.6 Implausible Equilibrium Example

There can be many subgame perfect equilibria in the multiple-election version of the game if parties are sufficiently patient, including one where the no party ever uses green energy. An example of possible strategies which sustain this equilibrium are the following:

1. Phase 1: Whichever party is in power sets  $E_b = E_1$  ( $E_1$  is defined below),  $x = 0$  and  $E_g = 0$ . If party  $i$  deviates, move to phase  $2^i$ .
2. Phase  $2^i$ : For 1 stage, if party  $j$  is in power, they set  $E_b = \bar{E}$ ,  $x = 0$ , and  $E_g = 0$ . If party  $i$  is in power, they set  $x = \max\{0, \tilde{K}_i - K_{t-1}\}$ ,  $E_g = F(K_t)$ , and  $E_b = \max\{0, D(mc + \gamma d_i) - F(K_t)\}$ . If party  $j$  deviates, move to phase  $2^j$ ; otherwise, move to phase  $1^j$ .
3. Phase  $1^i$ : Whichever party is in power sets  $E_b = E_1 + \epsilon(1\{i = b\} - 1\{i = g\})$ ,  $x = 0$ ,  $E_g = 0$ . If any party  $k$  deviates, move to phase  $2^k$ .

Where brown production along the equilibrium path  $E_1$  is set to a level that is too high from the green party's perspective and too low from the brown party's perspective:

$$v'(E_1) - (mc + \gamma d_b) > 0 > v'(E_1) - (mc + \gamma d_g)$$

Let  $\epsilon$  be small enough so that the above inequalities are satisfied when we replace  $E_1$  with  $E_1 \pm \epsilon$ . Define party  $i$ 's target capital level in phase 2,  $\tilde{K}_i$  as the unique solution to  $(mc + \gamma d_i)F'(\tilde{K}_i) - 1 = 0$ .

**Proposition A6:** *With sufficiently high  $\beta$  and  $\bar{E}$ , the above strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium*

*Proof.* If party  $i$  deviates in phase 1, the increase in their flow payoff in that period must be less than  $\bar{V} - (v(E_1) - (mc + \gamma d_i))$ , where  $\bar{V} \equiv \lim_{E \rightarrow \infty} v(E)$ . If they retain power in the next period (the punishment phase), then the increase in their flow payoff is also bounded above by  $\bar{V} - (v(E_1) - (mc + \gamma d_i))$ . If they lose power in the next period, their flow payoff is  $v(\bar{E}) - (mc + \gamma d_i)\bar{E} - (v(E_1) - (mc + \gamma d_i))$ . In periods more than two steps ahead, their flow payoff would be weakly lower due to the deviation. So, a sufficient condition for this deviation to not be profitable is:

$$(1 + (\beta/2))\bar{V} + (1/2)\beta(v(\bar{E}) - (mc + \gamma d_i)\bar{E}) < (1 + \beta)(v(E_1) - (mc + \gamma d_i))$$

With sufficiently high  $\bar{E}$ , this condition will be satisfied. Following the same steps, we can show that with sufficiently high  $\bar{E}$ , there is no profitable deviation, for either party, from phase  $1^i$  or phase  $1^j$ .

Finally, we need to show that there's no profitable deviation from phase  $2^i$  for either party. For party  $j$ , deviating would lead to a one-period benefit of at most  $\bar{V} - (v(\bar{E}) - (mc + \gamma d_j)\bar{E})$ , but a loss in all future periods due to moving from phase  $1^i$  to phase  $1^j$ . With  $\beta$  close enough to 1, this long term loss is guaranteed to dominate the short term benefit, so the deviation can't be profitable. For party  $i$ , their behavior has no impact on future payoffs, so we only need to check that the strategies chosen maximize their one-period payoff. The FOCs for party  $i$  are:

$$v'(F(K) + E_b)F'(K) - 1 \leq 0$$

$$v'(F(K) + E_b) - (mc + \gamma d_i) \leq 0$$

Which must hold with equality if the solution is interior. It can easily be verified that these FOCs hold for party  $i$ 's phase 2 strategy, and that they are strictly decreasing, so they are

a sufficient condition for optimality.  $\square$

Intuitively, the idea behind this equilibrium is that if any party  $i$  deviates from phase 1, they will be punished with a huge amount of brown production in phase 2. To make it rational for party  $j$  to carry out the phase 2 punishment, they must be rewarded by moving to phase 1<sup>j</sup> afterwards, which is slightly better for them than staying along the equilibrium path.

## B Proofs

**Proof of Theorem 1:** The Bellman equation for this planning problem is:

$$V(K) = \max_{K' \geq K, E_b \geq 0} v(E_b + F(K')) - (mc + \gamma d_j)E_b - (K' - K) + \beta V(K')$$

subject to  $K' \geq K, E_b \geq 0$

The FOCs are:

$$v'(E_b + F(K')) - (mc + \gamma d_j) \leq 0$$

$$v'(E_b + F(K'))F'(K') - 1 + \beta V'(K') \leq 0$$

With equality holding for interior solutions.

Define the function  $E_b^j(K') = \max\{D(mc + \gamma d_j) - F(K'), 0\}$ . Notice that for any value  $K'$ , setting  $E_b = E_b^j(K')$  solves the FOC for  $E_b$ .

Now, define  $K_j^*$  as the unique solution to:

$$v'(E_b^j(K_j^*) + F(K_j^*))F'(K_j^*) - 1 + \beta = 0$$

There's a unique positive solution since the left side is strictly decreasing, continuous, is greater than zero for  $K_j^* = 0$  (due to the first interior assumption) and eventually drops below zero for large enough  $K_j^*$  (since  $\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} v'(x) = 0$ ).

Guess that the optimal strategy is to set  $K' = \max\{0, K_j^* - K\}$  and  $E_b = E_b^j(K')$ . With this guess, the value function becomes:

$$V(K) = \begin{cases} -(K_j^* - K) + \frac{1}{1-\beta}(v(F(K_j^*) + E_b^j(K_j^*)) - (mc + \gamma d_j)E_b^j(K_j^*)) & K \leq K_j^* \\ \frac{1}{1-\beta}(v(F(K) + E_b^j(K)) - (mc + \gamma d_j)E_b^j(K)) & K > K_j^* \end{cases}$$

This satisfies  $V'(K) = 1$  for  $K \leq K_j^*$  and  $V'(K) < 1$  for  $K > K_j^*$ . From this, we see that the FOC for  $K'$  is satisfied at our guessed solution for any  $K$ . And, as was already noted,

the FOC for  $E_b$  is also satisfied. Since the maximization problem in the Bellman equation is concave, we know that the FOCs are sufficient conditions for solving the optimization problem. So, our guessed solution is a solution. Finally, the FOCs have unique solutions, so our guessed solution is the unique solution.

Since the initial capital level is zero, the optimal path has  $K_t = K_j^*$  and  $E_{bt} = E_b^j(K_j^*)$  in every period. This implies that  $x_1 = K_j^* > 0$  and  $x_t = 0$  for all  $t > 1$ , which proves the second part of the theorem.

The next step is to show that  $E_b^j(K_j^*) > 0$ , which happens iff  $D(mc + \gamma d_j) > F(K_j^*)$ . Assume otherwise for contradiction. Then the definition of  $K_j^*$  implies:  $v'(F(K_j^*))F'(K_j^*) = 1 - \beta$ . Combining this with the condition that  $D(mc + \gamma d_j) \leq F(K_j^*)$  gives the following inequality:

$$(mc + \gamma d_j)F'(F^{-1}(D(mc + \gamma d_j))) \geq 1 - \beta$$

which contradicts the second interior assumption. So, we know that  $E_b^j(K_j^*) > 0$ . This proves the third part of the theorem.

With this result, the definition of  $K_j^*$  simplifies to:

$$(mc + \gamma d_b)F'(K_j^*) = 1 - \beta$$

Which proves the first part of the theorem.

**Proof of Theorem 2:** Set  $p_t = v'(F(K_j^*) + E_b^j(K_j^*)) = mc + \gamma d_j$ . At this set of prices and the planner allocation, the consumer's FOCs are satisfied, which implies that the consumer problem is satisfied since it's a convex optimization problem.

The firm's FOC for  $E_{bt}$  is:

$$p_t = mc + \gamma \tau_t$$

Plugging in our values for  $p_t$  and  $\tau_t$  this becomes:

$$d_b + \gamma d_j = mc + \gamma d_j$$

So this is satisfied

The firm's FOC for  $K_1$  is:

$$p_t F'(K_j^*) = 1 - \beta$$

And the FOC for  $K_t$  for  $t \geq 2$  is:

$$p_t F'(K_j^*) \leq 1 - \beta$$

By the planner's FOC, we know that the left side of both of these is equal to  $1 - \beta$ , so both conditions are satisfied.

Since all FOCs are satisfied, and the firm problem is convex, this is a solution to the firm problem. So, it is a competitive equilibrium.

**Proof of Theorem 3:** To satisfy the consumer problem, any competitive equilibrium in which quantities are equal to the planner allocation must have  $p_t = mc + \gamma d_j$ . The firm's net marginal revenue from a marginal investment in period  $t$  must be weakly negative for the allocation to solve the firm problem (and must be equal to zero in period 1):

$$\sum_{t'=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t'-1} (mc + \gamma d_j) F'(K_j^*) \leq 1 - s_t$$

From the planner's FOC, we know  $(mc + \gamma d_j) F'(K_j^*) = 1 - \beta$ , so this condition reduces to:

$$1 \leq 1 - s_t$$

The only way for this to hold is for  $s_t \leq 0$ .

**Proof of Theorem 4:** The subgame starting in period 2 after the winner of the election has been realized as party  $j$  is just a one-player game, where party  $j$  chooses allocations in each period to maximize their social welfare. This is identical to the planner problem considered in theorem 1, except now the initial capital stock is  $K_1$  instead of zero. We already showed in the proof of theorem 1 that the optimal solution in this case is to set  $K$  equal to  $\max\{K_j^* - K_1, 0\}$  and  $E_b$  equal to  $\max\{D(mc + \gamma d_j), 0\}$ .

**Proof of Corollary 1** This follows immediately from the results in theorem 4.

**Proof of Theorem 5** According to theorem 4,  $E_{b1}$  has no impact on future allocations, so it will just be set to maximize the first period utility, which means  $E_{b1} = E_b^g(K_1) = \max\{D(mc + \gamma d_g) - F(K_1), 0\}$

So, the green party's optimization problem simplifies to choosing  $K_1$  to maximize:

$$u_g(K_1) - K_1 + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} ((1 - \theta)u_g(K_2^g(K_1)) + \theta u_b(K_2^b(K_1))) + \beta((1 - \theta)(K_2^g(K_1) - K_1) + \theta(K_2^b(K_1) - K_1))$$

where  $u_j(K) \equiv v(F(K) + E_b^j(K)) - (mc + \gamma d_g)E_b^j(K)$  and  $K_2^j(K_1) \equiv \max\{K_j^* - K_1, 0\}$

Notice that the objective function is continuous. Taking the right derivative of the

objective w.r.t.  $K_1$  gives the net marginal benefit of increasing  $K_1$ :

$$MB(K_1) \equiv \begin{cases} (mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_1) - (1 - \beta) & K_1 < K_b^* \\ (mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_1) - 1 + \beta(1 - \theta) + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\theta(mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_1) & K_b^* \leq K_1 < K_g^* \\ (mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_1) - 1 + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}(mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_1) & K_g^* \leq K_1 < \bar{K}_g \\ v'(F(K_1))F'(K_1) - 1 + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}((1 - \theta)v'(F(K_1)) + \theta(mc + \gamma d_g))F'(K_1) & \bar{K}_g \leq K_1 < \bar{K}_b \\ (1 + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta})v'(F(K_1))F'(K_1) - 1 & K_1 \geq \bar{K}_b \end{cases}$$

where  $\bar{K}_j$  is defined as the unique solution to:  $v'(F(\bar{K}_j)) = mc + \gamma d_j$ .

$MB(K_1)$  is positive for all  $K < K_g^*$ , negative for all  $K > K_g^*$ , and equal to zero for  $K = K_g^*$ . So,  $K = K_g^*$  is the unique solution to the optimization problem.

### Proof of Theorem 6:

By evaluating the consumer problem FOCs at the equilibrium allocation, we get  $p_1 = mc + \gamma d_g$  and  $p_t = mc + \gamma d_j$  for all  $t \geq 2$  when party  $j$  wins the election. With prices at that level, all consumer FOCs are satisfied, so the consumer problem is satisfied.

Note that with the tax policies given in the theorem, the firm's profits don't depend on  $E_{bt}$  since price equals the constant marginal cost in each period. So, any choice of  $E_{bt}$  can solve the firm problem. All that's left to show is that the firm problem is solved at the subgame perfect allocation of capital.

With this price sequence and the tax policies given in the theorem, the firm problem can be written recursively with the Bellman equations:

$$V_1 = \max_{K_1} (mc + \gamma d_g)F(K_1) + (1 - s_1)K_1 + \beta((1 - \theta)V_g(K_1) + \theta V_b(K_1))$$

$$V_j(K) = \max_{K'} (mc + \gamma d_j)F(K') - (K' - K) + \beta V_j(K')$$

subject to  $K' \geq K$ .  $V_1$  corresponds to the first period (note, it doesn't depend on  $K$  because the initial capital stock is fixed at zero).  $V_j(K)$  is the value function for all periods greater than 1 when party  $j$  wins the election.

First we'll solve  $V_j(K)$ . Guess that the solution is  $K' = \max\{K, K_j^*\}$ . If this guess were correct, the value function would be::

$$V_j(K) = \begin{cases} -(K_j^* - K) + \frac{1}{1-\beta}(mc + \gamma d_j)F(K_j^*) & K \leq K_j^* \\ \frac{1}{1-\beta} \frac{1}{1-\beta}(mc + \gamma d_j)F(K) & K > K_j^* \end{cases}$$

This value function can be easily shown to solve the Bellman. Furthermore, our guess

is consistent with the subgame perfect equilibrium allocation. The last step is to show that solves the maximization problem in the first period value function. Since  $V_j(K)$  is concave for each  $j$ , the FOC in the first period value function is a sufficient conditions for optimality:

$$(mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_g^*) - (1 - s_1) + \beta(\theta V'_g(K_g^*) + (1 - \theta)V'_b(K_g^*)) = 0$$

With our expression for  $V_j(K)$ , we can show that  $V'_g(K_g^*) = 1$  and  $V'_b(K_b^*) = \frac{1}{1-\beta}(mc + \gamma d_b)F'(K_g^*)$ . Plugging these into the FOC for  $K_1$  and solving for  $s_1$ :

$$s_1 = \theta\left(\frac{1}{1-\beta}\right)(d_g - d_b)\gamma F'(K_g^*)$$

Which is subsidy in the theorem, so this FOC holds.

**Proof of Theorem 7** In the proof of theorem 5, we showed the green party's FOC for increasing  $K_1$  in the first period is:

$$\frac{1}{1-\beta}(mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_g^*) - 1 + \beta = 0$$

First off, in any competitive equilibrium which has the subgame perfect allocation, prices are pinned down by the consumer problem FOCs:  $p_1 = mc + \gamma d_g$  and  $p_t = mc + \gamma d_j$  for all  $t \geq 2$  when party  $j$  wins the election. Next, a necessary condition for the firm problem to be solved is that a marginal change in first period investment can't increase expected profits:

$$(mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_g^*) - (1 - s_1) + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}(\theta(mc + \gamma d_g) + (1 - \theta)(mc + \gamma d_g))F'(K_g^*) = 0$$

Subtracting this from the green party's FOC gives:

$$s_1 = \theta\left(\frac{1}{1-\beta}\right)(d_g - d_b)\gamma F'(K_g^*)$$

**Proof of Theorem 8** In the subgame starting in period 2, the optimal strategy for the party in power is to choose  $E_{bt}, K_t$  to maximize their social welfare function:

$$\left[ \sum_{t=2}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} \left( \underbrace{v(F(K_t) + E_{bt})}_{\text{Consumption Value}} - \underbrace{x_t - mcE_{bt}}_{\text{Cost}} - \underbrace{d_j \gamma E_{bt}}_{\text{Externality}} \right) \right]$$



Subject to the law of motion for all  $t$ :

$$K_t = K_{t-1} + x_t$$

conditional on the inherited level of capital  $K_1$ .

Notice that there is now no irreversible investment constraint. The Bellman equation associated with this problem is:

$$V_j(K) = \max_{K', E_b} v(F(K') + E_b) - (K' - K) - (mc + \gamma d_b)E_b + \beta V_j(K')$$

Guess that the solution is

$$V_j(K) = (K_j^* - K) + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} (v(F(K_j^*) + E_b^j(K_j^*)) - (mc + \gamma d_j)E_b^j(K_j^*))$$

where  $E_b^j(K_j^*) = D(mc + \gamma d_j) - F(K_j^*)$ .

This value function solves the bellman equation, and maximization problem within the bellman has a unique solution:  $K' = K_j^*$  and  $E_b = D(mc + \gamma d_j) - F(K_j^*)$ . So, in any subgame perfect equilibrium,  $x_2 = K_j^* - K_1$ ,  $x_t = 0$  for all  $t \geq 2$ ,  $K_t = K_j^*$  for all  $t \geq 2$ , and  $E_{bt} = D(mc + \gamma d_j) - F(K_j^*)$  for all  $t \geq 2$ , where  $j$  denotes the party who wins the second period election.

The green party's problem in the first period then simplifies to maximizing:

$$v(F(K_1) + E_{b1}) - (mc + \gamma d_g)E_{b1} - K_1 + \beta K_1$$

The FOCs for this are:

$$v'(F(K_1) + E_{b1}) - (mc + \gamma d_g) \leq 0$$

$$v'(F(K_1) + E_{b1})F'(K_1) - (1 - \beta) \leq 0$$

We already showed in the proof of theorem 1 that these have a unique solution of  $K_1 = K_g^*$  and  $E_{b1} = D(mc + \gamma d_g) - F(K_g^*)$ . So, in every period, the party in power sets  $K_t$  and  $E_{bt}$  to their no-turnover level.

The FOCs from the consumer problem say that if this allocation is part of a competitive equilibrium,  $p_t = mc + \gamma d_j$ , where  $j$  is the party in power in period  $t$ . This, combined with the firm's FOCs for  $E_{bt}$ , says that  $\tau_t = d_j$  for all  $t$ , where  $j$  is the party in power at time  $t$ .

The firm can't benefit from marginally changing investment in the first period and holding

it constant in all future periods, which gives the condition:

$$(mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_g^*) - (1 - s_1) + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}(\theta(mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_g^*) + (1 - \theta)(mc + \gamma d_b)F'(K_b^*)) = 0$$

Since the FOCs from the planner problems tell us that  $(mc + \gamma d_j)F'(K_j^*) = 1 - \beta$  for each  $j$ , this simplifies to:  $s_1 = 0$ .

Similarly, the firm can't benefit from marginally changing investment in any period  $t \geq 2$ :

$$\frac{1}{1 - \beta}(mc + \gamma d_j)F'(K_j^*) - (1 - s_t)$$

which simplifies to  $s_t = 0$

**Proof of Theorem 9:** First, in any markov perfect equilibrium, allocations in each period can only depend on the capital inherited in that period. This means that allocations cannot depend on the history of previous level of brown production. So, brown production in each period is just set to maximize the party in power's period utility, which implies  $E_{bt}$  satisfies the FOC  $v'(F(K_t) + E_{bt}) = (mc + \gamma d_j)$ , which further implies that  $E_{bt} = E_b^j(K_t) = \max\{D(mc + \gamma d_j) - F(K_t), 0\}$ . This is equal to  $D(mc + \gamma d_j)$ , the value stated in the theorem, as long as  $D(mc + \gamma d_j) - F(K_t) \geq 0$ , which follows from the later result that along the equilibrium path,  $K_t \leq K_g^*$ .

Now, to prove the first part of the theorem. Let  $K_g$  and  $K_b$  be the equilibrium capital targets for the green and brown party, respectively. First we'll show that  $K_g > K_b$ . Assume otherwise for contradiction. Consider the green party's net marginal benefit from a permanent deviation where they set their capital target to be marginally lower than  $K_g$ :

$$1 - \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (1/2)^t v'(F(K_g) + E_b^g(K_g)) F'(K_g) + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t (1/2)^t \right] = 0$$

This condition simplifies to:

$$v'(F(K_g) + E_b^g(K_g)) - (1 - \beta) = 0$$

This is the FOC for investment in the green party's full control solution, so  $K_g = K_g^*$ .

Now write the brown party's FOC for a marginal increase in  $K_b$ :

$$-1 + v'(F(K_b) + E_b^b(K_b)) F'(K_b) + (1/2) \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (v'(F(K_b) + E_b^b(K_b)) F'(K_b) + u_g^{b'}(K_b))$$

where  $u_g^b(K_b) \equiv v(f(K_b) + E_b^g(K_b)) - (mc + \gamma d_b)E_b^{g'}(K_b)$  is the period utility that the brown party gets when the green party is in power and  $K_t = K_b$ , which implies  $u_g^{b'}(K_b) = v'(F(K_b) + E_b^g(K_b))(F'(K_b) + E_b^{g'}(K_b)) - (mc + \gamma d_b)E_b^{g''}(K_b)$ .

There are two possible cases. The first case is  $E_b^g(K_b) > 0$ . This implies that  $E_b^{g'}(K_b) = F'(K_b)$ , which implies  $u_g^{b'}(K_b) = v'(F(K_b) + E_b^g(K_b))F'(K_b)$ . The brown party's FOC for  $K_b$  then simplifies to:

$$-(1 - \beta) + v'(F(K_b) + E_b^g(K_b)) = 0$$

We know from the proofs in the no turnover case that this is only satisfied for  $K_b = K_b^*$ , but we assumed that  $K_b > K_b^*$ , so this case is impossible. The second case is  $E_b^g(K_b) = 0$ . This implies  $E_b^b(K_b) = 0$  and  $u_g^{b'}(K_b) = v'(F(K_b) + E_b^g(K_b))F'(K_b) = v'(F(K_b))F'(K_b)$ . So the FOC for  $K_b$  simplifies to:

$$-(1 - \beta) + v'(F(K_b))F'(K_b) = 0$$

We know from the proofs in the full control case that  $v'(F(K_b) + E_b^b(K_b))F'(K_b)$  is strictly decreasing and equals  $1 - \beta$  when  $K_b = K_b^*$ . We assumed that  $K_b > K_b^*$  here, so  $v'(F(K_b))F'(K_b) = v'(F(K_b) + E_b^b(K_b))F'(K_b) < (1 - \beta)$ , which implies:

$$-(1 - \beta) + v'(F(K_b))F'(K_b) < 0$$

But this contradicts our earlier expression for the FOC. In either case we have a contradiction, so it's impossible for  $K_b > K_g$ .

Now, we can pin down the value of  $K_b$  with the brown party's FOC for a permanent deviation which marginally decreases their target level:

$$1 - \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (1/2)^t v'(F(K_b) + E_b^b(K_b))F'(K_b) \right] + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t (1/2)^t = 0$$

This condition simplifies to:

$$v'(F(K_b) + E_b^b(K_b)) - (1 - \beta) = 0$$

Which we know from the no-turnover case is only satisfied at  $K_b = K_b^*$

Now, we can pin down the value of  $K_g$  by looking at the green party's net marginal benefit of a permanent marginal increase in  $K_g$ ,  $MB(K_g)$ . First, look at the case where

$K_g < K_b^*$ . In this case:

$$MB(K_g) = -1 + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (1/2)^t v'(F(K_g) + E_b^g(K_g)) F'(K_g) + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t (1/2)^t$$

which simplifies to:

$$(1 - (1/2)\beta)[-(1 - \beta) + (mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_g)] > 0$$

where the inequality follows from the fact that  $K_g < K_g^*$ .

Next the case where  $K_g \in [K_b, \bar{K}_g)$ , where  $\bar{K}_g$  is the unique solution to  $v'(F(\bar{K}_g)) = mc + \gamma d_g$ . In this case:

$$MB(K_g) = (mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_g) - 1 + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}(mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_g)$$

which simplifies to:

$$\frac{1}{1 - \beta}[(mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_g) - (1 - \beta)]$$

We know from the proofs in the no turnover case that this is strictly decreasing and is equal to zero when  $K_g = K_g^*$ .

Next is the case where  $K_g \in [\bar{K}_g, \bar{K}_b)$ . In this case:

$$MB(K_g) = v'(F(K_g))F'(K_g) - 1 + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}(1/2)(v'(F(K_g)) + (mc + \gamma d_g))F'(K_g)$$

Since  $v'(F(K_g)) \leq mc + \gamma d_g$ , we find:

$$MB(K_g) \leq \frac{1}{1 - \beta}[(mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_g) - (1 - \beta)] < 0$$

where the last inequality follows because  $K_g > K_g^*$ .

The final case is where  $K_g \geq \bar{K}_b$ . Then we get:

$$MB(K_g) = v'(F(K_g))F'(K_g) - 1 + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}v'(F(K_g))F'(K_g) < 0$$

Where the inequality follows from  $K_g > K_g^*$  and  $v'(F(K_g)) \leq mc + \gamma d_g$

So, we've shown that  $MB(K)$  is equal to zero at  $K_g^*$ , positive for all feasible  $K < K_g^*$ , and negative for all  $K > K_g^*$ . This means that the green party's target level must be  $K_g^*$ .

Last is to show that this is in fact a subgame perfect equilibrium by checking that there are no profitable one-shot deviations. Start first with the green party. The benefit from a

one-shot deviation that increases  $K_t$  to  $\hat{K} > K_g^*$  is the same as the benefit of permanently increasing the target level. We already showed that this can't be profitable. Now, consider a one shot deviation to  $\hat{K} < K_g^*$ . If this were profitable, then a permanent deviation of this sort would also be profitable (that is, a deviation where the green party sets their target level to  $\hat{K}$  instead of  $K_g^*$ ). But again, we already showed that this sort of permanent deviation isn't profitable. So the green party has no profitable one shot deviation.

Similarly, for the brown party, we know that if a one-shot deviation to  $\hat{K}$  is profitable, then a permanent deviation to  $\hat{K}$  must also be profitable. We've already shown that a permanent deviation to  $\hat{K} \geq K_g^*$  isn't profitable. Now consider a deviation to  $\hat{K} < K_g^*$ . The marginal benefit of increasing  $\hat{K}$  is given by:

$$-1 + \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (1/2)^t v'(F(\hat{K}) + E_b^b(\hat{K})) F'(\hat{K}) \right] + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t (1/2)^t$$

which simplifies to:

$$v'(F(\hat{K}) + E_b^b(\hat{K})) - (1 - \beta)$$

But, as we already noted previously, this is equal to zero when  $\hat{K} = K_b^*$ , positive when  $\hat{K} < K_b^*$ , and negative when  $\hat{K} > K_b^*$ . So no permanent deviation away from  $K_b^*$  can be profitable, which means that no one-shot deviation can be profitable.

Finally, with these equilibrium strategies, and an initial capital level of zero, the capital level never gets above  $K_g^*$  along the equilibrium path. So  $E_{bt} = D(mc + \gamma d_j) - F(K_t) > 0$  for all  $t$ .

**Proof of Theorem 10** First, if the competitive equilibrium allocation is equal to the equilibrium allocation from theorem 9, then we know from the consumer problem FOCs that  $p_t = mc + \gamma d_j$  for any  $t$  where party  $j$  is in power.

The FOCs for  $E_{bt}$  from the firm problem give:

$$p_t = mc + \gamma \tau_t$$

Plugging in our expression for  $p_t$ , this simplifies to  $\tau_t = d_j$ .

A necessary condition for the firm problem to be satisfied is that the expected impact on profits from a one time marginal increase in investments is zero. In the first period when the green party is in power, that expected increase in profits is:

$$-(1 - s_g^*) + (mc + \gamma d_g) F'(K_g^*) + (1/2) \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} ((mc + \gamma d_g) F'(K_g^*) + (c_g + d_b) F'(K_g^*)) = 0$$

The green party's FOC for  $K_g^*$  is:

$$-1 + (mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_g^*) + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}(mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_g^*) = 0$$

Subtracting these gives:

$$s_g^* = (d_g - d_b) \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1-\beta} F'(K_g^*)$$

The expected increase in profits from a marginal increase in investment when the brown party has control in the first period is:

$$-(1 - s_b^*) + \frac{1}{1 - (1/2)\beta}(mc + \gamma d_b)F'(K_b^*) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1 - (1/2)\beta}(1 - s_g^*)$$

The brown party's FOC for  $K_b^*$  is:

$$-1 + \frac{1}{1 - (1/2)\beta}(mc + \gamma d_b)F'(K_b^*) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1 - (1/2)\beta}$$

Subtracting these gives:

$$s_b^* = \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1 - (1/2)\beta} s_g^*$$

**Proof of Proposition A.1:** First off, in cases where the interior assumptions hold, theorem 9 applies, and so proposition A1 follows directly from theorem 9. Now we need to look at the case where the second interior assumption doesn't hold. Then the green party's full control steady state  $K_g^* \geq \bar{K}$ , so no brown energy gets used in the green party's full control solution.

Follow identical steps to the proof of theorem 9 until solving for the green party's target level. Here we get the same expressions for the green party's marginal benefit of increasing  $K_g$ :

$$MB(K_g) \equiv \begin{cases} (1 - (1/2)\beta)[-(1 - \beta) + (mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K)] & K < K_b^* \\ \frac{1}{1-\beta}[(mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K) - (1 - \beta)] & K_b^* \leq K < \bar{K}_g \\ v'(F(K))F'(K) - 1 + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}(1/2)(v'(F(K)) + (mc + \gamma d_g))F'(K) & \bar{K}_g \leq K < \bar{K}_b \\ v'(F(K))F'(K) - 1 + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}v'(F(K))F'(K) & \bar{K}_g \leq K < \bar{K}_b \end{cases}$$

Following the same steps from Theorem 9, we can show that  $MB(K) > 0$  when  $K < K_b^*$  and that  $MB(K) < 0$  for  $K > \bar{K}_b$ . Unlike in theorem 9, we can now show that  $MB(K) < 0$  for  $K \in [K_b, \bar{K}_g]$  since  $K_g^*$  is now weakly greater than  $\bar{K}_g$ .

For  $K = \bar{K}_g$ , we know that  $v'(F(K))F'(K) > 1 - \beta$  (since  $K < K_g^*$  and the green party's full control FOC says  $v'(F(K_g^*))F'(K_g^*) = 1 - \beta$ ). This then implies that  $MB(\bar{K}_g) > 0$ . Assumption A.1 says that  $MB(\bar{K}_b) < 0$ . Since  $MB(K)$  is continuous and strictly decreasing for all  $K \in [\bar{K}_g, \bar{K}_b]$ , there must be a point in that interval where it equals zero:

$$v'(F(K_g))F'(K_g) - 1 + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}(1/2)(v'(F(K_g)) + (mc + \gamma d_g))F'(K_g)$$

That point must be the green party's steady state  $K_g$ , since  $MB(K) < 0$  for all  $K < K_g$  and  $MB(K) > 0$  for all  $K > K_g$ .

Following the same steps as in theorem 9, we can show that there are no profitable one-shot deviations, so this is an equilibrium. So that proves the first part of the proposition.

Following the proof of theorem 10, we can write the firm's marginal benefit from a one-time increase in investment in the first period the green party has control:

$$-(1 - s_g^*) + v'(F(K_g))F'(K_g) + (1/2)\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}(v(F(K_g))F'(K_g) + (c_g + d_b)F'(K_g^*)) = 0$$

The green party's FOC for  $K_g^*$  is:

$$-1 + v'(F(K_g))F'(K_g) + (1/2)\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}(v(F(K_g))F'(K_g) + (c_g + d_g)F'(K_g^*)) = 0$$

Subtracting these gives:

$$s_g^* = (d_g - d_b)\frac{(1/2)\beta}{1 - \beta}F'(K_g)$$

The brown party's FOC for  $K_b^*$  is:

$$-1 + \frac{1}{1 - (1/2)\beta}(mc + \gamma d_b)F'(K_b^*) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1 - (1/2)\beta}$$

Subtracting these gives:

$$s_b^* = \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1 - (1/2)\beta}s_g^*$$

**Proof of Proposition 1:** Set  $p_t(h^t) = mc + \gamma d_j$  in any history where party  $j$  has power. The consumer problem FOCs are:  $p_t(h^t) = v'(E_t(h^t)) = mc + \gamma d_j$ , so these are satisfied, which means the consumer problem is satisfied.

The firm FOCs for  $E_{bt}$  are  $p_t(h^t) = mc + \gamma \tau_t(h^t)$ . With  $\tau_t(h^t) = d_j$  and  $p_t(h^t) = mc + \gamma d_j$ , these are satisfied.  $E_{bt}$  drops out of the firm problem since prices exactly equal marginal costs. So the firm problem is now to choose an allocation for  $K_t$  and  $x_t$  to maximize expected

profits:

$$E\left[\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} (p_t F(K_t) - (1 - s_t)x_t)\right]$$

subject to the law of motion and irreversibility constraints.

This can be written recursively with the following two Bellman equations:

$$V_j(K) = \max_{K' \geq K} (mc + \gamma d_j)F(K') - (1 - s_j)(K' - K) + (1/2)\beta(V_b(K') + V_g(K'))$$

Guess that the the policy function when party  $j$  is in control is  $K'(K) = \max\{K, K_j^*\}$ . If this guess is correct, then the equilibrium allocation solves the firm problem. With this guess, the value functions are:

$$V_g(K) = \begin{cases} -(K_g^* - K)(1 - s_g) + (mc + \gamma d_g)F(K_g^*) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1-\beta}(2mc + \gamma d_g + \gamma d_b)F(K_g^*) & K \leq K_g^* \\ (mc + \gamma d_g)F(K) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1-\beta}(2mc + \gamma d_g + \gamma d_b)F(K) & K > K_g^* \end{cases}$$

$$V_b(K) = \begin{cases} -(K_b^* - K)(1 - s_b) + \frac{1}{1-(1/2)\beta}(mc + \gamma d_b)F(K_b^*) & K \leq K_b^* \\ + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1-(1/2)\beta}(V_g(K_g^*) - (1 - s_g)(K_g^* - K_b^*)) & K \leq K_b^* \\ \frac{1}{1-(1/2)\beta}(mc + \gamma d_b)F(K) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1-(1/2)\beta}(V_g(K_g^*) - (1 - s_g)(K_g^* - K)) & K_b^* < K \leq K_g^* \\ (mc + \gamma d_g)F(K) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1-\beta}(2mc + \gamma d_g + \gamma d_b)F(K) & K > K_g^* \end{cases}$$

Taking derivatives:

$$V_g'(K) = \begin{cases} -(1 - s_g) & K \leq K_g^* \\ (mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1-\beta}(2mc + \gamma d_g + \gamma d_b)F'(K) & K > K_g^* \end{cases}$$

$$V_b'(K) = \begin{cases} -(1 - s_b) & K \leq K_b^* \\ \frac{1}{1-(1/2)\beta}(mc + \gamma d_b)F'(K) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1-(1/2)\beta}(1 - s_g) & K_b^* < K \leq K_g^* \\ (mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1-\beta}(2mc + \gamma d_g + \gamma d_b)F'(K) & K > K_g^* \end{cases}$$

These derivatives are continuous and weakly decreasing, which means that the maximization problems within the Bellman equations are convex, so the FOC is a sufficient condition



for optimality. Evaluating the FOC of the  $g$  bellman at  $K' = K_g^*$  and simplifying gives:

$$-(1 - s_g) + (mc + \gamma d_g)F'(K_g^*) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1 - \beta}(2mc + \gamma d_g + \gamma d_b)F'(K_g^*)$$

In the proof of theorem 10, we showed that this is equal to zero. And, since the FOC is strictly decreasing, this means that for  $K > K_g^*$  the left side will be  $\leq 0$ , so our guessed solution satisfies the FOC for all values of  $K$ .

Evaluating the FOC of the  $b$  Bellman at  $K' = K_b^*$  and simplifying gives:

$$-(1 - s_b) + \frac{1}{1 - (1/2)\beta}(mc + \gamma d_b)F'(K_b^*) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1 - (1/2)\beta}(1 - s_g) = 0$$

In the last step of the proof of theorem 10, we showed that this equals zero. And, since the FOC is strictly decreasing, this means that for  $K > K_b^*$  the left side will be  $\leq 0$ , so our guessed solution satisfies the FOC for all values of  $K$ .

**Proof of Theorem A.2:** Now, consider a modified version of the G.E. model from appendix A.1. where tax and subsidy revenue does not get transferred to consumers (i.e. taxes represent real costs in this economy). The consumer problem is to choose an allocation  $\{y(h_t)\}, \{E(h_t)\}$  to maximize utility:

$$\sum_t \sum_{h_t} \beta^{t-1} \Pi(h_t)(y_t + v(E_t))$$

subject to the budget constraint:

$$\sum_t \sum_{h_t} \beta^{t-1} \Pi(h_t)(y(h_t) + p(h_t)E(h_t)) \leq A$$

This is the same as in the original GE economy but now transfers equal zero.

The firm problem is to choose an allocation  $(\{y(h_t)\}, \{E_b(h_t)\}, \{K(h_t)\}, \{x(h_t)\})$  to maximize expected profits:

$$\sum_t \sum_{h_t} \beta^{t-1} \Pi(h_t)(y(h_t) + p(h_t)(F(K_t) + E_b(h_t)))$$

Subject to the resource constraint, law of motion, and irreversibility constraints:

$$y(h_t) + (mc + \tau(h_t))E_b(h_t) + (1 - s(h_t))x(h_t) = L$$

$$K(h_t) = K(h_{t-1}) + x(h_t)$$

$$x_t \geq 0$$

The difference is that taxes and subsidies now appear in the resource constraint.

A competitive equilibrium is now defined as a set of quantities, prices, taxes and subsidies which:

1. Solve the consumer problem
2. Solve the firm problem
3. Satisfy market clearing

The only difference here is that since there are no transfers, there's no government budget constraint.

Note that the consumer and firm problems both reduce to the partial equilibrium problems if we use the constraints to eliminate  $y(h_t)$ . So, any  $(\{E_b(h_t)\}, \{K(h_t)\}, \{x(h_t)\}, \{E(h_t)\})$  which are part of a competitive equilibrium allocation of this economy are also a competitive equilibrium allocation of the PE economy, since they solve the same consumer problem, firm problem, and market clearing constraints.

So, to solve for the set of possible C.E.A. in the PE economy, we just need to solve for the set of possible C.E.A. in the modified GE economy. The first welfare theorem says that any C.E.A. is pareto efficient. To solve for all pareto efficient allocations, find allocations which maximize expected utility:

$$\sum_t \sum_{h_t} \beta^{t-1} \Pi(h_t) (y_t + v(E_t))$$

subject to the resource constraint, irreversibility constraint, and law of motion. Using the resource constraint to eliminate  $y(h_t)$ , the problem simplifies to choosing an allocation to maximize:

$$\sum_t \sum_{h_t} \beta^{t-1} \Pi(h_t) (v(E_t) - (mc + \tau(h_t))E_b(h_t) - (1 - s(h_t))x(h_t))$$

subject to the law of motion and irreversibility constraints.

We are specifically looking at the case where  $\tau(h_t) = d_j$  and  $s(h_t) = 0$  for all  $t$ . In this case, the planner problem can be written recursively as the following two Bellman equations:

$$V_j(K) = \max_{K' \geq K, E_b \geq 0} v(F(K') + E_b) - (mc + \gamma d_j)E_b - (K' - K) + (1/2)\beta(V_b(K') + V_g(K'))$$

Guess that the solution is to

1. set  $K' = \max\{K, K_n\}$  and  $E_b = D(mc + \gamma d_g) - F(K')$  when party  $g$  is in power
2. set  $K' = \max\{K, K_b^*\}$  and  $E_b = D(mc + \gamma d_g) - F(K')$  when party  $b$

The Bellman equations that correspond to this guess are:

$$V_g(K) = \begin{cases} -(K_n - K) + u_g(K_n) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1-\beta}(u_g(K_n) + u_b(K_n)) & K \leq K_n \\ u_g(K) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1-\beta}(u_b(K) + u_g(K)) & K > K_n \end{cases}$$

$$V_b(K) = \begin{cases} -(K_b^* - K) + \frac{1}{1-(1/2)\beta}u_g(K_b^*) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1-(1/2)\beta}(V_g(K_b^*)) & K \leq K_b^* \\ \frac{1}{1-(1/2)\beta}u_g(K) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1-(1/2)\beta}(V_g(K)) & K_b^* < K \leq K_n \\ u_b(K) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1-\beta}(u_b(K) + u_g(K)) & K > K_g^* \end{cases}$$

where  $u_j(K) \equiv v(F(K) + E_b^j(K)) - (mc + \gamma d_j)E_b^j(K)$  and  $E_b^j(K) \equiv \max\{0, D(mc + \gamma d_j) - F(K)\}$ .

Taking derivatives:

$$V_g'(K) = \begin{cases} 1 & K \leq K_n \\ u_g'(K) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1-\beta}(u_b'(K) + u_g'(K)) & K > K_n \end{cases}$$

$$V_b'(K) = \begin{cases} 1 & K \leq K_b^* \\ \frac{1}{1-(1/2)\beta}u_g'(K) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1-(1/2)\beta} & K_b^* < K \leq K_n \\ u_b'(K) + \frac{(1/2)\beta}{1-\beta}(u_b'(K) + u_g'(K)) & K > K_g^* \end{cases}$$

Both  $V_b'(K)$  and  $V_g'(K)$  are continuous and weakly decreasing. This means that the maximization problems inside of the Bellmans are strictly convex, so the FOCs are sufficient conditions for optimality. By plugging  $V_b'(K)$  and  $V_g'(K)$  into the FOCs, we see that they are satisfied at our guessed solution for all values of  $K$ . Finally, with these value functions, the FOCs have a unique solution every  $K$ , so our guessed solution is the unique pareto efficient allocation in this economy. The welfare theorems tell us, then, that this is the unique competitive equilibrium allocation of this economy.

**Proof of Theorem A.4:** From period 2 on, the party in power has full control, so it's a one player game. Their planning problem is recursive and has the following Bellman:

$$V(K) = \max_{K' \geq K, E_b \geq 0} v(F(K') + E_b) - c(E_b) - \gamma d_j E_b - (K' - K) + \beta V(K')$$

The FOC for  $E_b$  is:

$$v'(F(K') + E_b) - c'(E_b) - \gamma d_j \leq 0$$

Where equality holds if  $E_b > 0$ . For fixed  $K'$ , this is strictly decreasing and for large enough  $E_b$  is negative, so it has a unique solution. Define the function  $E_b^j(K')$  to be that unique solution.

As in the proof of theorem 1, guess that the policy functions are  $K'(K) = \max\{K, K_j^*\}$  and  $E_b(K) = E_b^j(K'(K))$ , where  $K_j^*$  is the unique solution to  $v'(F(K_j^*) + E_b^j(K_j^*))F'(K_j^*) = 1 - \beta$ . This can be easily shown to solve the bellman equation.

Let the function  $K_2^j(K_1) \equiv \max\{K, K_j^*\}$  give the capital stock for periods  $t \geq 2$  in the case where party  $j$  wins the election.

The green party's problem in the first period is then to choose  $K_1$  to maximize:

$$u_g(K_1) - K_1 + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}[\theta u_b(K_1) + (1-\theta)u^g(K_1)] - \theta(K_2^b(K_1) - K_1) - (1-\theta)(K_2^g(K_1) - K_1)$$

where:

$$u_j(K_1) \equiv v(F(K_1) + E_b^j(K_1)) - c(E_b^j(K_1)) - \gamma d_g E_b^j(K_1)$$

This objective function is continuous. For  $K_1 \geq \bar{K}_b$  (where  $\bar{K}_b$  is the point where the brown party uses no brown energy in the second period, which is the unique solution to  $v'(F(k))F'(K) = c'(0) + \gamma d_b$ ), the objective function's right derivative is continuous and is equal to  $\frac{1}{1-\beta}v'(F(K_1))F'(K_1) - 1 < 0$  since in this range  $K_1 > K_g^*$ . For  $K_1 < K_b^*$ , the right derivative is  $\frac{1}{1-\beta}v'(F(K_1) + E_b^g(K_1))F'(K_1) - 1 > 0$ . So, there must exist at least one finite point  $K_1 \in [K_b^*, \bar{K}_b]$  which maximizes the objective.

Now we'll show that the solution must be in the interior of the interval  $[K_b^*, \bar{K}_b]$ .

First, the right derivative at  $K_b^*$  is equal to:

$$v'(E_b^g(K_b^*) + F(K_b^*))F'(K_b^*) - 1 + \beta(1-\theta) + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\theta u_b'(K_b^*) > 0$$

Where the inequality follows from the fact that:

$$\begin{aligned} u_b'(K_b^*) &= v'(E_b^b(K_b^*) + F(K_b^*))(F'(K_b^*) + E_b^{b'}(K_b^*)) - (c'(E_b^b(K_b^*)) + \gamma d_g)E_b^{b'}(K_b^*) \\ &< v'(E_b^b(K_b^*) + F(K_b^*))(F'(K_b^*) + E_b^{b'}(K_b^*)) - (c'(E_b^b(K_b^*)) + \gamma d_b)E_b^{b'}(K_b^*) = 1 - \beta \end{aligned}$$

where the last equality follows from the brown party's FOC in the second period. So the solution can't be at  $K_b^*$ .

Next, the left derivative at  $\bar{K}_b$  is:

$$\begin{aligned} & v'(F(\bar{K}_b))F'(\bar{K}_b) - 1 + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}(1-\theta)v'(F(\bar{K}_b))F'(\bar{K}_b) + \frac{\beta\theta}{1-\beta}u'_b(\bar{K}_b) \\ & < v'(F(\bar{K}_g))F'(\bar{K}_g) - 1 + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}(1-\theta)v'(F(\bar{K}_g))F'(\bar{K}_g) + \frac{\beta\theta}{1-\beta}u'_b(\bar{K}_b) \end{aligned}$$

where  $\bar{K}_g$  is the point which satisfies  $v'(F(K)) = c'(0) + \gamma d_g$ .

We can then put an upper bound on  $u'_b(\bar{K}_b)$ :

$$\begin{aligned} u'_b(\bar{K}_b) &= v'(F(\bar{K}_b))(F'(\bar{K}_b) + E_b^{b'}(\bar{K}_b)) - (c'(E_b^b(\bar{K}_b)) + \gamma d_g)E_b^{b'}(\bar{K}_b) \\ &\leq (c'(0) + \gamma d_g)F'(\bar{K}_b) = v'(F(\bar{K}_b))F'(\bar{K}_b) \end{aligned}$$

where the inequality used the fact that crowd out can be at most one-for-one, so  $E_b^{b'}(\bar{K}_b) \geq -F'(\bar{K}_b)$ . This result, combined with our earlier upper bound, says that the left derivative of the objective function at  $\bar{K}_b$  is negative.

So, any maximum is in the range  $(K_b^*, \bar{K}_b)$ . Within that range, the objective function is continuously differentiable.

There are two cases. The first is where  $K_1^* < K_g^*$ . In this case, the green party makes positive investment when they gain control in the second period. Following the same steps as in the proof of theorem 3, we can easily show that in any implementation of the optimum the green party must use zero subsidies in the second period and a carbon tax equal to  $d_g$  in all periods they have control. Similarly, the brown party must use a carbon tax equal to  $d_b$  whenever they have control. The green party's FOC for  $K_1$  is:

$$v'(E_b^g(K_1^*) + F(K_b^*))F'(K_1^*) - 1 + \beta(1-\theta) + \frac{\beta\theta}{1-\beta}u'_b(K_1^*) = 0$$

and the firm's FOC is:

$$v'(E_b^g(K_1^*) + F(K_b^*))F'(K_1^*) - 1 + s_1 + \beta(1-\theta) + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\theta u'_{bf}(K_1^*) = 0$$

where:

$$u_{bf}(K_1) \equiv v(F(K_1) + E_b^b(K_1)) - c(E_b^b(K_1)) - \gamma d_b E_b^b(K_1)$$

and we used the fact that prices in each period are equal to the marginal utility of consumption. Subtracting the firm and green party FOCs gives:

$$s_1 = \frac{\beta\theta}{1-\beta}(d_g - d_b)E_b^{b'}(K_1) = \frac{\beta\theta}{1-\beta}(d_g - d_b)\frac{dC_b(K_1)}{dx_1}$$

The second case is where  $K_1 \geq K_g^*$ . Here the green party's FOC for  $K_1$  is:

$$v'(E_b^g(K_1^*) + F(K_b^*))F'(K_1^*) - 1 + u'_g(K_1^*) + \frac{\beta\theta}{1-\beta}u'_b(K_1^*) = 0$$

And the firm's FOC is given by:

$$v'(E_b^g(K_1^*) + F(K_b^*))F'(K_1^*) - 1 + s_1 + \beta(1-\theta) + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\theta u'_{bf}(K_1^*) = 0$$

Subtracting these gives the same subsidy expression:

$$s_1 = \frac{\beta\theta}{1-\beta}(d_g - d_b)E_b^{b'}(K_1) = \frac{\beta\theta}{1-\beta}(d_g - d_b)\frac{dC_b(K_1)}{dx_1}$$