System Call Sandboxing

1. Introduction & Background

- System call: Talk to hardware through kernel (Figure 1)
- Sandboxing: Restrict system calls to minimal required set (Figure 2)
- **Problem:** Which calls to block and which ones to allow?
- **Solution:** Analyse applications, find out which calls are needed
- Gap: Static vs Dynamic analysis & Single vs Multi phase model (Figure 3)




Figure 2: Sandboxed flow

Single phase model Start Stop Multi phase model Stop Setup Main phase



Figure 4: The dynamic tracer

2. Research questions & Contributions

1. How can dynamic analysis method be used to identify the used system calls? 2. What is the runtime and accuracy of single phase model static analysis tools? 3. What is the runtime and accuracy of multi phase model static analysis tools?

- Dynamic analysis tool
- Analysis of various static analysis solutions
- Comparison of dynamic vs static and single phase vs multi phase approaches

Figure 1: Regular syscall flow

3. Dynamic tracer

- Gather list of system calls used, using ptrace
- Traces multiple processes & threads
- Records process structure and system calls (Figure 4)
- Supports multi phase tracing
- Requires exploration of many program states

4. Experiment setup

Test programs: ls (v8.22), sqlite3 (v3.22), redis (v4.0.9)


Environment: Ubuntu 18.04 Docker container

Analysis tools: Chestnut [1], Confine [4], temporal-specialization [3], sysfilter [2]


Figure 3: Single phase & multi phase model

Measurements: Runtime, Accuracy

5. Results & Discussion




Dynamic tracer blocks 14% more syscalls, than Sourecalyzer on average



Dynamic tracer is **4.5x** faster than Confine on average




Multi phase analysis blocks **11** more syscalls during the second phase than single phase analysis on average




Sourcealyzer is hardest to set up due to little setup instructions and a lot of compiling


6. Conclusion


Possible future work **Dynamic analysis Static analysis** Multi phase model Good amount of blocked system calls, Investigate if programs lose any Better security through more Allows for custom usage profile with slight underestimation fine-grained filters



system calls







References

[1] Claudio Canella, Mario Werner, Daniel Gruss, and Michael Schwarz. Automating seccomp filter generation for linux applications. In Proceedings of the 2021 on Cloud Computing Security Workshop, CCSW '21, page 139–151, New York, NY, USA, 2021. Association for Computing Machinery.

[2] Nicholas DeMarinis, Kent Williams-King, Di Jin, Rodrigo Fonseca, and Vasileios P. Kemerlis. sysfilter: Automated system call filtering for commodity software. In International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, 2020. [3] Seyedhamed Ghavamnia, Tapti Palit, Shachee Mishra, and Michalis Polychronakis. Temporal system call specialization for attack surface reduction. In Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium, SEC'20, USA, 2020. USENIX

[4] Seyedhamed Ghavamnia, Tapti Palit, Azzedine Benameur, and Michalis Polychronakis. Confine: Automated system call policy generation for container attack surface reduction. In International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, 2020