

of lines 4 and 5 between these algorithms are proved as

$$\begin{cases} x'^{a_1|s_i} \leftarrow x'^{a_1|s_i} + \gamma \\ \mathbf{x}' \leftarrow \text{Norm}(\mathbf{x}') \\ \Delta^{a_1|s_i} \leftarrow \frac{u^{\text{st}}(\mathbf{x}', \mathbf{y}) - u^{\text{st}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})}{\gamma} \end{cases} \quad (\text{A30})$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} x'^{a_1|s_i} \leftarrow x'^{a_1|s_i} + (1 - x'^{a_1|s_i})\gamma + O(\gamma^2) \\ x'^{a_2|s_i} \leftarrow x'^{a_2|s_i} - x'^{a_2|s_i}\gamma + O(\gamma^2) \\ \Delta^{a_1|s_i} \leftarrow \frac{u^{\text{st}}(\mathbf{x}', \mathbf{y}) - u^{\text{st}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})}{\gamma} \end{cases} \quad (\text{A31})$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} x'_i \leftarrow x'_i + (1 - x'_i)\gamma \\ \Delta_i \leftarrow \frac{u^{\text{st}}(\mathbf{x}', \mathbf{y}) - u^{\text{st}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})}{\gamma} \end{cases} \quad (\text{A32})$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} x'_i \leftarrow x'_i + \gamma \\ \Delta_i \leftarrow (1 - x'_i) \frac{u^{\text{st}}(\mathbf{x}', \mathbf{y}) - u^{\text{st}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})}{\gamma} \end{cases} \quad (\text{A33})$$

Here, we ignore terms of $O(\gamma^2)$ and use the definition of \mathbf{x} (i.e., $x'_i = x'^{a_1|s_i} = 1 - x'^{a_2|s_i}$) between Eqs. (A31) and (A32). Thus, we use the continualized version of this algorithm;

$$\dot{\mathbf{x}} = \mathbf{x} \circ (\mathbf{1} - \mathbf{x}) \circ \frac{\partial}{\partial \mathbf{x}} u^{\text{st}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}). \quad (\text{A34})$$

B.2 Approximation of learning dynamics

In **Section 4.2** and **5.1**, we introduce a method to approximate the learning dynamics up to k -th order terms for deviations from the Nash equilibrium. The stationary state condition of the one-memory two-action game is given by

$$\mathbf{p}^{\text{st}} = \mathbf{M} \mathbf{p}^{\text{st}}, \quad (\text{A35})$$

$$\mathbf{M} = \begin{pmatrix} x_1 y_1 & x_2 y_2 & x_3 y_3 & x_4 y_4 \\ x_1 \tilde{y}_1 & x_2 \tilde{y}_2 & x_3 \tilde{y}_3 & x_4 \tilde{y}_4 \\ \tilde{x}_1 y_1 & \tilde{x}_2 y_2 & \tilde{x}_3 y_3 & \tilde{x}_4 y_4 \\ \tilde{x}_1 \tilde{y}_1 & \tilde{x}_2 \tilde{y}_2 & \tilde{x}_3 \tilde{y}_3 & \tilde{x}_4 \tilde{y}_4 \end{pmatrix}. \quad (\text{A36})$$

Here, for any variable \mathcal{X} , we define $\tilde{\mathcal{X}} := 1 - \mathcal{X}$. In addition, let us denote $O(\delta^k)$ term in any variable \mathcal{X} as $\mathcal{X}^{(k)}$. The neighbor of the Nash equilibrium, by substituting $\mathbf{x} = x^* \mathbf{1} + \boldsymbol{\delta}$ and $\mathbf{y} = y^* \mathbf{1} + \boldsymbol{\epsilon}$, we can decompose $\mathbf{M} = \sum_{k=0}^2 \mathbf{M}^{(k)}$ as

$$\mathbf{M} = \underbrace{(\mathbf{x}^* \circ \mathbf{y}^*) \otimes \mathbf{1}}_{=\mathbf{M}^{(0)}} + \underbrace{(\mathbf{y}^* \circ \mathbf{1}_x) \otimes \boldsymbol{\delta} + (\mathbf{x}^* \circ \mathbf{1}_y) \otimes \boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{=\mathbf{M}^{(1)}} + \underbrace{\mathbf{1}_z \otimes (\boldsymbol{\delta} \circ \boldsymbol{\epsilon})}_{=\mathbf{M}^{(2)}}, \quad (\text{A37})$$

$$\mathbf{x}^* := (x^*, x^*, \tilde{x}^*, \tilde{x}^*), \quad \mathbf{y}^* := (y^*, \tilde{y}^*, y^*, \tilde{y}^*), \quad (\text{A38})$$

$$\mathbf{1}_x := (+1, +1, -1, -1)^T, \quad \mathbf{1}_y := (+1, -1, +1, -1)^T, \quad \mathbf{1}_z := \mathbf{1}_x \circ \mathbf{1}_y = (+1, -1, -1, +1)^T. \quad (\text{A39})$$

In the same way, we can decompose $\mathbf{p}^{\text{st}} \simeq \sum_{k=0} \mathbf{p}^{\text{st}(k)}$ as

$$\mathbf{p}^{\text{st}(0)} = \mathbf{M}^{(0)} \mathbf{p}^{\text{st}(0)} = \underbrace{(\mathbf{p}^{\text{st}(0)} \cdot \mathbf{1})}_{=1} \mathbf{x}^* \circ \mathbf{y}^* =: \mathbf{p}^*, \quad (\text{A40})$$

$$\mathbf{p}^{\text{st}(1)} = \mathbf{M}^{(1)} \mathbf{p}^{\text{st}(0)} = (\boldsymbol{\delta} \cdot \mathbf{p}^*) \mathbf{y}^* \circ \mathbf{1}_x + (\boldsymbol{\epsilon} \cdot \mathbf{p}^*) \mathbf{x}^* \circ \mathbf{1}_y, \quad (\text{A41})$$

$$\mathbf{p}^{\text{st}(2)} = \mathbf{M}^{(2)} \mathbf{p}^{\text{st}(0)} + \mathbf{M}^{(1)} \mathbf{p}^{\text{st}(1)} \quad (\text{A42})$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= (\boldsymbol{\delta} \circ \boldsymbol{\epsilon} \cdot \mathbf{p}^*) \mathbf{1}_z + \{(\boldsymbol{\delta} \cdot \mathbf{p}^*)(\boldsymbol{\delta} \circ \mathbf{y}^* \cdot \mathbf{1}_x) + (\boldsymbol{\epsilon} \cdot \mathbf{p}^*)(\boldsymbol{\delta} \circ \mathbf{x}^* \cdot \mathbf{1}_y)\} \mathbf{y}^* \circ \mathbf{1}_x \\ &\quad + \{(\boldsymbol{\delta} \cdot \mathbf{p}^*)(\boldsymbol{\epsilon} \circ \mathbf{y}^* \cdot \mathbf{1}_x) + (\boldsymbol{\epsilon} \cdot \mathbf{p}^*)(\boldsymbol{\epsilon} \circ \mathbf{x}^* \cdot \mathbf{1}_y)\} \mathbf{x}^* \circ \mathbf{1}_y. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A43})$$