Rapid Response Networks and Frameworks

Julian Neylan DISARM Foundation

EU CYBERNET SUMMER SCHOOL 2024

Cyber Crisis Management: Navigating Disinformation and Cyber Attacks in the AI Era

EU CyberNet

Federal Foreign Office

Funded by the European Union

Key Actors

G7 Rapid Response Group

European External Action Service

Military (NATO, various MODs)

National institutions (Viginum, NASK, FCDO, MFAs etc.)

Civil Society (FIMI-ISAC, Fact-Checkers, NGOs etc.)

These Groups first detect an incident or campaign

After detection, analysis of the data is required

EU CyberNet
Federal Foreign Office
Funded by the European Union

ABCDE Model

Actor Assets Account (who is it)

Behavior Actions by campaign (what are they doing)

Content Narrative Media (what are they saying)

Distribution Channel Target Reach (how far does their message go?)

Effect Engagement Impact (are there consequences?)

https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/ABC_Framework_2019_Sept_2019.pdf
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/adding-a-d-to-the-abc-disinformation-framework/
https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Pamment_-_Crafting_Disinformation_1.pdf

A-Attribution

Content Signals	Behavioral Signals	Technical Signals	Financial Signals
Text, images or video data contained within messages and/or websites are the focus of analysis	Rather than attending to what is communicated, behavioural analysis is concerned with how the distorting, distorting or deceptive activities are organized and conducted.	The focus here is upon the technological infrastructure used to mount an influence operation, in terms of IP addresses, particular servers and so forth	The financial data in making open-source attribution judgements. 19 ‘Following the money’

https://adacio.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ADACio-D1.2-%E2%80%93-Open-Source-Investigations-Field-Guide.pdf

B- DISARM Framework

Tactics

https://www.disarm.foundation/framework

Techniques



EU CyberNet

Federal Foreign Office

Funded by the European Union

Example from Recorded Future

Recorded Future Diamond Model for Influence Operations	
Influencer	Maduro Regime Venezuelan State-Sponsored Media Iranian State-Owned Media Iranian Proxy Media Organizations
Audience	International Government Officials Venezuelan Citizens Political Activists
Capabilities	T0002: Facilitate State Propaganda T0018: Purchase Targeted Advertisements T0101: Create Localized Content T0023: Distort Facts T0086: Develop Image-Based Content T0085.003: Develop Inauthentic News Articles T0084: Reuse Existing Content T0087: Develop Video-Based Content T0117: Attract Traditional Media T0126: Encourage Attendance at Events T0060: Continue to Amplify T0131.001: Legacy Web Content
Infrastructure	Venezuelan and Iranian Governments' Official Communications Graffiti Billboards/Posters teleSUR HispanTV Al Mayadeen

C- Content- INFOTESTER

INFOTESTER

1. **Cherry Picking** — presenting information using only data supporting a given thesis, while ignoring the wider context.
2. **Quote Mining** — using a short fragment of someone's longer speech in a way that significantly distorts its real, original tone.
3. **Anecdote** — the use of evidence in the form of personal experience or an isolated case, possibly rumour or hearsay, most often to discredit statistics.
4. **Whataboutism** — responding to a substantive argument not by addressing the heart of the matter, but by raising a new point that is unrelated to the topic under discussion. Often referred to as tossing a false lead to distract attention from the topic (*Red Herring*). Technique typical of Russian propaganda.

D- Breakout Scale



https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-breakout-scale-measuring-the-impact-of-influence-operations/

Social Media Diffusion

- Originators
  - accounts that originate the narrative
- Amplifiers
  - accounts that amplify the narrative
- True Believers
  - legitimate users who buy into the narrative and amplify it
- Opportunists
  - accounts that hijack the narrative and amplify it for a different agenda



Example: Detecting Anomalous Engagement

- C = Coefficient of Traffic Manipulation
- C = R/10 + F + U
- R = % Retweets
- F = % traffic from top 50 users
- U = average posts per user

Phrase	R/10	F	U	Coefficient
Friday	4.966	1.48	1.22	7.666
#4thofJuly	5.834	1.78	1.17	8.784
Thursday	6.396	1.63	1.21	9.236
Covfefe	5.561	2.27	2.14	9.971
Wednesday	6.931	2.50	1.24	10.671
Davos 1	6.617	2.85	1.54	11.007
Davos 2	7.512	2.82	1.59	11.922
Tamim the Glorious	7.74	2.43	3.65	13.82
Qadhafi of the Gulf	9.495	4.11	2.94	16.545
#DigDoug	6.678	19.78	4.78	31.238
#LaFranceVoteMarine	8.484	24.23	5.31	38.024
#LePionMacron	8.928	27.82	5.94	42.688
#StopAstroturfing	8.727	34.99	6.61	50.327
#Marine2017	8.705	35.83	8.81	53.345

https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/posts/measuring-traffic-manipulation-on-twitter/

EU CyberNet
Federal Foreign Office
Funded by the European Union

E- Effect

Courtesy of Daniel J. Solove

- *Deception:* Did someone act upon deceptive content? how do you know? surveys? polls? focus groups?
- *Freedom of Speech:* is there censorship? who is being censored? is there a chilling effect? whose speech is suppressed?
- *Harm:* Is there a chance of real-world harm? to whom? how extensive? how would you know? user reports? news reports?

DI.PROTOCOLS.1 Protocols for Information sharing and structured data

EU CyberNet

Federal Foreign Office

Funded by the European Union

Frame Harms Through a Human Rights Lens

Threats to personal and community safety

Violation of dignity

Harm to health and well-being

Invasion of privacy

Hate and discrimination

Deception and manipulation

World Economic Forum Online Harms Typology

DI.PROTOCOLS.1 Protocols for Information sharing and structured data

EU CyberNet

Federal Foreign Office

Funded by the European Union

Other useful frameworks for contextualizing incidents



Source

https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-threats-a-comprehensive-resilience-ecosystem/

RUSSIA IN WESTERN BALKANS (INFLUENCE)



2018—2021

- **Financing cultural groups and think tanks** to spread Russophile views and culture.
  C2/C3→C1→G2 Influenced cultural sensibilities at local level (C1) and societies and public administration at national level (G2).
- **Promoting and exploiting corruption** aimed to undermine the development.
  G2→G3→S1/S2 It had a negative impact on the entire region (G3), harming local and national economic development (S1/S2).
- **Exploiting vulnerabilities in public administration** to undermine its efficiency.
  G2→G1→G3 Poor governance led to discontent at the local level (G1), which affected the entire region (G3).
- **Support of political actors** who represent pro-Russia views.
  G2→G3→C2 Affected Russia's influence in the region (G3) and polarised societies (C2).
- **Infiltration and intelligence preparation** by Russian services.
  G2→G3 Covert expansion of military influence affected the entire region (G3).

Source

UNIDIR



https://unidir.org/introducing-a-new-framework-to-analyze-ict-activities/

Diamond Model for Influence

- CCP
- Spokesperson, MoFA, Zhao Lijian
- Chinese state-affiliated news

- COVID-19 came from US, not China
- Political Cartoons



- International audiences
- Chinese nationals
- Chinese and English language speakers
- US audiences

- State-sponsored TV
- Global Times
- Weibo
- WeChat
- Western social media
- Disinformation sites

https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/white-papers/diamond-model-influence-operations-analysis.pdf