

The Effects of More Informative Grading in Early Schooling: Evidence from Sweden

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Background & Motivation

Motivation

- Driving efficiencies in inputs to the education production function is a pillar of education policy - grading feedback is one such input
- Education production is increasing in student motivation and effort
- Can the framing of grading feedback be leveraged to improve student outcomes?

This Paper

- Using register data, we examine the effect of receiving finer grades in early schooling
- Exploiting a nationwide reform to the grading scale in Swedish compulsory schools, we use a difference-in-discontinuity design to identify the effects of this reform on long-term educational outcomes
- We supplement this approach with data from other sources to identify the mechanisms through which these effects occur
- Using a surrogate index, we estimate the long-term effect on earnings

Results Preview

We find evidence of negative medium and long-term consequences of receiving finer grades.

- At high school-level, the likelihood of completing an academic track, a STEM track or completing high school at all fell by 2-3 p.p.
- At university-level, boys are ca. 2 p.p. less likely to enroll in a STEM track
- We estimate a reduction in average earnings between ages 28-30 of ca. 1.15%
- We identify confidence in one's academic ability and mental health as mechanisms through which these effects occur

Literature and Contribution

Previous Literature

- Literature on extensive margin of receiving grading feedback
 - Bandiera, et al. (2015), Fischer & Sliwka (2018), Möbius, et al. (2014)
- Literature on relative grading feedback in education
 - Azmat & Iriberry (2010), Azmat, et al. (2018), Fischer & Wagner (2017), Goulas & Megalokonomou (2015), Tran & Zeckhauser (2012)

Previous Literature

- Most similar to us:
 - Jalava, et al. (2015)
 - Experiment randomising students into grading scales prior to a math test
 - Positive but insignificant effect of A-F grades, relative to continuous score
- Our Contribution:
 - First to use register data to examine finer grading
 - First to look at non-immediate outcomes of finer grading

Data & Institutional Context

The Swedish school system

- The Swedish school system:
 - 1st-9th grade in compulsory school, followed by 10th-12th grade in high school.
 - Students start first grade in Autumn of the year they turn 7.
- Students born in 1996 and earlier received grades from 8th grade onwards on a scale with three passing grades: godkänt (pass), väl godkänt (\sim pass with distinction) and mycket väl godkänt (\sim pass with special distinction).
- In 2011 a reform was passed which led to the introduction of a new grading scale, which was then implemented in 2012. This meant that students born in 1997 or later received grades on a scale with 5 passing grades (A/B/C/D/E).

The Reform

The change in scale was part of a larger reform:

- In 2011, a new curriculum for the Swedish compulsory school was introduced, affecting students born in 1996 and later.
 - The goal of the new curriculum was to re-write the syllabus of each course to ensure greater clarity.
- In 2011-12, the new grading scale was introduced.
 - This only affected those entering 8th grade from 2011 onward, so those in 9th grade continued under the old scale.
- In 2013-14 and onward students entering 7th grade began receiving grades from 7th grade.
- In 2013-14 and onward students entering 6th grade began receiving grades from 6th grade.

Reform Exposure

Cohort	5th Grade	6th Grade	7th Grade	8th Grade	9th Grade
1991	-	-	-	G/VG/MVG	G/VG/MVG
1992	-	-	-	G/VG/MVG	G/VG/MVG
1993	-	-	-	G/VG/MVG	G/VG/MVG
1994	-	-	-	G/VG/MVG	G/VG/MVG
1995	-	-	-	G/VG/MVG	G/VG/MVG
1996	-	-	-	G/VG/MVG	G/VG/MVG
1997	-	-	-	Letter Grades	Letter Grades
1998	-	-	-	Letter Grades	Letter Grades
1999	-	-	Letter Grades	Letter Grades	Letter Grades
2000	-	Letter Grades	Letter Grades	Letter Grades	Letter Grades

Reform Exposure

Cohort	5th Grade	6th Grade	7th Grade	8th Grade	9th Grade
1991	-	-	-	G/VG/MVG	G/VG/MVG
1992	-	-	-	G/VG/MVG	G/VG/MVG
1993	-	-	-	G/VG/MVG	G/VG/MVG
1994	-	-	-	G/VG/MVG	G/VG/MVG
1995	-	-	-	G/VG/MVG	G/VG/MVG
1996	-	-	-	G/VG/MVG	G/VG/MVG
1997	-	-	-	Letter Grades	Letter Grades
1998	-	-	-	Letter Grades	Letter Grades
1999	-	-	Letter Grades	Letter Grades	Letter Grades
2000	-	Letter Grades	Letter Grades	Letter Grades	Letter Grades

Swedish Register Data¹


- Births from 1991 to 1997
- High School leavers
- University enrolments: Up to spring semester at age 21
- University credits: Up to autumn at age 20
- Inpatient and outpatient health data: Up to middle of 9th grade

¹The data used in this paper comes from the Swedish Interdisciplinary Panel approved by the Regional Ethics Committee in Lund (2012/03).

Empirical Strategy


Identification

- Assignment to school cohort is based on date of birth
- This should lead us to an RD Design:




Identification

- This should lead us to an RD Design:
- BUT: Results confounded by school starting age effects




Identification

- BUT: Results confounded by school starting age effects
- Solution: Add placebo treatments to extract seasonal effect



Identification

- With real data:



- Difference-in-discontinuity model:

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \beta_0 \cdot 1[x_i \geq c] + \gamma_0 \cdot x_i + \gamma_1 \cdot 1[x_i \geq c] \cdot x_i \\ + A_i \cdot \{\alpha_1 + \beta_1 \cdot 1[x_i \geq c] + \gamma_2 \cdot x_i + \gamma_3 \cdot 1[x_i \geq c] \cdot x_i\} + \epsilon_i$$

- x_i = month of birth, centered around January 1st (c)
- A_i = indicator for birth in 12 month period around January 1st, 1997

Identification

- BUT: Non-compliance with school cohort assignment
- Solution: Fuzzy difference-in-discontinuity model:


$$S_i = \pi_0 + \delta_0 \cdot 1[x_i \geq c] + \rho_0 \cdot x_i + \rho_1 \cdot 1[x_i \geq c] \cdot x_i \\ + A_i \cdot \{\pi_1 + \delta_1 \cdot 1[x_i \geq c] + \rho_2 \cdot x_i + \rho_3 \cdot 1[x_i \geq c] \cdot x_i\} + \nu_i$$

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \beta_0 \cdot \hat{S}_i + \gamma_0 \cdot x_i + \gamma_1 \cdot \hat{S}_i \cdot x_i \\ + A_i \cdot \{\alpha_1 + \beta_1 \cdot \hat{S}_i + \gamma_2 \cdot x_i + \gamma_3 \cdot \hat{S}_i \cdot x_i\} + \epsilon_i$$


- x_i = month of birth, centered around January 1st (c)
- A_i = indicator for birth in 12 month period around January 1st, 1997
- S_i = indicator for being in school cohort with those born after January 1st, or later

Identification

- Compliance with assignment




Testing - Density of the running variable




Testing - Covariate Balance

Average Household Income



Testing - Covariate Balance

First Generation Immigrant



Results

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Results: High School Tracks

	Graduate High School	Academic track	Stem Track	Econ./Soc.Sci./ Hum. Track	Art Track
Grading Reform	-0.027*** (0.008)	-0.036*** (0.009)	-0.020*** (0.007)	0.000 (0.008)	-0.016*** (0.004)
Pre-reform mean	.792	.455	.168	.23	.0534
N	545,759	545,759	545,759	545,759	545,759

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Results: University

	Enrolled Spring Age 21	In Top 5 University	No. of credits passed]	STEM Track	Econ./Soc.Sci./ Hum. Track
Grading Reform	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.654* (0.370)	-0.013*** (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)
Pre-reform mean	.278	.127	9.22	.0837	.0527
N	541,301	541,301	541,301	508,014	508,014

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

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Gender Differences: High School

	Graduate High School	Academic track	Stem Track	Econ./Soc.Sci./ Hum. Track	Art Track
Grading Reform	-0.026** (0.011)	-0.039*** (0.012)	-0.028*** (0.010)	0.001 (0.010)	-0.011** (0.005)
Reform*Female	-0.003 (0.015)	0.005 (0.017)	0.016 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.008)
Pre-reform: boys	.766	.401	.194	.171	.0331
Pre-reform: girls	.819	.512	.14	.292	.0745
N	545,759	545,759	545,759	545,759	545,759

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Gender Differences: University

	Enrolled Spring Age 21	In Top 5 University	No. of credits passed	STEM Track	Econ./Soc.Sci./ Hum. Track
Grading Reform	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.796 (0.485)	-0.022*** (0.008)	0.006 (0.005)
Reform*Female	0.020 (0.015)	0.017 (0.011)	0.244 (0.739)	0.017* (0.010)	-0.010 (0.008)
Pre-reform: boys	.239	.104	7.81	.114	.0386
Pre-reform: girls	.319	.151	10.7	.0516	.0679
N	541,301	541,301	541,301	508,014	508,014

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.


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Surrogate Index

- Using adults born in 1985 and 1986 as surrogates, we predict average income between ages 28-30 for our sample as a function of our intermediate outcomes
- Athey et al. (2019): ATE of treatment on a surrogate index is equal to ATE on the true long-term outcome under the following assumptions:
 - Unconfoundedness
 - Comparability
 - Surrogacy

Income Age 28-30



Point estimate: - 2491.05 (643.546) [Regression table](#)

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The Health Behaviour of School Children survey



- Representative survey of 11, 13 and 15 year olds in over 50 countries/regions
- Undertaken by WHO every four years
- We use data from the 2002-2014 waves
- 1998 birth cohort were surveyed at age 11 in 2010 and age 15 in 2014

Identification Strategy

Triple Differences-in-differences, exploiting differences in responses:

- ① between age groups (15 v 11)
- ② between countries (Sweden v Denmark, Norway)
- ③ between birth cohorts (1998 v 1990, 1994)

Identification Strategy



Attitudes to School

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Very good	Good/ Very good	Average/ Good/ Very good
Academic Ability	-0.085*** (0.025)	-0.190*** (0.030)	-0.020 (0.012)
Pre-reform mean	.145	.581	.934
N	25,241	25,241	25,241
	A lot	A little/ A lot	Not much/ A little/ A lot
Like School	0.034 (0.033)	0.006 (0.027)	-0.014 (0.014)
Pre-reform mean	.125	.682	.908
N	25,241	25,241	25,241
	A lot	A little/ A lot	Some/ A little/ A lot
School Pressure	0.020 (0.023)	0.116***† (0.032)	0.118*** (0.028)
Pre-reform mean	.2	.482	.924
N	25,241	25,241	25,241

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

† evidence of non-parallel trends.

Mental Health (Register Data)

	(1) Any diagnosis	(2) No. of diagnoses
Health	0.002 (0.003)	0.015 (0.013)
Self-harm	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Drugs	0.001 (0.001)	0.003* (0.002)
Anxiety	0.001 (0.002)	0.006 (0.010)
Education	0.002 (0.002)	0.013* (0.008)
N	547,507	547,507

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$
*** $p < 0.01$.

Mental Health (HBSC Data)

	Monthly / more often	Weekly / more often	More than weekly / more often	Daily / more often
Irritable	0.010 (0.028)	0.033 (0.034)	0.046* (0.026)	0.013 (0.014)
Pre-reform mean	.88	.606	.321	.0729
N	25,241	25,241	25,241	25,241
Nervous	-0.025 (0.033)	-0.003 (0.031)	0.019 (0.023)	0.000 (0.011)
Pre-reform mean	.734	.41	.173	.0389
N	25,241	25,241	25,241	25,241
Difficulty Sleeping	0.094*** (0.036)	0.112*** (0.032)	0.105*** (0.028)	0.057*** (0.019)
Pre-reform mean	.642	.42	.245	.0931
N	25,241	25,241	25,241	25,241

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

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Placebo Tests: High School

	(1) Graduate High School	(2) Academic track	(3) Stem Track	(4) Econ./Soc.Sci./ Hum. Track	(5) Art Track
1992	0.005 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.001 (0.004)
1993	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.000 (0.004)
1994	-0.016** (0.007)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.007 (0.007)	0.001 (0.004)
1996	0.012 (0.008)	0.009 (0.009)	0.010 (0.007)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.004)
N	449,486	449,486	449,486	449,486	449,486

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Placebo Tests: University

	(1) Enrolled Spring Age 21	(2) In Top 5 University	(3) No. of credits passed	(4) STEM Track	(5) Econ./Soc.Sci./ Hum. Track
1992	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.024 (0.361)	0.001 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)
1993	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.550 (0.363)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)
1994	0.000 (0.008)	0.009 (0.006)	0.343 (0.368)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)
1996	0.011 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.262 (0.378)	0.009* (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)
N	445,536	445,536	445,536	417,045	417,045

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Other Robustness Checks

Randomisation Inference

Excluding specific control years

Adding covariates

Reduced bandwidth

Higher polynomial orders

Reduced form regressions

Summary

Summary/ Policy Implications

- Greater information reduces students self-confidence and affects mental health
- This leads to worse academic outcomes and less STEM enrolment
- We estimate that this has a negative long-term effect on earnings
- When it comes to the information content of grades, less is more

Thanks!

Questions/Suggestions?

Covariate Balance

	b	(se)
Total monthly births	-814.544	(511.889)
N	60	

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

[Back](#)

Covariate Balance

	b	(se)
Sex	0.005	(0.009)
Number of siblings	0.040	(0.027)
Birth order	0.005	(0.022)
Twins	0.004	(0.003)
Triplets or more	0.001***	(0.000)
Adoptive parents	0.003	(0.002)
Two adoptive parents	0.004**	(0.002)
Immigrant (1st generation)	0.003	(0.005)
Immigrant (2nd generation)	0.006	(0.005)
Mother has HS degree	-0.009	(0.005)
Mother has Uni. Degree	-0.010	(0.008)
Father has HS degree	-0.002	(0.006)
Father has Uni. degree	-0.005	(0.007)
Mother, STEM	-0.007	(0.005)
Father, STEM	0.003	(0.009)
Household income	-1803.401	(5794.428)
School class size	0.082	(0.095)
N	506,950	

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Surrogate Index

	Avg. Income Age 28-30
Grading Reform	-2491.05*** (643.546)
Pre-reform mean	218,136
N	508,014

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Randomisation Inference

Table: Randomisation Inference

	Original p-value	R.I. p-value
Finish High School	0.00	0.02
Academic Track High School	0.00	0.02
STEM Track High School	0.00	0.04
Econ./ Soc. Sci./ Hum. Track High School	0.98	0.49
Art Track High School	0.00	0.05
Enrolled in uni spring age 21	0.28	0.12
Enrolled in a top 5 university	0.83	0.44
University credits passed	0.08	0.00
STEM track university	0.01	0.13
Econ./ Soc. Sci./ Hum. Track university	0.84	0.46
Avg. Income aged 28-30 (Surrogate)	0.00	0.00

Excluding Control Years: High School

	(1) Graduate High School	(2) Academic track	(3) Stem Track	(4) Econ./Soc.Sci./ Hum. Track	(5) Art Track
1992	-0.025*** (0.008)	-0.039*** (0.009)	-0.021*** (0.007)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.016*** (0.004)
1993	-0.027*** (0.008)	-0.036*** (0.009)	-0.021*** (0.007)	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.016*** (0.004)
1994	-0.031*** (0.008)	-0.035*** (0.009)	-0.021*** (0.007)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.016*** (0.004)
1996	-0.024*** (0.008)	-0.034*** (0.009)	-0.018*** (0.007)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.016*** (0.004)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Excluding Control Years: University

	(1) Enrolled Spring Age 21	(2) In Top 5 University	(3) No. of credits finished	(4) STEM Track	(5) Econ./Soc.Sci./ Hum. Track
1992	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.659* (0.382)	-0.013** (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)
1993	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.795** (0.382)	-0.014*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.004)
1994	-0.008 (0.008)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.568 (0.382)	-0.015*** (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)
1996	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.596 (0.380)	-0.011** (0.005)	-0.000 (0.004)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Adding Covariates

	Graduate High School	Academic track	Stem Track	Econ./Soc.Sci./ Hum. Track	Art Track
Grading Reform	-0.023*** (0.007)	-0.032*** (0.008)	-0.018*** (0.006)	0.000 (0.007)	-0.015*** (0.004)
N	529,355	529,355	529,355	529,355	529,355
	Enrolled Spring Age 21	In Top 5 University	No. of credits passed	STEM Track	Econ./Soc.Sci./ Hum. Track
Grading Reform	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.604* (0.366)	-0.013*** (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)
N	525,236	525,236	525,236	492,535	492,535


Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Reduced Bandwidth

	Graduate High School	Academic track	Stem Track	Econ./Soc.Sci./ Hum. Track	Art Track
Grading Reform	-0.027** (0.012)	-0.027** (0.013)	-0.024** (0.010)	0.013 (0.012)	-0.016** (0.006)
N	260,780	260,780	260,780	260,780	260,780
	Enrolled Spring Age 21	In Top 5 University	No. of credits passed	STEM Track	Econ./Soc.Sci./ Hum. Track
Grading Reform	-0.012 (0.012)	0.000 (0.009)	-1.186** (0.568)	-0.016** (0.008)	0.008 (0.006)
N	258,653	258,653	258,653	242,763	242,763

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Higher Polynomial Orders



Higher Polynomial Orders

	Graduate High School	Academic track	Stem Track	Econ./Soc.Sci./ Hum. Track	Art Track
Grading Reform	-0.029** (0.012)	-0.030** (0.014)	-0.023** (0.011)	0.013 (0.012)	-0.020*** (0.007)
N	545,759	545,759	545,759	545,759	545,759
	Enrolled Spring Age 21	In Top 5 University	No. of credits passed	STEM Track	Econ./Soc.Sci./ Hum. Track
Grading Reform	-0.014 (0.013)	0.000 (0.009)	-1.383** (0.602)	-0.017** (0.008)	0.013** (0.007)
N	541,301	541,301	541,301	508,014	508,014

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Reduced Form Regressions

	Graduate High School	Academic track	Stem Track	Econ./Soc.Sci./ Hum. Track	Art Track
Grading Reform	-0.023*** (0.006)	-0.030*** (0.007)	-0.017*** (0.006)	0.000 (0.006)	-0.013*** (0.004)
N	545,759	545,759	545,759	545,759	545,759
	Enrolled Spring Age 21	In Top 5 University	No. of credits passed	STEM Track	Econ./Soc.Sci./ Hum. Track
Grading Reform	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.552* (0.312)	-0.011*** (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)
N	541,301	541,301	541,301	508,014	508,014

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.