

Subject: Re: [sacm] SCAM Use Case 5 "Define Security Policy"
Date: Tuesday, July 24, 2012 6:00:14 AM Pacific Daylight Time
From: Shawn Mullen (sent by <sacm-bounces@ietf.org>)
To: Baker, Jon, kathleen.moriarty@emc.com
CC: Stephen Whitlock, j.hietala@opengroup.org, sacm@ietf.org

Jon,

I believe it aligns exactly with the issues faced by industry CIO/CSOs. Yes, this is what we tried to address with ACEML. I equally believe the IETF process is perfectly suited to address this problem and vet the solution. I also still believe that a blend of SCAP/ACEML/other will be the optimal and probable solution.

As to Kathleen's comment/questions...

> From a conversation last week, we may want to have a use case on configuration management as well, before we get to enforcement, reporting, and remediation. It would be a building

> block along with the policy information suggested by Shawn. Any thoughts?

Yes I believe there is a foundational necessity for SACM to address of expressing security and IT governance principles in a policy that can be implemented and enforced by technology solutions. I'm currently on tour of Asia Pacific financial companies and this is a reoccurring theme.

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From: "Baker, Jon" <bakerj@mitre.org>
To: Shawn Mullen/Austin/IBM@IBMUS, "sacm@ietf.org" <sacm@ietf.org>
Cc: Stephen Whitlock <s.whitlock@opengroup.org>, "j.hietala@opengroup.org" <j.hietala@opengroup.org>
Date: 07/23/2012 08:08 PM
Subject: RE: [sacm] SCAM Use Case 5 "Define Security Policy"

How does the use case discussion you provided below align with the work the opengroup has done on ACEML?

Jon

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From: sacm-bounces@ietf.org [<mailto:sacm-bounces@ietf.org>] **On Behalf Of** Shawn Mullen
Sent: Monday, July 23, 2012 9:48 AM
To: sacm@ietf.org
Cc: Stephen Whitlock; j.hietala@opengroup.org
Subject: [sacm] SCAM Use Case 5 "Define Security Policy"

During the Washington DC 7/18/12 Open Group Conference Steve Hanna, John Banghart, and Kathleen Moriarty presented the SACM overview and called for participation. In particular they ask for review and contributions to the use case definition. Therefore I am proposing the following.

Looking at this form how a enterprise would roll-out or implement a SACM environment, I believe the first use case is a simple way to define or author a security policy. This defined policy bridges the organization's security principles and goals into a policy that form that can be applied to a system or used to check a system, e.g. XML. Formally stated I suggest UC5 as follows.

3.5 UC5 Define Security Policy

This use case provides a method for IT security principles and requirements to be expressed in a common descriptive language such as XML. This common descriptive language will define the organizations security policy. The security policy definition will be at a sufficiently high level to facilitate simplicity and ease of use. It will not require the author to specify the configuration methods and commands to implementation the policy on the differing IT devices. However it will be possible for the IT devices to bridge this high security policy into actionable configuration settings.

Given the above use case, a CIO or CSO can express the security and governance requirements in a single common security policy xml file. This single file can be applied to all IT devices such as servers, clients, network devices, etc. Given this state, UC1 can be attained, That is we now have a common security policy which can be assessment and enforced against.

A single security policy also facilitates UC4 making GRC reporting common no matter the device being assessed. That is high level security policy not only bridges the organization security principles into a device configuration it also provides the inverse for reporting devices assessment back up to the CIO/CSO level.

My other comment is on simplicity. Just like security should be built in and not bolted on. Simplicity should be clearly defined and built in. Complexity is the enemy of security. Not only does simplicity increase adoption it also eliminates the number of components to be trusted and reduces attack surfaces.

----- existing Use cases for reference -----

3.1. UC1: Assessment and Enforcement of Acceptable State

Controlling access to networks and services based on the assessment and analysis of host and/or network state based on machine processable content.

3.2. UC2: Behavioral Monitoring and Enforcement

Controlling access to networks and services based on the detection and analysis of host and/or user behavior using automatable information from various sources.

3.3. UC3: Security Control Verification and Monitoring

Continuous assessment of the implementation and effectiveness of security controls based on machine processable content.

3.4. UC4: Secure Exchange of Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC)

Information

Sharing security and/or operationally relevant information within and across trust boundaries using secure, automated communication channels and formats.

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