Supplementary Information for "Identity Conformity and Concealment in Taiwan and South Korea: Why Citizens in Divided Societies are Pressured to Overstate National Pride"

Appendix A Additional survey information

Taiwan and South Korea

From January to June 2024, native-born responses from 2,050 Taiwanese and 2,006 South Koreans were recorded. The recruitment process used Qualtrics' online panel. To ensure representativeness, quotas were established in alignment with the most up-to-date demographic parameters. Multiple quality assurance steps were included, incorporating Qualtrics' inbuilt quality control systems, manual attention checks, and specific questions designed to detect inattentiveness and validate manipulation and survey completion. Responses that failed our quality criteria were replaced following a thorough review and consultation with the Qualtrics project manager. We are confident that the final dataset comprises legitimate and valid survey responses. Tables A.1 and A.2 review the basic demographics of the panels.

North Korean Migrants

The sample of North Korean migrants was recruited in collaboration with Woorion, a nonprofit organization in South Korea dedicated to supporting North Korean defectors. Owing to Woorion's extensive involvement in educational assistance, vocational training, and community outreach for North Koreans, this partnership enabled a targeted and efficient recruitment process, ensuring that participants were both relevant to the study and actively engaged.

Participants in the North Korean migrant sample vary in age, background, and length of time since defection, capturing diverse experiences related to resettlement, discrimination, and social acceptance. The researchers worked alongside Woorion staff to verify respondents' identities and to address any quality concerns, including potential duplicates or incomplete surveys. Respondents spent no fewer than 15 years in North Korea and most considerably more. We are confident the sample constitutes a sample of fully or basically socialized citizens of the North Korean system. Between September 15 and October 29, 2023, 316 North

Korean migrants completed the survey. Woorion staff provided personalized guidance to respondents—either in person, online, or by telephone—to ensure participants fully understood each survey question and completed the survey accurately. Although this approach differs from traditional household surveys, the high degree of personalized support offered by Woorion significantly improves the reliability and validity of responses. Indeed, by fostering trust and clarity, this method is especially valuable for research intended to measure sensitive attitudes, such as preference falsification and social desirability, since respondents are encouraged and empowered to provide truthful and thoughtful answers in a supportive environment.

Notes on list experiment implementation

Research on list experiments indicates that in-person administration yields the most valid results, particularly among populations sensitive to social context or vulnerable to reputational pressures (Blair, Coppock & Moor, 2020). While our North Korean migrant sample was not interviewed face-to-face, many respondents completed the survey with NGO facilitator assistance (see Appendix A for notes). Notably, participation occurred in non-anonymous contexts, where respondents were likely aware that their identities were known to facilitators or researchers. These are conditions that are likely to heighten sensitivity to perceived social expectations. The design aligns with ethical norms for engaging vulnerable populations, even as it departs from the ideal of full interviewer administration ideal for a list experiment. The South Korean and Taiwanese samples were fielded via self-administered online surveys, which may have reduced the salience of social desirability pressures. Nonetheless, prior research demonstrates that even under conditions of full anonymity, respondents may still conform to perceived social norms when answering sensitive questions, due to internalized expectations or concerns about self-presentation (Paulhus, 1984; Tourangeau & Yan, 2007).

Variable	Count	Proportion
Age		
18-29	435	0.21
30-39	534	0.26
40-49	541	0.26
50-59	349	0.17
60-69	148	0.07
70+	43	0.02
Gender		
Male	1088	0.53
Female	962	0.47
Residence		
Taipei City	353	0.17
New Taipei City	461	0.22
Keelung City	27	0.01
Taoyuan City	211	0.10
Hsinchu City	39	0.02
Hsinchu County	37	0.02
Miaoli County	23	0.01
Yilan County	17	0.01
Taichung City	255	0.12
Changhua County	63	0.03
Nantou County	16	0.01
Yunlin County	31	0.02
Tainan City	177	0.09
Kaohsiung City	242	0.12
Chiayi City	23	0.01
Chiayi County	19	0.01
Pingtung County	33	0.02
Hualien County	10	0.00
Taitung County	8	0.00
Kinmen County	2	0.00
Penghu County	3	0.00
Education		
< University	544	0.27
>= University	1506	0.73

Table A.1: Sample Overview: Taiwan

Variable	Count	Proportion
Age		
19-29	440	0.22
30-39	366	0.18
40-49	414	0.21
50-59	422	0.21
60-69	266	0.13
70+	86	0.04
Sex		
Woman	909	0.46
Men	1085	0.54
Residence		
Busan	160	0.08
Daegu	107	0.05
Daejeon	63	0.03
Gangwon Province	46	0.02
Gwangju	64	0.03
Gyeonggi Province	456	0.23
Incheon	143	0.07
Ulsan	39	0.02
Sejong	12	0.01
Seoul	605	0.30
Jeju	19	0.01
North Chungcheong Province	42	0.02
North Gyeongsang Province	54	0.03
North Jeolla Province	36	0.02
South Chungcheong Province	42	0.02
South Gyeongsang Province	72	0.04
South Jeolla Province	34	0.02
Education		
< University	418	0.21
>= University	1576	0.79

Table A.2: Sample Overview: South Korea

Variable	Count	Proportion	WeightedProp
Age			
15-29	26	0.08	0.09
30-39	76	0.24	0.24
40-49	55	0.17	0.32
50-59	73	0.23	0.24
60+	85	0.27	0.10
Sex			
Woman	243	0.77	0.75
Men	72	0.23	0.25
Current Residence (Seoul/Other)			
Other	54	0.17	0.25
Seoul	261	0.83	0.75
Period of Residence			
1 to 3 years	15	0.05	0.01
3 to 5 years	46	0.15	0.12
5 to 10 years	90	0.29	0.23
10 or more years	164	0.52	0.64
Place of Birth			
Gangwon Province	12	0.04	0.03
Jagang Province	14	0.04	0.07
Kaesong	3	0.01	0.00
Nampo	1	0.00	0.00
North Hamgyong Province	113	0.38	0.28
North Hwanghae Province	15	0.05	0.07
North Pyongan Province	17	0.06	0.10
Pyongyang	18	0.06	0.10
Rason	2	0.01	0.00
Ryanggang Province	49	0.16	0.12
South Hamgyong Province	25	0.08	0.09
South Hwanghae Province	14	0.04	0.05
South Pyongan Province	23	0.08	0.09
Education in North Korea			
Elementary or below	17	0.05	0.05
Lower secondary (1-3 years)	40	0.13	0.17
Upper secondary (4-6 years)	147	0.47	0.49
2-year technical college, vocational high school	67	0.21	0.14
University (3-4 years)	44	0.14	0.15
Years lived in North Korea			
15-24	36	0.11	0.18
25-34	126	0.40	0.42
35-44	57	0.18	0.26
45-54	62	0.20	0.10
55-64	26	0.08	0.02
65-75	8	0.03	0.01

Table A.3: Sample Overview: North Korean Migrants

Appendix B Survey questions

B.1 Background questions

In this subsection, we provide the text used in background questions.

- What was your assigned sex at birth? [All]
  - Man
  - Woman
- In what year were you born? [All]
  - (validated input line)
- Where do you currently reside? [Taiwan]
  - Taipei City
  - New Taipei City
  - Keelung City
  - Taoyuan City
  - Hsinchu City
  - Hsinchu County
  - Miaoli County
  - Taichung City
  - Changhua County
  - Nantou County
  - Yunlin County
  - Tainan City
  - Kaohsiung City
  - Chiayi City
  - Chiayi County
  - Pingtung County
  - Hualien County
  - Taitung County
  - Kinmen County
  - Penghu County

  - Yilan County

- Where do you currently reside? [South Koreans, North Korean migrants]
  - Seoul
  - Busan
  - Daegu
  - Incheon
  - Gwangju
  - Daejeon
  - Ulsan
  - Sejong
  - Gyeonggi
  - Kangwon
  - Chungbuk
  - Chungnam
  - Cheonbuk
  - Cheonnam
  - Gyeongbuk
  - Gyeongnam
  - Jeju

- Please use a scale of 0 to 10 to indicate how much you consider yourself Taiwanese. A score of 0 means *not Taiwanese at all* and a score of 10 means *completely Taiwanese.* What score would you choose?
  - (slider from 0 to 10)

- Please use a scale of 0 to 10 to indicate the extent to which you consider yourself Chinese, with 0 meaning *not Chinese at all* and 10 meaning *completely Chinese.* How many points would you choose?
  - (slider from 0 to 10)

- How strongly do you feel about your national identity? [South Koreans, North Korean migrants]
  - 0 points means you *don't feel South Korean at all*, 10 points means you *feel very South Korean.*
  - (slider from 0 to 10)

- In what year did you leave North Korea? [North Korean migrants only]

  - (validated input line)

- In what year did you arrive in South Korea? [North Korean migrants only]
  - (validated input line)
- Which party would you vote for if there was a national election tomorrow? [South Koreans only]
  - People's Power Party
  - Minjoo Party
  - Justice Party
  - Basic Income Party
  - Progressive Party
  - Transition Korea
  - Hope of Korea
  - I don't know
- What is the highest level of education you have achieved? [South Koreans only]
  - No Formal Education
  - Elementary school or lower
  - Middle school
  - High school
  - Some college (including technical school)
  - University
  - Graduate school and above
  - Other (e.g., Seodang)
- What is your place of birth in North Korea?
  - Gangwon Province
  - Jagang Province
  - Kaesong
  - Nampo
  - North Hamgyong Province
  - North Hwanghae Province
  - North Pyongan Province
  - Pyongyang
  - Rason

  - Ryanggang Province
  - South Hamgyong Province
  - South Hwanghae Province
  - South Pyongan Province

- What is the highest level of education you achieved in North Korea?
  - Elementary or below
  - Lower secondary (1–3 years)
  - Upper secondary (4–6 years)
  - 2-year technical college, vocational high school
  - University (3–4 years)

B.2 List Experiments: Taiwan

Next, we provide the text used in the list experiments and the direct questions for the Taiwan sample.

- List experiment: How many of the following statements apply to you? (Taiwanese pride treatment)
  - I believe hard work is important to success.
  - I often spend time with friends.
  - I value cooperation in group settings.
  - I am proud to be Taiwanese. *(treatment item)*

- List experiment: How many of the following statements apply to you? (Chinese pride treatment)
  - I believe hard work is important to success.
  - I often spend time with friends.
  - I value cooperation in group settings.
  - I am proud to be Chinese. *(treatment item)*

- List experiment: How many of the following statements apply to you? (Taiwan independence treatment)
  - Everyone should participate in community service at least once per year.
  - People should sort their household waste for recycling.
  - In the past three months, I have signed a petition or submitted a complaint.
  - I support Taiwan independence. *(treatment item)*

- Direct question: To what extent do you agree with the following statement? "I support Taiwan independence."
  - Agree
  - Disagree
  - Not sure
- Direct question: To what extent do you agree with the following statement? "I feel proud to be Taiwanese."
  - Agree
  - Disagree
  - Not sure
- Direct question: To what extent do you agree with the following statement? "I feel proud to be Chinese."
  - Agree
  - Disagree
  - Not sure
- Question: Where is your father from?
  - Taiwanese Hokkien
  - Taiwanese Hakka
  - Taiwanese Indigenous
  - Mainlander from various provinces of China
  - Waishengren in Taiwan
  - Southeast Asian origin
  - Other foreigner
  - Other

B.3 List Experiments: Korea

Lastly, we provide the text used in the list experiments and the direct questions for the Korean samples.

- List experiment: How many of the following statements do you agree with? (*South Korean and North Korean migrant pride treatment*)
  - I believe hard work is important to success.
  - I enjoy working in teams.

  - I think saving money is important.
  - I prefer to plan things in advance.
  - I am proud to be South Korean. *(treatment item)*

- List experiment: How many of the following statements do you agree with? (*alternative South Korean identity treatment*)
  - I believe hard work is important to success.
  - I enjoy working in teams.
  - I think saving money is important.
  - I prefer to plan things in advance.
  - I support maintaining the division between North and South Korea. *(treatment item)*

- List experiment: How many of the following statements do you agree with? (*additional North Korean pride treatment*)
  - I believe hard work is important to success.
  - I enjoy working in teams.
  - I think saving money is important.
  - I prefer to plan things in advance.
  - I am proud to be from North Korea. *(treatment item)*

- Direct question: How proud are you to be South Korean? (*South Koreans and North Korean migrants*)
  - Very proud
  - Somewhat proud
  - Not very proud
  - Not at all proud

- Direct question: How proud are you to be from North Korea? (*North Korean migrants only*)
  - Very proud
  - Somewhat proud
  - Not very proud
  - Not at all proud

Appendix C Balance Tests

Tables C.1-C.4 present balance tests for the list experiments across co-variates used as controls for the models used in this study.

Taiwan

The political identification variable was constructed based on respondents' party support). To align with Taiwan's ideological landscape, we classified parties into three categories: Left, Right, and Center. Left-leaning parties, such as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), New Power Party (NPP), and Taiwan Statebuilding Party (TSP), advocate for progressive policies and stronger Taiwanese identity. Right-leaning parties, including the Kuomintang (KMT), New Party, People First Party (PFP), and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), are generally associated with conservative policies and closer ties with China. The Center category includes parties that do not fit neatly into the left-right spectrum, such as the Taiwan People's Party (TPP), Green Party, and Social Democratic Party, as well as respondents who selected "Other Parties" or did not answer.

Covariate	**Control**	**Treatment**	**p-value**
Age (median = 1, else 0)	0.53	0.51	0.545
Female	0.46	0.48	0.376
University education (1, else 0)	0.75	0.71	0.129
Political Identification: Center	0.50	0.50	0.636
Political Identification: Left	0.24	0.26	0.636
Political Identification: Right	0.25	0.24	0.636

Table C.1: Balance Table: Taiwan, pride in being Taiwanese

Note: Values represent proportions for each covariate. P-values are from Kruskal–Wallis one-way ANOVA tests assessing differences between treatment and control groups.

Covariate	Control	Treatment	p-value
Age (median = 1, else 0)	0.52	0.52	0.897
Female	0.47	0.47	0.884
University education (1, else 0)	0.72	0.76	0.061
Political Identification: Center	0.50	0.50	0.582
Political Identification: Left	0.26	0.24	0.582
Political Identification: Right	0.24	0.26	0.582

Table C.2: Balance Table: Taiwan, pride in being Chinese

Note: Values represent proportions for each covariate. P-values are from Kruskal–Wallis one-way ANOVA tests assessing differences between treatment and control groups.

South and North Koreans

For South Korea, we use a self-reported ideological scale as our primary measure of political orientation rather than party identification because partisan affiliation in South Korea is fluid and often does not map cleanly onto ideological divisions. Given the prevalence of party switching among elites and weak long-term party attachments among voters, using partisanship alone risks conflating party loyalty with ideological commitments. The scale-based measure of political orientation asked respondents to place themselves on a 10-point ideological spectrum, where 1 represents the most progressive (left-leaning) position, 10 represents the most conservative (right-leaning) position, and values in between indicate varying degrees of ideological moderation or centrism (i.e., 5-6).

A similar approach was considered for Taiwan, but we ultimately relied on party identification instead. Our analysis revealed that the scale-based measure systematically underrepresented conservatives, likely due to social desirability bias or differing interpretations of ideological positioning in the Taiwanese political context. This distortion would have led to a misclassification of respondents, particularly among those who align with the Kuomintang (KMT) or other right-leaning parties but may not self-identify as conservative on an abstract scale.

Covariate	Control	Treatment	p-value
Age (median = 1, else 0)	0.52	0.51	0.418
Female	0.48	0.50	0.302
University education (1, else 0)	0.82	0.80	0.323
Political Identification: Centrist	0.52	0.55	0.381
Political Identification: Conservative	0.20	0.20	0.381
Political Identification: Progressive	0.27	0.25	0.381

Table C.3: Balance Table: South Koreans, pride in being South Korean

Note: Values represent proportions for each covariate. P-values are from Kruskal–Wallis one-way ANOVA tests assessing differences between treatment and control groups.

Covariate	Control	Treatment	p-value
Female	0.74	0.78	0.518
Time in North Korea (median = 1, else 0)	0.48	0.52	0.444
Time in South Korea (median = 1, else 0)	0.45	0.55	0.088

Table C.4: Balance Table: North Koreans, pride being from North Korea

Note: Values represent proportions for each covariate. P-values are from Kruskal–Wallis one-way ANOVA tests assessing differences between treatment and control groups.

Covariate	Control	Treatment	p-value
Female	0.75	0.77	0.608
Time in North Korea (median = 1, else 0)	0.51	0.49	0.680
Time in South Korea (median = 1, else 0)	0.55	0.46	0.111

Table C.5: Balance Table: North Koreans, pride being South Korean

Note: Values represent proportions for each covariate. P-values are from Kruskal–Wallis one-way ANOVA tests assessing differences between treatment and control groups.

Appendix D Identity Measurement

Taiwan

Here, we show the distribution of Taiwanese and Chinese identity measures in more detail. Figure D.1 illustrates the distribution of respondents' self-assessed Taiwanese identity. The histogram reveals a heavily right-skewed distribution, with a substantial portion of respondents selecting the highest possible score of 10. Indeed, the median value for the Taiwanese identity strength measure is 10, indicating that most participants report very strong Taiwanese identification. Because of this skew, we code only those who answered exactly 10 as having an unequivocally strong Taiwanese identity (i.e., we set the binary indicator, `twidstrength`, to 1).

By contrast, Figure D.2 shows the distribution of Chinese identity. Unlike the Taiwanese identity measure, the distribution of Chinese identity is more diffuse. Many respondents cluster at low scores (0–1), while a second, noticeable cluster appears at higher values. The median of 3 suggests that a majority of respondents do not strongly identify as Chinese. Nonetheless, a sizable tail exists toward the upper end of the scale. We draw a dashed line at the 75th percentile (a score of 5) to highlight respondents with stronger Chinese identification. In our analyses, respondents scoring at or above this threshold are coded as having a "high" Chinese identity (i.e., we set `chineseidstrength` to 1).

As noted in the manuscript, we construct our final identity measures based on these binary indicators. A respondent is coded as a Taiwanese-only identifier if they report maximal Taiwanese identity and do not exhibit high Chinese identity. A respondent is coded as a Taiwanese-Chinese identifier if they report a high Chinese identity while also reporting meaningful Taiwanese identification. Table D.1 shows the final proportions for each group.

In addition to these main subgroups, we also consider a historically salient subgroup distinction between *Benshengren* (local Hokkien or Hakka paternal origin) and *Waishengren* (Mainlander paternal origin). Following standard practice in Taiwan surveys, we code pater-

nal origin as the basis for classification: *Benshengren* include respondents of local Hokkien or Hakka descent, while Waishengren include respondents of Mainlander descent who arrived with or after the Kuomintang in the late 1940s. This subgroup split allows us to assess whether conformity pressures are stronger for the modal group (*Benshengren*) than for minority-origin groups (*Waishengren*). Table D.2 summarizes the distribution of these subgroups in our sample.

Identity Group	**n**	**Proportion**
Taiwanese-only Identifier	861	0.42
Taiwanese-Chinese Identifier	328	0.16
Other / Neither	861	0.42
Total	2,050	1.00

Table D.1: Distribution of Taiwanese and Taiwanese-Chinese identifiers in the Taiwan sample.

Background	**n**	**Proportion**
Benshengren (Taiwanese Background)	1,687	0.82
Waishengren (Mainland Background)	291	0.14
Neither	72	0.04
Total	2,050	1.00

Table D.2: Distribution of Benshengren and Waishengren respondents in Taiwan sample.



Figure D.1: Distribution of Taiwanese identity strength.

Note: The dashed red line indicates the 75th percentile. Values range from 0 to 10, where 10 represents the strongest possible Taiwanese identity.



Figure D.2: Distribution of Chinese identity strength.

Note: The dashed red line indicates the 75th percentile. Values range from 0 to 10, where 10 represents the strongest possible Chinese identity.

D.1 South Korea

Figure D.3 presents the distribution of South Korean national identity strength, measured on a 0-10 scale, where higher values indicate stronger identification with South Korea. The histogram displays the frequency of responses across this scale.

The dashed red vertical line marks the median of the distribution, providing a reference point for central tendency. This indicates the score at which half of the respondents report a national identity strength above this value (coded as a "strong national identity"), and half report below ("weak national identity").



Figure D.3: Distribution of South Korean identity strength.

Note: The dashed red line indicates the 75th percentile. Values range from 0 to 10, where 10 represents the strongest possible South Korean identity.

Appendix E Additional Analysis

To evaluate whether social desirability pressures extend beyond national pride, we include additional list experiments focused on politically sensitive issues in each country. These help assess the scope of preference falsification and provide a robustness check for our main findings. This appendix presents additional list experiment results referenced in the "Additional Findings" subsection of the Findings.

These supplemental results reinforce the pattern observed in the main analysis: social desirability pressures are issue-specific and most pronounced when attitudes are closely tied to dominant identity narratives or perceived loyalty to the state.

Taiwan

In Taiwan, we included a list experiment on support for a formal declaration of independence using the same Qualtrics survey as our primary pride items. As shown in Figure E.1, we find no meaningful difference between direct and list responses, even among Taiwanese-Chinese dual identifiers. This suggests that, despite the political salience of independence, it is less subject to social desirability pressures than expressions of Taiwanese identity.



Figure E.1: Support for a Declaration of Independence in Taiwan by Identity Group

Note: Figure shows estimated proportions of respondents in Taiwan who support a formal declaration of independence, based on both direct (self-reported) and list-experiment measures. Respondents are grouped by strength of Taiwanese identity (strong vs. weak). List estimates are derived from linear probability models; direct responses are modeled using logistic regression. Models control for age, sex, education, and political identification. Error bars represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. The "difference" column reflects the gap between list and direct responses and captures potential social desirability bias. Results suggest relatively limited misreporting across groups, indicating that public support for independence may be less normatively sensitive than expressions of national identity.

South Korea

For South Korea, we analyze out-of-sample data from a 2021 Rakuten Insight online panel, quota-matched by age, gender, and region. This dataset includes list experiments on two issues: abolishing the National Security Act (NSA) and opposing Korean unification, originally collected for a [**TEMPORARILY REDACTED STUDY**]. As shown in Figure E.2, we find a substantial 29-point gap on the NSA item—indicating significant preference falsification on an issue tied to loyalty and national security. In contrast, responses to the unification question show no significant difference, suggesting that unification no longer functions as a normatively enforced stance.



Figure E.2: Opposition to NSA Abolition and Unification in South Korea

Note: Figure shows estimated proportions of respondents in South Korea who oppose abolishing the National Security Act (NSA) and unification with North Korea, based on both direct (self-reported) and list-experiment measures. The left panel represents attitudes toward abolishing the NSA; the right panel shows opposition to unification. List estimates are based on linear probability models; direct responses are modeled using logistic regression. Estimates control for age, sex, education, and political identification. Error bars represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. The "difference" column reflects the gap between list and direct responses and captures potential social desirability bias. Results suggest notable conformity pressures on NSA support, whereas views on unification appear less normatively policed.

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