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Department of CSE, NIIT University, Neemrana  
Rajasthan

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Subject- Cryptography

Faculty-  
Vivek Kumar Anand

# Hash Functions


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- condenses arbitrary message to fixed size

$$h = H(M)$$

- usually assume hash function is public
- hash used to detect changes to message
- want a cryptographic hash function
  - computationally infeasible to find data mapping to specific hash (one-way property)
  - computationally infeasible to find two data to same hash (collision-free property)

# Cryptographic Hash Function




# Message Authentication

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
- ❑ Message authentication is a mechanism or service used to verify the integrity of a message.
- ❑ Message authentication assures that data received are exactly as sent (i.e., there is no modification, insertion, deletion, or replay).
- ❑ When a hash function is used to provide message authentication, the hash function value is often referred to as a **message digest**.

# Hash Functions & Message Authentication



# Hash Functions & Message Authentication


- ❑ The message plus concatenated hash code is encrypted using symmetric encryption. Because only A and B share the secret key, the message must have come from A and has not been altered.
- ❑ The hash code provides the structure or redundancy required to achieve authentication. Because encryption is applied to the entire message plus hash code, confidentiality is also provided.





# Hash Functions & Message Authentication


Only the hash code is encrypted, using symmetric encryption. This reduces the processing burden for those applications that do not require confidentiality.



# Hash Functions & Message Authentication

It is possible to use a hash function but no encryption for message authentication. The technique assumes that the two communicating parties share a common secret value  $S$ .


A computes the hash value over the concatenation of  $M$  and  $S$  and appends the resulting hash value to  $M$ . Because B possesses  $S$ , it can recompute the hash value to verify. Because the secret value itself is not sent, an opponent cannot modify an intercepted message and cannot generate a false message.





# Hash Functions & Message Authentication

Confidentiality can be added to the approach of method (c) by encrypting the entire message plus the hash code.




# Digital Signature

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- ❑ Another important application, which is similar to the message authentication application, is the **digital signature**.
- ❑ The operation of the digital signature is similar to that of the MAC. In the case of the digital signature, the hash value of a message is encrypted with a user's private key.
- ❑ Anyone who knows the user's public key can verify the integrity of the message that is associated with the digital signature.


# Hash Functions & Digital Signatures



# Hash Functions & Digital Signatures


The hash code is encrypted, using public-key encryption with the sender's private key. As with Figure, this provides authentication.

It also provides a digital signature, because only the sender could have produced the encrypted hash code. In fact, this is the essence of the digital signature technique.



# Hash Functions & Digital Signatures

If confidentiality as well as a digital signature is desired, then the message plus the private-key-encrypted hash code can be encrypted using a symmetric secret key. This is a common technique.





# Two Simple Insecure Hash Functions

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- ❑ consider two simple insecure hash functions
- ❑ bit-by-bit exclusive-OR (XOR) of every block
  - ❑  $C_i = b_{i1} \text{ xor } b_{i2} \text{ xor } \dots \text{ xor } b_{im}$
  - ❑ a longitudinal redundancy check
  - ❑ reasonably effective as data integrity check
- ❑ one-bit circular shift on hash value
  - ❑ for each successive *n-bit* block
    - ❑ rotate current hash value to left by 1bit and XOR block
  - ❑ good for data integrity but useless for security

# Other Hash Function Uses

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To create a one-way password file

- store hash of password not actual password

For intrusion detection and virus detection

- keep & check hash of files on system

Pseudorandom function (PRF) or pseudorandom number generator (PRNG)

# Define : Preimage

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- ❑ For a hash value  $h = H(x)$ , we say that  $x$  is the **preimage** of  $h$ . That is,  $x$  is a data block whose hash function, using the function  $H$ , is  $h$ .
- ❑ Because  $H$  is a many-to-one mapping, for any given hash value  $h$ , there will in general be multiple preimages.
- ❑ A **collision** occurs if we have  $x \neq y$  and  $H(x) = H(y)$ . Because we are using hash functions for data integrity, collisions are clearly undesirable.

# Hash Function Requirements

Requirement	Description
Variable input size	H can be applied to a block of data of any size.
Fixed output size	H produces a fixed-length output.
Efficiency	$H(x)$ is relatively easy to compute for any given $x$ , making both hardware and software implementations practical.
Preimage resistant (one-way property)	For any given hash value $h$ , it is computationally infeasible to find $y$ such that $H(y) = h$ .
Second preimage resistant (weak collision resistant)	For any given block $x$ , it is computationally infeasible to find $y \neq x$ with $H(y) = H(x)$ .
Collision resistant (strong collision resistant)	It is computationally infeasible to find any pair $(x, y)$ such that $H(x) = H(y)$ .
Pseudorandomness	Output of H meets standard tests for pseudorandomness

# Hash Function Requirements

## Second pre-image resistance

Given an input  $m_1$  it should be difficult to find another input  $m_2$  such that  $m_1 \neq m_2$  and  $\text{hash}(m_1) = \text{hash}(m_2)$ . Functions that lack this property are vulnerable to second-preimage attacks.

## Collision resistance

It should be difficult to find two different messages  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  such that  $\text{hash}(m_1) = \text{hash}(m_2)$ . Such a pair is called a cryptographic hash collision.

The difference is in the choice of  $m_1$ .

- In the first case (second preimage resistance), the attacker is **handed a fixed**  $m_1$  to which he has to find a different  $m_2$  with equal hash. In particular, he **can't choose**  $m_1$ .
- In the second case (collision resistance), the attacker can **freely choose both messages**  $m_1$  and  $m_2$ , with the only requirement that they are different (and hash to the same value).

(From this, it is also obvious that collision resistance implies second preimage resistance: An attacker can just choose an arbitrary  $m_1$  and compute a second preimage  $m_2$  to obtain a collision.)



# Attacks on Hash Functions

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- Two categories of attacks on hash functions: brute-force attacks and cryptanalysis
- a preimage or second preimage attack
  - find  $y$  s.t.  $H(y)$  equals a given hash value
- collision resistance
  - find two messages  $x$  &  $y$  with same hash so  $H(x) = H(y)$
- hence value  $2^{m/2}$  determines strength of hash code against brute-force attacks
  - m bit hash value


# Birthday Attacks

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- ❑ might think a 64-bit hash is secure
- ❑ but by **Birthday Paradox** is not
- ❑ **birthday attack** works thus:
  - ❑ given user prepared to sign a valid message  $x$
  - ❑ opponent generates  $2^{m/2}$  variations  $x'$  of  $x$ , all with essentially the same meaning, and saves them
  - ❑ opponent generates  $2^{m/2}$  variations  $y'$  of a desired fraudulent message  $y$
  - ❑ two sets of messages are compared to find pair with same hash (probability  $> 0.5$  by birthday paradox)
  - ❑ have user sign the valid message, then substitute the forgery which will have a valid signature
- ❑ conclusion is that need to use [link](#) larger MAC/hash

# Hash Function Cryptanalysis

- Cryptanalytic attacks exploit some property of algorithm so faster than exhaustive search
- Hash functions use iterative structure
  - process message in blocks (include length)
- Attacks focus on collisions in function  $f$



# Block Ciphers as Hash Functions

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- ❑ can use block ciphers as hash functions
  - ❑ using  $H_0=0$  and zero-pad of final block
  - ❑ compute:  $H_i = E_{M_i} [H_{i-1}]$
  - ❑ and use final block as the hash value
  - ❑ similar to CBC but without a key
  
- ❑ resulting hash is too small (64-bit)
  - ❑ both due to direct birthday attack
  - ❑ and to “meet-in-the-middle” attack

# Secure Hash Algorithm

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- SHA originally designed by NIST & NSA in 1993
- was revised in 1995 as SHA-1
- US standard for use with DSA signature scheme
  - standard is FIPS 180-1 in 1995, also Internet RFC3174
- based on design of MD4 with key differences
- produces 160-bit hash values
- recent 2005 results on security of SHA-1 have raised concerns on its use in future applications



# Revised Secure Hash Standard

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
- NIST issued revision FIPS 180-2 in 2002
- adds 3 additional versions of SHA
  - SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
- designed for compatibility with increased security provided by the AES cipher
- structure & detail is similar to SHA-1
- hence analysis should be similar
- but security levels are rather higher

# SHA Versions

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	SHA-1	SHA-224	SHA-256	SHA-384	SHA-512
Message digest size	160	224	256	384	512
Message size	$< 2^{64}$	$< 2^{64}$	$< 2^{64}$	$< 2^{128}$	$< 2^{128}$
Block size	512	512	512	1024	1024
Word size	32	32	32	64	64
Number of steps	80	64	64	80	80

# SHA-512 Overview



$+$  = word-by-word addition mod  $2^{64}$

# SHA-512 Compression Function

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Heart of the algorithm-

- processing message in 1024-bit blocks
- consists of 80 rounds
  - updating a 512-bit buffer
  - using a 64-bit value  $W_t$  derived from the current message block.

# SHA-512

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**Step 1 Append padding bits:** The message is padded so that its length is congruent to 896 modulo 1024 .

Padding is always added, even if the message is already of the desired length. Thus, the number of padding bits is in the range of 1 to 1024.

The padding consists of a single 1 bit followed by the necessary number of 0 bits.



# SHA-512

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- ❑ **Step 2 Append length:** A block of 128 bits is appended to the message.
- ❑ This block is treated as an unsigned 128-bit integer (most significant byte first) and contains the length of the original message (before the padding).
- ❑ The outcome of the first two steps yields a message that is an integer multiple of 1024 bits in length.
- ❑ In Figure, the expanded message is represented as the sequence of 1024-bit blocks.

# SHA-512

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**Step 3 Initialize hash buffer:** A 512-bit buffer is used to hold intermediate and final results of the hash function.


The buffer can be represented as eight 64-bit registers (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h). These registers are initialized to the following 64-bit integers (hexadecimal values):

a = 6A09E667F3BCC908	e = 510E527FADE682D1
b = BB67AE8584CAA73B	f = 9B05688C2B3E6C1F
c = 3C6EF372FE94F82B	g = 1F83D9ABFB41BD6B
d = A54FF53A5F1D36F1	h = 5BE0CD19137E2179

# SHA-512

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- ❑ **Step 4 Process message in 1024-bit (128-word) blocks** : The heart of the algorithm is a module that consists of 80 rounds; this module is labeled F in Figure.
- ❑ The logic is illustrated in Following Figure.



# SHA-512

**Step 5 Output.** After all  $N$  1024-bit blocks have been processed, the output from the  $N$ th stage is the 512-bit message digest.

We can summarize the behavior of SHA-512 as follows:

$$H_0 = IV$$

$$H_i = \text{SUM}_{64}(H_{i-1}, \text{abcdefgh}_i)$$

$$MD = H_N$$

where

$IV$  = initial value of the `abcdefgh` buffer, defined in step 3

$\text{abcdefgh}_i$  = the output of the last round of processing of the  $i$ th message block


$N$  = the number of blocks in the message (including padding and length fields)

$\text{SUM}_{64}$  = addition modulo  $2^{64}$  performed separately on each word of the pair of inputs

$MD$  = final message digest value



# SHA-512 Round Function



# SHA-512 Round Function

The logic in each of the 80 steps of the processing of one 512-bit block. Each round is defined by the following set of Equations.

$$T_1 = h + \text{Ch}(e, f, g) + \left( \sum_1^{512} e \right) + W_t + K_t$$

$$T_2 = \left( \sum_0^{512} a \right) + \text{Maj}(a, b, c)$$

$$h = g$$

$$g = f$$

$$f = e$$

$$e = d + T_1$$

$$d = c$$

$$c = b$$

$$b = a$$

$$a = T_1 + T_2$$

# SHA-512 Round Function

where

$t$  = step number;  $0 \leq t \leq 79$

$\text{Ch}(e, f, g) = (e \text{ AND } f) \oplus (\text{NOT } e \text{ AND } g)$   
*the conditional function: If  $e$  then  $f$  else  $g$*

$\text{Maj}(a, b, c) = (a \text{ AND } b) \oplus (a \text{ AND } c) \oplus (b \text{ AND } c)$   
*the function is true only if the majority (two or three) of the arguments are true*

$\left( \sum_0^{512} a \right) = \text{ROTR}^{28}(a) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{34}(a) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{39}(a)$

$\left( \sum_1^{512} e \right) = \text{ROTR}^{14}(e) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{18}(e) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{41}(e)$


$\text{ROTR}^n(x)$  = circular right shift (rotation) of the 64-bit argument  $x$  by  $n$  bits

$W_t$  = a 64-bit word derived from the current 512-bit input block

$K_t$  = a 64-bit additive constant

$+$  = addition modulo  $2^{64}$

# SHA-512 Round Function



# SHA-3

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- ❑ SHA-1 not yet "broken"
  - ❑ but similar to broken MD5 & SHA-0
  - ❑ so considered insecure
- ❑ SHA-2 (esp. SHA-512) seems secure
  - ❑ shares same structure and mathematical operations as predecessors so have concern
- ❑ NIST announced in 2007 a competition for the SHA-3 next gen NIST hash function



# SHA-3 Requirements

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- ❑ replace SHA-2 with SHA-3 in any use
  - ❑ so use same hash sizes
- ❑ preserve the online nature of SHA-2
  - ❑ so must process small blocks (512 / 1024 bits)
- ❑ evaluation criteria
  - ❑ security close to theoretical max for hash sizes
  - ❑ cost in time & memory
  - ❑ characteristics: such as flexibility & simplicity

# Summary

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have considered:

- hash functions
  - uses, requirements, security
- hash functions based on block ciphers
- SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3