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New statistics for the design researcher

A Bayesian course in tidy R

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Preparations

Introduction

1.1 Whom this book is for

1.1.1 The empirical design researcher

If you are not a designer, chances are good that you are a design researcher very well. Are you doing studies with people and is your work about ways to achieve or improve products, services, trainings or business? Welcome to the not-so-special club of people I call design researchers.

Of course, I have no idea who you are, personally, but I figure you as one of the following personas:

You are an industrial design researcher, thirty-three years old, leading a small team in the center for research of a car maker. Your task is to evaluate emerging technologies, like augmented reality, car-to-car communication and smart light. Downstream research relies on your competent assessment of what is feasible. For example, you have just been asked to evaluate the following: Blue light makes people wake up easier, could it also be used to let car drivers not fall asleep? Several engineers and one industrial engineering student are involved in putting a light color stimulator for a premium car of the brand and stuff two workstations in its back, hooked to the recording systems and driving performance and physiological measures. Yes, this is as expensive as it sounds, and this why you have skin in the game, when you do a study.

You are a young academic and just got a cum laude master's degree in computer science. For your thesis you developed and implemented an animated avatar for a digital assistant. A professor from the social psychology department has read your thesis. He just got a funding for research on mass emergency communication using projected virtual characters. He fears that a young psychologist would not be up to the technical part of the project and found you. But, you ask yourself, am I up to the task of running experimental studies and do the statistics?

1.1.2 The experimentalist

If you are doing research with people, but the answers you seek are far from being applicable to anything in sight, don't put this book away. Chances are good that you will be able to read through the ephemeral details of the cases I present and recognize your own research situations, for example that you are comparing two groups. As you can see in the table of contents, you don't even have to read more than half the book to get there.

It may be true that strictly experimental data does not require more than group comparison. Still, I please you: also read the chapter on multilevel models. So much contemporary experimental research mistakens *average* for *universal*. It makes a difference to ask:

"Are responses in the Stroop task responses delayed in the incongruent condition?"

or to ask:

"Every person responds delayed in the incongruent condition?"

If your work is about revealing universal laws of behaviour, you have to search for the answer on an individual level. Technically, that means a rather simple multi-level model and a spaghetti plot will do the rest. But note that such a model is composed of many little participant-level models and all of them need their data. For multi-level models you need a within-subject design and repeated measures. On the second thought that makes full sense, as what really ask is:

"Do all people shift into a slower mode in the incongruent condition?"

This is not about groups of people, but mode transitions in individual brains. These transitions can only be observed by putting one-and-the-same person into all the conditions. If you fear that the order of modes makes a difference, why not put order under statistical control? Record what you cannot control and check the interaction effects. Maybe it is not so bad.

Just another candy for you: Response times! Have you been struggling with them forever, because they are not Normal distributed? Have you resorted to non-parametric tests so many times that what you say became "response times are non-parametric"? You shouldn't say that. Furthermore, your non-parametric sacrifices can be history with Generalized Linear Models.

Then again, you may soon notice a disturbing lack of stars. Is this book like a very dark night? Consider the opposite possibility: most times when you

don't see the stars is at daylight. But let me hand you a torch with a chapter on model selection. The following paragraph may help you pushing your work through the review process:

In order to confirm that the Stroop effect exists, we compared the predictive power of two models by information crieria. M_0 is an intercept-only model that denies the Stroop effect, M_1 allows for it. In order to evaluate universality of the Stroop effect, the models got participant-level random effects. As response times tend to have an offset and are left-skewed we chose exponential-Gaussian error distributions.

1.1.3 The applied researcher

Tongue-in-cheek, applied researchers take real problems to get their questions, but rarely solve them. Why not? It is legitimate, almost natural, to ask what causes the Uncanny Valley effect, for instance. You do a series of experimental study and also throw personality scales into the game. Maybe, the effect is not unversal. Why? Just that.

1.2 Assumptions

This book makes the following assumptions:

- 1. Design research is for decision making, where one accounts for expected utility of design options. This requires
- a. quantitative statements
- b. statements of (un)certainty
- Bayesian statistics is intuitive. Everybody has a good intuition about probability, value, decision making and gambling. It requires little effort to get to a more formal level of understanding.
- 3. Data arrives through data generating processes. Premise of statistical modelling is to neatly align to the generating process' anatomy.
- 4. Applied research data is multivariate and correlated. There is nothing such as a nuisance variable. Everything that helps understanding advantages and drawbacks of a design matters.
- 5. Average? Neverage! People differ, and diversity matters in design.
- 6. The universe is endless, but everything in it is finite, which strictly is at odds with linearity assumptions.

- 7. The human eye is a highly capable pattern evaluator. It would be a waste to not use visuals for exploring data and communicating results.
- The best way to anticipate and plan data analysis is to simulate data upfront.
- 9. R is the statisticians preferred toolbox. 80% of statistical analysis can be done with 20% of R's full capabilities.

1.3 How to read this book

Chapter @ref(design_research) introduces a framework for quantitative design research. It carves out the basic elements of empirical design research, such as users, designs and performance and links them to typical research problems. Then the idea of design as decision making under uncertainty is developed at the example of two case studies.

Chapter @ref(bayesian_statistics) introduces the basic idea of Bayesian statistics, which boils down to three remarkably intuitive conjectures:

- 1. uncertainty is the rule
- 2. you gain more certainty by observations
- 3. your present knowledge about the world is composed of what you learned from data and what you knew before.

The chapter goes on with introducing basic terms of statistical thinking. Finally, an overview on common statistical distributions serve as a vehicle to make the reader familiar with data generazing processes. I am confident that this chapter serves newbies and classically trained researchers with all tools they need to understand Bayesian statistics. The more formally trained reader may want to take this as a bedtime reading.

Chapter @ref(getting_started_r) is a minimal introduction to this marvelous programming language. Readers with some programming experience can work through this in just one day and they will get everything they need to get started with the book. Readers with prior R experience may get a lot out of this chapter, too, as it introduces the *tidy* paradigm of R programming. Tidy R is best be thought of as a set standard libraries 2.0. New tidy packages are arriving at an accelerating pace in the R world, and coding tidy is usually much briefer, easier to read and less error prone. It has at least the same significance as turning from procedural programming to object orientation. While this chapter serves as a stepping stone, the reader will encounter countless code examples throughout the book, working through these examples is a

The second part of the book consists of three chapters that strictly built on each other. The first chapter @ref(linear models) introduces basic elements of

linear models, which are factors, covariates and interaction effects. A number of additional sections cover under-the-hood concepts, such as dummy variables or contrasts, as well as basic model criticism (residual analysis). Working through this chapter fully is essential as develops the jargon to a good deal.

However, for most readers, the first chapter is not sufficient to get to work, as it does not cover models for repeated measures. This is added extensively in chapter @ref(multilevel_models). It proceeds from simple repeated measures designs to complex designs, where human and multiple non-human populations encounter each other. After working through this chapter, the reader is prepared to design highly effective studies. As long as the patterns of randomness are not off by to much from the linear model assumptions, it also suffices to get to work, seriously.

The third chapter @ref(generalized_linear:models) opens up a plethora of possibilities to analyze all kinds of performance variables. Standard models are introduces to deal with counts, chances, temporal variables and rating scales. It is also meant as an eye opener for researchers who routinely resorted to non-parametric procedures. After working through this chapter, I would consider anyone a sincere data analyst.

The fourth chapter @ref(nonlinear_models) re-iterates on the truth that in an endless universe everything is finite. We leave our fond of high-level regression engine alone and take a closer look at the nuts and bolts it is based upon. By the example of a logistic growth process and efefcts of training, the reader gains a preview on the almighty model specification language Stan.

The third part of the book is primarily dedicated to researchers who deal with complex and high-stake problems, routinely. Elements of the statistical workflow are spread out in much detail, covering data manipulation, advanced graphics, simulation and model evaluation.

Elements of quantitative design research

A design is the structure of an artifact or process that people use for a purpose. This definition appears extremely broad as it covers everything from teakettles to complex information systems, and even silver bullets are included if you wish so. In fact, this definition is even redundant in two points: first, artifacts are usually made for a purpose and some call them just "tools". Second, who else than people have purposes? Well, many wild animals reportedly create artificial structures for purposes such as shelter, mating and hunting. I have absolutely no objections against using this book to compare the stability of birds nestings, for example. (In such a case, everyone please, read "design" as "part of the extended phenotype" and "purpose" as "emerged by natural selection".

This book may apply to everything anyone likes to call a design; but only so for a specific set of research questions that hinge on the word "purpose". We all have purposes and much of the time it is quite a job to get there. Getting-there typically requires resources and often enough we find ourselves right there only to some extent. So, the two basic questions in quantitative design research are:

- 1. to what amount is a purpose fulfilled?
- 2. how easy is it to get there?

To the apt reader this may sound as i would next reduce all quantitative design research to the concept of usability and in a way i will be doing just that below (even discarding some subconcepts). The point here is that statistician actually don't care much about definitions from a domain, but think about research problems in a more abstract manner. Here is a number of things, a statistician would inquire:

• On what a scale is the measurement of purpose fulfillment?

- What is the expected precision of measures? Is a lot of noise to be expected?
- How many observations are available?
- Is the research concerned with how purpose fulfillment compares under various conditions?
- How are observations grouped?

In this book, quantitative design research is rather defined by a set of typical research problems, which includes the structure of the research question, as well as the empirical circumstances. In the following I will break this down one by one, and will also point out why the statistical framework of this book Bayesian regression models will do the job.

2.0.0.0.1 Introduce magnitude, as this is used when explaining uncertainty.

One obvious element is quantification, but that carries some ambiguity, as we can speak of measures or research questions. In much research, quantification happens during the process of measuring. Recording reaction times or counting errors certainly is quantitative. But, what matters is to really ask quantitative research questions and try to answer them. In the real world, decisions are (or should be) based on benefits and rational allocation of resources. Changing the background color of a website might just be a switch (and can have undesired effects as users hate change), but restructuring an intranet site can cost a million. In industrial design research, there usually is someone who wants to know whether this or that redesign is worth it, and that requires to ask research questions like the following:

- By how much does reaction ability degrade with age and it is safe that people beyond 80 still drive?
- Does design B reduce the required number of steps by a third, at least?
- What proportion of users prefers red over yellow? All websites better go red?

Sadly, in much existing research, quantification is frequently lost along the way and conclusions read more like:

- Older people have longer reaction times in traffic situations $(p \le .05)$.
- People find information more easily with design A, compared to B (p ≤ .05).
- Chinese people on average prefer red color schemes over yellow $(p \leq .001)$.

There simply is no numbers in these statements (except for the notorious p-values, which I will briefly discuss in chapter @ref(bayesian_statistics)).

Regression models are just right for measures and they are terrific at drawing quantitative conclusions. Every regression model features a so called *outcome*, which must be a measure (rather than a category). At the same time, regression models can deal with a broad class of measures and their peculiarities.

Modern designs tend to be very complex and so are research questions, potentially. The options for designing just your personal homepage are myriad and there is considerable uncertainty about which options, or rather which configuration works best. Consider every option, say font type, font size, color, background color, position of menu, a potential impact factor on how pleasant the page is to read. Perhaps, someone should once and for all figure out the optimal configuration. It is recommended in such a case, that as many as possible impact factors are represented in a single study and evaluated by a single comprehensive statistical model. The primary reason for this recommendation is given in chapter @ref(interaction_effects): impact factors have the nasty tendency to not act out independent of each other. Regression models handle such complexity with grace. There is theoretically no limit for the number of impact factors or predicors and interaction effects.

The central peculiarity in all behavioural research is that measures are extremely *noisy*. In the next chapter, the concept of measurement errors will be elaborated upon, but for now it suffices to understand that all measures approximate the measured property, only and that leaves room for *uncertainty*. In a simple experiment where participants respond to a signal and time is recorded, the first three trials will more likely have values that are widely scattered, like 900ms, 1080ms, 1110ms. Imagine this were an ability test in a training for, say, astronauts. To be admissioned to the space program the applicant needs a score of less than 1000ms. Would you dare to decide on the career of a young person based on these three observations? Hardly so.

On the other side, consider measuring a persons waste length for the purpose of tayloring a suit. By using a meter the taylor measures 990mm, and would be perfectly fine with that. Why did the taylor not take a second and a third measure? Well, experience tells that meters are pretty precise measures and waste length shows relatively little variation (under constant habits). Say the two measures were 995mm and 989mm. Such small deviations have practically no influence on cutting the linen.

"Our minds are not run as top - down dictatorships; they are rambunctious parliaments, populated by squabbling factions and caucuses, with much more going on beneath the surface than our conscious awareness ever accesses."

Carroll, Sean. The Big Picture (Kindle Locations 5029-5031). Oneworld Publications. Kindle Edition.

Vast fluctuations of measures are common in design research, simply for the fact that human behaviour is involved. Every magnitude we derive from a study is uncertain to some degree. Uncertainty makes that at any moment, we can rely on a quantitative result only to some extent, which influences how we take risks. Statistics is called inferential, when every derived magnitude comes with a degree of certainty attached. Section @ref(decision_making) gives some reasoning and examples, how to operate rationally under uncertainty, and drives at right into the arms of Bayesian statistics.

In an admission test for astronaut training, a decision is raised on very few individuals. Down on earth, everyday designs affect many people at once. Consider your personal homepage. If you decide, for aesthetic reasons, to shrink the font size, I promise you, that you just start loosing all visitors from the e-senior generation. Or, if your content is really good, they start using looking glasses on their o-pads. As a researcher, you can approach this in two ways: do a user study to compare the new design to the current design, or be the one who finds out, once and for all, what the optimal trade-off is between readability and aesthetic pleasure. Your method of choice would be an experiment.

When you have no greater goal in mind than proving your design is of quality, user studies are effective and quick. In the easiest case, you want to put your design against a fixed benchmark. For example, in the design of automotives, media devices in the cockpit may not distract the driver for more than 1.5 seconds at times [REF]. To prove that, you will have to plug some advanced eye tracking gear into a prototype car and send people on the test drive. But once the precise data is in, things get really simple. The saccade measures directly represent what you were out for: the length of episodes of visual attention on the media display. You can take the average value. IN web design, it is common to compare two or more designs in order to make the best choice. An e-commerce company can put a potential future design on the test drive, delivering it to a customer sample. Performance is measured as hard currency, which is as close to the purpose as it can get.

A user studies solves the momentary problem of comparing a local design to a benchmark (which can be another design). In the long run, design configurations are too manyfold to be compared in a one-by-one manner. It is inevitable that we try to trace some general patterns and apply our knowledge to a whole class of designs at once. Our research design just got one step more complex. Instead of just checking whether a smaller font size creates problems on a single website, the reseacher reaches out to comparing the combined effect of aging and font size on reading time, in general. This is what I call a design experiment.

Design experiments allow for much broader conclusions, if done right, and there are a some issues:

- 1. The design features under scrunity must be under control of the researcher. It does not suffice to collect some websites with varying font sizes, but every website needs to undergo the test at various font sizes.
- 2. The design feature must undergo a full range of manipulations. You will not find the laws of readability by just comparing 10pt versus 12pt.
- 3. Design features usually do not stand on their own. Readability is influenced by other factors, such as contrast and comprehensibility. Deriving a model from just one design will only generalize to this one design. Hence, the researcher must run the experiment on a sample of designs, with one of two strategies (or a mix of both): the randomization strategy takes a representative sample of designs, hoping that other impact factors average out. As we will see in @ref(interaction_effects), this is a daring assumption. Therefore, the preferred way is statistical control, where potential impact factors are recorded and added as control variables to the regression model.

2.0.0.0.2 TODO

- Designing is wicked
- Evaluative design research
- Decision problems in design research
- Design research as exploration
- Mapping multidimensional impact factors
- Quantification for decision making
- Minimax decision making on designs
- Measures and psychometrics
- Emergent design theories

2.1 Studies

- user studies
- experimental/fundamental studies
- qualitative vs quantitative

2.2 Observations and measures[TBC]

2.2.1 Interaction sequences

Behavioural records not necessarily require one-way mirrors and the nights of video coding. Log files of web servers provide sequences of how users navigate a web site. Plugin software is available that records keystrokes and mouse actions on computers. The difficult part is the following: When observing 50 users while doing a non-trivial task, no two interaction sequences are exactly the same (if i had to bet on it). By itself, there is little value without further means of interpretation and this can go two ways up:

The diligent and skilled *qualitative* researchers are able to extract meaningful patterns from such sequences. For example, in usability tests, the following patterns are frequently observed and interpreted.

- a user jumping back to the main screen possibly went into a wrong direction
- users randomly probing around either have no clue or no motivation
- users in a longitudinal study who only interact at the begin and the end
 of the period, have no use for the system, really.

The quantitative researcher will aim at deriving measures from the interaction sequence. Formally, to measure means assigning numbers to observed sequences, so that these can be brought into an order, at least. Obviously, we need some sort of transformation that gives us a single performance score. This we call here the performance function and we have many choices, for example:

- the number of all exploratory events
- their relative frequency
- their longest uninterrupted sequence
- total time spent in exploration

Sometimes, you have to go a long way up the qualitative route, before you can derive useful measures. In [Schnittker, Schmettow & Schraagen, 2016], we coded sequences from nurses using an infusion pump. Individual sequences were compared to a optimal reference path, the similar the better. But how to measure similarity? For eample, Levensthein distance counts the number of edits to transform one sequence into the other and we used it as the performance score: deviation from optimal path. Even more interpreting was another study we did on the active user paradox. We recorded interaction sequences of users doing some repetitive tasks with a graphics software. The sessions were taped and analysed using a behavioural coding scheme. First, events were classified on a low level (e.g. "reading the handbook", "first time trying a function") and later aggregated to broader classes (e.g. "exploratory behavior"). The number of events in a given time frame that were classified as such were finally taken as a measure, representing the exploratory tendencies.

2.2.2 performance measures

A good point to start with is the classic concept of "usability", which the ISO 9142-11 defines by the following three high-level criteria:

- effectiveness: can users accomplish their tasks?
- efficiency: what resources have to be spend for a task, e.g. time.
- satisfaction: how did the user like it?

While these criteria originated in the field of Human-Computer Interaction, they can easily be adapted to compare everything that people do their work with. Even within the field, it has been adapted to hundreds of studies and a hundred ways are reported of assessing these criteria.

Effectiveness is often measured by completion rate (CR). A classic waterfall approach would be to consult the user requirements documents and identify the, let's say eight, crucial tasks the system must support. User test might then show that most users fail at the two tasks, and a completion rate of 75% is recorded for the system. Completion rate is only a valid effectiveness measure with distinct tasks. Strictly, the set of tasks also had to be complete, covering the whole system. When completion rate is taken from in series of repetitive tasks, it depends on whether it is effectiveness or efficiency. It is effectiveness, when a failed operation is unrepairable, such as a traffic accident, data loss on a computer or medical errors. But, who cares for a single number between 0 and 1, when the user test provides such a wealth of information on why users failed? Effectiveness, in the sense of task completion, is primarily a qualitative issue and we shall rarely encounter it in this book.

A more subtle notion of effectiveness is the *quality of outcome*, and despite the very term, is a measure. Perhaps, it should better be called *task perfection*. Reconsider the AUP study, where participants had to modify a given graphic, e.g. change some colors and erase parts of it. Of course, some participants worked neatly, whereas others used broader strokes (literally). There certainly is a reasonable objective way to rank all results by quality.

Efficiency is where it really gets quantitative as with efficiency, we ask about resources: time, attention, strain, distraction and Euros. Other than that, efficiency can be measured in a vast variety of ways: ToT, clicks, mental workload or time spent watching the traffic while driving.

Counting the *number of clicks* before someone has found the desired piece of informnation is a coarse, but easy to acquire and intuitive measure of efficiency, and so is time-on-task (ToT), which is just the sum . Still, these It differs from ToT in that it only counts real action, not the time a participant read the manual or watched the sky. In the downside, this is a very limited definition of action. While errors are usually best analyzed qualitatively, error

rate can be efficiency, too, when failures are non-critical, but can be repaired in some time, such as correcting a typing error.

ToT and other performance measures can be very noisy, and RT even more so. In order to arrive at sufficiently certain estimates, it is recommended to always plan for *repetition*. In [LMM] we will make heavy use of repeated measures on users, tasks and designs.

Above, I did not mean to say that design research always requires the sometimes painful recording of interaction sequences. The majority of studies jumps over them and proceed to performance measures, directly, by counting attempts or pressing stop watches.

In many situations, such direct measures are right spot-on: When controlling a car in dense city traffic, a few hundred milliseconds is what makes huge a difference and therefore reaction time is a valid performance measure. In experimental cognitive research reaction times are a dominant tool to reveal the structure of the mind. The Stroop tasks is a golden evergreen cognitive psychology and serves as an example. Participants are shown a words drawn in one of three ink colors and are asked to name the ink as quick as possible. The Stroop effect occurs: in the incongruent condition, participants respond much slower than in the congruent and neutral (a few hundred ms). There is ample sweet replication of this effect and an ecosystem of theories surround it. In [Schmettow, Noordzij, Mundt] we employ the Stroop task to read the minds of participants. We showed them pictures with computers on them, followed by a printed word (e.g., "explore") on which to perform the Stroop task. It was conceived that reaction time is increased when a participant experiences a strong association, like:

black tower PC + "explore" -> "can someone hand me a screwdriver"

CONDITION WORD : Ink congruent [GREEN]: green incongr [YELLOW]: green neutral [CHAIR]: green

2.2.2.1 -> Satisfaction

2.2.3 experience [TBD]

2.2.4 design features [TBD]

2.2.5 the human factor [TBD]

2.2.6 situations [TBD]

2.3 Decision making under uncertainty

• I see clouds. Should I take my umbrella?

- Should I do this bungee jump? How many people came to death by jumping? (More or less than alpine skiing?) And how much fun is it really?
- Overhauling our company website will cost us EUR 100.000. Is it worth it?

All the above cases are examples of decision making under uncertainty. The actors aim for maximizing their outcome, be it well being, fun or money. But, they are uncertain. And their uncertainty occurs on two levels:

- 1. One cannot precisely foresee the exact outcome of one's chosen action:
- Taking the umbrella with you can have two consequences: if it rains, you
 have the benefit of staying dry. If it does not rain, you have the inconvenience of carrying it with you.
- You don't know if you will be the unlucky one, who's bungee rope breaks, with fatal consequences.
- You don't know whether the new design will attracts more visitors to your website and serves them better.
- 2. It can be difficult to precisely determine the benefits or losses of potential outcomes:
- How much worse is your day when carrying a useless object with you?
 How much do you hate moisture? In order to compare the two, they must be assessed on the same scale.
- How much fun (or other sources of reward, like social acknowledgements) is it to jump a 120 meter canyon? And how much worth is your own life to you?
- What is the average revenue generated per visit? What is an increase of recurrance rate of, say, 50% worth?

Once you know the probabilities of events and the respective values, decision theory provides an intuitive framework to estimate these values. Expected utility U is the sum product of outcome probabilities P and the involved losses L. As such, it is the average loss one can expect, when following a particular strategy.

In the given case, two strategies exist, namely taking an umbrella versus taking no umbrella, when it is cloudy. We calculate and compare the expected utilities U as follows:

```
P(rain) = 0.6 P(norain) = 1 - P(rain) = 0.4 L(carry) = 2 L(wet) = 4 U(umbrella) = P(rain)L(carry) + P(norain)L(carry) = L(carry) = 2 U(noumbrella) = P(rain)L(wet) = 2.4
```

```
attach(Rainfall)
Actions <-
  data.frame(action = c("umbrella", "no umbrella"))
Events <-
  data.frame(event = c("rain", "no rain"),
                     prob = c(0.6, 0.4))
Loss <-
  expand.grid(action = Actions$action, event = Events$event) %>%
  join(Events) %>%
  mutate(loss = c(2, 4, 2, 0))
Decision <-
  Loss %>%
  mutate(conditional_loss = prob * loss) %>%
  group_by(action) %>%
  summarise(expected_loss = sum(conditional_loss))
Decision
```

action	$expected_loss$
no umbrella	2.4
umbrella	2.0

We conclude that, given the high chance for rain, and the conditional losses, the expected loss is larger for not taking an umbrella with you. It is rational to take an umbrella when it is cloudy.

2.3.1 Measuring uncertainty

As we have seen above, a decision requires two investigations: the indeterministic nature of outcomes, and the assigned loss. Assigning loss to decisions is highly context dependent and often requires domain-specific expertize (or even individual judgment). We will do the formalization of it one more time,

then set it aside. The issues of indeterministic processes and the associated uncertainty is basically what the field of *statistics* deals with. We encounter uncertainty in two forms: first, we usually have just a limited set of observations to draw inference from, this is *uncertainty of parameter estimates*. From just 20 days of observation, we cannot be absolutely certain about the true chance of rain. It can be 60%, but also 62% or 56%. Second, even if we precisely knew the chance of rain, it does not mean we could make a certain statement of the future wheather conditions, which is *predictive uncertainty*. For a perfect forecast, we had to have a complete and exact figure of the physical properties of the atmosphere, and a fully valid model to predict future states from it. For all non-trivial systems (which excludes living organisms and wheather), this is impossible.

Review the rainfall example: the strategy of taking an umbrella with you has proven to be superior under the very assumption of predictive uncertainty. As long as you are interested in long-term benefit (i.e. optimizing the average loss on a long series of days), this is the best strategy. This may sound obvious, but it is not. In many cases, where we make decisions under uncertainty, the decision is not part of a homogeneous series. If you are member of a startup team, you only have this one chance to make a fortune. There is not much opportunty to average out a single failure at future occasions. In contrast, the investor, who lends you the money for your endeavour, probably has a series. You and the investor are playing to very different rules. For the investor it is rational to optimize his strategy towards a minimum average loss. The entrepreneur is best advised to keep the maximum possible loss at a minimum.

As we have seen, predictive uncertainty is already embebedded in the framework of rational decision making. Some concepts in statistics can be of help here: the uncertainty regarding future events can be quantified (for example, with posterior predictive distributions) and the process of model selection can assist in finding the model that provides the best predictive power.

Still, in our formalization of the Rainfall case, what magically appears are the estimates for the chance of rain. Having these estimates is crucial for finding an optimal decision, but they are created outside of the framework. Furthermore, we pretended to know the chance of rain exactly, which is unrealistic. Estimating parameters from observations is the reign of statistics. From naive calculöations, statistical reasoning differs by also regarding uncertainty of estimates. Generally, we aim for making statements of the following form:

"With probability p, the attribute A is of magnitude X."

In the umbrella example above, the magnitude of interest is the chance of rain. It was assumed to be 60%. This appears extremely high for an average day. A more realistic assumption would be that the probability of rainfall is 60% given the observation of a cloudy sky. How could we have come to the belief that with 60% chance, it will rain when the sky is cloudy? We have several options, here:

- 24
- 1. Supposed, you know that, on average, it rains 60% of all days, it is a matter of common sense, that the probability of rain must be equal or larger than that, when it's cloudy.
- You could go and ask a number of experts about the association of clouds and rain.
- 3. You could do some systematic observations yourself.

Maybe, you have recorded the coincidences of clouds and rainfall over a period, of, let's say, 20 days. You made the following observations:

```
Rain %>% as_tbl_obs()
```

Intuitively, you would use the average to estimate the probability of rain under every condition.

```
T_desc <-
Rain %>%
group_by(cloudy) %>%
summarize(chance_of_rain = mean(rain))
```

```
detach(Rainfall)
```

These probabilities we can feed into the decision framework as outlined above. The problem is, that we obtained just a few observations to infer the magnitude of the parameter P(rain|cloudy) = 60%. Imagine, you would repeat the observation series on another 20 days. Due to random fluctuations, you would get a more or less different series and different estimates for the probability of rain. More generally, the *true* parameter is only imperfectly represented by any sample, it is not unlikely, that it is close to the estimate, but it could be somewhere else, for example, P(rain|cloudy) = 60.078%.

The trust you put in your estimation is called *level of certainty* or *belief* or *confidence*. It is the primary aim of statistics to rationally deal with uncertainty, which involves to *measure the level of certainty* associated with a certain statement. So, what would be a good way to determine certainty? Think for a moment. If you were asking an expert, how would you do that to learn about magnitude and uncertainty regarding P(rain|cloudy)?

Maybe, the conversation would be as follows:

YOU: In your experience, what is the chance of rain, when it's cloudy.

EXPERT: Wow, difficult question. I don't have a definite answer.

YOU: Oh, c'mon. I just need a rough answer. Is it more like 50%-ish, or rather 70%-ish.

EXPERT: Hmm, maybe somewhere between 50 and 70%.

YOU: Then, I guess, taking an umbrella with me is the rational choice of action.

Note how the expert gave two endpoints for the parameter in question, to indicate the location and the level of uncertainty. If she had been more certain, she had said "between 55 and 65%. While this is better than nothing, it remains unclear, which level of uncertainty is enclosed. Is the expert 100%, 90% or just 50% sure the true chance is in the interval? Next time, you could ask as follows:

. . .

EXPERT: Hmm, maybe somewhere between 70-90%

YOU: What do you bet? I'm betting 5 EUR that the true parameter is outside the range you just gave.

EXPERT: I dare you! 95 EUR it's inside!

The expert feels 95% certain, that the parameter in question is in the interval. However, for many questions of interest, we have no expert at hand (or we may not even trust them altogether). Then we proceed with option 3: making our own observations.

2.3.2 Betting on designs

The design of systems can be conceived as a choice between design options. For example, when designing an informational website, you have the choice of making the navigation structure broad (and shallow) or deep (and narrow). Your choice will to some extent, change usability of the website, hence your customer satisfaction, rate of recurrance, revenue etc.

2.3.3 Case: e-commerce A/B

Consider the following example: Violet is development manager of a ecommerce website. At present, there is debate about a major overhaul of the website. Most management team members agree that implementing a better search function will increase the revenue per existing customer. At the opposite, there are considerable development costs involved, which you have estimated to EUR 100.000.

Upper management has a keen eye on shareholder value and wants the costs to be covered by increased revenues within one year. As the company's total revenue per year is 1.000.000 Euro, an increase by factor 1.1 is required to cover the development costs.

In order to get a rough idea whether this target can be met, Violet conducts a study where she observes the transactions of 50 random customers using the current system with 50 transactions with a prototype of the new system. The measured variable is the money every participant spends during the visit. The question is:

"Do customers in the prototype condition spend 10% more on average?"

The figure below shows the distribution of revenue in the experiment.

```
attach(Rational)

RD %>%
    ggplot(aes(y = Euro, x = Design)) +
    geom_boxplot()
```

There seems to be a slight benefit for the prototype condition. But, is it a 10% increase? And how certain can Violet be? A formal regression analysis gives the answer ¹.

```
T_fixef <- fixef(P_1, mean.func = exp)
T_fixef</pre>
```

¹ What we run here is a Gamma regression, which we will re-encounter in chapter [GLM]. The coefficients can directly be interpreted as changes in rate.

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept		4.70e + 01	
Designproto			
shape	1.77e + 09	8.00e + 06	1.13e + 12

The results tell her that participants spend 49.975 Euro on average with the current design. The prototype seems to increase the revenue per transaction by 1.126. That seems sufficient, but uncertainty is strong, too, as indicated by the 95% credibility intervals. There is a chance of more than 2.5%, that the revenue is just $47.035, 1.035, 8.003 \times 10^6$ (or lower), such that the target is not met. But what precisely is the chance of falling below EUR 5? In Bayesian analysis we usually get the complete posterior distribution, which we can evaluate to get a definite answer:

What is the probability of the increase in revenue being less than 5 EUR?

We inspect the posterior distribution and mark the area of interest

detach(Rational)

The red area represents the danger zone, where revenue increase does not reach EUR 5. The area amounts to 28.65% of the total probability. With this information the manager now has several options:

- 1) decides that 28.65% is a risk she dares to take
- 2) be confident in herself because *past successes* prove that she should follow her intuition

- 3) take into account other sources of evidence, for example expert opinions or meta studies
- 4) continue the study until sufficient evidence is gathered, but costs of additional effort have to be accounted for

The first option represents an unspecific tolerance towards risk. Extreme risk tolerance of managers is infamous as one cause for large scale economic crises [BLACK_SWANs]. Her motives could be manifold, still: maybe she was nursed to take risks in her life; or she is confident that consequences in case of failure will be bearable.

The second and third options have something in common: they make use of *external knowledge*. This is explained in the coming section. The fourth option is another way of making *cumulative use of knowledge*, namely [adaptive testing: find correct term].

2.3.4 Case: 99 seconds

Consider Jane: she is chief engineer at a mega-large rent-a-car company smartr.car that is doing their business nothing but online. Jane was responsible for a large scale overhaul of the customer interface for mobile users. Goal of the redesign was to streamline the user interface, which had grown wild over the years and had become boring. Early customer studies indicated that the app needed a serious visual decluttering and stronger funneling of tasks. 300 person months went into the re-development and the team did well: a recent A/B study had shown that users learned the smartr.car v2.0 fast and could use its functionality very efficiently. Jane's team is prepared for the roll-out, when marketing requested the following:

marketing: we want to support market introduction with the following slogan: "rent a car in 99 seconds".

Jane: not all users manage a full transaction in that short time. That could be a lie.

marketing: legally, the claim is fine if it holds on average.

Jane: i can find out for you (but we won't violate any rules).

Jane takes another look at the performance of users in the smartr car v2.0 condition. As she understands it, she has to find out whether the average of all recorded time-on-tasks with smartr.car 2.0 is 99 seconds, or better. Here is what she sees:

```
attach(Sec99)

Ver20 %>%
    ggplot(aes(x = ToT)) +
    geom_histogram()
```

Jane, trained in statistics as she is, figures that if she would make such a statement, she wanted to be 90% sure. The performance is not completely off 99 seconds. But given the huge variance in the sample, it seems impossible to hold the desired claim with a certainty of 80%. Still, she gives it a try and runs an estimation (which we will later get to know as a grand mean model)

```
M_1 <-
    Ver20 %>%
    stan_glm(ToT ~ 1, data = .)

P_1 <-
    posterior(M_1)</pre>
```

```
T_fixef <-
  fixef(P_1,
        interval = .6)
N_99s <-
  P_1 %>%
  filter(parameter == "Intercept") %>%
  mutate(confirm = value <= 99) %>%
  summarise(certainty = mean(confirm)) %>%
  mutate(odds = (1-certainty)/certainty) %>%
  as.numeric()
N_111s <-
  P_1 %>%
  filter(parameter == "Intercept") %>%
  mutate(confirm = value <= 111) %>%
  summarise(certainty = mean(confirm)) %>%
  mutate(odds = (1-certainty)/certainty) %>%
  as.numeric()
```

```
detach(Sec99)
```

The results tell her that most likely the average time-on-task is fixef. That is not very promising. In fact, the odds that the average user can do it in

99 seconds is a feeble 2%. Luckily, Jane had the idea that the slogan could be changed to "rent a card in 1-1-1 seconds". The certainty that this slogan holds is a favorable 95, a risk that a brave marketing department is surely willing to take.

2.3.5 Prior information

It is rarely the case that we encounter a situation *tabula rasa*. Whether we are correct or not, when we look at the sky in the morning, we have some expectations on how likely there will be rain. We also take into account the season and the region. Even the planet is sometimes taken into account: the Pathfinder probe carried a bag of gadgets, but the umbrella was for safe landing only.

In behavioural research it has been general standard that every experiment had to be judged on the produced data alone. For the sake of objectivity, researchers were not allowed to take into account previous results, let alone their personal opinion.

In Bayesian statistics, you have the choice. You can make use of external knowledge, but you don't have to. In Bayesian terminology, previous or external knowledge is called *prior information*. Kowledge that comes from the data is called the *likelihood* and both are combined to *posterior* knowledge by multiplication:

```
posterior = likelihood * prior
```

Reconsider Violet, the rational e-commerce development manager. She had this role for years and has supervised several large scale outrolls. Couldn't she be more daring, taking into account her past successes? This is not a completely new situation, after all.

The impact of prior information can range from negligible to overwhelming. The gain in confidence in our example depends on three factors:

- 1) the average magnitude of past successes, the higher, the better
- 2) the similarity of the current project with past projects
- 3) the amount of evidence (e.g., number of recorded projects)

attach(Rational)

```
P_prior <- posterior(M_prior)
```

Let's assume, the manager had done 5 projects in the past and recorded the resulting change in revenues. On these five values she does a regression, that we will later call an intercept-only model, and concludes that her *prior belief* is distributed as:

```
P_prior %>%
  filter(parameter == "Intercept") %>%
  mutate(value = exp(value)) %>%
  ggplot(aes(x = value)) +
  geom_density()
```

On average, revenues have increased by factor 1.211 by past design improvements. Of course, with only five points of measurement there is uncertainty as well. The mount of uncertainty is the spread of prior distribution. Using this prior information, the development manager runs another regression model on her experimental data, this time using both sources of information, her optimistic prior and the experimental data.

```
M_2 <-
RD %>%
stan_glm(Euro ~ Design,
    prior_intercept = normal(0, 100),
    prior = normal(T_prior[[1,2]], T_prior[[1,3]]),
    family = Gamma(link = "log"),
    data = .)

P_2 <- posterior(M_2)</pre>
```

```
T_fixef_2 <- fixef(P_2, mean.func = exp)
T_fixef_2</pre>
```

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	4.99e + 01	4.70e + 01	5.31e+01
Designproto	1.13e+00	1.04e+00	$1.23\mathrm{e}{+00}$
shape	1.66e + 09	7.29e + 06	$1.13\mathrm{e}{+12}$

```
detach(Rational)
```

Elements of Bayesian statistics

As human beings we make our decisions on what has happened to us earlier in time. For example, we trust a person or a company more, when we can look back at a series of successful transactions. And we have remarkable skills to recall what has just happened, but also what happened yesterday or years ago. By integrating over all the evidence, we form a view of the world we forage. When evidence is abundant, we believe vigorously experience a feeling of certainty, or lack of doubt. That is not to deny, that in a variety of situations, the boundedness of human cognition kick in and we becaome terrible decision makers. This is for a variety of psychological reasons, to name just a few:

- forgetting evidence
- the primacy effect: recent events get more weight
- confirmation bias: evidence that supports a belief is actively sought for, counter-evidence gets ignored.
- the hindsight bias: once a situation has taken a certain outcome, we believe that it had to happen that way.

The very aim of scientific research is to avoid the pitfalls of our minds and act as rational as possible by translating our theory into a formal model, gathering evidence in an unbiased way and weigh the evidence by formal procedures. When a statistic is reported together with the strength of evidence, this is conventionally called an *inferential statistic*. In applied research, real world decisions depend on the evidence, which has two aspects: first, the strength of effects and the level of certainty we have reached.

Bayesian inferential statistics grounds on the idea of accumulating evidence through and through. Certainty (or belief or credibility or credence) in Bayesian statistics is formalized as a probability scale (0 = impossible, 1 = certain). Evidence accumulates by two mechanisms, the successive observations in a data set and what has already been learned in the past. When new data arrives and is analyzed, a transition occurs from what you new before,

prior belief, to what you know after seeing the data, posterior belief. In other words: by data the current belief gets an update.

In the following the essential concepts of statistics and Bayesian analysis will be introduced.

3.1 Descriptive statistics

In empirical research we systematically gather observations. Observations of the same kind are usually subsumed as variables. A set of variables that have been gathered on the same sample are called a data set, which typically is a table with variables in columns. In the most general meaning, a statistic is a single number that somehow represents relevant features of a data set. Statistics fall into several broad classes that answer certain types of questions:

- frequency: how many measures of a certain kind can be found in the data set?
- central tendency: do measures tend to be located left (weak) or right (strong) on a scale?
- dispersion: are measures close together or widely distributed along the scale?
- association: does one variable X tend to change when another variable Y changes?

3.1.1 Frequencies

attach(Sec99)

The most basic statistics of all probably is the number of observations on a variable x, usually denoted by n_x . The number of observations is a rough indicator for the amount of data that has been gathered, which is directly linked to the level of certainty we can reach.

length(Ver20\$ToT)

```
## [1] 100
```

The number of observations is not as trivial as it may appear at first. In particular, it is usually not the same as the sample size, for two reasons: First, most studies employ repeated measures to some extent. You may have invited

 n_{Part} participants to your lab, but on each participant you have obtained several measures of the same kind. When every participant is tested on, let's say, five tasks, the amount of data obtained gets larger. Second, taking a valid measure can always fail for a variety of reasons, reasulting in *missing values*. For example, in the 99 seconds study, it has happened, that a few participants missed to fill in their age on the intake form. The researcher is left fewer measures of age n_{age} than there were participants.

```
N <- function(x) sum(!is.na(x))
N(Ver20$age)</pre>
```

```
## [1] 97
```

Another important issue is the distribution of measures across groups in a data set. Again, the number of observations in a group is linked to the certainty we can gain on that group. Furthermore, it is sometimes important to have the distribution match the proportions in the population, as otherwise biases may occur.

```
Ver20 %>%
group_by(Gender) %>%
summarize(n())
```

Gender	n()
female	59
male	41

The table above shows so called absolute frequencies. When comparing frequencies by groups, it often is more appropriate to report *relative frequencies* or *proportions*:

```
n_Gender <- N(Ver20$Gender)

Ver20 %>%
  group_by(Gender) %>%
  summarize(proportion = n()/n_Gender)
```

Gender	proportion
female	0.59
male	0.41

Summarizing frequencies of metric measures, such as ToT or number of errors is useful, too. However, a complication arises by the fact that continuous measures do not naturally fall into groups. Especially in duration measures no two measures are exactly the same.

```
length(unique(Ver20$Gender))

## [1] 2
length(unique(Ver20$ToT))

## [1] 100
```

The answer to this problem is *binning*: the scale of measurement is divided into a number of adjacent sections, called bins, and all measures that fall into one bin are counted. For example, we could use bins of 10 seconds and assess whether the bin with values larger than 90 and smaller or equal to 100 is representative in that it contains a large proportion of values. As the histogram reveals, it is not very representative.

```
bin <- function(x, bin_width = 10) floor(x/bin_width) * bin_width
n_ToT <- N(Ver20$ToT)

Ver20 %>%
  mutate(bin = bin(ToT)) %>%
  group_by(bin) %>%
  summarize(prop_ToT = n()/n_ToT) %>%
  ggplot(aes(x = bin, y = prop_ToT)) +
  geom_col()
```

```
# Ver20 %>%
# ggplot(aes(x = ToT)) +
# geom_histogram(binwidth = 10)
```

Strictly spoken, grouped and binned frequencies are not one statistic, but a vector of statistics. A plot that shows the density of values in a sequence of bins is called a histogram. It approximates what we will later get to know more closely as a *distribution*.

3.1.2 Central tendency

Reconsider Jane 2.3.4. When asked about whether users can complete a transaction within 99, she looked at the population average of her measures. The population average is what we call the *(arithmetic) mean*. The mean is computed by summing over all measures and divide by the number of observations.

```
mean <- function(x) sum(x)/length(x)
mean(Ver20$ToT)</pre>
```

```
## [1] 106
```

Imagine a competitor would go to court. Not an expert in that matter, my humble opinion is that one of the first questions to be regarded probably is: what does "rent a car in 99 seconds" actually promise? And here are some other ways to interpret the same slogan:

"50% (or more) of users can rent a car in 99 seconds". This is called the median. The median is computed by bringing all measures into an order and collect the element right in the center, or the mean of the center pair of values when the number of observations is even.

```
median <- function(x){
  n <- length(x)
  center <- (n + 1)%/%2
  if (n%%2 == 1)
      sort(x, partial = center)[center]
  else mean(sort(x, partial = center + 0:1)[center + 0:1])
}</pre>
```

Actually, the median is a special case of so called *quantiles*. The court could decide that 50% of users is too lenient as a criterion and could demand that 75% percent of users must complete the task within 99 seconds for the slogan to be considered valid.

```
quantile(Ver20$ToT, .75)

## 75%
## 125
```

A common pattern in distributions of measures is that a majority of observations accumulate in the center region. The point of highest density of a distribution is called the *mode*. In other words: the mode is the region (or point) that is most likely to occur. For continuous measures this once again poses the problem that every value is unique. Sophisticated procedures exist to smooth over this inconvenience, but by binning we can construct an approximation of the mode: just choose the center of the bin with highest frequency.

```
mode <- function(x, bin_width = 10) {
  bins <- bin(x, bin_width)
  bins[which.max(tabulate(match(x, bins)))] + bin_width/2
}</pre>
```

Ver20

Obs	Part	ТоТ	age	Gender
1	1	146.1	36	female
	2	88.1	41	male
$\overline{}$	3	115.9	34	female
$\frac{3}{4}$	4	124.0	39	female
$\frac{1}{5}$	5	117.1	44	male
$-\frac{3}{6}$	6	101.8	NA	female
$-\frac{6}{7}$	7	$\frac{101.8}{150.3}$	40	female
$-\frac{1}{8}$	8	102.2	41	male
$\frac{8}{9}$	9	165.6	42	
$\frac{3}{10}$	10	103.0 103.1	48	
$\frac{10}{11}$	11	144.1	37	female
$\frac{11}{12}$	12	173.6	55	male
$\frac{12}{13}$	13	63.3	37	male
$\frac{13}{14}$	14	96.6		female
$\frac{14}{15}$		101.0		
	15	101.0 124.1	48	
16	16		43	female
17	17	96.5	32	female
18	18	25.3	47	male
19	19	31.8	NA	male
20	20	144.6	47	female
21	21	95.8	44	male
22	22	51.6	24	female
23	23	99.8	46	female
24	24	141.4	44	
25	25	161.9	45	male
26	26	92.1	47	
27	27	97.3	50	
28	28	52.1	33	
29	29	118.8	36	
30	30	85.8	42	
31	31	118.7		female
32	32	126.1	53	
33	33	136.1	37	female
34	34	86.7		female
35	35	120.1	46	female
36	36	53.5	29	male
37	37	81.5	33	female
38	38	79.5	36	male
39	39	32.6	26	male
40	40	106.1	36	female
41	41	111.2	36	female
42	42	94.2	36	female
43	43	127.7	38	female
44	44	83.2	41	male
45	45	64.0	46	female
46	46	118.0		female
$-\frac{10}{47}$	47	80.7		female
48	48	148.3	43	male
49	49	92.1	48	female
$\frac{-45}{50}$	50	124.7	42	male
$\frac{-50}{51}$	51	114.7	26	female
$-\frac{51}{52}$	52	81.5	32	male
$\frac{-52}{53}$	53	$\frac{61.5}{152.3}$	51	female
		$\frac{152.3}{124.3}$	46	female
$\frac{54}{55}$	54 55	$\frac{124.3}{107.7}$	46	
- 50	55	1100	40	male

```
Ver20 %>%
  group_by() %>%
  summarize(
   mean_ToT = mean(ToT),
   median_ToT = median(ToT),
   mode_ToT = mode(ToT))
```

mean_	_ToT	$median_{_}$	_ToT	$mode_{-}$	_ToT
	106		108		145

The table above shows the three statistics for central tendency side-by-side. Mean and median are close together. This is frequently the case, but not always. When the distribution of measures is completely symmetric mean and median perfectly coincide. In section @??distributions) we will encounter distributions that are not symmetric. The more a distribution is skewed, the stronger the difference between mean and median increases.

To be more precise: for left skewed distributions the mean is strongly influenced by few, but extreme, values in the left tail of the distribution. The median only counts the number of observations to both sides and is not influenced by how extreme these values are. Therefore, it is located more to the right. The mode does not regard any values other than those in the densest region and just marks that peak. The same principles hold for right-skewed distributions.

To summarize, the mean is the most frequently used measure of central tendency, one reason being that it is a so called *sufficient statistic*, meaning that it exploits the full information present in the data. The median is frequently used when extreme measures are a concern. The mode is the point in the distribution that is most typical.

3.1.3 Dispersion

In a symmetric distribution with exactly one peak, mean and mode coincide and the mean represents the most typical value. For a value being more typical does not mean it is very typical. That depends on how the measures are dispersed over the whole range. In the figure below, the center value of the narrow distribution contains 60% of all measures, as compared to 40% in the wide distribution, and is therefore more representative.

A very basic way to describe dispersion of a distribution is to report the range between the two extreme values, minimum and maximum. These are easily computed by sorting all values and selecting the first and the last element. Coincidentally, they are also special cases of quantiles, namely the 0% and 100% quantiles.

The range statistic only uses just these two values and therefore does not fully represent the amount of dispersion. A statistic for dispersion that does so is the *variance*, which is the mean of squared deviations from the mean. Squaring the deviations always produces a positive value, but makes variance difficult to interpret. The *standard deviation* is the square root of variance. By reversing the square the standard deviation is on the same scale as the original measures and their mean.

$\overline{\min(\text{ToT})}$	$\max(\text{ToT})$	range(ToT)	var(ToT)	sd(ToT)
15.2	174	158	966	31.1

```
detach(Sec99)
```

3.1.4 Associations

Are elderly users slower at navigating websites? How does reading speed depend on font size? Is the result of an intelligence test independent from gender?

A majority of research deals with associations between variables and the present section introduces some statistics to describe them. Variables represent properties of the objects of research and fall into two categories: *Metric variables* represent a measured property, such as speed, height, money or perceived satisfaction. *Categorial variables* put observations (or objects of research) into non-overlapping groups, such as experimental conditions, persons who can program or cannot, type of education etc. Consequently, associations between any two variables fall into precisely one of three cases:

	categorial	metric
categoria	l frequency cross tables	differences in mean
-	-	-
metric	classification	covariance, correlation
-	-	-

All forms of associations derive directly from statistics we have already encountered. That is obvious for when one variable is categorial and a little more subtle for two metric variables.

When there are only categories in the game, but no measures, the only way to compare is by frequencies. To illustrate the categorial-categorial case, consider a study to assess the safety of two syringe infusion pump designs, called Legacy and Novel. All participants of the study are asked to perform a typical sequence of operation and it is recorded whether the sequence was completed correctly or not.

```
attach(IPump)

D_agg %>%
  filter(Session == 3) %>%
  group_by(Design, completion) %>%
  summarize(frequency = n()) %>%
  ungroup() %>%
  spread(completion, frequency)
```

Design	FALSE	TRUE
Legacy	21	4
Novel	22	3

Besides the troubling result that incorrect completion is the rule, not the exception, there is almost no difference between the two designs. Note that in this study, both professional groups were even in number. If that is not the case, it is preferred to report proportions within a group. Note how every row sums up to 1.

```
D_agg %>%
  filter(Session == 3) %>%
  group_by(Design, completion) %>%
  summarize(frequency = n()) %>%
  group_by(Design) %>%
  mutate(frequency = frequency/sum(frequency)) %>%
  ungroup() %>%
  spread(completion, frequency)
```

Design	FALSE	TRUE
Legacy	0.84	0.16
Novel	0.88	0.12

In a similar manner, associations between groups and metric variables are reported by group means. In the case of the two infusion pump designs, the time spent to complete the sequence is compared by the following table. And as you can see, adding a comparison of variance is no hassle.

```
D_agg %>%
  filter(Session == 3) %>%
  group_by(Design) %>%
  summarize(mean_ToT = mean(ToT),
        sd_ToT = sd(ToT))
```

Design	mean_ToT	sd_ToT
Legacy	151.0	62.2
Novel	87.7	33.8

For associations between two metric variables, *covariance* is a commonly employed statistic for the association between two variables and derives directly from variance, with the difference that the square of deviations is replaced by the multiplication of two deviations. For example, we may want to assess whether there is any relationship between years of experience and ToT:

$$cov_{XY} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (x_i - E(X))(y_i - E(Y))$$

```
cov <- function(x, y)
  mean((x - mean(x, na.rm = T)) * (y - mean(y, na.rm = T)), na.rm = T)

cov(D_agg$experience, D_agg$ToT)

## [1] 271</pre>
```

When at large the deviations go into the same direction from the respective mean, covariance becomes positive. When the deviations primarily move in opposite direction it is negative. When the picture is mixed, covariance will stay close to zero. The three plots below illustrate three covariances, a strongly positive, a weakly positive and a moderate negative one.

The graphs highlight the deviation from the population mean of each variables. A strong covariance emerges whenever there is a strong tendency to deviate in either one direction. In fact, the illustration introduces a geometric interpretation: every data point stretches a rectangle which has an area of the product of the two deviations, just like in the formula of covariance.

As intuitive the idea of covariance is, as unintelligible is the statistic itself for reporting results. Covariance is not a pure measure of association, but is contaminated by the dispersions of X and Y. For that reason, two covariances can hardly be compared. The *Pearson correlation coefficient* r solves the problem by rescaling a covariance by the two standard deviations:

$$r_XY = \frac{\text{cov}_{XY}}{\text{sd}_X\text{sd}_Y}$$

$$\text{cor} \leftarrow \text{function}(x, y)$$

$$\text{cov}(x, y)/(\text{sd}(x, \text{na.rm} = T) * \text{sd}(y, \text{na.rm} = T))$$

$$\text{cor}(D_p\text{sychomet}\text{MRS}_1, D_p\text{sychomet}\text{MRS}_2)$$

```
## [1] 0.952
```

Due to the standardization of dispersion, r lets the researcher interpret strength of association independent of scale of measurement. More precisely, r will always be in the interval [-1,1]. That makes it the perfect choice for several purposes.

In the field of psychometrics, correlations are ubiquotously employed to represent *reliability* and *validity* of tests. For example, when the long-term career of an individual is dependent on the score of an assessment, it would be inexceptable if test scores differed strongly from day to day. *Test-retest stability*

is one form to measure reliability and it is just the correlation of the same test taken on different days. For example, we could ask whether mental rotation speed as measured by the mental rotation task is a stable, such that we can use it for long-term predictions of whether someone will become a good surgeon. A reliability of .95 will probably satisfy most psychometricians. Validity of a test means that it predicts what it was intended for. For example, we could ask how well the ability of a person to become a minimally invasive surgeon depends on spatial cognitive abilities, like mental rotation speed. Validity could be assessed by taking performance scores from exercises in a surgery simulator and do the correlation with mental rotation speed. A correlation of r = .5 would indicate that mental rotation speed as measured by the task has rather limited validity. Another form is called discriminant validity and is about how specific a measure is. Imagine another test is already part of the assessment suite. This test aims to measure another aspect of spatial cognition, namely the capacity of the visual-spatial working memory (e.g., the Corsi block tapping task). If both tests are as specific as they claim to be, we would expect a particularly low correlation.

```
D_psychomet %>%
   GGally::ggpairs()
```

Correlations allow psychometricians to employ absolute standards for the quality of measures. In exploratory analysis, one often seeks to get a broad overview of how a bunch of variables is associated. Creating a correlation table of all variables is no hassle and allows to get a broad picture of the situation. Correlations are ubitutous in data analysis, but have limitations: First, a correlation only uncovers linear trends, whereas the association between two variables can take any conceivable form. The validity of correlations depends on how salient the feature of linear trend is. In the example below, Y_1 reveals a strong parabolic form, which results in zero correlation. The curvature of an exponentially rising function is only captured insufficiently. For that reason, I recommend that correlations are always cross-checked by a scatterplot.

Another situation where covariances and correlations fail is when there simply is no variance. It is almost trivial, but for observing how a variable Y changes when X moves is that both variables vary , there is no co-variance without variance.

3.1.4.1 [HERE]

3.2 Bayesian probability theory

First, be reminded mathematics is empty. In its purest form, it does not require or have any link to the real world. It often helps, to associate a mathematical system with some more real world ideas or illustrations, for example, I remember how my primary school teacher introduced the sum of two numbers as removing elements from one stack and place it on another, until the first stack is empty, piece by piece. Later, I found this to be an exact embodidment of how the sum follows from the Peano axioms, that define the set of natural numbers. Sometimes, a mathematical theory just describes trivial real world intuitions in just more complicated ways, like the Peano axioms. Sometimes a mathematical theory describe real world phenomena that we have no intuition about at all. A classic example is Einstein's General Relativity Theory, which assumes a curved, rather than straight space. Earlier, Isaac Newton has introduced his Mechanics, grounding on the idea of a Euclidian space, where three dimensions form rectangular cubes, just as we know them. In order to formalize his theory, Einstein used the mathematical theory of Rieman spaces, which were discovered in the 19th century, but initially made no sense to anyone outside mathematics.

Fortunately, the math of probability is more on the intuitive side of things. The most tangible interpretation is that the probability of an event to happen, say throwing a Six with a dice, coincides with the relative frequency of a Six in a (very long) sequence of throws. This is called the *frequentist interpretation* of probability and this is how probability will be introduced in the following. While thinking in terms of relative frequency in long running sequences is rather intuitive, it has limitations. Not all events we want to assign a probability can be imagined as a long running sequence, among those are:

- the probability that a space ship will safely reach Mars (there's only this one attempt)
- the probability that a theory is more true than another (there's only this pair)
- the probability that your house burns down (you only have this one)

Therefore, I will finally introduce the *Bayesian interpretation* of probability, which is the certainty in one's belief. While this might be less tangible, it is compatible with the mathematical notion of probability and it is immensly useful in scientific thinking, as progress in science can be described as updating our beliefs about the world.

3.2.1 Some set theory

The mathematical concept of probability can most intuitively be approached by thinking in terms of relative frequency in long-running sequences. Actually, it is not even required to think of a sequence (where events have an order). It suffices to assume a set of events.

A mathematical set is a collection of elements taken from a domain (or universe, more dramatically). These can either be defined by stating all the elements, like $S = \{\text{red, yellow, green, off}\}$ or by a characterizing statement, like:

S := possible states of a Dutch traffic light

The elements should be clearly identified, but need not have a particular order. (If they do, this is called an *ordered set*, the set of natural numbers is an example). Sets can have all possible sizes, which is called the *cardinality* of a set:

- empty like "all opponents who can defeat Chuck Norris", {} or ⊘
- finite (and countable) like the states of a traffic light
- infinite, but countable, like the natural numbers N
- infinite, uncountable, like the real numbers R

You may wonder now, whether you would ever need such a strange concept as uncaountable infinite sets in your down-to-earth design research. Well, the set of primary interest in every design study is the possible outcomes. Sometimes, these are finite, like {success, failure}, but when you measure durations or distances, you enter the realm of real numbers. We will set this issue aside for the moment and return to it later in the context of continuous distributions of randomness.

In order to introduce the mathematical concept of probability, we first have to understand some basic operations on sets. For an illustration, imagine a validation study for a medical infusion pump, where participants were given a task and the outcome was classified by the following three criteria:

- was the task goal achieved successfully?
- was the task completed timely (e.g., one minute or below)?
- were there any operation errors along the way with potentially harmful consequences?

Note how the the data table makes use of logical values to denote their membership to a set. Based on these three criteria, we can extract subsets of observations:

library(sets)

```
All <- as.set(D_sets$0bs)

Success <- as.set(filter(D_sets, Success)$0bs)

Harmful <- as.set(filter(D_sets, Harm)$0bs)

Timely <- as.set(filter(D_sets, Timely)$0bs)
```

The first basic set operator is the *complementary set*. It selects all elements from the domain that are not part of a given set:

```
Failure <- All - Success
Harmless <- All - Harmful
Delayed <- All - Timely
```

Once there is more than one set in the game, set operators can be used to create all kinds of new sets. First, the *union* of two sets collects the elements of two separate sets into one new set, for example, the set of all tasks that were failure or delayed (or both):

```
Failure | Delayed
```

```
## {1L, 2L, 3L, 4L, 5L, 6L, 19L, 20L, 21L, 22L, 23L, 24L, 25L, 26L, ## 27L, 28L, 29L, 30L}
```

Another commonly used set operator is the *intersect*, which produces a set that contains only those elements present in both original sets, like the set of timely and successful task completions:

```
Success & Timely
```

```
## {7L, 8L, 9L, 10L, 11L, 12L, 13L, 14L, 15L, 16L, 17L, 18L}
```

The set difference removes elements of one set from another, for example the set of all successful observations with no harmful side effects:

```
Success - Harmless
```

```
## {}
```

It turns out that all successful observations are also harmless. That indicates that the set of successful events is a *subset* of harmless events. The subset operator differs from those discussed so far, in that it does not produce a new set, but a truth value (also called logical or Boolean). A distinction is made

between subsets and *proper subsets*, where one set contains all elements of another, but never the other way round. If two sets are mutual subsets (and therefore improper), they are *equal*.

```
# subset
Success <= Harmless

## [1] TRUE

# proper subset
Success < Harmless

## [1] TRUE

# set equality
Success == Harmless

## [1] FALSE

Success == (All - Failure)

## [1] TRUE</pre>
```

The example above demonstrates another important element of set theory: the empty set, which has the special property of being a subset of all other set:

```
set() < Success
## [1] TRUE</pre>
```

Among other uses, the empty set is important for intersections. It may happen that two sets do not share any elements at all. It would be problematic, if the intersect operator only worked if common elements truly existed. In such a case, the intersection of two sets is the empty set. Sets that have an empty intersection are called *disjunct sets* and complementary sets are a special case. The package Sets, which defines all operators on sets so far is lacking a dedicated function for disjunctness, but this is easily defined using the intersect function:

```
is_disjunct <- function(x, y) set_is_empty(x & y)
is_disjunct(Success, Harmful)</pre>
```

```
## [1] TRUE
```

So far, we have only seen sets of atomic elements, where all elements are atomic, i.e. they are not sets themselves. We can easily conceive a set that has elements that are sets. The set of sets that are defined by the three performance criteria and their complementary sets is an obvious example:

For the introduction of probability, we need two concepts related to sets o sets: First, a partition of a set is a set of non-empty subsets such that every element is assigned to exactly one subset. The subsets of successes and its conplementary set, all failures, is such a partition. Second, the power set is the set of all possible subsets in a set. Even with a rather small set of 20 elements, this is getting incredibly large, so let's see it on a smaller example:

```
S <- set(1, 2, 3)
P <- set_power(S)
```

The power set is tantamount for the definition of probability that follows, because it has two properties: first, for every subset of S it also contains the complementary set. That is called closed under complementarity. Second, for every pair of subsets of S, P it also contains the union, it is closed under union. In the same way, power sets are also closed under intersection. Generally, all sets of subsets that fulfill these three requirements are called Σ algebras. The mathematical theory of Σ algebras is central for the mathematical definition of measures. Loosely speaken, a measure is a mapping from the domain of empirical observations to the domain of numbers, such that certain operations in the domain of measurement have their counterparts in the numerical domain. Probabilities are measures and in the next section we will see how numerical operations on probabilities relate to set operations in a Σ algebra.

3.2.2 Probability

Before we get to a formal presentation of probability, we can develop the idea on the fictional validation study introduced in the previous section. Performance of participants was classified by the three two-level criteria, success, harm and timeliness. Every recorded outcome therefore falls into one of eight possible sets and a purposeful way to summarize the results of the study would be relative frequencies (π, pi) :

```
N_sets <- nrow(D_sets)
D_freq <-
D_sets %>%
  group_by(Success, Harm, Timely) %>%
  summarize(n = n()) %>%
  ungroup() %>%
  complete(Success, Harm, Timely, fill = list(n = 0)) %>% # adds empty events
  mutate(pi = n/sum(n))
D_freq
```

Success	Harm	Timely	n	pi
FALSE			1	0.033
FALSE			2	0.067
FALSE			3	0.100
FALSE	TRUE	TRUE	6	0.200
TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	6	0.200
TRUE	FALSE	TRUE	12	0.400
TRUE	TRUE	FALSE	0	0.000
TRUE	TRUE	TRUE	0	0.000

Let's examine on an abstract level, what has happened here:

- 1. The set of events has been partitioned into eight disjunct subsets
- 2. All subsets got a real number assigned, by the operation of relative frequencies, that is between (and including) zero and one.
- 3. The sum of these numbers is one.

The common mathematical theory of probability assumes a set of outcomes Ω and a Σ algebra F on Ω , like the power set. An element E of F is called an *event*. Note the difference between outcomes, which are singular outcomes, and events, which are sets of outcomes, like the eight outcome categories above. Also note that these eight sets are a partition of Ω , but not a Σ -algebra. However, we can easily construct a Σ -algebra by adding all possible unions and intersections. Or we use the power set of outcomes in the data set right-away.

The first Kolmogorov axiom states that a probability is a non-negative real number assigned to every event. Take a look at the table above, to see that this is satisfied for the relative frequencies.

While the first axiom defines a lower border of zero for a probability measure, the *second Kolmogorov axiom* cares for the upper limit (although somewhat indirectly) by stating that the set of all observations Ω (which is an element of F) is assigned a probability of one. In the table of relative frequencies that is not yet covered, but we can easily do so:

```
D_sets %>%
    # no group_by
summarize(pi = n()/N_sets) %>%
c()

## $pi
## [1] 1
```

So far, the theory only cared for assigning numbers to events (subsets), but provides no means to operate on probabilities. The *third Kolmogorov axiom* establishes a relation between the union operator on sets and the sum operator on probabilities by stating that the probability of a union of disjunct events is the sum of the individual probabilities. We can approve this to be true for the relative frequencies. For example, is the set of all successful observations is the union of successful timely observations. Indeed, the relative frequency of all successful events is the sum of the two and satisfies the third axiom:

```
D_sets %>%
  group_by(Success) %>%
  summarize(n = n()) %>%
  mutate(pi = n/sum(n))
```

Success	n	pi
FALSE	12	0.4
TRUE	18	0.6

The Kolmogorov axioms establish a probability measure and lets us do calculations on disjunct subsets. That would be a meager toolbox to do calculations with probabilities. What about all the other set operators and their possible counterparts in the realm of numbers? It is one of greatest wonders of the human mind that the rich field of reasoning about probabilities spawns from just these three axioms and a few set theoretic underpinnings. To give just one example, we can derive that the probability of the complement of a set A is $P(\Omega/A) = 1 - P(A)$:

- 1. From set theory follows that a set A and its complement Ω/A are disjunct, hence axiom 3 is applicable: $P(A \cup \Omega/A) = P(A) + P(\Omega/A)$
- 2. From set theory follows that a set A and its complement Ω/A form a partition on Ω . Using axiom 2, we can infer:

$$A \cup \Omega/A = \Omega$$

$$\Rightarrow P(A) + P(\Omega/A) = P(\Omega) = 1$$

$$\Rightarrow P(\Omega/A) = 1 - P(A)$$

The third axiom tells us how to deal with probabilities, when events are disjunct. As we have seen, it applies for defining more general events. How about the opposite direction, calculating probabilities of more special events? In our example, two rather general events are Success and Timely, whereas the intersection event Success and Timely is more special. The probability of two events occuring together is called *joint probability* $P(\text{Timely} \cap \text{Success})$. The four joint probabilities on the two sets and their complements are shown in the following table.

```
D_sets %>%
  group_by(Success, Timely) %>%
  summarize(pi = n()/N_sets) %>%
  ungroup()
```

Success	Timely	pi
	FALSE	
	TRUE	
TRUE	FALSE	0.200
TRUE	TRUE	0.400

As joint probability asks for simultaneous occurance it treats both involved sets symmetrically: $P(\text{Timely} \cap \text{Success}) = P(\text{Successes} \cap \text{Timely})$. What if you are given one piece of information first, such as "this was a successful outcome" and you have to guess the other "Was it harmful?". That is called *conditional probability* and in this case, we even have 100% certainty in our guess, because an observation was only rated a success if there was no harm. But we can easily think of more gradual ways to make a better guess.

P(Harmful|Success)

```
D_sets %>%
  filter(Success) %>%
  group_by(Harm) %>%
  summarize(n = n()) %>%
  mutate(pi = n/sum(n)) %>%
  ungroup()
```

Harm	n	pi
FALSE	18	1

Perhaps, there is a relationship between Timely and Harm in the manner of a speed-accuracy trade-off. In the manner of a speed-accuracy trade-off, there could be a relationship between Timely and Harm. Participants who rush through the task are likely to make more harmful errors. We would then expect a different distribution of probability of harm by whether or not task completion was timely.

```
D_sets %>%
  group_by(Timely, Harm) %>%
  summarize(n = n()) %>%
  mutate(pi = n/sum(n)) %>%
  ungroup()
```

Timely	Harm	n	pi
FALSE	FALSE	7	0.7
FALSE	TRUE	3	0.3
TRUE	FALSE	14	0.7
TRUE	TRUE	6	0.3

See how conditional probabilities sum up to one *within* their condition. In this case, the conditional probabilities for harm are the same for successes and failures. As a consequence, it is also the same as the overall probability, hence:

$$P(\text{Harm}|\text{Timely}) = P(\text{No harm}|\text{Timely}) = P(\text{Timely})$$

This sitation is called *independence of events* and it means that knowing about one variable does not help in guessing the other. In statistics, *conditional probability* is an important concept. In particular, it will carry us away from the set theoretic interpretation towards the Bayesian interpretation of probability as states of knowledge.

- joint probability
- conditional probability (events in a sequence -> knowledge of A is knowledge of B)
- independence
- Bayes theorem

Other definitions and basic numerical operations on probabilities can be inferred in similar ways.

The basic operations on probability then give rise to more advanced laws of probability:

3.2.3 Likelihood

[...]

Consider the following example: A standard dice is rolled twice. How likely is an outcome of two times Six? We use probability theory: It is the same dice and the results of the rolls are independent. The probability of rolling a

Six on either attempt is $p(y_1 = \text{Six}) = p(y_2 = \text{Six}) = \frac{1}{6}$. Therefore the joint probability is just the product:

$$P(y_1 = \text{Six and } y_2 = \text{Six}) = P(y_1 = \text{Six}) \times P(y_2 = \text{Six}) = \frac{1}{36}$$

The joint probability of all data points is called the *Likelihood* and generalizes to situations where the probabilities of events are not the same, for example: What is the probability of the first dice being an Four, the second a five and the third a Three or a Six?

$$P(y_1 = \text{Four and } y_2 = \text{Five and } y_3 = \text{Three or Six} = \frac{1}{6} \times \frac{1}{6} \times \frac{1}{3} = \frac{1}{108}$$

Notice how the likelihood gets smaller in the second example. In fact, likelihoods are products of numbers between zero and one and therefore become smaller with every observation that is added. In most empirical studies, the number of observations is much larger than two or three and the likelihood becomes inexpressibly small. Consider the following results from 16 rolls. In order to distinguish the base probability for any side from derived probabilities, we call it $\pi = \frac{1}{6}$

```
set.seed(42)
Events <- c("One", "Two", "Three", "Four", "Five", "Six")
Result <- sample(Events, 16, replace = T)
pi = 1/6
Likelihood <- pi^length(Result)</pre>
```

The likelihood of this result, given that it is a fair dice, is $\frac{1}{6}^{16} = 3.545 \times 10^{-13}$. Therefore, one usually reports the *logarithm of the likelihood (log-likelihood)*. This results in "reasonable" negative numbers. Why negative? Because all Likelihoods are fractions of One (the identity element of multiplication), which results in a negative logarithm.

```
(logLik <- log(Likelihood))</pre>
```

```
## [1] -28.7
```

The dice rolling example above has a twist, assumed that we may enter $\pi = \frac{1}{6}$, because we *believe* that it is a fair dice, without further notice. In other words, we needed no data, because of overwhelming prior knowledge (or theory, if you will). Imagine we have been called in to uncover fraud with biased dices in a casino. There is suspicion, that the chance of rolling a Six is lower than $\frac{1}{6}$. So, what is the (most likely) chance of rolling a Six? With the help of a dice rolling robot, the following 6000 rolls have been recorded.

Roll	Result
1	Three
2	Six
3	Five
4	One
5	Two
6	Six

```
Rolls %>%
  ggplot(aes(x = Result)) +
  geom_bar()
```

The result is shown in the figure above. For simplicity we just focus on rolling Six. If we have no prior assumptions about the dice, the estimated probability is simply the relative frequency of Six.

```
Rolls %>%
group_by(Result) %>%
summarize(pi = n()/n_Rolls)
```

pi
0.189
0.177
0.163
0.160
0.164
0.147

In this case, we can simply note down that the most likely value is $\pi_{Six}=.147$, which is lower than the fair 0.167. But, note the slight ruggedness of the bar chart. Not a single bar is read as exactly $\frac{1}{6}$, so the deviation of Six could have happened by chance. One way to approach this question is comparing the likelihoods $P(\text{Result} = \text{Six}|\pi = \frac{1}{6})$ and $P(\text{Result} = \text{Six}|\pi = .147)$. For that purpose, we create a new event variable Six, that indicates whether a roll is a Six (TRUE) or not (FALSE). Further, a distribution function is required that assigns these events their probabilities. Distribution functions can take very complicated forms [REF statistical models], but in the case here it is the rather simple Bernoulli distribution.

$$d_{\text{Bern}}(\text{Six}|p) = \begin{cases} \text{Six,} & p\\ \text{not Six,} & 1-p \end{cases}$$

The log-likelihood function of the Bernoulli distribution is just the sum of log-probabilities across all Rolls y_i .

$$LL_{\mathrm{Bern}}(\pi) = \sum_{i} \log(d_{\mathrm{Bern}}(\mathrm{Six}, \pi))$$

Now, we can determine the ratio of likelihoods, conditional on π . Recall that with logarithmic transformations, what was a ratio becomes a difference.

$$LR = \exp(LL_{\text{Bern}}(.147) - LL_{\text{Bern}}(\frac{1}{6}))$$

```
Rolls <- Rolls %>%
  mutate(Six = (Result == "Six"))

dbern <- function(y, pi) if_else(y, pi, 1 - pi)
LL_bern <- function(pi) sum(log(dbern(Rolls$Six, pi)))

pi_fair = 1/6
pi_est = .147

exp(LL_bern(pi_est) - LL_bern(pi_fair))</pre>
```

```
## [1] 4846
```

Now, recall what a likelihood is: the probability of the observed data, under a certain model. Here, the data is almost 5000 times more likely with p=.147. In classic statistics, such likelihood ratios are routinely been used for comparison of models.

Previously, I have indicated that the relative frequency gives us the most likely value for parameter π (the case of a Bernoulli distributed variable), the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE). The MLE is that point in the parameter range (here [0; 1]), with the maximum likelihood. It is the point, where the data is most likely. In a similar way, the mean of Normal distributed measures is the maximum likelihood estimate for the distribution parameter μ . But, more advanced models do not have such a closed form, i.e., a formula that you can solve. Therefore, parameter estimation in classic statistics heavily grounds on numerical procedures to find maximum likelihood estimates, which I will now outline for illustrative purposes:

Notice that the probability function $d_{\text{Bern}}(y_i,\pi)$ has two parameters, the result of a roll and the base probability. The likelihood function, in contrast, only has the parameter π , whereas the data is "buried" inside. This is by convention in order indicate that the likelihood function takes the data as fixed and is meant to explore the range of values for the parameter. By varying the parameter and reading the resulting likelihood of data, we can numerically interpolate the MLE. The most basic numerical interpolation method is a grid search, which starts at the left boundary of parameter range, zero in this case, and walks in small steps along a grid to the right boundary (one). By convention, maximum likelihood estimation is performed by minimizing the negative log-likelihood. For the convenience, the following likelihood function has been vectorized, to make it work smoothly in a tidy processing chain.

```
LL_bern <- function(pi) map_dbl(pi, function(x) sum(log(dbern(Rolls$Six, x))))
LL_bern(c(.1, .2))

## [1] -2572 -2563

LL_grid <-
    tibble(pi = seq(.01, .99, by = .01)) %>% ## the grid
mutate(nlogLik = -LL_bern(pi),
        rank = min_rank(nlogLik),
        MLE = (rank == 1))

LL_grid %>%
    ggplot(aes(x = pi, y = nlogLik)) +
```

```
geom_line() +
geom_point(data = filter(LL_grid, MLE), color = "Red") +
geom_text(data = filter(LL_grid, MLE), label = "MLE", color = "Red", nudge_y = -500)
```

Because we use the *negative* log-liklihood, the value for π with maximum likelihood is the minimum of the likelihood curve. Here, $pi_{\rm MLE}=0.15$, which is very close to the relative frequency estimate. It is always possible to get even more accurate by using a finer grid.

```
(MLE <- filter(LL_grid, MLE))
```

pi	nlogLik	rank	MLE
0.15	2507	1	TRUE

In classic statistics MLE is one of the most common methods for estimating parameters from models. However, most of the time, data is more abundant and there is more than one parameter. It is possible tow extend the grid method to as many parameters as the model contains by just creating multi-dimensional grids. However, already a two-dimensional grid of rather coarse 100×100 would require the computation of 10.000 likelihoods. Classic statisticians have therefore developed optimization methods to identify the MLE with as few runs as possible. Soon, we will turn our attention to Bayesian estimation, where the Likelihood plays a central role in estimation, too [REF]. Another appliction of the Likelihood is introduced in chapter ??, where it defines the deviance criterion for model goodness-of-fit.

3.2.4 Certainty as probability

Inferential statistics serves rational decision making under uncertainty by attaching information on the *level of certainty* to a parameter of interest. A central difference between frequentist and Bayesian statistical theory is how the elusive concept of *certainty* emerges.

Let us for a moment return to how probability was axiomatically defined by Kolmogorov's axioms. The axioms themselves only speak of relations between sets and ptobability. At no point do these axioms operate on frequencies (such as the cardinality of sets). The axioms are not constructive in the way that they show you how to calculate a probability in the real world. They just define the requirements for any number to be called a probability. It is our intuition that makes it almost inevitable to think of probability of a set A as relative frequencies, i.e. the ratio of the cardinality of A divided by the cardinality of the universal set Ω . Relative frequency precisely is the frequentist defintion of probability:

$$P(A) = \frac{|A|}{|\Omega|}$$

In frequentist statistics, a common way to express ones level of certainty about a parameter (say, the population mean) is the *confidence interval*, which is expressed as two endpoints:

```
attach(Sec99)
```

```
Ver20 %>%
  lm(ToT ~ 1, data = .) %>%
  confint()
```

	2.5 %	97.5 %
(Intercept)	99.8	112

The 95% confidence interval is defined by assuming an (infinite) set of replications of the very same experiment and using relative frequencies: The 95% confidence interval is constructed in such a way that, if the same experiment were repeated an infinite number of times, in 95% of these repetitions the true value is contained in the interval.

And similar it goes for the infamous p-value: A result is called statistically significant on level $\alpha = .05$, if drawing from the null distribution (an infinite number of times) will produce the observed result or a larger result in no more than 5% of cases.

You are not alone when you lack intuition of what the definition says and when you feel at unease about where all these experiments are supposed to come from. (Most of the time they are just imaginations.) As much as I usually embrace parsimony, it must not kill intuition. Also, the Kolmogorov axioms can be satisfied by other interpretations of probability. In Bayesian statistics, the level of certainty is expressed as a proposition about one's state of knowledge, like: Based on my data I am 95% sure that there is a difference. Equating level of certainty with probability directly, without taking the detour via relative frequencies, may be a little lax, but it leads to remarkably intuitive statements on uncertainty. In Bayesian statistics the credibility interval is defined as: With a probability of 95%, the true value is contained. Since there seems to be no external criterion (such as a series of experiments, imagined or not), Bayesian statistics often faced the criticism of being subjective. In fact, if we imagine a certainty of 95% as some number in the researchers mind, that might be true. But, it is quite easy to grasp certainty as an objective quantity, when we assume that there is something at stake for the researcher and that she aims for a rational decision. In the previous chapter I have illustrated this idea by the example of carrying an umbrella with you (or not) and the 99 seconds claim. Generally, it helps to imagine any such situation as a gamble:

if you bet 1 EUR that the true population mean is outside the 95% credibility interval, as a rational person I would put 19 EUR against.

In effect, the Bayesian certainty is a probability in mathematical terms, without the necessity to implement it as a relative frequency. That liberates our reasoning from the requirement to think of long-running series, when this makes little sense to us. Much of the time, we have only this one shot. In the next section we will see how probability theory is used to operate on certainties using Bayes famous theorem.

3.2.5 Bayes theorem (and the dynamics of belief)

In Bayesian statistics, certainty (or strength of belief, state of knowledge, credibility) is assumed to follow all rules of probability theory. We may still think of it in terms of frequencies or illustrate it as a gamble, whatever fits the context better. What sets Bayesian statistics apart is how it emphasizes the *dynamics of certainty*, like in the real world:

- Someone sceptical of climate change may change their view after one very hot summer.
- Everyone believed strongly in Newton's Mechanics, but some people got curious when it turned out that light speed is constant.

Note how these examples all have the same dynamics: a prior belief is updated when new data arrives. These are precisely the three elements of Bayesian statistics:

- 1. the *prior belief* is what you believe before (climate change is a myth)
- 2. the *likelihood* is what you learn by observation (hot summer)
- 3. the *posterior belief* is your adjusted believe after seeing the data (maybe not such a myth)

Before we get to a more formal definition of the dynamics of knowledge, Bayes theorem, let us explore this idea a little. First of all, it seems that updating knowledge is the primary purpose of any central nervous system, including its sensors (which provide the data).

The data is usually the present observation or study. But, that does not exclude that prior knowledge grounds on data, too. In experimental Psychology researchers entertain themselves repetitions of the very same experimental paradigm, with slight variations maybe. For example, in the famous Stroop effect, participants have to name the ink color of a word. When the word is itself a color word and refers to a different color, response times typically increase. This effect has been replicated in many dozens of published studies

and, probably, thousands of student experiments. Cumulative evidence is so strong that, would repeat the experiment another time and find the reverse effect, no one would seriously take this as a debunk. This extreme example illustrates another principle that follows from Bayes rule:

Today's posterior is tomorrow's prior.

There is no principled difference between prior and posterior. They are just levels of belief (credences) at different points in time. Both differ in strength: prior knowledge can be firm when it rests on an abundance of past evidence. The same holds for the likelihood in the present data: the more observations, the stronger the evidence. This is why larger sample sizes are usually preferred. Prior belief and likelihood can be congruent or contradict each other. When they are congruent, prior belief is just strengthened by the data. When they are contradicting each other, prior belief is over-ruled to some degree. That degree depends on how much data there is.

Whatever happens in the individual case, it is generally accepted that scientific progress is incremental over large periods of time. Under this perspective the idea of updating one's belief is even trivial. It is common sense, that if you are too uncertain about a situation you better gather more information. Once you have reached a satisfactory level of certainty, you proceed to act (or publish). However, as readers with a very firm background in classic statistics may know, once you have settled down on a sample size (and a level of significance), you absolutely must test precisely this number of participants. Stopping early (because you have reached the desired p-value) or adding to the sample is strictly forbidden. Doesn't that bother you under the perspective of accumulative evidence? It should bother you that incremental collection of evidence is impossible when doing frequentist statistics. On the other hand, in Bayesian statistics, accumulation of evidence is a core feature.

Neither is there a way to express one's prior belief when doing a t-test, nor may you continuously adjust your sample size until satisfactory certainty is reached. In the fictional example of the Stroop task, the classic data analysis pretends as if no one has ever done such an experiment before. At the same time, it is strictly forbidden to invite further participants to the lab, when the test results point into the right direction, but evidence is still to weak. If you planned the study with, say, N=20, this is what you must do, no less no more. If you reach your goal with less participants, you must continue testing. If you are unsatisfied with the level of certainty, the only permissable action is dump your data and start over from zero. The denial incremental knowledge is commonly counter-intuitive and for a researcher it is a millstone around the neck.

Reconsider Jane and Andrew. What did they know about the current state of affairs when running a particular session. Using some time-on-task measures

they disproved the claim "rent a car in 99 seconds". Recall how precisely the question was phrased: on average, users had to be able to complete the transaction in 99 seconds. The statistic of interest is the mean. This was debunked with almost no effort, by calculating:

$$\frac{\hat{M}_{ToT} = 1}{n * \sum ToT = 105.975}$$

But how about the updated slogan: "rent a car in 111 seconds". Can we be sure it holds, when someone repeats the study? We can only to a degree. It could still happen, that the belligerent competitor comes to a different result, just because they have a different sample of participants. Even if they would test a fully matching sample of participants, the measures will differ, simply because an array of smaller and larger impact factors is continuously hitting the central and peripheral nervous systems of your participants. The result is randomness in the data. Fortunately, randomness is often found to be well-behaved in that recurrent patterns emerge. These patterns are called distributions of randomness and I will introduce a whole bunch of them later in this chapter @??).

Let us finally see how Bayesian statistics formalizes the transition from prior belief to posterior belief. Although it may not seem obvious at first, but everything rests on one rather simple result from probability theory, *Bayes's theorem*:

$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(A)P(B|A)}{P(B)}$$

This theorem emerges from formal probability theory (and therefore is neither Bayesian nor frequentist). As so often with math, the theorem is easiest understood when put into context. Standing on the shoulder of giants, let me explain it by the example of a medical screening test:

In the 1980, the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) was discovered and since then has become a scourge for humanity. Given that the first outbursts of the desease raged among homosexual men, it is not really surprising that a few conservative politicians quickly called for action an proposed a mandatory test for everyonefor the results to be registered in a central data base. With some stretch it may just be justifiable to store (and use) the information that someone is carrying such a dangerous desease. The problem is with those people who do not carry it, but could be mis-diagnosed. These are called false-positives. The power of a screening test has been assessed by examining samples of participants where it is fully known whether someone is a carrier of the virus C+ or not C-. The result is a specificity of 95%, meaning that 95% of C- are diagnosed correctly (P(T-|C-)), and a sensitivity of 99%, meaning

that 99% with C+ are diagnosed correctly (P(T+|C+)). The question that Bayes' theorem can answer in such a situation is $How\ many\ citizens\ would\ be\ registered\ as\ HIV\ carrying,\ although\ they\ are\ not?$. For this to work, we must also know the probability that someone randomly chosen from the population is a carrier (P(C+)) and the proportion of positive test results P(T+).

$$\begin{array}{lll} P(C+) & = .0001 \\ P(C-) = 1 - P(C+) & = .9999 \\ P(T+|C+) & = .999 \\ P(T-|C+) = 1 - P(T-|C+) & = .01 \\ P(T-|C-) & = .95 \\ P(T+|C-) = 1 - P(T-|C-) & = .05 \\ P(T+) = P(C+)P(T+|C+) + P(C-)P(T+|C-) & \approx .05 \\ P(T-) = 1 - P(T+) & \approx .95 \end{array}$$

Once again, how do these numbers arise? The first, P(C+) is the proportions of HIV carriers in the whole population. If you have no test at all, that is your best guess for whether someone random has the virus, your prior knowledge. Then, the validation study of the test provides us with more data. The study examined the outcome of the test (T+ or T-) in two groups of participants, those that were knowingly carriers C+ and those that were not C-. This is where all the conditional probabilities come from. Finally, we need the expected proportion of positive test results P(T+), which we compute as, sort of, a weighted average over the two conditions. Because C- dominates the population, this is approximately the same as P(T+|C-). What matters in the present, that is when the test is put to use on random people.

- collateral damage: which proportion of the population will be registered, with all possible consequences, although they are non-carriers? That is: P(C-|T+)
- intercourse risk: if a random sexual candidate shows you a negative test results, what is the remaining risk that they are carriers? That is: P(C + |T-)

These two questions can be answered by using Bayes' theorem. By combining prior knowledge and data in the prescribed form, we obtain for collateral damage:

$$\frac{P(C - |T+) = \frac{P(C-)P(T+|C-)}{P(T+)} \approx .9999 \times .05}{.05 \approx .9999}$$

This would be a disaster. The data base would be filled mostly with noncarriers. Let us see whether the test is safe in practice? The probability that somehone has the virus despite a negative test result is:

$$P(C + |T-) = \frac{P(C+)P(T-|C+)}{P(T-)} \approx \frac{.0001 \times .01}{.95} \approx .000001$$

We see a strong asymmetry in how useful the test is in the two situations. Specificity of the test is rather low and stands no chance against the overwhelming prevalence of non-carriers. In the second use case, prevalence and high test sensitivity work in the same direction, which results in a fantastic low risk to err.

Again, you probably are not alone, if you lack intuition, here: As Gerd Gigerenzer argues from an evolutionary perspective, our brain is capable of understanding Bayes' theorem if it sees it in terms of *frequencies*. Isn't that ironic? Gigerenzer argues that our brains might even be Bayesian machines that operate on frequencies in our personal history with encounters of this and that type. In fact, there were frequencies in the first place, when the evaluation study was conducted. Specificity and sensitivity are statistics, i.e. summaries of 2x2 frequency tables.

We simulate the situation with a population of 100.000.000:

```
n_HIV <- 100000000

set.seed(42)
D_HIV_pop <-
   tibble(Carrier = as.logical(rbinom(n_HIV, size = 1, prob = .0001))) %>%
mutate(prob = if_else(Carrier, .99, .05),
        Test = as.logical(rbinom(n_HIV, size = 1, prob = prob))) %>%
group_by(Carrier, Test) %>%
summarize(N = n()) %>%
print()
```

```
## # A tibble: 4 x 3
## # Groups:
                Carrier [2]
##
     Carrier Test
                            N
##
     <1g1>
              <1g1>
                       <int>
## 1 FALSE
             FALSE 94991624
## 2 FALSE
             TRUE
                     4998456
## 3 TRUE
             FALSE
                         108
## 4 TRUE
              TRUE
                        9812
```

3.2.5.1 [HERE]

The table below comes in long format and computes the posterior probability in just two steps. First, it takes the frequencies of all positive and negative tests. These are the *margin sums* of Test.

```
D_HIV_pop %>%
  group by (Test) %>%
 mutate(margin Test = sum(N)) %>%
 ungroup() %>%
  mutate(posterior_prob = N /margin_Test,
         log_posterior_prob = log(posterior_prob)) %>%
  print()
  ## # A tibble: 4 x 6
  ##
        Carrier Test
                             N margin_Test posterior_prob log_posterior_prob
  ##
        <1g1>
                <1g1>
                          <int>
                                      <int>
                                                                          <dbl>
  ## 1 FALSE
                FALSE 94991624
                                   94991732
                                                1.000
                                                                   -0.00000114
  ## 2 FALSE
                TRUE
                       4998456
                                    5008268
                                                0.998
                                                                   -0.00196
  ## 3 TRUE
                FALSE
                            108
                                   94991732
                                                0.00000114
                                                                  -13.7
  ## 4 TRUE
                TRUE
                           9812
                                    5008268
                                                0.00196
                                                                   -6.24
```

Now, we clearly see how it happens: In this massive evaluation study, only 100 persons were carriers, due to the low prevalence of the virus. Only 1 in 949906 is a carrier with a negative test result. At the same time, almost everybody who has a positive test is not a carrier, just because almost everybody is a non-carrier. To be fair, part of the magic is an assumption we made: the evaluation study is fully representative as it reflects the true distribution of carriers in the full population. Probably, a real study would be conducted with a biased sample, say 100 carriers and 100 non-carriers. That is not a problem, if we first adjust for prevalence and then carry out the same procedure:

```
TestEval <-
  tribble(~Carrier,
                       ~Test, ~prevalence, ~N,
                       Τ,
                               .0001,
                                             99,
          Τ,
                       F,
          Τ,
                               .0001,
                                              1,
          F,
                       Τ,
                               .9999.
                                              5.
          F,
                               .9999,
                                             95) %>%
  group_by(Test) %>%
  mutate(margin_Test = sum(N)) %>%
  ungroup() %>%
  mutate(prob = (N /margin_Test)) %>%
  print()
```

##	#	A tibble	e: 4 x	6			
##		Carrier	Test	prevalence	N	margin_Test	prob
##		<lg1></lg1>	<1g1>	<dbl></dbl>	<dbl></dbl>	<dbl></dbl>	<dbl></dbl>
##	1	TRUE	TRUE	0.0001	99	104	0.952
##	2	TRUE	FALSE	0.0001	1	96	0.0104
##	3	FALSE	TRUE	1.000	5	104	0.0481
##	4	FALSE	FALSE	1.000	95	96	0.990

posterior \propto prior \times likelihood

Note that \propto here means proportional to. In very plain words this is:

what you believe now is a combination of what you knew before and what you have just seen in the data.

3.3 Statistical models

It is a scientific principle that every event to happen has its causes (from the same universe). The better these causes are understood, the better will be all predictions of what is going to happen the next moment, given that one knows the laws of physics. Laplace demon is a classic experiment of thought on the issue: the demon is said to have perfect knowledge of laws of physics and about the universe's current state. Within naturalistic thinking, the demon should be able to perfectly predict what is going to happen next. Of course, such an entity could never exist, because it were actually a computer that matches the universe in size. In addition, there are limits to how precisely we can measure the current state, although physicist and engineers have pushed this very far.

When Violet did her experiment to prove the superiority of design B, the only two things she knew about the state of affairs was that the participant sitting in front of her is member of a very loose group of people called the "typical user" and the design her or she was exposed to. That is painstakingly little to pin down the neural state of affairs. Her lack of knowledge is profound but still not a problem as the research question was gross, too, not asking for more than the difference in average duration. Instead, imagine Violet and a collegue had invented a silly game where they both guess the time-on-task of individual participants. Who comes closest wins. As both players are clever people, they do not just randomly announce numbers, but let themselves guide by data of previous sessions. A very simple but reasonable approach would be to always guess the average ToT in all previous sessions. As gross as this is, it qualifies as a model, more precisely the grand mean model [LM]. The model explains all observations by the population mean.

Of course, Violet would never expect her grand mean model to precisely predict the outcome of a session. Still, imagine a device that has perfect knowledge of the car rental website, the complete current neural state of a the participant and the physical environment both are in. The device would also have a complete and valid psychological theory. With this device, Jane could always make a perfect prediction of the outcome. Unfortunately, real design researchers are far from Laplace demoism. Routinely borrowing instruments from social sciences, precision of measurement is humble and the understanding of neural processes during web navigation is highly incomplete. Participants vary in many complex ways in their neural state and a myriad of small unrelated forces (SMURF) can push or hinder the user towards completion.

Laplace demon has perfect knowledge of all SMURF trajectories and therefore can produce a perfect prediction. Violet is completely ignorant of any SMURFs and her predictions will be off many times. A common way to conceive this situation is that observed values y_i are composed of the *expected value* under the model μ_i and a random part, ϵ_i

$$y_i = \mu_i + \epsilon_i$$

Generally, statistical models consist of these two parts: the *likelihood* to describe the association between predictors and expected values and the random part, which describes the overall influence of the unexplained SMURFs.

3.3.1 Predictions and likelihood

The likelihood function states the dependency of outcome on the predictor variables. The dependency can be a complex mathematical function of multiple predictors, or as simple as the population average. A common likelihood function is the linear function. For example, in their guessing game, Violet could try to improve her population model, by also taking age of participants into account. Older people tend to be slower. Violet creates a plot from past records. The ellipsoid form of the point cloud indicates that ToT is somehow depending on age. Violet draws a straight line with an upward slope to approximate the relationship. It seems that 30 year old persons have an average ToT of around 90 seconds, which increases to around 120 seconds for 50 year olds. Arithmetically, this is an increase of around 1.5 seconds per year of age.

```
Sec99$Ver20 %>%
  ggplot(aes(x = age, y = ToT)) +
  geom_point() +
  geom_smooth(method = "lm", se = F)
```

Violet can use this information to improve her gambling. Instead of stoically calling the population mean, she uses a linear function as predictor: \$90 + (age - 30) 1.5 \$. In Bayesian statistics, this is called a *likelihood function* and the general form for a single linear likelihood function is:

$$\mu_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i}$$

Likelihood functions connect the expected value μ with observed variables $x_{i1}, x_{i2}, ..., x_{ik}$, and (to be estimated) parameters, e.g. β_0, β_1 . The likelihood function is often called the deterministic part of a model, because its prediction strictly depends on the observed values and the predictors, but nothing else. For example, two persons of age 30 will always be predicted to use up 90 seconds. Apparently, this is not the case for real data.

The linear model is very common in statistical modelling, but likelihoods can basically take all mathematical forms. For example:

- the grand mean model, Violet used before: $\mu_i = \beta_0$
- two predictors with a linear relationship: $\mu_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i} + \beta_1 x_{2i}$
- a parabolic relationship: $\mu_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i} + \beta_2 x_{2i}^2$
- a nonlinear learning curve: $\mu_i = \beta_{\text{asym}} (1 + \exp(-\beta_{\text{rate}}(x_{\text{training}} + \beta_{\text{pexp}})))$
- the difference between groups A and B, where x_1 is a membership (dummy) variable coded as $A \to x_1 := 0, B \to x_1 := 1$: $\mu_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i}$

In the vast majority of cases, the likelihood function is the interesting part of the model, where researchers transform their theoretical considerations or practical questions into a mathematical form. The parameters of the likelihood function are being estimated and answer the urging questions, such as:

- Is the design efficient enough? (β_0)
- By how much does performance depend on age? (β_1)
- Under which level of arousal does performance peak? (determining the staionary point of the parabola)
- How fast people learn by training (β_{rate})
- By how much design B is better than A (β_1)

A subtle, but noteworthy feature of likelihood functions is that μ_i and x_i have indicators i. Potentially, every observation i has their own realization of predictors and gets a unique expected value, whereas the parameters β_0, β_1 asf. are single values that apply for all observations at once. In fact, we can conceive statistical models as operating on multiple levels, where there is always the two: the observation level and the population level. When introducing multi-level models, we will see how this principle extends to more than

these two levels. Another related idea is that parameters summarizes patterns found in data. Any summary implies repetition and that is what the likelihood expresses: the pattern that repeats across observations and is therefore predictable.

3.3.2 Distributions: patterns of randomness

The random part of a statistical model is what changes between observation and is not predictable. When using the grand mean model, the only information we are using is that the person is from the target population. Everything else is left to the unobserved SMURFs and that goes into the random part of the model. Fortunately, SMURFs don't work completely arbitrary. Frequently, recognizable patterns of ramdomness emerge. These patterns can be formulated mathematically as probability and density distributions. A probability distribution is typically characterized as a probability mass function that assigns probabilities to outcomes, such as:

- probability of task success is .81
- probability of 99 seconds or better is .22
- probability of all SMURFs together pushing a persons *IQ beyond 115* is around .33

3.3.2.1 Probability distributions

Probability distributions are mathematical functions that assign probabilities to the outcome of a measured variable y. Consider a participant who is asked to complete three tasks of constant difficulty, such that there is a chance of 30 percent for each one to be solved. The outcome variable of interest is the number of correct completions (0, 1, 2 or 3). Under idealized consitions, the following random distribution gives the probability of every possible outcome.

Further, we observe that the most probable outcome is exactly one correct task, which occurs with a probability of P(y=1)=0.441. At the same time, there is ample possibility for all failures, P(y=0)=0.343. We may also look at *combined events*, say the probability for less than two correct. That is precisely the sum $P(y \le 1) = P(y=0) + P(y=1) = 0.784$.

We can bundle basic events by adding up the probabilities. An extreme case of that is the universal event that includes all possible outcomes. You can say with absolute certainty that the outcome is, indeed, between zero and three and certainty means the probability is 1, or: $P(0 \le y \le 3) = 1$. As a matter of fact, all probability (and density) distributions fulfill that property.

More precisely, the area under the PMF must be exactly one and that brings us directly to a second form of characterizing the random distribution: the *cumulative distribution distribution (CDF)* renders the probability for the outcome to be smaller or equal to y. In the case of discrete outcomes, this is just stacking (or summing) over all outcomes, just as we did for $P(y \le 1)$ above. The CDF of the three-tasks example is shown in the graph below. We recognize the left starting point, which is exactly P(y = 0) and observe large jump to $P(y \le 1)$. Finally, at $y \le 3$ the function reaches the upper limit of 1, which is full certainty.

```
D_three_tasks %>%
  ggplot(aes(x = y, y = cumul_prob)) +
  geom_step() +
  ylim(0,1)
```

3.3.2.2 Density distributions

In the three-tasks example, reading and recombining probabilities is like counting blocks and stacking them upon each other. This is how most children learn basic arithmetics, when the outcome measure is *continuous*, rather than discrete, some high school math is required. The most common continuous measure is probably durations. As we will see, durations take quite tricky random patterns, so for the sake of simplicity, consider the distribution of intelligence quotients (IQ). Strictly spoken, the IQ is *not* continuous, as one usually only measures and reports whole number scores. Still, for instructional purposes, assume that the IQ is given in arbitrary precision, be it 114.9, 100.0001 or $\pi * 20$.

We observe that the most likely IQ is 100 and that almost nobody reaches scores higher than 150 or lower than 50. But, how likely is it to have an IQ of exactly 100? Less than you might think! With continuous measures, we can no longer think in blocks that have a certain area. In fact, the probability of having an IQ of exactly 100.00...0 is exactly zero. The block of IQ = 100 is infinitely narrow and therefore has an area of zero. Generally, with continuous outcome variables, We can no longer read probabilities directly. Therefore, probability mass distributions don't apply, but the association between outcome and probability is given by what is called probability density functions. What PDFs share with PMFs is that the area under the curve is always exactly one. They differ in that PDFs return a density for every possible outcome, which by itself is not as useful as probability, but can be converted into probabilities.

Practically, nobody is really interested in infinite precision. When asking "what is the probability of IQ = 100?", the answer is "zero", but what was really meant was: "what is the probability of an IQ in a close interval around 100?". Once we speak of intervals, we clearly have areas larger than zero. The graph below shows the area in the range of 85 to 115.

```
D_IQ %>%
  ggplot(aes(x = IQ, y = density)) +
  geom_line() +
  geom_area(aes(y = SE))
```

But, how large is this area exactly? As the distribution is curved, we can no longer simply count virtual blocks. Recall that the CDF gives the probability mass, i.e. the area under the curve, for outcomes up to a chosen point. Continuous distributions have CDFs, too, and the the graph below shows the CDF for the IQs. We observe how the curve starts to rise from zero at around 50, has its steepest point at 100, just to slow down and run against 1.

```
D_IQ %>%
  ggplot(aes(x = IQ, y = cdf)) +
  geom_line()
```

Take a look at the following graph. It shows the two areas $IQ \leq 85$ and $IQ \leq 115$. The magic patch in the center is just the desired interval.

```
D_IQ %>%
    ggplot(aes(x = IQ, y = density)) +
    geom_line() +
    geom_area(aes(y = PDF_085, fill = "P(IQ < 85)"), alpha = .4) +
    geom_area(aes(y = PDF_115, fill = "P(IQ < 115)"), alpha = .4)</pre>
```

And here the CDF comes into the play. To any point of the PDF, the CDF yields the area up to this point and we can compute the area of the interval by simple subtraction:

$$P(IQ \le 115) = 0.159 \\ P(IQ \le 85) = 0.841 \\ P(85 \le IQ \le 115) = P(IQ \le 115) \\ -P(IQ \le 85) = 0.683$$

Probability and density distributions usually are expressed as mathematical functions. For example, the function for the case of task completion is the binomial distribution, which gives the probability for y successes in k trials when the success rate is p:

$$Pr(y|p,k) = \binom{k}{y} p^y (1-p)^{k-y}$$

In most cases where the binomial distribution applies, base probability p is the parameter of interest, whereas the number of of trials is known beforehand and therefore does not require estimation. For that reason, the binomial distribution is commonly taken as a one-parameter distribution. When discussing the binomial in more detail, we will learn that p determines the location of the distribution, as well as how widely it is dispersed (preview Figure XY). The distribution that approximated the IQs is called the Gaussian distribution (or Normal). The Gaussian distribution function takes two parameters, mu determines the location of the distribution, say average IQ being 98, 100 or 102 and sigma which gives the dispersion, independently (preview Figure XY).

3.3.2.3 Location and dispersion

Location and dispersion are two immediate properties of plotted distributions that have intuitive interpretations. Location of a distribution usually reflects where the most typical values come to lie (100 in the IQ example). When an experimenter asks for the difference of two designs in ToT, this is purely about location. Dispersion can either represent uncertainty or variation in a population, depending on the research design and statistical model. The most common interpretation is uncertainty. The basic problem with dispersion is that spreading out a distribution influences how typical the most typical values are. The fake IQ data basically is a perfect Gaussian distribution with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. The density of this distribution at an IQ of 100 is 0.027. If IQs had a standard deviation of 30, the density at 100 would fall to 0.013. If you were in game to guess an unfamiliar persons IQ, in both cases 100 would be the best guess, but you had a considerable higher chance of being right, when dispersion is low.

The perspective of uncertainty routinely occurs in the experimental comparison of conditions, e.g. design A compared to design B. What causes experimenters worry is when the *residual distributions* in their models is widely spread. Roughly speaking, residuals are the variation that is not predicted by the model. The source of this variation is unknown and usually called *measurement error*. It resides in the realm of the SMURFs. With stronger measurement error dispersion, the two estimated locations get less certainty assigned, which blurs the difference between the two.

The second perspective on dispersion is that it indicates variation by a known source. Frequently, this source is differences between persons. The IQ is an extreme example of this, as these tests are purposefully designed to have the desired distribution. In chapter [LMM] we will encounter several sources of variation, but I am really concerned about human variation, mostly. Commonly, experimental researchers are obsessed by differences in location, which to my mind confuses "the most typical" with "in general". Only when variation by participants is low, this gradually becomes the same. We will re-encounter this idea when turning to multi-level models.

Most distributions routinely used in statistics have one or two parameters. Generally, if there is one parameter this determines both, location and dispersion, whereas two-parameter distributions can vary location and dispersion independently, to some extent. The Gaussian distribution is a special case as μ purely does location, whereas σ is just dispersion. With common two-parametric distributions, both parameters influence location and dispersion in more or less twisted ways. For example, mean and variance of a two-parametric binomial distributions both depend on chance of success p and number of trials k, as M = pk and Var = kp(1-p).

3.3.2.4 Range of support and skewness [###]

In this book I advocate the thoughtful choice of distributions rather than doing batteries of goodness-of-fit to confirm that one of them, the Gaussian, is an adequate approximation. It usual is trivial to determine whether a measure is discrete (like everything that is counted) or (quasi)continuous and that is the most salient feature of distributions. A second, nearly as obvious, feature of any measure is its range. Practically all physical measures, such as duration, size or temperature have natural lower bounds, which typically results in scales of measurement which are non-negative. Counts have a lower boundary, too (zero), but there can be a known upper bound, such as the number of trials. Statistical distributions can be classified the same way: having no bounds (Gaussian, t), one bound (usually the lower, Poisson, exponential) or two bounds (binomial, beta).

3.3.2.5 Data generating process

Many dozens of PMFs and PDFs are known in statistical science and are candidates to choose from. First orientation grounds on superficial characteristics of measures, such as discrete/continuous or range, but that is sometimes not sufficient. For example, the pattern of randomness in three-tasks falls into a binomial distribution only, when all trials have the same chance of success. If the tasks are very similar in content and structure, learning is likely to happen and the chance of success differs between trials. Using the binomial distribution when chances are not constant leads to severely mistaken statistical models.

For most distributions, strict mathematical definitions exist for under which circumstances randomness takes this particular pattern. Frequently, there is one or more natural phenomena that accurately fall into this pattern, such as the number of radioactive isotope cores decaying in a certain interval (Poisson distributed) or This is particularly the case for the canonical four random distributions that follow. Why are these canonical? The pragmatic answer is: they cover the basic types of measures: chance of success in a number of trials (binomial), counting (Poisson) and continuous measures (exponential, Gaussian).

3.3.2.6 Binomial distributions

A very basic performance variable in design research is task success. Think of devices in high risk sitations such as medical infusion pumps in surgery. These devices are remarkably simple, giving a medication at a certain rate into the bloodstream for a given time. Yet, they are operated by humans under high pressure and must therefore be extremely error proof in handling. Imagine, the European government would set up a law that manufacturers of medical infusion pump must prove a 90% error-free operation in routine tasks. A possible validation study could be as follows: a sample of N=30 experienced nurses are invited to a testing lab and asked to complete ten standard tasks with the device. The number of error-free task completions per nurse is the recorded performance variable tpo validate the 90% claim. Under somewhat idealized conditions, namely that all nurses have the same proficiency with the device and all tasks have the success chance of 90%, the outcome follows a Binomial distribution and the results could look like the following:

```
set.seed(1)

tibble(succs = rbinom(30, 10, .9)) %>%
   ggplot(aes(x = succs)) +
   geom_histogram(binwidth = 1) +
   scale_x_continuous(breaks = 0:10, limits = c(0,11))
```

Speaking about the Binomial distribution in terms of successes in a number of attempts is common. As a matter of fact, any binary classification of outcomes is amenable for Binomial modelling, like on/off, red/blue, male/female. Imagine, Jane's big boss needs a catchy phrase for an investor meeting. Together they decide that the return rate of customers could be a good measure, translating into a statement such as eighty percent of customers come back. To prove (or disprove) the claim, Jane uses the customer data base and divides all individuals into two groups: those who have precisely one record and those who returned (no matter how many times). This process results in a distribution, that has two possible outcomes: : 0 for one-timers and 1 for returners. This is in fact, a special case of the Binomial distribution with k=1 attempts. Examples are given in the first row of the figure.

```
geom_step() +
facet_grid(k ~ p)
```

A Binomial distributions has two parameters: p is the chance of success and k is the number of attempts. p is a probability and therefore can take values in the range from zero to one. With larger p the distribution moves to the right. The mean of Binomial distributions is the probability scaled by number of attempts, M = kp. Logically, there cannot be more successes then k, but with larger k the distribution gets wider. The variance is the odds scaled by number of attempts, Var = kp(1-p). As mean and variance depend on the exact same parameters, they cannot be set independently. In fact, the relation Var = M(1-p) is parabolic, so that variance is largest at p = .5, but decreases towards both boundaries. A Binomial distribution with, say k=10and p = .4 always has mean 4 and variance 2.4. This means, in turn, that an outcome with a mean of 4 and a variance of 3 is not Binomially distributed. This occurs frequently, when the success rate is not identical across trials. A common solution is to use hierarchical distributions, where the parameter pitself is distributed, rather than fixed. A common distribution for p is the beta distribution and the *logitnormal* distribution is an alternative.

The Binomial distribution has two boundaries, zero below and number of attempts k above. While a lower boundary of zero is often natural, one cannot always speak of a number of attempts. For example, the number of times a customer returns to the car rental website does not yield a natural interpretation of number of attempts. Rather, one could imagine the situation as that any moment is an opportunity to hire a car. At the same time, every single moment has a very, very small chance that a car is hired, indeed. Under these conditions, an infinite (or painstakingly large) number of opportunities and a very low rate, the random pattern is neatly summarized by Poisson distributions.

3.3.2.7 Poisson distributions

Some counting processes have no natural upper limit like the number of trials in a test. In design research, a number of measures are such *unbounds counts*:

- number of erronous actions
- frequency of returns
- behavioural events, e.g. showing explorative behaviour
- physiological events, such as number of peaks in galvanic skin response

These measures can often be modelled as *Poisson distributed*. A useful way to think of unbound counts, is that they can happen at every moment, but

with a very small chance. Think of a longer interaction sequence of a user with a system, where errors are recorded. It can be conceived as an almost infinite number of opportunities to err, with a very small chance of something to happen. The Poisson distribution is a so called limiting case of the binomial distributions, with infinite k and infinitely small p. Of course, such a situation is completely ideal. Yet, Poisson distributions fit such situations well enough.

Poisson distributions possess only one parameter λ (lambda), that is strictly positive and determines mean and variance of the distribution alike: $\lambda = M = \text{Var.}$ As a matter of fact, there cannot be massively dispersed distributions close to zero, nor narrow ones in the far. Owing to the lower boundary, Poisson distributions are asymmetric, with the left tail always being steeper. Higher λ s push the distribution away from the boundary and the skew diminishes. It is commonly practiced to approximate counts in the high numbers by normal distributions.

The linkage between mean and variance is very strict. Only a certain amount of randomness can be contained. If there is more randomness, and that is almost certainly so, Poisson distributions are not appropriate. One speaks of *overdispersion* in such a case.

Consider a very simple video game, subway smurfer, where the player jumps and runs a little blue avatar on the roof of a train and catches items passing by. Many items have been placed into the game, but catching a single one is very difficult. The developers are aware that a too low success rate would demotivate players as much as when the gane is made to easy. In this experiment, only one player is recorded, and in wonderful ways this player never suffers from fatigue, nor does he get better with training. The player plays a 100 times and records the catches after every run. In this idealized situation, the distribution of catches would, indeed, follow a Poisson distribution, as in the figure below.

Consider a variation of the experiment with 100 players doing one game and less restrictive rules. Players come differently equipped to perform visual search tasks and coordinate actions at high speeds. They are tested at different times of the day and by chance feel a bit groggy or energized. The chance of catching varies between players, which violates the assumption that

was borrowed from the Binomial, a constant chance p. The extra variation is seen in the wider of the two distributions.

Poisson distributions' lower boundary can cause trouble: the measure at hand is truly required to include the lower bound. A person can perform a sequence with no errors, catch zero items or have no friends on facebook. But, you cannot complete an interaction sequence in zero steps or have a conversation with less than two statements. Fortunately, once a count measure has a lower boundary right of zero, the offset is often available, such as the minimum necessary steps to complete a task. In such a case, the number of errornous steps can be derived and used as a measure, instead:

```
\#errors = \#steps - \#neccessary steps
```

Another lower bound problem arises, when there are hurdles. In traffic research, the frequency of use public transport certainly is an interesting variable. A straight-forward assessment would be to ask bus passengers "How many times have you taken the bus the last five days?". This clearly is a count measure, but it cannot be zero, because the person is sitting in the bus right now. This could be solved by a more inclusive form of inquiry, such as approaching random households. But, the problem is deeper: actually, the whole population is of two classes, those who use public transport and those who don't.

3.3.2.8 Exponential distribution [TBC]

Exponential distributions apply for measures of duration. Exponential distributions have the same generating process as Poisson distributions, except,

that the duration for an event to happen is the variable of interest, rather than events in a given time. The same idealized conditions of a completely unaffected subway smurfer player and constant catchability of items, the duration between any two catches is exponentially distributed. In more general, the chance for an event to happen is the same at any moment, completely independent of how long one has been waiting for it. For this property, the exponential distribution is called memoryless.

Durations are common measures in design research, most importantly, timeon-task and reaction time. Unfortunately, the exponential distribution is a poor approximation of the random pattern found in duration measures. That is for two reasons: first, the exponential distribution shares with Poisson, that it does not allow variance between participants. Second, the distribution always starts at zero, whereas human reactions always include some basic processing, and be this just the velocity of signals passing nerve cells, which is far below speed of sound (in air).

3.3.2.9 Gamma distribution [TBD]

3.3.2.10 Normal distributions

The best known distributions are normal distributions or Gaussian distributions. These distributions arise mathematically under the assumption of a myriad of small unrelated forces (SMURF) pushing performance (or any other outcome) up or down. As SMURFs work in all directions independently, their effects often average out and the majority of observations stays clumped together in the center, more or less.

Normal distributions have two parameters: μ marks the center and mean of the distribution. The linear models introduced later are aiming at predicting μ . The second parameter σ represents the dispersion of the random pattern. When randomness is pronounced, the center of the distribution gets less mass assigned, as the tails get wider.

Different to Poisson and Binomial distributions, mean and variance of the distribution can be set independently and overdispersion is never an issue.

```
ggplot(data.frame(x = c(-4, 4)), aes(x = x)) +
    stat_function(fun = dnorm, args = list(mean = 0, sd = 1), mapping = aes(colour = "Normal(
    stat_function(fun = dnorm, args = list(mean = -1.5, sd = 0.5), mapping = aes(colour = "Normal tabs(colour="Normal distributions", x = "outcome", y = "density")
```

Normal distributions have the compelling interpretation of summarizing the effect of SMURFs. They serve to capture randomness in a broad class of regression models and other statistical approaches. The problem with normal distributions is that they only capture the pattern of randomness under two assumption. The first assumption is that the outcome is continuous. While that holds for duration as a measure of performance, it would not hold for counting the errors a user makes. The second assumption is that the SMURFs are truly additive, like the forces add up, when two pool balls collide. This appears subtle at first, but it has the far reaching consequence that the outcome variable must have an infinite range in both directions, which is impossible.

The normal distribution is called "normal", because people normally use it. Of course not. It gots its name for a deeper reason, commonly known (and held with awe) as the *central limit theorem*. Basically, this theorem proves what we have passingly observed at binomial and Poisson distributions: the more they move to the right, the more symmetric they get. The central limit theorem proves that, in the long run, a wide range of distributions are indistinguishable from the normal distribution. In practice, infinity is relative. In some cases, it is reasonable to trade in some fidelity for convenience and good approximations make effective statisticians. As a general rule, the normal distribution approximates other distributions well, when the majority of measures stay far from the natural boundaries. That is the case in experiments with very many attempts and moderate chances(e.g. signal detection experiments), when counts are in the high numbers (number of clicks in a complex task) or with long durations. However, these rules are no guarantee and careful model criticism is essential.

Measurement is prime and specialized (non-central-limit) distributions remain the first recommendation for capturing measurement errors. The true salvation of normal distributions is their application in *multi-level models*. While last century statistics was reigned by questions of location, and variance considered nuisance, new statistics care for variation. Most notably, amount of variation in a population is added as a central idea in multi-level modelling, which is commonly referred to as *random effects*. These models can become highly complex and convenience is needed more than ever. Normal distributions tie things together in multi-level models, as they keep location and dispersion apart, tidy.

The dilemma is then solved with the introduction of generalized linear models, which is a framework for using linear models with appropriate error distributions. Fortunately, MLM and GLM work seemlessly together. With MLM we can conveniently build graceful likelihood models, using normal distributions for populations. The GLM part is a thin layer to get the measurement scale right and choose the right error distribution, just like a looking glass.

3.3.2.11 t distribution [TBD]

3.3.2.12 Exercises:

1. Google it: speed of sound and signal velocity in nerve cells.

3.4 Bayesian estimation

Frequentist statistics falls short on recognizing that research is incremental. Bayesian statistics embraces the idea of gradual increase in certainty when (new) data arrives. Why has it not been adopted earlier? The reason is that Bayesian estimation was computationally unfeasible. The seemingly innocent multiplication of prior and likelihood results in a complex integral, which in most cases has no analytic solution. If you have enjoyed a classic statistics education, you may remember how the computation of sum of squares (explained and residual) can be done by paper and pencil in reasonable time. And that is precisely how statistical computations has been performed before the advent of electronic computing machinery. In the frequentist statistical framework (some call it a zoo), ingenious mathematicians have developed procedures that were rather efficient to compute. That made statistical data analysis possible in those times. It came at costs, though:

- 1. procedures make more or less strong assumptions, limiting their applicability.
- 2. procedures are asymptotically accurate with inference being accurate at large sample sizes only
- 3. common researchers do not understand crucial elements, for example how the F distribution is derived

Expensive computation is in the past. Modern computers can simulate realistic worlds in real time and the complex integrals in Bayesian statistics they solve hands down. When analytical solutions do not exist, the integrals can still be solved using numerical procedures. Numerical procedures have been used in frequentist statistics, too, for example the iterative least squares algorithm applies for Generalized Linear Models, Newton-Rapson optimizer can be used to find the maximum likelihood estimate and boot-strapping produces accurate confidence limits. However, these procedures are too limited as they fail for highly multidimensional problems as they are common in advanced regression models.

Most Bayesian estimation engines these days ground on a numerical procedure called *Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC)* sampling. This method differs

from the earlier mentioned in that it basically is a random walk. The closest frequentist counterpart to MCMC is the boot strapping algorithm, which draws many samples from data and computes the estimates many times. In some way, MCMC turns this upside down, by randomly drawing possible parameter values and computing the posterior probability many times. Similar to boot strapping, the basic MCMC algorithm is so simple, it can be explained on half a page and implemented with 25 lines of code. Despite its simplicity, the MCMC algorithm is applicable to practically all statistical problems one can imagine. Being so simple and generic at the same time must come at some costs. The downside of MCMC sampling still is computing time. Models with little data and few variables, like the Rainfall case above, are estimated within a few minutes. Linear-mixed effects models, which we will encounter later in this book, can take hours and large psychometric models, can take up to a few days of processor time.

The particular merit of the MCMC algorithm is that it not only delivers accurate point estimates in almost any situation, it produces the full *posterior probability distribution*. This lets us characterize a parameters magnitude and degree of (un)certainty. Let's run an analysis on the 20 rainfall observations to see how this happens.

```
attach(Rainfall)

M_1 <-
   Rain %>%
   stan_glm(rain ~ cloudy -1,
        family = binomial,
        data = .)
```

What the estimation does, is to calculate the *posterior distribution* from the observations. The *posterior distribution* contains the probability (more precisely: the *density*) for all possible values of the parameter in question. The following density plot represents our belief about the parameter P(rain|cloudy) after we have observed twenty days:

```
posterior(M_1) %>%
  filter(type == "fixef") %>%
  mutate(chance_of_rain = plogis(value)) %>%
  ggplot(aes(x = chance_of_rain, fill = parameter, col = parameter)) +
  geom_density(alpha = .5)
```

From the posterior distribution, we can deduct all kinds of summary statistics, such as:

- 1. the most likely value for a parameter in question is called the *posterior* mode and is the same as the maximum likelihood estimate when prior knowledge is absent.
- 2. the average of parameter values, weighted by their probability is called the *posterior mean*
- 3. a defined range to express 95% (or any other level of) certainty is the 95% credibility interval

We can also make non-standard evaluations on the posterior distribution, for example: How certain is it that P(rain|cloudy) < 0.7? We'll demonstrate the use of this in the next section.

Coming back to MCMC: how is this distribution actually produced. In plain words, MCMC makes a random walk through parameter space. Regions where the true value is more likely to be are just visited more often. The posterior distribution plots above are really just marginal frequencies. Note how the gray connecting lines show the jumps in the MCMC random walk.

detach(Rainfall)

3.5 What is wrong with classic statistics? [TBC]

The short version of the story is this: in face of typically noisy data, there is always the risk that experimental data supports a certain hypothesis, seemingly. If the researcher calls the results supportive, although they were just due to randomness, this is called a *false alarm*. Many scientific disciplines have therefore committed to keep the overall number of false alarms under a threshold, for example 5%.

Thze even shorter version is that voluntary commitment failed. The true rate of false alarms is about a magnitude higher.

The p-value [...] Imagine giant replication study that showed that 35% of published psychology studies are not replicable. In fact, such a study exists and it has far-reaching consequences. [...] [REF] shows that rejection bias is one reason: studies that have not reached the magic .05 level of significance, have a lower chance of publication. [REF] sees as a reason that author's implicitly trick the system by the garden of forking paths strategy. The research project collects an array of variables, followed by a fishing expediture. Theory is conventiently considered last, but written up in a pseudo-a prior way.

Getting started with R

In this book, we will be using the statistical computing environment R. R at its core is a programming language that specializes on statistics and data analysis. Like all modern programming languages, R is more than just a compiler or interpreter that translates human-writeable formal statements into something a computer understands and can execute. R comes with a complete set of standard libraries that cover the usual basic stuff, as well as a collection of common statistical routines, for example the t-test or functions to compute mean and variance. Even regression analysis and plotting is included in R. Finally, packaged with R comes a rudimentary programming environment, including a console, a simple editor and a help system.

Most of what comes packaged with R, we will set aside. R is basically a brilliantly designed programming language for the task, but many of the standard libraries are an inconsistent and outdated mess. For example, R comes with a set of commands to import data from various formats (SPSS, CSV, etc.). Some of these commands produce objects called data.frames, whereas others return lists of lists. Although one can convert lists into dataframes, it is easier and prevents confusion if all import functions simply create dataframes. As another example, to sort a data frame by participant number, one has to write the following syntax soup:

D[order(D\$Part),]

In the past few years, a single person, Hadley Wickham, has almost single-handedly started an initiative known as the *tidyverse*. The tidyverse is a growing collection of libraries that ground on a coherent and powerful set of principles for data management. One of the core packages is *dplyr* and it introduces a rich, yet rather generic, set of commands for data manipulation. The sorting of a data frame mentioned above would be written as

D %>% arrange(Part)

One of Wickham's first and well-known contributions is the *ggplot* system for graphics. Think of R's legacy graphics system as a zoo of individual routines, one for boxplots, another one for scatterplots asf. Like animals in a zoo, they live in different habitats with practically no interaction. ggplot implements a rather abstract framework for data plots, where all pieces can be combined in a myriad of ways, using a simple and consistent syntax.

Where to get these gems? R is an open source system and has spawned an open ecosystem for statistical computing. Thousands of extensions for R have been made available by data scientists for data scientists. The majority of these packages is available through the *comprehensive R archive network (CRAN)*. For the common user it suffices to think of CRAN as an internet catalogue of packages, that can be searched and where desired packages can be downloaded and installed in an instance.

Finally, R comes with a very rudimentary programming environment that carries the questionable charm of early 1990s. Whereas several alternatives exist, most R users will feel most comfortable with the R programming environment Rstudio. At the time of writing, it is the most user-friendly and feature rich software to program in R. The next sections describe how you can set up a fully functional environment and verify that it works. Subsequently, we will get to know the basics of programming in R.

4.1 Setting up the R environment

First, you will have to download and install R and Rstudio on your computer. The two programs can be retrieved from the URLs below. Make sure to select the version fit for your operating system.

- R
- Rstudio

If you fully own the computer you are working with, meaning that you have administrator rights, just do the usual downloading and running of the setup. If everything is fine, you'll find R and Rstudio installed under c\Programs\ and both are in your computers start menu. You can directly proceed to the installation of packages.

In corporate environments, two issues can arise with the installation: first a user may not have administrator rights to install programs to the common path c:\programs\. Second, the home directory may reside on a network drive, which is likely to cause trouble when installing packages.

If you have no administrator rights, you must choose your home directory during the setup. If that is a local directory, (c:/Users/YourName/), this should work fine and you can proceed with the installation of packages.

If your home directory (i.e. My Documents) is located on a network drive, this is likely to cause trouble. In such a case, you must install R and Rstudio to a local directory (on your computers hard drive), where you have full read/write access. In the following, it is assumed that this directory is D:/Users/YourName/:

- create a directory D:/Users/YourName/R/. This is where both programs, as well as packages will reside.
- create a sub directory Rlibrary where all additional packages reside (R comes with a pack of standard packages, which are in a read-only system directory).
- 3. start Rstudio
- 4. create a regular text file File -> New File -> Text file
- 5. copy and paste code from the box below
- 6. save the file as .Rprofile in D:/Users/YourName/R/
- 7. open the menu and go to Tools -> Global options -> General -> Default working directory. Select D:/Users/YourName/R/.

```
## .Rprofile

options(stringsAsFactors = FALSE)

.First <- function(){
   RHOME <<- getwd()
      cat("\nLoading .Rprofile in", getwd(), "\n")
   .libPaths(c(pasteO(RHOME, "Rlibrary"), .libPaths()))
}

.Last <- function(){
   cat("\nGoodbye at ", date(), "\n")
}</pre>
```

With the above steps you have created a customized start-up profile for R. The profile primarily sets the library path to point to a directory on the computers drive. As you are owning this directory, R can install the packages without admin rights. In the second part, you configure Rstudio's default path, which is where R, invoked from Rstudio, searches for the .Rprofile.

After closing and reopening Rstudio, you should see a message in the console window saying:

Loading .Rprofile in D:/Users/YourName/R/

That means that R has found the .Rprofile file and loaded it at start-up. The .Rprofile file primarily sets the path of the *library*, which is the collection of

packages you install yourself. Whether this was successful can be checked by entering the console window in Rstudio, type the command below and hit Enter.

.libPaths()

If your installation went fine, you should see an output like the following. If the output lacks the first entry, your installation was not successful and you need to check all the above steps.

[1] "D:/Users/YourName/R/Rlibrary" "C:/Program Files/R/R-3.3.0/library"

4.1.1 Installing CRAN packages

While R comes with a set of standard packages, thousands of packages are available to enhance functionality for every purpose you can think of. Most packages are available from the *Comprehensive R Network Archive (CRAN)*.

For example, the package *foreign* is delivered with R and provides functions to read data files in various formats, e.g. SPSS files. The package *haven* is a rather new package, with enhanced functionality and usability. It is not delivered with R, hence, so we have to fetch it.

Generally, packages need to be *installed once* on your system and to be *loaded* everytime you need them. Installation is fairly straight-forward once your R environment has been setup correctly and you have an internet connection.

In this book we will use a number of additional packages from CRAN. The listed packages below are all required packages, all can be loaded using the library(package) command. The package tidyverse is a metapackage that installs and loads a number of modern packages. The ones being used in this book are:

- dplyr and tidyr for data manipulation
- *ggplot* for graphics
- haven for reading and writing files from other statistical packages
- readr for reading and writing text-based data files (e.g., CSV)
- readxl for reading Excel files
- stringr for string matching and manipulation

tidyverse library(tidyverse) ## data manipulation

```
library(openxlsx)

## plotting
library(gridExtra)

## regression models
library(rstanarm)

## other
library(devtools) ## only needed for installing from Github
library(knitr)

## non-CRAN packages
library(mascutils)
library(bayr)
```

We start by checking the packages:

- 1. create a new R file by File --> New file --> R script
- 2. copy and paste the above code to that file and run it. By repeatedly pressing Ctrl-Return you run every line one-by-one. As a first time user with a fresh installation, you will now see error messages like:

Error in library(tidyverse): there is no package called 'tidyverse'

This means that the respective package is not yet present in your R library. Before you can use the package tidyverse you have to install it from CRAN. For doing so, use the built-in package management in RStudio, which fetches the package from the web and is to be found in the tab Packages. At the first time, you may have to select a repository and refresh the package list, before you can find and install packages. Then click Install, enter the names of the missing package(s) and install. On the R console the following command downloads and installs the package tidyverse.

```
install.packages("tidyverse")
```

CRAN is like a giant stream of software pebbles, shaped over time in a growing tide. Typically, a package gets better with every version, be it in reliability or versatility, so you want to be up-to-date. Rstudio has a nice dialogue to update packages and there is the R command:

```
update.packages("tidyverse")
```

Finally, run the complete code block at once by selecting it and Ctrl-Enter. You will see some output to the console, which you should check once again. Unless the output contains any error messages (like above), you have successfully installed and loaded all packages.

Note that R has a somewhat idiosyncratic jargon: many languages, such as Java or Python, call "libraries" what R calls "packages". The library in R is strictly the set of packages installed on your computer and the library command loads a package from the library.

4.1.2 Installing packages from Github

Two packages, mascutils and bayr are written by the author of this book. They have not yet been committed to CRAN, but they are available on Github which is a general purpose versioning system for software developers and few authors. Fortunately, with the help of the devtools package it is rather easy to install these packages, too. Just enter the Rstudio console and type:

```
library(devtools)
install_github("schmettow/mascutils")
install_github("schmettow/bayr")
```

Again, you have to do that only once after installing R and you can afterwards load the packages with the library command. Only if the package gets an update to add functionality or remove bugs, you need to run these commands again.

4.1.3 A first statistical program

After you have set up your R environment, you are ready to run your first R program (you will not yet understand all the code, but as you proceed with this book, all will become clear):

- Stay in the file where you have inserted and run the above code for loading the packages.
- 2. Find the *environment tab* in Rstudio. It should be empty.
- 3. Copy-and-paste the code below into your first file, right after library commands.
- 4. Run the code lines one-by-one and observe what happens (in RStudio: Ctrl-Enter)

```
## Simulation of a data set with 100 participants
## in two between-subject conditions
N <- 100
levels <- c("control", "experimental")
Group <- rep(levels, N/2)
age <- round(runif(N, 18, 35),0)
outcome <- rnorm(N, 42 * 5, 10) + (Group == "experimental") * 42
Experiment <- data_frame(Group, age, outcome)

Experiment %>% sample_n(8)
```

Group	age	outcome
experimental	27	243
control	22	194
control	28	225
control	28	209
experimental	27	247
control	29	221
control	20	203
experimental	28	241

```
## Plotting the distribution of outcome
Experiment %>%
   ggplot( aes(x = outcome) ) +
   geom_density(fill = 1)
```

```
## ... outcome by group
Experiment %>%
  ggplot( aes(fill = Group, x = outcome) ) +
  geom_density()
```

```
fixef(model)
```

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	211.9	209.1	214.7
Groupexperimental	38.5	34.6	42.3

Observe Console, Environment and Plots. Did you see

- how the *Environment* window is populated with new variables (Values and Data)?
- a table appears in the *Console*, when executing the summary(Experiment) command?
- how the "camel-against-the-light" in *Plots* tab morphed into "two-piles-of-colored-sugar"?

Congratulations! You have just

- simulated data of a virtual experiment with two groups
- summarized the data
- plotted the data and
- estimated a Bayesian regression model that compares the two groups.

Isn't it amazing, that in less than 20 simple statements we have just reached the level of a second-year bachelor student? Still, you may find the R output a little inconvenient, as you may want to save the output of your data analysis. Not long ago, that really was an issue, but in the past few years R has become a great tool for *reproducable research*. The most simple procedure of saving your analysis for print or sharing is to:

- 1. save the R file your have created by hitting CTRL-S and selecting a directory and name.
- in RStudio open File --> Compile notebook and select Word as a format.
- 3. Hit Compile

A new Word document should appear that shows all code and the output. Now, you can copy-and-paste the graphics into another document or a presentation.

4.1.4 Bibliographic notes

Getting started with Rstudio (presentation)

Getting started with Rstudio (ebook)

rstudio cheat sheets is a collection of beautifully crafted cheat sheets for ggplot, dplyr and more. I suggest you print the data mangling and ggplot cheat sheets and always keep them on your desk.

The tidyverse is a meta package that loads all core tidyverse packages by Hadley Wickham.

4.2 Learning R: a primer

cRazy as in 'idiosyncrasy'

This book is for applied researchers in design sciences, whose frequent task is to analyze data and report it to stakeholders. Consequently, the way I use R in this book capitalizes on interactive data analysis and reporting. As it turns out, a small fraction of R, mostly from the tidyverse, is sufficient to write R code that is effective and fully transparent. In most cases, a short chain of simple data transformations tidies the raw data which can then be pushed into a modelling or graphics engine that will do the hard work. We will not bother (ourselves and others) with usual programming concepts such as conditionals, loops or the somewhat eccentric approaches to functional programming. At the same time, we can almost ignore all the clever and advanced routines that underlay statistical inference and production of graphics, as others have done the hard work for us.

R mainly serves three purposes, from easy to advanced: 1. interactive data analysis 2. creating data analysis reports 3. developing new statistical routines.

With R one typically works interactively through a data analysis. The analysis often is a rather routine series of steps, like:

- 1. load the data
- 2. make a scatter plot
- 3. run a regression
- 4. create a coefficient table

A program in R is usually developed iteratively: once you've loaded and checked your data, you progress to the next step step of your analysis, test it and proceed. At every step, one or more new objects are created in the environment, capturing intermediate and final results of the analysis:

- 1. a data frame holding the data
- 2. a graphic object holding a scatterplot
- 3. a model object holding the results of a regression analysis
- 4. a data frame for the coefficient table

As R is an interpreter language, meaning there is no tedious compile-and-run cycles in everyday R programming. You develop the analysis as it happens. It is even normal to jump back and forth in an R program, while building it.

R is a way to report and archive what precisely you have been doing with your data. In statistics, mathematical formulas are the common form of unambiguously describing a statistical model. For example, the following equation defines a linear regression model between the observed outcome y and the predictor x:

$$\mu_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_i y_i \sim N(\mu_i, \sigma)$$

As we will later see [CLM], in Rs formula language the same model is unambiguously specified as:

R is currently the *lingua franca* of statistical computing. As a programming language, R has the same precision as math, but is more expressive. You can specify complex models, but also graphics and the steps of data checking and preparation. As an example, consider an outlier removal rule of:

An observation is valid if it does not exceed the tenfold of the observation mean.

We just applied our own rule of outlier removal to the data. Others may consider this rule invalid or arbitrary. Disagreement is virtue in science and one can only disagree with what one actually sees. In R, the researcher *formally reports* what precisely has been done with the data. For example, the same outlier removal rule is unambiguously specified by the following code (the first line just simulates some data).

```
D <- data_frame(score = c(1, 2, 4, 3, 5, 6, 50, 800))
D %>% filter(score < mean(score))</pre>
```

score	,
1	
2	,
4	-
3	;
5	,
6	,
50	1

Finally, R is a way to develop and share statistical programs. Thousands of packages in the R ecosystem cover almost all statistical problems you can

imagine. As a programming language, R has been designed for that particular purpose. Under the hood of R, a bunch of generic, yet powerful, principles purr to make it a convenient language for typical problems in statistical computation. Readers with programming experience can fly over the R basics that follow. But, as a specific purpose language R has a few idiosyncracies you should know about:

Almost all programming languages the first element of a list has the index zero. We got used to it, but for beginners it is a another hurdle that is unnecessary. Mathematicians, catholiques, software developers in bars and everyone, young or old, counts

```
"one", "two", "three".
```

And so does R:

```
c(1:3)[1:3]
```

```
## [1] 1 2 3
```

Counting from one is perhaps the most lovable idiosyncracy of R. But, lets also welcome people who have experience with other programming languages:

The first thing one has to know about R is that it is a functional programming language. A function simply is a programmed procedure that takes data as input, applies some transformation and returns data as output. That sounds trivial, but there is an important difference to most other languages: Different to procedures in Pascal or object oriented methods (in Java or Python), functions are forbidden to modify any external object. A certain function is a black box, but one can be sure that the only thing it does is return a new object.

At the same time, functions are first-class citizens in R and can be called everywhere, even as an argument to another function. The plyr package is famous for functions that call functions, also called high-level functions. The following three liner makes heavy use of high level functions. First, a list of binary matrices is generated by repeatedly calling a random number generator, then the row sum of all matrices is computed and returned as a (new) list.

```
make_binary_matrix <-
  function(size) as.matrix(rbernoulli(size^2, p = 1/4))

LoM <- plyr::llply(c(5:7), make_binary_matrix)

llply(LoM, rowSums)</pre>
```

What we have seen is a routine application of higher level functions, 11ply applies a transformation rowSums to a list of objects LoM and returns a list of modified objects. In a majority of programming languages you had to write a loop instead and this is why experienced programmers can easily fall for the active user paradox when they learn R, by sticking to loops. Believe me one thing: Once you have wrapped your head around functional programming, you will program the same procedure in a quarter of time with half the code and your program will run significantly faster. My general advice is:

Whenever you think you need a loop, you don't.

For me it helped to imagine the following: loops carry the notion of chain of data that moves over a fixed transformation device. In functional programing functions the can work in a hierarchy, a high-level device moves along a string of data. It carries an exchangeable low-level device that applies the desired transformation to every position.

If you come from relational data bases you you have something in common with the statistician: you both think in transformation of tables. Not coincidently, the features in *dplyr*, the tidy data transformation engine, are clearly borrowed from SQL. You will also feel at home with the idea of reports powered by functional chunks embedded in a templating system.

For object orientation folks, R is a good choice, but you have to get used to it. First, it gives you the choice of several object orientation systems, which sometimes requires to install a package. The so-called S3 system is the original. It is rather limited and some even call it informal. The approach is as simple as it is unusal. S3 mainly is a raw method dispatcher that can handles overloading of functions. S3 puts methods first, then objects, whereas in traditional object orientation, the method belongs to the class, making the object "knows" its methods. In S3, the object and the method both know their class. When calling an S3 method, you actually call a generic method that finds the matching method and applies it.

Any statistical analysis can be thought of as a production chain. You take the raw data and process it into a neat data table, which you feed into graphics

and regression engines or summarize by other means. At almost every step there is an input and an output object.

4.2.1 Objects

Objects are a basic feature of R. They are temporary storage places in the computer's memory. Objects always have a name chosen by the programmer. By its name, a stored object can be found back at any time. Two basic operations apply for all objects: an object is stored by assigning it a name and it is retrieved by calling its name. If you wanted to store the number of observations in your data set under the name N_obs, you use the assignment operator <-. The name of the variable is left of the operator, the assigned value is right of it.

```
N_obs <- 100
```

Now, that the value is stored, you can call it any time by simply calling its name:

```
N_obs
```

```
## [1] 100
```

Just calling the name prints the value to Console. In typical interactive programming sessions with R, this is already quite useful. But, you can do much more with this mechanism.

Often, what you want is to do calculations with the value. For example, you have a repeated measures study and want to calculate the average number of observations per participant. For this you need the number of observations, and the number of participants. The below code creates both objects, does the calculation (right of <-) and stores it in another object avg_N_Obs

```
N_Obs <- 100
N_Part <- 25
avg_N_Obs <- N_Obs/N_Part
avg_N_Obs</pre>
```

```
## [1] 4
```

Objects can exist without a name, but are volatile, then. They cannot be used any further. The following arithmetic operation does create an object, a single number. For a moment or so this number exists somewhere in your computers memory, but once it is printed to the screen, it is gone. Of course, the same expression can be called again, resulting in the same number. But, strictly, it is a different object.

N_Obs/N_Part ## gone after printing

[1] 4

N_Obs/N_Part ## same value, different object

[1] 4

There even is a formal way to show that the two numbers, although having the same value assigned, are located at different addresses. This is just for the purpose of demonstration and you will rarely use it in everyday programming tasks:

tracemem(N_Obs/N_Part)

[1] "<0000003AB80FF8>"

tracemem(N_Obs/N_Part)

[1] "<00000003ABDD030>"

Again: programming beginners can be at peace with all of this. You can count like you do. And the function **summary** always does something useful with an object. And last, but not least, tidy R is a highly user-friendly programming approach for data analysis workflows.

This book is about programming and statistics at the same time. Unfortunately, there are a few terms that have a particular meaning in both domains. One of those is a "variable". In statistics, a variable usually is a property we have recorded, say the body length of persons, or their gender. In programming, a variable is a space in the computers memories, where results can be stored and recalled. Fortunately, R avoids any confusion and calls these containers *objects*.

4.2.2 Vectors

42

[1] 42

Notice the [1] that R puts in front of the single value when printing it? This is called the *index*. Different to most other programming languages, all basic data types are *vectors* in R. Vectors are containers for storing many values of the same type. The values are addressed by the index, N_Obs[1] calls the first element. In R, *indices start counting with 1*, which is different to most other languages that start at zero. And if you have a single value only, this is just a vector of length one.

For statistics programming having vectors as basic data types makes perfect sense. Any statistical data is a collection of values. What holds for data is also true for functions applied to data. Practically all frequently used mathematical functions work on vectors, take the following example:

```
X <- rnorm(100, 2, 1)
mean(X)
```

[1] 2.06

The rnorm command produces a vector of length 100 from three values. More precisely, it does 100 random draws from a normal distribution with mean 2 and an SD of 1. The mean command takes the collection and reduces it to a single value. By the way, this is precisely, what we call a statistic: a single quantity that characterizes a collection of quantities.

4.2.3 Classes

Objects can be of various *classes*. In R the basic classes are: logical, factor, character, integer and numeric. Advanced programmers can create their own classes, for example, to store the results of an estimation into an object.

In most programming languages, basic objects contain one number or one character string. If you have a line of object to handle, you have to store them in lists. In statistical computing it is the common case

Objects of type *logical* store the two levels TRUE, FALSE, like presence or absence of a treatment, or passed and failed test items. With Boolean operators one can compute new logical values, for example

```
Apple <- TRUE
Pear <- FALSE

Apple & Pear ## and

## [1] FALSE

Apple | Pear ## or
```

```
## [1] TRUE
```

More generally, logical values can be used for categorization, when their are only two categories, which is called a *dichotomous variable*. For example, gender is usually coded as a vector of characters ("m", "f", "f"), but one can always do:

```
is_female <- c(FALSE, TRUE, TRUE)
is_male <- c(T, F, F)</pre>
```

Programmers are lazy folks when it comes to typing, therefore R allows you to abbreviate TRUE and FALSE as shown above. As a consequence, one should never assign objects the name reserved for logical values, so don't do one of the following:

```
## never do this
TRUE <- "All philosophers have beards" ## a character object, see below
F     <- "All gods existed before the big bang"
42 * F</pre>
```

The class numeric stores real numbers and is therefore abundant in statistical programming. All the usual arithmetic operations apply:

```
a <- 1.0
b <- a + 1
sqrt(b)
```

```
## [1] 1.41
```

Objects of class integer are more specific as they store natural numbers, only. This often occurs as counts, ranks or indices.

```
## [1] 1 3 2
```

The usual arithmetic operations apply, although the result of operation may no longer be integer, but numeric

```
N <- 3
sum_of_scores <- 32
mean_score <- 32/3
mean_score</pre>
```

```
## [1] 10.7
```

```
class(mean_score)
```

```
## [1] "numeric"
```

Surprisingly, logical values can be used in arithmetic expressions, too. When R encounters value TRUE in an arithmetic context, it replaces it with 1, zero otherwise. Used with multiplication, this acts like an on/off switch, which we will use in [LM: dummy variables].

```
TRUE + TRUE

## [1] 2

sqrt(3 + TRUE)
```

```
is_car <- c(TRUE, TRUE, FALSE) ## bicycle otherwise
wheels <- 2 + is_car * 2
wheels</pre>
```

```
## [1] 4 4 2
```

[1] 2

Data sets usually contain variables that are not numeric, but partition the data into groups. For example, we frequently group observations by the following

- Part: participant
- Condition: experimental condition
- Design: one of several designs
- Education: level of education (e.g., low, middle or high)

Two object types apply for grouping observations: factor and character. While factors specialize on grouping observations, character objects can also be used to store longer text, say the description of a usability problem. The following identifies two conditions in a study, say a comparison of designs A and B. Note how the factor identifies its levels when called to the screen:

```
design_char <- c("A", "B", "B", "A")
design_char

## [1] "A" "B" "B" "A"

design_fact <- factor(c("A", "B", "B", "A"))
design_fact

## [1] A B B A
## Levels: A B</pre>
```

Statistical analyses deal with real world data which ever so often is messy. Frequently, a planned observation could not be recorded, because the participant decided to quit or the equipment did not work properly or the internet collapsed. Users of certain legacy statistics packages got used to coding missing observations as -999 and then declared this a missing value. In R missing values are first-class citizens. Every vector of a certain class can contain missing values, which are identified as NA.

Most basic statistics functions, like mean(), sd() or median() act very strict if the data contains missing values. If there is a single NA in the variable to be summarized, the result is NA. While it is important to be aware of missing values, much of the time what the researcher wants is to have the summary statistic with NA values being removed, first.

```
clicks <- c(3, NA, 2)
mean(clicks)

## [1] NA

mean(clicks, na.rm = T)

## [1] 2.5</pre>
```

4.2.4 Functions

R comes with a full bunch of functions for creating and summarizing data. Let me first introduce you to functions that produce exactly one number to characterize a vector. The following functions do that with to the vector X, every in their own way:

```
length(X)
sum(X)
mean(X)
var(X)
sd(X)
min(X)
max(X)
median(X)
```

These functions are a transformation of data. The input to these transformations is X and is given as an argument to the function. Other functions require more than one argument. The quantile function is routinely used to summarize a variable. Recall that X has been drawn from a Normal distribution of $\mu=2$ and standard deviation $\sigma=1$. All Normal distributions have the property that about two thirds of the mass accumulates between $\mu-\sigma$ and $\mu+\sigma$. That means in turn: 17% are below $\mu-\sigma$ and 66 + 17 = 83% are below $\mu+\sigma$. The number of observations in a certain range of values is called a quantile. The quantile function operates on X, but takes an (optional) vector of quantiles as second argument:

```
quantile(X, c(.17, .83))

## 17% 83%
## 1.15 2.97
```

Most functions in R have optional arguments that let you change how the function performs. The basic mathematical functions all have the optional argument na.rm. This is a switch that determines how the function deals with missing values NA. Many optional arguments have defaults. The default of na.rm is FALSE ("return NA in case of NAs in the vector"). By setting it to TRUE, they are removed before operation.

```
B \leftarrow c(1, 2, NA, 3)
mean(B)
```

```
## [1] NA
```

```
mean(B, na.rm = TRUE)
## [1] 2
```

Most complex routines in R have an abundance of arguments to control how precisely they work, most of which got reasonable defaults. To give a more complex example, the following call of stan_glm performs a Bayesian estimation of a grand mean model [REF]. The required arguments of stan_glm are the model formula and the data. The model is given as a formula and data is expected to be a data frame. In the first run, all other arguments are left to their defaults, for example, the number of iterations (1000) and the response distribution family of the model ("gaussian").

The second invocation of stan_glm changes the defaults of these two arguments. The same model is estimated, but with a Poisson distribution and only 500 iterations.

Finally, it sometimes is convenient or necessary to program own functions. A full coverage of developing functions is beyond the scope of this introduction, so I show just one simple example. If one desires a more convenient function to compute the mean that ignore missing values by default, this can be constructed as follows:

```
mean_conv <- function(x) {
  mean(x = B, na.rm = TRUE)
}
mean_conv(B)</pre>
```

[1] 2

Notice that:

the function() function creates a new function that gets a name assigned.

- the argument x given to function() is passed on to become the arguments of the mean_conv(x).
- code enclosed by {...} are called a *code block*.

More examples of creating basic functions can be found in section @ref(descriptive_stats). As R is a functional programming language, it offers very elaborate ways of programming functions, way beyond what is found in common languages, such as Python or Java. An advanced example of functional programming is given in section @ref(forecasting_LOO).

4.2.5 Operators

R brings the usual set of arithmetic operators, like +, -, *, / and more. In fact, an operator is just a function. The sum of two numbers can, indeed, be written in these two ways:

```
1 + 2

## [1] 3

^+^(1,2)

## [1] 3
```

The second term is a function that takes two numbers as input and returns a third. It is just a different syntax, and this one is called the *polish notation*. I will never use it throughout the rest of this book.

Another set of commonly used operators are logical, they implement *Boolean algebra*. Some common Boolean operators are shown in the truth table:

AI	3 !A	A &	ВА В	A == B
	not	and	or	equals
T	ГΕ	\mathbf{T}	${ m T}$	\mathbf{T}
ΤI	F	F	${ m T}$	F
F :	ГΤ	F	${ m T}$	F
F	ŦΤ	F	\mathbf{F}	T

Be careful not to confuse Boolean "and" and "or" with their common natural language use. If you ask: "Can you buy apples *or* pears on the market?", the natural answer would be: "both". The Boolean answer is: TRUE. In a requirements document you could state "This app is for children and adults".

In Boolean the answer would be FALSE, because no one can be a child and an adult at the same time, strictly. A correct Boolean statement would be: "The envisioned users can be adult or child".

Further Boolean operators exist, but can be derived from the three above. For example, the exclusive OR, "either A or B" can be written as: (A | B) & !(A & B). This term only gets TRUE when A or B is TRUE, but not both. In the data analysis workflow, Boolean logic is frequently used for filtering data and we re-encounter them in data transformation.

4.2.6 Storing data in data frames

Most behavioral research collects *real data* to work with. As behavior researchers are obsessed about finding associations between variables, real data usually contains several. If you have a sample of observations (e.g. participants) and every case has the same variables (measures or groups), data is stored in a table structure, where columns are variables and rows are observations.

R knows the data.frame objects to store variable-by-observation tables. Data frames are tables, where columns represent statistical variables. Variables have names and can be of different data types, as they usually appear in empirical research. In many cases data frames are imported to R, as they represent real data. Here, we first see how to create data frames by simulation. First, we usually want some initial inspection of a freshly harvested data frame.

Data frames are objects. By just calling a data frame it gets printed to the screen. This is a good moment to reflect on one idiosyncrasy in R, a feature, of course. R is primarily used interactively, which has the immense advantage that the programmer can incrementally build the data analysis. This implies, that the programmer often wants to quickly check what currently is in a variable. Now, observe what happens when we call Experiment:

Experiment

Group	age	outcome
control	30	219
experimental	27	247
control	22	194
experimental	23	243
control	32	187
experimental	34	261
control	33	200
experimental	26	246
control	26	205
experimental	23	262
control	32	215
experimental	26	239
control	34	202
experimental	32	250
control	32	223
experimental	19	259
control	22	206
experimental	26	$\frac{260}{257}$
control	29	207
experimental	$\frac{29}{24}$	240
control	$\frac{24}{32}$	$\frac{240}{208}$
		$\frac{208}{241}$
experimental	28	
control	26	204
experimental	21	248
control	22	197
experimental	21	244
control	24	208
experimental	20	243
control	20	203
experimental	29	253
control	22	205
experimental	33	246
control	27	213
experimental	30	252
control	28	217
experimental	28	243
control	24	228
experimental	23	264
control	27	199
experimental	32	254
control	27	211
experimental	18	$\frac{252}{252}$
control	29	221
experimental	35	$\frac{221}{257}$
control	22	$\frac{237}{203}$
experimental	24	$\frac{203}{259}$
control	25	214
experimental	21	241
control	27	213
		213
experimental	21	
control	28	211
experimental	25	262
control	25	227
experimental	21	247
control	19	214
• , 1	00	0.40

This is useful information printed to the screen, we see sample size, names of objects and their classes, and the first ten observations as examples. Obviously, this is not the data itself, but some sort of summary. It would be a complete disaster, if R would pass this information on when the call is part of an assignment or other operation on the data, for example: NewExp <-Experiment. Apparently, R is aware of whether a called object is part of an operation, or purely for the programmers eyes. For any object, if called to the console in an intercative session, R silently uses the print function on the object. The following would give precisely the same results as above.

print(Experiment)

Such print functions exist for dozens of classes of objects. They represent what the developers thought would be the most salient or logical thing to print in an interactive session. By virtue of the object system, R finds the right print function for the object at hand.

However, when working interactively, most of the time you do a data transformation and assign it to a new variable, thus you check it immediately. As the assignment is always silent (unless there occurs an error), you are forced to type a print statement afterwards. There is shortcut for that: if you embrace the assignment statement in brackets, the result will be printed to the screen. As convenient as this is, especially when creating longer data transformation chains, it introduces some visual clutter. In this book I use it sparingly, at most.

The dedicated print function does what way back a developer thought would be the most useful information in most cases. Depending on the situation, it can provide too much, too little or just the wrong information. For example: when simulating a data set, like in [First Exercise], we want to check whether the resulting data frame has the desired length and whether the variables have the correct class. The standard implementation of the print command, dumps the whole data frame to the screen, which can be much more than ever needed. The newer dplyr implementation data_frame (from the tidyverse, also called tibble) you have seen in action already, is much better suited for this situation, as it displays dimensions and variable classes. In contrast, if the job is to spot whether there are many missing values (NA), the classic print performs better.

Whatever the question is, several commands are available to look into a data frame from different perspectives. Another command that is implemented for a variety of classes is summary. For all data frames, it produces an overview with descriptive statistics for all variables (i.e. columns). Particularly useful for data initial screening, is that missing values are listed per variable.

print(summary(Experiment))

```
##
       Group
                             age
                                          outcome
##
    Length:100
                               :18.0
                                               :187
                       Min.
                                       Min.
##
    Class : character
                       1st Qu.:23.0
                                       1st Qu.:208
    Mode :character
                       Median:26.0
                                       Median:230
##
                              :26.2
                       Mean
                                       Mean :229
##
                        3rd Qu.:29.0
                                       3rd Qu.:248
##
                       Max.
                               :35.0
                                       Max.
                                               :264
```

\$ outcome: num 219 247 194 243 187 ...

The str (structure) command works on any R object and displays the hierarchical structure (if there is one):

```
## Classes 'tbl_df', 'tbl' and 'data.frame': 100 obs. of 3 variables:
## $ Group : chr "control" "experimental" "control" "experimental" ...
## $ age : num 30 27 22 23 32 34 33 26 26 23 ...
```

Data frames store variables, but statistical procedures operate on variables. We need ways of accessing and manipulating statistical variables and we will have plenty. First, recall that in R the basic object types are all vectors. You can store as many elements as you want in an object, as long as they are of the same class.

Internally, data frames are a collection of "vertical" vectors that are equally long. Being a collection of vectors, the variables of a data frame can be of different classes, like character, factor or numeric. In the most basic case, you want to calculate a statistic for a single variable out of a data frame. The \$ operator pulls the variable out as a vector:

```
mean(Experiment$outcome)
```

```
## [1] 229
```

As data frames are rectangular structures, you can also access individual values by their addresses. The following commands call

- the first *outcome* measure
- the first to third elements of *Group*
- the complete first row

```
Experiment[ 1, 3]
```

outcome 219

Experiment[1:3, 2]

```
\frac{\overline{30}}{30}

\frac{27}{22}
```

Experiment[1,]

Group	age	outcome
control	30	219

Addressing one or more elements in square brackets, always requires two elements, first the row, second the column. As odd as it looks, one or both elements can be empty, which just means: get all rows (or all columns). Even the expression Experiment[,] is fully valid and will just the return the whole data frame.

There is an important difference, however, when using R's classic data.frame as compared to dplyr's data_frameimplementation: When using single square brackets on dplyr data frames one always gets a data frame back. That is a very predictable behavior, and very much unlike the classic: with data.frame, when the addressed elements expand over multiple columns, like Experiment[, 1:2], the result will be a data.frame object, too. However, when slicing a single column, the result is a vector:

```
Exp_classic <- as.data.frame(Experiment)
Exp_classic[1:2,1:2] ## data.frame</pre>
```

Group	age
control	30
experimental	27

```
Exp_classic[1,] ## data.frame
```

Group	age	outcome
control	30	219

```
Exp_classic[,1] ## vector
```

```
[1] "control"
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                        "experimental"
##
     [5] "control"
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                        "experimental"
##
##
     [9] "control"
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                        "experimental"
    [13] "control"
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                        "experimental"
##
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                        "experimental"
    [17] "control"
```

```
"experimental" "control"
                                                         "experimental"
##
    [21] "control"
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                         "experimental"
##
    [25] "control"
##
    [29]
         "control"
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                         "experimental"
##
    [33]
         "control"
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                         "experimental"
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                         "experimental"
##
    Γ371
         "control"
    Γ417
                          "experimental" "control"
                                                          "experimental"
##
         "control"
##
    Γ451
         "control"
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                         "experimental"
    [49]
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                         "experimental"
##
         "control"
##
    [53] "control"
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                         "experimental"
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                          "experimental"
    [57]
         "control"
##
##
    Γ61]
         "control"
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                         "experimental"
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                         "experimental"
##
    [65]
         "control"
##
    [69]
         "control"
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                         "experimental"
##
    [73]
         "control"
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                         "experimental"
    [77]
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                         "experimental"
##
         "control"
##
    [81] "control"
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                         "experimental"
    [85] "control"
                                                         "experimental"
                         "experimental" "control"
##
                         "experimental" "control"
##
    [89]
         "control"
                                                         "experimental"
         "control"
                                                         "experimental"
##
    [93]
                         "experimental" "control"
##
    [97] "control"
                         "experimental" "control"
                                                         "experimental"
```

Predictability and a few other useful tweaks made me prefer data_frame over data.frame. But, many third-party packages continue to produce classic data.frame objects. For example, there is an alternative to package 'readxl, openxlsx, which reads (and writes) Excel files. It returns classic data.frames, which can easily be converted as follows:

```
D_foo <-
  read.xlsx("foo.xlsx") %>%
  as_data_frame()
```

While data_frame[] behaves perfectly predictable, in that it always returns a data frame, even when this is just a single column or cell. Sometimes, one wants to truly extract a vector. With a data_frame a single column can be extracted as a vector, using double square brackets, or using the \$ operator.

```
Experiment[[1]] ## vector
Experiment$Group ## the same
```

Sometimes, it may be necessary to change values in a data frame. For example, a few outliers have been discovered during data screening, and the researcher decides to mark them as missing values. The syntax for indexing elements in a data frame can be used in conjunction with the assignment operator <-. In the example below, we make the simulated experiment more realistic by

injecting a few outliers. Then we discard these outliers by setting them all to

```
## injecting
Experiment [2,
                    "outcome"] <- 660
Experiment [6,
                   "outcome"] <- 987
Experiment[c(1,3), "age"]
## printing first few observations
head(Experiment)
```

Group	age	outcome
	_	
control	-99	219
experimental	27	660
control	-99	194
experimental	23	243
control	32	187
experimental	34	987

```
## setting to NA
Experiment[c(2, 6), "outcome"] <- NA</pre>
Experiment[c(1, 3), "age"]
```

Besides the injection, note two more features of addressing data frame elements. The first is, that vectors can be used to address multiple rows, e.g. 2 and 6. In fact, the range operator 1:3 we used above is just a convenient way of creating a vector c(1,2,3). Although not shown in the example, this works for columns alike.

The careful reader may also have noted another oddity in the above example. With Experiment[c(2, 6), "outcome"] we addressed two elements, but right-hand side of <- is only one value. That is a basic mechanism of R, called reuse. When the left-hand side is longer than the right-hand side, the righthand side is reused as many times as needed. Many basic functions in R work like this, and it can be quite useful. For example, you may want to create a vector of 20 random numbers, where one half has a different mean as the second half of observations.

```
rnorm(20, mean = c(1,2), sd = 1)
```

The above example reuses the two mean values 50 times, creating an alternating pattern. Strictly speaking, the sd = 1 parameter is reused, too, a 100 times. While reuse often comes in convenient, it can also lead to difficult programming errors. So, it is a good advice to be aware of this mechanism and always carefully check the input to vectorized functions. Especially, one should not ignore the kind warning that R gives, when the longer vector is not a multiple of the shorter one.

```
c(1, 2, 3) + c(3, 4)

## Warning in c(1, 2, 3) + c(3, 4): longer object length is not a multiple of
## shorter object length

## [1] 4 6 6
```

4.2.7 Import, export and archiving

R lets you import data from almost every conceivable source, given that you have installed and loaded the appropriate packages (foreign, haven or openxlsx for Excel files). Besides that R has its own file format for storing data, which is .Rda files. With these files you can save data frames (and any other object in R), using the save(data, file = "some_file.Rda") and load(file = "some_file.Rda") commands.

Few people create their data tables directly in R, but have legacy data sets in Excel (xslx) and SPSS files (sav). Moreover, the data can be produced by electronic measurement devices (e.g. electrodermal response measures) or programmed experiments can provide data in different forms, for example as csv (comma-separated-values) files. All these files can be opened by the following commands:

```
## Text files
Experiment <-
    read_csv("Data/Experiment.csv")

## Excel
Experiment <-
    read_excel("Data/Experiment.xlsx", sheet = 1)

## SPSS (haven)
Experiment <-
    read_sav("Data/Experiment.sav")

## SPSS (foreign)
Experiment <-
    read.spss("Data/Experiment.sav", to.data.frame = TRUE)</pre>
```

Note that I gave two options for reading SPSS files. The first (with an underscore) is from the newer haven package (part of tidyverse). With some SPSS

files, I experienced problems with this command, as it does not convert SPSS's data type *labelled* (which is almost the same as an R factor). The alternative is the classic read.spss command which works almost always, but as a default it creates a list of lists, which is not what you typically want. With the extra argument, as shown, it behaves as expected.

Remember, data frames are objects and volatile as such. If you leave your session, they are gone. Once you have you data frame imported and cleaned, you may want to store it to a file. Like for reading, many commands are available for writing all kinds of data formats. If you are lucky to have a complete R-based workflow, you can conveniently use R's own format for storing data, Rdata files. For storing a data frame and then reading it back in (in your next session), simply do:

```
save(Experiment, file = "Data/Experiment.Rda")
load(file = "Data/Experiment.Rda")
```

Note that with save and load all objects are restored by their original names, without using any assignments. Take care, as this will not overwrite any object with the same name. Another issue is that for the save command you have to explicitly refer to the file argument and provide the file path as a character object. In Rstudio, begin typing file="", put the cursor between the quotation marks and hit Tab, which opens a small dialogue for navigation to the desired directory.

Once you have loaded, prepared and started to analyze a data frame in R, there is little reason to go back to any legacy program. Still, the haven and foreign packages contain commands to write to various file formats. I'll keep that as an exercise to the reader.

4.2.8 Case environments

This book features more than a dozen case studies. Every case will be encountered several times and multiple objects are created along the way: data sets, regressions, graphics, tables, you name it. That posed the problem of naming the objects, so that they are unique. I could have chosen object names, like: BrowsingAB_M_1, AUP_M_1, etc. But, this is not what you normally would do, when working on one study at a time. Moreover, every letter you add to a line of code makes it more prone to errors and less likely that you, dear reader, are typing it in and trying it out yourself.

For these reasons, all cases are enclosed in *case environments* and provided with this book. Case environments are provided as R data files (.Rda). For getting a case environment to work in your session, it has to be loaded from the data file first:

```
load("BrowsingAB.Rda")
```

Formally, R *environments* are means to organize objects into so called namespaces. If an object BAB1 is placed in an environment BrowsingAB, it can be called as BrowsingAB\$BAB1. This way, no brevity is gained. For assessing objects without the environment prefix, one can *attach* the environment as:

```
attach(BrowsingAB)
BAB1 %>% as_tbl_obs()
detach(BrowsingAB)

attach(Reading)
D_1 %>% as_tbl_obs()
detach(Reading)
```

Calling attach gets you into the namespace of the environment (formally correct: the namespace gets imported to your working environment). All objects in that namespace become immediately visible by their mere name. When working with case environments in this book it is recommended to only have them attached one at a time. Removing an environment from the namespace is done by detach

All case environments provided with this book contain one or more data sets. One part of these cases contain data from real studies. Other cases provide synthetic data which has been generated by a simulation function. This function, always called simulate, is provided with the case environment, too. Calling the simulation function without any further arguments, exactly reproduces the synthetic data set provided with the case environment.

```
attach(Reading)
simulate() %% as_tbl_obs() ## reproduces the data frame D_1
```

To a varying degree, the simulation functions take arguments to produce new data sets with the same structure, but different effects. The following produces the first six participants, with a standard error of 10.

The default values can be inspected by using the command formals:

```
formals(simulate)
```

```
## $N
## [1] 40
##
## $beta
## c(Intercpt = 60, fnt_size_12 = -12, fnt_color_blk = -10, ia_blk_12 = 8)
##
## $sigma
## [1] 5
##
## $seed
## [1] 42
```

The other option is to inspect the code of the function, which is printed, when the function is called without parentheses:

simulate ## calling a function without parantheses prints its code

```
## function(N = 40,
##
              beta = c(Intercpt = 60,
##
                        fnt_size_12 = -12,
##
                        fnt_color_blk = -10,
##
                        ia_blk_12 = 8),
##
              sigma = 5,
##
              seed = 42)
##
       {
##
       set.seed(seed)
       out <-
##
##
         data frame(Part = 1:N,
##
                    font_size = factor(rep(c(1, 2), N/2),
##
                                        levels = c(1,2),
                                        labels = c("10pt", "12pt")),
##
##
                    font_color = factor(c(rep(1, N/2), rep(2, N/2)),
##
                                         levels = c(1,2),
##
                                         labels = c("gray", "black"))) %>%
          mutate( mu = beta[1] +
##
                   beta[2] * (font_size == "12pt") +
##
                   beta[3] * (font_color == "black") +
##
##
                   beta[4] * (font_color == "black") * (font_size == "12pt"),
                 ToT = rnorm(N, mu, sigma)) %>%
##
##
       as_tbl_obs()
##
##
       #class(out) <- append(class(out), "sim_tbl")</pre>
##
       attr(out, "coef") <- list(beta = beta,
##
                                  sigma = sigma)
##
       attr(out, "seed") <- seed
```

```
##
## out %>% as_tbl_obs()
## }
## <bytecode: 0x00000000319fc290>

detach(Reading)
```

By the latter method, you retrieve the full code of the simulation function, which should help to understand its behavioral and psychological assumptions. All simulation functions follow the principles laid out in [REF Simulation].

Finally, the case environments contain all objects that have been created throughout this book. This is especially useful for the regression models, as fitting these can take from a few seconds to hours.

When working on one data set at a time, environments are overkill. Still, it is very useful to save R data frames and objects that hold the result of your analysis. That is easily done by saving all relevant objects to an Rdata files, directly.

```
save(myData, my_model_1, my_model_2,
    file = "my_data_analysis.Rda")
## have a break
load("my_data_analysis.Rda")
```

Next to that, Rstudio can be configured to save the current workspace on exit and reload it on the next start. When working on just one data analysis for a longer period of time, this can be a good choice.

4.2.9 Structuring data

In the whole book, data sets are structured according to the rule one-row-per-observation of the dependent variable (the ORPO rule). Many researchers still organize their data tables as one-row-per-participant, as is requested by some legacy statistics programs. This is fine in research with non-repeated measures, but will not function properly with modern regression models, like linear mixed-effects models. Consider a study where two designs were evaluated by three participants using a self-report item, like "how easy to use is the interface?" Then, the wrong way of structuring the data would be:

```
ORPO %>%
  filter(Task == 1, Item == 1) %>%
  mascutils::discard_redundant() %>%
  spread(Design, response) %>%
  as_tbl_obs()
```

The correct way of setting up the data frame is:

```
ORPO %>%
  filter(Task == 1, Item == 1) %>%
  mascutils::discard_redundant()
```

Part	Design	response
1	A	4
2	A	4
3	A	6
1	В	1
2	В	4
3	В	3

The ORPO rule dictates another principle: every row should have a unique identifier, which can be a combination of values. In the example above, every observation is uniquely identified by the participant identifier and the design condition. If we extend the example slightly, it is immediatly apparent, why the ORPO rule is justified. Imagine, the study actually asked three participants to rate two different tasks on two different designs by three self-report items. By the ORPO rule, we can easily extend the data frame as below (showing a random selection of rows). I leave it up to the reader to figure out how to press such a data set in the wide legacy format.

Using identifiers is good practice for several reasons. First, it reduces problems during manual data entry. Second, it allows to efficiently record data in multimethod experiments and join them automatically. This is shown in chapter [DM]. Lastly, the identifiers will become statistically interesting by themselves when we turn to linear mixed-effects models and the notion of members of a population. Throughout the book I will use standard names for recurring identifier variables in design research:

- Part
- Design
- Item
- Task

Note that usually these entities get numerical identifiers, but these numbers are just labels. Throughout, variables are written Uppercase when they are entities, but not real numbers. An exception is the trial order in experiments with massive repeated measures. These get a numerical type to allow exploring effects over time such as learning, training and fatigue.

```
ORPO %>%
  sample_n(6) %>%
  arrange(Part, Task, Design, Item)
```

Part	Task	Design	Item	response
1	1	В	1	1
1	2	В	1	6
2	1	В	3	5
2	2	В	2	3
3	2	A	2	6
3	2	В	2	4

4.2.10 Data transformation

Do you wonder about the strange use of %>% in my code above? This is the tidy way of programming data transformations in R.

The so-called magritte operator %>% is part of the dplyr/tidyr framework for data manipulation. It chains steps of data manipulation by connecting transformation functions, also called piping. In the following, we will first see a few basic examples. Later, we will proceed to longer transformation chains and see how graceful dplyr piping is, compared to the classic data transformation syntax in R.

Importing data from any of the possible resources, will typically give a data frame. However, often the researcher wants to *select* or *rename* variables in the data frame. Say, you want the variable *Group* to be called *Condition*, omit the variable *age* and store the new data frame as *Exp*. The *select* command does all this. In the following code the data frame *Experiment* is piped into *select*. The variable *Condition* is renamed to *Group*, and the variable *outcome* is taken as-is. All other variables are discarded.

```
Exp <- Experiment %>%
select(Condition = Group, outcome) %>% as_tbl_obs()
```

Another frequent step in data analysis is cleaning the data from missing values and outliers. In the following code example, we first "inject" a few missing values for age (which were coded as -99) and outliers (>500) in the outcome variable. Note that I am using some R commands that you don't need to understand by now. Then we reuse the above code for renaming (this time keeping age on board) and add some filtering steps:

```
## rename, then filtering
Exp <-
   Experiment %>%
   select(Condition = Group, age, outcome) %>%
   filter(outcome < 500) %>%
   filter(age != -99)
```

```
Exp %>% as_tbl_obs()
```

During data preparation and analysis, new variables are created routinely. For example, the covariate is often shifted to the center before using linear regression:

```
mean_age = mean(Exp$age)
Exp <- Exp %>%
  mutate(age_cntrd = age - mean_age)
Exp %>% as_tbl_obs()
```

Finally, for the descriptive statistics part of your report, you probably want to summarize the outcome variable per experimental condition. The following chain of commands first groups the data frame, then computes means and standard deviations. At every step, a data frame is piped into another command, which processes the data frame and outputs a data frame.

```
Exp %>%
  group_by(Condition) %>%
  summarize(mean = mean(outcome),
        sd = sd(outcome) )
```

Condition	mean	sd
control	209	10.38
experimental	249	8.02

4.2.11 Plotting data

Good statistical graphics can vastly improve your and your readers understanding of data and results. This book exclusively introduces the modern ggplot2 graphics system of R, which is based on the grammar of graphics.

Every plot starts with piping a data frame into the <code>ggplot(aes(...))</code> command. The <code>aes(...)</code> argument of ggplot creates the <code>aesthetics</code>, which is a <code>mapping between variables and features of the plot</code> (and only remotely has something to do with beauty). Review the code once again that produces the piles-of-sugar: the aesthetics map the variable <code>Group</code> on the fill color, whereas <code>outcome</code> is mapped to the x axis. For a plot to be valid, there must at least one layer with a <code>geometry</code>. The above example uses the density geometry, which calculates the density and maps it to the y axis.

The ggplot2 plotting system knows a full set of geometries, like:

scatter plots with geom_point()

- smooth line plots with geom_smooth()
- histograms with geom_histogram()
- box plots with geom_boxplot() and
- my personal favorite: horizontal density diagrams with geom_violin()

For a brief demonstration of ggplots basic functionality, we use the BAB1 data set of the BrowsingAB case. We attach the case environment and use the str command to take a first look at the data:

```
attach(BrowsingAB)
BAB1 %>% as_tbl_obs()
```

The BrowsingAB case is a virtual series of studies, where two websites were compared by how long it takes users to complete a given task, time-on-task (ToT). Besides the design factor, a number of additional variables exist, that could possibly play a role for ToT, too. We explore the data set with ggplot:

We begin with a plot that shows the association between age of the participant and ToT. Both variables are metric and suggest themselves to be put on a 2D plane, with coordinates x and y, a *scatter plot*.

```
BAB1 %>%
  ggplot(aes(x = age, y = ToT)) +
  geom_point()
```

Let's take a look at the elements of the command chain: The first two lines pipe the data frame into the ggplot engine.

```
BAB1 %>%
ggplot(...)
```

At that moment, the ggplot engine "knows" which variables the data frame contains and hence are available for the plot. It does not yet know, which variables are being used, and how. The next step is, usually, to consider a basic (there exist more than 30) geometry and put it on a layer. The scatter plot geometry of ggplot is geom_point:

```
BAB1 %>%
  ggplot(...) +
  geom_point()
```

The last step is the *aesthetic mapping*, which tells ggplot the variables to use and how to map them to *aesthetic* properties of the geometry. The basic properties of points in a coordinate system are the x and y-positions:

```
BAB1 %>%
  ggplot(aes(x = age, y = ToT)) +
  geom_point()
```

The function aes creates a mapping where the aesthetics per variable are given. When call aes directly, we see that it is just a table.

```
aes(x = age, y = ToT)

## Aesthetic mapping:
## * `x` -> `age`
## * `y` -> `ToT`
```

One tiny detail in the above chain has not yet been explained: the +. When choosing the geometry, you actually add a layer to the plot. This is, of course, not the literal mathematical sum. Technically, what the author of the ggplot2 package did, was to overload the + operator. A large set of ggplot functions can be combined in a myriad of ways, just using +. The overloaded + in ggplot is a brilliant analogy: you can infinitely chain ggplot functions, like you can create long sums. You can store ggplot object and later modify it by adding functions. The analogy has its limits, though: other than sums, order matters in ggplot combinations: the first in the chain is always ggplot and layers are drawn upon each other.

Let's move on with a slightly different situation that will result in a different geometry. Say, we are interested in the distribution of the time-on-task measures under the two designs. We need a geometry, that visualizes the distribution of quantitative variables split by a grouping variable, factor. The box plot does the job:

```
BAB1 %>%
ggplot(aes(x = Design, y = ToT)) +
geom_boxplot()
```

The box plot maps ToT to y (again). The factor Design is represented as a split on the x-axis. Interestingly, the box plot does not represent the data as raw as in the scatter plot example. The geometry actually performs an analysis on ToT, which produces five statistics: min, first quartile, median, third quartile and max. These statistics define the vertical positions of bars and end points.

Now, we combine all three variables in one plot: how does the association between ToT and age differ by design? As we have two quantitative variables,

we stay with the scatter plot for now. As we intend to separate the groups, we need a property of points to distinguish them. Points offer several additional aesthetics, such as color, size and shape. We choose color, and add it to the aesthetic mapping by aes. Note, that it does not matter whether you use the British or American way of writing (colour vs. color).

```
BAB1 %>%
ggplot(aes(x = age, y = ToT, color = Design)) +
geom_point()
```

Now, we can distinguish the groups visually, but there is too much clutter to discover any relation. With the box plot we saw that some geometries do not represent the raw data, but summaries (statistics) of data. For scatter plots, a geometry that does the job of summarizing the trend is <code>geom_smooth</code>. This geometry summarizes a cloud of points by drawing a LOESS-smooth line through it. Note how the color mapping is applied to all geometry layers.

```
BAB1 %>%
   ggplot(aes(x = age, y = ToT, color = Design)) +
   geom_point() +
   geom_smooth()
```

We see a highly interesting pattern: the association between age and ToT follows two slightly different mirrored sigmoid curves.

Now that we have represented three variables with properties of geometries, what if we wanted to add a fourth one, say education level? Formally, we could use another aesthetic, say shape of points, to represent it. You can easily imagine that this would no longer result in a clear visual figure. For situations, where there are many factors, or factors with many levels, it is impossible to reasonably represent them in one plot. The alternative is to use faceting. A facet splits the data by a grouping variable and creates one single plot for every group:

```
BAB1 %>%
   ggplot(aes(x = age, y = ToT, color = Design)) +
   geom_point() +
   geom_smooth() +
   facet_grid(Education ~ .)
```

See, how the facet_grid command takes a formula, instead of just a variable name. This makes faceting the primary choice for highly-dimensional situations. For example, we may also choose to represent both factors, Design and education by facets:

```
BAB1 %>%
  ggplot(aes(x = age, y = ToT)) +
  geom_point() +
  geom_smooth() +
  facet_grid(Education ~ Design)
```

Note how the color aesthetic, although unnecessary, is kept. It is possible to map several aesthetics (or facets) to one variable, but not vice versa.

4.2.12 Fitting regression models

Above we have seen examples of functions that boil down a vector to a single statistic, like the mean. R has several functions that summarize data in a more complex way. One function with a wide range of applications is the 1m command, that applies regression models to data (provided as data frames).

In the following, we will use another simulated data frame Exp to demonstrate linear models. To make this more interesting, we simulate Exp in a slightly advanced way, with quantitative associations between variables. Note how the expected value μ is created by drawing on the variables Condition and age. The last step adds (somewhat) realistic noise to the measures, by drawing from the normal distribution with a mean of mu.

The experiment involves two groups, which in classic statistics would clearly point to what is commonly referred to as *ANOVA*. As it will turn out in [LM], old-fashioned ANOVA can be replaced by a rather simple regression model, that I call comparison of groups model (CGM). The estimation of regression

models is done by a regression engine, which basically is a (very powerful) R command. The specification for any regression model is given in R's formula language. Learning this formula language is key to unleashing the power of regression models in R. We can perform a CGM on the data frame Exp using the regression engine stan_glm. The desired model estimates the effect of Condition on outcome. This produces a regression object that contains an abundance of information, much of it is of little interest for now. (A piece of information, that it does not contain is F-statistics and p-values; and that is why it is not an ANOVA, strictly speaking!) The foremost question is how strong the difference between the groups is. The fixef command extracts the parameter estimates from the model to answer the question.

```
M_1 <-
stan_glm(outcome ~ Condition,
    data = Exp)</pre>
```

fixef(M_1)

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	274.0	266	282.4
${\bf Condition Experimental}$	-46.1	-58	-34.5

Another classic model is *linear regression*, where outcome is predicted by a metric variable, say age. The stan_glm regression engine is truly multipurpose and does the job with grace:

```
M_2 <-
stan_glm(outcome ~ age,
    data = Exp)</pre>
```

fixef(M_2)

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	206.60	126.1	285.79
age	1.58	-1.2	4.46

If you are interested in both at the same time, you can combine that in one model by the following formula:

```
M_3 <-
stan_glm(outcome ~ Condition + age,
    data = Exp)</pre>
```

fixef(M_3)

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	231.69	199.310	265.46
ConditionExperimental	-46.21	-56.362	-36.43
age	1.51	0.344	2.66

A statistical model has several components, for example the coefficients and residuals. Models are complex objects, from which a variety of inferences can be made. For example, the coefficient estimates can be extracted and used for prediction. This is what fixef() does in the above code.

A number of functions can be used to extract certain aspects of the model. For example:

- fixef(model) extracts the linear effects
- residuals(model) extracts the measurement errors
- predict(model) extracts the expected values

These will all be covered in later chapters.

4.2.13 Knitting statistical reports

As you have seen throughout this chapter, with R you can effectively manage data, create impressively expressive graphics and conveniently estimate statistical models. Then usually comes the painful moment where all this needs to be assembled into a neat report. With R and Rstudio it has never been easier than that. In fact, complete books have been written in R, like the one you are reading.

A minimal statistical report contains four elements:

- 1. a recap of the research question
- 2. description of how the statistical model relates to the research question
- 3. a few figures or tables that answers the research question
- 4. an explanation of the results

Of these four elements, three are pure text. For a minimal report it is a fairly convenient to use a word processor software for the text, craft the figure in R and copy it. One problem with this approach is that a *scrunitable statistical* report contains at least the following *additional* elements:

- 1. procedures of data preparation (sources, transformations, variable names, outlier removal)
- 2. data exploration (ranges of variables, outlier discovery, visualizing associations, etc.)
- 3. model estimation (formula specification, convergence checks)
- 4. model criticism (normality of residuals, etc.)

In advanced statistical workflows this is then multiplied by the number of models, an iterative selection process. Because it is easy to lie with statistics, these elements are needed as to build a fundament of credibility. Full transparency is achieved, when another researcher can exactly reproduce all steps of the original analysis. It is obvious that the easiest way to achieve this, is to hand over the full R script.

The most user-friendly way to achieve both, a good looking report and full transparency, is to write a document that contains all before mentioned: text, graphics, tables and R code. In the R environment such mixed documents can be written in the markdown/knitr framework.

Markdown implements a simple markup language, with that you can typset simple, structured texts in a plain ASCII editor. Later in the workflow, such a markup document is transformed into one of various output formats, that are rendered by the respective programs, such as Microsoft Word or an HTML browser.

The above text is an alternation of markup text and *chunks*, those weirdly enclosed pieces of R code. While the text is static, the chunks are processed by the knitr engine, evaluating the enclosed R code and knitting the output into a document. Very conveniently, when the output is a figure, it will be inserted into the document right away. The kable command from the knitr package, in turn, produces neatly rendered tables from data frame objects. By default, the R code is shown, too, but that can be customized.

The minimal workflow for statistical reporting with knitr is as follows:

- 1. Use markdown right away, covering all steps of your data analysis, i.e. a scrutable report. You may even start writing when only one part of your data gathering is completed, because due to the dynamic chunks, updating the report when new data arrives is just a button click away.
- 2. When the data analysis is complete, compile the scrutable report to Word format

```
# Results
In the study we examined
1. whether on average users can rent a car in 99 seconds
2. and if we can say that with sufficient certainty
## Data exploration
```{r}
summary(D)
```{r}
summary(D)
All variables show good variation.
## Regression
M_1 \leftarrow stan_lm(ToT \sim 1, data = D)
```{r}
coef(M_1) %>% knitr::kable()
Our main observations are:
+ the 99 seconds claim is not supported
+ time-on-task measures are not normally distributed
```

Fig. 4.1. A minimal statistical report in markdown

- 3. Extract the passages, figures and tables for a minimal statistical report. This is your results section.
- 4. Provide the scrutable report as appendix or supplementary material

In the notion of this chapter, this is just to get you started and knitr is so tightly integrated with the Rstudio environment that I don't even bother to explain the commands for knitting a document. Once acquainted with the basics, markdown provides a few additional markup tokens, like footnotes, hyperlinks or including images. The customization options and addons for

knitr are almost endless and various interesting addons are available, just to mention two:

- 1. The bookdown package provides an infrastructure for writing and publishing longer reports and books.
- 2. With the shiny package one can add dynamic widgets to HTML reports. Think of a case, where your statistical model is more complicated than a linear regression line or a few group means, say you are estimating a polynomial model or a learning curve. Then, with a simple shiny app, you can enable your readers to understand the model by playful exploration.

#### 4.2.14 Exercises

- 1. In the book package (directory /Data) you will find the data set of the (virtual) study BAB1, which we will be using in coming chapters. This data comes as comma-separated value file with the file ending .csv. Load this file into R using the read\_csv command and check the dataframe.
- 2. Find the documentation of the packages haven and readr. Find two import functions. The one that is most useful for you and the one that you consider most exotic.
- 3. We have seen how to extract a data frame column as a vector using the double square brackets. There seems to be no such option to extract an individual row as a vector. Why? (Think about object types). <-! #14 ->
- 4. Use the world wide web to find geometries that are useful for plotting associations between grouping variables (factors) and a metric variables. Try them all on the BAB1 data frame. Compare the geometries on what properties of the data they convey.
- 5. Like data frames and regression results, plots produced by ggplot are complex objects, too. Create an arbitrary plot, store it in a variable and inspect it using class, summary and str. In addition, what happens when you assign the plot to a variable and what happens when you call the variable?
- 6. Revisit the python-swallowed-camel plot and check out how the aesthetic mapping is created. The plot uses a density geometry. Change it into a histogram. Then produce a box plot that shows the two conditions (think carefully about the mappings of x and y).
- 7. Use the data set BAB5 in BrowsingAB. It contains a follow-up experiment, where participants had to do five different tasks on the website. Plot the association between age and ToT by task, using color. Then put Task on a facet grid, and use color to represent Design again.

- 8. Use the data set BAB5 in BrowsingAB. Using a transformation chain, take the sum or average of participants' ToT. Then run a few simple regression models.
- 9. Use your own data. Drop an Excel and/or an SPSS file into the same directory as your current R file. Read the data into a data frame and summarize what is in the data frame. Use ggplot to create one or more exploratory graphs. Then use dplyr summarize to create summary statistics.
- 10. Do a full exploratory analysis of the dataframe D\_agg in case environment IPump. It has the predictors Design, Group, Education and experience. It has the outcome variables ToT, deviations and workload.
  - 1. Get the data frame into R and produce a summary.
  - 2. Plot a histogram for all dependent variables.
  - 3. Produce a table that counts the number of observations per Education(al level).
  - 4. Produce a table that displays minimum, maximum, median, mean and standard deviation of experience.
  - 5. Exclude participants with less than four years of experience.
  - 6. Produce a table with group means per Design and Session.
  - 7. For every outcome variable, produce a plot for Design by session.
  - 8. Explore graphically, what other relations may exist between outcome variables and Group, Education and experience.
  - 9. Run a regression model for ToT with Design and Session as predictors.
  - 10. Produce a coefficient table.
  - 11. Plot the residuals.

## 4.2.15 Bibliographic notes

R for Data Science is a book co-authored by Hadley "Tidy" Wickham.

ggplot2 Version of Figures in "25 Recipes for Getting Started with R" for readers who are familiar with the legacy plotting commands in R.

Introduction to dplyr for Faster Data Manipulation in R introduces dplyr, the next generation R interface for data manipulation, which is used extensively in this book.

Quick-R is a comprehensive introduction to many common statistical techniques with R.

Code as manuscript features a small set of lessons with code examples, assignments and further resources. For if you are in a haste.

bookdown: Authoring Books and Technical Documents with R Markdown fully unleashes the power of knitr for writing and publishing longer reports and books.

Models

# Linear models

# 5.1 Quantification at work: grand mean models

Reconsider Andrew and Jane. They were faced with the problem that potential competitors could challenge the claim "rent a car in 99 seconds" and drag them to court. More precisely, the question was: "will users on average be able ...", which is not about individual users, but the *population mean*. A statistical model estimating just that, we call a *grand mean model* (GMM). The GMM is the most simple of all models, so in a way, we can think of it as the "grandmother of all models". Although its is the simplest of all, it is of useful application in design research; here are a few examples:

- with medical infusion pump the frequency of decimal input error (giving the tenfold or the tenth of the prescribed dose) must be below a bearable level
- the checkout process of an e-commerce website must have a a cancel rate not higher than . . .
- the timing of a traffic light must be designed to give drivers enough time to hit the brakes.

A GMM predicts the average expected level of performance in the population  $(\beta_0)$ . When you want to predict the achievable IQ score of a totally random and anonymous individual (from this population), the population average (100) is your best guess. However, this best guess is imperfect and chances are low that 100 is the correct guess.

```
random IQ sample, rounded to whole numbers
set.seed(42)
N <- 1000
D_IQ <- tibble(score = rnorm(N, mean = 100, sd = 15),</pre>
```

```
IQ = round(score, 0))
proportion of correct guesses
pi_100 <- sum(D_IQ$IQ == 100)/N
str_c("Proportion of correct guesses: ", pi_100)</pre>
```

```
[1] "Proportion of correct guesses: 0.031"
```

This best guess is imperfect, for a variety reasons:

- 1. People differ a lot in intelligence.
- 2. The IQ measure itself is uncertain. A person could have had a bad day, when doing the test, whereas another person just had more experience with being tested.
- 3. If test items are sampled from a larger set, tests may still differ a tiny bit.
- 4. The person is the slum dog millionaire, who by pure coincidence encountered precisely those questions, he could answer.

In a later chapters we will investigate on the sources of randomness [REF MLM]. But, like all other models in this chapter, the GMM is a *Gaussian single-level linear model*. This single level is the *population-level* and as a Gaussian model all unexplained sources of variation are collected in  $\sigma$ , the *standard error*.

Formally, a GMM is written as follows, where  $\mu_i$  is the *predicted value* of person i and  $\beta$  is the grand mean  $\beta_0$ , which in linear models is referred to as *Intercept*.

$$\mu_i = \beta_0 y_i \sim \text{Norm}(\mu_i, \sigma)$$

R provides its own formula language to specify regression models. This formula language is not very complex, at the same time provides a surprisingly high flexibility for specification of models. The only really odd feature of this formula language is that it represents the intercept  $\beta_0$  with 1. To add to the confusion, the intercept means something different, depending on what type of model is estimated. In GMMs, it is the grand mean, whereas in group-mean comparisons, it is the mean of one reference group [REF CGM] and in linear regression, it is has the usual meaning as in linear equations.

```
coef(M_IQ)
```

parameter	type fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	fixef Intercept	99.6	98.7	100.5
$sigma\_resid$	disp NA	15.1	14.4	15.8

So, when estimating the grand mean model, we estimate the intercept  $\beta_0$  and the standard error  $\sigma$ . In R, the analysis of the 99 seconds problem [REF Design Research] unfolds as follows: completion times (ToT) are stored in a data frame, with one observation per row. This data frame is send to the R command stan\_glm for estimation, using data = D\_1. The formula of the grand mean model is ToT ~ 1. Left of the ~ (tilde) operator is the outcome variable. In design research, this often is a performance measure, such as time-on-task, number-of-errors or self-reported cognitive workload. The right hand side specifies the deterministic part, containing all measures that are used to predict performance.

```
attach(Sec99)
M_1 \leftarrow stan_glm(ToT \sim 1, data = D_1)
summary(M_1)
 ##
 ## Model Info:
 ##
 ##
 function:
 stan_glm
 ##
 family:
 gaussian [identity]
 ToT ~ 1
 ##
 formula:
 algorithm:
 ##
 sampling
 see help('prior_summary')
 ##
 priors:
 ##
 sample:
 4000 (posterior sample size)
 observations: 100
 ##
 ##
 predictors:
 1
 ##
 ## Estimates:
 ##
 sd
 2.5%
 25%
 50%
 75%
 97.5%
 mean
 106.0
 ##
 (Intercept)
 3.1
 99.9
 103.8
 106.0
 108.1
 112.0
 27.5
 ## sigma
 31.5
 2.3
 29.9
 31.3
 33.0
 36.5
 ## mean_PPD
 106.0
 4.5
 97.2
 103.0
 106.0
 109.0
 114.9
 1.0 -497.1 -494.7 -494.0 -493.6 -493.3
 ## log-posterior -494.3
 ##
 ## Diagnostics:
 ##
 mcse Rhat n_eff
 ## (Intercept)
 0.1 1.0 2711
```

```
sigma 0.0 1.0 2709
mean_PPD 0.1 1.0 3258
log-posterior 0.0 1.0 1382
##
```

## For each parameter, mcse is Monte Carlo standard error, n\_eff is a crude measure of expression ## For each parameter, mcse is Monte Carlo standard error, n\_eff is a crude measure of expression ## For each parameter, mcse is Monte Carlo standard error, n\_eff is a crude measure of expression ## For each parameter, mcse is Monte Carlo standard error, n\_eff is a crude measure of expression ## For each parameter, mcse is Monte Carlo standard error, n\_eff is a crude measure of expression ## For each parameter, mcse is Monte Carlo standard error, n\_eff is a crude measure of expression ## For each parameter, mcse is Monte Carlo standard error.

Most of the time a researcher does not want to deal with the posterior directly, but desires a brief summary of location and uncertainty. Coefficient tables like the one shown below serve exactly this purpose. Coefficient tables report the central tendency of every coefficient, which is the best guess for the true magnitude of an effect. Next to that, the spread of the posterior distribution is summarized as 95% credibility intervals and represent the degree of uncertainty: the less certain an estimate is, the wider is the interval. A 95% credibility interval gives a range of possible values where you can be 95% certain that it contains the true value. A coefficient table is produced by the coef command (bayr package):

## coef(P\_1)

parameter	type fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	fixef Intercept	106.1	99.9	112.1
$sigma\_resid$	disp NA	31.3	27.5	36.3

The coef command being used in this book is from the accompanying R package bayr and produces publication-ready coefficient tables, showing all parameters in a model. It comes with sibling commands to only show the population-level linear coefficients:

## coef(P\_1)

parameter	type fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept sigma_resid	fixef Intercept disp NA			112.1 36.3

Note that regression engines, such as rstanarm, bring their own version of fixef, but these often report the center estimates, only.

```
rstanarm::fixef(M_1)

(Intercept)
106
```

In order to always use the convenient commands from package bayr, it is necessary to load bayr after package rstanarm.

```
library(rstanarm)
library(bayr)
```

```
detach(Sec99)
```

A GMM is the simplest linear model and as such makes absolute minimal use of knowledge when doing its predictions. The only thing one knows is that test persons come from one and the same population (humans, users, psychology students). Accordingly, predictions are very inaccurate. From the GM we will depart in two directions. First, in the remainder of this chapter, we will add further predictors to the model, for example age of participants or a experimental conditions. These models will improve our predictive accuracy by using additional knowledge about participants and conditions of testing. In the following chapter on mixed-effects models [REF MLM], the error term is partitioned into its sources.

## 5.1.1 Talking coefficient tables

Reporting a model estimate together with its level of certainty is what makes a statistic inferential (rather than merely descriptive). In Bayesian statistics, the posterior distribution is estimated (usually by means of MCMC sampling) and this distribution carries the full information on certainty. If the posterior is widely spread, an estimate is rather uncertain. You may still bet on values close to the center estimate, but you should keep your bid low. Some authors (or regression engines) express the level of certainty by means of the standard error. However, the standard deviation is a single value and has the disadvantage that a single value does not represent non-symmetric distributions well. A better way is to express certainty as limits, a lower and an upper. The most simple method resembles that of the median by using quantiles.

It is common practice to explain and interpret coefficient tables for the audience. My suggestion of how to report regression results is to simply walk through the table row-by-row and for every parameter make two statements:

- 1. a quantitative statement based on the central tendency
- 2. an uncertainty statement based on the CIs

In the present case that would be:

The intercept  $\beta_0$  is in the region of 106 seconds, which is pretty off the target of 99 seconds. The certainty is pretty good. At least we can say that the

chance of the true mean being 99 seconds or smaller is pretty marginal, as it is not even contained in the 95% CI.

And for  $\sigma$ :

The population mean is rather not representative for the observations as the standard error is almost one third of it. We can be pretty certain that this is so.

### Likelihood and random term

In formal language, regression models are usually specified by likelihood functions and one or more random terms (exactly one in linear models). The likelihood represents the common, predictable pattern in the data. Formally, the likelihood establishes a link between predicted values  $\mu_i$  and predictors. It is common to call predictors with the Greek letter  $\beta$  (beta). If there is more than one predictor, these are marked with subscripts, starting at zero. The "best guess" is called the expected value and is denoted with  $\mu_i$  (mu\_i). If you just know that the average ToT is 106 seconds and you are asked to guess the performance of the next user arriving in the lab, the reasonable guess is just that, 106 seconds.

$$\mu_i = \beta_0$$

Of course, we would never expect this person to use 106 second, exactly. All observed and imagined observations are more or less clumped around the expected value. The random term specifies our assumptions on the pattern of randomness. It is given as distributions (note the plural), denoted by the  $\sim$  (tilde) operator, which reads as: "is distributed". In the case of linear models, the assumed distribution is always the Normal or Gaussian distribution. Gaussian distributions have a characteristic bell curve and depend on two parameters: the mean  $\mu$  as the central measure and the standard deviation  $\sigma$  giving the spread.

$$y_i \sim N(\mu_i, \sigma_\epsilon)$$

The random term specifies how all unknown sources of variation take effect on the measures, and these are manifold. Randomness can arise due to all kinds of individual differences, situational conditions, and, last but not least, measurement errors. The Gaussian distribution often is a good approximation for randomness and linear models are routinely used in research. In several classic statistics books, the following formula is used to describe the GMM (and likewise more complex linear models):

$$y_i = \mu_i + \epsilon_i \mu_i = \beta_0 \epsilon_i \sim \text{Norm}(0, \sigma_{\epsilon})$$

First, it is to say, that these two formulas are mathematically equivalent. The primary difference to our formula is that the residuals  $\epsilon_i$ , are given separately. The pattern of residuals is then specified as a single Normal distribution. Residual distributions are a highly useful concept in modelling as they can be used to check a given model. If residuals are such a highly useful concept, the classic formula is more intuitive. The reason for separating the model into likelihood and random term is that it works in more cases. When turning to Generalized Linear Models (GLM) in chapter ??, we will use other patterns of randomness, that are no longer additive, like in  $\mu_i + \epsilon_i$ . As I consider the use of GLMs an element of professional statistical practice, I use the general formula right from the start.

## 5.1.2 Working with the posterior distribution

Coefficient tables are the standard way to report regression models. They contain all parameters (or a selection of interest) in rows. For every parameter, the central tendency (center, magnitude, location) is given, and a statement of uncertainty, by convention 95% credibility intervals (CI).

```
attach(Sec99)
```

The object M\_1 is the model object created by stan\_glm. When you call summary you get complex listings that represent different aspects of the estimated model. These aspects and more are saved inside the object in a hierarchy of lists. The central result of the estimation is the *posterior distribution* (HPD). With package Rstanarm, the posterior distribution is extracted as follows:

```
P_1_wide <-
 as_tibble(M_1) %>%
 rename(Intercept = `(Intercept)`)

str(P_1_wide)
```

```
Classes 'tbl_df', 'tbl' and 'data.frame': 4000 obs. of 2 variables:
$ Intercept: num 102 104 103 108 112 ...
$ sigma : num 31.9 30.5 30.2 31.8 33.3 ...
```

The resulting dataframe is a matrix, where each of the 4000 rows is one coordinate the MCMC walk has visited in a two-dimensional parameter space [REF MCMC]. For the purpose of reporting parameter estimates, we create a *coefficient table*, that

center_Intercept	center_sigma	lower_Intercept	lower_sigma	upper_Intercept	upper_sigma
106	31.3	99.9	27.5	112	36.5

Creating coefficient tables from wide posterior objects is awful and repetitive, even when there are just two parameters (some models contain hundreds of parameters). Additional effort would be needed to get a well structured table. The package Bayr can extract posterior distributions, too, but produces a long format. This works approximately like can be seen in the following code, which employs tidyr::gather to make the wide Rstanarm posterior long.

```
P_1_long <- P_1_wide %>%
 tidyr::gather(key = parameter)

P_1_long %>%
 sample_n(10) %>%
 arrange(parameter)
```

parameter	value
Intercept	102.3
Intercept	103.6
Intercept	96.5
sigma	28.1
sigma	34.0
sigma	30.3
sigma	29.9
sigma	37.1
sigma	31.3
sigma	32.1

With long posterior objects, summarizing over the parameters is efficient and straight-forward, in other words: it is tidy.

```
P_1_long %>%
 group_by(parameter) %>%
 summarize(center = median(value),
```

```
lower = quantile(value, .025),
upper = quantile(value, .975))
```

parameter		1	
Intercept	106.0	99.9	112.0
sigma	31.3	27.5	36.5

With the Bayr package, the **posterior** command produces such a long posterior object:

```
P_1 <- bayr::posterior(M_1)
P_1
```

\*\* tbl\_post: 4000 samples in 1 chains

model	parameter	type fixef	entities
M_1	Intercept	fixef Intercept	1

When called, the posterior object identifies itself by telling the number of MCMC samples, and the variables contained in the model. In the case here, there is just the intercept (representing the grand mean) and the standard deviation of errors. The following gives a glance on the real structure of the long posterior object. Most essential are the identification of the iteration (and chain), the parameter name and the value. However, there is a lot more information stored along side, much of which we will only use in later chapters.

```
P_1 %>%
 as_tibble() %>%
 filter(!as.logical(iter %% 500)) ## <-- modulo division selects every 500th iteration</pre>
```

$\overline{\text{model}}$	chain	iter	order	parameter	type	nonlin	fixef	re_factor	re_entity	value
M_1	NA	500	2	$sigma\_resid$	$\operatorname{disp}$	NA	NA	NA	NA	30.1
M_1	NA	500	1	Intercept	fixef	NA	Intercept	NA	NA	105.8
M_1	NA	1000	2	$sigma\_resid$	$\operatorname{disp}$	NA	NA	NA	NA	31.2
M_1	NA	1000	1	Intercept	fixef	NA	Intercept	NA	NA	107.5
$M_1$	NA	1500	2	$sigma\_resid$	disp	NA	NA	NA	NA	27.4
$M_1$	NA	1500	1	Intercept	fixef	NA	Intercept	NA	NA	102.8
$M_1$	NA	2000	2	$sigma\_resid$	disp	NA	NA	NA	NA	30.7
$M_1$	NA	2000	1	Intercept	fixef	NA	Intercept	NA	NA	109.1
$M_1$	NA	2500	2	$sigma\_resid$	disp	NA	NA	NA	NA	34.0
$M_1$	NA	2500	1	Intercept	fixef	NA	Intercept	NA	NA	102.8
$M_1$	NA	3000	2	$sigma\_resid$	disp	NA	NA	NA	NA	32.4
$M_1$	NA	3000	1	Intercept	fixef	NA	Intercept	NA	NA	104.5
$M_1$	NA	3500	2	$sigma\_resid$	disp	NA	NA	NA	NA	35.4
$M_1$	NA	3500	1	Intercept	fixef	NA	Intercept	NA	NA	109.4
M_1	NA	4000	2	sigma_resid	disp	NA	NA	NA	NA	30.0
M_1	NA	4000	1	Intercept	fixef	NA	Intercept	NA	NA	103.0

Note how the two parameters Intercept and sigma are assigned different parameter types: Effects and Dispersion. That is a generally useful classification made by the command bayr::posterior. It allows us to easily produce a coefficient table with just the effects:

```
par_tab.tbl_post <- function(tbl_post){</pre>
 tbl_post %>%
 group_by(parameter) %>%
 summarize(center = median(value),
 lower = quantile(value, .025),
 upper = quantile(value, .975))
}
```

```
P_1 %>%
 filter(type == "fixef") %>%
 par_tab.tbl_post()
```

parameter	center	lower	upper
Intercept	106	99.9	112

That is precisely how the bayr::fixef command is implemented. Note that coef and fixef can be called on the rstanarm model object, directly, which produces the long posterior in the background.

```
fixef(M_1)
```

model type fixef	center	lower	upper
object fixef Intercept	106	99.9	112

## 5.1.3 Center and interval estimates

The authors of Bayesian books and the various regression engines have different opinions on what to use as center statistic and credibility limits in a coefficient table. The best known option are: the mean, the median and the mode.

```
T_1 <-
 P_1 %>%
 group_by(parameter) %>%
 summarize(mean = mean(value),
 median = median(value),
 mode = mascutils::mode(value),
 lower = quantile(value, .025),
 upper = quantile(value, .975))
T_1
```

-		median	1		
Intercept	106.0	106.0	106.0	99.9	112.0
sigma_resid	31.5	31.3	31.1	27.5	36.5

We observe that for the Intercept it barely matters which center statistic we use, but there are differences for the standard error. We investigate this further by producing a plot with the marginal posterior distributions of  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$  with mean, median and mode.

```
T_1_long <-
 T_1 %>%
 gather(key = center, value = value, -parameter)
T_1_long
```

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parameter	center	value
Intercept	mean	106.0
sigma_resid	mean	31.5
Intercept	median	106.0
sigma_resid	median	31.3
Intercept	mode	106.0
sigma_resid	mode	31.1
Intercept	lower	99.9
sigma_resid	lower	27.5
Intercept	upper	112.0
$sigma\_resid$	upper	36.5

```
G_1 <- P_1 %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = value)) +
 facet_wrap(~parameter, scales = "free_x") +
 geom_density(fill = 1) +
 geom_vline(aes(xintercept = value, col = center), data = T_1_long)
G_1
```

This example demonstrates how the long format posterior works together with the Ggplot graphics engine. A density plot very accurately renders how certainty is distributed over the range of a parameter. In order to produce vertical lines for point estimate and limits, we first make the summary table long, with one value per row. This is not how we would usually like to read it, but it is very efficient for adding to the plot.

When inspecting the two distributions, it appears that the distribution of Intercept is completely symmetric. For the standard error, in contrast, we note a slight left skewness. This is rather typical for dispersion parameters, as these have a lower boundary. The closer the distribution sits to the boundary, the steeper becomes the left tail.

A disadvantage of the *mean* is that it may change under monotonic transformations. A monotonic transformations is a recoding of a variable  $x_1$  into a new variable  $x_2$  by a transformation function  $\phi$  (phi) such that the order of values stays untouched. Examples of monotonic functions are the logarithm ( $x_2 = \log(x_1)$ ), the exponential function ( $x_2 = \exp(x_1)$ ), or simply  $x_2 = x_1 + 1$ . A counter example is the quadratic function  $x_2 = x_1^2$ . In data analysis monotonous transformations are used a lot. Especially Generalized Linear Models make use of monotonous link functions to establish linearity ??. Furthermore, the mean can also be highly influenced by outliers.

The *mode* of a distribution is its point of highest density. It is invariant under monotonic transformations. It also has a rather intuitive meaning as the most

likely value for the true parameter. Next to that, the mode is compatible with classic maximum likelihood estimation. When a Bayesian takes a pass on any prior information, the posterior mode should precisely match the results of a classic regression engine (e.g. glm). The main disadvantage of the mode is that it has to be estimated by one of several heuristic algorithms. These add some computing time and may fail when the posterior distribution is bimodal. However, when that happens, you probably have a more deeply rooted problem, than just deciding on a suitable summary statistic.

The median of a distribution marks the point where half the values are below and the other half are equal or above. Technically, the median is just the 50% quantile of the distribution. The median is extremely easy and reliable to compute, and it shares the invariance of monotonous transformations. This is easy to conceive: The median is computed by ordering all values in a row and then picking the value that is exactly in the middle. Obviously, this value only changes if the order changes, i.e. a non-monotonous function was applied.

For center estimates I use the posterior median by default, for its simplicity. Researchers who desire downward compatibility with classic regression engines, can easily switch to the mode by using the *estimate* argument. The following uses the mode as a center estimate.

In this book, 2.5% and 97.5% certainty quantiles are routinely used to form 95% credibility intervals (CI). Again, another method exists to obtain CIs. Some authors prefer to report the highest posterior interval (HPD), which is the narrowest interval that contains 95% of the probability mass. While this is intriguing to some extent, HPDs are not invariant to monotonic transformations, either.

The coef command by default gives the median and the 2.5% and 97.5% limits. The three parameters have in common that they are quantiles, which are handled by Rs quantile command. To demystify the coef, here is how you can make a basic coefficient table yourself:

parameter	center		
Intercept	106.0	99.9	112.0
sigma_resid	31.3	27.5	36.5

Note that we get CIs for the dispersion parameter  $\sigma$ , too. Many classic analyses call  $\sigma$  are nuisance parameter and ignore it, or they blame high variation between observations for not reaching "significant" certainty for the parameter

of interest. Furthermore, classic regression engines don't yield any measures of certainty on dispersion parameters. I believe that understanding the amount of variation is often crucial for design research and several of the examples that follow try to build this case. This is why we should be glad that Bayesian engines report uncertainty on all parameters involved.

### 5.1.4 Do the random walk: Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling

So far, we have seen how linear models are specified and how parameters are interpreted from standard coefficient tables. While it is convenient to have a standard procedure it turns out very useful to understand how these estimates came to life. In Bayesian estimation, the posterior distribution (PD) is the central point of departure for any such statements. The PD assigns a degree of certainty for every possible combination of parameter values. In the current case, you can ask the PD, where and how certain the population mean and the residual standard error are, but you can also ask: How certain are we that the population mean is smaller than 99 seconds and  $\sigma$  is smaller than 10?

In a perfect world, we would know the analytic formula of the posterior and derive statements from it. In most non-trivial cases, though, there is no such formula one can work with. Instead, what the regression engine does is to approximate the PD by a random-walk algorithm called Markov-Chain Monte Carlo sampling (MCMC).

In fact, the stan\_glm command returns a large object that stores, among others, the full random walk. This random walk represents the posterior distribution almost directly. The following code extracts the posterior distribution from the regression object and prints it. When calling the new object (class: tbl\_post) directly, it provides a compact summary of all variables in the model, in this case the intercept and the residual standard error.

```
attach(Sec99)

P_1 <- posterior(M_1)
P_1

** tbl_post: 4000 samples in 1 chains

model parameter type fixef entities

M_1 Intercept fixef Intercept 1</pre>
```

The 99 second GMM has two parameters and therefore the posterior distribution has three dimensions: the parameter dimensions  $\beta_0$ ,  $\sigma$  and the probability

density. Three dimensional plots are difficult to put on a surface, but for somewhat regular patterns, a density plot with contour lines does a sufficient job:

```
P_1 %>%
 select(chain, iter, parameter, value) %>%
 spread(parameter, value) %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = Intercept, y = sigma_resid, fill = ..level..)) +
 stat_density_2d(geom = "polygon") +
 xlim(95, 115) + ylim(25, 40) +
 scale_fill_continuous(name="relative frequency")
```

Let's see how this PD "landscape" actually emerged from the random walk. In the current case, the parameter space is two-dimensional, as we have  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$ . The MCMC procedure starts at a deliberate point in parameter space. At every iteration, the MCMC algorithm attempts a probabilistic jump to another location in parameter space and stores the coordinates. This jump is called probabilistic for two reasons: first, the new coordinates are selected by a random number generator and second, it is either carried out, or not, and that depends on a bet. If the new target is in a highly likely region, it is carried out with a higher chance. This sounds circular, but it provenly works. More specifically, the MCMC sampling approach rests on a general proof, that the emerging frequency distribution converges towards the true posterior distribution. That is called ergodicity and it means we can take the relative frequencies of jumps into a certain area of parameter space as an approximation for our posterior belief, that the true parameter values fall within this region.

The regression object stores the MCMC results as a long series of positions in parameter space. For any range of interest, it is the relative frequency of visits that represents its certainty. The first 50 jumps of the MCMC random walk are shown in @ref(99\_seconds\_random\_walk). Apparently, the random walk is not fully random, as the point cloud is more dense in the center area. This is where the more probable parameter values lie. One can clearly see how the MCMC algorithm jumps to more likely areas more frequently. These areas become more dense and, finally, the cloud of visits will approach the contour density plot above.

```
G_random_walk <-
P_1 %>%
filter(iter <= 50) %>%
select(iter, parameter, value) %>%
spread(parameter, value) %>%
ggplot(aes(x = Intercept, y = sigma_resid, label = iter)) +
geom_text() +
```

```
geom_path(alpha = .3) +
ylab("residual sd") +
xlab("intercept mu") +
xlim(95, 115) + ylim(25, 40)
G_random_walk
```

The more complex regression models grow, the more dimensions the PD gets. The linear regression model in the next chapter has three parameter dimensions, which is difficult to visualize. Multi-level models have hundreds of parameters, which is impossible to intellectually grasp at once. Therefore, it is common to use the *marginal posterior distributions* (MPD), which give the density of one coefficient at time. My preferred geometry for plotting many MPDs is the violin plot, which packs a bunch of densities and therefore can be used when models of many more dimensions.

```
P_1 %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = parameter, y = value)) +
 geom_violin() +
 ylim(0, NA)
```

In our example, in @ref(99\_seconds\_post) we can spot that the most likely value for average time-on-task is 106.1. Both distributions have a certain spread. With a wider PD, far-off values have been visited by the MCMC chain more frequently. The probability mass is more evenly distributed and there is less certainty for the parameter to fall in the central region. In the current case, a risk averse decision maker would maybe take the credibility interval as "reasonably certain".

Andrew and Jane expect some scepticism from the marketing people, and some lack in statistical skills, too. What would be the most comprehensible single number to report? As critical decisions are involved, it seems plausible to report the risk to err: how certain are they that the true value is more than 99 seconds. We inspect the histograms. The MPD of the intercept indicates that the average time-on-task is rather unlikely in the range of 99 seconds or better. But what is the precise probability to err for the 99 seconds statement? The above summary with fixef() does not accurately answer the question. The CI gives lower and upper limits for a range of 95% certainty in total. What is needed is the certainty of  $\mu \geq 99$ . Specific questions deserve precise answers. And once we have understood the MCMC chain as a frequency distribution, the answer is easy: we simply count how many visited values are larger than 99. In R, the quantile function handles the job:

```
 certainty_99s
 certainty_111s

 0.986
 0.054
```

It turns out that the certainty for average time-on-task above the 99 is an overwhelming 0.986. The alternative claim, that average completion time is better than 111 seconds, has a rather moderate risk to err (0.054).

```
detach(Sec99)
```

# 5.2 Walk the line: linear regression

In the previous section we have introduced the mother of all regression models: the grand mean model. It assigns rather coarse predictions, without any real predictors. Routinely, design researchers desire to predict performance based on *metric variables*, such as:

- previous experience
- age
- font size
- intelligence level and other innate abilities
- level of self efficiacy, neuroticism or other traits
- number of social media contacts

To carry out such a research question, the variable of interest needs to be measured next to the outcome variable. And, the variable must vary. You cannot examine the effects of age or font size on reading performance, when all participants are psychology students or you test only one size. Then, for specifying the model, the researcher has to come up with an expectation of how the two are related. Theoretically, that can be any mathematical function, but practically, a *linear function* is often presumed for its simplicity. The following plot shows a variety of linear relations between two variables x and y.

A linear function is a straight line, which is specified by two parameters: intercept  $\beta_0$  and slope  $\beta_1$ :

$$f(x_1) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i}$$

The intercept is "the point where a function graph crosses the x-axis", or more formally:

$$f(x_1 = 0) = \beta_0$$

The second parameter,  $\beta_1$  is called the *slope*. The slope determines the steepness of the line. When the slope is 1, the line will rise by this amount when one moves one step to the right.

$$f(x_1+1) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i} + \beta_1$$

There is also the possibility that the slope is zero. In such a case, the predictor has no effect and can be left out. Setting  $\beta_1 = 0$  produces a horizontal line, with  $y_i$  being constant over the whole range. This shows that The linear regression model (LRM) can be conceived a generalization of the GM model:  $\mu_i = \beta_0$ .

Linear regression gives us the opportunity to discover how ToT can be predicted by age  $(x_1)$  in the BrowsingAB case. In this hypothetical experiment, two designs A and B are compared, but we ignore this for now. Instead we ask: are older people slower when using the internet? Or: is there a linear relationship between age and ToT? The structural and random terms of the LRM are:

$$\mu_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i}$$
$$y_i \sim N(\mu_i, \sigma)$$

This literally means: with every year of age, ToT increases by  $\beta_1$  seconds. Before we run a linear regression with stan\_glm, we visually explore the

association between age and ToT using a scatter plot. The blue line in the graph is a so called a *smoother*, more specifically a LOESS. A smoother is an estimated line, just as linear function. But, it is way more flexible. Where the linear function is a lever fixed at a pivotal point, LOESS is a pipe cleaner. LOESS shows a more detailed picture of the relation between age and ToT. There is a rise between 20 and 40, followed by a stable plateau, and another rise starting at 60. Actually, that does not look like a straight line, but at least there is steady upwards trend.

## attach(BrowsingAB)

```
G_eda_1 <-
BAB1 %>%
ggplot(aes(x = age, y = ToT)) +
geom_point()+
geom_smooth(se = F, fullrange = F)
G_eda_1
```

In fact, the BrowsingAB data contains what one could call a psychological model. The effect of age is partly due to farsightedness of participants (making them slower at reading), which more or less suddenly kicks in at a certain range of age. Still, we currently make do with a rough linear approximation. To estimate the model, we use the stan\_glm command in much the same way as before, but add the predictor age. The command will internally check the data type of your variable, which is metric in this case. Therefore, it is treated as a continuous predictor (sometimes also called covariate).

```
T_age <- fixef(M_age)
T_age</pre>
```

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	164.090	143.152	185.18
age	0.642	0.234	1.04

Is age associated with ToT? The coefficient table tells us that with every year of age, users get 0.64 seconds slower, which is considerable. It also tells us that the predicted performance at age = 0 is 164.09.

### 5.2.1 Transforming measures

In the above model, the intercept represents the predicted ToT at age == 0, of a newborn. We would never seriously put that forward in a stakeholder presentation, trying to prove that babies benefit from the redesign of a public website, would we? The prediction is bizarre because we intuitively understand that there is a discontinuity up the road, which is the moment where a teenager starts using public websites. We also realize that over the whole life span of a typical web user, say 12 years to 90 years, age actually is a proxy variable for two distinct processes: the rapid build-up of intellectual skills from childhood to young adulthood and the slow decline of cognitive performance, which starts approximately, when the first of us get age-related far-sightedness. Generally, with linear models, one should avoid making statements about a range that has not been observed. Linearity, as we will see in [REF: debunking], always is an approximation for a process that truly is non-linear.

Placing the intercept where there is no data has another consequence: the estimate is rather uncertain, with a wide 95% CI,  $164.09[143.15, 185.18]_{CI95}$ . As a metaphor, think of the data as a hand that holds the a stick, the regression line and tries to push a light switch. The longer the stick, the more difficult is becomes to hit the target.

### 5.2.1.1 Shifting an centering

Shifting the predictor is a pragmatic solution to the problem: "Shifting" means that the age predictor is moved to the right or the left, such that point zero is in a region populated with observations. In this case, two options seem to make sense: either, the intercept is in the region of youngest participants, or it is the sample average, which is then called *centering*. To shift a variable, just subtract the amount of units (years) where you want the intercept to be. The following code produces a shift of -20 and a centering on the original variable age:

```
BAB1 %>%
 tidyr::gather("predictor", "age", starts_with("age")) %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = age, y = ToT)) +
 facet_grid(predictor~.) +
 geom_point() +
 geom_smooth(se = F, method = "lm", fullrange = T)
```

By shifting the age variable, the whole data cloud is moved to the left. To see what happens on the inferential level, we repeat the LRM estimation with the two shifted variables:

```
M_age_shft <-
 stan_glm(ToT ~ 1 + age_shft, data = BAB1)

M_age_cntr <-
 stan_glm(ToT ~ 1 + age_cntr, data = BAB1)</pre>
```

We combine the posterior distributions into one multi-model posterior and read the *multi-model coefficient table*:

model	fixef	center	lower	upper
M age	Intercept	164.090	143.152	185.18
M age	age			
M_age_	_cntr Intercept			
	$_{\rm cntr}$ age $_{\rm cntr}$			
	shft Intercept			
$M_age_$	shft age_shft	0.645	0.256	1.04

When comparing the regression results the shifted intercepts have moved to higher values, as expected. Surprisingly, the simple shift is not exactly 20 years. This is due to the high uncertainty of the first model, as well as the relation not being exactly linear (see Figure XY). The shifted age predictor

has a slightly better uncertainty, but not by much. This is, because the region around the lowest age is only scarcely populated with data. Centering, on the other hand, results in a highly certain estimate, due to the dence data. The slope parameter, however, practically does not change, neither in magnitude nor in certainty.

Shift (and centering) move the scale of measurement and make sure that the intercept falls close (or within) the cluster of observations. Shifting does not change the unit size, which is still years. For most metric predictors that would also not be desireable, as the unit of measurement is natural and intuitive.

### 5.2.1.2 Rescaling

Most rating scales are not natural units of measure. Most of the time it is not meaningful to say: "the user experience rating improved by one". The problem has two roots, as I will illustrate by the following four rating scale items:

This product is ...

```
1. difficult to use |1 \dots X \dots 3 \dots 4 \dots 5 \dots 6 \dots 7| easy to use 2. from hell |----X------| (10cm) heavenly 3. neutral |1 \dots X \dots 3 \dots 4| uncanny
```

If you would employ these three scales to assess one and the same product, the data could look like this:

Part	$difficult\_easy$	heavenly_hell	neutral_uncanny
1	5	5.60	1
2	4	5.52	3
3	4	4.50	3
4	5	5.91	4
5	4	4.67	2
6	4	5.05	2

In the following, we are comparing the results of these three items. However, they came in the wide format, as you would use to create a correlation table. For a tidy analysis, we first make the data set long. Ratings are now classified by the item they came from. We can produce a grid histogram.

```
D_ratings <-
Raw_ratings %>%
gather(key = Item, value = rating, -Part) %>%
mascutils:::as_tbl_obs()

D_ratings
```

```
D_ratings %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = rating)) +
 facet_grid(Item ~ .) +
 geom_histogram() + xlim(0, 10)
```

The first problem is that rating scales have been designed with different end points. The first step when using different rating scales is shifting the left-end point to zero and dividing by the range of the measure (upper - lower boundary). That brings all items down to the range between zero and one. Note how the following tidy code joins in a table that holds the properties of our items.

```
D_Items <- tribble(~Item,</pre>
 ~lower, ~upper,
 1,
 "difficult_easy",
 7,
 "heavenly_hell",
 0,
 10,
 "neutral_uncanny", 1,
 5)
D_ratings <-
 D_ratings %>%
 left_join(D_Items, by = "Item") %>%
 mutate(scaled = (rating - lower)/(upper - lower))
D_ratings %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = scaled)) +
 facet_grid(Item ~ .) +
 geom_histogram(bins = 100) +
 xlim(0,1)
```

This partly corrects the horizontal shift between scales. However, the ratings on the third item still are shifted relative to the other two. The reason is that the first two items have the neutral zone right in the center, whereas the third item is neutraul at its left-end point. The second inconsistency is that the second item uses rather extreme anchors (end point labels), which produces a tight accumulation in the center of the range (with a lot of polite people in the sample, at least). The three scales have been rescaled by their nominal range, but they differ in their observed variance.

z-transformation rescales a measure by its observed variance. A set of measures is z-transformed by centering it and scaling it by its own standard deviation.

```
D_ratings %>%
 group_by(Item) %>%
 mutate(zrating = (rating - mean(rating))/sd(rating)) %>%
mascutils::z_score(rating) %>%

ggplot(aes(x = rating)) +
 facet_grid(Item ~ .) +
 geom_histogram(bins = 100)
```

By z-transformation, the three scales now exhibit the same mean location and the same dispersion. This could be used to combine them into one general score. Note however, that information is lost by this process, namely the differences in location or dispersion. If the research question is highly detailed, such as "Is the design consistently rated low on uncanniness?", this can no longer be answered from the z-transformed variable.

Finally, sometimes researchers use *logarithmic transformation* of outcome measures to reduce what they perceive as pathologies of tha data. In particular, many outcome variables do not follow a Normal distribution, as the random term of linear models assumes, but are left-skewed. Log-transformation often mitigates such problems. However, as we will see in chapter [REF GLM], linear models can be estimated gracefully with a random component that precisely matches the data as it comes. The following time-on-task data is from the IPump study, where nurses have tested two infusion pump interfaces:

```
attach(IPump)

D_pumps %>%
 mutate(logToT = log(ToT)) %>%
 select(Design, ToT, logToT) %>%
 gather(key = Measure, value = value, -Design) %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = value, color = Design)) +
```

```
facet_wrap(Measure~., scale = "free") +
geom_density()
```

```
detach(IPump)
```

Frequently, it is count measures and temporal measures to exhibit non-symmetric error distributions. By log transformation one often arrives at a reasonably Normal distributed error. However, the natural unit of te measure (seconds) gets lost by the transformation, making it very difficult to report the results in a quantitative manner.

### 5.2.2 Correlations

LRM render the quantitative relationship between two metric variables. Another commonly known statistic that seems to do something similar is Pearson's correlation statistic r (@??#associations)). In the following, we will see that a tight connection between correlation and linear coefficients exists, albeit both having their own advantages. For a demonstration, we reproduce the steps on a simulated data set where X and Y are linearly linked:

```
D_cor %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = x, y = y)) +
 geom_point() +
 geom_smooth(method = "lm", se = F)
```

Recall, that r is covariance standardized for dispersion, not unsimilar to z-transformation [REF transformations] and that a covariance is the mean squared deviance from the population mean. This is how the correlation is decontaminated from the idiosyncracies of the involved measures, their location and dispersion. Similarly, the slope parameter in a LRM is a measure of association, too. It is agnostic of the overall location of measures since this is captured by the intercept. However, dispersion remains intact. This ensures that the slope and the intercept together retain information about location, dispersion and association of data, and we can ultimately make predictions.

Still, there is a tight relationship between Pearson's r and a slope coefficient  $\beta_1$ , namely:

$$r = \beta_1 \frac{sd_X}{sd_Y}$$

For the sole purpose of demonstration, we here resort to the built-in non-Bayesian command 1m for doing the regression.

```
M_cor <- lm(y ~ x, D_cor)
beta_1 <- stats::coef(M_cor)[2]

r <- beta_1 * sd(D_cor$x) / sd(D_cor$y)
r</pre>
```

## x ## 0.66

The clue with Pearson's r is that it normalized the slope coefficient by the variation found in the sample. This resembles z-transformation as was introduced in  $\ref{loop}$ . In fact, when both, predictor and outcome, are z-transformed before estimation, the coefficient equals Pearson's r exactly:

## x\_z ## 0.66

In regression modelling the use of coefficients allows for predictions made in the original units of measurement. Correlations, in contrast, are unit-less. Still, correlation coefficients play an imortant role in exploratory data analysis (but also in multilevel models, see @??re correlations) for the following reasons:

- 1. Correlations between predictors and responses are a quick and dirty assessment of the expected associations.
- 2. Correlations between multiple response modalities (e.g., ToT and number of errors) indicate to what extent these responses can be considered exchangeable.

3. Correlations between predictors should be checked upfront to avoid problems arising from so-called collinearity [REF collinearity].

The following table shows the correlations between measures in the MMN study, where we tested the association between verbal and spatial working memory capacity (Ospan and Corsi tests and performance in a search task on a website (clicks and time).

```
attach(MMN)

MMN_2 %>%
 select(Corsi, Ospan.A, Ospan.B, time, clicks) %>%
 corrr::correlate()
```

rowname	Corsi	Ospan.A	-		
Corsi	NA	0.177			0.137
Ospan.A	0.177			0.053	
Ospan.B	0.116	0.876	NA	0.060	0.119
time	0.068	0.053	0.060	NA	0.838
clicks	0.137	0.111	0.119	0.838	NA

```
detach(MMN)
```

These correlations give an approximate picture of associations in the data:

- 1. Working memory capacity is barely related to performance.
- 2. There is a strong correlations between the performance measures.
- 3. There is a strong correlation between the two predictors Ospan.A and Ospan.B.

Linear coefficients and correlations both represent associations between measures. Coefficients preserve units of measurement, allowing us to make meaningful quantitative statements. Correlations are re-scaled by the observed dispersion of measures in the sample, making them unit-less. The advantage is that larger sets of associations can be screened at once and compared easily.

```
attach(MMN)
str(MMN_1)
```

```
Classes 'tbl_obs', 'grouped_df', 'tbl_df', 'tbl' and 'data.frame': 20 obs. of 11 va
$ Part : Factor w/ 20 levels "1","2","3","4",..: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ...
$ Corsi : num 7 9 7 7 6 5 6 7 5 7 ...
$ Ospan.A : num 38 32 19 35 10 25 26 24 22 24 ...
```

```
$ Ospan.B : num 29 20 10 23 6 17 13 12 15 12 ...
$ zCorsi : num 0.46 2.504 0.46 0.46 -0.562 ...
$ zOspan.A: num 2.089 1.245 -0.584 1.667 -1.85 ...
$ zOspan.B: num 2.487 1.092 -0.457 1.557 -1.077 ...
$ time : num 724 519 474 701 239 ...
$ clicks : num 72 31 45 35 21 43 31 36 24 24 ...
$ ltime : num 6.58 6.25 6.16 6.55 5.47 ...
$ lclicks : num 4.28 3.43 3.81 3.56 3.04 ...
- attr(*, "vars")= chr "Part" "Corsi" "Ospan.A" "Ospan.B" ...
- attr(*, "labels")='data.frame': 20 obs. of 6 variables:
 ..$ Part : Factor w/ 20 levels "1","2","3","4",..: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ...
##
##
 ..$ Corsi : num 7 9 7 7 6 5 6 7 5 7 ...
##
 ..$ Ospan.A : num 38 32 19 35 10 25 26 24 22 24 ...
##
 ..$ Ospan.B : num 29 20 10 23 6 17 13 12 15 12 ...
##
 ..$ zCorsi : num 0.46 2.504 0.46 0.46 -0.562 ...
##
 ..$ zOspan.A: num 2.089 1.245 -0.584 1.667 -1.85 ...
##
 ..- attr(*, "vars")= chr "Part" "Corsi" "Ospan.A" "Ospan.B" ...
 ..- attr(*, "drop")= logi TRUE
##
##
 - attr(*, "indices")=List of 20
##
 ..$: int 0
 ..$: int 1
##
##
 ..$: int 2
##
 ..$: int 3
 ..$: int 4
##
 ..$: int 5
##
 ..$: int 6
##
 ..$: int 7
##
 ..$: int 8
##
 ..$: int 9
##
 ..$: int 10
##
 ..$: int 11
##
 ..$: int 12
##
 ..$: int 13
##
 ..$: int 14
##
 ..$: int 15
##
 ..$: int 16
##
 ..$: int 17
##
 ..$: int 18
 ..$: int 19
- attr(*, "drop")= logi TRUE
- attr(*, "group_sizes")= int 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ...
- attr(*, "biggest_group_size")= int 1
```

#### 5.2.3 Endlessly linear

On a deeper level the bizarre age = 0 prediction is an example of a principle, that will re-occur several times throughout this book.

### In an endless universe, everything is finite.

A well understood fact about LRM is that they allow us to fit a straight line to data. A lesser regarded consequence from the mathematical underpinnings of such models is that this line extends infinitely in both directions. To fulfill this assumption, the outcome variable needs to have an infinite range, too,  $y_i \in [-\infty; \infty]$  (unless the slope is zero). Every scientifically trained person and many lay people know, that even elementary magnitudes in physics are finite: all speeds are limited to  $\approx 300.000km/s$ , the speed of light and temperature has a lower limit of -276°C (or 0K). If there can neither be endless acceleration nor cold, it would be daring to assume any psychological effect to be infinite in both directions.

The endlessly linear assumption (ELA) is a central piece of all LRMs. From a formal perspective, the ELA is always violated in a universe like ours. So, should we never ever use a linear model and move on to non-linear models right away? Pragmatically, the LRM often is a reasonably effective approximation. From figure [G\_eda\_1] we have seen that the increase is not strictly linear, but follows a more complex curved pattern. This pattern might be of interest to someone studying the psychological causes of the decline in performance. For the applied design researcher it probably suffices to summarize the monotonous relationship by the slope coefficient. In 5.4.3 we will estimate the age effects for designs A and B separately, which lets us compare fairness towards older people.

As has been said, theorists may desire a more detailed picture and see disruptions of linearity as indicators for interesting psychological processes. An uncanny example of theoretical work will be given in polynomial regression. For the rest of us, linear regression is a pragmatic choice, as long as:

- 1. the pattern is monotonically increasing
- 2. any predictions stay in the observed range and avoid the boundary regions, or beyond.

### 5.2.4 Exercises

- 1. Examine the linear parameters of model M\_age\_rtrn and derive some impossible predictions, as was done in the previous section.
- The BAB1 data set contains another outcome variable where the number of clicks was measured until the participant found the desired information.

Specify a LRM with age and examine the residual distribution. Is the Normality assumption reasonably defensible? What is the difference to home returns, despite both variables being counts?

3. Review the two figures in the first example of [GSR]. The observations are bi-modally distributed, nowhere near Gaussian. After (graphically) applying the model they are well-shaped. What does that tell you about checking residual assumptions before running the model?

## 5.3 A versus B: Comparison of groups

Another basic linear model is the *comparison of groups* (CGM), which replaces the commonly known analysis of variance (ANOVA). In design research group comparisons are all over the place, for example:

- comparing designs: as we have seen in the A/B testing scenario
- comparing groups of people, based on e.g. gender or whether they have a high school degree
- comparing situations, like whether someone uses an app on the go, or sitting still behind a computer

In order to perform a CGM, a variable is needed that establishes the groups. This is commonly called a *factor*. A factor is a variable that identifies members of groups, like "A" and "B" or "male" and "female". The groups are called *factor levels*. In the BrowsingAB case, the prominent factor is Design with its levels A and B.

Asking for differences between two (or more) designs is routine in design research. For example, it could occur during an overhaul of a municipal website. With the emerge of e-government, many municipal websites have grown wildly over a decade. What once was a lean (but not pretty) 1990 website has grown into a jungle over time, to the disadvantage for users. The BrowsingAB case could represent the prototype of a novel web design, which is developed and tested via A/B testing at 200 users. Every user is given the same task, but sees only one of the two designs. The design team is interested in: Do the two web designs A and B differ in user performance?

Again, we first take a look at the raw data:

## attach(BrowsingAB)

```
BAB1 %%
ggplot(aes(x = ToT)) +
geom_histogram() +
facet_grid(Design~.)
```

This doesn't look too striking. We might consider a slight advantage for design B, but the overlap is immense. We perform the CGM. Again, this is a two-step procedure:

- The stan\_glm command lets you specify a simple formula to express the dependency between one or more predictors (education) and an outcome variable (ToT). It performs the parameter estimation using the method of *Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo Sampling*. The results are stored in a new object M\_Design.
- With the fixef command the estimates are extracted and can be interpreted.

```
T_Design <- fixef(M_Design)
T_Design</pre>
```

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	203	194.7	212.21
${\bf DesignB}$	-15	-27.4	-3.05

#### detach(BrowsingAB)

The model contains two parameters, the first one being the *intercept*, again. How can you have a "crossing point zero", when there is no line, but just two groups? You can't. When speaking of pure factor models, like the one above or the multifactorial models of the next section, the intercept has a different meaning, it is the *mean of a reference group*. Per default, stan\_glm chooses the alphabetically first group label as the reference group, in this case design A. We can therefore say that design A has an average performance of  $203.36[194.7, 212.21]_{C195}$ .

The second parameter is the effect of "moving to design B". It is given as the difference to the reference group. With design B it took users  $15.02[27.36, 3.05]_{CI95}$  seconds less to complete the task. However, this effect appears rather small and there is huge uncertainty about it. It barely justifies the effort to replace design A with B. If the BrowsingAB data set has some exciting stories to tell, the design difference is not it.

#### 5.3.1 Not stupid: dummy variables

Are we missing anything so far? We have not yet seen the model formula. The CGM is a linear model, but this is not so apparent as it contains a factor, i.e. a non-metric variable. Linear model terms are a sum of products  $\beta_i x_i$ , but factors cannot just enter such a term. What would be the result of DesignB  $\times \beta_1$ ?

Factors basically answer the question: What group does the observation belong to?. This is a label, not a number, and cannot enter the regression formula. Dummy variables solve the dilemma by converting factor levels to numbers. A dummy variable represents only one level of a factor, by asking the simple question: Does this observation belong to group DesignB? The answer is yes/no and can be coded by a Boolean variable. For every level, a separate dummy variable is constructed to answer the simple yes/no question of membership. But, can Boolean variables enter arithmetic equations? R at least assumes that this is safe, as they can always be converted to ones and zeros using as.numeric. Routinely, we can leave the whole dummy variable business to the linear model engine. Still, it is instructive to do it yourself once.

### attach(BrowsingAB)

	Design	d_A	d_B	ToT
109	В	0	1	199
24	A	1	0	209
75	A	1	0	211
65	A	1	0	220
186		0	1	166
178	В	0	1	235
148	В	0	1	201
147	В	0	1	158

Vice versa, numbers in a logical context are always interpreted in complete reverse .

Boolean variables can be used in all contexts, including numerical and categorical. It is unfortunate that we call them dummies in such a belittling manner, as they are truly bridges between the world of categories and arithmetic. However, if preferred, they can also be called indicator variable, Boolean indicator or binary variable. They identify groups in our data set and switch on or off the effect in the linear term. For a factor G with levels A and B and zero/one-coded dummy variables d\_A and d\_B, the likelihood is written as:

$$\mu_i = d_{Ai}\beta_A + d_B\beta_{Bi}$$

When  $d_{Ai} = 1$ ,  $d_{Bi} = 0$ , the parameter  $\beta_A$  is switched on, and  $\beta_B$  is switched off. An observation of group A gets the predicted value:  $\mu_i = \beta_A$ , vice versa for members of group B. All arithmetic commands in R do an implicit typecast when encountering a Boolean variable, e.g. for sum(TRUE, FALSE, TRUE) the result is 2. In contrast, regression engines interpret Boolean variables as categorical. Therefore, dummy variables have to be passed on as explicitly numeric to the regression engine. Only when a variable truly consists of zeroes and ones, it will be interpreted as desired. This has been done that with the explicit typecast as.numeric above.

Most research deals with estimating effects as differences, and all regression engines quietly assume that what you want is a model with a reference group. When expanding the dummy variables manually, this automatism gets into the way and needs to be switched off explicitly. In R's linear models formula language, that is done by adding the term 0 + to the formula.

```
M_dummy <-
stan_glm(ToT ~ 0 + d_A + d_B,
 data = BAB1)</pre>
```

```
fixef(M_dummy)
```

fix	æf	center	lower	upper
$\overline{\mathrm{d}}_{\underline{}}$	A	203	194	213
$d_{\underline{}}$	$_{\mathrm{B}}$	188	179	197

In its predictions, the model M\_dummy is equivalent to the former model M\_design, but contains two effects that are exactly the group means. This model we call an absolute group means model (AGM).

Regression engines expand dummy variables automatically when they encounter a factor. However, when formally specifying the likelihood , dummy

variables must be made explicit. When doing an AGM on a factor  $x_1$  with 1, ..., k levels, the likelihood function becomes:

$$\mu_i = d_1 \beta_{1[1]} + \dots + d_k \beta_{1[k]}$$

In the remainder of the book, we are dealing with more complex models (e.g., multifactorial models in the next section), as well as factors with many levels (random effects in multi-level models 6). With expanded dummy variables, the likelihood can become unduly long. However, many other textbooks avoid this altogether and the model is unambiguously specified in R's regression formula language.

Up to this point, I have introduced dummy variables at the example of AGMs, where at any moment only one factor level is switched on. A more common CGMs would have a the following likelihood specification (with a factor of k levels):

$$\mu_i = \beta_0 + d_1 \beta_{1[1]} + \dots + d_k \beta_{1[k-1]}$$

For a factor with k levels in a CGM with intercept, k-1 dummy variables need to be constructed in the way shown above. As all non-reference levels are seen as difference towards the reference, the reference level is set to always on. To see that, we extract the dummy variables from the CGM on design with the standard command model.matrix. As you can see, for all observations the (Intercept) column takes the value 1, whereas level DesignB is switched on and off.

```
BAB1 %>%
 select(Part, Design, ToT) %>%
 cbind(model.matrix(M_Design)) %>% ## <---
 as_data_frame() %>%
 sample_n(8) %>%
 kable()
```

Part	Design	ТоТ	(Intercept)	DesignB
200	В	145	1	1
116	В	185	1	1
43	A	190	1	0
27	A	196	1	0
156	В	171	1	1
192	В	151	1	1
191	В	260	1	1
25	A	195	1	0

Regression engines take care of factors by automatically expanding the dummy variables under the hood. Still, by understanding the concept we gained additional flexibility in specifying factorial models. One version is to estimate an AGM, which leaves out the intercept. Of course, this can also be done right-away with the formula ToT ~ 0 + Design. Later, we will see a very practical application of AGMs, when drawing interaction plots. The second benefit is that we can specify the reference level as we want. It just depends on which dummy variable one sets to always-on. In the next section we will gain even more control over what the effects mean by setting contrasts.

detach(BrowsingAB)

### 5.3.2 Getting it sharper with contrasts [TBC]

The default behaviour of regression engines, when encountering a factor, is to select the first level as reference group and estimate all other levels relative to that. This fully makes sense if you are after the effect of a treatment, and is therefore called *treatment contrast*. Treatment contrasts do not have anything special to them. They are just a default of the regression engines, because so many people work experimentally.

Before we come to an understanding of what contrasts are, let me point out what they are not: In @ref(dummy\_variables) it was mentioned, that the AGM and CGM make exactly the same predictions (even though the formulas differ by the 0+ term). For contrasts, this holds in general. Setting contrasts never changes the predictions  $\mu_i$ . On the contrary, contrast changes what the coefficients  $\beta_i$  mean. Recall that in a CGM  $\beta_1$  has the meaning of "difference to the reference group", whereas in an AGM it is "the mean of the second group".

In the following, I will illustrate contrasts that represent two different types of questions:

- To what extent does a group deviate from the overall mean in the sample?
- With three ordered factor levels, how large is the rolling effect, i.e. from level 1 to level 2, and the average of 1 and 2 to level 3?

So, how are contrasts set? Although this is a bit odd, they are neither set by modifications to the regression formula, nor by additional command arguments. Instead, contrasts are set as attributes of the factor variable, which we can retrieve and set by the standard command contrasts. For example, the variable Education has the three levels "Low", "Middle", "High", in that exact order:

```
attach(BrowsingAB)

levels(BAB1$Education)

[1] "Low" "Middle" "High"

contrasts(BAB1$Education) %>%
 kable()
```

	Middle	High
Low	0	0
Middle	1	0
High	0	1

If you believe to have seen something similar before, you are right. Contrast tables are related to dummy variables (@ref(dummy\_variables)). The column Low is omitted in the contrasts table, due to being the reference level with an always-on intercept. In the previous section I mentioned that you can choose the reference level freely by constructing the dummy variables accordingly. However, that would mean to always bypass the regression engines dummy handling. The package forcats provides a set of commands to change the order of levels. In the following code the factor levels are reversed such that High becomes the reference group:

```
BAB1 <-
BAB1 %>%
mutate(Education_rev = forcats::fct_rev(Education)) # <--
levels(BAB1$Education_rev)</pre>
```

```
[1] "High" "Middle" "Low"
```

```
contrasts(BAB1$Education_rev) %>%
 kable()
```

	Middle	Low
High	0	0
Middle	1	0
Low	0	1

```
detach(BrowsingAB)
```

If we were running a CGM on Education\_rev, the intercept would now represent level High. Again, this model would make the very same predictions

and residuals. In that respect, it is the same model as before, only the meanings (and values) of the coefficients change and become differences to the level High.

Sometimes, it is useful to have contrasts other than treatment, as this matches the research question more closely. A plethora of contrasts is known and in the following I will introduce deviation contrasts and successive difference contrasts.

#### [Example for deviation coding]

Successive difference coding (SDC) applies when one is interested in progressive effects, such as performance gain in a number of sessions. Consider the following research situation: Shortly after the millennium, medical infusion pumps became infamous for killing people. Infusion pumps are rather simple devices that administer medication to a patients body in a controlled manner. Being widely used in surgery and intensive care, development of these devices must comply to national and international regulations. Unfortunately, the regulations of those days almost completely overlooked the human factor. While those devices would always function "as described in the user manual", they contained all kinds of severe violations of user-interface design rules. Just to name few: foil switches with poor haptic feedback, flimsy alphanumeric LCD screenlets and a whole bunch of modes. Imagine a medical devices company has partnered with some renowned research institute to develop the infusion pump of the future. Users got interviewed and observed, guidelines were consulted, prototypes developed, tested and improved. At the end of the process the design was implemented as an interactive simulation. In the meantime, national agencies had reacted as well and regulations now demand a routine user-oriented development cycle. One of the new rules says: "the design must undergo validation testing with trained users".

That means you have to first introduce and train your users to get fluent with the device, then test them. We [REF] thought that the training process itself is of immense importance. Why not test it then already? In the real study we tested everyone three times and traced individual progress. This requires a repeated measures analysis and we are not quite there yet [see LMM].

### [TODO:

- simulate IPump case, non-repeated
- demonstrate succ diff contr
- find example for deviation contrasts
- Contrasts extend the idea of dummy variables.
- Dummy variables become continuous, thereby more flexible in their effects

]

## 5.3.3 Sharper on the fly: derived quantities [TBD]

Contrasts are classic in aligning regression estimates with research questions that explore differences. With two groups A and B the following hypotheses of difference can be formed:

A - 0

B - 0

A - B

#### 5.3.4 Exercises

- 1. The simulate function in case environment Browsing AB lets you change the residual error (in standard deviations). Simulate three data sets with different residual variance, and estimate them by the same model. See how the uncertainties of effects behave.
- 2. With BrowsingAB, simulate several data sets of very small sample size. Observe how strongly the composition of education and age varies.
- BAB1 contains the variable Education, which separates the participants by three education levels (Low, Middle, High). Construct the dummy variables and run an AGM.
- 4. Specify the expanded CGM likelihood for education. Construct the dummy variables and run a regression.
- 5. Consider you wanted to use education level High as reference group. Create dummy variables accordingly and run the regression.

# 5.4 Putting it all together: multi predictor models

Design researchers are often forced to obtain their data under rather wild conditions. Users of municipal websites, consumer products, enterprise information systems and cars can be extremely diverse. At the same time, Designs vary in many attributes, affecting the user in many different ways. There are many variables in the game, and even more possible relations. With *multi predictor models* we can examine the simultaneous influence of everything we have recorded. First, we will see, how to use models with two or more continuous predictors. Subsequently, we address the case of multi-factorial designs. Finally, we will see examples of models, where continuous predictors and factors peacefully co-reside.

#### 5.4.1 On surface: multiple regression models

Productivity software, like word processors, presentation and calculation software or graphics programs have evolved over decades. For every new release, dozens of developers have worked hard to make the handling more efficient and the user experience more pleasant. Consider a program for drawing illustrations: basic functionality, such as drawing lines, selecting objects, moving or colourizing them, have practically always been there. A user wanting to draw six rectangles, painting them red and arranging them in a grid pattern, can readily do that using basic functionality. At a certain point of system evolution, it may have been recognized that this is what users routinely do: creating a grid of alike objects. With the basic functions this is rather repetitive and a new function was created, called "copy-and-arrange". Users may now create a single object, specify rows and columns of the grid and give it a run.

The new function saves time and leads to better results. Users should be very excited about the new feature, should they not? Not quite, as [Carroll in Rosson] made a very troubling observation: adding functionality for the good of efficiency may turn out ineffective in practice, as users have a strong tendency to stick with their old routines, ignoring new functionality right away. This troubling observation has been called the *active user paradox* (AUP).

Do all users behave that way? Or can we find users of certain traits that are different? What type of person would be less likely to fall for the AUP? And how can we measure resistance towards the AUP? We did a study, where we explored the impact of two user traits need-for-cognition (ncs) and geekism (gex) on AUP resistance. To measure AUP resistance we observed users while they were doing drawing tasks. A moderately complex behavioural coding system was used to derive an individual AUP resistance score. Are users with high need-for-cognition and geekism more explorative and resistant to the AUP?

As we will see later, it is preferable to build a model with two simultaneous predictors. For instructive purposes we begin with two separate LRMs, one for each predictor. Throughout the regression models we use z-transformed scores. Neither the personality nor the resistance scores have a natural interpretation, so nothing is lost in translation.

$$\mu_i = \beta_0 + \beta_{\rm ncs} x_{\rm ncs} \mu_i = \beta_0 + \beta_{\rm gex} x_{\rm gex}$$

```
attach(AUP)
M_1 <-
 AUP_1 %>%
 stan_glm(zresistance ~ zncs, data = .)
```

```
M_2 <-
 AUP_1 %>%
 stan_glm(zresistance ~ zgex, data = .)
detach(AUP)
```

@ref(tab:AUP\_coef) shows the two separate effects (M\_1 and M\_2). Due to the z-transformation of predictors, the intercepts are practically zero. Both personality scores seem to have a weakly positive impact on AUP resistance.

Next, we estimate a model that regards both predictors simultaneously. For linear models, that requires nothing more than to make a sum of all involved predictor terms (and the intercept). The result is a multiple regression model (MRM):

$$\mu_i = \beta_0 + \beta_{\rm ncs} x_{\rm ncs} + \beta_{\rm gex} x_{\rm gex}$$

In R's regression formula language, this is similarly straight-forward. The + operator directly corresponds with the + in the likelihood formula.

```
attach(AUP)
M_3 <-
 AUP_1 %>%
 stan_glm(zresistance ~ zncs + zgex, data = .) #<--
detach(AUP)</pre>
```

For the comparison of the three models we make use of a feature of the package bayr: the posterior distributions of arbitrary models can be combined into one multi-model posterior object, by just stacking them upon each other. The coefficient table of such a multi-model posterior gains an additional column that identifies the model:

model	fixef	center	lower	upper
M_1	Intercept	0.005	-0.308	0.306
$M_{\perp}1$	zncs	0.377	0.054	0.699
$M_2$	Intercept	-0.004	-0.312	0.311
$M_2$	zgex	0.298	-0.029	0.605
$M_3$	${\bf Intercept}$	0.001	-0.306	0.317
$M_3$	zncs	0.300	-0.090	0.686
$M_3$	zgex	0.121	-0.273	0.508

The intercepts of all three models are practically zero, which is a consequence of the z-transformation. Recall, that the intercept in an LRM is the predicted value, when the predictor is zero. In MRM this is just the same: here, the intercept is the predicted AUP resistance score, for when NCS and GEX are both zero.

When using the two predictors simultaneously, the overall positive tendency remains. However, we observe major and minor shifts: in the MRM, the strength of the geekism score is reduced to less than half:  $0.12[-0.27, 0.51]_{CI95}$ . NCS has shifted, too, but lost only little of its original strength:  $0.3[-0.09, 0.69]_{CI95}$ .

For any researcher who has carefully conceived a research question this appears to be a disappointing outcome. In fact, there is a reason for the loss of strength and ignoring this issue will mislead the interpretation of results.

The reason is that the two *predictors are correlated*. In this study, participants who are high on NCS also tend to have more pronounced geekism. @ref(AUP\_corr\_predictors) reveals the situation:

```
detach(AUP)
```

Participants with a higher NCS also tend to score higher on geekism. Is that surprising? Actually, it is not. People high on NCS love to think. Computers

are a good choice for them, because these are complicated devices that make you think. (Many users may even agree that computers help you think, for example when analyzing your data with R.) In turn, geekism is a positive attitude towards working with computers in sophisticated ways, which means such people are more resistant towards the AUP.

[NCS: love to think] -> [GEX: love computers] -> [resist AUP]

When such a causal chain can be established, some researchers speak of a mediating variable GEX. Although a bit outdated [REF], mediator analysis is correct when the causal direction of the three variables is known. Then, a so-called step-wise regression is performed to find the pure effects. (A better alternative is structural equation modelling, SEM).

Unfortunately, in the situation here, the causal direction is partly ambiguous. We can exclude that the resistance test has influenced the personality scores, because of the order of apperance in the study. But, causally speaking, geekism may well preced NCS. For example, computers reward you for thinking hard and, hence, you get used to it and make it your lifestyle. If you like thinking hard, then you probably also like the challenge that was given in the experiment.

[GEX: love computers] -> [NCS: love to think] -> [resist AUP]

In the current case, we can not distinguish between these two competing theories with this data alone. This is a central problem in empirical research. An example, routinely re-iterated in social science methods courses is the observation that people who are more intelligent tend to consume more fresh vegetables. Do carrots make us smart? Perhaps, but it is equally plausible that eating carrots is what smart people do.

The issue is that a particular direction of causality can only be established, when all reverse directions can be excluded. Behavioural science researchers know of only two ways to do so:

- 1. By the *arrow of time*, it is excluded that a later event caused a preceding one. In the AUP study, there is no doubt that filling out the two personality questionnaires cause the behaviour in the computer task, because of the temporal order.
- 2. In *strictly controlled experiments*, participants are assigned to the conditions, randomly. That has (virtually) happened in the BrowsingAB case, which gives it an unambiguous causal direction. This was not so, if participants had been allowed to choose themselves which design to test.

To come back to the AUP study: There is no way to establish a causal order of predictors. The correct procedure is to regard the predictors simultaneously (not step-wise), as in model M\_3. This results in a redistribution of the overall covariance and the predictors are *mutually controlled*. In M\_2 the effect of

GEX was promising at first, but then became spurious in the simultaneous model. Most of the strength was just borrowed from NCS by covariation. The model suggests that loving-to-think has a considerably stronger association with AUP resistance than loving-computers.

That may suggest, but not prove, that geekism precedes NCS, as in a chain of causal effects, elements that are closer to the final outcome (AUP resistance) tend to exert more salient influence. But, without further theorizing and experimenting this is weak evidence of causal order.

The readers of a paper on geekism, NCS and the AUP will probably be more impressed by the (still moderate) effects in the separate models we had run, initially. The reason why one should not do that is that separate analyses suggest that the predictors are independent. To illustrate this at an extreme example, think of a study where users were asked to rate their agreement with an interface by the following two questions, before ToT is recorded:

- 1. Is the interface beautiful?
- 2. Does the interface have an aesthetic appearance?

Initial separate analyses show strong effects for both predictors. Still, it would not make sense to give the report the title: "Beauty and aesthetics predict usability". Beauty and aesthetics are practically synonyms. For Gex and NCS this may be not so clear, but we cannot exclude the possibility that they are linked to a common factor, perhaps a third trait that makes people more explorative, no matter whether it be thoughts or computers.

So, what to do if two predictors correlate strongly? First, we always report just a single model. Per default, this is the model with both predictors simultaneously. The second possibility is to use a disciplined method of model selection @ref(model\_selection) and remove the predictor (or predictors) that does not actually contribute to prediction. The third possibility is, that the results with both predictors become more interesting when including interaction effects @ref(interaction\_effects)

## 5.4.2 Crossover: multifactorial models [TBC]

The only necessary precondition for statistical control is that you recorded the influencing variable. This has happened in the BrowsingAB study: the primary research question regarded the design difference, but the careful researcher also recorded the gender of participants.

What happened to the likelihood function when we moved from GMM to CGM and LRM? The effect of age was simply added to the intercept. For a model on education level effects, we expanded the dummy variables and then added them all up. Indeed, the linear model is defined as a succession of

linear terms  $x_i\beta_i$  and nothing keeps us from adding further predictors to the model. Seeing is believing! The following code estimates a model with design and gender as predictors.

```
attach(BrowsingAB)
M_mpm_1 < -
 BAB1 %>%
 stan_glm(ToT ~ Design + Gender, data = .)
T_fixef_mpm_1 <- fixef(M_mpm_1)</pre>
T fixef mpm 1
```

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	203.349	191.9	215.10
DesignB	-15.050	-27.8	-2.68
$\operatorname{GenderM}$	0.196	-12.8	12.71

By adding gender to the model, both effects are estimated simultaneously. In a factorial multiple predictor model (MPM) the intercept is a reference group, too. Consider that both factors have two levels, forming a  $2x^2$  design with groups: A-F, A-M, B-F, B-M. The first one, A-F, has been set as reference group. Women in condition A have an average ToT of  $203.35[191.94, 215.1]_{CI95}$ seconds. The other two fixed effects are, once again, differences to the reference. It is neither the case that gender effects performance much, nor does the design effect really change, compared to the CGM.

[likelihood][interaction plot]

#### 5.4.3 Line-by-line: regression in groups [TBC]

Recall, that dummy variables make factors compatible with linear regression. Thus, no barriers are left for combining factors and continuous predictors in one model. For example, we can estimate the effects age and design simultaneously:

```
M_mpm_2 < -
 BAB1 %>%
 stan_glm(ToT ~ Design + age_shft, data = .)
```

```
T_fixef_mpm_2 <- fixef(M_mpm_2)
T_fixef_mpm_2</pre>
```

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	184.208	169.940	198.79
DesignB	-14.981	-27.804	-2.14
$age\_shft$	0.648	0.254	1.03

#### detach(BrowsingAB)

Once again, we get an intercept first. Recall, that in LRM the intercept is the the performance of a 20-year old (age shifted). In the GCM it was the mean of the reference group. When marrying factors with continuous predictors, the intercept is point zero in the reference group. The predicted average performance of 20-year old with design A is  $184.21[169.94, 198.79]_{CI95}$ . The age effect has the usual meaning: by year of life, participants get  $0.65[0.25, 1.03]_{CI95}$  seconds slower. The factorial effect B is a vertical shift of the intercept. A 20-year old in condition B is  $14.98[27.8, 2.14]_{CI95}$  seconds faster. In fact, this holds for all ages, as can be seen in the following figure. The model implies that the age affect is the same for both designs, which is not true, as we will see later.

[likelihood][interaction plot]

## 5.4.4 Posterior predictions [TBC]

Up to this point, we have solely interpreted coefficient tables. Very often, the research question is how strong the response variable is associated with a certain condition (i.e., the "independent" variable). This strength of an effect is what the coefficient table tells.

Another way to look at the model is how well it fits the observations. In Bayesian regression models, *posterior predictions* are a simple, yet powerful concept to compare the fitted model with the original data. As [McElreath] points out, one should rather call them *retrodictions*, because they regard the real data one has, not the future. In yet another perspective they are *idealized responses* and as such address both, present and future.

A more formal understanding of predicted values can be gained by

Remember that all statistical model assume that an observed value is somehow composed of a systematic (or structural) component and the error. All linear models assume that any observed value is a sum of a structural term and the error. That becomes most apparent, when writing a linear model in a slightly different form:

$$y_i = \mu_i + \epsilon_i \mu_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_i \epsilon_i \sim N(0, \sigma)$$

The first line of the formula does the separation: by estimation,  $\mu_i$  will become what the model thinks is the structural part, the one that is associated with the predictor  $x_i$ , which is stated in the second line.  $\epsilon_i$  is the error, the part that does not repeat. The error is not assumed to run completely wild, but should take the form of a zero-centered Normal distribution, as is given in the third line. This is also called the *residual distribution* and, in contrast to the response distribution, it has a fixed location at zero.

## attach(BrowsingAB)

In the BrowsingAB case, we have repeatedly recorded age of participant. The LRM M\_age\_shft found that with every unit of age, average ToT increased by 0.645 seconds. If we now ask: what is predicted for a person of age 45? We get the predicted value  $\mu_i$ :

$$\mu_{aqe=45} = 176.688 + 0.645 * 45 = 205.707$$

This predicted value is our best guess of how a person of age 45 would perform. But, the separation of an observation into predicted value and error remains just that: a guess under a certain amount of information. Like coefficients, predicted values are uncertain to some degree, but we are setting this aside for the moment. What we know for sure is the *observed value*.

At any moment can we compute predicted values from coefficients using the full model formula, as seen above. A more convenient way is to use the standard command predict on the model object (the shifted model from chapter [REF LRM]). The package bayr provides a tidy version of predict() that provides the best guess for all observations, as well as 95% credibility intervals.

Obs	center	lower	upper
116	211	120.4	302
125	182	91.5	273
137	182	88.1	270
149	213	120.7	304
159	196	102.4	283

For most analysis based on predicted values, it is useful to just add the predictions of a model to the original data. (Of course, it is crucial at this step, that the order of data has not been altered.)

```
BAB1 <- BAB1 %>%
 mutate(M_age_shft = T_pred_age_shft$center)
```

Now we can extract predicted values for certain conditions, say all participants of age 45. What differs is the observed value, as this contains the influence of all random sources at the time of measuring. We will return to residuals in the next section.

```
BAB1 %>%
select(age, ToT, M_age_shft) %>%
filter(age == 45)
```

ТоТ	$M_age_shft$
153	194
168	192
120	193
175	192
	153 168 120

Apparently, the model is strongly biased. It predicts too long ToT for all the 45 year olds (In chapter [REF Interaction effects]) we will find out why this is so. Interestingly, the four cases also do not get the same predictions. On closer examination we observe that the lower the observation, the lower the predicted value. What happens here is related to the third term of the model specification. The error  $\epsilon_i$  is not completely unconstrained, but follows the Normal distribution shape. This shape implies that extreme errors are less likely to occur. That is what the model is adjusting for. Most noticable on the third case in the table above, the estimation rather takes a slightly lower predicted value, than a too extreme error. We will return to this mechanism in chapter [REF shrinkage].

Routinely, models are assessed by looking at how well the predicted pattern fits the observed response distribution. Note how the line geometry alters initial aesthetic mapping of the y axis (y = ToT). Here the second geometry maps the y axis to the predicted values. In this context, mapping an aesthetic to constant strings produces the legend (color = "observed").

```
BAB1 %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = age, y = ToT)) +
 geom_point(aes(col = "observed")) +
 geom_smooth(aes(y = M_age_shft, col = "M_age_shft"))
```

The prediction line is rather flat, indicating a small total effect of age. Observations are scattered wildly around the prediction line, which brings us to the next topic: residual analysis.

detach(BrowsingAB)

### 5.4.5 Residual analysis

Recall the first and third line of the LRM model formula above. The residuals  $\epsilon_i$  is what you get  $y_i - \mu_i$ . The assumptions of linear models regarding these residuals are

- to take the shape of a zero-centered Normal distribution
- with a constant variance

The main purpose of residual analysis is to examine these two assumptions.

#### 5.4.5.1 Normal distribution

So far, we have seen two linear models, the GMM and the LRM. They only differ in how they sketch the relation between predictor variables and predicted values. In the remainder of this chapter on linear models, we will encounter a few more building blocks for the likelihood part and these will allow us to specify a wealth of complex models. However, the random term will stoically stay the same:

$$y_i \sim N(\mu_i, \sigma_\epsilon)$$

In words, the random term says: observed values  $y_i$  are drawn from a Normal distribution with the predicted value  $\mu_i$  as mean and a fixed standard deviation  $\sigma_{\epsilon}$ . As we have seen in 3.3.2, Normal distributions are one pattern of randomness among many and this choice may therefore be appropriate, or not. One heuristic that may justify this choice is that the observed values are located rather in the center of the scale of measurement. That is certainly much better, than to blindly stick to the normal random pattern just for convenience. Even better is to check the assumption of normally distributed randomness. In the following, we will examine the underlying assumptions closer and apply graphical techniques for verification. Before we delve more into depth, I would like to contrast the overall tenor in this section (and [MODEL]) to the workflow frequently encountered in classic statistics. Boldly speaking, classicically trained researchers often seem to imply, that such assumptions needed to be

checked beforehand. In the process called assumption checking, arcane non-parametric tests are carried out, before the researcher actually dares to hit the button labelled as RUN ANOVA. As we will see now, the order of actions is just the other way round. In the workflow called model criticism, we start by contemplating what may be a reasonable model, using heuristics or even past data. Then the model is immediatly executed and the estimated model itself undergoes a routine checkup. In linear models, verifying the random pattern assumptions grounds on extracting the estimated residuals from the model object and is hence called residual analysis.

In the notation displayed above, there are possibly as many distributions as there are observed values (due the subscript in  $\mu_i$ ). It appears impossible to evaluate not just one distribution, but this many. However, an equivalent notation is routinely used for linear models, that specifies just one *residual distribution*. For the LRM that is:

$$\mu_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 y_i = \mu_i + \epsilon_i \epsilon_i \sim N(0, \sigma_{\epsilon})$$

In this notation, observed values  $y_i$  are decomposed into predicted values and individual residuals  $\epsilon_i$ . These are frequently called errors, hence the greek symbol  $\epsilon$ . The standard deviation of residuals  $\sigma_{\epsilon}$  is commonly called the  $standard\ error$ . The random pattern of the model can now be expressed as a single Normal distribution. The reason why I do not use this notation routinely, is that it only works for linear models, but not for models with other random patterns. More specifically, Generalized Linear Models @ref(generalized\_linear\_models) cannot be specified that way. But, for the purpose of residual analysis, it appears more intuitive.

The first assumption of randomness underlying the linear model simply is that the distribution follows a normal distribution. Visually, normal distributions is characterized by:

- one curved peak (unimodality)
- from which density smoothly declines towards both ends (smoothness)
- at same rates (symmetry)

For a rough evaluation of this assumption, it suffices to extract the residuals from the model at hand and plot it as a distribution. The residuals command returns a vector of residual values, exactly one per observation. With the vector of residuals at hand, we can evaluate this assumption by comparing the residual distribution to its theoretically expected form, a perfect bell curve. The following command chain extracts the residuals from the model and pipes them into the ggplot engine to create a histogram. With stat\_function an overlay is created with the theoretical normal distribution, which is centered at zero. The standard error  $\sigma_{\epsilon}$  has been estimated alongside the coefficients and is extracted using the function bayr::coef.

G\_resid\_age\_shft

# 

The match of residual distribution with the theoretical distribution is not perfect, but overall this model seems to sufficiently satisfy the normality assumption. To give a counter example, we estimate the same model using the outcome variable returns, which captures the number of times a participant had (desparately) returned to the homepage.

```
M_age_rtrn <-
 stan_glm(returns ~ 1 + age_shft, data = BAB1)
P_age_rtrn <- posterior(M_age_rtrn)</pre>
```

```
T_age_rtrn <- coef(P_age_rtrn)
T_age_rtrn</pre>
```

parameter	type fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	fixef Intercept	2.563	1.99	3.099
$age\_shft$	$fixef \ age\_shft$			
$sigma\_resid$	disp NA	1.875	1.71	2.073

```
C_age_rtrn_disp <-
 T_age_rtrn %>%
 filter(type == "disp") %>%
 select(center) %>%
 as.numeric()

G_resid_age_rtrn <-
 data_frame(resid = residuals(M_age_rtrn)) %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = resid)) +
```

```
detach(BrowsingAB)
```

The estimation produces the usual coefficients, as well as a standard error. However, the residuals do not even remotely resemble the theoretical curve. While it is unimodal, it appears rather asymmetric, with a steep rise to the left and a long tail to the right. That is a typical outcome when count measures get too close to the left boundary. How about unimodality? We have not discussed any multimodal theoretical distributions in 3.3.2, but one has been displayed in @ref(first\_program). In brief, a bimodal residual distribution can arise, when two groups exist in the data, which lay far apart. The following code illustrates the situation by simulating a simple data set with two groups, that is fed into a GMM.

```
attach(Chapter_LM)
```

```
set.seed(42)
D_bimod <-
bind_rows(
 data_frame(Group = "A", y = rnorm(50, 4, 1)),
 data_frame(Group = "B", y = rnorm(50, 8, 1))
)</pre>
```

```
M_bimod <- stan_glm(y ~ 1, data = D_bimod, iter = 200)</pre>
```

```
D_bimod %>%
 mutate(resid = residuals(M_1)) %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = resid)) +
 geom_density()
```

These two deviations from normal distribution have very different causes: asymmetry is caused by scales with boundaries. This is an often arising situation and it is gracefully solved by Generalized Linear Models 7. This is a

family of models, where each member covers a certain type of measurement scale. In the above example, Poisson regression, applies, taking care of count measures. Multimodality is caused by heterogeneous groups in the data, like experimental conditions, design or type of user. For a grouping structure to cause distinguished multimodality, differences between groups have to be pronounced in relation to the standard error. It is often the case, that these variables are controlled conditions, such as in an AB test. It is also quite likely that strong grouping structures can be thought of beforehand and be recorded. For example, in usability tests with diverse user samples, it almost comes natural to distinguish between users who have used the design before and those who did not. If the grouping variable is recorded, the solution is group comparison models 5.3, already introduced.

Visual assessment of symmetry and unimodality is simple and effective in many cases. But, normal distributions are not the only ones to have these properties. At least logistic distributions and t distributions have these, too, with subtle differences in curvature. Normal and t distributions differ in how quickly probability drops in the tails. Normal distributions drop much faster, meaning that extreme events are practically impossible. With t-distributions, extreme values drop in probability, too, but the possibility of catastrophies (or wonders) stays substantial for a long time.

Provided one has a small abundance of data, quantile-quantile (qq) plots can be used to evaluate subtle deviations in curvature (and symmetry and unimodality). In qq plots, the observed and theoretical distributions are both flattened and put against each other. This is a powerful and concise method, but it is a bit hard to grasp. The following code illustrates the construction of a qq-plot that compares GMM residuals of a t-distributed measure against the normal distribution. We simulate t-distributed data, run a GMM and extract residuals, as well as the standard error  $\sigma_{\epsilon}$ .

```
set.seed(2)
D_t <- data_frame(y = rt(200, 2))

M_t <- stan_glm(y ~1, data = D_t, iter = 200)</pre>
```

We obtain the following residual and theoretical distributions. It is approximately symmetric and unimodal, but the curvature seems to be a bit off.

```
D_t <- mutate(D_t, resid = residuals(M_t))

C_sigma <- rstanarm::sigma(M_t)

D_t %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = resid)) +
```

The next step is where the two curves get flattened. First, we compute a sequence of quantiles with fixed steps, say 1%, 2%, ... 99%%. Finally, theoretical and observed quantiles are fed into a scatterplot.

In the ideal case, they match perfectly and the quantiles are on a straight line. Instead, we see a rotated sigmoid shape and this is typical for fat-tailed distributions such as t. The shape is symmetric with turning points at around -4 and 4 on the theoretical scale. In the middle part the relation is almost linear, however, not matching a 1-by-1. The t distribution loses probability mass rather quickly when moving from the center to the turning points. From these points on the theoretical quantiles start to lag behind. The lower and upper 1% sampled quantiles go to much more extreme values, ranging from -10 to almost 20, whereas the Normal distribution renders such events practically impossible. Generally, a rotated sigmoid shape is typical for fat tailed distributions. The problem of misusing a Normal distribution is that it dramatically underestimates extreme events. Have you ever asked yourself, why in the 1990s, the risk for a nuclear meltdown were estimated to be one in 10.000 years, in face of two such tragic events in the past 40 years? Perhaps, researchers used the Normal distribution for the risk models, under-estimating the risk of extreme events.

The ggplot engine provides an easy to use geometry for qqlots, which lets us further explore deviant patterns. Variables with t distribution take an inverse-sigmoid shape due to their fat tails.

```
D_t %>%
 ggplot(aes(sample = resid)) +
 geom_qq(distribution = qnorm) +
 geom_abline(intercept = 0, slope = 1, col = "red")
```

```
detach(Chapter_LM)
```

Once mastered, the qq-plot is the swiss knife of Normality check. Next to the subtleties, we can also easily discover deviations from symmetry. This is how the residuals of the returns-to-homepage model look like:

```
data_frame(resid = residuals(BrowsingAB$M_age_rtrn)) %>%
ggplot(aes(sample = resid)) +
geom_qq(distribution = qnorm) +
geom_abline(intercept = 0, slope = 1, col = "red")
```

To the left, extreme values have a lower probability than predicted by the Normal distribution, but the right tail is much fatter, once again. We also see how residuals are clumped, which is characteristic for discrete (as compared to continuous) outcome measures. This is poor behaviour of the model and, generally, when a model is severely mis-specified, neither predictions nor estimates, nor certainty statements can be fully trusted. A model that frequently fits in case of count numbers is Poisson regression, which will enter the stage in chapter @ref(poisson\_regression).

## 5.4.5.2 Constant variance

In @ref(resid\_normality), we assessed one assumption that underlies all linear models, namely Normal distribution of residuals. The second assumption underlying the linear model random (or residual) is that residual variance is constant throughout the whole range. In both classic and modern notation, this stems from the fact that there is just a single  $\sigma_{\epsilon}$  defined. However large  $\mu_i$  is, the dispersion of residuals is not supposed to change.

Before we dive into the matter of checking the assumption, let's do a brief reality check using common sense:

1. Consider people's daily commute to work. Suppose you ask a few persons you know: "What is your typical way to work and what is the longest

and the shortest duration you remember?". In statistical terms, you are asking for a center estimate and (informal) error dispersion. Is it plausible that a person with typical travel time of 5 minutes experienced the same variation as another person with a typical time of 50 minutes?

2. Consider an experiment to assess a typing training. Is it plausible that the dispersion of typing errors before the training is the same as after the training?

In both cases, we would rather not expect constant variance and it is actually quite difficult to think of a process, where a strong change in average performance is not associated with a change in dispersion. The constant variance assumption, like the normality assumption is a usual suspect when approximating with linear models. We will come back to that down below.

In a similar way, we can ask: can it be taken for granted that residual variance is constant when comparing two or more groups? Would you blindly assume that two rather different designs produce the same amount of spread around the average? It may be so, but one can easily think of reasons, why this might be different. We check the situation in the CGM of the BrowsingAB study. Do both design conditions have the same residual variance? Again, we extract the residuals, add them to the data set and produce a boxplot by Design condition:

```
attach(BrowsingAB)
```

```
BAB1 %>%
 mutate(resid_Design = residuals(M_Design)) %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = Design, y = resid_Design)) +
 geom_boxplot()
```

Both sets of residuals are reasonably symmetric, but it appears that design B produces more widely spread residuals. Something in the design causes individual performance to vary stronger from the population mean. The cause of this effect will be disclosed in @ref(differential\_design\_effects). (In essence, design B is rather efficient to use for younger users, whereas older users seem to have severe issues.)

Visual checks of constant variance for factors is straight forward using common boxplots. For continuous predictors, such as age, requires a more uncommon graphical representation known as *quantile plots*. These are not the same as qq plots, but luckily are included with ggplot.

```
BAB1 %>%
 mutate(resid_age = residuals(M_age)) %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = age, y = resid_age)) +
 geom_point() +
 geom_quantile()
```

The quantile plot uses a smoothing algorithm (probably not unlike LOESS) to picture the trend of quantiles (25%, 50% and 75%). Here, the quantiles run almost horizontal and parallel, which confirms constant variance. Taking this as a starting point, we can evaluate more complex models, too. The MPM on age and design, just requires to create a grouped quantile plot. This looks best using facetting, rather than separating by colour:

```
BAB1 %>%
 mutate(resid_mpm_2 = residuals(M_mpm_2)) %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = age_shft, y = resid_mpm_2)) +
 facet_grid(~Design) +
 geom_point() +
 geom_quantile()
```

This looks rather worrying. Especially with Design A, the residuals are not constant, but increase with age. In addition, we observe that residuals are not even centered at zero across the whole range. For design A, the residual distribution moves from positive centered to negative centered, design B vice versa. That also casts doubts on the validity of the LRM on age: these contrariwise trends seem to mix into an unsuspicious even distribution. It seems that a lot more has been going on in this study, than would be captured by any of these models.

```
detach(BrowsingAB)
```

Another model type we may want to check with quantile plots is the MRM. With two continuous predictors, one might be tempted to think of a 3-dimensional quantile plot, but this is not recommended. Rather, we can use a generalization of quantile plots, where the x-axis is not mapped to the predictor directly, but the predicted values  $\mu_i$ . We assess the residual variance on the MRM model on the AUP study, where resistance to fall for the active user paradox has been predicted by geekism tendencies (gex) and need-forcognition (ncs):

#### attach(AUP)

We observe a clear trend in quantiles, with residual dispersion increasing with predicted values. Generally, plotting residuals against predicted values can be done with any model, irrespectively of the number and types of predictors. However, interpretation is more limited than when plotting them against predictors directly. In fact, interpretation boils down to the intuition we introduced at the beginning of the section, that larger outcomes typically have larger dispersion. This is almost always a compelling assumption, or even a matter of underlying physics and, once again, a linear model may or may not be a reasonable approximation. Fortunately, when we turn towards @ref(generalized\_linear\_models), we will find that these models provide more reasonable defaults for the relationship between predicted values and dispersion. In contrast, residual variance per predictor allows to discover more surprising issues, such as interaction effects or heterogeneity in groups.

```
detach(AUP)
```

## 5.4.5.3 Assessing predictive power

```
attach(BrowsingAB)
```

When residuals are pronounced, predictions are inaccurate, which is undesirable. A model that reduces the residuals, may provide better predictions. In the current case, we may wonder: does the age predictor effectively reduce the residual standard error  $\sigma_{\epsilon}$  as compared to the GMM? We fit the GMM for comparison purposes and compare the standard error. This does not look convincing, as the reduction is marginal.

```
M_0 <-
BAB1 %>%
stan_glm(ToT ~ 1, data = .)
```

```
bind_rows(
 posterior(M_0),
 posterior(M_age_cntr)) %>%
 coef(type = "disp")
```

model	center	lower	upper
M_0	46.1	42.0	51.2
$M\_age\_cntr$	45.2	41.1	49.9

Does the age variable really have that little predictive value? The following graph shows the individual residuals for both models as a column plot. The two caterpillars have about the same overall width and there is no noticable reduction in residual magnitude by adding the age predictor.

```
T_resid <-
BAB1 %>%
select(Obs, age) %>%
mutate(
 M_0 = residuals(M_0),
 M_age = residuals(M_age))

G_resid_age_1 <-
 T_resid %>%
mutate(Obs_ordered = min_rank(age)) %>%
gather(model, error, -Obs, -Obs_ordered, -age) %>%
ggplot(aes(x = Obs, y = error)) +
facet_grid(~model) +
geom_col(position = "dodge") +
geom_quantile()
G_resid_age_1
```

When adding a predictor to a model, the least one would expect is a noticable reduction in error and @ref(BAB1\_resid\_age\_1) confirms that the age predictor is pretty useless.

```
detach(BrowsingAB)
```

## 5.4.6 How to plot MPM? [TBC, move to Interaction effects]

Now that we have seen how we can compare based on one factor, we can extend the CGM to more factors. With linear models, we can extend the basic CGM to incorporate multiple of such factors. This is called *multifactorial models* (MFM).

Now, we are looking at a slightly more complicated situation, where browsing is predicted by design and education level of participants at the same time.

First, with the *ggplot* system, we plot the new situation. Recall that with *ggplot* you can

- 1. map variables in the data set to elemental properties in the plot, such as: x position, y position, colour, shape etc.
- select an appropriate geometry that carries such properties, e.g. points, bars, box plots.

Now we can do the two-factorial ANOVA in much the same way as before. We only have to add the predictor *Education* to the model formula, then we run the MCMC estimation and get the estimates.

[Interaction plots with groups, IA plots with standard debs, mixed IA plots, using the AMM]

#### 5.4.7 Empirical versus statistical control

Fundamental researchers have a knack for the experimental method. An experiment, strictly, is a study where you measure the effects of variables you manipulate. Manipulation is, almost literally, that it is in your hands, who receives the treatment. The fantastic thing about manipulation is that it allows for causal conclusions. A strictly controlled experiment is when all influencing variables are either manipulated or kept constant. That is an ideal and would not even be the case if you test the same person over-and-over again (like researchers in psychophysics often do). You never jump into the same river twice.

Sometimes an influencing variable lends itself to be kept constant. For example, in cognitive psychological experiments environment and equipment is usually kept constant. For applied research, keeping things constant comes at a major disadvantage: it limits the possible conclusions drawn from the study. Imagine, you tested a smartphone app with participants, all students, comfortably sitting in a quiet environment. Would you dare to make conclusions on how any users perform in real life situations, say while driving a car? When keeping things constant, ecological validity and generalizability suffer.

In most applied design studies we need ecological validity and generalizability. If performance differs under certain conditions, you certainly want to know that. The solution is to *let conditions vary and record them* as variables, as good as possible. For example, if you were to compare two voice-controlled

intelligent agent apps, you could manipulate the ambient noise level, if you are in the lab.

In practically all applied studies, variables may exist which you cannot manipulate. Especially, user traits are impossible to manipulate; If someone has an extrovert character or did a lot of gaming in the past, you cannot change that. Diversity of users is a fact and people come as they are.

Field studies usually aim for high ecological validity. Participants are supposed to use the system in the situations they encounter. If a smartphone app is being used sitting, walking, driving or at a secret place, it is crucial to observe all situations. Consider a car navigation system that is tested in a long, lonely highway situation only. How much would the results tell your for performance in dense city traffic? Design researchers frequently need results that are highly representative for various users and situations of use.

Fundamental lab researchers are afraid of individual differences, too. The reasons are different, though: all non-manipulated influencing factors add noise to the study, which makes it harder to find the effects of interest. While lab researchers do there best to keep the environment constant, they cannot keep all participant traits constant. Lab researchers have two solutions to the problem: matching and randomized control.

With pair matching, potentially relevant participant traits are recorded upfront; then participants are assigned to conditions such that groups have about the same composition. For example, one makes sure that the age distribution is about the same and both genders are equally represented. When all other influencing variables are constant between groups, the lab researcher can be sure that the effect is unambiguously caused by the manipulation. So they say and routinely record participants age, gender and nationality.

However, there are better alternatives: the best pair match is the person herself. Experimental studies that expose the same person to several conditions are called *within-subject*. In the special case that all participants encounter all conditions, the variable is *complete within-subject*. [A special case of within-subject design is *repeated measures*.] In the following chapter, we use mixed-effects models [LMM] to deal with within-subject designs, gracefully.

In design research, pair matching applies for situations where designs are compared. In the simple situation that a design is evaluated against a set standard (e.g. 111 seconds to rent a car), it is more important to do population matching. The sample of participants is drawn to be representative for the target population. Representativeness comes in two levels: coverage representation is reached when all influencing properties have occurred a few times during observation. So, if your target population contains several subgroups, such as age groups, experience or people with different goals, they should all be covered to some extent. Proportional representation means all user and situa-

tional properties are covered and they have about the same proportion in the sample as in the population.

You can only match what you can measure and you only measure what you expect. Human behaviour in everyday life is influenced by many factors in complex ways. Although a plethora of personality inventories exists, doing them all prior to the real study is impossible. It would probably not even be effective. Never have I seen a design research study, where even the most established personality tests explain more than a few percent of variation. As another example, take the primacy effect: what you experienced first, has the strongest influence. In real life, impressions are constantly pouring on people and you will never be able to record and match that to a reasonable extent.

When influencing variables cannot be measured for matching or statistical control, the last resort is randomized control. This is a misleading term, insofar as what the researcher actually does is to let go to chance. Indeed, if the process of drawing participants and assigning them to manipulations is completely left to chance, then in the long-term, the sample will be proportional representative and all groups will have the same composition of traits. Randomization works well with larger samples. With small samples, it can still easily happen that one ends up with more or less biased samples or heterogeneous groups. Just by chance, more higher-educated people could have ended up in condition A of BrowsingAB.

Using manipulation, matching or randomization in in-the-wild research may work in some cases. In other cases, it will be ineffective or impractical. The ultimate problem is the attempt to keep things constant. In applied design research the questions rarely come down to a "Is A better than B?". If there is an age effect, you may certainly want to know it and see how the design effect compares to it. But, you can only examine what is varied and recorded. The approach of *statistical control* is to record (instead of manipulate) all variables that may influence the results and add them to the statistical model. As we will see now, the linear model puts no limits on the number of predictors. If you believe that user age may play a role for performance, just record it and add it to the model. Statistical control requires at least coverage representation of the sample.

### 5.4.8 Exercises

- 1. Rerun  $M_3$ , this time using the unstandardized resistance scores. Interpret the intercept.
- 2. The innovators behind the WWW have a long tradition in figurative use of nautical metaphors, like navigator, cybernaut, . . . Do people in a worldwide hypermedia system behave like animals roaming known and lesser known territory? Then we would expect performance to be dependent

on abilities for spatial cognition, like the visual-spatial working memory. Another theory could draw on the fact that for most websites, the written word prevails. Would we not expect people with better verbal processing capabilities to excel? Consider a study MMN (for Miller's magic number, an iconic term in working memory research) that examines the influence of working memory capacities on people's browsing performance. Two tests for WM capacity were used: the Corsi task for visual-spatial WM capacity and the Ospan task for verbal WM capacity. Then participants were given five different search tasks on five websites. As a measure of efficiency, total time on task and number of clicks were recorded. As these variables tend to have skewed residual distributions, logarithmic transformation was applied before analysis. Do LRM on both WM predictors separately, then move on to an MRM.

#### 5.5 Interaction effects

With the framework of MPM, we can use an arbitrary number of predictors. These can represent properties on different levels, for example, two designs proposals for a website can differ in font size, or participants differ in age. So, with MPM we gain much greater flexibility in handling data from applied design research, which allows us to examine user-design interactions (literally) more closely.

The catch is that if you would ask an arbitrary design researcher:

Do you think that all users are equal? Or, could it be that one design is better for some users, but inferior for others?

you would in most cases get the answer:

Of course users differ in many ways and it is crucial to know your target group.

Some will also refer to the concept of usability by the ISO 9241-11, which contains the famous four words:

```
"... for a specified user ..."
```

The definition explicitly requires you to state for *for whom* you intended to design. It thereby implicitly acknowledges that usability of a design could be very different for another user group. In other words, statements on usability are by the ISO 9241-11 definition *conditional* on the target user group.

In statistical terms, conditional statements have this form:

the effect of design changes with (some) user properties

In regression models, conditional statements like these are represented by interaction effects. Interactions between user properties and designs are the most genuine in design research, and deserve a neologism: differential design effects (DDM). They come with some of their siblings. Saturation occurs when physical (or other) boundaries are reached and the result is less than the sum. Amplification, a rare one, is like compound glue: it will harden only if the two components are present. The final section is a plea for interaction effects in theorizing.

## 5.5.1 Users differ: differential design effects

Do people differ? Yes. If you showed two web designs to a group of stakeholders, asking to choose individually. Is there any chance they would all agree? No. Is the design of universal systems easy? No. The ideal of universal design is to never put a user group at a disadvantage. If it is an ideal, then designs are likely to differ in how much they accomplish it.

As to age: it is commonly held that older people tend to have lower performance than younger users. A number of factors are called responsible, such as: slower processing speed, lower working memory capacity, lower motor speed and visual problems. Is, perhaps, one of the two designs less of a burden for elderly users? We plot the observed ToT by age, this time forming groups by design.

As we have seen, with GLM, it is possible to investigate the effect of design properties and user properties simultaneously. For example, assume that main difference between design A and B in the web browsing example is that A uses

T\_ia1

larger letters than B. Would that create the same benefit for everybody? It is not unlikely, that larger letters only matter for users that have issues with farsightedness, which is associated with age. Maybe, there is even an adverse effect for younger users, as larger font size takes up more space on screen and more scrolling is required.

We recall the MPM in BrowsingAB: M\_mpm\_2 showed a moderate relationship between age and ToT. The design effect was disappointing (M\_Design): a classic statistician may have called it "significant", but one can hardly claim practical relevance. By adding the interaction effect Design:age\_shft to the model, we will now investigate how the age effect differs by design. We call this a differential interaction effect, as one of the involved

model	fixef	center	lower	upper
M_ia1	Intercept	195.684	176.708	214.337
$M_ia1$	DesignB	-37.779	-64.695	-12.813
$M_ia1$	$age\_shft$	0.259	-0.276	0.798
$M_ia1$	DesignB:age_shft	0.770	0.056	1.557
$M\_mpm\_$	_2 Intercept	184.208	169.940	198.789
$M\_mpm\_$	_2 DesignB	-14.981	-27.804	-2.140
$M\_mpm\_$	$_2$ age_shft	0.648	0.254	1.033

The intercept still is the performance of an average twenty-year-old using design A. Compared to the MPM, it is less favorable, with  $195.68[176.71,214.34]_{CI95}$  seconds time-on-task. The effect of design B improved dramatically with the DDM: a twenty-year-old is now  $-37.78[-64.7,-12.81]_{CI95}$  faster with it. Is B the clear winner? It is

not, because A has a much lower age effect. The age parameter does no longer represent both groups, but just reference A, and it is now very small,  $0.26[-0.28, 0.8]_{CI95}$ . The final coefficient is *not* the age effect in B, but *the difference* to the reference age effect. With design B, users are getting 1.029 seconds slower per year of life. That is a lot!

If we can do it with continuous predictors, like age, we can do it with factors, too. For example, does the overall improvement from design A to B depend on education level?

```
BAB1 %>%
 ggplot(aes(y = ToT, x = Education, color = Design)) +
 geom_boxplot()
```

Again, we compare the main-effect model to the one with interaction effects.

```
T_ia2 <-
bind_rows(
 posterior(M_mpm_3),
 posterior(M_ia2)) %>%
fixef()
T_ia2
```

model	fixef	center	lower	upper
M_ia2	Intercept	224.57	208.53	239.20
$M_ia2$	DesignB	-26.34	-48.10	-4.42
$M_ia2$	EducationMiddle	-29.51	-51.65	-7.64
$M_ia2$	EducationHigh	-31.49	-51.70	-10.77
$M_ia2$	DesignB:EducationMiddle	32.98	1.61	64.12

model	fixef	center	lower	upper
M_ia2	DesignB:EducationHigh	4.36	-24.50	32.74
$M_{mpm_3}$	3 Intercept	218.83	206.34	231.21
$M_{mpm_3}$	B DesignB	-15.11	-26.84	-3.27
$M_{mpm_3}$	B EducationMiddle	-13.46	-28.80	2.44
M_mpm_3	B EducationHigh	-29.39	-43.19	-14.46

The model has factors only, so there is a reference group. The intercepts in both models represent low education encountering design A. The main effect designB on low-educated users is present in both models. With the interaction term, design B looks much more favorable,  $-26.34[-48.11, -4.42]_{CI95}$ . The effect of middle education has doubled, whereas it remains stable for high education.

That may appear strange at first, but keep in mind, that by the interaction term, the education main effects are no longer "main": they only refer to group A, now. In the main effects model, the same education effects are assumed for both designs. Here, it is conditional on design, which brings us to the two interaction effects B:Middle and B:High. These are, once again, differences. The effect of middle education in B is 32.98more seconds than in A (-29.51). There practically is no net effect of middle education in B. In contrast, the high education interaction effect is small, with practically makes DesignB a main effect: it is the same in both groups.

Count the number of parameters in both models! We have six with interaction and four without. Six is just the number of groups and, indeed, with interaction effects all group means can vary freely. That is best demonstrated by estimating a variant of the model, where six parameters represent six group means, directly. In other words, it is an AGM, without an intercept and without main effects:

We extract the coefficients and, with a little preparation, we create an *inter*action plot. It shows the same pattern as the exploratory plot, but is fully inferential, with error bars indicate the 95% credibility interval.

```
P_ia3 <- posterior(M_ia3)
T_ia3 <- fixef(M_ia3)
T_ia3</pre>
```

fixef	center	lower	upper
DesignA:EducationLow	224	208	240
DesignB:EducationLow	197	181	212
DesignA:EducationMiddle	194	178	209
DesignB:EducationMiddle	200	185	216
DesignA:EducationHigh	192	178	207
DesignB:EducationHigh	170	157	184

```
detach(BrowsingAB)
```

We can distinguish between saturation effects and amplification effects.

```
Interactions <- expand.grid(effect = c("saturation", "amplification"),</pre>
 A = seq(0,1, length.out = 11),
 B = seq(0,1, length.out = 11)) %>%
 join(data.frame(effect = c("saturation", "amplification"),
 beta_1 = c(.1,.1),
 beta_2 = c(.2,.2),
 beta_3 = c(-0.3, 0.3))) %>%
 mutate(Outcome = A * beta 1 + B * beta 2 + A * B * beta 3)
library(lattice)
grid.arrange(
 wireframe(Outcome ~ A + B,
 data = filter(Interactions, effect == "saturation"),
 main = "saturation"),
 wireframe (Outcome ~ A + B,
 data = filter(Interactions, effect == "amplification"),
 main = "amplification"),
 ncol = 2
)
```

## 5.5.2 Hitting the boundaries of saturation

Most statistically trained researchers are aware of some common assumptions of linear regression, such as the normally distributed residuals and variance homogeneity. Less commonly regarded is the assumption of linearity, which arises from the basic regression formula:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i} \dots$$

The formula basically says, that if we increase  $x_1$  (or any other influencing variable) by one unit, y will increase by  $\beta_1$ . It also says that y is composed as a mere sum. In this section, we will discover that these innocent assumptions do not hold.

A major flaw with the linear model is that it presumes the regression line to increase and fall infinitely. However, in an endless universe everything has boundaries. The time someone needs to read a text is limited by fundamental cognitive processing speed. We may be able to reduce the inconvenience of deciphering small text, but once an optimum is reached, there is no further improvement. Boundaries of performance measures inevitably lead to non-linear relationships between predictors and outcome. Modern statistics knows

several means to deal with non-linearity, some of them are introduced in later chapters of this book ([GLM, NLM]). Still, most researchers use linear models, and it often can be regarded a reasonable approximation, as long as one keeps reasonable distance to the upper and lower boundaries of the outcome.

Before we turn to a genuine design research case, let me explain saturation effects by an example that I hope is intuitive. It boils down to the question: do two headache pills have twice the effect of one? Consider a pharmaceutical study on the effectiveness of two pain killer pills A and B. It takes place in the aftermath of a great party on a university campus. Random strolling students are asked to participate. First, they rate their experienced headache on a Likert scale ranging from "fresh like the kiss of morning dew" to "dead highway opossum". Participants are randomly assigned to four groups, each group getting a different combination of pills: A-B, A-Placebo, B-Placebo, Placebo-Placebo. After 30 minutes, experienced headache is measured again and the difference between both measures is taken as the outcome measure, headache reduction. We inspect the position of four group means graphically:

```
attach(Headache)
Pills %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = PillA, col = PillB, reduction)) +
 geom_boxplot()
```

When neither pill is given a slight spontaneous reduction seems to occur, which is the placebo-effect. Both pills alone seem to be effective in their own way, and giving them both has the most beneficial effect. However, it seems that the net effect of B is slightly weaker when administered together with A. Again, when the effect of one predictor depends on the level of another, the effect is called *conditional*.

Now, we will estimate and compare a set of three models, starting with the standard factorial MPM and proceeding to two models with interaction effects. The third one is actually an AGM with two factors, although it may not seem so at a first glance.

```
M_1 <- stan_glm(reduction ~ 1 + PillA + PillB, data = Pills)
M_2 <- stan_glm(reduction ~ 1 + PillA + PillB + PillA:PillB, data = Pills)
M_3 <- stan_glm(reduction ~ 0 + PillA:PillB, data = Pills)

P <- bind_rows(
 posterior(M_1),
 posterior(M_2),</pre>
```

```
posterior(M_3)
)
```

Imagine, the researcher started with the two-way MGM, estimating the fixed effects PillA and PillB. The result is:

```
T_fixef_1 <- fixef(M_1)
T_fixef_1</pre>
```

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	0.678	0.384	0.975
PillATRUE	1.293	0.959	1.626
PillBTRUE	0.576	0.232	0.907

Given these estimates, we conclude that pill A has an almost double reduction of headache compared to B. The intercept indicates that headache diminishes due to the placebo at a rate of  $0.68[0.38, 0.98]_{CI95}$ . Setting the placebo-effect aside, what would you predict the effect to be in the group with both pills?

Thinking linearly you probably came up with:

1.87

Does that make sense? Do the effects of headache pills simply add up like this? Consider a scenario, where five headache pills were compared in the same manner. If we assume linear addition of effects, some participants in the group with all pills could even experience the breathtaking sensation of negative headache. Certainly, the effect is not linear. But, is it in the long run? In some Hollywood movies the wounded hero consumes handful of pills before the showdown (With the exception of Leon, the Profi, where it is the scary Gary Oldman consuming some harder stuff). With two pills, how close to the boundaries are we? We can just test that by introducing an interaction term to the model: PillaA:PillB.

```
T_fixef_2 <- fixef(M_2)
T_fixef_2</pre>
```

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	0.592	0.252	0.940
PillATRUE	1.469	0.976	1.940
PillBTRUE	0.746	0.270	1.226
PillATRUE:PillBTRUE	-0.359	-1.017	0.315

We first examine the main effects for both pills. Interestingly, both effects are now considerably stronger than before. Taking either pill alone is more effective than we thought from the multiple CGM. The fourth coefficient (PillATRUE:PILLBTRUE) is the interaction term. With the updated model we, again, predict the net headache reduction when both pills are given. This is as simple as summing up all coefficients from intercept to interaction. The result is a combined effect of both main effects reduced by 0.36. As we would expect, the effectiveness of two pills is not their sum, but less. One can have headache to a certain degree or no headache at all. If it's gone, any more pills have no additional effects. This is called the saturation effect: the more is given, the closer it gets to the natural boundaries and the less it adds. Let me emphasize that this is not some strange (and therefore interesting) metabolic interaction between pharmaceuticals. Saturation effects must not be confused with any "real" interaction, that is theoretically interesting. Still, as we have seen, ignoring saturation effects results in severely biased estimates.

Back to design research! Imagine, you are testing the influence of font size on reading performance. In your experiment, you found that increasing from 8pt to 12pt cuts the required reading time by 10 seconds. According to the linear model, you had to expect the reading time to decrease by another 10 seconds, when enlarging to 16pt.

```
detach(Headache)
```

It should be clear by now, that these expectations have no ground: for normally sighted persons, a font size of 12 is easy enough to decipher and another increase will not have the same effect. Taking this further, one would even arrive at absurdly short or impossible negative reading times. At the opposite, a font size of four point may just render unreadable on a computer screen. Instead of a moderate increase by 10 seconds, participants may have to decipher and guess the individual words, which will take much longer.

Researching the effect of font sizes between 8pt and 12pt font size probably keeps the right distance, with approximate linearity within that range. But what happens if you bring a second manipulation into the game with a func-

tionally similar effect? A likely outcome is that the fundamental assumption of *predictors sum up* no longer holds, but *saturation* occurs.

Let's turn to a fictional, yet realistic problem in design research. Design of systems is a matter of compromises. A common conflict of interests is between the aesthetic appearance and the ergonomic properties. Consider the typesetting on web pages. Many commercial websites are equally concerned about the ease of comprehending information as of positive emotional response. From an ergonomic point of view, the typesetting of longer text simply requires you to choose the best screen-readable font, find an optimal font size and maximize contrast. If you were now to suggest typesetting a website in black Arial on white background, you are in for trouble with your graphic designer or, much worse, the manager responsible for corporate impression management. In any case, someone will insist on a fancy serif font (which renders rather poorly on low resolution devices) in an understating blueish-grey tone. For creating a relaxed reading experience, the only option left is to increase the font size. This option is limited by another compromise, though, as too large letters requires excessive scrolling.

The question arises: can one sufficiently compensate lack of contrast by setting the text in the maximum reasonable font size 12pt, as compared to the more typical 10pt? In the fictional study Reading, this is examined in a 2x2 between-subject design: the same page of text is presented in four versions, with either 10pt or 12pt, and grey versus black font colour. Performance is here measured as time-on-task of reading the full page.

```
D_1
```

We see immediately, that both design choices have an impact: more contrast, as well as larger letters lead to improved reading performance. But, do they add up? Or do both factors behave like headache pills, where more is more, but less than the sum. Clearly, the 12pt-black group could read fastest on average. Neither with large font, nor with optimal contrast alone has the design reached maximum performance, i.e. saturation. Still, there could be an interaction effect, that gradually reduces the positive effect of large font in a high-contrast design. We run two regression models, one with both main effects and one that adds an interaction term. We extract the coefficients from both models and view them side-by-side:

fixef	M_1	M_2
Intercept	59.79	61.17
$font\_size12pt$	-9.91	-12.45
font_colorblack	-8.23	-10.78
$font\_size12pt:font\_colorblack$	NA	5.22

The estimates confirm, that both manipulations have a considerable effect. And, there is an interaction effect as well, correcting the additive effect of font colour and size. The combined effect of high contrast and large font is therefore

$$\mu_{12pt,black} = 61.172 + -12.45 + -10.783 + 5.222 = 43.161$$

In this research scenario, that was not strictly the question, as we were primarily interested in comparing the effects of font size and contrast. Also, if we see the credibility interval of the interaction effect it is not highly certain  $(5.22[-2.25, 12.57]_{CI95})$ . Still, including the interaction term is the right choice for two reasons: first, both manipulations influence the same cognitive processing, as they both improve visual clarity, with the effect of better visual letter recognition. From a theoretical perspective, we would thus expect saturation. This is simply the application of prior knowledge and in a perfect world one would use a prior distribution for the interaction term, creating a more certain estimate. That being said, the data set is synthetic, and the simulation definitely included the interaction effect. Second, in Table [XY], all other coefficients change considerably with introduction of the interaction

effect. Especially the effects of the two manipulations get considerably underestimated.

Why are the main effects under-estimated, if the interaction term is not included? The pure main-effects model has three parameters. This allows it to represent the same number of independent group means. Formally, the number of groups in the study is four, however, the three-parameter model assumes that the fourth group (black, 12pt) can sufficiently be specified by the existing three parameters. If saturation occurs, the group of participants in the 12pt group is not homogeneous: in the grey group, they experience a stronger improvement than in the black group. The three parameter model is forced to make the best out of situation and adjusts the net effect of font size to be slightly lower than it actually is. The same occurs for the font colour effect.

Interaction effects are notoriously neglected in research and they are hard to grasp for audience with or without a classic statistics education. It is therefore highly recommended to illustrate interaction effects using interaction plots. To begin with, an interaction plot for the 2x2 design contains the four estimated group means. These can be computed from the linear model coefficients, but there is an alternative way: we modify the model such that it represents the four group means, directly. The re-parametrized model has no intercept (if we want the group means directly, we need no reference group), and no main effects. The model contains just the raw interaction effect, which results in an estimation of the four group means:

#### $fixef(M_3)$

fixef	center	lower	upper
font_size10pt:font_colorgray	60.9	56.7	64.9
font_size12pt:font_colorgray	48.2	44.2	52.2
$font\_size10pt:font\_colorblack$	49.8	45.9	53.7
$font\_size12pt:font\_colorblack$	42.8	38.8	46.5

With some basic data transformation on the coefficient table, we create a data frame that encodes the two factors separately. Note how separate is used to split the coefficient names into group identifiers. Using mutate and str\_replace, the group labels are stripped of the factor names. The resulting coefficient table serves as input to ggplot, creating an interaction plot with overlayed credibility intervals, using geom errorbar.

```
T 2x2 mu <-
 fixef(M 3) %>%
 separate(fixef, c("font size", "font color"), sep = ":") %>%
 mutate(font_size = str_replace(font_size, "font_size", ""),
 font_color = str_replace(font_color, "font_color", "")) %>%
 as.data.frame()
G_interaction <-
 T_2x2_mu %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = font_color,
 color = font_size, shape = font_size,
 y = center,
 ymin = lower,
 ymax = upper)) +
 geom_point() +
 geom_line(aes(group = font_size)) +
 geom_errorbar(width = .1)
G interaction
```

#### detach(Reading)

In Figure XY, we can easily spot the two main effects, and how they go together. The researcher would conclude that with the desired grey font, increasing font size partly compensates for the lack of contrast. At the same time, we see that some saturation occurs, but from a purely ergonomic perspective, large font and high contrast still is the preferred design.

We have seen in the Headache example that interaction effects occur as non-linearity. The more a participant approaches the natural boundary of zero headache, the less benefit is created by additional effort. This we call *saturation*. Saturation is likely to occur when multiple factors influence the same cognitive or physical system or functioning. In quantitative comparative design studies, we gain a more detailed picture on the co-impact of design interventions and can come to more sophisticated decisions.

In the Reading case, overall utility is a compound of ergonomic quality and aesthetic appeal. It was assumed that a grey-on-white colour scheme is more appealing. The researcher would choose the grey-12pt design: higher contrast would increase ergonomic value, but too much at the expense of appeal. Of course, in a perfect world, one would add emotional appeal as a second measure to the study.

If we don't account for saturation by introducing interaction terms, we are prone to underestimate the net effect of any of these measures and may falsely conclude that a certain measure is ineffective. Consider a large scale study, that assesses the simultaneous impact of many demographic variables on how willing customers are to take certain energy saving actions in their homes. It is very likely that subsets of variables are associated with similar cognitive processes. For example, certain action requires little effort (such as switching off lights in unoccupied rooms), whereas others are time-consuming (drying the laundry outside). At the same time, customers may vary in the overall eagerness (motivation). For high effort actions the impact of motivation level probably makes more of a difference than when effort is low. Not including the interaction effect would result in the false conclusion that suggesting high effort actions is rather ineffective.

## 5.5.3 More than the sum: amplification

Saturation effects occur, when multiple impact factors act on the same system and work in the same direction. When reaching the boundaries, the change per unit diminishes. These impact factors can be similar (headache pills) or unsimilar, like font size and contrast. Still, they are to some extent exchangeable. We can compensate lack of contrast with larger font size.

Amplification interaction effects are the opposite: They occur, when two (or more) factors impact different cognitive processes in a processing chain. Conceiving good examples for amplification effects is far more challenging as compared to saturation effects. Probably because saturation is a rather trivial phenomenon, whereas amplification involves some non-trivial orchestration of cognitive or physiological subprocesses. Here, a fictional case on technology acceptance will serve to illustrate amplification effects. Imagine a start-up company that seeks funding for a novel augmented reality game, where groups of gamers compete for territory. For their fund raising endeavor, they need to know their market potential, i.e. which fraction of the population is potentially interested. The entrepreneurs have two hypotheses they want to verify:

- 1. Only technophile persons will dare to play the game, because it requires some top-notch equipment.
- 2. The game is strongly cooperative and therefore more attractive for people with a strong social motif.

In their study, they asked a larger set of participants to rate their technophily and sociophily. They were then given a description of the planned game and were asked how much they intended to participate in the game.

While the example primarily serves to introduce amplification effects, it is also an opportunity to get familiar with interaction effects between metric predictors. Although this is not very different to interaction effects on groups, there are a few peculiarities, one being that we cannot straight-forwardly make an exploratory plot. For factors, we have used box plots, but these do not apply for metric variables. In fact, it is very difficult to come up with a good graphical representation. One might think of 3D wire-frame plots, but these transfer poorly to the 2D medium of these pages. Another option is to create a scatter-plot with the predictors on the axes and encode the outcome variable by shades or size of dots . These options may suffice to see any present main effects, but are too coarse to discover subtle non-linearity. The closest we can get to a good illustration is to create groups and continue as usual. Note, that turning metric predictors into factors is just a hack to create exploratory graphs. By no means do I intend to corroborate the use of group-mean models on metric data.

From the boxplot it seems that both predictors have a positive effect on intention to play. However, it remains vague whether there is an interaction effect. In absence of a good visualization, we have to rely fully on the numerical estimates of a linear regression with interaction effect.

```
T_1 <- fixef(M_1)
T_1
```

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	0.273	0.259	0.288
sociophile	0.113	0.075	0.153
technophile	0.183	0.152	0.212
sociophile:technophile	0.165	0.082	0.246

The regression model confirms that sociophilia and technophilia both have a moderate effect on intention. Both main effects are clearly in the positive range. Yet, when both increase, the intention increases overlinearly. The sociophile-technophile personality is the primary target group.

While plotting the relationship between three metric variables is difficult, there are alternative ways to illustrate the effect. For example, we could ask: how does intention change by .1 unit sociophilia for two imaginary participants with extreme positions on technophilia (e.g., .2 and .8). We could calculate these values arithmetically using the model formula and the center estimates. The better and genuinely Bayesian way of doing it is sampling from the posterior predictive distribution (PPD). This distribution is generated during parameter estimation. While the posterior distribution (PD) represents the predictors, the PPD is linked to the outcome variable. More specifically, the PPD is the models best guess of the true value  $\mu$ , separated from the random component. Once the posterior has been estimated, we can draw from it with any values of interest. As these can be combinations of values that have never been observed, we can truly speak of prediction. Regression engines usually provide easy means to simulate from a PD and generate predictions. In the following example, we simulate some equidistant steps of sociophilia for three participants with technophilia scores from .1 to .9.

The effect is not stunning, but visible. The lines diverge, which means they have different slopes. With high technophilia, every (tenth) unit of sociophilia has a stronger effect on intention to play.

```
detach(AR_game)
```

Amplification effects are like two-component glue. When using only one of the components, you will just get a smear. Putting both togeher gives a strong hold. There also is a parallel in Boolean algebra. Recall, the Boolean OR operator returns TRUE when one of the operands is TRUE, whereas AND requires both operands to be TRUE.

			A AND B
FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
FALSE	TRUE	TRUE	FALSE
TRUE	FALSE	TRUE	FALSE
TRUE	TRUE	TRUE	TRUE

The Boolean OR is an extreme case of saturation. Once one of the factors is present, the result is "positive" and introducing the other one has absolutely no additional effect. Another basic Boolean operation is AANDB with quite the opposite effect: any of the two factors only has an effect, if the other is present as well. Clearly, this is a conditional effect. We will rarely encounter non-trivial cases where the results are so crisp as in the Boolean world.

## 5.5.4 Theoretically interesting interaction effects [EDIT]

Explaining or predicting complex behaviour with psychological theory is a corner stone of design research. Unfortunately, it is not that easy. While design is definitely multifactorial, with a variety of cognitive processes, individual differences and behavioural strategies, few psychological theories cover more than three associations between external or individual conditions and behaviour. The design researcher is often forced to enter a rather narrow perspective or knit a patchwork model from multiple theories. Such a model can either be loose, making few assumptions on how the impact factors interact which others. A more tightened model frames multiple impact factors into a conditional network, where the impact of one factor can depend on the overall configuration. A classic study will now serve to show how interaction effects and theoretical reasoning go together.

Vigilance is the ability to remain attentive for rarely occurring events. Think of truck drivers on lonely night rides, where most of the time they spend keeping the truck on a straight 80km/h course. Only every now and then is the driver required to react to an event like braking lights flaring up ahead. Vigilance tasks are among the hardest thing to ask from a human operator. Yet, they are safety relevant in a number of domains. Keeping up vigilance most people perceive as tiring, and vigilance deteriorates with tiredness.

Several studies have shown that reaction time at simple tasks increases when people are tired. The disturbing effect of noise has been documented as well. A study by Corcoran (1961) examined the simultaneous influence of sleep deprivation and noise on a rather simple reaction task. They asked:

will the effects of noise summate with those of loss of sleep to induce an even greater performance decrement or will noise subtract from the performance decrement caused by loss of sleep?

The central argument is that sleep deprivation deteriorates the central nervous arousal system. In consequence, sleep deprived persons cannot maintain the necessary level of tension that goes with the task. Noise is a source of irritation and therefore usually reduces performance. At the same time, noise may have an arousing effect, which may compensate for the loss of arousal due to sleep deprivation. To re-iterate on the headache pills analogy, noise could be the antidote for sleepiness.

The sleep case study is a simplified simulation of Corcoran's results. Participants were divided into 2x2 groups (quiet/noisy, rested/deprived) and had to react to five signal lamps in a succession of trials. In the original study, performance measure gaps were counted, which is the number of delayed reactions (> 1500ms).

```
attach(Sleep)
```

Using a 2x2 model including an interaction effect, we examine the conditional association between noise and sleepiness. The \* operator in the model formula is an abbreviation for the fully factorial term Environment + Sleep + Environment:Sleep.

```
M_1 <-
 D_1 %>%
 stan_glm(gaps ~ Environment * Sleep, data = .)
```

```
T_fixef <- fixef(M_1)
T_fixef</pre>
```

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	99.01	65.1	132.8
EnvironmentNoisy	-0.16	-51.3	51.3
SleepSleepy	160.31	113.5	209.5
${\bf Environment Noisy: Sleep Sleepy}$	-98.91	-168.6	-29.6

Recall, that treatment contrasts were used, where all effects are given relative to the reference group quiet-rested (intercept). The results confirm the deteriorating effect of sleepiness, although its exact impact is blurred by pronounced uncertainty  $160.32[113.49, 209.55]_{CI95}$ . Somewhat surprisingly, noise did not affect well-rested persons by much  $-0.16[-51.33, 51.31]_{CI95}$ . Note however, that we cannot conclude a null effect, as the credibility limits are wide. Maybe the lack of a clear effect is because steady white noise was used, not a disturbing tumult. The irritating effect of noise may therefore be minimal. As suggested by Corcoran, the effect of sleepiness on performance is partly reduced in a noisy environment  $-98.91[-168.62, -29.62]_{CI95}$ . This suggests that the arousal system is involved in the deteriorating effect of sleep deprivation, which has interesting consequences for the design of vigilance tasks in the real world.

The finding also relates to the well known Yerkes-Dodson law in ergonomic science. The law states that human performance at cognitive tasks is influenced by arousal. The influence is not linear, but better approximated with a curve as shown in Figure XY. Performance is highest at a moderate level of arousal. If we assume that sleepy participants in Corcona's study showed low performance due to under-arousal, the noise perhaps has increased the arousal level, resulting in better performance. If we accept that noise has an arousing effect, the null effect of noise on rested participants stands in opposition to the Yerkes-Dodson law: if rested participants were on an optimal arousal level, additional arousal would usually have a negative effect on performance. There is the slight possibility, that Corcona has hit a sweet spot: if we assume that calm/rested participants were still below an optimal arousal level, noise could have pushed them right to the opposite point.

Central to the Yerkes-Dodson law is that arousal is a gradually increasing property, but the current experiment only features two levels. A straight line

is the only way to unambiguously connect two group means; examining any curved relationships is impossible. We could think of varying noise levels over a wider range for better tracing the non-linear relationship between arousal and performance. The next section introduces polynomial regression for approximating non-linear associations between metric variables.

#### detach(Sleep)

#### 5.5.5 Exercises

- 1. In the IPump case (data set D\_agg), two infusion pumps have been tested against each other (L = legacy, N = novel). Nurses from two professional groups (intensive and general care) completed a sequence of tasks with both devices. In order to account for learning effects, this procedure was repeated in three sessions. Three performance measures were taken: time-on-task, deviations from the optimal path and self-reported workload. Analyze the results using the models that have been introduced so far. Start with basic CGM and LRM, then use these as building blocks for more complex models. At least for the more basic models, always start by an exploratory plot. Then build and run the model. Extract the coefficients table and interpret magnitude and certainty.
- 2. For the basic models of the previous exercise, extract and plot the residual distribution. Compare the residual distribution by groups.
- 3. For the more complex models, extract the predicted values and residuals and plot them. Is their an association between the two?

## 5.6 Doing the rollercoaster: polynomial regression

Robots build our cars and sometimes drive them. They mow the lawn and may soon also deliver parcels to far-off regions. Prophecy is that robots will also enter social domains, such as accompany children and care for our elderly. One can assume that in social settings emotional acceptance plays a significant role for technology adoption. Next to our voices, our faces and mimic expressions are the main source of interpersonal messaging. Since the dawn of the very idea of robots, anthropomorphic designs have been dominant. Researchers and designers all around the globe are currently pushing the limits of human-likeness of robots. One could assume that emotional response improves with every small step towards perfection. Unfortunately, this is not the case. [Mori] discovered a bizarre non-linearity in human response: people respond more

positive to improvements in human-likeness, but only at the lower end. A feline robot design with recognizable but stylized facial features will always beat a faceless robot with a strong mechanical appeal. For designs on the high end, with a very much but not exactly human-like face, there is a sudden drop in emotional response, which is called the *uncanny valley*.

[Mathur et al.] study aimed at rendering the association between humanlikeness and liking at full range. They collected 60 pictures of robots and attached a score ranging from mechanical to human appearance. They then let more than 200 participants rate the faces on how much they liked them. Finally, they created an average score of likability per robot picture and examined the association with human likeness using a statistical model. Owing to the curved shape of the uncanny valley, linear regression is not applicable to the problem. Instead, Mathur et al. applied a third degree polynomial term.

A polynomial function of degree k has the form:

$$y_i = \beta_0 x_i^0 + \beta_1 x_i^1 + \dots + \beta_k x_i^k$$

In fact, you are already familiar with two polynomial models. The zero degree polynomial is the grand mean model. This follows from  $x_i^0 = 1$ , which makes  $\beta_0$  a constant, the intercept. Also, a first degree polynomial is simply the linear model. By adding higher degrees we can introduce more complex curvature to the association.

```
D_poly %>%
 ggplot(aes(x, y)) +
 geom_line() +
 facet_grid(~polynomial)
```

Mathur et al. argue that the Uncanny Valley curve possesses two stationary points, with a slope of zero. One is a local minimum and represents the deepest point in the valley, the other is a local maximum and marks the shoulder left of the valley. Such a curvature can be approximated with a polynomial of (at least) third degree, which has a constant term  $\beta_0$ , a linear slope  $x\beta_1$ , quadratic component  $x^2\beta_2$  and a cubic component  $x^3\beta_3$ .

While R provides high-level methods to deal with polynomial regression, it is instructive to build the regression manually. The first step is to add variables to the data frame, which are the exponentiated predictors  $(x_k = x^k)$ . These variables are then straight-forwardly added to the model term, as if they were independent predictors. For better clarity, we rename the intercept to be  $x_0$ , before summarizing the fixed effects.

```
attach (Uncanny)
M_poly <-
 UV_1 %>%
 mutate(huMech 0 = 1,
 huMech 1 = huMech,
 huMech_2 = huMech^2,
 huMech_3 = huMech^3) %>%
 stan_glm(avg_like ~ + huMech_1 + huMech_2 + huMech_3,
 data = ., iter = 400)
 # stan_glm(avg_like ~ poly(huMech, 4),
 data = ., iter = 200)
P_poly <- posterior(M_poly)</pre>
Uncanny$P 1 %>%
 mutate(parameter = str_replace(parameter, "Intercept", "huMech_0"),
 fixef = str_replace(fixef, "Intercept", "huMech_0"))
library(polynom)
T_fixef_1 <- fixef(P_poly)</pre>
T fixef 1
```

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	-0.207	-0.337	-0.093
$huMech\_1$	-0.525	-0.763	-0.281
$huMech_2$	0.293	0.060	0.577
huMech_3	0.744	0.368	1.133

We can extract the fixef effects table as usual. The four coefficients specify the polynomial to approximate the average likability responses. The polynomial parameters have little explanatory value. Neither of the parameters alone relates to a relevant property of the uncanny valley. One relevant property would be the location of the deepest point of the uncanny valley, its trough. The trough is a local minimum of the curve and we can find this point with polynomial techniques.

Finding a local minimum is a two step procedure: first, we must find all *stationary points*, which includes local minima and maxima. Then, we determine which of the resulting points is the local minimum. Stationary points occur, where the curve bends from a rising to falling or vice versa. They are distinguishable by having a slope of zero, neither rising nor falling. Stationary points can be identified by the derivative of the third degree polynomial, which is a second degree polynomial:

$$f'(x) = \beta_1 + 2\beta_2 x + 3\beta_2 x^2$$

The derivative f'(x) of a function f(x) gives the slope of f(x) at any given point x. When f'(x) > 0, f(x) is rising at x, with f'(x) < 0 it is falling. Stationary points are precisely those points, where f'(x) = 0 and can be found by solving the equation. The derivative of a third degree polynomial is of the second degree, which has a quadratic part. This can produce a parabolic form, which hits point zero twice, once rising and once falling. A rising encounter of point zero indicates that f(x) has a local minimum at x, a falling one indicates a local maximum. In consequence, solving f'(x) = 0 can result in two solutions, one minimum and one maximum, which need to be distinguished further.

If the stationary point is a local minimum, as the trough, slope switches from negative to positive; f'(x) crosses x = 0 in a rising manner, which is a positive slope of f'(x). Therefore, a stationary point is a local minimum, if f''(x) > 0.

Mathur et al. followed these analytic steps to arrive at an estimate for the position of the trough. The following code uses several high-level functions from package polynom to estimate the location of the trough, by drawing on the first and second derivative d[d]poly

```
= polynomial(T_fixef_1$center) # UC function on center
poly
dpoly
 = deriv(poly)
 # 1st derivative
ddpoly
 = deriv(dpoly)
 # 2nd derivative
stat pts = solve(dpoly)
 # finding stat points
 = as.function(ddpoly)(stat_pts)# slope at stat points
slopes
 = stat pts[slopes > 0]
 # selecting the local minimum
trough
cat("The trough is most likely at a huMech score of ", round(trough, 2))
```

## The trough is most likely at a huMech score of 0.37

While this procedure is instructive, there is an issue: drawing on the center estimates, which is a summary of the PD, we only get a point estimate. Statements on certainty are impossible, as a CI is lacking. Recall the 99 seconds study, where we operated directly on the PD to obtain more specific statements on certainty. Another case for directly operating on the PD samples is to calculate additional statistics. This is possible due to another virtue of the MCMC method.

Every PD sample contains simultaneous draw of the four parameters huMech\_[0:3], and therefore fully specifies its own third degree polynomial. A PD for the trough parameter can be obtained by performing the above procedure on every sample separately. For the convenience, the case study Uncanny contains a function trough(coef) that includes all the above steps. The following code creates a data frame with one row per MCMC draw and the four huMech variables, the function trough acts on this data frame as a matrix of coefficients and returns one trough point per row. We have obtained the PD of the trough.

```
P_trough <-
 P_poly %>%
 filter(type == "fixef") %>%
 select(chain, iter, fixef, value) %>%
 spread(fixef, value) %>%
 select(Intercept, starts_with("huMech")) %>%
 trough()
```

From the PD, we can derive statements on uncertainty in the usual way: the 95% credibility limits we get by:

```
quantile(P_trough, c(.025, 0.5, .975), na.rm = T) %>%
 kable()
```

	Х
2.5%	0.271
50%	0.367
97.5%	0.479

The 95% CI is a conventional measure of uncertainty and may be more or less irrelevant for the spectator. The most generous account on uncertainty is a density plot on the full posterior. The density function just smooths over the frequency distribution of trough draws, but makes no arbitrary choices on where to cut it.

```
grid.arrange(
 UV_1 %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = huMech, y = avg_like)) +
 geom_point(size = .3) +
 xlim(-1, 1),

data_frame(trough = P_trough) %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = trough)) +
 geom_density(aes(x = trough)) +
 xlim(-1, 1)
)
```

With reasonable certainty, we can say that the trough is at approximately two-thirds of the huMech score range. The illustration of the uncanny valley as they used to be perpetuated from the original source, place the trough at about four quarters of the scale. We clearly see that this is not the case in Mathur's study. This might be an artifact, for example in that the huMech score is not linearly related to the perception of human-likeness.

```
detach(Uncanny)
```

## Multilevel models

In the previous chapters we have seen several examples of differential design effects: groups of users responding differently to design conditions, such as font size, noise and emerging technology. Dealing with differential design effects seems straight forward: identify the relevant property, record it and add an interaction effect to the model. Identifying the relevant property is, in fact, a catch-22: how would you know what is relevant before you actually conducted the research. Researchers routinely record basic demographic properties such as age and gender, but these frequently show little effects, or the effects are obvious, i.e. not interesting. In addition, such predictors are rarely more than approximations of the properties that make the real difference. Older people have weaker vision by tendency, but the individual differences in any age group are immense. Boys tend to be more technophile, but there are some real geeky girls, too.

Identifying properties that matter upfront requires careful review of past research or deep theorizing, and even then it remains guesswork. Presumably, hundreds of studies attempted to explain differences in usage patterns or performance by all sorts of psychological predictors, with often limited results. That is a big problem in design research, as variation in performance can be huge and good predictors are urgently needed. Identifying the mental origins of being fast versus slow, or motivated versus bored, is extremely useful to improve the design of systems to be more inclusive or engaging.

As we will see in this chapter, individual differences can be accounted for and measured accurately without any theoretically derived predictors. For researchers trained in experimental social sciences it may require a bit of Zen to let go of theory-driven reasoning, as it is always tempting to ask for the why. But in applied evaluation studies, what we often really need to know is by how much users vary. The key to measuring variation in a population is to create models that operate on the level of participants, in addition to the population level, for example

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- on population level, users prefer design B over A on average  $(\beta_1 = 20)$
- on the participant-level, participant i preferred B over A  $(\beta_{1i} = 20)$ , j preferred A over B  $(\beta_{1j} = -5)$ , ...

See how on the participant level, everyone gets their own estimate for preference  $(\beta_1)$ . The key to estimating individual parameters is simply to regard participant (Part) a grouping variable on its own, and introduce it as a factor to the linear model. As we will see, it is almost that easy. The additional idea is that the levels of the factor, hence the individuals, are part of a population. While researchers in fundamental social sciences typically ignore individual variation, there is an independent branch in Psychology called *psychometrics* that deals with precisely that: constructing tests to measuring the individual. Think of IQ tests, which are constructed to have an average of 100, with 67% humans falling in the range 85 - 115. More extreme values become increasingly infrequent. From this perspective, it becomes clear what a population is: a set of entities that do vary but clump around a typical value. These two simple ideas, participants are factors, too, and are part of a population, form what is commonly called random factors: a factor where levels are drawn from an overarching distribution, usually the Gaussian. This distribution is estimated simultaneously to the individual parameters  $(\beta_1)$ , which has some interesting consequences, as we will see when discussing shrinkage.

Typically, fixed and random effects appear together in a linear mixed-effects model. As we will see, it depends on the research question whether the researcher capitalizes on the participant-level effects, the average outcome or the variation in the population. As we will also see, the idea of random effects transfers with grace to *non-human populations*, such as designs or question-naire items. But, first, let me give you an illustration, why caring for individual differences is not just an added value, that you may take or leave, but a necessary perspective to avoid severely wrong conclusions.

### 6.1 Average? Neverage!

Many studies in design research pretend that all users are alike. This idea is borrowed from experimental social science research. Seminal studies in cognitive psychology and social psychology claim mental structures or processes that hold for all humans. That is the very paradigm of fundamental psychology and many researchers ground their theorizing and experimentation on it. And indeed, several properties of human information processing have been replicated under such diverse conditions that one can assume that they are general. For example, the Stroop observation has been observed a hundred times in various population subgroups [REF], situations [REF] and variations.

The treatments in such experiments can be simplistic to an extreme. Often, participants are asked to respond to colored geometric shapes that light up on a black background by simple key presses. This is called *reductionism* and it has led to at least some insights into how the human mind works. As much as design researchers should draw upon psychological theory, as little useful is the reductionist paradigm. Designs must work in real world situations and often in many different ones, highly controlled lab experiments just bear too little resemblance to the real world. In particular, by no means can we expect all users to respond alike to one or more designs. Their minds are complex, obscure and unpredictable besides.

Our minds are not run as top - down dictatorships; they are rambunctious parliaments, populated by squabbling factions and caucuses, with much more going on beneath the surface than our conscious awareness ever accesses. (Carroll, Sean. The Big Picture (Kindle Locations 5029-5031). Oneworld Publications. Kindle Edition.)

Let me get it straight: People differ! If you plan to move from design A to B, or any other design choice, it is a good idea to also regard how much people vary. If your research question refers to any mental process or its change, the only solid way is to observe how one-and-the-same individuals behave on all conditions. That means within-subject designs should be the rule, not the exception. In contrast, doing a between-subject design is a potential mistake and requires good justification. The following case illustrates how things can go terribly wrong, when within-subject processes are examined in a between-subject manner:

Imagine you set out to determine the association between typing speed and errors. It is common sense that quality decreases with speed, so a positive correlation is expected. During the experiment, participants get a number of texts to type. With the first trial they are instructed to type at a relaxed speed. With every further trial they were asked to type slightly faster than at the trial before. The expectation is that

The faster a person types, the more errors occur

In terms of statistical skills, the researcher is familiar with linear models, and is aware of the fact, that these may not be applied for repeated measures. Therefore our researcher first averages the scores across participants and receives a data set with a neat 30 data points, one per trial. A first exploratory plot reveals a bizarre relation: it seems that the faster participants type, the less errors they make. That is completely against expectations, as there almost always is a trade-off between speed and accuracy.

Could it be true that the faster a person types, the less errors happen? Of course not. The problem is how precisely we ask the question. When averaging over persons, we actually answer a different question, which is on a *population-level*: Do persons who can type faster make fewer errors? This question sees every person as one data point with two performance measures, speed and errors, both representing the ability to type. Now, the above results make more sense: people, who are trained in typing are at the same time fast and more accurate. But, what the experiment was out for is the trade-off between speed and accuracy *within a person*. The experiment provokes this trade-off by asking the same person to accelerate in typing. And, when we visualize the results on an individual level, the speed-accuracy trade-off becomes immediately visible:

```
detach(Typing)
```

The example here is constructed to be extreme: the population-level effect has the opposite direction of individual level effects. However, the situation is fully plausible and points us to an important principle: Whenever a research question capitalizes on a change in mental state or behaviour, the only solid way to investigate is a within-subject design. Therefore again: treating averaged data as if it represents within-persons changes is a severe mistake. In the A/B case, for example, one must always be clear about the level. Is it true that

- on average, users prefer B over A?
- or all users individually prefer B over A?

The bizzare situation with the Typing study will have to wait, because we will need all elements of multilevel modelling to resolve it. However, the figure above features the core elements of multilevel models:

- persons have different levels for errors at relaxed typing (varying intercepts)
- persons differ in how much the error frequency goes up with speed (varying slopes)
- the better a person performs at relaxed typing, the less the number of errors goes up when the person types faster (correlated random effects)

### 6.2 The Human Factor: Intercept random effects

Design science fundamentally deals with interaction between systems and humans. Every measure we take in a design study is an encounter of an individual with a system. As people differ in almost every aspect, it is likely that people differ in how they use a system. In the previous chapter we have already dealt with differences between users: in the BrowsingAB case, we compared two designs in how inclusive they are with respect to elderly users. The data set included further variables, education and gender, that may help to predict performance.

Imagine, you had gathered no predictors at all and observed a massive amount of variation in performance. It is reasonable to assume that much of this variation stems from individual differences. That, in turn would mean that a fraction of users perform extremely well, whereas many users fail miserably. If that were true, you would give the advice to invest into redesign that is more inclusive, ironing out the differences, would you not? To make your point, you had to prove that individual differences are the main source of variation.

At first, one might think that the grand mean model would do, take  $\beta_0$  as the population mean and  $\sigma$  as a measure for individual variation. Unfortunately, it is not valid to take the residual variance as variance between individuals, the reason being that random variation captured by  $\sigma$  is composed of multiple sources, in particular:

- inter-individual variation
- intra-individual variation, e.g. by different levels of energy over the day
- variations in situations, e.g. responsiveness of the website
- inaccuracy of measures

What is needed, is a way to separate the variation of participants from the rest. Reconsider the principles of model formulations: the likelihood captures what is repeatable, what does not repeat goes to the random term. For the problem of identifying individual differences, we simply apply this principle: to pull out a factor from the random term, repetition is needed. For estimating users' individual performance level, all that is needed is repeated measures.

Imagine, a pre-study to BrowsingAB was done on the existing design A. Data was gathered during operation of the website. Real users were tracked on eight tasks. It was possible to identify the task a user was on and identity of users could be tracked, too. However, as a consequence of privacy protection not a single demographic variable could be gathered. With the simulation function of the BrowsingAB case environment, we generate a new data set SOV (sources of variance), reduce it to design A and remove all predictors.

```
attach(BrowsingAB)
```

```
n_Part = 25
n_Task = 8
n_Obs = n_Part * n_Task

SOV <-
simulate(n_Part, n_Task) %>%
filter(Design == "A") %>%
select(Obs, Part, Task, ToT) %>%
as_tbl_obs()
```

We start with some data exploration. The first question we can ask is:

What is the average ToT in the population?

```
SOV %>%
summarize(mean_Pop = mean(ToT)) %>%
kable()
```

```
\frac{\text{mean_Pop}}{146}
```

This question is rather global and does not refer to any individuals in the population. The following question does:

What is the average ToT of individual participants?

```
SOV %>%
group_by(Part) %>%
summarize(mean_Part = mean(ToT)) %>%
sample_n(5) %>%
kable()
```

Part	$mean_{\underline{}}$	_Part
7		145
14		101
6		128
22		127
12		148

This question differs in that it is *grouped* by participant. Now, that we have the individual means, we can plot the variation in task performance. For comparison, the overall variation is added to the plot. It is apparent that individual differences make only part of the overall variance.

#### detach(BrowsingAB)

Above, we have claimed that our data set is bare of predictors. Is it? The variable Part groups observations by participant identity and therefore is a plain factor. If we can compute user means like above, what keeps us from adding a factor, like the following?

```
SOV ~ 1 + Part
```

While formally, a participant is just a group of observations, there is one apparent, one practical and one subtle difference compared to factors as we know them so far. The apparent difference is that before we had just very few levels and many observations. With participants we would have to estimate dozens or hundreds of coefficients with just very few observations per level. In

consequence, the posterior distribution will become spread out like butter on a toast and certainty will be abysmal. The practical difference is that, while we are interested in the overall variation, the ability of individual users is rather uninteresting. We actually have no use for dozens of user ability scores. The subtle difference is that users form a population. That sounds rather obviuous than subtle, but is key for the solution once we understand what being member of a population means, statistically. I will give a brief account here and return to the topic in a later section.

Imagine the following situation: you are seated in a university bistro and you get the task to guess the intelligence quotient of every person entering the bistro. After every trial you are disclosed the real IQ of the person. You know that the average IQ is 100 and you give a bonus of 5 owing to the fact it is at a university. The first five persons have the IQs:

$$IQ \leftarrow c(106, 108, 103, 115, 110)$$

It seems the bonus of five is an understatement and the average is closer to 110. You adjust your best guess accordingly. That sounds trivial, but for the specification of a regression model it is not. The crucial point is that any guess k depends on the information you received on trials 1...(k-1). Review the model formulation for comparison of means models. There is nothing in the linear term that transfers information between levels of factors. The group means are estimated in complete independence.

The key is is that participants are members of a population. In a reasonably large population, extremes such as an IQ of 160 will eventually happen, but they are very unlikely. By far most people, roughly two thirds, are clumped together in the range 85 to 115. Imagine you are travelling to an African country you have never heard of before. Africa has the richest gene pool of all and ethnicies differ a lot in tallness and skin tone. Once you have left the plane and saw a few people, you get an impression of how tall and dark people are in this place. The same principle holds for human attributes or capabilities in design research. Having seen a bunch of participants completing a task between two and five minutes gives a best guess for the next particiant. It is not excluded that this person will need 25 minutes or 20 seconds for the task, but it is less likely.

Factors where the individual levels vary, but are more or less clumped around a population mean are best modelled as *random factors* and the individual levels are called *random effects*. Random effects enter the likelihood of the linear model specification in a similar additive way as fixed effects. The difference is that the levels are assumed to stem from a normal distribution, which represents the clumping. The mean of this distribution is zero, similar to the distribution of residuals, but the standard deviation of this distribution, representing the amount of variation in the population, is *estimated alongside* the individual levels.

For the pre-study we have simulated above we can formulate a GM model with participant-level random effect  $\beta_{p0}$  as follows:

$$\mu_i = \beta_0 + x_p \beta_{p0} \beta_{p0} \sim N(0, \sigma_{p0}) y_i \sim N(\mu_i, \sigma_\epsilon)$$

There will be as many parameters  $\beta_{p0}$ , as there were users in the sample, and they have all become part of the likelihood. The second term describes the distribution of the levels. And finally, there is the usual random term. Before we examine further features of the model, let's run it. In the package rstanarm, the command stan\_glmer() is dedicated to estimate mixed-effects models with the extended formula syntax.

```
attach(BrowsingAB)
```

```
M_1_SOV <- stan_glmer(ToT ~ 1 + (1 | Part), data = SOV)
P_1_SOV <- posterior(M_1_SOV)</pre>
```

The posterior of the mixed-effects model contains four types of variables:

- 1. the fixed effect captures the population average (Intercept)
- 2. random effects capture how individual participants deviate from the population mean
- 3. random factor variation (or group effects) captures the overall variation in the population.
- 4. the residual standard deviation captures the amount of noise

With the bayr package these parameters can be extracted using the respective commands:

```
fixef(P_1_SOV)
```

model	type	fixef	center	lower	upper
M_1_	_SOV fixef	Intercept	146	133	159

```
ranef(P_1_SOV) # a long list
grpef(P_1_SOV)
```

model	type	fixef	$re_{-}$	_factor	center	lower	upper
M_1_SOV	grpef	Intercept	Pa	rt	26.1	15.5	40.4

Random effects are factors and enter the model formula just as linear terms. What sets them apart, is that they are estimated together with the overarching Gaussian distribution. To indicate that to the regression engine, a dedicated syntax is used in the model formula (recall that 1 represents the intercept parameter):

#### (1|Part)

In probability theory expressions, such as the famous Bayes theorem, the I symbol means that something to the left is conditional on something to the right. Random effects can easily be conceived as such conditional effects. Left of the I is the fixed effect that is conditional on (i.e. varies by) the factor to the right. In the simplest form the varying effect is the intercept and in the case here could be spoken of as:

ToT depends on the participant you are looking at

Speaking of factors: so far, we have used treatment contrasts most of the time, which represent the difference towards a reference level. Analogue to a factor model, we could estimate the first participants performance level and make it the reference group, intercept  $\beta_0$ . All other average scores, we would express as differences to the reference participant. This seems odd and, indeed, has two disadvantages: first, whom are we to select as the reference participant? The choice would be arbitrary, unless we wanted to compare brain sizes against the grey matter of Albert Einstein, perhaps. Second, most of the time the researcher is after the factor variation rather than differences between any two individuals, which is inconvenient to compute from treatment contrasts.

The solution is to use a different contrast coding for random factors: deviation contrasts represent the individual effects as difference ( $\delta$ ) towards the population mean. As the population mean is represented by the respective fixed effect, we can compute the absolute individual predictions by adding the fixef effect to the random effect:

Finally, we can assess the initial question: are individual differences a significant component of all variation in the experiment? Assessing the impact of variation is not as straight-forward as with fixed effects. One heuristic is to compare it against the residual variance, which is:

```
T_sov_vc <- coef(P_1_SOV, type = c("grpef", "disp"))
T_sov_vc</pre>
```

parameter	type	fixef	re_factor	center l	lower	upper
sigma_resid	disp	NA	NA	54.5	49.3	60.9
Sigma[Part:Intercept,(Intercept)]	grpef	Intercept	Part	26.1	15.5	40.4

```
detach(BrowsingAB)
```

The variation due to individual differences is half of the noise, which is considerable. It seems in order to further investigate why and how users vary in performance, as this is the key to improving the design for all users.

Exercises:

## 6.3 Designs and other non-human populations

With the introduction of random effects design researchers can make more precise statements about how a design affects the population of users. The population-level average effect gets amended by a measure of variation. Only when this variation is small can one conclude that the effect is homogenous for the whole population. In the BrowsingAB case, this gives valuable information on how well this particular design serves the population of users and whether one should be satisfied with it or not. This is a typical research question in applied design research where one seeks to choose one from a small set of designs. Generally, A/B studies seek to answer the question: is one design better for the user population?. This question has two entities: the user and the design. However, it is not symmetric, as users are provided as a sample from which one wishes to generalize, whereas the two designs are exhaustive. There is the choice between the two and they are both present.

But, that is not all there is in design research. Many studies in, what one could call fundamental design research seek to uncover general laws of design that may guide future system development. Fundamental design research is not concerned with choosing between individual designs, whether they are good enough or not, but with seperating the population of possible designs into good ones and bad ones. A/B studies, as we know them, are not adequate to answer such questions, simply because there is no reasonable way to generalize from a sample of two to all possible designs. This would only be possible under one strict constraint: the design property in question, let's say font size, must be the only property where A and B differ. Under this constraint, the population

of designs is exactly all designs that are constant except for font size. It is left to the reader to contemplate why that is of little value.

If the research question is fundamental, aiming at general conclusions on design, it is almost inevitable to test it on a larger sample of designs. Once we start speaking about samples of designs, there must be a *population of designs*, too. The term population suggests a larger set of entities, and in fact many application domains have an abundance of existing designs and a universe of possible designs. Just to name a few: there exist dozens of note taking apps for mobile devices and hundreds of different jump'n'run games. Several classes of websites count thousands of members, such as webshops and municipal websites.

Even in highly standardized domains such as automotive cockpits the differences between generations, manufacturers and models are noticable to be called individuals from a population. That is precisely the idea of a random effect: entities vary around a clump of commonalities. In consequence, when testing a fundamental design rule, like large fonts are better to read, the proposed research strategy is to sample from the population of websites, classify sample members by font size, and test every design with a sample of users. Given our definition of random effects it is easy to see that the regression model will contain two random effects (at least), one across users, the other across websites. More on that later.

It does not stop here. While design research is clearly about the user-design encounter, other research entities exist that we could call a population. The most routinely used *non-human populations* in design research besides *designs* are *tasks*, *situations* and *questionnaire items*. We briefly characterize the latter three and proceed to a case study that employs three populations at once.

Tasks: Modern informational websites contain thousands of information pieces and finding every one of those can be considered a task. At the same time, it is impossible to cover them all in one study, such that sampling a few is inevitable. We will never be able to tell the performance of every task, but using random effects it is possible to estimate the variance of tasks. Is that valuable information? Probably it is in many cases, as we would not easily accept a design that prioritizes on a few items at the expense of many others, which are extremely hard to find.

Situations: With the emerge of the web, practically everyone started using computers to find information. With the more recent breakthrough in mobile computing, everyone is doing everything using a computer in almost every situation. People chat, listen to music and play games during meals, classes and while watching television. They let themselves being lulled into sleep, which is tracked and interrupted by smart alarms. Smartphones are being used on trains, while driving cars and bikes, however dangerous that might be, and not even the most private situations are spared. Does the usability of messaging, navigation and e-commerce apps generalize across situations?

Again, a study to examine performance across situations would best sample from a population of situations.

Questionnaire items: Most design researchers cannot refrain from using questionnaires to evaluate certain aspects of their designs. I do not refrain from being very critical about that, however: a well constructed scale (which unfortunately is rather rule than exception in design research) consists of a set of items that trigger similar responses. At the same time, it is desireable that items are unsimilar to a degree, as that establishes good discrimination across a wide range. In ability tests, for example to assess people's intelligence or math skills, test items are constructed to vary in difficulty. The more ability a person has, the more likely will a very difficult item be solved correctly. In design research, rating scales cover concepts such as perceived mental workload, perceived usability, beauty or trustworthiness. Items of such scales differ in how extreme the proposition is, like the following three items that could belong to a scale for aesthetic perception:

- 1. The design is not particularly ugly.
- 2. The design is pretty.
- 3. The design is a piece of art.

For any design it is rather difficult to get a positive response on item 3, whereas item 1 is little of a hurdle. So, if one thinks of all possible propositions about beauty, any scale is composed of a sample from the population of beauty propositions.

If we look beyond design research, an abundance of non-human populations can be found in other research disciplines, such as:

- phonemes in psycholinguistics
- test items in psychometrics
- pictures of faces in face recognition research
- products in consumer research
- patches of land in agricultural studies
- flowers in biology

However, most of the time one or two of these populations are involved at once, whereas in design research the encounter of three is rather typical, and not even the limit, as we will see in the following case study.

## 6.4 Crossover: Testing Egans assumption

In design research, the encounter of users and designs is almost inevitable. All sampling schemes with an encounter of otherwise independent populations

produce so called *cross-classified random effects* (CRE). Random effects, that is the individual entities in the sample, are usually of lesser interest, but the group-level variation is a natural measure of diversity in the sample. When performance is diverse, we gain little faith that the situation serves all users well.

But, is variance in performance necessarily due to diversity of users? At least this is what Dennis Egan claimed almost three decades ago:

'differences among people usually account for much more variability in performance than differences in system designs' <sup>1</sup>

This claim has been cited in many papers that regarded individual differences. We were wondering how it would turn out in the third millenium, with the probably most abundant of all application domains: informational websites. For the convenience, we chose the very accessible user population of student users. The design population consisted of ten unversity websites, and ten representative tasks on those were selected. During the experiment, every one of 41 participants completed 10 information search items, being of the folling form:

On website [utwente.nl] find the program schedule [Biology].

As this is a real study, there is some inconvenience ahead. Most synthetic case studies so far have outcome measures that are too good to be true. Recall that the distribution of residuals is assumed to be Gaussian in linear regression models. Unfortunately, that is not how the noise of time-on-task measures and other "temporal" variables is frequently shaped. The cheap trick of *log transformation* often serves the purpose when not much is at stake. A more disciplined approach to work with time variables is given in [GLM - Time variables].

```
attach(Egan)
```

```
D_egan <- D_egan %>% mutate(logToT = log(ToT))
D_egan %>% as_tbl_obs()
```

The study originally gathered demographic data and even design features, but for the question of which population varies the most, they are of no further interest. The basic factors in the study were exclusively from human and non-human populations. The latter consisted of designs and tasks in the first

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Egan, D. Individual differences in human-computer interaction. In M. Helander, ed., Handbook of Human Computer interaction. Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1988, 543–568.

place. However, a fourth non-human population has been added: after all, participants get items, which are pairs of tasks and websites. Only seemingly redundant, items will enter the model as a separate random effect. Similar to interaction effects, it may not hold that a task has the same difficulty on every website, and a particular website may present one task in an accessible way, but hide another. The following grid of histogram shows a graphical approximation of the distribution of human and non-human populations. The individual plots were created using the following code:

```
D_egan %>%
 group_by(Part) %>%
 summarize(avg_logToT = mean(logToT)) %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = avg_logToT)) +
 geom_histogram() +
 labs(title = "distribution of participant average log-times") +
 xlim(1.5,6.5)
```

There seems to be substantial variation between participants, tasks and items, but very little variation in designs. We build a GMM for the encounter of the four populations.

```
\mu_i = \beta_0 + x_{Pi}\beta_P + x_{Di}\beta_D + x_{Ti}\beta_T + x_{D:Ti}\beta_{D:T}\beta_P \sim N(0, \sigma_P)\beta_D \sim N(0, \sigma_D)\beta_T \sim N(0, \sigma_T)\beta_{DxT} \sim N(0, \sigma_{DxT})y_{in}
```

```
M_1 <- D_egan %>%
 stan_glmer(logToT ~ 1 + (1|Part) + (1|Design) + (1|Task) + (1|Design:Task),data = .)
P_1 <- posterior(M_1)</pre>
```

The group-level variations are recorded as standard deviations and in the Bayesian estimation framework such variance parameters have their posterior distributions like any other. While the grpef command would conveniently extract a summary of the posteriors, here we choose to get in full contact with the posteriors. In contrast to the linear coefficients, variance parameters are bounded at zero. For this reason, it usually makes little sense to ask whether there is possibly zero variance in a random effect. But, to answer our question, we should rather compare the posterior distributions of all  $\sigma$ , including the error term (Obs).

```
P_1 %>%
 filter(type == "grpef" | type == "disp") %>%
 mutate(re_factor = if_else(type == "disp", "Obs", re_factor)) %>%
```

```
arrange(order) %>%
mutate(re_factor = forcats::fct_inorder(re_factor)) %>%
ggplot(aes(x = value)) +
geom_density() +
labs(x = "group-level standard deviation") +
facet_grid(re_factor~.)
```

Before we formally evaluate Egan's claim, there are a few noteworthy remarks on how to read the posteriors, when the parameter is a group-level standard deviation. First, standard deviation is on the same scale as the measured variable. Usually, this makes standard deviations rather intuitive to interpret. This is, unless you have obscured your variable by log transformation, which is the major disadvantage of this procedure. Second, the posterior graph is too easily misinterpreted by confusing the posterior distribution for the group-level distribution. Instead, the amount of variation in a random factor is reflected by the location on the x-axis, while the spread is uncertainty. The population of designs seems to have the lowest variation of all, with users being close second. The observation-level variation (Obs) is nothing but the standard error,  $\sigma_{\epsilon}$ . The observation-level variation sometimes serves well as a reference point to make quantitative statements on variation. For example, there is little confirmation for an overwhelming "users differ!" in this particular study, as there is much more variation from one situation to the other than between participants. A third observation on the posterior plot is that some posteriors are rather certain, e.g. Obs, whereas others are extremely uncertain, especially task-level variation. There is a pattern to explain this: uncertainty of group-level variation estimates heavily depends on sample size from the respective population. Design and Task have a meager N=10, which is why there is so much uncertainty. At the other extreme, every single one of the 410 observations contributes to estimation of  $\sigma_{\text{Obs}}$ , resulting in a rather certain estimate.

All interaction effects are potential assaults on generalizability and so are items (Design:Task). Without this interaction effect, the model would assume that all ten tasks had the same relative difficulty regardless of the website. And the same goes for website. Given the countless possibilities to structure information on a website, this is a bold assumption. It were as if all ten information architects had previously agreed on how well to support any of the tasks. And, as the results show, there is substantial conditional variation, information architects do not fully agree. Regarding the interpretation, the question is: are we willing to add the conditional design effects under what Egan called "designs", or can only complete websites be called designs, with everything underneath being singular forces that amplify or erase each other? This depends on whether you are an optimist or realist designer. The realist

thinks that design is a wicked problem science, where a good design is a bunch of reasonable compromises, but it is never the maximum. You may use large fonts to improve reading speed, but that comes at more scrolling time. You may choose to place an awesome video presentation of your university on its homepage, but you are using costly space you could use for other frequently used information. In such a view, a design is a set of carefully calibrated trade-offs and must therefore be taken as a whole.

We proceed with a formal check of Egans claim. It can be stated as: is the random effect variation of users larger than variation of designs,  $\sigma_{\rm Part} > \sigma_{\rm Design}$ ? One might be tempted to somehow refer to the figure above and evaluate how much the two posterior distributions overlap. It is much easier than that. Recall, that the joint posterior distribution covers all parameters simultaneously at every MCMC draw. Usually, we evaluate the marginal posterior of one parameter at a time for inference. But, it is equally valid to derive further quantities at every MCMC draw and make inference. In the present case, this quantity is a variable with two states: either Egan's claim holds, or it does not. The marginal posterior of such a logical variable is of type Bernoulli, capturing the proportion of MCMC draws, where  $\sigma_{\rm Part} > \sigma_{\rm Design}$  holds.

```
C_Egan_is_right <-
P_1 %>%
filter(type == "grpef", re_factor %in% c("Part", "Design")) %>%
select(chain, iter, re_factor, value) %>%
spread(re_factor, value) %>%
summarize(Prop_Egan_is_right = mean(Part > Design)) %>%
c()

C_Egan_is_right
```

```
$Prop_Egan_is_right
[1] 0.944
```

A chance of 0.944 can count as good evidence in favour of Egan's claim, although it is outshined by other factors, as we have discussed above.

In this case study we have illustrated a number of useful concepts in design research:

- 1. Design research deals with samples of several human and non-human populations at once. Cross-classified random effects models capture these structures.
- 2. Group-level standard deviations are captured by the posterior in much the same manner as linear coefficients. The only difference being that they are bounded to zero, which makes null hypotheses useless and can lead to strongly skewed marginal posteriors.

3. When testing Egan's claim, we saw how an exotic hypothesis can easily be answered through deriving further quantities from the joint posterior. The same technique we have previously employed to find the troughs in te uncanny valley polynomials.

detach (Egan)

## 6.5 Measuring entities: psychometric applications [TBC]

Traditionally, psychometrics deals with the valid and reliable measurement of personal characteristics, such as individual levels of performance, motivation, socio-cognitive attitude and the like. Advanced statistical models have been devised, such as confirmatory factor analysis or item response models. Formally, these applications establish an order among population entities, from low to high. The least one is aiming for is that for any pair of entities A and B, we can tell which entity has the more pronounced property. This is called an *ordering structure*. Few applications even go beyond mere ranking and establish metric interpretations. For example, in an *interval-scaled* test, the researcher may compare differences between participants.

A psychometric test usually contains several items. For example, a test to measure a child's arithmetic skills would contain a set of arithmetic problems and a simple test score would be the number of correctly answered items. In design research, self-report questionnaires are routinely used for one of two purposes: first, research questions sometimes involve traits or abilities of users. For example, one could ask how a persons visual-spatial abilities are related to navigation performance, be it in a complex hypertext environment, body cavities during surgical procedures or the scattered displays in air traffic control centers. The researcher would then administer two tests: an innate ability test, such as a mental rotation task and a performance test on, let's say, the surgical procedure. This is just twice the standard psychometric procedure. Second, in design research one frequently assesses properties of a design by using standardized questionnaires. One example would be the comparison of user experience among a set of e-commerce homepages using scales such as the AttrakDiff (the hedonic dimension). Another example would be to map the uncanny valley effect by letting participants judge a set of artificial faces with a scale to measure eeriness.

We begin with the first case, standard psychometrics to assess user characteristics. A well designed test always employs a set of items. The primary reason for multiple items is a familiar one. In classical test theory, the observed test score  $y_i$  for participant i is assumed to be composed of the true score  $\mu_i$  and the measurement error  $\epsilon_i$  as:

$$y_i = \mu_i + \epsilon_i$$

The same principle holds as for linear models: the researchers aim is to separate  $\mu_i$  from  $\epsilon_i$  and that is only possible if there are repeated measures.

In our terminology, psychometric models are the encounter of persons and test items. With only two populations involved, the standard psychometric model is a crossover of person and item random effects, a simplification of the quadruple crossover encountered in the Egan study. What sets psychometric models apart is how random effects are being used. While in the Egan study inference was based on the population-level distribution, i.e.  $\sigma$ ., in psychometrics interesting applications are the individual scores. If we wanted to compare two individuals, e.g. which of the two is more likely to become the better surgeon based on some ability test, we need individual scores and that is precisely what random effects are on their lowest level.

#### [semantic Stroop]

Measuring participant performance is a useful application in some design research fields, such as human performance in critical systems, e.g. identify persons with the best talent for being an airspace controller. However, in design research, it is frequently designs that are to be compared. For example, in the Egan case, one might be interested to select the best of the ten website designs, in order to use it as a blueprint. Such a research question is no longer psychometric, literally, but formally the only difference is that participants can be considered test items, rather than test objects. At least, when using ramdom effects for psychometric purposes, there is nothing special about the participant random effects compared to design random effects. Let's pretend we had conducted the study in order to identify a good template for university websites. The following code extracts design random effects posteriors, summarizes them in the usual way and makes a plot.

```
attach(Egan)

ranef(P_1) %>%
 filter(re_factor == "Design") %>%
 rename(Design = re_entity) %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = Design, y = center, ymax = upper, ymin = lower)) +
 geom_point(size = 1) +
 geom_crossbar() +
 ylab("log ToT") +
 theme(axis.text.x = element_text(angle = 45))
```

The most simple form is the Rasch model in item response theory (IRT), where participants respond to a set of items and the response is either cor-

rect or incorrect. The outcome variable response is usually coded as 0 = incorrect and 1 = correct. Apparently, such a variable does nowhere near satisfy the assumption of linear models. It turns out that the Rasch model can be interpreted as cross-classified random effects in a *logistic regression* @ref(logistic\_regression). Logistic regression is a member of the General *ized* Linear family of models, which will be introduced in the next chapter.

As innocent as the Egan study seems, there is some psychometrics involved. First, cognitive workload was measured using the NASA TLX questionnaire which has four items. With four items, we would hardly want to speak of a population. The trick is to view the four items as instantiations from all a virtual set of possible questions (on that matter). A typical question in psychometric research is that of *item consistency*, which for a small set of items can be measured by the correlation between items. High inter-item correlations indicate that a scale is reliable, which basically means it predicts well. Item correlations are mainly used during scale development, as a criterion to sort out renegade items, those that do not move in accordance with the others.

detach (Egan)

### 6.6 Nested random effects

Nested random effects (NREs) represent nested sampling schemes. A classic example from educational research is: a sample of schools is drawn and inside every school a sample of students is selected. Like cross-classified models, nested models consist of multiple levels. The difference is that if one knows the lowest (or: a lower) level of an observation, the next higher level is unambiguous, like:

- every student is in exactly one class
- every participant is from exactly one professional group

As we have seen above, cross-classified models play a primary role in design research, due to the user/task/design encounter. NREs are more common in research disciplines where organisation structures or geography plays a role, such as education science (think of the international school comparison studies PISA and TIMMS), organisational psychology or political science.

Examples of nested sampling structures are some of the Comparative Usability Evaluation (CUE) studies, pioneered by Rolf Molich [CUE8]. Different to what the name might suggest, not designs are under investigation in CUE, but usability professionals. The over-arching question in the CUE series is the performance and reliability of usability professionals. Earlier studies sometimes

came to devastating results regarding consistency across professional groups when it comes to identifying and reporting usability problems. We always knew, qualitative analysis is much harder to do in an objective way, did we not? The CUE8 study lowered the bar, by asking whether several professional groups are able to arrive at consistent measures for time-on-task.

The CUE8 study measured time-on-task in usability tests, which had been conducted by 14 different teams. The original research question was: how reliable are time-on-task measures across teams? All teams were responsible for recruiting their own sample of participants. The nested sampling scheme is therefore: every participant is assigned to exactly one team. The original analysis [CUE8] focussed on the consistency across teams. Using hierarchical random effects, we can extend the analysis. Consider the research question: strong systematic variation between teams is considered a sign of low reliability in the field. But, how strong is strong? It is difficult to come up with an absolute standard for inter-team reliability. Again, we can resort to a relative standard: how does the variation between teams compare to variation between individual participants?

Under this perspective, we examine the data. This time, we have real time-on-task data and as so often, it is highly skewed. Again, we use the cheap trick of logarithmic transformation to obtain a more symmetric distribution of residuals. The downside is that the outcome variable may not be zero. For time-on-task data this is not an issue. In fact, the original CUE8 data set contains several observations with unrealistically low times. Before proceeding to the model, exploring the original variable ToT on the two levels is in order. The mean ToT is computed for the two random effect levels, participants and teams, and plotted in that order.

```
summarize(mean_ToT = mean(ToT, na.rm = T),
 n \text{ Obs} = n()) \%
 ungroup() %>%
 rename(Unit = Team) %>%
 mutate(percentile = percent_rank(mean_ToT),
 Level = "Team")
D task mean <-
 D_cue8 %>%
 group_by(Task, Condition) %>%
 summarize(mean ToT = mean(ToT, na.rm = T),
 n_0bs = n()) %>%
 ungroup() %>%
 rename(Unit = Task) %>%
 mutate(percentile = percent_rank(mean_ToT),
 Level = "Task")
bind_rows(D_team_mean,
 D_part_mean) %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = percentile,
 y = mean_ToT,
 col = Level,
 shape = Level,
 size = Level)) +
 geom_point()
```

#### detach(CUE8)

It seems there is ample variation in ToT for participants, with mean ToT ranging from below 100 to almost 500 seconds. There is variation in teamwise ToT, too, although less pronounced. This observation is congruent with the *law of small numbers*, which will be discussed in the following section.

The model is easily specified with the familiar syntax. In fact, it is not even necessary to specify that participants are nested within teams. The only requirement is that participant identifiers are unique across the whole study (not just within a team unit). The model below contains another feature of the CUE8 study. Participants were tested in one of two conditions: moderated and remote testing sessions. Mixing fixed and random effects, we examine all influences simultaneously.

Note that this treatment is between-subject for participants. There is also just one team that did both conditions. For specifying hierarchical random

effects we can use the same syntax as before, *if* all participants have a unique identifier. If the participant identifier is only unique within a team, it is either to be recoded, e.g. mutate(Part = str\_c(Team, Part)), or one uses the nesting operator Part/Team.

After running the model, we compare the sources of variation. Recall, that LRMs assume that the ramdom effects are drawn from a Normal distribution and the amount of systematic variation is represented by  $\sigma$ . As this is precisely the way, Normal distributed errors are represented, we can actually distinguish three levels of variation: participants, team and observations (residuals). The table below tells that the strongest variation is still on observation-level. Almost the same amount of variation is due to teams. And, surprisingly, the variation due to teams is considerably smaller than participant-level variation.

```
attach(CUE8)
T_sov <- coef(P_1, type = c("grpef", "disp"))
T_sov</pre>
```

parameter	type	fixef	re_factor	center	lower	upper
sigma_resid Sigma[Part:Intercept,(Intercept)]	disp grpef		NA Part	$0.611 \\ 0.427$		
${\bf Sigma[Team:Intercept,(Intercept)]}$	grpef	Intercept	Team	0.589	0.405	0.940

It is hard to deny that, at least for consumer systems, people vary greatly in performance. That is the whole point about universal design. However, the discordance between professional teams is also concerning. And that arises after controlling for an experimental factor, remote or moderated. By the way, the difference between moderated and remote testing is  $0.33[-0.31, 1.05]_{CI95}$ . The fixed effect is rather weak and highly uncertain.

```
T_fixef <- fixef(P_1)
T_fixef</pre>
```

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	4.614	4.093	5.10
${\bf Condition moderated}$	0.331	-0.311	1.05

```
detach(CUE8)
```

## 6.7 What are random effects? On pooling and shrinkage

At least half a dozen of defintions exist for the term random effect. This is so confusing that some authors refrain to use the term altogether. Here, the definition is conceptually based on the idea of a population. Technically, it is compatible with the implementation found in rstanarm and other engines. Unfortunately, the very terms random effect and random factor are highly misleading, as there is nothing more or less random in a random factors as compared to fixed factors. The opposite is the case: as we have seen above, a random effects model pulls a variance component from the random term and explains it by assigning coefficients to entities (teams or users). The best advice is to not contemplate over what makes a factor random. It is just a name and because random factors are so amazingly useful, they should be called fonzy factors, instead.

When a data set contains a factor that we may wish to add to the model, the question is: fixed effect or random effect? Above, I have introduced the heuristic of populations. If one can conceive tasks, designs, or whatever set of items as a population, there is clumping to some degree, but also variation. The more clumping there is, the better is the guess for unobserved members by observing some members. In such a case, the predictor is introduced as a fonzy factor. Now it is time to more formally conceive when a set of things is a population.

Obviously, we would never speak of a population, when the objects of interest are from different classes. Entities gathering on super market parking lots, like persons, cars, baskets and and dropped brochures, we would never see as a population. People, we would generally see as a population, as long as what we want to observe is somewhat homogenous. When the question is, how fast persons can do a 2000 meter run at the olympic games, we would certainly want one population per discipline (swimming, running, etc). Why is that so? It is because we expect members of a population to have some similarity,

in other words: if you have observed how some members of the population behave, you get an idea about the unobserved.

Reconsider the Bayesian principle of prior knowledge by an experiment of thought: Consider, a UX expert with experience in e-commerce is asked to estimate how long it takes users to do the checkout, without being shown the system. The expert will probably hesitate briefly, and then come up with an estimate of, let's say, 45 seconds. Without any data, the expert made some reasonable assumptions, e.g. that a disciplined design process has been followed, and then relies on experience. The experts personal experience has formed prior to the study by observing many other cases. Now, we confront the expert with an even more bizzare situation: guess the time-on-task for an unknown task with an unseen system of unknown type! The expert will probably refuse to give an answer, arguing that some systems have tasks in the millisecond range (e.g. starting a stopwatch), whereas other processes easily run for hours or days (e.g. doing data exploration). This is agreeable, and we provide the expert with average ToT of four other tasks within the same system:

$$ToT_{1-4} = 23, 45, 66, 54$$

Now, the expert is confident that ToT be around 50 seconds and that is probably a good guess. What has happened is that prior belief about the unkown task parameter has been formed not externally, but by data as it arrived. The likely value of one unit has been learned from the other units and this appears pretty reasonable. The same principle applies when removing outliers. When staring at a boxplot or scatterplot the mind of the observer forms a gestalt that covers the salient features of data, for example: almost all points are located in the range 100 - 500. Once this pattern has formed, deviant points stand out.

However, the salience of the gestalt may vary. Consider a situation where ToT has been measured by the same procedure, but using five different stop watches. Stop watches are so incredibly accurate that if you know one measure, you basically know them all. What many researchers do with repeated measures data, is average over the repetitions. This is the one extreme called total pooling. In the stopwatch case the average across the five measures would be so highly representative, that total pooling is a reasonable thing to do.

In other cases, the levels of a factor are more or less independent, for example tasks in a complex system, where procedure duration ranges from seconds to hours. Guessing the duration of one task from a set of others is highly susceptible and the average duration across tasks is not representative at all. The best choice then is to see tasks as factor levels, that are independent. This extreme of *no pooling* is exactly represented by fixed effect factors as they have been introduced in @ref(linear\_models).

Random effects sit right between these two extremes of no and total pooling and implement partial pooling: the more the group mean is representative for the units of the group, the more it is taken into account. The best thing about partial pooling is that, unlike real priors, there is not even the need to determine the amount of pooling in advance. The variation of entities has been observed. The stronger the enities vary, the less can be learned from the group level. The variation is precisely the group-level standard deviation of the random effect. So, we can think of random factors as factors where there is a certain amount of cross-talk between levels. The random effect estimate then draws on two sources of evidence: all data from the overarching population and data that belongs just to this one entity. As that is the case, the exploratory analysis of individual performance in SOV does not resemble a true random effect, as group means were calculated independently.

How are random effects implemented to draw on both sources? Obviously, the procedure must be more refined than just putting dummy variables in a likelihood formula. In the Bayesian framework a remarkably simple trick suffices, and it is even a familiar one. By the concept of prior distributions, we already know a way to restrict the range of an effect based on prior knowledge. For example, intelligence test results have the prior distribution  $IQ\ N(100,15)$ , just because they have been empirically calibrated this way. In most other cases, we do have rough ideas about the expected magnitude and range in the population, say: healthy human adults will finish a 2000m run in the range of 5-12 minutes.

As prior knowledge is external to the data, it often lacks systematic evidence, with the exception of a meta analyses. This is why we tend to use weak informative priors. Like priors, random effects take into account knowledge external to the entity under question. But, they draw this knowledge from the data, which is more convincing after all. The basic trick to establish the cross-talk between random factor levels, is to simultaneously estimate factor levels and random factor variation. This has several consequences:

All random effects get a more or less subtle trend towards the population mean. As a side effect, the random factor variance is usually smaller than variance between fixed factors, or naive group means. This effect is called *shrinkage*. When the random factor variation is small, extreme factor levels are pulled stronger towards the population mean, resulting in stronger shrinkage. Or vice versa: When random variation is large, the factor levels stand more on their own.

The random factor variation is an estimate and as such it is certain only to a degree. As we have seen in 6.4, the more levels a random factor comprises, the more precise is the estimate of random factor variation. The strongest shrinkage occurs with few observations per factor levels and highly certain random factor variation.

Previously, I have stressed how important repeated measures design is, as the number of observations per entity plays a role, too. The more observations there are, the less is the group mean overruled by the population mean. Less shrinkage occurs. This is why mixed-effects models gracefully deal with imbalanced designs. Groups with more observations are just gradually more self-determined. Taking this to the opposite extreme: when a factor level contains no data at all, it will just be replaced by the population mean. This principle offers a very elegant solution to the problem of missing data. If you know nothing about a person, the best guess is the population mean.

Under the perspective of populations as a more or less similar set of entities, these principles seem to make sense. Within this framework, we can even define what fixed effects are:

a fixed effect is a factor where levels are regarded so unsimilar, that the factor-level distribution can be practically considered infinite.

We routinely approximate such a situation when using non-informative prior distributions, like  $\beta_0$  N(0, 10000). In the extreme case, a uniform distribution with an infinite upper boundary truly has an infinite variance:  $\beta_0$   $U(0, \infty)$ . A finite population mean doesn't even exist with such a distribution.

So, when a design researcher has observed that with design A, ToT is approximately distributed as  $ToT_A$  N(120,40), is it realistic to assume that design B has ToT in the range of several hours? Would a cognitive psychologist see it equally likely that the difference in reaction time on two primitive tasks is 200ms or 2h? Probably not. Still, using fixed effects for factors with very few levels is a justifyable approximation. First of all, priors can be used at any time to factor in reasonable assumptions about the range. Second, with very few estimates, the random factor variation cannot be estimated with any useful certainty. Very small shrinkage would occur and the results would practically not differ.

The CUE8 study makes a case for seeing shrinkage in action: Teams of researchers were asked to conduct a performance evaluation on a website. Tasks and website were the same, but the teams followed their own routines. Some teams tested a few handful of participants, whereas others tested dozens remotely. Teams, as another non-human population (sic!) differ vastly in the number of observations they collected. We can expect differences in shrinkage. To see the effect, we compare the team-level group means as fixed factor versus random factor. All teams have enough participants tested to estimate their mean with some certainty. At the same time, the group sizes vary so dramatically that we should see clear differences in tendency towards the mean.

We estimate two models, a random effects (RE) model and a fixed effects (FE) model. For the RE model, the absolute group means are calculated on the posterior. Figure XY shows the comparison of FE and RE estimates.

```
attach(CUE8)
M_2 <-
 D_cue8 %>%
 stan_glm(logToT ~ Team - 1, data = .)
M 3 <-
 D_cue8 %>%
stan_glmer(logToT ~ 1 + (1|Team), data = .)
P_2 <- posterior(M_2, type = "fixef")</pre>
P_3_fixef <- posterior(M_3, type = "fixef")
P_3_ranef <- posterior(M_3, type = "ranef")
Creating a derived posterior with absolute team-level random effects
P_3_abs <-
 left_join(P_3_ranef, P_3_fixef,
 by = c("chain", "iter", "fixef"),
 suffix = c("","_fixef"))
P_3_abs$value <- P_3_abs$value + P_3_abs$value_fixef
T_shrinkage <-
 D_cue8 %>%
 group_by(Team) %>%
 summarize(N = n()) %>%
 mutate(fixef = fixef(P_2)$center,
 ranef = ranef(P_3_abs)$center,
 diff = fixef - ranef)
sd_fixef <- sd(T_shrinkage$fixef)</pre>
sd_ranef <- sd(T_shrinkage$ranef)</pre>
T_shrinkage %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = Team, y = fixef, size = N, col = "fixef")) +
 geom_point() +
 geom_point(aes(y = ranef, col = "ranef"), alpha = .5)
```

#### detach(CUE8)

Team H is far off the population average, but almost no shrinkage occurs due to the large number of observations. Again, no shrinkage occurs for Team L, as it is close to the population mean, and has more than enough data to speak for itself. Team B with the fewest observation (a genereous N=45, still), gets noticable shrinkage, although it is quite close to the population mean. Overall, the pattern resembles the above properties of random effects: groups that are far off the population mean and have comparably small sample size get a shrinkage correction. In the case of CUE8, these correction are overall negligible, which is due to the fact that all teams gathered ample data. Recall the SOV simulation above, where the set of tasks every user did was beyond control of the researcher. In situations with quite heterogeneous amount of missing data per participant, shrinkage is more pronounced and more information is drawn from the population mean.

At the same time, shrinkage adjusts the estimates for variation, with  $sd_{RE} = 0.583 < sd_{FE} = 0.588$ . The random effects estimate is an unbiased estimate for the population variance, whereas fixed effects variation would be overestimating. [REF]

Now that random effects have been de-mystified as effects with partial pooling, where the amount of pooling is a consequence of observed data, we can move on to applications. The variance in the population is an indicator for heterogeneity of participants (or any non-human population) and random effects variation is an accurate estimator for that. For designers, it is vital to understand how varied performance with a system is. Furthermore, as we will see in the next section, with slope random effects we can even estimate the variation of how users respond to different design conditions. When comparing two designs A and B, that enables the researcher to assess in how much a design is uniformly better, a desirable property of universal designs. There are also useful applications for the random effects, i.e. the individual levels. In some applications the crucial issue is to get good estimates of individual performance, which falls into the domain of psychometrics.

# 6.8 Variance in variation: slope random effects [TBC]

So far, we have dealt with random effects that capture the gross differences of entities: individuals differ in how quick they work, tasks differ in length and test items in difficulty. We introduced these random effects as conditional effects like: "the intercept depends on what person you are looking at". Whereas in the beginning of the chapter I emphasized the necessity to examine within-person processes in within-subject designs, we never went beyond conditional

statements regarding the intercept effect. In contrast consider the A/B testing case. Being more efficient with design B compared to A is the primary question and that we can straight-forwardly put into a conditional statement: "by how much B is more efficient than A depends on the person".

Let's first exlore graphically what this means. Assume that we had tested only five participants with one task each. The CGM model with participant-level random effect takes the following form:

$$\mu_i = \beta_0 + \beta_{0p} + x_1 \beta_1 \beta_{0p} \sim N(0, \sigma_{0p})$$

The figure below illustrates the model on a sample of five participants. As the effect is the same, we see five parallel lines. While the height where a line starts differs between users, they all benefit to the precisely same amount from design B.Is that realistic? If we expect that differential design effects exist, it is not. There can be plenty of reasons why two users differ in how much the benefit from a certain design. For example, the BrowsingAB case features a strong interaction effect on age. When thinking of random effects, it helps to imagine the situation where an influencing factor exists, but was not recorded. The inter-individual variance will remain, and the participant identifier is the only predictor at hand.

```
sim <- function(n_Part = 5,</pre>
 beta_OP = rnorm(n_Part,0, sigma_OP),
 sigma OP = 20,
 beta 1P = rnorm(n Part, 0, sigma 1P),
 sigma_1P = 0,
 sigma_eps = 0) {
 Part = data_frame(Part = 1:n_Part,
 beta_OP = beta_OP,
 beta_1P = beta_1P)
 Design = data_frame(Design = c("A", "B"),
 beta_0 = 120,
 beta_1 = -30)
 mascutils::expand_grid(Part = Part$Part, Design = Design$Design) %>%
 left_join(Part) %>%
 left_join(Design) %>%
 mutate(mu = beta_0 + beta_0P + (beta_1 + beta_1P) * (Design == "B"),
 ToT = rnorm(nrow(.), mu, 0)) %>%
 as_tbl_obs()
}
sim() %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = Design,
 y = ToT,
```

```
group = Part)) +
geom_line()
```

A more realistic figure of the effects is the spaghetti plot below. All but one of the participants improve with design B, but to rather different degrees. The lines have different starting points, and they differ in slopes. This is called a *slope random effect*. Similar to intercept random effects, slope random effects are factors that represent individual deviations from the population-level effect.

For the design effect in Browsing AB, a model with intercept and slope random effects is formally specified as:

$$\mu_i = \beta_0 + \beta_{0p} + x_1\beta_1 + x_1\beta_{1p}\beta_{0p} \sim N(0, \sigma_{0p})\beta_{1p} \sim N(0, \sigma_{1P})$$

Previously, we have seen that repeated measures are the key to pull a random effect out of the residual term. The same holds for slope random effects. For estimating individual slopes, the same participant (or any non-human entity) must encounter multiple conditions. For demonstration of slope random effects, we examine another instantiation of the BrowsingAB data set BAB5, which differs from BAB1 in two aspects: all participants encounter both designs (within-entity design) and ToT was measured on five given tasks (repeated measures). We use the simulation function as provided by the BrowsingAB case environment. As always, we start with some exploratory analysis.

```
attach(BrowsingAB)
```

The spaghetti plot (the pasta is dry, not cooked) is excellent for visualizing participant-level effects. For the BAB5 data set the following figure shows the individual design effects. While on average design B is favoured, there is a wild bunch of slopes. That should not surprise us, as in the previous chapter we discovered a strong interaction effect by age. Here we ignore this predictor (or pretend not to have recorded it) and exclusively work with the participant factor.

The R formula for slope random effects follows the same principles as before. For the present case it reads as "the intercept and design effect are *conditional* on participants": (1 + Design|Part). We estimate the model using the rstanarm engine and use the usual commands to extract population-level estimates and random effect variation.

Remember to always put complex random effects into brackets, as the + operator binds very strongly.

The random factor variation is extracted from the posterior distribution using the grpef command. The coefficients are standard deviations of the two random factors, Intercept and DesignB. The results confirm the earlier fixed effects analysis on the data set: users experience very different advantages of Design B. The variation of the difference is almost as pronounced as the

variation on Design A (Intercept), alone. The standard deviation has the same magnitude as the group level effect, hence some users are likely to experience a disadvantage, even. That matches the earlier results, where design B caused problems for elderly users. In fact, we can phrase the slope random effect in much the same way as interaction effect age:Design in @ref(differential\_design\_effects), namely as a conditional statement of the form:

the effect of Design depends on the participant.

re_factor	fixef	center	lower	upper
NA	DesignB			-8.93
NA	Intercept	99.5	91.27	108.17
Part	DesignB	18.9	9.63	33.86
Part	Intercept	17.6	10.48	26.45

```
detach(BrowsingAB)
```

Intercept random effects capture gross variations between users. Independent of designs, tasks or situation, some users are assumed to always be faster, more accurate or pleased. That is certainly better than sticking with the image of the average user, but it remains static. With slope random effects can we render individual differences in the process. How differently do individual users react when proceeding from design A to B? That is a completely different question than the average difference between designs. Review the spaghetti plot @ref(fig:BAB RE age) once again. Adding a slope random effect to the model really means that the effect is estimated as many times as there are participants in the sample (run ranef(M\_slope\_1) to see it). And these coefficients tell a story about generalizeability. The more the random effects are dispersed, the less typical is the average (the fixed effect). When you are doing a user study for an e-commerce company, it may be sufficient to just tell the average figure (this may even be a good idea as to not overwhelm the mind of your manager). However, when doing design experiments for the purpose of finding more generally applicable rules for good design, generalizability matters. In fact, with a CGM model that compares two independent groups, you cannot prove that the hypothesized process (e.g. larger fonts are better to read) holds for everyone.

Proving that an effect is practically universal across participants is possible with slope random effects, but requires rendering individual trajectories. That is only possible, if the study assesses the conditions in question for every participant. This is called a within-subject design. Anyone who has trustingly made generalizing conclusions on the basis of between-subject manipulations, should feel deeply troubled. Can we actually be sure that:

- everyone experiences the uncanny valley effect, when viewing robot faces?
- everyone's alertness when sleepy benefits from noise?
- every nurse makes fewer errors with a third millenium infusion pump design?

Even researchers doing plain user studies cannot refrain from the issue completely. When the system is safety critical, it matters that a particular design is a universal improvement over the other. Whoever operates it, errors must occur less frequently. In the next chapter, we will encounter such a study, where a novel infusion pump interface was compared with a legacy design. Furthermore, we examined how performance with both devices changed with practice. As the experiment was fully within-subject it is open to investigate generalizeability on both issues:

- do all participants benefit from the modern design?
- do all participants learn over the course of the experiment?

As we will see in 7, most of the recorded performance measures do not comply with the assumptions of linear models and only the measure of perceived workload seems amenable. We construct a model that captures the two main factors (design and session) with a possible interaction effect. Intercept and slope random effects are added for participants and tasks:

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	21.00	14.13	28.20
DesignNovel	-8.03	-12.30	-3.78
Session2-1	-8.14	-12.80	-3.20
Session3-2	-5.69	-10.32	-1.14
DesignNovel:Session2-1	2.20	-3.64	7.96
DesignNovel:Session3-2	1.62	-4.50	7.59

## #grpef(M\_wkld) FIXME bayr

```
posterior(M_wkld) %>%
 filter(type == "grpef") %>%
 group_by(parameter) %>%
 summarize(median = median(value)) %>%
 filter(!is.na(median)) %>%
 kable()
```

parameter	median
Sigma[Part:DesignNovel,DesignNovel]	6.52
$\overline{Sigma[Part:DesignNovel:Session2-1,DesignNovel:Session2-1]}$	3.41
$\overline{Sigma[Part:DesignNovel:Session 3-2, DesignNovel:Session 3-2]}$	4.07
$\overline{\text{Sigma}[\text{Part:Intercept},(\text{Intercept})]}$	12.38
Sigma[Part:Session2-1,Session2-1]	4.79
Sigma[Part:Session3-2,Session3-2]	3.83
Sigma[Task:DesignNovel,DesignNovel]	3.22
$\underline{Sigma[Task:DesignNovel:Session2-1,DesignNovel:Session2-1]}$	2.37
$\underline{Sigma[Task:DesignNovel:Session 3-2, DesignNovel:Session 3-2]}$	2.62
Sigma[Task:Intercept,(Intercept)]	6.91
Sigma[Task:Session2-1,Session2-1]	2.81
Sigma[Task:Session3-2,Session3-2]	2.49

### 6.8.0.1

## 6.8.0.2 Exercises

detach(IPump)

1. Review the scientific literature in your field. Find examples of design experiments where general conclusions were drawn from between-subject predictors. If that was easy, visit one of the leading social psychology journals and repeat.

# 6.9 Growing with random effects correlations [TBD]

Here we finally resolve the typing paradox and encounter another immensely useful element in random effect modelling. Let's take another good look at the Figure X [Average? Neverage. Last one].

## 6.10 Advanced tricks

- non-compliant test users in CUE8
- handling missing values by priors

# 6.11 Exercises

1. In the Egan study, cross-classified random effects capture the encounter of samples. Actually, we have not even taken this to an extreme, as the original study also measured mental workload with a scale of four items. Create and run a model that captures all samples, including the scale items. Interpret the results.

# Generalized Linear Models

In the preceding chapters we got acquainted with the linear model as an extremely flexible tool to represent dependencies between predictors and outcome variables. We saw how factors and covariates gracefully work together and how complex research designs can be captured by multiple random effects. It was all about specifying an appropriate (and often sophisticated) right-hand side of the regression formula, the predictor term. Little space has been dedicated to the outcome variables. That is now going to change, and we will start by examining the assumptions that are associated with the outcome variable.

Have you wondered about the abundance of simulated data sets up to this point? The reason for using simulated data is: the linear model, as introduced so far, makes assumptions that are *never* truly met by real data. The simulated data sets so far were meant to demonstrate some features found in real data sets, but generously wiped over some other frequent peculiarities.

Another question is probably lurking in the minds of readers with some classic statistics training: what has happened to the assumptions of ANOVA and the like, and where are all the neat tests that check for Normality, constant variance and such? In the next section we will review these assumptions and lead them ad absurdum. Simply put, in the real world is no such thing as Normal distribution and linearity. Checking assumptions on a model that you know upfront is inappropriate, is a futile exercise, at least when better alternatives are available, and that is the case: with *Generalized Linear Models* (GLMs) we extend the regression modelling framework once again.

The GLM framework rests on two extensions that bring us a huge step closer to the data. The first one is a minor mathematical trick to establish linearity, the *link function*. The second is the informed choice about the expected *pattern of randomness*. As we will see, most of the time it is more or less obvious what statistical distribution, other than the Gaussian, matches the data.

For the impatient: The regression engines retanarm and brms offer a huge variety of randomness distributions to possibly replace the Gaussian distribution. Having too many choices is not always an advantage, but here it is. In my opinion, most of the time it suffices to know just two or three properties of the outcome variable:

- 1. Is the outcome varible discrete or continuous?
- 2. What are the boundaries of measures?
- 3. In case of discrete data: Can we expect cover-dispersion?

The first two properties are obvious and we already know them when planning the study. And we also do not have to worry about what over-dispersionis even, because it practically always is the case.

In the following three sections I will explain the three core assumptions of linear models, for this recall the canonical model formulation:

$$\mu_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i} + \ldots + \beta_k x_{ki} y_i \sim \text{Norm}(\mu_i, \sigma)$$

The first term, we call the likelihood and it represents the systematic quantitative relations we expect to find in the data. When it is a sum of products, like above, we call it linear. *Linearity* is a frequently under-regarded assumption of linear models and it is doomed to fail. The second term defines the pattern of randomness and it hosts two further assumptions: *Normal distribution* and *constant error variance* of the random component.

Some classic textbooks tend to present these assumptions as preconditions for a successful ANOVA or linear regression. The very term *pre*condition suggest, that they need to be checked upfront and the classic statisticians are used to deploy a zoo of null hypothesis tests on the data. If one fails, let's say the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test on Normality, researchers often turn to non-parametric tests. Many also just continue with ANOVA and add some shameful statements to the discussion of results or bravely cite some research paper that claims ANOVAs robustness to violations.

I have met at least one seasoned researcher who divided the world of data into two categories: parametric data, that meets ANOVA assumptions, and non-parametric that does not. All models (or families) in the present chapter, he would have regarded as non-parametric. Let me get this straight:

First of all, data is neither parametric nor non-parametric. Instead, data is distributed in some form and a good model aligns to this form. A model is parametric, when the statistics it produces have a useful interpretations, like the intercept is the group mean of the reference group and the intercept random effect represents the variation between individuals. The parameters

of a polynomial model usually don't have a direct interpretation. However, we saw that useful parameters, such as the minimum of the curve, can be derived. Therefore, polynomial models are often called semiparametric [CROSSREF]. As an example for a non-parametric test, the Mann-Whitney U statistic is composed of the number of times observations in group A are larger than in group B. The resulting sum U usually bears no relation to any real world process or question. Strictly speaking, the label non-parametric has nothing to do with ANOVA assumptions. It refers to the usefulness of parameters. A research problem, where U as the sum of wins has a useful interpretation could be that in some dueling disciplines, such as Fencing, team competitions are constructed by letting every athlete from a team duel every member of the opponent team. We could call the U-test parametric, and perhaps, the group means turn out to be meaningless.

Here, I will not present any tests on assumptions, other than exploratory plots. Non-parametric tests are completely at odds with the philosophy of this book, as they do not produce parameters that can be interpreted quantitatively. Instead, I will debunk all three assumptions for those type of measures design researchers are routinely dealing with right away. Every assumption that crumbles, rebounces from two new building blocks that add to our regression framework:

- 1. link functions re-establish linearity
- 2. random distributions cover the expected pattern of randomness and the relation of mean and variance

By these two concepts, the GLM framework rises from the ashes of LMs. It hosts a variety of models that leaves little reason for crude approximations, like the Gaussian LM, let alone non-parametric procedures and data transformations. There almost always is a reasonable choice that largely depends on the properties of the response variable: the Poisson LM is the first choice for outcome variables that are counted (with no limit), like number of errors. Binomial (aka logistic) LM covers the case of successful task completion, where counts have an upper boundary. These two GLM members have been around for more than half a century in statistics. The quest for a good model for reaction time and time-on-task was more difficult, as there does not seem to be a generally accepted default. Luckily, with recent developments in Bayesian regression engines the choice of random distributions has become much broader. For RT and ToT, I will suggest primarily the exponentially-modified Gaussian (ExGauss) LM and, to some extent, Gamma LM. Along the way, this very chapter introduces a basic way of choosing between response distributions based on model comparison. For binned rating scales, where responses fall into a few ordered categories, ordinal logistic regression is a generally accepted approach. For (quasi)continuous rating scales will I make a novel suggestion, the Beta LM.

# 7.1 Debunking the Gaussian linear model

The Gaussian linear model, which we discussed at first, makes many assumptions, where numbers often vary between sources. In my view, the three crucial assumptions are:

- 1. Linearity of the association between predictors and outcome variable.
- 2. Normal distribution of responses
- 3. constant variance of response distribution

Researchers routinely check these assumptions by means of visual exploration or null hypothesis tests. However, on closer examination, it turns out that the first two assumptions strictly cannot be true for any real data, and the third is highly susceptible, at least.

## 7.1.1 Assuming linearity

Recall the principle, "all-finite-in-the-endless": when two or more interventions improve the same process, e.g. visual recognition of letters, the sum is less than the summands. This results in a non-linearity when the boundary of performance is reached. With a small set of predictors this can gracefully be modelled as saturation interaction effects.

Consider a study that assesses the improvement of safe operation with continued practice. For simplicity, we regard just a single nurse whose number of errors were measured on a chain of 8 tasks. Errors in operation were measured as number of deviations from the shortest possible interaction sequence.

We simulate a linear model, assuming there is an improvement of one error less with every repetition of the sequence, with expected 7 deviations in the first session. We assume that path deviations has a normally distributed random component with  $\sigma=1$ .

See what happens when the linear model is naively applied to the deviation counts? In no time, negative values are produced, which are impossible. Similar to saturation effects, we would expect some asymptotic behaviour, rather than a straight line, when the outcome variable approaches its natural lower boundary.

Here is some real world data from the IPump study. We take a look at a small slice of it: the total number of deviations of one participant across the three sessions.

```
attach(IPump)

D_pumps %>%
 filter(Part == 5, Design == "Novel") %>%
 group_by(Part, session) %>%
 summarize(deviations = sum(deviations)) %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = session, y = deviations)) +
 geom_point() +
 geom_line() +
 ylim(0,7)
```

```
detach(IPump)
```

What really happens when a performance measure approaches its natural limit, is an asymptotic leaning-on. Neither will the line break through the limit, nor will it stop there abruptly.

Such a non-linearity happens to all outcome variables that have natural lower or upper boundaries, and that includes all outcome variables in the universe, except its very own spatial extension, perhaps. All outcome variables in design research suffer from the problem of impossible predictions as a consequence of their boundedness:

- Errors and other countable incidences are bounded at zero
- ToT is bounded at zero and probably also bounded above when users loose their patience
- Rating scales are bounded at the lower and upper extreme item
- Task completion has a lower bound of zero and upper bound is the number of tasks. Or the average task completion is in the range [0, 1]

### 7.1.2 Assuming Normal distribution of randomness

The second term of a linear model,  $y_i \sim Norm(\mu_i, \sigma)$  states that the observed values are drawn from Normal distributions (see @ref(resid\_normality)). Two

observed values  $y_i$  and  $y_j$  are only drawn from the same distribution, when they have the same expected value  $\mu_i = \mu_j$ . The Normal distribution has been used ubiquitously in statistics. But in fact, the Normal distribution is a reasonable approximation when the measures are far off the boundaries of measures and the error is much smaller than the predicted values (@ref(normal\_distributions)).

In design research studies this is frequently not the case. We begin with a simulated study comparing a novel and a legacy interface design for medical infusion pumps. The researchers let trained nurses perform a single task on both devices and count the errors. Assuming, the average number of errors per tasks is  $\mu_L = 3$  for the legacy device and  $\mu_N = 1.2$  for the novel device, with standard deviation of  $\sigma = .8$ . We can simulate a basic data set as:

We illustrate the data set using histograms:

```
pumps_2 %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = errors)) +
 facet_grid(~Design) +
 geom_histogram(bins = 20) +
 geom_vline(col = "red", xintercept = 0) +
 coord_flip()
```

The simulated predicted values  $(\mu_i)$  and errors are in a fairly realistic range. Still, we immediatly see, that simulation with Normal distributions is rather inappropriate: a substantial number of simulated observations is negative, which strictly makes no sense for error counts. The pragmatic and impatient reader may suggest to adjust the standard deviation (or move the averages up) to make negative values less unlikely. That would be a poor solution for the following two reasons. First, Normal distributions support the full range of real numbers. There is always a chance of negative simulations, as tiny as it may be. Repeatedly running the simulation until pumps contains exclusively positive numbers (and zero), obviously is poor practice. The second reason is that the simulations very purpose was to express and explore expectations from the linear model (CG). We can simply conclude that any model that assumes normally distributed errors must be wrong when the outcome is bounded below or above, which means: always.

Recall how linearity is gradually bent when a magnitude approaches its natural limit. A similar effect occurs for distributions. Distributions that respect a lower or upper limit get squeezed like chewing gum into a corner when approaching the boundaries. Review Binomial and Poisson distribution in chapter 1 for illustrations. As a matter of fact, a lot of real data in design research is skewed that way, whereas the Normal distribution eternally claims symmetry.

A common misconception is that random distributions approach the Normal distribution with larger sample sizes. The only thing that happens is that increasing the number of observations renders the true distribution more idle. Examine yourself, how the shape of Poisson distributions changes by mean count, as well as sample size. The following code simulates a Poisson distribution with a given  $\lambda$  and N. With every new run of the code, rpois generates a new random set of counts. By repeatedly running this code and watching the output, you can get a good idea of how varied the shape of the distribution can be.

### 7.1.3 Assuming constant variance of randomness

The third assumption of linear models is rooted in the random component term as well. Recall, that there is just one parameter  $\sigma$  for the dispersion of randomness and that any Normal distribution's dispersion is exclusively determined by  $\sigma$ . That is less harmless than it may sound. In most real data, the dispersion of randomness depends on the expected value, as can be illustrated by the following example.

Imagine a simple survey where commuters are asked three questions about their daily way to work:

- 1. How long is the route?
- 2. How long does it typically take?
- 3. What are the maximum and minimum travel times you remember?

If we simulate such data from a linear model, the relationship between length of route and travel time would inevitably look like a evenly wide band.

It is very unrealistic that persons who live right around the corner experience the same range of possible travel times than people who drive dozens of kilometers. Most of the time, we intuit the dispersion of randomness to increase with the magnitude of the expected value. For example, a Gamma distribution takes two parameters, shape  $\alpha$  and scale  $\tau$  and both of them influence mean and variance of the distribution, such that the variance increases by the mean by square.

```
X \sim \text{Gamma}(\alpha, \theta) E(X) = \alpha \theta \text{Var}(X) = \alpha \theta^2 \text{Var}(X) = E(X) \theta
```

A similar situation arises for count data. When counting user errors, we would expect a larger variance for complex tasks and interfaces, e.g. writing an article in a word processor, as compared to the rather simple situation like operating a medical infusion pump. For count data, the Poisson distribution is often a good choice and for Poisson distributed variables, mean and variance are both exactly determined by the Poisson rate parameter  $\lambda$ , and therefore linearly connected.

```
X \sim \text{Poisson}(\alpha, \theta)\lambda = E(X) = \text{Var}(X)
```

Not by coincidence, practically all distributions with a lower boundary have variance increase with the mean. Distributions that have two boundaries, like binomial or beta distributions also have a mean-variance relationship, but a different one. For binomially distributed variables, mean and variance are determined as follows:

```
X \sim \text{Binom}(p, k)E(X) = pk\text{Var}(X) = p(1-p)k\text{Var}(X) = E(X)(1-p)
```

To see this, imagine a study that examines the relationship between user expertise (for the convenience on a scale of zero to one) and success rate on ten tasks. The result is a cigar-like shape. For binomial distributions, variance gets largest, when the chance of success is centered at p=.5. This is very similar for other distributions with two boundaries, such as beta and logit-normal distributions.

In conclusion, the Normal distribution assumption is flawed in two ways: real distributions are typically asymmetric and have mean and variance linked. Both phenomena are tightly linked to the presence of boundaries. Broadly, the deviation from symmetry gets worse when observations are close to the boundaries (e.g. low error rates), whereas differences in variance is more pronounced when the means are far apart from each other.

## 7.2 Elements of Generalized Linear Models

GLM is a framework for modelling that produces a family of models. Every member of this family uses specific link functions to establish linearity and chooses a particular random distribution, that has an adequate shape and mean-variance relationship.

Sometimes GLMs are mistaken as a way to relax assumptions of linear models, (or even called non-parametric). They are definitely not! Every member makes precise assumptions on the level of measurement and the shape of randomness (see Table A). One can even argue that Poisson, Binomial and exponential regression are stricter than Gaussian, as they use only one parameter, with the

consequence of a tight association between variance and mean. A few members of GLM are classic: Poisson, Binomial (aka logistic) and exponential regression have routinely been used before they were united under the hood of GLM. These and a few others are called *canonical* GLMs, as they possess some convenient mathematical properties, that made efficient estimation possible, back in the days of expensive computer time.

## 7.2.1 Re-linking linearity (#relinking\_linearity) [TBC]

The strength of the linear term (the likelihood) is its endless versatility in specifying relations between predictor variables and outcome. Unfortunately, it represents all associations as straight lines. These lines extend from  $-\infty$  to  $\infty$  and will cross the lower or upper boundaries of every known outcome variable. All linear models predict events that cannot happen.

Generalized linear models use a simple mathematical trick to keep the linear term, but confine the expected values to the natural boundaries of the measures. In linear models, the linear term is mapped to expected values, directly, causing the aforementioned problems. In GLMs, a layer is drawn between the expected value  $\mu$  and the linear term, linear predictor  $\theta$ . The link function transforms between  $\mu$  and  $\theta$ . In order to transform back to the scale of measurement, the inverse of the link function, the mean function is used.

In arithmetics an abundance of functions exists for every possible purpose. However, link functions must fulfill two criteria,

- 1. they must map to the range  $[-\infty, \infty]$ , as that ensures linearity
- 2. they must be monotonically increasing

Intuitively speaking, a monotonically increasing function preserves the order in magnitude, such that the following holds for a link function.

$$\mu_a > \mu_b \to \theta_a > \theta_b$$

The primary reason for this requirement is that for a link function  $\phi$  there must exist the inverse, that is the mean function  $(\phi^{-1})$ . A function that is *not* monotonically increasing, such as  $x^2$  does not have an inverse function. For example,  $x^2$  is not a proper link function, because its inverse,  $\sqrt{x}$  can take *two* values (e.g.  $\sqrt{x} = [2, -2]$ ) and therefore is not a function, strictly speaking.

An adequate link function for count variables would map the range of natural numbers to the *linear range* of  $\eta$  that is  $[-\infty; \infty]$ . The logarithm is such a function and its inverse is the *exponential* function, which bends the linear range back into the boundary. Figure XY shows them side-by-side. Note that the logarithm is *not asymptotic* as it may seem. This function truly approaches

infinity, albeit at a decelerating pace (which is mind-boggling). Other variables, like success rates or rating scales, have lower and upper boundaries. A suitable pair of functions is the *logit* link function and the *logistic* mean function.

```
plot_glmfun <- function(f = log,</pre>
 title = "log link function",
 lower = .01, upper = 3,
 dir = "link"){
 out <-
 data_frame(x = seq(lower, upper, (upper - lower)/100)) %>%
 ggplot(aes(x)) +
 stat_function(fun = f) +
 labs(title = title) +
 labs(x = expression(mu), y = expression(eta))
 if(dir == "mean") out <- out + labs(x = expression(eta),</pre>
 y = expression(mu))
 out
}
gridExtra::grid.arrange(
 plot_glmfun(),
 plot_glmfun(f = exp, "exponential mean function", -3.5, 1, dir = "mean"),
 plot_glmfun(f = logit, "logit link function", 0.01, .99),
 plot_glmfun(f = inv_logit, "logistic mean function", -5, 5, dir = "mean"))
```

Using the link function comes at a cost: the linear coefficients  $\beta_i$  no longer has a natural interpretation, like "moving one unit on the predictor lets the outcome change by  $\beta_i$ ". Later we will see that logarithmic and logit scales gain an intuitive interpretation when parameters are exponentiated,  $\exp(\beta_i)$  (7.4.1 and ??

### 7.2.2 Choosing patterns of randomness (#choosing\_randomness)

In chapter 3.3.2 a number of random distributions were introduced, together with conditions of when they arise. The major criteria were related to properties of the outcome measure: how it is bounded and whether it is discrete (countable) or continuous.

In GLMs, the researcher has a larger choice for modelling the random component and Table XY lists some common candidates.

boundaries	discrete	continuous
unbounded	NA	Normal
lower	Poisson	Exponential
lower and upper	Binomial	Beta

That is not to say that these five are the only possible choices. Many dozens of statistical distributions are known and these five are just making the least assumptions on the shape of randomness in their class (mathematicians call this maximum entropy distributions). In fact, we will soon discover that real data frequently violates principles of these distributions. For example, count measures in behavioural research typically show a variance that exceeds the mean, which speaks against the Poisson distributions. As we will see in ?? and 7.4.1.3, Poisson distribution can still be used in such cases with some additional tweaks.

As we will see, response times in design research are particularly misbehaved, as they do not have their lower boundary at zero, but at the lowest human possible time. In contrast, most continuous distributions assume that measures near zero are at least possible. In case of response times, we will take advantage of the fact, that modern Bayesian estimation engines support a large range of distributions, by far exceeding the available choices in asymptotic methods of frequentist statistics. The stan\_glm regression engine has been designed with downwards compatibility in mind, which is why it only includes the classic distributions. Luckily, there is a sibling engine in the package brms, which is more progressive and gives many more choices.

Still, using distributions that are not Gaussian sometimes carries minor complications. Normal distributions have the convenient property that the amount of randomness is directly expressed as the parameter  $\sigma$ . That allowed us to compare the fit of two models A and B by comparing  $\sigma_A$  and  $\sigma_B$  (note, however that this is not a rigorous method for model selection). In random distributions with just one parameter, the random component is either determined by the location (e.g. Poisson  $\lambda$  or Binomial p). For distributions with more than one parameter, dispersion of randomness typically is a function of two or more parameters. For example, Gamma distributions have two parameters, but these do not pull location and dispersion neatly apart as Normal distributions do. Instead, mean and variance Gamma distributions depend on both parameters.

Using distributions with entanglement of location and dispersion seems to be a step back, but frequently it is necessary to render a realistic association between the expected value and amount of absolute randomness. Most distributions with a lower bound (e.g. Poisson, exponential and Gamma) increase variance with mean, whereas double bounded distributions (beta and binomial) typically have maximum variance when the distribution is centered and symmetric.

# 7.3 Case: user testing infusion pumps

Medical infusion pumps are unsuspicious looking devices that are en-mass installed in surgery and intensive care. Their only purpose is controlled injection of medication in the blood stream of patients. Pumps are rather simple devices as infusion is not more than a function of volume and time. They are routinely used by trained staff, mostly anaesthesiologists and nurses. We should have great faith in safe operation under such conditions. The truth is, medical infusion pumps have reportedly killed dozens of people, thousands were harmed and an unknown number of nurses lost their jobs. The past generation of pumps is cursed with a chilling set of completely unnecessary design no-gos:

- tiny 3-row LCD displays
- · flimsy foil buttons without haptic marking or feedback
- modes
- information hidden in menus

For fixing these issues no additional research is needed, as the problems are pretty obvious to experienced user interface designers. What needs to be done, though, is proper validation testing of existing and novel interfaces, for example:

- is the interface safe to use?
- is it efficient to learn?
- is a novel interface better than a legacy design? And by how much?

We conducted such a study. A novel interface was developed after an extensive study of user requirements and design guidelines. As even the newest national standards for medical devices do not spell precise quantitative user requirements (such as, a nurse must be able to complete a standard task in t seconds and no more than e errors may occur), the novel interface was compared to a device with a legacy design. The participants were nurses and they were asked to complete a set of eight standard tasks with the devices. In order to capture learnability of the devices, every nurse completed the sequence of tasks in three consecutive sessions. A number of performance measures were recorded to reflect safety and efficiency of operation:

- 1. task completion: for every task it was assessed whether the nurse had completed it successfully.
- 2. deviations from optimal path: using the device manual for every task the shortest sequence was identified that would successfully complete the task. The sequence was then broken down into individual operations that were compared to the observed sequence of operations. An algorithm called Levenshtein distance was used to count the number of deviations.

- 3. time on task was recorded as a measure for efficiency.
- 4. mental workload was recorded using a one-item rating scale.

As can be expected in the light of what has been said above, each one these measures violate one or more assumptions of the Gaussian linear model. In the following chapters, proper models from the GLM family are introduced for commonly occurring measures:

- 1. count data, such as the number of completed tasks and path deviations
- 2. temporal data, such as time-on-task
- 3. rating scales

### 7.4 Count data

Normal distributions assume that the random variable under investigation is continuous. For measures, such as time, it is natural and it can be a reasonable approximation for measures with fine-grained steps, such as average scores of self-report scales with a large number of items. Other frequently used measures are clearly, i.e. naturally, discrete, in particular everything that is counted. Examples are: number of errors, number of succesfully completed tasks or the number of users. Naturally, count measures have a lower bound and frequently this is zero. A distinction has to be made, though, for the upper bound. In some cases, there is no well defined upper bound, or it is very large (e.g. number of users) and Poisson regression applies. In other cases, the upper bound is given by the research design, for example the number of tasks given to a user. When there is an upper bound, logistic regression applies.

## 7.4.1 Poisson regression

If data can be considered successes in a fixed number of trials, logistic regression is the model type of choice. When the outcome variable is of type count, but there is no apparent upper limit, Poisson regression applies.

In brief, Poisson regression has the following attributes:

- 1. The outcome variable is bounded at zero (and that must be a possible outcome, indeed).
- 2. The linear predictor is on a logarithmic scale, with the exponential function being the inverse.
- 3. The random component follows a Poisson distribution.
- 4. Variance of randomness increases linearly with the mean.

The link function is the logarithm, as it transforms from the non-negative range of numbers to real numbers. For a start, we have a look at a Poisson GMM: In an advanced level of the smart smurfer game, the items are hidden from the player and therefore extremely difficult to catch. To compensate somewhat for the increased difficulty, the level carries an abundance of items. On average, the player is not supposed to find more than three items. We simulate a data set for one player repeating the level 30 times and run a Poisson regression model:

```
set.seed(6)
D_Pois <-
 data_frame(Obs = 1:30,
 items_found = rpois(30, lambda = 3.4))

D_Pois %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = items_found)) +
 geom_histogram()
```

```
fixef(M_Pois)
```

model type fixef center lower upper object fixef Intercept 1.31 1.16 1.48

```
bayr:::knit_print.tbl_coef(M_Pois)
```

The Poisson parameter  $\lambda$  (lambda) has a direct interpretation as it represents the expected mean (and variance) of the distribution. On the contrary, the regression coefficient is on a logarithmic scale to ensure it has no boundaries. To scale it down to the scale of measurement, the exponential function is the canonical mean function in Poisson regression:

```
fixef(M_Pois, mean.func = exp)
```

model type fixef	center	lower	upper
object fixef Intercept	3.72	3.18	4.41

The exponentiated intercept coefficient can be interpreted as the expected number of items found per session. Together with the credibility limits it would allow the conclusion that the items are slightly easier to find than three per session.

## 7.4.1.1 Speaking multiplicative

To demonstrate the interpretation of coefficients other than the intercept (or absolute group means), we turn to the more complex case of the infusion pump study. In this study, the deviations from normative path were counted to serve as a measure for safety of operation. In the following regression analysis, we examine the reduction of deviations by training sessions as well as the differences between the two devices. As we are interested in the improvement from first to second session and second to third, successive difference contrasts apply.

```
attach(IPump)
```

```
fixef(M_dev)
```

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	0.838	0.311	1.362
DesignNovel	-1.511	-2.247	-0.780
session	-0.233	-0.350	-0.139
DesignNovel:session	-0.081	-0.242	0.113

Again, the coefficients are on a logarithmic scale and cannot be interpreted right away. By using the exponential mean function, we obtain the following table:

### fixef(M\_dev, mean.func = exp)

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	2.312	1.365	3.904
DesignNovel	0.221	0.106	0.459
session	0.792	0.705	0.870
DesignNovel:session	0.922	0.785	1.120

The intercept now has the interpretation as the expected number of deviations with the legacy design in the first session. However, it is incorrect to speak of the effects in terms of differences. i.e. summative. Fortunately, the following arithmetic law tells that what is summative on the level of the linear predictor, becomes *multiplicative* on the original scale:

$$\exp(\beta_0 + x_1\beta_1 + x_2\beta_2) = \exp(\beta_0)\exp(x_1\beta_1)\exp(x_2\beta_2)$$

Hence, the exponentiated coefficients have a *multiplicative interpretation*, like the following:

- 1. In the first session, the novel design produces 2.312 *times* the deviations than with the legacy design.
- 2. For the legacy design, every new training session reduces the number of deviations  $by\ factor\ 0.792$
- 3. The reduction rate per training session of the novel design is \*92.229% as compared to the legacy design.

With counts, we usually expect the variance of randomness to rise with the mean. The Poisson distribution is very strict in the sense that the variance equals the mean.

$$y_i \sim \text{Pois}(\lambda) \to \text{Var}(x_i) = \text{Mean}(x_i) = \lambda$$

Real count data frequently has variance that raises proportionally with the mean, but is inflated. This is called *overdispersion* and is accounted for by an observation-level random effect, which will be explained in a separate section ??.

Hence, the novel design reduces the initial number of deviations by factor

detach(IPump)

### 7.4.1.2 Monotony and quantiles

The transformation of coefficients to the original scale has been applied to the point and range estimates as produced by the fixef command, that is after summarizing the posterior distribution. One may wonder if this is valid. Would we get the same estimates when applying the mean function to all draws of the MCMC chain and then summarize? The general answer is that applying the mean function after summarizing is allowed if the summary function is invariant under the exponential function.

For all GLM, the link and mean functions are monotonically increasing, with the consequence that the order of observations is preserved. Formally, for any two MCMC iterations i and j for a parameter  $\beta_i$ :

$$\beta_{1i} < \beta_{1j} \to \exp(\beta_{1i}) < \exp(\beta_{1j})$$

Recall that throughout this book, center and interval estimates have been obtained by simple quantiles, marking the points where 2.5%, 50% and 97.5% of all iterations are smaller. Order does not change with monotonous transformations, if 2.5% (50%, 97.5%) of draws are smaller on the linear scale, they will still be after applying the mean function. Quantiles are not affected by monotonous transformation and transformation after summary is therefore valid. Some researchers prefer the mode of the posterior to represent its center location. The mode is the point of highest density and does not rely on ranks, it is therefore even invariant under all transformations that preserve identity.

This is different for higher order methods for obtaining point and interval estimates. Most notably the mean and the highest posterior density intervals are not invariant to mean functions. When using those, the mean function must be applied before summarizing the posterior, which is inconvenient and inconsistent.

#### 7.4.1.3 Zero inflation

Imagine a study that examines the frequency of visits to the social media website Fakebook. While other researchers already set out to find predictive factors, like extrovert personality and the like, we are here interested in the frequency of daily use.

```
sim_zi <- function(</pre>
 beta 0 = 2.5,
 N_Part = 120,
 p_zero = .2, # proportion of non-users
 sd_Part = 0.8, # individual differences (lp scale)
 = 23 # parameters passed on to simulate 1
){
 set.seed(seed)
 data_frame(Part = 1:N_Part,
 theta = rnorm(N_Part, beta_0, sd_Part),
 mu = exp(theta),
 is_user = rbinom(N_Part, 1, 1 - p_zero),
 visits = 0 + is_user *rpois(N_Part, mu))
}
D_zi <- sim_zi()</pre>
D_zi %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = visits)) +
 geom_histogram()
```

```
[1] "sim_zi" "D_zi"
```

#### 7.4.2 Logistic (aka Binomial) regression (#logistic\_regression)

When the outcome variable can be conceived as successes in a fixed number of trials, logistic regression applies. In brief, logistic regression has the following attributes:

- 1. The outcome variable is bounded at zero and the number of trials k
- 2. The linear predictors are on a *logistic scale*, with the *logit* being the inverse. However, in 7.4.2.1 we will see, that using the logarithm results in a convenient way of speaking about the effects.
- 3. The random component follows a binomial distribution.
- 4. Due to the former, the variance of randomness is largest at  $\mu=0.5$  or  $\eta=1$  and declines towards both boundaries, taking a characteristic cigar shape.

The most simple form of successes-in-trials measure is when there is only one trial. This is called *dichtotomous*, with the following common examples:

a user is successful at a task, or fails

- a visitor returns to a website or does not
- a usability problem is discovered or remains unseen
- a driver brakes just in time or crashes
- a customer would recommend a product to a friend or rather not
- a web user starts a search for information by keyword query or by following links

Most dichotomous outcome variables have a more or less clear notion of success and failure (although not necessarily as in the last example). When the outcome casts a positive light on the design, by convention it is coded as 1, otherwise 0.

In computer science jargon, every dichotomous observation accounts to a bit, which is the smallest amount of information ever possible. Since in inferential statistics the amount of information is tantamount to the reduction in uncertainty, with dichotomous data one usually needs an abundance of observations to reach reasonably certain conclusions. Because the information of a single observation is so sparse, large samples and repeated measures are important when dealing with dichtomous outcomes.

Let us consider an example: early research on foraging strategies of web users revealed that they are extremely impatient companions. They scan a page for visual features, rather than reading [REF: high school students information mall]. Visitors of websites build their first judgement in a time as short as 17ms [REF: Tuch presentation time]. For e-commerce that is a highly important fact to know about their customers and nowadays practically all commercial websites shine with a pleasing visual appearance. But, how would one measure the gratitude of a visitor who actually used the website and may have something to tell beyond visual appeal?

A simple measure for gratitude is whether a visitor returns. This is usually a highly available measure, too, as any skilled web administrators can distill such data from the server logfiles with little effort. First, all unique visitors are extracted and if the same visitor returns within a given period of time, this is coded as a success (one) or otherwise failure (zero). We simulate such a data set:

visitor	returned
63	1
22	0
99	1
38	0
91	1
92	0

```
D_ret %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = returned)) +
 geom_bar()
```

In total, 46% of the visitors return. In order to estimate the return rate together with a statement on uncertainty, we run a logistic regression grand mean model and inspect the coefficient table. Note how the linear formula is completely common ground, but we explicitly pass the binomial family to the regression engine.

model type fixef center lower upper object fixef Intercept -0.148 -0.542 0.211

As expected from a GMM we retrieve one parameter that reflects the average tendency to return to the site. Recall, that the linear model assumes the predictions to be unbounded. However, in case of return rates, we rather speak of proportions of users to return. As a side note, I would rather avoid speaking of probabilities in the context of logistic regression. While being mathematically correct, it sometimes causes confusion with certainty or, beware of this, the p-value.

Proportions are on a range from zero to one. Because the quantity of interest is bounded, a link function is needed that stretches the bounded into an unbounded range. For logistic regression, the *logit* functions maps the expected values  $\mu_i \in [0; 1]$  onto the *linear predictor* scale  $\eta_i \in [-\infty; \infty]$ :

$$\eta_i = \text{logit}(\mu_i)$$

The inverse function, commonly called the *mean function*, of the logit is the *logistic function*. @ref(logit\_logist) shows link and mean functions side-by-side.

```
grid.arrange(
 ggplot(data.frame(mu=c(0, 1)), aes(x = mu)) +
 stat_function(fun = mascutils::logit) +
 xlab(expression(mu)) + ylab(expression(eta)) +
 ggtitle("logit link function"),
 ggplot(data.frame(eta=c(-5, 5)), aes(x = eta)) +
 stat_function(fun = mascutils::inv_logit) +
 xlab(expression(mu)) + ylab(expression(eta)) +
 ggtitle("logistic mean function"),
 nrow = 1)
```

In order to obtain a statement on proportion  $\mu$  (note that in a GMM, there is only one), we therefore have to perform the mean transformation:

$$\eta = \beta_0 \mu = \operatorname{logist}(\eta)$$

The fixef command lets you pass on a mean function. However, this logistic mean function is only admissable for intercepts and other absolute group means, as we will see in 7.4.2.1

```
fixef(M_ret, mean.func = inv_logit)
```

model	type	fixef	center	lower	upper
object	fixef	Intercept	0.463	0.368	0.553

The apt reader may have noticed that the returners data set has been simulated with an exact return rate of 40%. Despite the sample size of 100, the center estimate seems rather off and hampered by considerable uncertainty. That is precisely because of the low level of information contained in dichotomous variables (one bit). For a reasonably certain estimate one would need many more observations. These can either be obtained through a larger sample or through repeated measures.

Recall the fictional jump-and-run game *smart smurfer* in @ref(poisson\_dist): the goal of the game is that players collect items and for the user experience it is crucial that this is neither too difficult nor too easy. Imagine, that for adjusting the difficulty level, the developers conduct a quick evaluation study,

where they place a number of items (trials) in the game and the success rate of a single player is observed in a series of 15 game sessions:

```
D_smrf <-
data_frame(
 Session = 1:15,
 trials = round(runif(15, 0, 25), 0),
 successes = rbinom(15, trials, .4),
 failures = trials - successes) %>%
 mascutils::as_tbl_obs()
D_smrf
```

Per session the player has a number of opportunities for collecting an item, which makes it a repeated measures situation. One might expect that we need to include random effects into the model. Later we will see that this is necessary when the sessions were observed on a sample of players with different abilities. However, as long as one can reasonably assume the chance of catching an item to be constant across all sessions, plain logistic regression can deal with successes in multiple trials. In order to estimate a model with more than one trial per observation, it is necessary to add a variable for the number of failures and use a cbind(successes, failures) statement for the left-hand-side of the model formula. This may seem inconvenient, but it allows to have a different number of trials per observation.

```
fixef(M_smrf, mean.func = inv_logit)
```

 $\frac{\text{model type fixef}}{\text{object fixef Intercept}} \ \, \frac{\text{center lower upper}}{\text{0.485 0.418 0.559}}$ 

```
[1] "D smrf" "D ret"
```

We turn now to a real case study, the comparison of two medical infusion pumps (@ref(slope\_RE)). On both devices (legacy and novel), 25 nurses completed a set of eight tasks repeatedly over three sessions. In @ref(slope\_RE) a multi-level model was estimated on the workload outcome. It is tempting to apply the same structural model to success in task completion, using binomial random patterns and logit links.

attach(IPump)

```
completion ~ Design*Session + (Design*Session|Part) + (Design*Session|Task)
```

Such a model is practically impossible to estimate, because dichtomous variables are so scarce in information. Two populations encounter each other in the model: participants and tasks, with 6 observations per combination (6 bit). We should not expect to get reasonably certain estimates on that level and, in fact, the chains will not even mix well. The situation is a little better on the population level: every one of the six coefficients is estimated on 400 bit of raw information. We compromise here: we estimate the full model on group level and do only intercept random effects to account for gross differences between participants and tasks.

```
T_cmpl <-
 fixef(M_cmpl)
T_cmpl</pre>
```

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	1.367	0.242	2.497
DesignNovel	0.398	0.116	0.710
Session2-1	0.694	0.155	1.223
Session3-2	-0.062	-0.602	0.492
DesignNovel:Session2-1	-0.281	-1.066	0.520
DesignNovel:Session3-2	0.272	-0.543	1.006

Keep in mind that the estimates are on the scale of the linear predictor  $\eta_i$ . This is a boundless space, where we can freely create linear combinations of effects to obtain group means. To get a group mean prediction on the more meaningful measurement scale  $\mu \in [0; 1]$ , one must first do the linear combination, followed by the mean function.

• the completion rate in the first legacy session is 0.797

- in novel/session 1: logist(Intercept + DesignNovel) = 0.854
- in novel/session 2: logist(Intercept + DesignNovel + Session2-1 + DesignNovel:Session2-1) = 0.898
- in legacy/session 3: logist(Intercept + DesignNovel + Session2-1) = 0.881

## 7.4.2.1 Talking odds

When presenting results of a statistical analysis, the linear predictor is likely to cause trouble, at least when the audience is interested in real quantities. The linear predictor scale has only very general intuition:

- zero marks a 50% chance
- positive values increase the chance, negative decrease
- bigger effects have larger absolute values

That is sufficient for purely ranking predictors by relative impact (if on a comparable scale of measurement), or plain hypothesis testing, but it does not connect well with quantities a decision maker is concerned with, for example:

- 1. What is the expected frequency of failure on first use?
- 2. The novel design reduces failures, but is it sufficient?
- 3. Is frequency of failures reduced to an acceptable level by two training sessions?

Above we have used the mean logistic mean function to elevate the absolute group means to proportions. This is an intuitive scale, but unfortunately, the mean function does not apply to individual effects. It is for example, *incorrect* to apply it like: "the novel pumps proportion of failures in the first session increases by logist(DesignNovel) = 0.598".

However, there is another transformation, that does the trick. For a better understanding, we have to first inspect, what the logit actually is. The logit is also called a log-odds: logit(p) := log(p(1-p)). The inner part of the function, the odds, are the chance of success divided by the chance of failure. Odds are a rather common way to express ones chances in a game, say:

- odds are 1 against 1 that the coin flip produces Head. If you place €1 on Head, I put €1 on tail.
- odds are 1 against 12 that Santa wins the dog race. If you place 1€ on Santa, I place €12 against.

If the coefficients are log-odds, than we can extract the odds by the inverse of the logarithm, the exponential function, like in the following call of fixef:

```
T_fixef_cmpl_odds <- fixef(M_cmpl, mean.func = exp)
T_fixef_cmpl_odds</pre>
```

fixef	center lower	upper
Intercept	3.922 1.274	12.14
DesignNovel	$1.489\ 1.123$	2.03
Session2-1	$2.001\ 1.167$	3.40
Session3-2	$0.940\ 0.548$	1.64
DesignNovel: Session 2-1	$0.755\ 0.344$	1.68
${\bf Design Novel : Session 3-2}$	$1.312\ 0.581$	2.73

But is it legitimate to apply the transformation on individual coefficients in order to speak of changes of odds? The following arithmetic law tells that what is a sum on the log-odds scale, is multiplication on the scale of odds:

$$\exp(x+y) = \exp(x)\exp(y)$$

Consequently, we may speak of changes of odds using multiplicative language:

- If you place €100 on failure in the next task with the legacy design in session 1, I place €392.214 on success.
- The odds of success with the novel design increase by factor 1.489. Now, I would place  $392.214 \times 1.489 = €583.99$  on success.
- On success with the novel design in session 2, I would place  $392.214 \times 1.489 \times 2.001 \times 0.755 = \text{€}882.124$  on success.

Once, we have transformed the coefficients to the odds scale, we can read coefficients as multipliers and speak of them in hard currency.

```
detach(IPump)
```

### 7.4.3 Modelling overdispersion

If you are in a hurry: real data is always overdispersed. If your data is real, prefer the negative binomial family over Poisson and beta-binomial over logistic regression. Or do observation-level random effects.

Poisson and binomial distributions are one-parameter distributions. As there is only one parameter, it is impossible to set location and dispersion separately. In effect, both properties are tightly entangled. For Poisson distributions they are even the same.

$$x \sim Pois(\lambda) \implies \mu = \sigma^2 = \lambda$$

For binomial variables, mean and variance both depend on probability p and are entangled in cigar shaped form, as the dispersion shrinks when approaching either two boundaries.

The strict variance assumptions of Poisson and binomial models are frequently violated by real data. The violation happens when impact factors have not been included in the likelihood equation. Whenever there is one or more impact factors on the outcome at question that the researcher has not regarded, overdispersion inevitably happens. That means it practically always happens in studies involving objects with complex dynamics, such as the human mind.

Two solutions exist for overdispersed count data: we can either switch to an appropriate two parameter response distribution, that disentangles mean and variance, or introduce an observation-level random effect.

### 7.4.3.1 Negative-binomial regression for overdispersed counts

For all three one-parameter distributions, there exists a two-parameter distribution that allows to estimate the amount of random dispersion (almost) independently of the mean.

readxl::read\_excel("Illustrations/GLM\_distributions.xlsx", sheet = "plugin")

canonical	generalization	parameters	limiting case
binomial	betabinomial	$\alpha > 0, \beta $	\$\alpha, \beta \rightarrow \infty\$
Poisson	negative binomial	NA	NA
exponential	gamma	rate, shape	NA

Using Poisson regression for overdispersed count data results in too narrow certainty of estimates, which is a mistake, of course, because of overfitting. One solution to the problem is to switch to yet another response distribution that has a second parameter, thereby allowing the variance to vary (almost) freely. For the Poisson case (i.e. counts without an upper limit) that typically is the negative binomial distribution (never mind its name!), for binomial the beta-binomial applies. Both distributions are so-called *mixture distributions*. In mixture distributions, the parameter of the original distribution is not constant, but allowed to vary, typically according to some other distribution. Under this perspective, negative binomial distribution is equivalent to a Poisson distribution, if we let parameter  $\lambda$  follow a certain gamma distribution:

```
rnegbinom <- function(n, mu, size){
 shape = size
 scale = mu/size
 lambda = rgamma(n, shape = shape, scale = scale)</pre>
```

The figure below shows a negative binomial distribution and Poisson distribution with the same mean.

#### 7.4.3.2 Beta-binomial regression for successes in trials

For beta-binomial distributions, the binomial parameter p is mixed from a beta distribution, with parameters a and b:

```
rbetabinom <- function(n, size, a, b) rbinom(n, size, rbeta(n, a, b))
rbetabinom(1000, 10, 1, 2) %>% qplot()
```

Predictions and interpretation of coefficients of negative-binomial and betabinomial models are just as with their counterparts, using the same link functions. There is just a tiny difference: a single parameter has been added to the model, which modifies the dispersion. In a standard analysis these parameters have very little meaning, even less than the standard error in a Gaussian model. No misunderstanding: these parameters are *not* the constant standard deviation of residuals. They act as scalers for the "natural" dispersion at any point.

The brms regression engine currently only implements the negative binomial, but not the beta-binomial family. That is a minor problem, because the brms regression engine can be extended. The following code is directly taken from the brms documentation and provides a betabinomial model. The canonical parametrization of the betabinomial distribution takes the parameters a and b

from the inner beta distribution. Note, how the author of this code transforms the parameters to obtain an expected value  $\mu$  and a dispersion parameter  $\phi$ . Like in logistic regression, coefficients are on a logit scale.

```
define a custom beta-binomial family
beta_binomial2 <- custom_family(</pre>
 "beta binomial2", dpars = c("mu", "phi"),
 links = c("logit", "log"), lb = c(NA, 0),
 type = "int", vars = "trials[n]"
define custom stan functions
bb_stan_funs <- "
 real beta_binomial2_lpmf(int y, real mu, real phi, int N) {
 return beta_binomial_lpmf(y | N, mu * phi, (1 - mu) * phi);
 int beta_binomial2_rng(real mu, real phi, int N) {
 return beta_binomial_rng(N, mu * phi, (1 - mu) * phi);
 }
D_betabin <- data_frame(y = rbetabinom(100, 10, 4,2), n = 10)</pre>
M betabin <- D betabin %>%
 brm(y | trials(n) ~ 1, family = beta_binomial2,
 stan_funs = bb_stan_funs, data = .)
```

```
coef(M_betabin)
```

parameter	type fixef	center lov	wer upper
b_Intercept	fixef Intercept	0.876 0.6	676 1.08

## 7.4.3.3 Using observation-level random effects

With the broad implementation of random effects models in Bayesian regression engines, there is a generic procedure to capture the extra variance even with one parameter distributions. The trick is to introduce an *observation-level random effect* (OLRE). Recall how we regard variation between members of a population as normally distributed deviations from the population mean, by the example of a Poisson grand mean model with a participant-level (p) random effect:

$$\theta_{pi} = \beta_0 + x_p \beta_{0p} \mu_{pi} = \exp(\theta_{pi}) \beta_{0p} \sim N(\mu_p, \sigma_p) y_p \sim \text{Pois}(\mu_{ij})$$

The OLRE is normally distributed but does not cause any bounded range, as it is added on the level of the linear predictor before applying the exponential transformation. Observation-level random effects are completely analogous, except that every observation becomes its own group, in a Poisson grand mean model with added variation:

$$\theta_i = \beta_0 + \beta_i \mu_i = \exp(\theta_i) y_{ij} \sim \operatorname{Pois}(\mu_{ij})$$

See, how  $\beta_i$  is a unique deviation per observation i, and how a variance parameter  $\sigma$  appears in an otherwise purely Poisson model. Observation-level random effects are on the linear predictor level, and therefore additive. Compare this to the negative binomial distribution where variance is scaled up, which is multiplication. We find a resemblance with how sums on the linear predictor become multiplications on the expected values scale.

For demonstration of the concept, we simulate from an overdispersed Poisson grand mean model with participant-level random effects, and recover it via regression.

```
sim_ovdsp <- function(</pre>
 beta_0 = 2, \# mu = 8
 sd_0bs = .3,
 sd Part = .4,
 N_Part = 30,
 N_{Rep} = 20,
 N_Obs = N_Part * N_Rep,
 seed = 42){
 set.seed(seed)
 Part <- data frame(Part = 1:N Part,
 beta_0p = rnorm(N_Part, 0, sd_Part)) ## participant-level RE
 D <- data_frame(Obs = 1:N_Obs,
 Part = rep(1:N_Part, N_Rep),
 beta_0i = rnorm(N_Obs, 0, sd_Obs), ## observeration-level RE
 beta_0 = beta_0) %>%
 left_join(Part) %>%
 mutate(theta_i = beta_0 + beta_0p + beta_0i,
 = exp(theta_i),
 ## inverse link function
 = rpois(N_Obs, mu_i))
 y_i
 D %>% as_tbl_obs()
}
 D_ovdsp <- sim_ovdsp()</pre>
```

```
D_ovdsp %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = y_i)) +
 geom_histogram()
```

```
[1] "sim_ovdsp" "D_ovdsp"
```

```
M_ovdsp <-
D_ovdsp %>%
stan_glmer(y_i ~ 1 + (1|Part) + (1|Obs), data = .,
family = poisson, iter = iter)
```

Random effect variation is accurately recovered from the simulated data. The following two plots show, that the participant latent scores and even the observation levels themselves can be recovered. Every observation gets an accurate measure of how much it had been pushed by unrecorded sources of variation. Practically, we obtain residuals which can be used for model criticism. For example, extreme outliers can be identified and relations between random variation and predicted values (or groups) are open to scrutiny.

```
grpef(M_ovdsp)
```

re_factor	center	lower	upper
Obs Part		-	$0.350 \\ 0.719$

Frequently, I reminded the reader to interpret parameters quantitatively by translating their magnitude to statements of practical relevance. For random effects variance this is not always straight forward. One possible way is to make comparative statements on the sources of variance "the variance due to individual differences exceeds all other sources of variation taken together". OLREs are on the same scale as all other random effects in the model, which makes it a good default reference. A non-default comparison of sources of variance is the one of Dennis Egan, that people cause more variance than designs do. With GLMMs, the marriage of LMM and GLM this claim is testable.

From LMM we borrow a surprisingly simple and general solution, observation-level random effects. So, most of the time we will not need one of those twisted two parameter random distributions to account for overdispersion.

With OLRE models we get an estimate that is very similar to *residuals*, which has proven very useful in model criticism.

```
[1] "sim_ovdsp" "D_ovdsp"
```

#### 7.4.4 Exercises:

## 7.5 Measures of time

Time is a highly accessible measure, as clocks are all around us: on your wrist, in transport stations, in your computers and a very big one at the Physikalisch-Technischen Bundesanstalt in Braunschweig (Physical-technological federal institute in Braunschweig, Germany). Temporal variables often carry useful information. Reaction time (RT) measures are prime in experimental cognitive studies and have revealed fascinating phenomena of the human mind, such as the Stroop effect and priming. In user studies and design research, for example,  $time-on-task\ (ToT)$  is a common measure for efficiency, with quicker being the better.

Temporal variables are practically continuous (as long as one measures with sufficient precision), but have lower bounds. A large number of statistical distributions are routinely used to model temporal variables. However, those do not always apply well to ToT or RT data, as they assume a lower bound of zero, which is unrealistic. Still, we begin with two of such models, exponential and gamma regression, and present a candidate for ToT data with offset as third (exgaussian regression).

#### 7.5.1 Exponential regression

Exponential distributions arise from random processes under some very idealized conditions. First, the lower boundary must be zero and second, the waiting time of any event in a series is completely independent, i.e. not predictable from how long one has been waiting so far. This is also called the property of being memoryless. In physics memoryless processes are observed only in the simplest systems, such as the time between two nuclei of a radioactive isotope to decay. Examples of memoryful processes are plenty, such as:

- earthquakes are essentially relaxations in the earth crust. Once it happened, it is less likely to reoccur in near future.
- participants learn with every trial or task, making shorter times more likely

Reconsider the subway smurfer example, where players collect items in a jump and run game. We have already seen how collection counts can be modelled using Poisson or binomial regression. Another way to look at it is the time between two events of item collection. For demonstration only, we assume such idealized conditions in the subway smurfer example and generate a data set. Exponential distributions are determined by one parameter, the *rate* parameter  $\lambda$ , which is strictly positive. The mean of an exponential distribution is the inverse  $\mu = 1/\lambda$  and the variance is  $\text{Var} = 1/\lambda^2$ 

```
set.seed(20)
D_exp <-
 data_frame(Obs = 1:100,
 time = rexp(100, rate = 1/3))

D_exp %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = time)) +
 geom_histogram(bins = 10)
```

```
mean(D_exp$time)

[1] 3.29

var(D_exp$time)

[1] 12.4
```

As the stan\_glm engine does not support exponential response distributions, we use brm, instead, and recover the parameter.

```
fixef(M_exp, mean.func = exp)
```

type fixef	center	lower	upper
fixef Intercept	3.29	2.73	4

### 7.5.2 Gamma regression

## [1] 7.61

Exponential regression has a single parameter and therefore has the same problem as seen with Poisson and binomial regression before. Only if all events have the same probability to occur, will an exponential distribution arise, which means for behavioural research: never. Again, one could solve this by introducing an observation-level random effect. Instead, here we will tackle the problem by using a continuous, zero-bounded distribution with two parameters, the gamma family of distributions. While the two parameters rate and shape do not directly translate into location and dispersion as with Gaussian, it provides the extra degree of freedom to set them almost independently. The only limitation is that variance rises with the mean, but as we have argued in 7.1.3, this is rather a desired feature than a problem. In the following, we simulate gamma distributed observations.

```
set.seed(20)
D_gam <-
 data_frame(Obs = 1:100,
 time = rgamma(100, rate = 1/3, shape = 2))

D_gam %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = time)) +
 geom_histogram(bins = 10)
```

```
mean(D_gam$time)
```

In comparison to the exponential distribution above, a significant difference is that the mode of the gamma distribution (its peak) is not fixed at zero, but can move along the x-axis. That makes it appear a much more realistic choice for temporal data in behavioural research. We estimate a simple gamma GMM on the simulated data. For historical reasons, brm uses the inverse link function  $(\theta=1/\mu)$  for gamma regression per default, but that does not actually serve the purpose of link functions to stretch  $\mu$  into the range of real numbers. Instead, we resort to the common log link.

```
fixef(M_gam, mean.func = exp)
```

type fixef center lower upper fixef Intercept 7.64 6.7 8.71

Both, the exponential and the gamma distribution support the range of real numbers including zero. The weak point of both models is that they have zero as their natural starting point. For the exponential distribution that even goes to the extreme, that zero always is the point of highest density, i.e. the most likely outcome. As we will see in the following section, this assumption is usually violated with RT and ToT data, therefore exponential and gamma regression should be avoided. So, what are they good for, after all? These two models are routinely used for the time intervals (TI) between events that are triggered independently. In nuclear physics the individual triggers are atoms, each one deciding on their own when to emit a neutron. If you measure the interval between two emissions the time interval is exponentially distributed. (And if you count the neutrons per time interval, the result is a Poisson distribution). An analogue situation arises for customer support systems. Customers are like atoms in that their decision to file a request is usually independent from each other. By chance it can happen that the whole center is idle for 20 minutes, but it is equally possible that 20 customers call within a minute and some of them practically at the same moment. Overwhelmed hotline queues do not make people happy, if they have technical problems. When planning a support system, the risk of angry customers has to be weighed against the costs of over-staffing. A good design would hit a certain sweet spot and in the ideal case there would be a predictive model of inflow rate of customers. Whatever predictors such a model would have, the response distribution would probably be very much a gamma distribution. In contrast, when the events are the moments of completion in successive tasks performed by one user, the triggers are not independent and the measure cannot be arbitrarily small (unless, perhaps, you kill seven flies with a single strike).

## 7.5.3 ExGaussian regression

The problem with the two temporal models discussed so far is that they assume a RT or ToT of zero to be possible. In the case of exponential regression, this is even the most likely region. This assumption is not realistic in most cases, as any task uses up a minimum time to complete. For example, the table below shows the minimum reaction times for finding the academic calendar on ten university websites (case Egan). This varies a lot between designs, but

is never close to zero. The last column puts the minimum observed ToT in relation to the observed range. On two of the websites, the offset was even larger than the obvserved range itself, hence the problem of positive lower boundaries is real in user studies.

```
attach(Egan)
```

Task	Design	min_time	range	min_time/range
academic calendar	VU Brussel	21	130	0.162
academic calendar	KU Leuven	52	40	1.300
academic calendar	UGent	8	70	0.114
academic calendar	University of Antwerp	3	7	0.429
academic calendar	UHasselt	21	48	0.438
academic calendar	Leiden University	130	181	0.718
academic calendar	VU Amsterdam	207	188	1.101
academic calendar	RUG	119	132	0.902
academic calendar	University Tilburg	24	39	0.615

On the first glance, that does not seem to pose a major problem for gamma regression, as the mode can move along the x-axis. However, when a theoretical gamma distribution moves to the right, it inevitably becomes more symmetric, i.e. the skewness is reduced (and we may eventually use a Gaussian distribution, instead). As there is no separate parameter controlling the skewness of the curve it may happen that the random component captures the amount of variance, but overdoes the left tail, which introduces a bias on the coefficients. The following graphic illustrates that with a bunch of gamma distributions that move from left to right (M), keeping the variance constant (V):

```
M = c(200, 300, 400)
V = 20000

gamma
rate = M/V
shape = rate^2 * V
```

We have seen so far, that distributions with one parameter (Poisson, binomial, exponential) have a fixed relationship between location and dispersion. In order to vary location and dispersion independently, a second parameter is needed (Gamma, Gaussian). It seems logical that only three-parameter distributions can do the trick of setting skewness separately. The exponentially modified Gaussian (exgaussian) distribution is a convolution of a normal distribution and an exponential distribution and has three parameters,  $\mu$ ,  $\sigma$  and rate  $\beta$ . Very roughly, the Gaussian component controls location and dispersion whereas the exponential part introduces the skewness. When  $\beta$  is large in comparison to  $\mu$ , the distribution is more left skewed. With this additional degree of freedom it becomes possible to simulate (and estimate) distributions that are far to the right have strong dispersion and strong skewness. The following plot shows the density of an exgaussian and gamma distribution with the same mean and variance.

```
M = 400
V = 20000
exgauss
beta = 135
mu = M - beta
sigma = sqrt(V - beta^2)
gamma
rate = M/V
shape = rate^2 * V
ggplot(data.frame(x = c(0, 1200)), aes(x = x)) +
 stat_function(fun = dgamma,
 args = list(rate = rate, shape = shape),
 mapping = aes(colour = "gamma distribution")) +
 stat_function(fun = brms::dexgaussian,
 args = list(mu = mu,
 sigma = sigma,
```

```
beta = beta),
mapping = aes(colour = "exgaussian distribution")) +
labs(colour="Distribution", x = "ToT", y = "density")
```

The gamma distribution in this example starts approaching a bell curved form, almost resembling a Gaussian distribution. In contrast, the exgaussian distribution takes a steep left climb followed by a long right tail, which is caused by its pronounced exponential component. We do the usual exercise to simulate a grand mean model and recover the parameters with the help of the fabulous brm engine:

Noteworthy, the brm engine uses the identity link function by default. While this is rather convenient for interpretation, it could theoretically lead to impossible predictions. As we will see later, the exgaussian is not immune, but robust to impossible predictions because of its tiny left tail. Any linear impact factor, like an experimental treatment can push it 150 ms to the left with insignificant risk of impossible predictions.

### 7.5.3.1 Modelling reaction times

In experimental studies, the *inertia of the nervous system* sets a limit larger than zero for reaction times. This is due to some hard electrochemical and biomechanical facts of the peripheral systems. Nerve cells and muscle fibers

are slow working horses. The same goes for our minds. Arguably, they are blazingly fast at complex tasks, such as recognizing written words in the faintest colours and the bizarrest advertisements. Still, there is a minimum time to retrieve an idea from the memories and activate the surrounding nodes.

As swift and enthusiastic most people are with words, the more clumsy and desinterested many are with computers. Today's consumer computing devices are unmatched in usability and most people do not need to think harder than they like, when hunting for the best online prices, stream movies and enjoy their communications. However, there is a minority of computer users, who call themselves the geeks. The hypothetical geek personality feels attracted to the inner workings of a computer system itself, rather than the applications and media it delivers. A geek person seeing a computer is more likely to have certain memories or associations. For example, remembering how it was to build your first own computer, or the intellectual joy of learning a new programming language. If this were true, we thought, then showing a word that is related to how geeks perceive computers (e.g. "explore", "play", "create") should create a brief nostalgic moment, resulting in a delayed response. As a response we had chosen the Stroop task, and in order to make this more likely, participants were primed by a picture shown before the Stroop task. These pictures were from two conditions: either showing computers in a geekish way (for example, an open case or programming code on the screen) or as regular product images. Furthermore, we theorized that the least one can say is that geeks like to think hard and therefore used the need-for-cognition scale as a predictor. It was expected that participants with high NCS scores would recognize computers as a source of delightful hard thinking and hence have slower reaction times, when priming image and target word are both from the category Geek.

What would be a suitable response distribution for reaction times in the semantic Stroop task? In the following, we run three models with the same predictor term, but with exgaussian, gamma or Gaussian random components.

```
attach(Hugme)

D_hugme <-
 filter(D_hugme, correct) %>%
 select(Obs, Part, zNCS, WordGeek, PrimeGeek, RT) %>%
 as_tbl_obs()

D_hugme

F_1 <- formula(RT ~ zNCS*PrimeGeek*WordGeek + (1|Part))

M_1_gau <- D_hugme %>%
 brm(F_1,
 family = gaussian,
```

```
data = .)
M_1_exg <- D_hugme %>%
 brm(F_1,
 family = exgaussian,
 data = .)
M_1_gam <- D_hugme %>%
 brm(F_1,
 family = Gamma(link = identity),
 data = .)
P_1 <- bind_rows(
 posterior(M_1_gau),
 posterior(M_1_gam),
 posterior(M_1_exg)
)
T_1_predict <-
 bind_rows(
 post_pred(M_1_gau, thin = 5),
 post_pred(M_1_gam, thin = 5),
 post_pred(M_1_exg, thin = 5)
) %>%
 predict()
```

The following plot shows the fixed effects for the three random components:

```
T_1_fixef <- fixef(P_1)

T_1_fixef %>%
 filter(fixef != "Intercept") %>%
 ggplot(aes(y = fixef, x = center, xmin = lower, xmax = upper, color = model, group = mode
 geom_point(size = 2) +
 geom_errorbarh()
```

None of the effects have considerable impact. Nevertheless, it seems that the Exgaussian model produces much tighter credibility limits, i.e. better degrees of certainty. In any case, if there is a reason to prefer the exgaussian model, we should primarily see that in how the residuals are shaped. In the following plot it can be seen, that the extra flexibility of the exgaussian is employed, indeed. Both, Gaussian and gamma are unable to accommodate the steep left climb and are producing a visible drag to the left.

```
D_hugme <- D_hugme %>%
 left_join(T_1_predict) %>%
 mutate(resid = RT - center)

D_hugme %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = resid, color = model)) +
 geom_density() +
 xlim(-.5,1.5)
```

## 7.5.3.2 Modelling Time-on-task

Although experimental psychologists call the Stroop task a complex one, the minimal processing time is rather short in comparison to usual tasks in usability studies, such as finding information on websites or renting cars online. We compare the three patterns of randomness on the CUE8 data set, which contains ToT measures on five tasks on a car rental website. In this study 14 professional teams took part with two conditions: remote and moderated sessions. As we will see in a later section, the remote condition is contaminated with cheaters. Therefore, we only use the moderated sessions. In addition, it is interesting to compare the impact of the chosen distribution on effects estimates. For this reason only, we include the factor Task as a fixed effect (with treatment contrasts), despite this not being very meaningful.

The comparison draws upon the effects, as well as residual distributions. For the latter, the predictive posterior distribution is required. With several hundred observations, this results in a very large object. To prevent running into the memory limit, we crank it up (memory.limit) and thin out the number of posterior predictive samples by factor 5. Finally, we combine the three posterior predictive distributions and examine the differences.

```
attach(CUE8)

D_cue8_mod <- D_cue8 %>%
 filter(Condition == "moderated", !is.na(ToT)) %>%
 as_tbl_obs()

memory.limit(16000)

F_4 <- formula(ToT ~ 1 + Task + (1|Part) + (1|Team))

M_4_gau <- D_cue8_mod %>%
```

```
brm(F_4,
 family = gaussian,
 data = .)
M_4_exg <- D_cue8_mod %>%
 brm(F_4,
 family = exgaussian,
 data = .)
M_4_gam <- D_cue8_mod %>%
 brm(F_4,
 family = Gamma(link = identity),
 data = .)
P_4 <- bind_rows(
 posterior(M_4_gau),
 posterior(M_4_gam),
 posterior(M_4_exg)
T_4_predict <- bind_rows(</pre>
 post_pred(M_4_gau, thin = 5),
 post_pred(M_4_gam, thin = 5),
 post_pred(M_4_exg, thin = 5)) %>%
 predict()
```

# fixef(P\_4)

model	fixef	center	lower	upper
$M_4$ _exg	Intercept	211.87	179.7	242.93
$M_4_{exg}$	Task2	-31.15	-44.6	-16.94
$M_4_exg$	Task3	-73.86	-86.9	-59.97
$M_4_exg$	Task4	-13.82	-26.0	-1.18
$M_4_exg$	Task5	-49.23	-62.0	-36.65
$M_4_{gam}$	Intercept	219.58	162.7	275.89
$M_4_{gam}$	Task2	-51.72	-71.5	-30.49
$M_4_{gam}$	Task3	-103.55	-122.4	-85.23
$M_4_{gam}$	Task4	9.84	-14.0	33.81
$M_4_{gam}$	Task5	-71.43	-90.5	-52.00
$M_4_{gau}$	Intercept	240.33	170.7	301.38
$M_4_{gau}$	Task2	-76.84	-103.2	-50.34
$M_4_{gau}$	Task3	-132.31	-158.9	-106.38

model	fixef	center	lower	upper
M_4_gau	Task4	-2.94	-29.7	22.16
$M_4_{gau}$	Task5	-93.21	-120.1	-67.02

# grpef(P\_4)

model	$re\_factor$	center	lower	upper
$M_4$ exg	Part	23.4	16.2	31.5
$M_4_exg$	Team	37.3	21.4	76.5
$M_4_{gam}$	Part	40.2	29.3	52.0
$M_4_{gam}$	Team	71.6	42.0	141.5
$M_4_gau$	Part	65.2	52.4	80.2
$M\_4\_gau$	Team	82.2	47.3	157.0

```
fixef(P_4) %>%
 ggplot(aes(y = fixef, x = center, xmin = lower, xmax = upper, color = model)) +
 geom_point(size = 2) +
 geom_errorbarh()
```

As with reaction times, the three models produce rather different fixed effects estimates and with the tendency that the Gaussian, followed by the gamma model, exaggerates the effects. Again, the exgaussian model produces estimates of superior certainty.

```
D_cue8_mod %>%
 left_join(T_4_predict) %>%
 mutate(resid = ToT - center) %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = resid, color = model)) +
 facet_wrap(~Task) +
 geom_density(adjust = 2)
```

Inspecting the residual distributions yields a different pattern as with RT: generally, the left skewness is much less pronounced and Gaussian and gamma even tend to be right skewed. Strikingly, the residuals of the exgaussian models sit much tighter around the center, which corresponds with the narrower credibility intervals for the fixed effects.

In general, it seems that the exgaussian model for RT and ToT accommodates left skewness better and produces estimates that are more conservative and

certain at the same time. Could it be true, that Gaussian and gamma models overestimate group mean differences for left skewed RT and ToT responses? We examine this possibility by simulating a well-known experiment using an exgaussian distribution.

```
sim_Stroop <- function(beta_0 = 500, # congruent</pre>
 beta_1 = 50, # neutral
 beta_2 = 120, # incongr
 sigma = 20,
 beta = 70,
 N = 400,
 # obs per condition
 seed = 42){
 set.seed(seed)
 data_frame(Condition = rep(c("con", "neu", "inc"), N),
 mu = beta_0 + beta_1 * (Condition == "neu") + beta_2 * (Condition == "inc"),
 RT = rexgaussian(N * 3, mu, sigma, beta)) %>%
 as_tbl_obs()
D_stroop <- sim_Stroop()</pre>
D_stroop %>%
 group_by(Condition) %>%
 summarize(mean(RT)) %>%
 kable()
```

Condition	mean(RT)
con	497
inc	619
neu	549

```
D_stroop %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = RT, col = Condition)) +
 geom_density()
```

In the same way as above, we recover the effects by three models that have the same likelihood, but differ in their response distribution.

```
F_stroop <- formula(RT ~ Condition)

M_stroop_gau <- D_stroop %>%
 brm(F_stroop,
 family = gaussian,
```

```
data = .)
M_stroop_exg <- D_stroop %>%
 brm(F_stroop,
 family = exgaussian,
 data = .)
M_stroop_gam <- D_stroop %>%
 brm(F_stroop,
 family = Gamma(link = identity),
 data = .)
P <- bind_rows(</pre>
 posterior(M_stroop_gau),
 posterior(M_stroop_gam),
 posterior(M_stroop_exg)
)
T_stroop_predict <- bind_rows(</pre>
 post_pred(M_stroop_gau, thin = 4),
 post_pred(M_stroop_gam, thin = 4),
 post_pred(M_stroop_exg, thin = 4)
) %>%
 predict()
fixef(P_stroop) %>%
 ggplot(aes(y = fixef, x = center, xmin = lower, xmax = upper, color = model)) +
 facet_wrap(~fixef, ncol = 1, scales = "free") +
 geom_point(size = 2) +
 geom_errorbarh()
```

What is confirmed by the simulation is that the exgaussian model, when it is the true one, produces more certain estimates.

```
D_stroop %>%
 left_join(T_stroop_predict) %>%
 mutate(resid = RT - center) %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = resid, color = model)) +
 facet_wrap(~Condition) +
 geom_density(adjust = 2) +
 xlim(-200, 350)
```

Different to what has been observed above, the shapes of the residual distributions do not differ much, except for a shift to the right. What could be accountable for that is that the simulation only contained three homogenous groups, rather than the many groups in the previous multi-level data sets (random factors). It remains to be clarified what precisely the biases and drags are caused by, ill-specified response distribution for RT or ToT in complex research designs. Despite these question marks, it has been confirmed that the superior certainty of estimates is not just an artifact of the exgaussian model, but is real and likely to make quantitative inference from RT and ToT data more efficient.

One last issue remains to get clarified: using the identity link for exgaussian models is very convenient and is probably much safer as compared to Gaussian models with their longer left tails. But, what risk is there to get impossible, i.e. negative, predictions? We check this on the posterior predictive distributions of both studies, CUE8 and Hugme. The following table shows the proportion observations, that get a negative 2.5% credibility limit assigned:

```
bind_rows(Hugme$T_1_predict, CUE8$T_4_predict) %>%
 group_by(model) %>%
 summarize(mean(lower < 0)) %>%
 kable()
```

model	mean(lower < 0)
M_1_exg	0.000
$M_1_{gam}$	0.000
M_1_gau	0.000
M_4_exg	0.029
$M_4$ gam	0.000
M_4_gau	0.714

For our RT data, impossible predictions is not a big issue with any of the models, as all 2.5% quantiles are positive. That is different for ToT: while the gamma model is inherently immune to negative predictions, the exgaussian model produced a few impossible lower 2.5% limits (around 3%). The Gaussian model is extremely off: more than 70% of all predictions have impossible lower 2.5% limits.

In the scientific literature, the coverage on what random pattern to use for RT and ToT data is meager at this moment. Probably, that is due to the lack of user-friendly engines supporting the more exotic GLM family members, gamma or exgaussian regression. The brms engine covers a much broader set of distributions than any other implementation before and researchers have the choice. This chapter attempted to provide theoretical arguments as well as empirical indications that the exgaussian regression is a better choice than

Gaussian and gamma. First of all, it accommodates the strong left skew of RT and ToT much better than the gamma, which takes a too symmetric form when far from the left boundary. Second, it is reasonably robust to impossible predictions, even when using the convenient identity link function. Third, and that is almost too good to be true, it massively improves certainty in predictors. Possibly, exgaussian models are more efficient for carving out delicate cognitive effects in comparison to Gaussian models (not to mention non-parametric tests).

However, as the discussion has not even fully started, to declare it settled would be premature. In contrast, the aim of this chapter was to illustrate a semi-formal approach that reseachers can follow to choose among the candidate models for their specific RT and ToT data. Data from other RT paradigms might take different shapes. For example, when measuring RT by events in EEG signals (rather than actual key presses), motor time plays a much smaller role, pushing RTs closer to the left boundary. Then, the exgaussian model might produce higher rates of impossible predictions and the gamma model could sufficiently accommodate the left skewness. Note that even using a log link on the exgaussian model can produce visits to the negative range. When both accommodate the left skew equally well, the gamma model is to be preferred as it never produces impossible predictions and is more parsimomous.

That being said, the brms engine offers even more opportunities. First, it supports two more distributions with an offset component: the shifted log-normal and the Wiener distribution. Interestingly, the latter grounds on one of the few formally specified cognitive process models, the diffusion model for simple choice tasks. All four parameters of the Wiener distribution are directly linked to individual elements of the cognitive process. This brings us to the second relevant extension of brms, which I will not fully cover, but is worth mentioning: distributional models. The vast majority of statistical analysis capitalizes on the location parameters. We ask whether an increase in a continuous predictor causes an increase in the outcome or if one group has a higher average than the other.

Only in the analysis of random effects have we drawn conclusions from dispersion parameters, such as to test Egans claim. In design research, the variance in performance is a crucial issue. To give another example: reportedly, several areas of cognitive functioning deteriorate with age, on average, but variance typically increases. It was the very idea of Dennis Egan that designs should not just improve performance on average, but also keep variance at a minimum. Hence, linking variance to predictors, such as design and age, can be a fruitful endeavour under the paradigm of robust designs. For RT the beforementioned Wiener distribution matches RTs in simple choice tasks and every parameter corresponds with an element in the so called diffusion model. In design research, such ideas are almost unexplored. Perhaps, one day a researcher finds

that the gaussian and the exponential component are influenced by different design features.

### 7.5.4 Literature

#### 7.5.5 Exercises:

- 1. Review the literature on reaction times. What is the shortest time length you can find?
- 2. The user can only do things one after the other and therefore, RT and ToT will never come close to zero. Conceive examples of independently triggered events that *happen* to users and effect user satisfaction.

# 7.6 Rating scales

In classic design research of the last millenium, die-hard Human Factors researchers have mainly been asking objectively sounding questions, like:

- Can a user achieve accurate results with the system?
- Can they do so in less time?
- Is the number of errors reasonably confined?

For professional, and especially critical, systems, these are highly valid questions, indeed. The purpose of a medical infusion pump is to improve the health status of a patient by accurately and reliably delivering medication into the bloodstream and the extent to which this can be measured directly.

However, starting with the 1990s, wave after wave of novel electronic entertainment systems and digital gadgets rolled over the comsumer mass market. The purpose of a video recorder or a smartphone is to deliver joy . . . and to be sold in large batches. The sole purpose of a commercial website is to sell and nothing else. With the new millenium, design researchers began to recognize what consumer psychologists had discovered two decades earlier: users are not rational decision makers in a utilitarian sense. When people decide to adopt (or buy) a new system, this is only partly driven by their expectation of productivity. These additional expectations are commonly called *hedonistic values* and cover a broad class of human needs, such as:

- positive emotions
- expression of self
- social connectedness

- aesthetic perception
- personal growth

Whether or not these concepts are well-defined from a psychological point-of-view is beyond the scope of this book. What matters is that these concepts are so elusive that the most sincere researchers have not yet found objective criteria to measure them. Instead, almost everyone resorts to use of *self-report rating scales*, like this one:

How beautiful do you perceive the user interface to be?

```
unattractive 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 a piece of art
```

If you use a 5 point rating scale like this one to measure perceived beauty, participants have to convert their gut feeling into a number, which involves the following three processes somewhere in their minds:

- 1. anchoring
- 2. introspection
- 3. binning

By anchoring participants establish an idea of how ugly or beautiful something has be to get an extreme rating of 1 or 5. These imaginary endpoints define the absolute range of the rating scale. The researcher might early on give explicit or implicit cues to let the participant guess the range the researcher has in mind. If an experiment is overtly about web design, then probably "very ugly" means the least attractive commercial website the participant can think of. However, participants old enough to remember web design in its infancy (say the early attempts of disney.com), may end up with a lower anchor than today's kids. If too few cues are given upfront, participants will probably adjust their anchors to the stimuli they see throughout the experiment. Probably, it will make a difference for what 1 or 5 mean, when the set of stimuli contain just websites, or websites and impressionist paintings and screenshots from 1980 splatter movies.

By *introspection* participants intuitively assess the intensity of their *real feelings* as compared to the anchors. Reportedly, feelings are influenced by:

- 1. visual simplicity
- 2. prototypicality
- 3. second exposure
- 4. Gestalt principles
- 5. fluency of processing
- 6. attribute substitution heuristics
- 7. color aesthetics
- 8. fashion

- 9. previous stimuli
- 10. current mood
- 11. a person's history
- 12. and cultural background

By binning the participant mentally divides the absolute range into five categories that are either fuzzy or defined by stereotypes, like "It must look at least as elegant as a certain other website to get a 4."

As the outcome of anchoring, introspection and binning are not under the control of the researcher, the response patterns can vary between participants. Let's consider a few possible patterns of participants (and their dramatic stories):

- 1. A is undecisive and stays in the center region
- 2. B has a crush on the experimenter and responds slightly more positive
- 3. C politely avoids the negative extremes
- 4. D is a human rights activist and habitually treats the seven bins equally.
- 5. E is annoyed by the experiment (rightly so) and falls into a dichotomous response pattern: 1 or 5
- 6. F is a surrealist and has a completely unique way to "look at things".

Many unkowns are in the game. Only one special case we can alleviate with the multilevel modelling tools in our hands. Anchoring can (but not necessarily does) result in a constant *shift* between participants. Compare participants A and B: A collects almost all stimuli in categories 2, 3 and 4, whereas B uses 3, 4 and 5. This is not much else than a participant-level intercept random effect. Unfortunately, the situation can be more difficult than that. When participants differ in how extreme they set their endpoints, like C and D, than their responses will differ in variance. The maximum variance, however, will be found in participant E.

To speak of a real case: In the IPump study, a single-item rating scale was used to measure mental workload. The results suggest that all participants used the lower range of the scale, but differed vastly in where they set their upper point. Figure XY orders participants by the maximum value they used. This is obviously related to variance, but seemingly not so much with location. It does not suffice to use a response distribution with mean-variance relationship, as we used to. All these issues make rating scales peculiar and we should not pretend they have the same neat arithmetic properties as objective measures.

```
attach(IPump)

D_pumps %>%
 group_by(Part) %>%
```

```
detach(IPump)
```

Setting the idiosyncratic rating scale responses aside, how does a common rating scale appear in our framework of link functions and patterns of randomness? Rating scales are bounded on two sides and we already know what that means: a suitable model for rating scales will likely contain a logit link function and a distribution of randomness that is bounded on two sides.

A real problem with rating scales is that they often are discrete. Most scales force participants to give their answer as a choice between five or seven ordered levels. When the response variable has just a few levels, *ordinal regression* is a good choice. Ordinal regression itself is a generalization of logistic regression.

However, with most properly designed self-report instruments, a scale comprises several items, because only that can sufficiently reduce measurement error and allow for in-depth psychometric assessments. Take the well-known Cronbach  $\alpha$ , which assesses reliability of a scale by correlating every items score with the sum score. Obviously, that only makes sense when there are multiple items. While from a psychometric perspective, single-item scales are susceptible, there can be situations where a researcher may use a validated single item scale for pragmatic reasons. Especially, when measures happen in situ, such as during a usability test or even a real operation, being brief and unobtrusive might be more important than good quality of measures.

With multi-item rating scales, one also has the possibility to build a psychometric multi-level model, where items are considered a sample of a population of possible items. That is actually a very good idea, as the item-level random effects control for differences in item location. For example, the following item is likely to produce generally lower beauty ratings than the one shown earlier, because the anchors have been moved downwards:

How beautiful do you perceive the user interface?

like a screenshot from a splatter movie 1-2-3-4-5 quite attractive

Unless one builds such a psychometric multi-level model, ordinal regression is not very suitable for multi-item scales and here is why: The sum (or mean) score is still binned, but more finely grained. A sum score over three sevenbinned items already has 21 bins, which would result in an inflation of number of parameters in ordinal regression.

As a rescue, one might well regard a measure with 21 bins as continuous. Furthermore, there actually is no strong reason to use binned rating scales at all. So called *visual analog scales* let participants make continuous choices by either drawing a cross on a line or move a slider control. For sum scores and visual analogue scales, the problem of choice reduces to a logit link function (they still have two boundaries) and a continuous distribution bounded on both sides. That is precisely what is behind *beta regression* and, as we shall see, this distribution is flexible enough to smooth over several of the rating scale pathologies that were just discussed.

## 7.6.1 Ordered logistic regression

When the ordinal response has a low number of response categories (between 4 and 7), ordinal regression applies. Recall logistic regression: the response falls into one of two categories, which are coded as 0 and 1. Although not in a strict sense, the two categories can often be thought of as in an order: success is better than failure, presence more than absence and a return better than bailing out. Instead of two categories, we can also conceive the situation as a threshold between the categories, that needs force to jump over it. Any positive impact factor  $x_i$  can then be thought of as such a force that pushes a response probability to the higher category, by the amount  $\beta_i$  (on logit scale). At the same time, the intercept  $\beta_0$  represents the basic log-odds of falling into category 1 in a default state, that is  $x_i = 0$ .

In ordinal regression, this idea extends to cases with more than two ordered response categories. The only arising complication is that with two categories, we have one *threshold* to overcome, whereas with three categories there are two thresholds and generally, with c categories, there are c-1 thresholds. Ordinal regression deals with the problem by estimating c-1 intercept estimates  $\beta_{0[k]}$ . Each threshold intercept  $\beta_{0[k]}$  represents the probability (on logit scale) that the response falls into category k or lower, or formally:

$$logit(P(y_i \le k)) = \beta_{0[k]}$$

Let's see this at the example of the BrowsingAB case, first. User ratings have been simulated with seven levels:

attach(BrowsingAB)

```
BAB1 %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = rating)) +
 facet_grid(Design~.) +
 geom_histogram() +
 xlim(1,7)
```

The brms regression engine implements ordinal regression by the family cratio (cumulative odds ratio ) with a default logit link function.

```
M_ord_1 <-
BAB1 %>%
brm(rating ~ Design,
 family = "cratio",
 data = .)
```

```
fixef(M_ord_1)
```

fixef	center	lower upper
NA	-12.753	-47.631 -5.870
NA	-12.979	-53.096 -5.817
NA	-4.087	-4.999 -3.260
NA	-2.263	-2.825 -1.802
NA	-1.118	-1.566 -0.744
NA	1.322	$0.847 \ 1.924$
DesignB	-0.865	-1.339 -0.443

The six intercepts correspond with the thresholds between the seven levels. It is no coincidence that the intercept estimates increase by order, as they are cumulative (the "c" in cratio). The first intercept estimate represents (the logit of) the proportion of responses  $y_i \leq 1$ , the second  $y_i \leq 2$  etc. The Design effect has the usual interpretation as compared to logistic regression, an increase in logit. The only difference is that it refers to all six reference points. The expected proportion of responses equal to or smaller than 2 for design A is:

$$\pi(y_i \le 2|A) = \text{logit}^{-1}(\beta_{0[2]}) = \text{logit}^{-1}(-13) = 2.26 \times 10^{-6}$$

The expected proportion of responses equal to or smaller than 2 for design B we get by the usual linear combination:

$$\pi(y_i \le 2|B) = \text{logit}^{-1}(\beta_{0[2]} + \beta_1) = \text{logit}^{-1}(-13.9) = 9.19 \times 10^{-7}$$

All coefficients are shifting all thresholds by the same amount (on the linear predictor scale). You can picture this as a single puppetier controlling multiple puppets by just one stick, making them dance synchronously. As long as the ordinal scale has only a low number of bins, that keeps the number of parameters at a reasonable level. Just imagine, you were estimating an ordinal multilevel model and all participant-level effects were five or sevenfolded, too. However, the equidistancy of effects on bin thresholds is an assumption by itself, and in the presence of response styles on rating scales, it cannot be taken for granted .

Besides that, the ordinal model appears very snug to the structure of the data. It does not wipe over the fact that the response is discrete and the thresholds represent the order. Conveniently, effects are represented by a single estimate, which one can use to communicate direction and certainty of effects. On the downside, communicating absolute performance (that is, including the intercept) is more complicated. When presenting predictions from an ordinal model one actually has to present all thresholds, rather than a single mean. In practice that probably is less relevant than one might think at first, because predictions on self-report scales is less useful than metric performance data. Ordinal data also does not lend itself so much to further calculations. For example, you can use ToT measures on infusion pumps in calculating the required staffing of an intensive care unit, because seconds are metric and can be summed and divided. In contrast, it does not make sense to calculate the cognitive workload of a team of nurses by summing their self-report scores. The only possibility is to compare the strengths of predictors, but that does not require predictions.

detach(BrowsingAB)

# 7.6.2 Beta regression

One of the most futile discussions in methodology research to my mind is whether one should use a four, five or seven binned Likert scale. From a pure measurement point of view, more bins give better resolution, the ultimate consequence being not to bin at all, that is using continuous rating scales. At the same time, many rating responses come from multiple item scales, which multiplies the number of bins. Speaking of ordinal regression, it seems reasonable to have seven intercepts for a single item scale, but who would want 14 or 21 for a two or three-item scale? And most scales have more items than that, which is good from a psychometric perspective.

In fact, psychometric research in the process of developing rating scales routinely uses a method called *confirmatory factor analysis*, which derives from

the Gaussian linear model and inherits its assumptions. Not surprisingly, most research applying the very same instruments also use plain linear models. It seems fair enough to take a multi-item scale as a continuous measure, but given the framework of GLM, it is unnecessary (to put it mildly) to go along with the assumptions of Normality and linearity. While the link function for a double bounded response variable is simply the logit, the only missing ingredient is a double bounded error distribution. Enter beta distribution!

We demonstrate beta regression on rating scales at the example of the CUE8 study. This study aimed at assessing whether remote usability testing arrives at the same ToT measures as in moderated sessions. As we have seen in [CROSSREF], the difference is marginal. But, rating scales are susceptible for all kinds of cognitive and social biases. For that reason, a golden rule for user test moderators is to constantly remind participants to not blame themselves for errors. Reportedly, test moderators also do help participants (after counting to 10) in order to minimize frustration (and maximize information flow). What could the presence or absence of a moderator do to satisfaction ratings? Perhaps, remote participants feel the lack of assurance and support as higher levels of frustration. Furthermore, it is not unlikely that satisfaction ratings are sensitive to idiosyncratics in the process and setting of the user test, such that we could even expect differences between teams.

Before we build the model, there are two issues to regard: First, the boundaries are 0 and 1, which requires a rescaling of responses into this interval. The SUS scores are on a scale from 0 to 100 and a divisor of 100 would produce the desired interval. Second, the responses must actually lie *strictly between 0 and 1*, excluding the boundaries. On (quasi)continuous scales, it seems not very likely to have 0 or 1 as response, but it can happen. Indeed, participants in the CUE8 study have responded with a satisfaction rating of 100 quite often.

A practical solution is to scale the responses in such a way as to avoid the two boundaries, which is what the following hack does.

- 1. add a tiny value to all responses
- 2. create a divisor by adding twice that value to the maximum value the responses can take
- 3. divide all responses by that divisor

You may find it inappropriate to mangle a response variable in such an arbitrary way. However, keep in mind that the levels of ordinal responses are highly arbitrary. In terms of measurement theory, all transformations that maintain the order are permitted for ordinal scales. For the following analysis, the data set was further reduced by averaging the scores across tasks and excluding probable cheaters with a ToT < 30s.

M\_5\_bet

```
M_5_bet <-
D_cue8_SUS %>%
brm(SUS ~ Condition + (1 | Team),
 family = Beta(link = "logit"), iter = 0, chains = 1,
 data = .)

M_5_bet <-
D_cue8_SUS %>%
brm(fit = M_5_bet, data = .)

sync_CE(M_5_bet, Env = CUE8)
```

```
Family: beta
Links: mu = logit; phi = identity
Formula: SUS ~ Condition + (1 | Team)
Data: . (Number of observations: 363)
Samples: 4 chains, each with iter = 2000; warmup = 1000; thin = 1;
total post-warmup samples = 4000
##
Group-Level Effects:
~Team (Number of levels: 7)
Estimate Est.Error 1-95% CI u-95% CI Eff.Sample Rhat
```

```
sd(Intercept)
 0.81
 0.39
 0.34
 1.95
 297 1.02
##
Population-Level Effects:
##
 Estimate Est.Error 1-95% CI u-95% CI Eff.Sample Rhat
 0.79
 0.52
 -0.51
 1.78
 385 1.00
Intercept
Conditionmoderated
 -0.34
 0.70
 -1.70
 1.11
 967 1.00
##
##
 Family Specific Parameters:
##
 Estimate Est.Error 1-95% CI u-95% CI Eff.Sample Rhat
 3362 1.00
 4.13
 0.30
 3.56
 4.74
##
 phi
##
Samples were drawn using sampling(NUTS). For each parameter, Eff.Sample
is a crude measure of effective sample size, and Rhat is the potential
scale reduction factor on split chains (at convergence, Rhat = 1).
```

### fixef(M\_5\_bet)

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	0.,00	-0.506	1.78
Conditionmoderated		-1.699	1.11

### grpef(M\_5\_bet)

type	fixef	re_	factor	center	lower	upper
grpef	Intercept	Tea	am	0.71	0.344	1.95

Do participants in remote sessions feel less satisfied? There seems to be a slight disadvantage, but we cannot confirm this with sufficient certainty. In contrast, the variation between teams is substantial, which indicates that SUS ratings are not independent of the particular setting. That is rather concerning for a widely used and allegedly validated rating scale.

Is that a realistic model for the SUS responses? Another glance at the violin plot suggests another pathology: the teams seem to differ in variation. In the closing section I will briefly demonstrate how to deal with differences in variance (rather than mean) by a distributional model.

### 7.6.3 Distributional models

The framework of GLM, as flexible as it has proven to be up to this point, has one major limitation: it renders the relationship between predictors and

the location of the response. We only think in terms of impact factors that improve (or damage) average response times, error rates, satisfaction ratings etc. one would think that multi-level models deal with variance to a large extent, and they do. But, they only give us the variance of a certain effect on a set of objects. That is absolutely not the same as asking: "Do teams in CUE8 differ in the variation of responses?".

That brings me to the final feature of modern regression modelling in the scope of this book: GLMs greatly enhanced the scope of modelling by giving us the choice of response distributions and linearizing functions. Still, all models introduced so far establish an association between predictors and the expected value  $\mu$ , only. However, all but the one-parameter distributions come with additional parameters that capture a family of distributions in its whole variety of shapes. Strong variance can become a real problem, because this implies that extremely poor performance becomes more likely. Under the perspectives of safety in hazardous environments and universal usability, variance is a crucial parameter by itself. We should track carefully, that an improvement on average is not accompanied by more variance (other than the mean-variance relationship prescribed by the error distribution).

As a first illustration, imagine two versions of a continuous rating scale for visual beauty that differ in how their extreme levels are labelled:

- like the ugliest website I have ever seen: 0 ——— 1 like the most beautiful website
- 2. distgusting as a screenshot from a splatter movie: 0 ——— 1 like the most beautiful sunset I have seen

The second scale has the lower and upper anchors moved to more extremes. Two questions arise:

- 1. Is the overall location of the scale untouched, that is, have both anchors been moved by the same distance outwards?
- 2. What range do websites cover as compared to all thinkable visual impressions?

For the sake of simplicity (not for a strong research design), let us assume that one participant has rated a randomized sample of 100 websites in two conditions: narrow anchoring and wide anchoring. The following simulates data as if there were just a minor positive shift of the wider condition, accompanied by an immense up-scaling.

```
set.seed(42)
N = 100
```

The two conditions have about the same location, but a more narrow anchoring produces a wider dispersion of responses. How would we confirm this statistically?

Models that contain predictors linked to any distribution parameter other than  $\mu$  are called distributional models and have only recently been implemented in the brms engine. They have an immense potential as they relax another assumption of GLM, namely that all parameters but  $\mu$  are constant across observations or follow the mean-variance relationship. Here we aim to estimate the difference in variance by experimental condition.

The brms engine uses a parametrization of the beta distribution (other than the more common a, b parametrization), where  $\mu$  is the location and phi is a *scale* parameter. Take great care: "scale" does not refer to dispersion itself. Rather, it is comparable to the number of trials in a binomial process. The more trials there are, the tighter the distribution becomes, *relative* to the boundaries:

```
plot_rbinom <- function(N, size, p) {
 data_frame(succ = rbinom(N, size, p)) %>%
 ggplot(aes(x = succ)) +
 geom_histogram(bins = size + 1) +
 xlim(0, size)
}
```

```
plot_rbinom(1000, 10, .5)
```

```
plot_rbinom(1000, 50, .5)
```

In effect, increasing  $\phi$  results in reduced dispersion and accordingly, when used in a distributional model, positive effects decrease variance and negative ones increase variance. This all works on top of to the mean-variance relationship of the beta distribution.

When estimating dispersion or scale parameters, we have to regard that these are positive, strictly. When linking a linear term to such a parameter, predictions are generated for the variance and these should never become negative. The brms engine simply extends the principle of link functions to parameters other than the  $\mu$  and sets a default log link for  $\phi$ . In order to estimate the changes in  $\mu$  and  $\phi$  simultaneously, the brms engine receives two regression formulas, which is done by the command bf().

The coefficient table shows the effect of anchoring on both parameters of the response distribution: the widely anchored item produces slightly less favorable ratings, but dramatically reduces on dispersion.

```
fixef(M_beta)
```

fixef	center	lower	upper
Intercept	-0.318	-0.544	-0.095
NA	1.630	1.247	1.986
Anchoringwide	-0.529	-0.788	-0.274
NA	1.504	0.968	2.023

Back to the CUE8 study. Do teams differ in how much variance arises, as the violin plot suggests? Before we test this by a distributional model, recall once again the principle of the mean-variance relation. Beta distributions have variance tied to the mean in much the same way as binomial distributions. When moving along the range between 0 and 1, variance is largest in the center and decreases towards the boundaries. That does not seem to be the case in CUE8. Compare the distributions of Teams B and K to H and L. They all are close to the upper boundary, but show inflated variance. It could be the case, that somehow some teams trigger more extreme responses, inflating variance. The following model tests the effect of testing condition and teams on the location and dispersion of responses simultaneously.

```
T_fixef <-
brms::fixef(M_6_bet)[,c(1,3,4)] %>%
as_data_frame(rownames = "fixef") %>%
dplyr::rename(center = Estimate)
T_fixef
```

fixef	center		
Intercept	0.751	-0.247	1.86
phi_Intercept	1.087	-0.632	1.88
Conditionmoderated	-0.211	l	
phi_Conditionmoderated	0.701	-0.277	2.82

The default behaviour of brm is that the scale parameter  $\phi$  is on a log scale. As usual, lifting it to original scale by exponentiation makes it a multiplier. By  $\exp(0.701) = 2.015$ , we see that there is just a small difference between the two conditions. But, are there other differences between teams? The following table shows the scale multipliers for individual teams. All multipliers are closely

arranged around 1, which means there is little differences. The SUS scale can safely be adminstsred in remote and moderated usability testing.

```
T_ranef <-
 ranef(M_6_bet) %>%
 filter(nonlin == "phi") %>%
 mutate_if(is.numeric, exp) %>%
 discard_redundant()
T_ranef
```

$re_{-}$	_entity center	lower	upper
A3	0.830	0.323	1.32
B3	0.965	0.384	1.71
H3	0.967	0.485	6.75
К3	1.151	0.720	2.95
L3	1.029	0.608	7.78
M3	1.112	0.669	9.87
N3	1.015	0.573	2.41

```
detach(CUE8)
```

### 7.6.4 Exercises

1. The IPump study took repeated measure of workload on a one-item quasicontinuous rating scale. Examine the effect of training and Design on workload. Then take a closer look at how participants used the scale. Build a distributional model.

# 7.7 Robust Models

```
attach(Egan)
M_1
```

```

 ##
 Median MAD_SD
 ## (Intercept) 4.0
 ##
 ## Auxiliary parameter(s):
 ##
 Median MAD_SD
 ## sigma 0.6
 0.0
 ##
 ## Error terms:
 ## Groups Name
 Std.Dev.
 ## Design:Task (Intercept) 0.58
 ## Part (Intercept) 0.30
 (Intercept) 0.74
(Intercept) 0.14
 ## Task
 ## Design
 ## Residual
 0.63
 ## Num. levels: Design:Task 99, Part 41, Task 10, Design 10
 ## Sample avg. posterior predictive distribution of y:
 ##
 Median MAD_SD
 ## mean_PPD 4.0
 0.0
 ##
 ## ----
 ## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
 ## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg
insight::find_formula(M_1)
 ## $conditional
 ## logToT ~ 1
 ## <environment: 0x00000000859e9a20>
 ##
 ## $random
 ## $random[[1]]
 ## ~1 | Part
 ## <environment: 0x000000008596d0d0>
 ##
 ## $random[[2]]
 ## ~1 | Design
 ## <environment: 0x0000000859678e8>
 ##
 ## $random[[3]]
 ## ~1 | Task
 ## <environment: 0x000000085962100>
 ##
 ## $random[[4]]
```

```
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~1 | Design:Task
<environment: 0x000000008595c918>

M_1_t <-
D_egan %>%
mutate(logToT = log(ToT)) %>%
brm(formula(M_1), family = "student", data = .)
ls(Egan)
```

```
[1] "D_egan" "M_1" "M_tot_exg" "P_1"
```